ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES DE BULGARIE

INSTITUT D’ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES

ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES, 2004, No 4

Bisser PETROV (Institute of Balkan Studies)

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS ALBANIA: APRIL 1939 – APRIL 1941

The well-known scholar of British policy in South-East Europe in the years

of World War II E. Barker wrote that Great Britain became involved in the events in
the region against its will. British statesmen regarded the Balkans as a shadowy no-
man’s land, located between German pressure to the east and Italian – to the south.
To them, Turkey was the only state of strategic importance. With the exception of
Greece to some extent, the region was a murky place and the best mode of conduct
regarding it was to keep out. To London’s regret, however, neither fascist Italy nor
nazi Germany shared this opinion. In the long run, Britain entered World War II
having extended guarantees not only to the direct target of German aggression Po-
land, but to Greece and Romania as well1.
In this broader context one could say that Britain’s attitude to Albania in the
said period was not conditioned by some special interest (which was obviously
lacking) but by other reasons stemming from its general policy of appeasement in
Europe in general and the attitude to the occupying state of Italy in particular. The
two-year chronological period, marked distinctly by Italy’s occupation of Albania
(April 7, 1939) and the beginning of the German military campaign in the Balkans
(April 6, 1941), was packed with events of considerable significance for Europe,
the Balkans and Albania.

* * *
Italy’s sensitivity regarding Albania, which the fascist leadership regarded as
something little short of an overseas colony, was neither a secret nor contested by
London2. The policy towards this small Balkan state on the very eve of the war was
1
Barker, E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. London, 1976, p.3.
2
On the Italian policy in Albania see Fischer, B. Italian Policy in Albania, 1894-1943. –
Balkan Studies, vol. 26, 1985, No 1, 101-112. On the British policy in the inter-war period see
Funderburk, D. Anglo-Albanian Relations, 1920-1939. – Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, t.
XIII, 1975, No 1, 117-123. Albanian historiography on British wartime policy towards Albania is
mainly represented by A. Puto. See Puto, A. Nëpër analet e diplomacisë angleze. Planet antishqiptare
të Britanisë se Madhë gjatë luftës së dytë botërore (1939-1944). Tiranë, 1980. The book is translated

51
secondary and derivative of the one towards Italy, which the British authorities re-
garded as one of prime importance.
Two diverse positions regarding the approach that was to be adopt to Mussolini
evolved in the Foreign Office itself by the beginning of 1938. The first upheld the
thesis that Italy should be torn away from Germany’s orbit through demonstrative
benevolence and concessions, while the second based itself on the conviction that
the fascist government was committed to the aggressive course and any attempt to
achieve understanding with it would be interpreted as an excuse for the aggression
in Abyssinia and Spain and as a weakness of the British government3. In the long
run, it was the first opinion that prevailed, upheld as it was by Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain himself. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden tendered his resignation at
the beginning of the year as a sign of disagreement exactly on this issue. He was
succeeded by Lord Halifax, who was to put into practice the Prime Minister’s policy
of appeasement.
The bilateral agreement of April 16, 1938, which was directly related to Al-
bania, was the foundation of British-Italian relations to the very day of Italy’s entry
into the war. By this agreement London strove to avoid friction with the Italians in
the Mediterranean and the Middle East by agreeing to acknowledge the Italian con-
quest of Ethiopia and undertaking to exert its influence to convince other states to
do the same. In turn, Italy was obliged to withdraw its troops from Spain after the
end of the Civil War and to abstain from propaganda in the Middle East. The agree-
ment came into force on November 16, 1938 although the war in Spain had not
ended.
Albania’s occupation by the Italians was preceded by a series of events of
European significance. On March 15, 1939 the Nazi army entered Prague, thereby
putting an end to Czechoslovakia’s agony. This event had a sobering effect on the
British government, which was forced to reconsider its foreign policy and to step up
military preparations for the country’s defence.
On March 21 Germany occupied the Memel territory, thereby gaining a new
front for an attack against Poland. Slovakia became a German protectorate on the
same day and a Romanian-German trade agreement making Romania strongly de-
pendent on Germany was concluded two days later4.
As to Italy, abdicated positions in Central Europe in favour of its stronger
partner, it relied on receiving compensations in the Balkans. Obsessed by the idea of
complete hegemony in Europe, however, Hitler was not agreeable to dividing the
continent into spheres of influence5. The occupation of Czechoslovakia, effected
and is also accessible in other languages: Idem. From the Annals of British Diplomacy: The Anti-
Albanian Plans of Great Britain during the Second World War according to Foreign Office Docu-
ments of 1939-1944. Tirana, 1981; Idem. In den Annalen der englischen Diplomatie geblättert. Die
albanienfeindlichen Pläne Grossbrittanniens im Zweiten Weltkrieg anhand der Dokumenten des For-
eign Office in den Jahren 1939-1944. Tirana, 1980.
3
Rendel, G. The Sword and the Olive. Recollection of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service,
1913-1954. London, 1957, p. 134.
4
Hitchens, M. Germany, Russia and the Balkans. Prelude to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact. New York, 1983, p. 40.
5

, .
   
        . – In:

  
   .  , 1975, . 223. For more details about Italian policy in the
Balkans see Eadem.    
, 1936-1941. , 1969.

