Jan.23 PM Best Bar Reviewer

#Best_Bar_Reviewer
CRIMINAL LAW
A. Basic Principles
• GENERAL PRINCIPLES
• Mens rea means to have "a guilty mind." The rationale behind the rule is that it is wrong for
society to punish those who innocently cause harm.
• Actus reus literally means "guilty act," and generally refers to an overt act in furtherance of a
crime.
• While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. “Ignorantia
facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.”
• The rule that in all criminal prosecutions the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is based obviously upon broad principles of humanity which forbid the infliction
of punishment until the commission of the crime is established to a reasonable certainty.
• Pro reo - The fundamental principle in interpreting and applying penal laws is the principle of
pro reo. The phrase “in dubio pro reo” means “when in doubt, for the accused.” (Intestate Estate of
Gonzales v. People, GR 181409, Feb.11, 2010). This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.
• We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the evidence on an issue
of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction.
(Amanquiton v. People, GR 186080, Aug. 14, 2009)
• TERRITORIALITY - For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the place of commission of the
criminal act and the place of occurrence of the effect of such act, which is an element of the offense,
shall be considered. If one pulled the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in City
of Manila, who died as a consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which are the places of
commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are proper venues.
• If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity punishable under RA No. 9262 is
committed in Singapore but the psychological effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of
the respondent, who suffered mental anguish, is residing in the Philippines, our court can assume
jurisdiction (see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January 11, 2018). However, if the commission of
the criminal act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is not an element thereof, the place
of occurrence of the effect shall not be considered for purpose of venue and territoriality rule.
Bigamy committed in Singapore is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended
spouse is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy to her is not an
element thereof.
• Under the English Rule, which our jurisdiction recognizes and follows, crimes committed aboard
a vessel within the territorial waters of a country are triable in the courts of such country, except
when the crimes merely affect things within the vessel, or when they only refer to the internal
management thereof.
• Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the flag state of
a foreign merchant vessel passing through the 12-mile territorial sea of another state has
jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can
exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if
its consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good
order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a diplomatic or consular officer of the flag
State requested assistance from the local authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
pg. 1 #Best_Bar_Reviewer Dodie D. Lagarto, JD, MBA

• Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel anchored in a Philippine port
against a passenger thereof is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime
disturb the peace of the country.
• GENERALITY - Stated differently, it is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, regardless of nationality, gender, or other personal circumstances, the only
exception to its application are those expressly provided for under treaty stipulations or those
expressly provided under laws of preferential application.
• Under Article 14 of the Civil Code, penal laws shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
the Philippine territory. This is the generality principle. Hence, a person regardless of his
citizenship, religion, political position or any other status can be criminally prosecuted and
convicted as long as he is living or sojourning in the territory of the Philippines.
• PROSEPECTIVITY - The prohibition of ex post facto law has been unquestionably known as
applicable only to laws or statutes which are penal in nature. (Geronimo v. COMELEC, 107 SCRA
614)
• As a general rule penal laws will generally have prospective application except where the new
law will be advantageous to the accused. (People v. Avecilla, 351 SCRA 635)
• The presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is
clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive application of the laws. (Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA
635)
• MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA - Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts
wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact
that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita." This distinction is important with
reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts
mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. (Estrella vs. People, G.R.
No. 212942, June 17, 2020)
• Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account
of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
• Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended (Art.4 of RPC)
• Attempt to commit suicide although an intentional act is not constitutive of a felony. According
to Luis B. Reyes, “a person who attempts to commit suicide is not criminally liable, because the
society has always considered a person who attempts to kill herself as an unfortunate being, a
wretched person more deserving of pity rather than of penalty.”
• In the case of Intod v. CA, GR 103119, October 21, 1992, the SC ruled that when factual
impossibility occurs because extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor were beyond his
control, rendering the intended crime impossible of accomplishment, the offense committed is
impossible crime. (Art.4(2), RPC)
• An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means. The crime of impossible crime is applicable only to crimes
against person or property.
• The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1. that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2. that the act was done with evil intent; and
3. that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
• ABERRATIO ICTUS – If the crimes committed against the target victim and third person, who
was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a single act, the accused is liable for a

complex crime. Thus, single act of throwing a grenade killing one and injuring another
constitutes a complex crime of murder and attempted murder. (People v. Julio Guillen, G.R. No.
L-1477, January 18, 1950; People vs. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020) However, the
accused is liable for separate crimes despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, and not a
complex crime in the following cases:
1. If the bullet that killed the target victim is different from the bullet that killed the
third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909,
June 23, 2000; People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015; Cruz vs. People, G.R. No.
216642, September 8, 2020);
2. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio
ictus, is merely a light felony such as slight physical injuries (People v. Violin, G.R. Nos.
114003-06, January 14, 1997);
3. If the components of a complex crime are alleged in two different information. (People
v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014);
4. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio
ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special law (Patulot vs. People,
G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) Components of complex crime must be felonies.
B. Justifying, Exempting, Mitigating, Aggravating, and Alternative Circumstances
• CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
• JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
• SELF-DFENSE – Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means
an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that
is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver
at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his
right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or
like aiming to throw a pot. (Ganal, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020)
• For the first element of unlawful aggression to be present, jurisprudence dictates that there must
be an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. It
presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not merely threatening and
intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
one’s life. (Sombol v. People, 695 SCRA 630)
• Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
• Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening;
it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening
attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. (Rustia v. People, GR 208351,
Oct.5, 2016)
• Shooting the leg of the victim without killing him may be a reasonable means to prevent or repel
an actual or imminent unlawful aggression; hence, self-defense is not confined to consummated
killing.
• The relatives of the accused for purpose of defense of relative under Article 11(2) of RPC are his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
Relative by affinity within the same degree includes the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister
of the spouse of the accused.
• Under the RPC, a person who depends a person who is not his relative may invoke the defense
of a stranger provided that all its elements exist, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable

necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (c) the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
• There is incomplete self-defense because A proved that it was the victim who first attacked him
and did so without provocation on his part. There is, however, no reasonable necessity of the
means employed to defend himself, after A used a knife to stab the weaponless victim. There are
also no aggravating circumstances present, because it was not shown that A disregarded the age
of the victim or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime; moreover, dwelling cannot
be appreciated because the crime happened in the house where both A and the victim lived.
• EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTNACES
• INSANITY - The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or avoidance because an
accused invoking it admits to have committed the crime but claims that he should not be
criminally liable therefor because of insanity, which is an exempting circumstance. Consequently,
the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction
is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt. An accused invoking the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence
because every person is presumed sane. For the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven
that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence, which must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. (People vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018)
• In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence ;and (2) such complete
deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of
the offense. The defense failed to prove its plea of insanity under the requirements set by law.
Although accused underwent out-patient consultation for his diagnosed condition of
schizophrenia from August 2006 until 13 June 2009, this evidence of insanity may be accorded
weight only if there is also proof of abnormal psychological behavior immediately before or
simultaneous with the commission of the crime (on November 9, 2009). The evidence on the
alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of execution. (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019)
• The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking
the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
such insanity. (People v. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597)
• To be exempting from criminal responsibility, insanity is the complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not exempt from
criminal responsibility. (People v. Haloc, GR 227312, Sept. 05, 2018)
• IMBECILITY AND MINORITY – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental age is
two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose
mental age is twelve-year old and (d) borderline intelligence. (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932,
October 19, 2011; People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012; People vs. Gilles, G.R. No.
229860, March 21, 2018
• In exempting circumstance, there is a difference between actual age and mental age. In exempting
circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose
mental age is 2 years, and imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No.
168932, October 19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose
mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability since he is not an imbecile (People
vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is entitled to mitigating circumstance of
mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950). In exempting
circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological
or actual age of the accused. If the actual age of the accused is 18 years old and mental age is 9
years old, the exempting circumstance of minority and imbecility shall not be appreciated because
he is neither a minor nor an imbecile (People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014).
• A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced
him to mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. (People v. Fieldad,
737 SCRA 455)

• MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
• PASSION - There is no uniform rule on what constitutes a considerable length of time. The
provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length
of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on
the consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet
"recovered his normal equanimity" when he committed the crime. Passion and obfuscation as a
mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds before the commission of the crime.
It may build up and strengthen over time until it can no longer be repressed and will ultimately
motivate the commission of the crime. (People vs. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015, Justice
Leonen)
• Length of service is not a magic phrase that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of the party invoking it. (Office of the Omd.-Mindoro v. Martel,
819 SCRA 525)
• Jurisprudence replete with cases declaring that a grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact
that the accused is a first time offender or by the length of service of the accused. (Bondoc v.
Mantala, 740 SCRA 311)
• For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused
must neither be “habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit a felony” (Bacerra v. People, 829
SCRA 525)
• Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is always considered as a modifying
circumstance is always considered as a modifying circumstance in the imposition of penalty of a
child in conflict with the law.
• Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity. (Bacerra
v. People, 829 SCRA 525)
• Surrender is not voluntary where the accused went to Barangay Chairman after the killings to
seek protection against the retaliation of the victim’s relatives. As such, accused did not
unconditionally submit himself to the authorities in order to acknowledge his participation in the
killings or in order to save the authorities the trouble and expense for his arrest. Surrender is not
mitigating. (People v. Del Castillo, GR 169084, Jan.18, 2012)
• A privileged mitigating circumstance when present in the commission of a crime shall affect the
imposition of the penalty as to degree. Such circumstance is present only in certain offenses and
also refers to the circumstances of the offender in a crime against person particularly in self-
defense when all the circumstances to justify self-defense are not present. The accused is entitled
to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• If the offending party is a minor and such minority is present at the time the crime was
committed, the same shall likewise be considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• When the crime committed is attended by two or more ordinary mitigating circumstance and
there is the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, and the
crime committed is a divisible penalty, such ordinary mitigating circumstances will also be
considered a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
• There are new guidelines on how to allege aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the
Information. In cases where law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which may
exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident
premeditation; (4) cruelty, alleging in the information the name of the modifying circumstance
e.g. treachery is not enough. The information must state the ultimate facts relative to such
circumstance e.g. alleging that the accused surreptitiously stabbed the victim at his back to
ensure that he cannot defend himself. In case of failure to comply with the rule on allegation of
ultimate facts, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of
particulars. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his
right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the
Information, and consequently, the same may be appreciated against him if proven during trial.
Alternatively, prosecutors may sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or
aggravating circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding

probable cause against the accused, which resolution should be attached to the Information.
(People vs. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019)
• The Information for murder alleged that the killing of the victim is qualified by the circumstances
of treachery and abuse of superior strength. This information is defective since the prosecution
failed to allege facts on which treachery and abuse of super strength are based. (The prosecution
to comply with Solar principle may allege that accused to render the victim defenseless
surreptitiously stabbed in at his back) It was held that: Accused did not question the supposed
insufficiency of the Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for
bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with
the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances.
(People vs. Solar, supra)
• Justice Bersamin in his dissenting opinion said that the accused had no duty or obligation to
remind the State by motion to quash (or motion for bill of particular) on what charge he should
be made to answer to. The information did not charge murder, but only homicide. Justice Leonen
joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Bersamin. (People vs. Solar, supra)
• Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance if the accused purposely uses excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes advantage
of superior strength. (People v. Del Castillo, GR 169084, Jan.18, 2012)
• If the victim is completely defenseless, treachery should be appreciated. When the circumstance
of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. (People
v. Rebucan, GR 182551, July 27, 2011)
• Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law
or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall
not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. The same rule shall apply
with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must
be necessity accompany the commission thereof. Aggravating circumstances which arise from
the moral attributes of the offender shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant (Art.62 of RPC) Hence,
aggravating circumstance involving moral attributes should be taken into consideration in
increasing the penalty to be imposed upon the convict.
• There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
• Dwelling is aggravating because the crimes were committed in the privacy of A’s room which in
law is considered as her dwelling. It is well settled that “dwelling” includes a room in a boarding
house being occupied by the offended party where she enjoys privacy, peace of mind and sanctity
of an abode.
• Nocturnity or nighttime is also aggravating because although it was not purposely or especially
sought for by A, nighttime was obviously taken advantaged of by him in committing the other
crimes. Under the objective test, nocturnity is aggravating when taken advantaged of by the
offender during the commission of the crime thus facilitating the same.
• The aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be factored in because there was no showing
that Calinawan especially sought the same or took advantage of it, or that it had facilitated the
commission of the crime by insuring his immunity from identification or capture. (People v.
Calinawan, 817 SCRA 424)
• ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
• While it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes
against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of
the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Art.15 of the RPC, “when the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.” (People v. Barcela, 723 SCRA 647)

• Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
• The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse
and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship
by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the
death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people
and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties.
• This view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
• First, Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332 (1) is meant to be beneficial to
relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity
view is more appropriate.
• Second, the language of Article 332 (1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is
couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of
one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) can be drawn from Article 332 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
• Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to
strengthen the solidarity of the family. Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy
that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. In this connection, the spirit of Article 332
is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.
• Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless
and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the
court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that its prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.
• Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an
absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332 (1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should
adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
• Thus, for purposes of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one's relatives under Article 11 [2] of the
Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one's relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause
of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.) Intestate Estate of
Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010
C. Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
• INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
• Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term is that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC. The basis for fixing the
minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not the imposable penalty.

• The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein
which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty".
For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión
temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code
provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a
felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus
modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty". In the case of homicide which is committed
with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable
penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this
imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which
is the "penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve. People v.
Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008
• An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year or less, and
the maximum exceeds one year.
• For example, the trial court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, since the
maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the trial court opts to impose a
penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but
a straight penalty of one year or less instead. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25,
2005
• If the offense is punished by a special law, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this
law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same law.
• Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law such as R.A.
3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this law, and the minimum term shall not be
less than the minimum prescribed by the same law. The penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years,
perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to
his salary and other lawful income." Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month
as minimum to 15 years as maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is within
the range fixed by law. Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 189343, 189369 & 189553, July 10,
2013
• The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum of term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the RPC, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law
(special law), the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same (Sec.1, ISL)
• Under the second part of the ISL, in cases where the offense is punishable under special law, the
maximum indeterminate penalty shall not exceed the maximum limit of the prescribed penalty
while the minimum penalty shall not be less than the minimum limit thereof. However, if the
special law adopts the technical nomenclature of the penalties of RPC, the provision of the RPC
will apply. Consequently, there will be an application of Art.64 of RPC. The maximum penalty
shall be fixed within the range of the proper imposable period after taking into consideration the
modifying circumstance; while the minimum penalty shall be fixed within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law. (People v. Simon, GR 93028, July 29, 1994)
• Since he was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with one aggravating circumstance of
recidivism, this aggravating circumstances is offset by one of the three mitigating circumstances;
so the penalty to be imposed is still reclusion temporal (Art.342, RPC) but because there are 2
more mitigating circumstances left and the penalty is divisible, in determining the maximum
term, it should be reduced to prision mayor and because there is no more mitigating and
aggravating circumstances to be considered, the maximum term should be prision mayor in its

medium period, that is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. The minimum term shall be any range
within that is from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.
• The court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, except where the imposable penalty is one (1)
year or less, determine two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Law as the
“maximum” and “minimum” terms.
• The ISL is applicable even to special laws. Since life imprisonment was converted into reclusion
perpetua, which in turn was graduated to reclusion temporal, the ISL is applicable (People v.
Montalaba, GR 186227, July 20, 2011)
• Under the ISL the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the of RPC. The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend
to limit “attending circumstances” as referring to Arts.13 & 14 of the RPC. If the legislature
intended that the “attending circumstances” under the ISL be limited to Arts.13 & 14, then it
could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other modifying
circumstances outside of Arts.13 & 14 of the RPC to be treated as “attending circumstances” for
purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism and circumstance involving
incremental penalty rule in estafa and theft. (People v. Temporada, GR 173473, Dec. 17, 2008)
• Sec.3 of RA 9346 provides that persons convicted of offense punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under ISL.
(People v. Candellada, 701 SCRA 19)
• Disqualifications
• The benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall not apply:
1) To persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment;
2) To persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua;
3) To those convicted of
a. treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
b. misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
c. piracy;
4) To those who are habitual delinquents;
5) To those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
6) To those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof;
7) To those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
8) To those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except
those
a. sentenced for more than one year by final judgment;
b. recommended by the Board of Pardon and Parole to be qualified for parole; and,
c. after serving a period of imprisonment not less than the minimum period for which they
might have been sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law for the same offense.
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, §§ 2 & 5, December 5, 1933 indeterminate
penalty may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year or less, and the
maximum exceeds one year.
• For example, the trial court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, since the
maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the trial court opts to impose a
penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but
a straight penalty of one year or less instead. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25,
2005
D. Service of Sentence
• When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed: In the
imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they
maybe executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted
as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

• The three-fold rule is applicable only in connection with the service of the sentence, not in the
imposition of the proper penalties. The court must impose all penalties for all the crimes for
which the accused have been found guilty. Thus, the court should not make a computation in its
decision and sentence the accused to not more than the three-fold of the most severe of the
penalties imposable. The computation under the three-fold rule is for the prison authorities to
make (Art.70, RPC)
• Three-fold rule – We hold that the correct rule is to multiply the highest principal by 3 and the
result will be the aggregate principal penalty which the prisoner has to serve, plus the payment
of all the indemnities which he has been sentenced to pay, with or without subsidiary
imprisonment depending upon whether or not the principal penalty exceeds 6 years. (Bagtas v.
Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692)
• When a prisoner had already served the period provided under the threefold rule of article70 of
the RPC, he is entitled to be released through the writ of habeas corpus because in such cases the
prisoner’s imprisonment should not exceed three times the most serious of the sentences he got,
plus subsidiary imprisonment for the total indemnity he had been condemned to pay the offended
parties. (Aspra v. Director of Prisons, 85 Phil. 737)
• Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment (Art.89, RPC).
• Art. 63 of the RPC mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (People v. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 78)
• Reclusion temporal is a single divisible penalty. In determining the proper penalty vis-a-vis the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism and the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, uncontrollable fear, and provocation, Art. 64 of the RPC should be applied. Pursuant
to Art. 64(4) of the RPC, upon offsetting one ordinary aggravating circumstances with one
mitigating circumstances, 2 mitigating circumstances may be appreciated in favor of the accused
in determining the maximum imposable penalty.
• PROBATION LAW
• Grant of Probation
• No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of conviction imposing
a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based
on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. Amendment to P.D. No. 968
(Probation Law of 1976), Republic Act No. 10707, November 26, 2015
• When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct
the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much
the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
• We have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein,
has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by
virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified
respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to
the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act
Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
Amended, allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she is sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty. Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874,
December 5, 2017
• The court must make its own findings as to the merits of the application, considering that the
Probation Law vests upon it the power to make a final decision on the matter.