52
without the knowledge of Mussolini, finally put an end to the Duce’s ambitions for
influence in Central Europe. That was why he and his Foreign Minister (and son-in-
law) Count G. Ciano were resolved to get revenge and strove after consolidating the
shaken Italian prestige. The two saw the occupation of Albania, the smallest and
most backward Balkan state as the first appropriate opportunity for compensation.
According to their forecasts, the operation was to pass without international compli-
cations or consequences.
Even on March 17 the Foreign Office received information that, emulating
Hitler, Mussolini was planning some drastic step in the near future and would prob-
ably put forward claims in the form of an ultimatum to France or undertake an
immediate occupation of Albania. It was assumed he would announce his intentions
on March 21 or 23. In connection with that Chamberlain was advised to send a
personal message to the Italian dictator. In his letter dated March 20 the Prime Min-
ister expressed his concern for peace in Europe and appealed to the Duce to abide
by his promised policy of peace, to help reduce the amassed tension and restore the
shaken confidence6.
On March 23 Ciano recorded in his diary that Mussolini would answer after
the occupation of Albania and that Chamberlain’s letter strengthened his resolve to
act because he saw in it yet another proof of the inertia of democracies7. On March
28 the Italian Foreign Minister informed the German ambassador in Rome about the
answer which, in his words, “would confirm our desire to preserve peace while also
underscoring an effective and essential recognition of Italian rights”8. On the same
day the Civil War in Spain ended with the victory of General Franco’s nationalist
forces, which allowed Mussolini and Ciano to focus on the occupation of Albania.
Intelligence information about the pending attack that reached London, how-
ever, was neither analysed nor taken into account. A little later, Churchill was to
declare that in both cases – the conquest of Czechoslovakia and the occupation of
Albania – British intelligence, which he considered the best in the world, had done
its job but the ministers had ignored its work9.
The Foreign Office also received information about the forthcoming invasion
through diplomatic channels – from the legations in Rome and Durrës (the British
legation was there, not in Tiranë) headed respectively by Lord Perth and Sir A.
Ryan. On April 3 and 4 both sent reports with information about rising tension
auguring attack, additionally confirmed by information provided by the Greek am-
bassador in London10.
On April 4 Lord Perth met with Ciano and drew his attention to the fact that
aggression against Albania would be detrimental to British-Italian relations. A change
of the status of that country, which was a member of the League of Nations, would
definitely represent a violation of the agreement of 1938. In response to the ex-
pressed concern, Ciano gave his own version of the events (which had nothing to do

6
Documents on British Foreign Policy. Third Series, Vol. V. London, 1952, 402-403 (DBFP).
7

 ,
.    , 1939-1943.  , 1992, . 48.
8
Ibidem, p. 50.
9
Churchill, W. S. The Second World War. Vol. I. The Gathering Storm. London, etc., 1950,
230-231.
10
DBFP, 116-119, 122-123.

53
with reality), i.e. that the Albanian King Zogu had requested himself for Italian
troops to be sent even on March 8, for he needed them to attack Yugoslavia and
annex Kosovo. It was to Italy’s interest, however, to preserve its good relations with
Yugoslavia. Soon after that King Zogu adopted a hostile attitude to Italy and did not
accept the Italian scheme for strengthening the alliance in accordance with his sug-
gestion of March 8. Because of the fact that Italy had invested a lot of money and its
interests in Albania were threatened it was obliged to intervene. Finally, Ciano ad-
vised the British ambassador not to take the resulting situation so seriously11.
On the next day, the Italians handed Zogu an ultimatum with practically in-
feasible claims with a deadline expiring in 24 hours. Perth reported that the king
was determined to resist and had turned for assistance to the Little Entente, Great
Britain and France12. On April 6 Perth was instructed by the Foreign Secretary to
request a new meeting with Ciano and to inform him that His Majesty’s government
took the special Italian interests into account, but he was also to be reminded that the
two governments had acknowledged the independence and the borders of that country
at the Ambassadors’ Conference of November 9, 1921 and that the British-Italian
agreement provided for respect of the status quo concerning the national sover-
eignty of the Mediterranean states13.
Meanwhile, Sir A. Ryan’s reports on the events did not reach Foreign Office
because Ciano issued a specific order to hinder the sending of cryptograms14.
Again on April 6, the last day of independent Albania, during Question
Time at the House of Commons regarding British interests in Albania, Chamberlain
declared that His Majesty’s government did not have direct interest in that country
but rather a general interest in peace in the whole world. He added that the ambassa-
dor in Rome would draw the attention of the Italian government to the fact that a
change of the status quo in Albania ran counter to the British-Italian agreement of
193815.
On this occasion, on the next day (which was the day of aggression) Mussolini
sent a message to the Prime Minister with formal assertions that the settlement of
the Italian-Albanian issue would take place in a form that would not cause a crisis in
bilateral relations or in the international situation as a whole16.
The operation on the conquest of Albania itself passed without major prob-
lems, providing one leaves aside the sporadic resistance in Durrës and the faulty
organisation of the operation itself. Zogu, more concerned with the security of his
newborn son Leka than with that of his country, left to seek salvation in Greece.
When Mussolini’s message was presented by the Italian chargé d’affaires
Crolla, Halifax noted the fact that the Albanian government was showing resistance
- something that would hinder Mussolini in keeping his promise, and expressed
concern that the situation could raise in severe form the entire issue of status quo in

11
Ibidem, 120-121.
12
Ibidem, p. 123.
13
Ibidem, p. 125.
14

 ,
. Op. cit., p. 55.
15
Public Foreign Office, Foreign Office (PRO FO) 371/23712, R 2438/1335/90, April 7,
1939.
16
DBFP, p. 129.

54
the Mediterranean which constituted such an important element of the British-Ital-
ian agreement17.
At the same time, in Rome, Perth met with the Italian Foreign Minister, who
had just returned from a tour of inspection in Albania, and handed him an aide-
mémoire which, according to Ciano’s ironic hint “could have been written in one of
our own offices”18. Once again, the latter drew for Perth a completely distorted
picture of the events and declared that the Italian government intended to abide by
the independence and integrity of Albania and the status quo in the Mediterranean.
As to the Italian intervention, it was made imperative by the Albanian revolt against
Zogu’s regime and Italy had been forced to intervene to restore order19.
In spite of all the information it had, Italy’s occupation of Albania found the
British government unprepared and confused, without a clear strategy of adequate
reaction. Chamberlain, who cut his vacation in Scotland short because of the event,
took Mussolini’s action quite personally. Nevertheless, he continued to maintain the
adopted line of conduct towards the Italian dictator. The British-Italian agreement
remained in force, without even a hint at condemnation for its unilateral violation
on the part of Italy20. The government’s intention to abstain from sharper reaction is
also visible from the cables the Foreign Office sent to the ambassadors in Belgrade
and Athens, advising them that they shouldn’t leave the governments to which they
were accredited, with the impression that His Majesty’s government would under-
take to participate actively in the development of the situation in Albania21. The
desperate appeal for help, which the Albanian ambassador in London L. Kurti made
on the day following the aggression, was also left without consequence22.
The government’s policy regarding the Italian occupation was discussed at a
cabinet meeting on April 8. Halifax suggested that it should be restricted to inquir-
ies. He said the aggression was a demonstration of dictatorial ambition and had
caused wide reverberations in public opinion, admitting that “we use brave words,
our action was less heroic”. According to him, it would not be reasonable to send
the fleet in the Adriatic or to give Mussolini an ultimatum and unleash a new Euro-
pean war. The episode with Albania showed the instability in that region and that,
according to the Foreign Secretary, required the provision of guarantees to Greece
and Turkey. In conclusion, Halifax recommended not to fight for Albania but to put
efforts in gaining additional time in which to work for improving Britain’s posi-
tions. The question of the manner in which to demonstrate disapproval of the ag-
gression was raised in the course of the discussion. The suggestion to recall the
ambassador was not accepted because his return could possibly cause even greater
problems. It was decided that diplomatic steps would be taken to provide guaran-
tees to Greece and Turkey, that British ships would not berth at Italian ports and
would clear for Malta and that work should be done to step up Britain’s defensive
capacity23.
17
Ibidem, 127-128.
18

 
. Op. cit., p. 57.
19
DBFP, 128-129.
20
Fischer, B. Albania at War, 1939-1945. West Lafayette, Indiana, 1999, p. 30.
21
DBFP, p. 132.
22
Ibidem, 139-140.
23
PRO FO 371/23712, R 2564/1335/90, April 11, 1939.

55
 In conformity with these decisions, that very day Halifax sent Perth instruc-
tions to request a new meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister for additional ex-
planations regarding the reasons that led to the invasion in Albania in the light of
new facts denying the Italian version, as well as regarding future Italian intentions24.
In the course of the meeting on the next day, Ciano dispersed British concern and
compared the status of Albania to that of Egypt, where British troops were also
stationed. According to Perth, the Italians intended to conclude with Albania pre-
cisely the type of agreement Britain had with Egypt25.
In turn, again on April 9, Halifax received Crolla twice. During the first meet-
ing, the Italian chargé d’affaires relegated a verbal message of Mussolini that the
occupation had been conducted in a peaceful manner and was accepted well by the
population, while the future status of the country would follow the juridical tradi-
tions of Rome. Crolla rejected the rumours of an eventual forthcoming occupation
of Corfu. After an exchange of plentiful diplomatic pleasantries and clichés, Halifax
again declared Britain’s abidance by the agreement of 193826.
At the meeting after noon, Crolla brought yet another verbal assurance of
Mussolini that he would withdraw his troops from Spain and that he did not intend
to attack Greece. Halifax said that the sooner the Italians declared the new status of
Albania in abidance with the authority of world public opinion the better. In addi-
tion, he asked Crolla whether when British Parliament convened over the forthcom-
ing week, the government could refer if necessary, to Mussolini’s promises regard-
ing Albania, Corfu and Spain. Crolla’s answer was that there could hardly be any
problem but he would nevertheless make the necessary inquiries. In turn, in his
personal capacity, he gauged the British position regarding Albania, expressing the
hope that the British government would not create problems at the acknowledgement
of that country’s new status. Understandably, Halifax did not go quite so far and did
not undertake such a commitment. Rather, he slipped away with the diplomatic
formula that the future of Albania had to be in accordance with previous Italian
assurances of independence27.
The Italian explanations given in London on April 9 obviously proved suffi-
cient for British diplomacy. The Italian fascist leadership was left without a doubt
that the former had reconciled itself to the occupation of Albania and did not intend
to react in a sharper way. This gave Ciano reason to conclude on April 10 that
“reaction abroad begins to lessen. It is clear above all that the British protests are
more for domestic consumption than anything else”28.
Obviously, such half-hearted and toning down reaction was quite predictable
to Rome. Of course, at that time Britain did not have the means or opportunities for
open counteraction to the aggression. The problem, however, lay in the fact that the
adopted favourable attitude intended to split Italy from Germany was perceived by
Rome as non-punishability and encouragement of new aggressive adventures. What
is indicative in this respect is the fact that, on the eve of the attack on Albania, Ciano

24
PRO FO 371/23712, R 2471/1335/90, April 9, 1939.
25
PRO FO 371/23712, R 2489/1335/90, April 10, 1939.
26
DBFP, 153-155.
27
Ibidem, 155-157.
28

 ,
. Op. cit., p. 58.

56
sent a secret cable to the embassies in London and Paris with instructions to spread
through third parties rumours that the occupation aimed to block the way of future
German expansion in the Balkans29.
On April 12, Halifax ordered Perth to notify Ciano that in his speech before
the Commons next day the Prime Minister would refer to the Italian assertions of
Albania’s independence and integrity given through Crolla, as well as for abidance
by the British-Italian agreement (read abidance by the status quo in the Mediterra-
nean). The speech was also to include some critical comments on Italian policy, but
these were to be expressed in the least possible provocative form30.
On the next day, April 13, Chamberlain announced the government’s inten-
tion to extend unilateral guarantees to Greece and Romania31. In addition, justifying
his foreign policy, he again declared confidence in the correctness of the British-
Italian agreement of 1938, which was not to be denounced. In the course of the
debates, the leader of the Labour opposition, C. Atley, levelled severe criticism at
the agreement, which he considered part of an erroneous policy of unilateral ap-
peasement, stating that Albania’s occupation was a result of that agreement just as
Czechoslovakia’s partitioning was a product of the Munich Agreement32.
The occupation of this small and defenseless Balkan state proved an event of
insufficient dimension or importance to introduce corrections into Britain’s policy
towards Mussolini’s Italy, as earlier Czechoslovakia’s occupation had marked the
beginning of changes in the attitude to Nazi Germany. In this sense one could sum
the situation up and say without exaggeration that Albania was simultaneously the
victim of Italian aggressiveness and British tolerance towards it.

* * *
The plans of the Italian leadership regarding the fate of occupied Albania
were quite different from what was presented before the British government. The
operation on the “legalization” of the annexation was personally headed by Count
Ciano. On April 12 a hastily convened Constitutional Assembly divested Zogu’s
dynasty of its rights, suspended the Constitution of 1928 and expressed the “unani-
mous desire of the Albanian people that the King of Italy also be King of Albania by
a personal union of the two crowns”33. A puppet government was also set up, headed
by the largest landowner in Albania, Shefqet Vërlaci. On April 15, the delegation he
headed arrived in Rome to present the crown of Skanderbeg to King Victor Emmanuel
III, whose full title was changed to “King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethio-
pia”, at a ceremony staged in advance. Albania was taken out of the League of
Nations under Italian pressure and with the complete indifference of the interna-
tional community. Although it was clear to everyone that that country’s sovereignty
was violated brutally, the international organisation demonstrated complete inabil-
ity and reluctance to undertake anything in Albania defence. Quoting purely formal

29

, .
  