• It is settled that the grant of probation is discretionary upon the court, and in exercising such
discretion, it must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the demands
of justice and public interest, along with other relevant circumstances. It should not limit the basis
of its decision to the report or recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only
persuasive. Otherwise stated, in determining whether or not to grant the application for
probation, the court must not merely rely on the Post-Sentence Investigation Report, but rather,
it must make its own findings as to the merits of the application, considering that the Probation
Law vests upon it the power to make a final decision on the matter. Ching v. Ching, G.R. No.
240843, June 3, 2019
• Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
• As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Suyan v. People, G.R. No.
189644, July 2, 2014
• PARDON
• Under Art.36 of RPC, a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office
unless such right be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. Under Art.41, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute disqualification, which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon (Risos-Vidal v.Estrada, GR 206666, Jan.21, 2015)
• AMNESTY
• Under Art.89 of RPC, criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. Thus, the amnesty extinguishes not only the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua, but also its effects such as the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, so that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense
(Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, GR L-1278, Jan.21, 1949)
• PRESCRIPTION
• Art.93 of RPC provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said
provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence.
Pursuant to Art.157 of RPC, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. A never served
a single minute of his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run in his favor. Clearly,
one who has not been committed to prison, cannot be said to have been escaped therefrom (Del
Castillo v. Torrecampo, GR 139033, Dec.18, 2002)
• Going to a foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty to interrupt
the running of prescription is not applicable nor even material because the period of prescription
had not commenced to run in the first place; hence, there is nothing to interrupt.
• Generally, the period of prescription of a crime commences to run from the date it was committed;
but if the crime was committed clandestinely, the period of prescription of the crimes under the
RPC commence to run from the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents. (Art.91, RPC)
• The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted when “any kind of investigative
proceeding is instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution”
(Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, GR 167571, Nov.25, 2008)
• When A left the country and returned only after three (3) years, the running of the prescriptive
period of the crime is interrupted and suspended because prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (Art.91, RPC)

E. Effect of Death of the Accused
• Effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as the civil liability, based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a. Law
b. Contracts
c. Quasi-contracts d. Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017
F. Crime Against Persons
• MURDER
• To be able to sustain a conviction for murder the prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) That a person was killed; (2) That the accused killed him; (3) That the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.248; and (4) The killing is not parricide
or infanticide. (People v. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1)
• There is no treachery as the attack was preceded by heated words. The act was spontaneous,
arising from the said circumstance. The sudden attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused, because of
the provocative act of the victim. Where their meeting was purely accidental.
• Treachery is present since the sudden attack rendered the victims defenseless. The nature of the
weapon used in attacking the victims and extent of the wounds sustained by the five victims
showed intent to kill. His psychotic condition is not an exempting circumstance of insanity in the
absence of showing that there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in accordance with the
cognition test. (Minucher v. Hon.Ca, GR 142396, Feb.11, 2003)
• Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who
would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. (People v. Pulgo, 830 SCRA 220)
• Gagging the mouth of the child with stockings, placing him in a box, sealing it with masking
tape, and placed the box in the attic were only methods employed by the defendant in committing
murder qualified by the circumstances of treachery. (People v. Lora, GR L-March 30, 1982)
• Taking advantage of the defenseless condition of the victim by reason of his tender age is killing
him is treachery (People v. Fallorina, GR 137347)
• A is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery for killing B due to error in
personae or mistake of identity, and slight physical injuries for the wound sustained by the
passerby due to aberratiu ictus or mistake of blow. Although his intention was to commit parricide,
he is liable for murder and slight physical injuries since they are direct, natural and logical
consequences of act committed with intent to kill his wife.
• A is criminally liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery, or evident
premeditation, as well as illegal possession of firearms. Minority is not exempted under Sec.7 of
RA 9644, since his age is above fifteen years but below eighteen years, and he acted with

discernment. Circumstance will show that he discerned the consequences of his criminal act as
shown from the fact that he employed means to make a surprise attack and that he even hid the
murder weapon in an empty container. It was also clear that he planned the killing. However,
minority will be considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance, which will require the
graduation of the penalty prescribed by law to one degree lower. (Art.68, RPC)
• When the victim is killed while tied and blindfolded, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
• There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. In the case at bar, it was
proven that prior to the killing, the victim was tied and blindfolded. Later, when they reached
the fishpond, the victim, still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the vehicle by the group. When
the remains of the victim was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy report indicated
that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull
and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There is no question
therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded. This
situation of the victim when found shows without doubt that he was killed while tied and
blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in the
commission of the crime. People v. Anticamara y Cabillo, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011
• The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting
victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victims.
• The victims were walking by the roadside, on their way back to their camp. They felt secure as
they have just passed a sentry and were nearing their barracks. They were totally unaware of the
threat to their life as their backs were turned against the direction where the accused’s speeding
van came. They were therefore defenseless and posed no threat to the accused when the accused
mowed them down with his van, killing two of them, injuring three others and one narrowly
escaping injury or death. Beyond reasonable doubt, there was treachery in the accused’s act.
People v. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012
• In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only.
• The armed men must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as
the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators.
People v. Enojas y Hingpit, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
• For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following
must be established by the prosecution “with equal certainty as the criminal itself”: (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between determination
and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v.
Ordona, 840 SCRA 439)
• The crime committed is not infanticide since the victim killed is not less than three days of age.
Killing a three-day old baby constitutes murder qualified by treachery. Minor children, who by
reason of their years, cannot be expected to put a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks
a child, treachery exists. (People v. Fallorina, GR 137347, March 4, 2004)
• Killing a person on occasion of public calamity is murder.
• If the main objective of the offender is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed murder
only.
• When the RPC declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire
should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to

take life. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs the crime of arson since the latter is an
inherent means to commit the former. (People v. Baluntong, GR 182061, March 15, 2010)
• A single act of burning the house of victims with the main objective of killing them resulting in
their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder committed by means of fire (People
v. Caffud, GR 168050, Sept.19, 2008)
• A was correctly charged with the crime of frustrated murder qualified by treachery—not evident
premeditation because the victim was different from the one premeditated against. A has
performed all the acts of execution that would produce the death of the victim but for reasons
independent of the will of the perpetrator, the death of the victim was not accomplished.
Treachery qualifies the crime, because the means, manner and method of committing the
intended killing were consciously adopted to insure its execution without risk that may arise
from the defense the victim may make. Evident premeditation is absorbed in the treachery.
• Art.247 – DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
• The requisites of Art. 247 are:
(1) a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person;
(2) he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious
physical injury “while in the act” or immediately thereafter; and
(3) he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
• Under the RPC, for Art.247 to apply, the offender must catch his or her spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person. In People v. Gonzales, GR 46310, Oct. 31,
1939, the SC held that to avail of the privilege under Art.247, the accused should surprise his wife
in the “very act of sexual intercourse”. Sexual intercourse generally presupposes the penetration
of the man’s sexual organ into that of a woman’s. If the paramour was of the same gender as the
erring spouse. As such, there is legally, no sexual intercourse to speak of, hence, Art.247 is not
applicable.
• However, in this case this is not death under exceptional circumstance because she was having
homosexual intercourse with another woman and not sexual intercourse with a man.
“Homosexual intercourse” is not within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in
Art.247. However, the crime of parricide is attended by the circumstance of passion arising from
a lawful sentiment as a result of having caught his wife in the act of infidelity with another
woman. (People v. Belarmino, GR L-4429, April 18, 1952)
• HOMICIDE
• The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that
of Parricide or infanticide. (Wacoy v. People, 760 SCRA 259)
• Considering that death resulted from A’s accidentally pulling the trigger of his gun and even if
there be no intent to kill, the crime is still homicide. Here, intent to kill is conclusively presumed
when the victim dies as a consequence.
• The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present.
• Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of
the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim. The thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds the victim sustained, confirmed the
prosecution's theory that the accused purposely and vigorously attacked the victim. Guevarra v.
People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014
• If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.

• Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and
holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. Wacoy y Bitol v. People, G.R. Nos.
213792 & 213886, June 22, 2015
• PARRICIDE
• Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. (People v. Tibon, GR
188320, June 29, 2010)
• With respect to the killing of the wife, parricide under Art.246 of RPC is committed because of
the qualifying circumstance of relationship. With respect to the killing of the child, he is not liable
for unintentional abortion under Art.257 because the child, who was born alive, was already
viable or capable of independent existence, his age being six and a half months. The crime
committed is another parricide because the victim is his child with his wife. Hence, relationship
qualifies the killing. He shall incur criminal liability of two parricides although these crimes
committed are different from his criminal intention of maltreating his wife. This is a complex
crime because the single act of punching the victim constitutes two grave felonies.
• Killing a legitimate brother is not parricide since he is just a collateral relative of the accused.
• Killing his granddaughter, grandson or wife shall only be considered as parricide if the
relationship is legitimate. On the other hand, killing his mother is parricide whether the
relationship is legitimate or illegitimate.
• MUTILATION
• Bilateral vasectomy cannot amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under
Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We
answer in the negative. In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage,
called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the
urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut
ends merely tied. That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is
part of the duct system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a
highly organized unit of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and
consisting of a range of tissues. Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular
passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man
of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking
away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been
tied, are then dropped back into the incision.
• Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not
deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction". Notably, the
ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body),
with the operative expression being "deprivation". In the same manner, the word "castration" is
defined as the removal of the testes or ovaries. Such being the case in this present petition, the
bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined
and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal
culpability could be foisted on to the urologist who performed the procedure. Aguirre v. Secretary
of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
• RAPE
• Intent to have sexual intercourse is an essential element of attempted rape. In other words, intent
to lie with the victim must be closer. However, this intent is not established for failure to show
that A had done acts to have sex with B. (Cruz v. People, GR 166441, Oct. 8, 2014); or that A
had actually commenced to force his penis into the victim’s sexual organ (People v. Banzuela, GR
202060, Dec.11, 2013). Moreover, he spontaneously desisted from committing further lascivious
acts after undressing B which is a defense in attempted rape. Undressing the victim with lewd
design merely constitutes acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Sanico, GR 208469, Aug. 13, 2014)

• The charge of rape through forcible abduction is correct. The rule is settled that if the main
objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the crime committed is rape even if he abducted her
forcefully. Forcible abduction is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Art.48 of RPC
is applicable since forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape. If forcible
abduction, however, is a necessary means to commit rape, this is a complex crime proper under
Art.48 of RPC.
• Where the victim was abducted with lewd design and brought to a house, in a desolate place e.g.
uninhabited grassy upland where she was raped, forcible abduction should be treated as a
necessary means to commit rape, and thus, the crime committed is a complex crime of rape
through forcible abduction under Art.48 of RPC.
• To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be shown that the erectile penis is in the position to
penetrate or the offender actually commenced to force his penis into the victim’s sexual organ.
• To be held liable for attempted rape by carnal knowledge, the penis of the accused must not touch
the labia of the pudendum of the victim but his acts must be committed with clear intention to
have sexual intercourse. Intent to have sexual intercourse is present if it is shown that the erectile
penis of the accused is in the position to penetrate or the accused actually commenced to force
his penis into the victim’s sexual organ. (Cruz v. People & People v. Banzuela)
• The crime committed is simple rape. To be held liable for qualified rape, a qualifying circumstance
should be alleged in the Information and proven by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Although
minority and step-relationship as a qualifying circumstance are alleged in the Information, what
is proven by the evidence is the qualifying circumstance of minority and common-law
relationship with the mother of the victim. The concept of step-relationship is different from that
of common-law relationship because in the former, the mother of the victim and the offender are
legally married, while in the latter they are not. To appreciate this qualifying circumstance of
minority and common-law relationship, will offend the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the crime charged against him.
• A and B cannot be held liable for the death of X due to suicide committed by reason of the rapes.
Suicide is an intervening cause that breaks the connection between the rapes and death. The
death resulting from suicide cannot be considered as the direct, natural and logical consequence
of the rapes committed by A and B.
• The crimes committed by A and B are forcible abduction with rape. There is no doubt at all that
the forcible abduction of X as she walked home was a necessary if not indispensable means which
enabled them to commit the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however,
that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had
already been consummated, so that the second rape cannot legally be considered as still connected
with the abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter. (People
v. Garcia, GR 141125, Feb.28, 2002)
• The victim’s voluntary acts of separating from her friends and going with the accused because
she trusted him — despite the alleged previous sexual advances made by the accused — negate
the presence of force, threat, or intimidation in the commission of the alleged rape.
• In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for
the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be
absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed
by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause.
• Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused
had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield
to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even
thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation includes
the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
• Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of
the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female
is alleged and shown to be without her consent. Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent
is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving
consent. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to
penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,

prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.
People v. Oropesa y Doe, G.R. No. 229084, October 2, 2019
• In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. People v. Oropesa y Doe, G.R. No.
229084, October 2, 2019
• In incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice.
• Thus, in order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this jurisdiction,
only two (2) elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old. People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10,
2011
• In rape perpetrated by close kin, such as the common-law spouse of the child's mother, actual
force or intimidation need not be employed.
• Force and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim's perception and judgment when
the assailant committed the crime. Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately
report the incident to the authorities or to her mother do not undermine her credibility. The
silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless,
untrue, or fabricated. A minor "cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced
woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and
complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. People v. Entrampas, G.R. No. 212161,
March 29, 2017
• Men who are victims of rape through sexual assault involving penile insertion is entitled to the
same civil indemnity awarded to victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile
insertion. This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the
information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape
committed by means other than penile insertion is P30,000." This statement considered the
prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are all women. However, as in
this case, men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and this can involve penile
insertion. Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
• Carnal knowledge of a mentally deficient individual is rape under subparagraph b and not
subparagraph d of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended.
• Under paragraph 1 (d), the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, under
paragraph 1 (b), the phrase deprived of reason has been interpreted to include those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. People v. Ventura, Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March
12, 2014
• TRAFFICKING
• A may be held liable for the crime of trafficking in persons under RA 9208 for recruiting, offering
and hiring B by means of fraud or deception for the purpose of exploitation or prostitution. A
recruited B in the guise of making her a commercial model, the deceit that A employed in order
to recruit B for the purpose of prostitution making him liable for trafficking in persons. The
criminal liability or the penalty for the trafficker is higher when the crime committed is qualified
trafficking in person.
• SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
• If the passerby was hit in the left eye causing blindness, the crime committed by A is serious
physical injuries. Unlike slight physical injuries, serious physical injuries can be made a
component of a complex crime under Art.48 of RPC. Since a single act of shooting the victim

constitutes murder and serious physical injuries, they can be merged together to form a complex
crime.
• In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus.
• As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the
act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. Thus, we have ruled in a
number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not
make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258,
December 1, 2014
G. Crime Against Property
• The members of the group who, by means of violence against or intimidation, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another,
is criminally liable under Art.312 of the RPC or Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights
in property.
• ROBBERY BY A BAND - There is band in this case since more than three armed malefactors
take part in the commission of a robbery. Under Art.296 of RPC, any member of a band, who is
present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the
assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.
• Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway,
the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage under
Presidential Decree No. 532.
• Under Article 294 (5) in relation to Article 295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code,
robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All
members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be
proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime. Amparo y Ibañez v.
People, G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017
• THEFT
• Under Art. 308 of the RPC, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence or against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latter’s consent. While the CCTV captured A surreptitiously taking the
necklace from a jewelry store without the knowledge and consent of the store owner, she cannot
be charged with theft, because the taking was made under a claim of ownership. The fact of
ownership negates any intention to gain, as A cannot steal the necklace which she claims to own.
• Even if it was proven that the necklace was bought by the store from another person who was
the real owner of the necklace, A still cannot be held liable for theft absent a felonious intent.
“Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent. The ruling in U.S v. Vera (1 Phil 458, May 31, 1974)
is emphatic; if a person takes personal property of another believing it to be his own, the
presumption of intent to gain is rebutted and therefore he is not guilty of theft.
• A could incur civil liability only, not criminal liability, as Art. 332 of RPC provides that No
criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling,
or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