, . 99.
30
DBFP, 181-182.
31
Ibidem, p. 197.
32

, .
  

, . 113.
33

 ,
. Op. cit., p. 60.

57
grounds of procedure, the League’s Secretary General J. Avenol did not even table
the issue of the liquidation of Albanian independence for debate34.
The Albanian ambassador in London, L. Kurti, appealed to the British au-
thorities for assistance and counsel, since he was ordered to close the embassy and
was in absolute quandary regarding his own fate. The Foreign Office offered only
dry sympathy. Although there were influential people who lobbied for finding him
a job at the League of Nations, Halifax refused commit himself to do such a favour35.
Even on April 13, the Foreign Office instructed A. Ryan that in case the Ital-
ians requested from him new credentials or recognition of the new regime he should
not commit himself with a concrete answer36. On April 19 Ciano had a meeting with
Perth about which he wrote the following in his diary: “Talk with Perth. The British
raise certain problems related to the title of King of Albania. Several animated dis-
cussions with Perth in which I maintained that the change in dynasty is an internal
issue in which he does not have the right to step in.”37 To spare the British party the
inconvenience, Ciano and Mussolini decided to accept the credentials of the succes-
sor of Perth (whose term was expiring) without these being addressed to the “King
of Albania” as the consent was requested before the latest developments of events38.
The same problem, however, hung over the appointment of a successor to A. Ryan
who was also soon to leave his post.
The Italians did not liquidate the Albanian Foreign Ministry directly after the
occupation. The former ambassador in Sofia and son-in-law of Prime Minister S.
Vërlaci, Xhemil Dino, was appointed Foreign Minister39. After connection with
London was restored, A. Ryan sent comprehensive reports on the situation in the
country and the policy of the Italians. At the beginning of May he met with the
General Secretary of the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Sherko, who surprisingly shares
to him that the new government would try “to save what can be saved”. According
to A. Ryan, he was probably sincere, because the majority of the Albanians, even
members of the government, had not imagined the extent to which the liquidation of
the Albanian state could reach. The country was subjected to complete assimilation
and Albanian independence was destroyed. A. Ryan dubbed the arrival of the Sec-
retary of the Italian Fascist Party, A. Starace, with the purpose of establishing an
Albanian one, the “second phase of Italian triumph”. Officially, the new Albanian
government expressed readiness to send diplomatic representatives abroad and re-
spectively to receive such in its country40.
At the same time, the Foreign Office analysts began to hatch the position that
had to be taken on the changed status of Albania. Sir A. Noble of the Southern
Department drafted a minute on the matter in which he expressed the opinion that
the new status was to be recognized any way at an appropriate moment, although
this would not be received well at home, in the United States or France. Perth’s

34
Fischer, B. King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania. New York, 1984, p. 288.
35
PRO FO 371/23716, R 4025/2066/90, May 15, 1939.
36
PRO FO 371/23713, R 2711/1335/90, April 13, 1939.
37

 ,
. Op. cit., p. 61.
38
Ibidem, p. 62.
39
PRO FO 371/23714, R 3075/1335/90, April 21, 1939.
40
PRO FO 371/23714, R 3517/1335/90/, May 2, 1939.

58
farewell meeting with Mussolini was said to have featured hopeful signs that had to
be developed further. Recognition was to become a fact sooner or later and putting
this unpleasant step off was a futile gesture of disapproval. Futile, because it would
not harm Italy or punish it for the crime it had committed, but would only compli-
cate relations with that country. The complications would be at legal issues, such as
recognition of diplomatic representatives and treaty making. The feeling of Italians
– even those who did not sympathize with fascism – would be hurt. As a whole, A.
Noble recommended that relations with Italy should not be strained “since there are
signs that Signor Mussolini is less inclined to war than Herr Hitler and we may be
able to use him as a break on the more powerful end of the Axis”41. A little later, on
May 17, he suggested that, when an Italian request for recognition of the new status
was received, it be postponed on the motive that complete clarity on the situation in
that country was still lacking. The postponement was to continue until it was appro-
priate, although it was possible for circumstances to arise that would make the rec-
ognition imperative more quickly42.
The expectations of increasing the distance between Mussolini and Hitler
proved ungrounded, quite the contrary – their involvement increased with the so-
called Pact of Steel concluded by the two totalitarian states on May 22. This event,
however, did not change British policy towards Italy in the slightest, nor conse-
quently that towards Albania.
On May 25 Mussolini and Ciano decided to close the Albanian Foreign Min-
istry and to remove the foreign diplomats from Tiranë43. Two days later, the Italian
Foreign Minister noted: “In my opinion, the British-Italian agreement is dead and
maybe Chamberlain may die with it”44. Meanwhile, the said Chamberlain sent a
message to Mussolini by the newly appointed ambassador in Rome, Sir P. Lorain,
under the conviction that the agreement remained fully valid and with the hope that
it could even be developed further45…
On June 3 the Albanian Foreign Ministry was liquidated, which meant that
Albanian affairs were entirely in the hands of Rome. The Foreign Office was faced
with the delicate question how to proceed in the new situation. The legation in Durrës
had to be demoted to Consulate General and A. Ryan himself – to the rank of Con-
sul General. At that he would have to apply for exequatur from the “King of Italy
and Albania”, which practically meant de facto recognition of Albania’s occupation
and the new regime imposed on that country46. To avoid such an embarrassing pro-
cedure the Foreign Office decided to give the Italian party the explanation that A.
Ryan’s mandate expired on July 15 and Zogu had received his credentials. If he
advised the Italian authorities verbally that only a month of his mandate remained
then recognition could be avoided47. In fact, the Italians did not insist on the prompt
transformation of the legation into a Consulate General, thereby sparing the Foreign
Office the discomfiture and anxiety.
41
PRO FO 371/23716, R 3583/2066/90, May 4, 1939.
42
PRO FO 371/23716, R4110/2066/90, May 17, 1939.
43

 ,
. Op. cit., p. 74.
44
Ibidem, p. 75.
45
Ibidem, p. 80.
46
PRO FO 371/23716, R 4676/2066/90, June 19, 1939.
47
PRO FO 371/23716, R 4845/2066/90, June 14, 1939.

59
 The British government tried to belittle the act of liquidation of the Albanian
Foreign Ministry and the change of the British diplomatic representation it necessi-
tated. The Foreign Office drafted response of the Prime Minister during Question
Time on June 12 stated that the Albanian Foreign Ministry had been “unified” with
the Italian one and it could still have certain independence. The diminished status of
the legation would not lead to problems since A. Ryan had also acted as Consul
General until then48.
Thus, the British government closed its eyes at the destruction of the very last
institution symbolizing Albanian sovereignty. In reality, Britain had neither eco-
nomic interest in that country nor a large colony of its subjects. The consular service
was necessary only to maintain relations in the course of old policy and for collect-
ing information regarding Italian military preparations against neighbour Greece
and Yugoslavia. Britain’s allies USA and France, however, refused to acknowledge
the demotion of diplomatic rank and closed their legations in Albania. A. Ryan left
the country on July 17, his functions temporarily were assumed by Vice Consul
Gamble.

* * *
Two days after the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, which
marked the beginning of World War II, Great Britain and France declared war on
Germany. The British government was reconstructed with the attraction of some
members of the opposition and the so-called War Cabinet was set up. In turn, Italy
declared non-interference in the conflict – an attitude that became known as the
non-belligeranza policy.
During the Phoney War in the West the Allies’ military strategists made plans
for attacks on Germany beyond the difficult to approach and fortified Siegfried
Line. The French were particularly active in this respect, obsessed with the idea of
opening a new Salonika front and a repetition of the events in World War I. The idea
was initiated by the commander of the French troops in Syria, General M. Weygand49.
Five days after Britain entered the war, Halifax told the War Cabinet that he would
insist before that French government to abstain from such actions in the Balkans
until Italy did not declare its intentions. Instead, he suggested the alternative idea of
forming a “Balkan neutral bloc”50. The Foreign Office feared that, along with its
other drawbacks, an allied military operation could provoke Mussolini to enter the
war. On September 14 the War Cabinet discussed a Foreign Office memorandum,
which concluded that a neutral and a fortiori friendly (sic) Italy seemed much more
valuable than Balkans pushed by Great Britain into the war by force – two things
that were entirely incompatible51. This motive was the main political reason to give
up the French plan (it was also completely unrealistic from a military point of view),
although later Prime Minister W. Churchill was to return again to the idea of a Sec-
ond front in the Balkans.

48
PRO FO 371/23716, R 4856/2066/90, June 14, 1939.
49
For more details see: Batowski, H. Proposal for a Second Front in the Balkans in September
1939. – Balkan Studies, Vol. 9, 1968, No 2, 335-344.
50
Barker, E. Op. cit., 13-14.
51
Ibidem, p. 14.

60
 In such conditions, on September 18 the Foreign Office compiled a detailed
minute commissioned by the Foreign Secretary on the policy that was to be led
towards Albania. Along with everything else, this document pointed out that recog-
nition of the status of that country could be granted to the Italians without many
problems, although it could provoke some friction with the Prince Regent of Yugo-
slavia, Pavle. The matter could be postponed until the situation around a possible
intervention in the Balkans cleared. Sooner or later, however, that recognition had
to come. Literally, the document states: “On wider political grounds, it is of great
importance that Italy should not join Germany in the war; our recognition of the
new status of Albania will be not a deciding factor, but it’s something we can give
the Italians at no cost to ourselves; indeed, as explained above, we are actually
handicapping ourselves by refusing to recognize now rather than later.”52 It was
recommended that A. Ryan’s successor should leave for Albania after the submis-
sion of the exequatur application, which would mean de facto recognition. Later,
action could be taken and for de jure recognition. As a whole, the order of the day
was to avoid complications and friction and to “go straight ahead”53.
In this case the Foreign Office called upon the precedent with the recognition
of Ethiopia’s status, when the British Consul there was appointed seven months
after the conquest and twenty-two months before the de jure recognition. As to the
possible reaction of Prince Pavle, it was decided that it would simply be ignored and
he will be told openly that Britain was following its own interests in this case54.
Although the Foreign Office still hoped to receive something in return, it was
decided in the final analysis that this was not a good moment to bargain with the
Italians: that was why the recognition was to be effected within the framework of
routine procedure. Certain doubts were raised by public opinion in the country that
could come up with a negative reaction, particularly if the Italian press released
news of the recognition. Therefore, it would be desirable not to give it publicity or
report it before the Commons and the Italians should be asked to show discretion55.
Intention finally became reality. On October 30 P. Lorain applied in Rome for
a Consul General exequatur before the Italian Foreign Ministry. On the next day,
Chamberlain announced it officially in Parliament in the form of an answer to a
parliamentary question coordinated in advance. L. Grafftey-Smith was appointed
the new Consul General in Durrës56.
The decision of the British government evoked sharp reaction of the Alba-
nian émigrés. The ambassadors in Paris and Cairo expressed their protest while
Zogu, who was in Paris at that time, sent a letter to King George VI in a similar
spirit. The king coolly answered that he would be duly informed by the responsible
ministers in accordance with the constitutional practice of the country57.
Thus Albania’s occupation and new status were officially recognized by His
Majesty’s government – something it had been ready to do even directly after the

52
PRO FO 371/23717, R 8149/2066/90, September 29, 1939.
53
Ibidem.
54
PRO FO 371/23717, R 8442/2066/90, October 5, 1939.
55
PRO FO 371/ 23717, R 9376/2066/90, October 27, 1939.
56
PRO FO 371/23717, R 9586/2066/90, November 2, 1939.
57
PRO FO 371/23717, R 11314/2066/90, December 11, 1939.

61
aggression. Undoubtedly condemnable from a moral point of view, this act was not
undertaken under any external pressure or in return for something else. It lacked
practical value and cannot therefore be regarded as anything but a gesture of good-
will to fascist Italy.