• The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime.
• X shall be liable as principal in the crime of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of
confidence defined and punishable under Art.310 of RPC. Being a bank teller, she had only the
physical possession, not juridical possession of the money received by her. Consequently, her
subsequent misappropriation of the same shall constitute the crime of theft, qualified with grave
abuse of confidence.
• Theft was already consummated from the taking of the personal property of another with intent
to gain without the consent of the latter. The presence of injury or damage is not an element of
theft. Her leaving behind her own purse will not alter the fact that she took a purse from the
high-end shop without the consent of the owner.
• Misappropriation of personal property in possession of the accused may constitute estafa or theft
depending upon the nature of possession. If his possession of the property is physical or de facto,
misappropriation thereof is constitutive of theft. If the possession is juridical or legal,
misappropriation thereof is estafa through misappropriation. (People v. Mirto, GR 193479, Oct.19,
2011). Thus, the person, who ran away with a cellphone which was handed to him upon his
pretence that he had to make an emergency call, is liable for theft since the possession of offender
is merely physical.
• Theft is committed by a person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner. (Art.308, RPC)
• Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of
dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party
might create a high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused.
(Benabaye v. People, 752 SCRA 26)
• Theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when
it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice.
• To warrant a conviction under the Article 308(2) provision for theft of damaged property, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property
belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to
gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. Magsumbol v. People, G.R. No. 207175, November 26, 2014
• Under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
• The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is
that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as
"carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal
code does not require asportation or carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful
owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to
transfer possession which may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well
as any mechanical device. Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015
• ROBBERY
• The elements of simple robbery are: a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b)
that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that
there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. (People v. Avancena, 826
SCRA 414)
• The crime committed is robbery. Since the taking of the victims was merely to commit robbery
and not to transport them to another place for purpose of detention, the crime committed is not
Kidnapping but robbery. Intent to deprive liberty is not present since the deprivation of liberty
is just incidental to the commission of robbery.
• The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered
the residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of

committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an inhabited house,
the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of one is the act of all.
• One who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals
therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable
under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.
• Robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary
robbery committed by force upon things” It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art.
294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person takes place
without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code.
• We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold that when the elements of both provisions are
present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of
said Code — of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the
case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed
in its maximum period. Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015
• For the requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained
less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries.
• Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that some kind of violence had been exerted to
accomplish the snatching, and the offended party herself admitted that she did not feel anything
at the time her watch was snatched from her left wrist, the crime committed is not robbery but
only on simple theft. Ablaza y Caparas v. People, G.R. No. 217722, September 26, 2018
• SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
• ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
• The Court explained extensively the nature of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide: For
the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence
of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person;
(b) the property thus taken belongs to another;
(c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
(d) on the occasion, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.
• Homicide component – A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a
conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason
or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of
the crime (People vs. Balute, G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015)
• The homicide was committed on the occasion of a robbery; thus, the crime committed is robbery
with homicide as long as the killing occurred on the occasion of the robbery whoever be the
victim, whether intended or not.
• When a homicide takes place by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part
shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, whether or not they
actually participated in the killing.
• Robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, is primarily a crime against property and not
against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main
purpose of the criminal.

• Since death results by reason or on occasion of robbery, the crime committed is a special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. This composite crime is committed even though the victim of
homicide is a responding Barangay Tanod (People v. Pelagio, GR L-16177, Mat 24, 1967)
• Since the crime committed is robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as arson and direct
assault committed by reason or on occasion of robbery shall be integrated into the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. Arson shall not be considered as a separate crime but
as a mere aggravating circumstance of commission of the felony by means of fire.
• They are liable for a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In this special complex
crime, it is immaterial that several persons are killed. It is also immaterial that aside from the
homicides, rapes are committed by or on the occasion of the crime. Since homicides are committed
by or on the occasion of the robbery, the multiple rapes shall be integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. (People v. Diu, GR 201449, April 3, 2013)
• A, B and C committed the crime of robbery with homicide under par.1 of Art.294 of RPC. It is
immaterial that the death of a person occurred by mere accident. As long as homicide is produced
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime is robbery with homicide as it is only the
result, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. They are not
liable for the detention of the boy as illegal detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery. The
settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with homicide.
• A person who, on the occasion of a robbery, kills a bystander by accident is liable for the crime
of robbery with homicide is constituted because the RPC punishes the crimes as only one
indivisible offense when a killing, whether intentional or accidental, was committed by reason or
on occasion of a robbery (People v. Mabasa, 65 Phil. 563(1938)
• Whenever the commission of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven, all
those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals even though they did not take part in
the killing, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (People v. Sumalinog,
GR 128387, Fe.5, 2004)
• In robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as rape, intentional mutilation, usurpation of
authority, or direct assault with attempted homicide are integrated into this special complex
crime. This special complex crime is committed as long as death results by reason or on occasion
or robbery without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009;
People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016).
• There is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. The offense
should have been designated as robbery with homicide alone, regardless of the number of
homicides or injuries committed. (People vs. Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020)
• If the original design is to kill the victim (e.g., there is motive to kill), and accused killed him, and
took his property as an afterthought, the crimes committed are homicide or murder and theft
(People v. Atanacio, No. L-11844, November 29, 1960) or robbery. (People vs. Natindim, G.R. No.
201867, November 4, 2020)
• In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a bystander (People vs.
Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding policeman (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-
16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the robbers. (People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020)
• Collective responsibility – Case law establishes that whenever homicide has been committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in
the homicide, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing. (People v. Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 168173, December 24, 2008; People v. Castro, G.R. No. 187073, March 14, 2012; People vs.
Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018;
• The victim was shot while accused was robbing the passengers of a jeepney. Even if victim's bag
was not taken, accused are liable for special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In this
special complex crime, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, as long as homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof. (People
vs. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018)

• ROBBERY WITH RAPE
• Robbery with Rape contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take,
with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the
occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. (People v. Belmonte, 830 SCRA 258)
• A is liable for special complex crime of robbery with rape since he raped the daughter of B on
occasion or by reason of robbery. Even if the place of robbery is different from that of rape, the
crime is still robbery with rape since what is important is the direct connection between the two
crimes. (People v. Canastre, GR L-2055, Dec.24, 1949)
• Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would all be equally liable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the
occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others
from committing rape. (People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v. De Leon, G.R.
No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018; People vs. Sanota,
G.R. No. 233659, December 10, 2019)
• However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex crime of robbery with
rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act in order for him to have the opportunity
to attempt to prevent the same, without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs.
Agaton, G.R. No. 251631, August 27, 2020) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the
commission of rape, he could not have prevented the rape. Hence, the accused is only liable for
robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490, June 22, 1995)
• For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed
before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by
rape. (People vs. Salen, G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020, Justice Leonen)
• KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE
• A is liable for kidnapping with homicide. Abducting B is not forcible abduction since the victim
in this crime must be a woman. Gender reassignment will not make him a woman within the
meaning of Art.342 of RPC. There is no showing, moreover, that at the time abduction is
committed with lewd design; hence, his abduction constitutes illegal detention. Since B was killed
in the course of the detention, the crime constitutes kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide under Art.267.
• In a special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide, it is immaterial that other crimes were
committed such as multiple rapes and arson. Since multiple rapes and arson are committed by
reason or on occasion of kidnapping, they shall be integrated into one and indivisible felony of
kidnapping with homicide. (People v. Larranaga, GR 138874-75, Jan.31, 2004)
• If the victim dies or is killed as a consequence of detention, the offender is liable for special
complex crime of kidnapping with homicide. If the victim dies or is killed in the course of
arbitrary detention, the offender is not liable for special complex crime. Neither is he liable for
complex crime. These two crimes were not produced by a single act. Arbitrary detention was not
used as a necessary means to commit murder. Hence, the offenders are liable for separate crimes
of murder and arbitrary detention even if they were indicted of a complex crime in the
Information. It was improper for the prosecutor to have charged them of a complex crime as the
offenses were separate and distinct from each other and cannot be complexed. (People vs. Dongail,
G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020)
• KIDNAPPING WITH RAPE
• A, B, C & D are all liable for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape. It was sufficiently proved that the four accused kidnapped B and held in detention for
5 days and carnally abused her. Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been
committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape. The composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense with only
one penalty. The offense is not forcible abduction with rape since it was obvious that the intent
is to detain the victim.
• The crime committed by A is kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. Since X was
raped for two weeks, there was a clear deprivation of liberty, which constitutes the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention. This crime is committed when one kidnaps or detains

another, or in any other manner deprives her or his liberty and the kidnapping or detention has
lasted more than three days or the victim is a female. Since as a consequence of the detention, the
victim is raped, the crime committed is special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. No matter
how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the
resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts are
regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact RA 7659 punishes these acts with only a single
penalty. (People v. Mirandilla, Jr., GR 186417, July 27, 2011)
• CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE
• Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (People v. Aquino, 714 SCRA 107)
• ARSON
• A is liable for attempted arson. He manifested before his intention to burn the house of B to his
friends. He then performed the act of pouring gasoline around the walls of the house to execute
his criminal design to commit arson. This is not just a preparatory act, because it already ceased
to be equivocal and revealed a clear intention to burn the house. In sum, he already commenced
the commission of the crime of arson directly by overt acts, but he did not perform all acts to
execute his criminal design to commit arson by setting the house on fire due to a cause other
than his spontaneous desistance, and that is, having been caught by the police.
• If the main objective of the offender is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed (People v. Baluntong, GR 182061, March 15, 2010)
• There is no complex crime of arson with homicide.
• In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated — whether arson, murder, or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to
ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to
kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means
to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise,
to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a
means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed —
homicide/murder and arson. People v. Malngan y Mayo, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
• Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1613, on the other hand, governs simple arson.
• P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.
• The elements of simple arson under Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case.
• The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple

Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
• CARNAPPING
• Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.
• The elements of carnapping are: (a) taking of the motor vehicle which belongs to another; (b) the
taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (c) the taking is done with intent to gain (People v.
Bustinera, GR 148233, June 8, 2004)
• Since carnapping is punishable under a special law, it shall be considered as a crime separate from
robbery with homicide (People v. Dela Cruz, GR 174658, Fe.24, 2009)
• The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the Anti-Carnapping Law, and not by
the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of
robbery and theft. Hence, rules applicable to theft or robbery are also applicable to carnapping.
In theft, unlawful taking should be understood within the Spanish concept of apoderamiento. In
order to constitute apoderamiento, the physical taking must be coupled with the intent to
appropriate the object, which means intent deprive the lawful owner of the thing, whether
permanently or temporarily.
• To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only
of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.
• Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and
that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." People v. Donio y Untalan, G.R. No. 212815, March 1, 2017
• ESTAFA
• X, can be liable for estafa and also for violation of BP 22. While the two criminal actions of estafa
under Art.315(2)(d) of the RPC and violation of BP 22 may refer to identical acts committed by
X, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may
give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the
elements of an offense in one law and another law, there will be no double jeopardy, because what
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution
for the same offense. Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an
identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different cause of action, which, under the law, are
considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Both cases, therefore, can
proceed to their final adjudication - both as to their criminal and civil aspects. (Rimando v. Spouses
Aldaba and People, GR 203583, Oct. 13, 2014)
• The crime committed is Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. A capataz is a foreman
for the government and since the falsification of the public document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper charge is estafa through falsification of public documents.
• The crime committed is estafa through false pretenses (Art.315(2)(a)). A defrauded the investors
by falsely pretending to possess business or imaginary transactions. The fact that he sold all the
equipment of his perfume business, and absconded with the money when the amounts to be paid
by him to the investors reached millions of pesos shows that the transaction or his business is
imaginary, and he defrauded the victims.
• A is liable for Estafa through Misappropriation under Art. 315 of RPC. He received the cows
under obligation involving the duty to return the same thing deposited, and acquired legal or
juridical possession in so doing, since their transaction is a commodatum. Selling the cows as if
he owned it constitutes misappropriation or conversion within the contemplation of Art. 315 of
RPC.

• Art.315(1)(b) of RPC punishes Estafa through Misappropriation. To prove the foregoing crime,
the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the offender’s receipt of money, goods,
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion
by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property;
(3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by
the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
• Estafa is committed by any person who shall ask money from another for the alleged purpose of
bribing a government employee when in truth the offender intended to convert the money to his
own personal use and benefit (Art.315(2)(c), RPC)
• A is liable for one count of estafa under Art.315(2)(d) for the issuance of the first 3 checks because
he issued them simultaneous with the transaction in order to defraud another. However, the 2
other checks are deemed to have been issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, hence the
same act could not have been the efficient cause of defraudation required in estafa under the RPC.
• The criminal charge of estafa through falsification is correct. A forged the signature of his
mother-in-law in the SPA, which is a public document, as a necessary means to sell her properties
to third parties without delivering the proceeds thereof. Although the relationship of affinity
created between A and his mother-in-law survived the death of either party to the marriage, the
coverage of the absolutory cause under Art.332(1) of RPC cannot be applied to him. It is strictly
limited to the simple theft, estafa and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the
crimes mentioned is complexed with another crime. This is because when estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves.
Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches the public interest in the integrity
of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Art.332 (Intestate Estate of Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, GR 181409, Feb. 11, 2010)
• In estafa with abuse of confidence, no specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. Even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money, would be tantamount to a demand.
• The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money, would be tantamount to a demand. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
• In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation.
• This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted
with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.
• The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of
deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. People v. Wagas, G.R.
No. 157943, September 4, 2013
• When the payee was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or
estafa shall not arise.

• Estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat
the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties
at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or
present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of
deceit is lacking. People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015
• A bank teller who took advantage of the bank depositors who trusted her enough to leave their
passbooks with her upon her instruction; and later, filled out withdrawal slips that she signed,
and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due
course, allowing her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips commits two crimes,
namely: estafa and falsification of a commercial document. Such offenses were complex crimes,
because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal
slips.
• As a bank teller, the accused took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough
to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she
filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that
the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co- employees
enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two
crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding the bank, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank
accounts of the depositors; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures
of the depositors in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had
signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification
of the withdrawal slips. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should
impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. De Castro v. People, G.R. No.
171672, February 2, 2015
• SYNDICATED ESTAFA
• The elements of Syndicated Estafa, therefore, are as follows: (a) Estafa or other forms of
swindling, as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling
is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) the defraudation results on the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, “samahang nayon(s)” or farmer’s associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/association from the general public. (People v. Baladjay, 833 SCRA 264)
• Syndicated estafa may be committed through a Ponzi scheme.
• A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to
existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new
investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are
profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme,
which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the
scheme. It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs
an even larger pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors.
The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man" collects his money from his second or
third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily,
Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
• In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of the
corporation comprising more than five (5) people, including the accused, made false pretenses
and representations to the investing public regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with the corporation in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses
and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying
on the same, the victims invested their hardearned money into the corporation; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of the corporation ended up running away with the victims’ investments,
obviously to the latter's prejudice. People v. Tibayan, G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015

• OTHER DECEIT
• Fraud or deceit may be committed by omission. It is true that mere silence is not in itself
concealment. Concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to
hide facts which the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in
good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent
capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose
is equivalent to a false representation. A seller, who failed to disclose the defect of the property
sold to the buyer, is liable for other deceit under Art.318 of RPC. (Guinhawa v. People, GR 162822,
Aug.25, 2005)
• Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to
another without the investor's consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit
not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code. Osorio v. People, G.R. No.
207711, July 2, 2018
H. Crime Against Liberty
• KIDNAPPING
• The following elements must be established by the prosecution to obtain conviction for
kidnapping, viz: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of kidnapping or detention must be illegal;
and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention las for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained.
Or threats to kill are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female or a
public officer. (People v. De Guzman, 775 SCRA 601)
• The crime committed is kidnapping for ransom. Even before the ransom note was received, the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot
be considered an impossible crime because there was not inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. The delivery of the
ransom after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when A deprived B of her liberty. The sending of the of the ransom note would
have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Art.267.
Furthermore, kidnapping is a crime against liberty while in impossible crime it is important that
the accused committed and act that would have been a crime against person or property.
• Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had freedom to
roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such
situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. (People v. Kamir,
838 SCRA 512)
• Actual taking indicates an intention to deprive the victim of his liberty.
• Actual confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element of the crime of
kidnapping. Thus, in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution must show actual confinement
or restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor.
• Clearly, the acts of the accused of hitting the victim until he was unconscious, of putting him
inside the sack, and of carrying him to their yard showed their intention to immobilize the victim
and deprive him of his liberty. Thus, the element of restraint was clearly established. People v.
Chan, G.R. No. 226836, December 5, 2018
I. Crime Against Public Interest
• FALSIFICATION
• Falsification of Documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. (David v. Agbay,
753 SCRA 526)
• In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what

is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. (People v. Sandiganbayan, 765 SCRA 321)
• The law provides the presumption that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the one
who falsified the same. His contention that B did not suffer injuries likewise bereft of merit.
Damage or intent to cause damage is not considered in attempted estafa, only in consummated
estafa.
• The act of “altering true dates” requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the document is essential;
and (b) the alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document
or the effects thereof. (Typoco, Jr.v. People, 837 SCRA 306)
• Mayor A is liable for falsification of public document by a public officer under Art.171. Making
an untruthful statement by stating in a marriage contract, a public document, that the marriage
was solemnized by him, is an act of falsification. The crime of illegal marriage is not committed
because the element that “the offender has performed an illegal marriage ceremony” is lacking
(Ronulo v. People, GR 182438, July 2, 2014)
• A person may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions
of R.A. 9225.
• In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for
re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens
after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. Considering that
the accused was naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225,
he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3
who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of the accused at the time of filing his
application, it is noted that R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
• A loan application, a deed of assignment, and a promissory note are all commercial documents.
The elements of the crime of falsification of commercial documents under Article 172 (1), in
relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 10951,
are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and, (3) that the act of
falsification is committed in a commercial document.
• First, the accused is a private individual; second, the acts of falsification consisted in the accused’s
act of causing it to appear that another person had participated in the act of applying for a loan
when, in fact, he did not do so; and third, the falsification was committed in a loan application, a
deed of assignment, and a promissory note, which are all commercial documents considering that,
in general, these documents or instruments are used by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions, while a
check is a means of payment used in business, in lieu of money, for convenience in business
transactions. Desmoparan v. People, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019
• Falsification of Public Document may be committed by making untruthful statements concerning
relatives in the government service in the SALN.
• The required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does
not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to
967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute
direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not

persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of
fact. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to
its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government
employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited
therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have
no relevance to the employee's eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or
restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.
• In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the
preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public
document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37 & 174845-52, February 9, 2011
• USURPATION OF OFFICIAL FUNCTION
• A committed the crime of usurpation of function under Art.177 of RPC because he performed the
act of solemnizing marriage, which pertained to the mayor, a person in authority, without being
lawfully entitled to do so. The crime of illegal marriage is not committed, because the element
that “the offender is authorized to solemnize marriage” is lacking (Ronulo v. People, GR 182438,
July 2, 2014)
J. RA 9362 – ANTI- VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT
• For beating and humiliating A, such acts violate RA 9262, particularly Sec.3(a) thereof under
“Physical Violence” referring to acts that include bodily or physical harm against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
• For withdrawing support for A, such act is a violation of RA 9262, Sec.3(d) thereof under
“Economic Abuse” which refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent to the accused.
• The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence” which has
three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase;
(2) the acute battering incident; and
(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
• During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs--it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman tries to pacify the batterer through a kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. The acute battering incident is
characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has not control; only
the batterer may put an end to the violence. The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when
the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
relief.
• Under Sec.3(b) of RA9262, “Battery” refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman
or her child resulting in physical and psychological or emotional distress.
• Under Sec.3(c) of RA 9262, “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a scientifically defined pattern
of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a
result of “cumulative abuse”.
• In sum, the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the woman in marital
relationship with the victim is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the infliction
of physical harm resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative
means resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be “at least two battering episodes”
between the accused and her intimate partner and such final episode produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life (People v. Genosa, GR 135981, Jan.15, 2004)