* * *
The new Consul General, L. Grafftey-Smith, took his assignment and by the
beginning of 1940 the Foreign Office began to receive his reports on rising discon-
tent against the occupation regime in Albania, particularly among the students58.
Over the past period the Albanians had begun to realize what it had actually brought.
Many of them became members of the Albanian Fascist Party, but from self-interest
rather than from doctrinal views as life outside the party was quite uncomfortable.
The country was being stripped and that reflected on the population. That is why it
would have been difficult for Italian popularity to grow59. In order to tone it done
and somewhat compensate the negative effect, they supported the idea of a “Greater
Albania”, catering Albanian irredentism aimed at Greece and Yugoslavia60.
In their concern about Italian neutrality, the British did not consider serious
possibilities to stimulate Albanian resistance at the moment of the outbreak of the
war. Early in October 1939, when the War Cabinet was discussing its policy in
South-East Europe, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff expressed the
opinion that this could be left to the Turks who could create problems through the
Muslim population in Albania61. Nevertheless, at the beginning of April 1940, the
War Cabinet instructed the General Staff to draft projects for organizing subversive
activity in both Italy and its colonies in case that country entered the war62.
At that time there were two British secret services that could be commis-
sioned to carry out operations in the Italian rear. One of them was M.I. (R), estab-
lished within the War Office at the end of 1938 to plan irregular military operations.
The other was Section D, set up after the annexation of Austria in March 1938,
which nominally remained part of the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S., also known
as M.I.6 or “C”) until the late summer of 1940. The distinction between the func-
tions of the two services was not clearly defined. By the autumn of 1940 they merged
into the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which was subordinate to the Minis-
ter of Economic Warfare63.
In April 1940 M.I. (R) developed a scheme for an uprising in Albania which
the agents of Section D in Yugoslavia were also called to join. They contacted three
organisations that could be drawn into the cause. The first was headed by the former
Yugoslav ambassador in Tiranë, J. Djonović, the second by Kosovar Gani Bey
Kryezin and the third – by Colonel Kokosi. The latter two organisations sent couri-
ers to Albania to gather information about the Italian army and the situation in the
country as a whole. Section D reported that the prospects for provoking incidents

58
PRO FO 371/24866, R 783/503/90, January 16, 1940.
59
PRO FO 371/ 24866, R 2018/503/90, February 13, 1940.
60
PRO FO 371/24866, R 4098/503/90, April 1, 1940.
61
Barker, E. Op. cit., 47-48.
62
PRO FO 371/24866, R 4552/503/90, April 8, 1940.
63
Barker, E. Op. cit., p. 30.

62
and general uprising in the eastern part of the country were good, particularly in the
region of Mirdita64. For one reason or another, however, the plan did not receive the
go ahead and remained only on paper.
On June 10, 1940, the Italian Foreign Minister informed the British ambassa-
dor that Italy was entering war with Britain as of midnight the same day. A similar
notification was addressed to the French government, after which the Italians
promptly attacked the French troops on the front in the Alps. In turn, Great Britain
declared war on Italy. The policy of appeasing Mussolini ended with a complete
fiasco.

* * *
With the new development of events the hands of the British to organize anti-
Italian operations – Albania included – were untied. At the end of June, Section D
office in Belgrade suggested the instigation of a revolt in Albania from the territory
of Yugoslavia, requiring 5,000 guns for the undertaking. The Commander-in-Chief
Middle East, however, did not want an uprising at that moment and consequently
opposed the plan. Section D agents were ordered to maintain contact with appropri-
ate Albanians but not to provoke incidents65. In the Yugoslav capital, they managed
to establish contact with Albanian émigrés from a broad political spectrum – the
Kryeziu brothers who were opponents of Zogu, his supporter Abaz Kupi and the
communist Mustafa Gjinishi66.
At the same time, Section D also made preparations from the territory of
Greece, including recruitment of agents and storing ammunition dumps near the
Albanian border, but in such a way as not to give the Italians occasion to attack
Greece. By the end of August the Middle East High Command approved the Sec-
tion D program for Albania. The Foreign Office also gave its approval for subver-
sive action67.
Meanwhile, the government was also faced with the political problem of tak-
ing a new attitude to the status of Albania as a whole and its king in particular.
At the end of June, after prolonged wanderings and tribulations, Zogu, his
family and retinue finally managed to reach British shores. He decided to settle
there instead of heading for Spain as previously planned. Zogu was determined to
return to the throne with British help at any cost, offering in return his services for
military undertakings in his country68.
The situation of the king-in-exile was discussed at a meeting in the Foreign
Office held on July 2. Participants included: O. Sargent – deputy under-secretary, P.
Lorain, A. Ryan and L. Grafftey-Smith. They found that Zogu was strongly com-
promised and was incapable of either instigating a revolt in Albania or of heading it.
For these reasons his sojourn in the country was undesirable and he was to be redi-
rected to the United States. As to the future of Albania, the participants in the meet-

64
Ibidem, p. 48.
65
Ibidem, p. 49.
66
Amery, J. Approach March. London, 1973, 163-164.
67
Kondis, B. A British Attempt to Organize a Revolt in Northern Albania during the Greek-
Italian War. – In: Greece and the War in the Balkans (1940-1941). Thessaloniki, 1992, 113-114.
68
For more details see: Fischer, B. King Zog, 291-292.

63
ing arrived at the conclusion that the country was unable to exist alone after the war
without the protection of a Great Power that could ensure higher living standard for
its population. This necessitated it to remain in the power of Italy (which would no
longer have a fascist government) as a counterweight of Germany (sic)69.
It was A. Ryan who was given the task to acquaint Zogu with his further fate
– something that was done on the very next day. In the course of their tête-à-tête
Zogu expressed readiness to assist the cause of the Allies and offered his help for
military operations on the territory of Albania.
The official position on Zogu’s status was that he was not perceived as hav-
ing abdicated but, because His Majesty’s government had recognized the new sta-
tus of Albania on October 31, 1939, he was not recognized as the sovereign of his
country70. Nevertheless, a little later, thanks to the more favourable comment of A.
Ryan, the intercession of General J. Percy (who once commanded the Albanian
gendarmerie) and to his own activity, Zogu was allowed to remain, after all, under
the condition of abstaining from political activity.
On July 23 A. Ryan visited him again, bearing the glad tidings from Halifax.
Zogu, in turn, again expressed his readiness to support the cause of the Allies. Re-
tired from active diplomatic service, the former ambassador in Tiranë was to remain
the unofficial intermediary between the king and the British authorities.
At that point, the position of the Foreign Office regarding Albania tended
towards obvious reluctance to undertake commitments on the restoration of Alba-
nian independence. Shortly after Italy entered the war, the government declared that
it would retain full freedom of action regarding any undertakings provided in the
past to the Italian government regarding the Mediterranean, the regions of North
and East Africa and the Middle East. Translated into normal language, this convo-
luted phrase meant that it was withdrawing the previous de facto recognition of the
Italian occupation. Immediately after that, however, the Foreign Office added the
condition that this did not include the recognition of independent Albania71.
In a memorandum dating from September, the head of the Albanian section at
the Foreign Office, P. Dixon, suggested anti-Italian propaganda among the Albanian
population in cooperation with SOE. According to him, that would be hindered by
the unclear status of the country, although he again supported the thesis that Albania
was not ready for independence and, after Italy lost the war, it should be left to the
latter as a counterweight to Germany. P. Dixon also suggested that commitments
should not be undertaken but the stress should be laid only on the struggle against
the Italians. Because radio broadcasts and the dissemination of leaflets would be
effected from the territories of Greece and Yugoslavia, it was necessary to assure
their governments that the propaganda would follow a relatively milder line72.
By the beginning of November, the Ministry of Information reported its readi-
ness to begin propaganda in Albanian on the BBC73.