• Even in the absence of unlawful aggression, however, Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense.
Under Sec.27 of RA9262, Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense notwithstanding the absence
of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under RPC such as unlawful
aggression (Sec.26, RA9262)
• The defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the woman with marital relationship
with the victim is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the infliction of physical
harm resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be “at least two battering episodes”
between the accused and her intimate partner, and such final episode produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer, and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. (People v. Genosa, GR 135981, Jan.15, 2004)
• What R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence
causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
• It is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital
infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may
be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of
reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on
the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element
in the commission of the offense. AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018
• A foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child, if under the national law of the foreign national, the legal obligation to
support exists; and, the act of refusing to support the minor child is committed in the Philippines.
However, for such national law to be recognized, it must not work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum.
• To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists. Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties. However, even if the national laws of the parent neither enforce a
parent's obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. Del Socorro v. Van
Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
• To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.
• Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. Dinamling v. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015
K. RA 7610 – Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act
• A, may be charged with the crime of Child Prostitution or other sexual abuse under Sec.5(b) of
RA 7610 by having sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution. Because the victim
was under 12 years of age, A should be prosecuted under Art.266-A and 266-B of RPC.
• B, may be charged with the crime of Child Prostitution or other sexual abuse under Sec.5(a) of
RA 7610 by acting as procurer of a child prostitute.
• RA 7610 covers sexual abuse committed against a child or children below 18 years of age.
Children, who for money, profit, or any other consideration due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

• Under Sec.10 of RA 7610, any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor twelve (12)
years or under or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel,
motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or
other tourist resort or similar places is liable for child abuse.
• Lastly, applying the episdem generis principle, A is not liable for child abuse because Luneta is
not a place similar to hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or
massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort.
• A laid hands on B without intent to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of B as a human
being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass B. It appears that the laying of
hands on B have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor son. With the loss
of self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse; hence,
the crime committed is only slight physical injuries. (Bongalon v. Peopel, GR 169533, March 20,
2013)
• A person who has a cognitive disability would be considered a child under Republic Act No. 7610
based on his or her mental age, not chronological age.
• This Court defined "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal
Code as either the chronological age of a child or the mental age if a person has intellectual
disability.
• We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual disability," had been classified
under "deprived of reason." The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented," however, should
be differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled." An intellectually
disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that
they may be credible witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical
age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and
practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment,
he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal independence and social
responsibility."
• Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of
making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age
of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered
to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions,
especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a
person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity
is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in
determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A (1) (d), the
interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she
is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established.
• In light of this interpretation, and based on the distinction set forth in Section 3 (a), a person who
has a cognitive disability would be considered a child under Republic Act No. 7610 based on his
or her mental age, not chronological age. Versoza v. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 3, 2019
• Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
• The laying of the hands on a child resulting only to mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes, and
which was an offshoot of the accused’s emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter's
head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead, negates the specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that is so
essential in the crime of child abuse.
• As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is
the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of the

accused against the victim is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her
own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes
suffered by the victim, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost
the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof
required for a successful prosecution under Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. Jabalde y
Jamandron v. People, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016
• The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim
suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of.
• The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim
suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to
the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610
occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even
without a prior sexual affront. Quimvel y Braga v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017
• The label "children exploited in other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject
of coercion and sexual intercourse.
• Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No.
7610). A single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has
expressed that this is conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law
already punish that single act as child abuse. Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely,
and universally child abuse. Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
L. RA 11313 – Safe Spaces Act
• SAFE SPACES ACT
• Catcalling refers to unwanted remarks directed towards a person, commonly done in the form of
wolf-whistling and misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexiest slurs.
• Gender-based online sexual harassment refers to an online conduct targeted at a particular
person that causes or likely to cause another mental, emotional or psychological distress, and fear
of personal safety, sexual harassment acts including unwanted sexual remarks and comments,
threats, uploading or sharing of one’s photos without consent, video and audio recordings,
cyrberstalking and online identity theft.
• Public spaces refer to streets and alleys, public parks, schools, buildings, malls, bars, restaurants,
transportation terminals, public markets, spaces used as evacuation centers, vehicles covered by
app-based transport network services and other recreational spaces such as, but not limited to,
cinema halls, theaters and spas.
• Stalking refers to conduct directed at a person involving the repeated visual or physical
proximity, non-consensual communication, or a combination thereof that cause or will likely
cause a person to fear for one’s own safety or the safety of others, or to suffer emotional distress.
• Sec. 11. Specific Acts and Penalties for Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in Streets and
Public Spaces. – The following acts are unlawful and shall be penalized as follows:
(a) For acts such as cursing, wolf-whistling, catcalling, leering and intrusive gazing, taunting,
cursing, unwanted invitations, misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs,
persistent unwanted comments on one’s appearance, relentless requests for one’s personal
details such as name, contact and social media details or destination, the use of words, gestures
or actions that ridicule on the basis of sex gender or sexual orientation, identity and/or
expression including sexist, homophobic, and transphobic statements and slurs, the persistent
telling of sexual jokes, use of sexual names, comments and demands, and any statement that
has made an invasion on a person’s personal space or threatens the person’s sense of personal
safety –
(1) The first offense shall be punished by a fine of One thousand pesos (PI,000.00) and
community service of twelve hours inclusive of attendance to a Gender Sensitivity Seminar to
be conducted by the PNP in coordination with the LGU and the PCW;
(2) The second offense shall be punished by arresto menor (6 to 10 days) or a fine of Three
thousand pesos (P3,000.00)

(3) The third offense shall be punished by arresto menor (11 to 30 days) and a fine of Ten
thousand pesos (P1O, 000.00).
(b) For acts such as making offensive body gestures at someone, and exposing private parts for
the sexual gratification of the perpetrator with the effect of demeaning, harassing, threatening
or intimidating the offended party including flashing of private parts, public masturbation,
groping, and similar lewd sexual actions –
(1) The first offense shall be punished by a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and
community service of twelve hours inclusive of attendance to a Gender Sensitivity Seminar, to
be conducted by the PNP in coordination with the LGU and the PCW;
(2) The second offense shall be punished by arresto menor (11 to 30 days) or a fine of Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00);
(3) The third offense shall be punished by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) and
a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
(c) For acts such as stalking, and any of the acts mentioned in Section 11 paragraphs (a) and
(b), when accompanied by touching, pinching or brushing against the body of the offended
person; or any touching, pinching, or brushing against the genitalia, face, arms, anus, groin,
breasts, inner thighs, face, buttocks or any part of the victim’s body even when not accompanied
by acts mentioned in Section 11 paragraphs (a) and (b) –
(1) The first offense shall be punished by arresto menor (11 to 30 days) or a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00), provided that it includes attendance in a Gender Sensitivity
Seminar, to be conducted by the PNP in coordination with the LGU and the PCW;(2) The
second offense shall be punished by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) or a fine of
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
(3) The third offense shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period or a fine of One
hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00)
• Sec. 12. Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment. – Gender-based online sexual harassment
includes acts that use information and communications technology in terrorizing and
intimidating victims through physical, psychological, and emotional threats, unwanted sexual
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist remarks and comments online whether
publicly or through direct and private messages, invasion of victim’s privacy through
cyberstalking and incessant messaging, uploading and sharing without the consent of the victim,
any form of media that contains photos, voice, or video with sexual content, any unauthorized
recording and sharing of any of the victim’s photos, videos, or any information online,
impersonating identities of victims online or posting lies about victims to harm their reputation,
or filing false abuse reports to online platforms to silence victims.
• Sec. 13. Implementing Bodies for Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment. — For gender-
based online sexual harassment, the PNP Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNPACG) as the National
Operational Support Unit of the PNP is primarily responsible for the implementation of pertinent
Philippine laws on cybercrime, shall receive complaints of gender-based online sexual
harassment and develop an online mechanism for reporting real-time gender-based online sexual
harassment acts and apprehend perpetrators. The Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) of the DICT shall also coordinate with the PNPACG to prepare appropriate and
effective measures to monitor and penalize gender-based online sexual harassment.
• Sec. 14. Penalties for Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court shall be imposed upon any person found guilty of any gender-based online
sexual harassment.
• If the perpetrator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall be automatically deemed
revoked, and the persons liable shall be the officers thereof, including the editor or reporter in
the case of print media, and the station manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of broadcast
media. An alien who commits gender-based online sexual harassment shall be subject to
deportation proceedings after serving sentence and payment of fines.
• Exemption to acts constitutive and penalized as gender-based online sexual harassment are
authorized written orders of the court for any peace officer to use online records or any copy

thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the crime: Provided, That such
written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses may produce, and upon showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that gender-based online sexual harassment has been
committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution or prevention of such crime.
• Any record, photo or video, or copy thereof of any person that is in violation of the preceding
sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
• Sec. 15. Qualified Gender-Based Streets, Public Spaces and Online Sexual Harassment. –
The penalty next higher in degree will be applied in the following cases:
(a) If the act takes place in a common carrier or PUV, including, but not limited to, jeepneys,
taxis, tricycles, or app-based transport network vehicle services, where the perpetrator is the
driver of the vehicle and the offended party is a passenger:
(b) If the offended party is a minor, a senior citizen, or a person with disability (PWD), or a
breastfeeding mother nursing her child;
(c) If the offended party is diagnosed with a mental problem tending to impair consent;
(d) If the perpetrator is a member of the uniformed services, such as the PNP and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the act was perpetrated while the perpetrator was in
uniform; and(e) If the act takes place in the premises of a government agency offering frontline
services to the public and the perpetrator is a government employee.
• Sec. 16. Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. – The crime of gender-based
sexual harassment in the workplace includes the following:
(a) An act or series of acts involving any unwelcome sexual advances, requests or demand for
sexual favors or any act of sexual nature, whether done verbally, physically or through the use
of technology such as text messaging or electronic mail or through any other forms of
information and communication systems, that has or could have a detrimental effect on the
conditions of an individual’s employment or education, job performance or opportunities;
(b) A conduct of sexual nature and other conduct-based on sex affecting the dignity of a person,
which is unwelcome, unreasonable, and offensive to the recipient, whether done verbally,
physically or through the use of technology such as text messaging or electronic mail or
through any other forms of information and communication systems;
(c) A conduct that is unwelcome and pervasive and creates an intimidating, hostile or
humiliating environment for the recipient: Provided, That the crime of gender-based sexual
harassment may also be committed between peers and those committed to a superior officer by
a subordinate, or to a teacher by a student, or to a trainer by a trainee; and
(d) Information and communication system refers to a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents
and includes the computer system or other similar devices by or in which data are recorded or
stored and any procedure related to the recording or storage of electronic data messages or
electronic documents.
• Sec.21. Gender Based Sexual Harassment in Educational and Training Institutions. —All
schools, whether public or private, shall designate an officer-in-charge to receive complaints
regarding violations of this Act, and shall ensure that the victims are provided with a gender-
sensitive environment that is both respectful to the victims’ needs and conducive to truth-telling.
• Every school must adopt and publish grievance procedures to facilitate the filing of complaints
by students and faculty members. Even if an individual does not want to file a complaint or does
not request that the school take any action on behalf of a student or faculty member and school
authorities have knowledge or reasonably know about a possible or impending act of gender -
based sexual harassment or sexual violence, the school should promptly investigate to determine
the veracity of such information or knowledge and the circumstances under which the act of
gender-based sexual harassment or sexual violence were committed, and take appropriate steps
to resolve the situation. If a school knows or reasonably should know about acts of gender-based
sexual harassment or sexual violence being committed that creates a hostile environment, the

school must take immediate action to eliminate the same acts, prevent their recurrence, and
address their effects.
• Once a perpetrator is found guilty, the educational institution may reserve the right to strip the
diploma from the perpetrator or issue an expulsion order.
• The Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) of all educational institutions shall
address gender-based sexual harassment and online sexual harassment in accordance with the
rules and procedures contained in their CODI manual.
M. RA 10173 – Data Privacy Act
• A, who accessed the private messages of his brother and shared in Facebook pictures of other
people without their consent, can be charged with violation of RA 10173 (Data Privacy Act of
2012) in relation to Chapter II, Section 6 of RA 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)
• Data Subject
• Section 3(c) of the DPA defines a data subject as “an individual whose personal information is
processed.” The IRR of the DPA is more specific when it declares that the term refers to “an
individual whose personal, sensitive personal, or privileged information is processed.” IRR of
DPA, §3(d)
• Personal Information
• Section 3(d) of the DPA, defines personal information as “any information whether recorded in a
material form or not, from which the identity of an individual is apparent or can be reasonably
and directly ascertained by the entity holding the information, or when put together with other
information would directly and certainly identify an individual.” Accordingly, images of an
individual are personal information and fall under the protection of the DPA. ADVISORY
OPINION NO. 2019-049, December 11, 2019
• Sensitive Personal Information
• Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:
1) About an individual’s race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color, and religious,
philosophical or political affiliations;
2) About an individual’s health, education, genetic or sexual life of a person, or to any
proceeding for any offense committed or alleged to have been committed by such person, the
disposal of such proceedings, or the sentence of any court in such proceedings;
3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not limited to,
social security numbers, previous or current health records, licenses or its denials, suspension
or revocation, and tax returns; and
4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept classified.
• Potential borrower’s details
• The name, account number and the bank account transaction history of a potential borrower are
considered personal information since it directly identifies a specific individual. The automated
retrieval thereof, considered a form of processing, must comply with the standards provided by
Section 12 of the DPA. NPC Advisory Opinion 2020-021
• It is worthy to note that the unit numbers of a condominium may be considered as personal
information as these may represent and correspond to the natural persons who are the registered
owners of that particular condominium unit.
• The condominium association, as the entity holding and recording all information pertaining to
the registered unit owners, can easily identify the individual owners of the condominium unit.
Nevertheless, contrary to the position of the lawyer of the association, Section 12 of the DPA
provides for the criteria for lawful processing of personal information. Particularly, Section 12(c)
states that personal information may be processed if it is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the personal information controller is subject. In your case, the condominium
association has a legal obligation, rooted in Section 74 of the Corporation Code, to provide access
to and inspect corporate records and documents, even the financial statement, as stated in Section
75 of the same Code. The DPA has the twin task of protecting the fundamental human right of
privacy while ensuring free flow of information.
• The DPA does not operate to curtail existing rights of members of a condominium corporation,
specifically on inspection of corporate books and records, subject to existing laws and regulations

on such matters. Hence, the condominium corporation may lawfully disclose the unit numbers of
the members of the association based on the DPA and your right to inspect the books and records
of the corporation as discussed above. Although the right to inspect is subject to certain
limitations, such may be raised as a defense in actions filed under Section 74 of the Corporation
Code. NPC Advisory Opinion 2018-011, March 22, 2018
• Consent of Data Subject
• Consent under Section 3(b) of the DPA, and Section 3(d) of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), is defined as follows: “Consent of the data subject refers to any freely given,
specific, informed indication of will, whereby the data subject agrees to the collection and
processing of personal information about and/or relating to him or her. Consent shall be
evidenced by written, electronic or recorded means. It may also be given on behalf of the data
subject by an agent specifically authorized by the data subject to do so.” From the definition
provided above, it is clear that consent may be evidenced by written, electronic, or recorded
means. Any of the three (3) formats provided may be adopted by a personal information controller
(PIC) relative to the collection and processing of personal data. The NPC currently does not
maintain any preference among the three. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing that, regardless
of the format of the consent given by the data subject, it must be freely given, specific, and
informed.
• From the definition provided above, it is clear that consent may be evidenced by written,
electronic, or recorded means. (IRR of DPA of 2012, §3[d]) Any of the three (3) formats provided
may be adopted by a personal information controller (PIC) relative to the collection and
processing of personal data. The NPC currently does not maintain any preference among the
three. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing that, regardless of the format of the consent given
by the data subject, it must be freely given, specific, and informed.
• In line with the foregoing discussion, implied, implicit or negative consent is not recognized
under the law. Thus, a company policy that merely stipulates that the inputting of requested
personal information amounts to consent or a waiver by a data subject of his or her data privacy
rights shall not be considered as valid consent, as required under the DPA. Regarding consent
through recorded means or consent given through a duly recorded oral statement, the PIC is
also allowed to present any other types of evidence (i.e., object, documentary, electronic evidence)
that may validate the existence and content of the said recording. Note that, pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily whenever
practicable and/or convenient, given the circumstances. NPC Advisory Opinion No. 2017-007,
January 9, 2017
• Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information
• The processing of personal information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by
law, and when at least one of the following conditions exists:
a) The data subject has given his or her consent;
b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fulfillment of a
contract with the data subject or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to
entering into a contract;
c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal
information controller is subject;
d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the data subject, including
life and health;
e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to comply with the
requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions of public authority which
necessarily includes the processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its mandate; or
f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the personal
information controller or by a third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed, except where
such interests are overridden by fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which
require protection under the Philippine Constitution. Sec. 12, DPA

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