69
PRO FO 471/24868, R 6586/6586/90 D, June 19, 1940.
70
Ibidem.
71
Barker, E. Op. cit., p. 49.
72
PRO FO 371/24867, R 7766/998/90, September 25, 1940.
73
PRO FO 371/24867, R 8313/998/90, November 9, 1940.

64
 * * *
Italy attacked Greece from the territory of Albania on October 28, 194074.
After the initial penetration on Greek territory, the Italian army encountered an un-
expected stiff resistance shown by the Greeks, who in turn made a successful coun-
terattack on Albanian territory. At the same time the British Empire and fascists
Italy were engaged in direct conflict in their North and East Africa territories.
In these circumstances, the British again saw an excellent opportunity to cause
troubles in the enemy rear in Albania. Events also pushed forward the figure of
Zogu, who was ready to ride on the favourable state of affairs. The opinion at the
Foreign Office was that if he were ever to be used that could only be done in his
personal capacity, without his royal title, but as an ordinary Albanian patriot under
the name of Ahmed Bey Zogu. As to the future status of the country, the prevalent
opinion at that point was that it would be a matter of future peaceful settlement75.
Zogu himself made his own plans for a revolt with his active participation.
He offered to go to Istanbul at first to mobilize 14,000 of his followers and then they
would be transferred to Salonika. They were to be joined by more émigrés from
Bulgaria and Egypt. Zogu, however, could not rely on the Albanian diaspora in the
USA, which had a negative attitude to him in its majority76.
In the conditions of obviously softer attitude, the Foreign Office and SOE
agents developed a plan to use the king in support of the Greek allies. He was to be
transported to Greece from where he was to address his compatriots on the radio on
the occasion of Albania’s national holiday, November 2877. Zogu consented, but
insisted on meeting with the British Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary before his
departure, most probably to negotiate on his status. The British authorities, how-
ever, maintained a reserved distance and did not become involved in official con-
tacts, using only A. Ryan to communicate with him.
The Foreign Office informed the Greek government of these intentions, speci-
fying explicitly that the position regarding Zogu and the independence of his coun-
try remained unchanged. The plan did not see green light because of the obvious
unwillingness of the Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Metaxas, to see Zogu on his
territory78. The explanation for this lies in the circumstance that, after the major
Greek military successes in Albania and particularly after Korçë was taken, the Greek
government obviously wanted to retain the territorial acquisitions and rectify the
border in its favour.
P. Dixon suggested that Zogu be “kept on ice” for better times and to be used
again in case things took a bad turn for the Greeks. To that end, he was to be sent to
Cairo, to be at hand and to maintain contact with his compatriots79.

For more details on the Italian-Greek war see for example Cervi, M. The Hollow Legions.
74

Mussolini’s Blunder in Greece, 1940-1941. London, 1972. On the role and place of Albania in this
war see: Fischer, B. Albania and the Italian Invasion of Greece, October, 1940. – In: Greece and the
War, 91-100.
75
PRO FO 371/24868, R 8270/6586/90, November 8, 1940.
76
Ibidem.
77
PRO FO 371/24868, R 8639/6586/90, November 23, 1940.
78
For more details see: Barker, E. Op. cit., 50-51; Kondis, B. Op. cit., 115-117.
79
PRO FO 371/24868, R 8639/6586/90, November 23, 1940.

5, Études balkaniques 4 65
 On December 9, the Foreign Office and SOE finally decided not to resort to
Zogu’s services in such undertakings80. The British position took the interests of the
Greeks into account and remained cautious, restricted only to “liberation of Albania
from fascist yoke”. At the same time, the idea of instigating the Albanians towards
resistance from abroad was not discarded, but without giving them any promises of
independence, Zogu’s restoration or post-war borders81.
Yugoslavia’s position on the situation in Albania was slightly different from
the Greek one. The authorities in Belgrade were not against independence or its
territorial integrity but they, too, had a negative attitude to Zogu. In addition, Prince
Pavle was worried about the hectic activity of SOE in Belgrade, for it could annoy
and provoke the Italians. He cooperated somewhat for the British intentions for
subversive activity in Albania, but without particular enthusiasm82. SOE office in
Belgrade was not troubled by this fact and in December launched a new plan for
revolt in northern Albania with the participation of chieftain Gani Bey, who was to
be helped with air supplies. There were also provisions for the establishment of a
provisional Albanian government that would promptly be recognized by Great Britain
(even the text of acknowledgement was written and appended). The sum of 60,000
pounds was to be set aside for this adventure, plus arms, ammunitions, etc. In this
case, too, the consent of the Greek government was sought83.
The plan was approved by the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Air
Ministry but it, was foiled by Athens again. On December 21 the British ambassa-
dor M. Palairet reported that the Greek government had quite a bad attitude to the
idea of establishing a provisional government. At that, the Royal Air Forces did not
have technical readiness to drop arms from the sky. The Greek General Staff and the
British military experts were of the opinion that the only feasible scheme was to use
small guerrilla bands. The Greeks suggested that this should be done from Yugoslav
territory. Finally SOE London reprimanded its agents in Belgrade as they had obvi-
ously lost their heads and gone way past their authority, reminding them that the
decision about the Albanian revolt lay with the military in Cairo and Athens and
that they were those who gave the instructions. At that time the Greeks still reaped
success on the front in Albania. Approval of a large-scale uprising could bring I.
Metaxas possible commitments that were absolutely unwelcome at that stage84.
SOE agents in the Balkans, however, did not despair or stop at that point.
This time it was the office in Istanbul, where Colonel W. Stirling was entrusted to
deal with Albanian affairs as he had served before the war in Albania as inspector of
the gendarmerie and advisor to the Interior Minister. Under his supervision, promi-
nent Albanian political émigrés established an Albanian Committee for Liberation,
chaired by former ambassador in London Mehmet Bey Konitza. The committee
appealed to the British government to come out with a declaration that Albania
would be restored in its borders of April 7, 1939 (as it had already done in relation
to other occupied states), and the immediate establishment of an Albanian national
government. This allegedly had to be done in order to encourage the Albanian people
80
PRO FO 371/24866, R 8924/6586/90, December 15, 1940.
81
PRO FO 371/24867, R 8783/503/90, December 5, 1940.
82
Barker, E. Op. cit., p. 51.
83
PRO FO 371/24867, R 8992/503/90, December 19, 1940.
84
Barker, E. Op. cit., 52-53.

66
for resistance and clear the doubts about annexation of territories on the part of
Greece. On February 25, 1941, W. Stirling proposed the committee to be trans-
formed into a provisional Albanian government85. The Foreign Office did not take a
stance on this initiative and left it without consequences.
On March 27, 1941, not without the involvement of SOE, a military coup
was staged in Belgrade, headed by General D. Simović86. The British urged the new
government to attack the Italians in Albania, but it was too disorganized and taken
up with other pressing problems to undertake anything that could be interpreted as
open aggression87.
At last, an operation in the Italian rear was organized nevertheless. A band of
Albanians, headed by Lt. Colonel D. Oakley-Hill (another former officer in Albania’s
pre-war gendarmerie), penetrated on Albanian territory and advanced towards
Shkodër. Unluckily, besides being devoid of logistic support, the operation coin-
cided in time precisely with the German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece of April
6. The party was dispersed while D. Oakley-Hill himself, disguised as an Albanian
refugee, headed for Belgrade to seek asylum in the American legation. After that
was refused, he was forced to give himself up to the Germans who sent him to a
POW camp88. That was the end of British plans for a revolt in Albania.

* * *
Official British policy towards occupied Albania, however, was not without
alternative. One could also hear the voice of politicians, public figures and people
of note who were not indifferent to Albania’s fate.
At the end of 1940 the Foreign Office was concerned with the appearance of
a committee titled Friends of the Albanian People. The committee announced its
appearance by a notice in The Times of November 29, which demanded a govern-
ment declaration (on the occasion of Albania’s national holiday) that would encour-
age the resistance of the Albanian people. The committee included Lord Cecil,
Vernon-Bartlett, V. Cazalet, M. E. Durham, R. M. Hodgson, Geoffrey Le M. Mander,
Lord P. Noel-Baker, F. W. Pethic-Lawrence and Ben Riley. In addition, the newspa-
per featured an article on the radio address of Lord Cecil (1937 Nobel Peace Prize
winner) on the occasion of Albania’s national holiday, delivered on the BBC Alba-
nian service the previous day. This is how the address ended: “In any case, friends
of liberty in Britain will insist upon the restoration of Albanian independence and
promote by all means in their power the prosperity of your heroic country.”89
The activity of the committee attracted the interest of the Greek ambassador,
who wanted to find out whether it enjoyed official government support. The For-
eign Office advised him to turn for more information directly to P. Noel-Baker
(Labour MP, well-known humanist and pacifist, 1959 Nobel Peace Prize winner)90.

85
PRO FO 371/29719, R 7173/2/2390, March 7, 1941.
86
For more details on SOE role in the coup see: Stafford, D. SOE and British Involvement in
the Belgrade Coup d’État of March 1941. – Slavic Review, Vol. 36, 1977, No 3, 398-419.
87
Barker, E. Op. cit., 53-54.
88
Costa, N. Invasion – Action and Reaction. Albania, a Case Study. – East European Quar-
terly, Vol. X, 1976, No 1, p. 55.
89
PRO FO 371/24867, R 9032/998/90, December 24, 1940.
90
Ibidem.

67
 On January 23, 1941, Foreign Secretary A. Eden admitted before Lord Cecil
that the government was for an independent Albania on principle, but at the mo-
ment was forced to coordinate its policy with the desires of the Greeks91.
The well-known Balkan Committee in London didn’t remain indifferent as
well and raised the same claims in defence of the Albanian cause. It was presided
over by the popular Lord Noel-Buxton with E. Boyle acting as chairman. At a meet-
ing on January 27, 1941 the committee adopted a resolution to the government,
which expressed sympathy for the Albanian and the Greek peoples and hope for the
restoration of Albania’s complete independence. In addition, the document recalled
the previous activity of the committee in protection of wronged Balkan peoples and
appealed to the government to realize the importance of maintaining the ideal of
self-determination92.
On February 6, Major V. Cazalet (Balkan Committee member, Conservative
MP and personal friend of W. Churchill) wrote a letter to the Foreign Secretary,
suggesting that Albania’s independence be declared one of Britain’s military objec-
tives, without any commitments regarding future borders or the restoration of Zogu.
The response, sent a week later, laconically states that the idea of a declaration that
could give the Albanians confidence in their future status was being considered, but
for various reasons existing at the moment such a declaration would not be made93.
The official position remained unchanged for a long time, although mean-
while other variants for Albania’s post-war future were discussed. For example, by
the end of 1941, the Foreign Office mulled a variant in which the country was to be
driven in the then considered Balkan federation, whose first stage was the conclu-
sion of an agreement between the Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile in
London. The presumption this time was that Italy should not restore its positions in
Albania, which should be placed under a joint Greek-Yugoslav protectorate within
the federation94.
It was only on December 17, 1942 that the Foreign Secretary, again in the
form of an answer during Question Time, announced the recognition of Albania’s
independence95. At that time, British policy already encountered new challenges to
which it had to adapt. They came from Albania itself with the emergence and growth
of the resistance movement.

* * *
British policy towards Albania in the reviewed period reveals complete disre-
gard of Albanian interests, which were sacrificed in the name of egotistical reasons,
which were considered more significant. Insofar as there were any positions in that
country, Britain was ready to relinquish them for the convenience of others – Italy at
first and later Greece. In the long run, the lack of principle and following the winds
of the moment did not lead to any practical results but only permanent and strong
suspicion of the Albanians towards Great Britain for a long time.

91
Barker, E. Op. cit., p. 51.
92
PRO FO 371/29714, R 824/187/90, February 7, 1941.
93
PRO FO 371/29714, R 989/187/90, February 12, 1941.
94
PRO FO 371/29783, R 10045/113/67, November 24, 1941.
95
PRO FO 371/37144, R 10356/1067/90, October 15, 1943.

68