© IESSG

System Vulnerability

Professor Terry Moore

Professor of Satellite Navigation
Institute of Engineering Surveying and Space Geodesy
The University of Nottingham

Version 0909
Motivation for Augmention

• GPS and GLONASS

– not designed for safety-of-life operations
– no performance guarantees

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– accuracy not sufficient for all operations
– cannot always be ‘trusted’
– single-state control
– no liability in case of failure
• Need additional components
– to improve performance
– to provide some performance guarantee
– to address liability issues
Satellite Navigation
System Vulnerability

• Unintentional Interference
– Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)
– Military Trials and Testing
– Ionospheric; Solar Max

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– Spectrum Congestion
• Intentional Interference
– Jamming; Denial of Use
– Spoofing
• Counterfeit Signals
– System Damage
• GPS Constellation
• Ground Control Segment
• Human Factors
– Errors
– Over-Reliance, Lack of Knowledge, Lack of Training
Other Systems

• Cellular phone positioning systems

• LF Systems: Loran-C (eLoran) and Datatrak

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• VHF systems
• Inertial Navigation Systems
Cellular Phone Positioning

• Cell phone based positioning systems

– Not yet standardised
– Networks not designed for accurate positioning

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– Already rely on GPS for synchronisation
– Assisted GPS as vulnerable as GPS itself
LF Systems

• Intentional jamming possible

but very difficult

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• Coverage not worldwide
• Many systems now rely on GPS
timing for synchronisation and
calibration
Loran-C World Coverage

© IESSG Loran-C-Coverage-2003.JPG
GPS & Loran-C

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GPS & Loran-C

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VHF Systems

• VOR/DME and ILS

– Line-of-Sight Systems
– Limited to overland and coastal regions
– VOR is inaccurate

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– DME accurate but prone to survey and calibration errors
– DME has limited capacity of use
– Spectrum Congestion
– ILS was expected to be replaced by MLS
– Intentional and Unintentional Interference
Inertial Navigation
Systems
• Suffer from unbounded and oscillatory errors
• Accurate systems still relatively expensive
• Systems are relatively complex and thus less

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reliable than radionavigation systems

error

84.4
time (mins)
System Dependencies

• Marine
– AIS - Automatic Information System
– GMDSS - Global Maritime Distress & Safety System
– ECDIS - Electronic Chart Display & Information System
• Air
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– EGPWS - Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
– ADS - Automatic Dependent Surveillance and ADS-B
– Landing Systems
• Ground
– Utilities – power, cellphones etc.
– Banking
– Congestion Charging
– Vehicle Management
– Personal Locating Systems – emergency calls
Effect on
Safety-of-Life Systems
• Automatic Information System (AIS)
– All position reports are based on GPS (GNSS)
– The time synchronisation of SO-TDMA is based on GPS
(GNSS)

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– In overload situations, GPS position reports are used to
determine which ships are furthest away for time-slot
sharing
Effect on
Safety-of-Life Systems

• GMDSS
– Distress calls from a ship include identity and GPS
position

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– Latest EPIRBs transmit GPS position from vessels in
distress
• Also many systems for man-overboard
emergencies rely on GPS positioning
Effect on
Safety of Life Systems

• ECDIS
– Position feeds to ECDIS are invariably derived from GPS
(GNSS)

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Effect on
Safety of Life Systems

• EGPWS
– Positioning data used to locate the aircraft on a terrain
database is taken from an FMS, but this is often heavily

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biased to GPS (GNSS) data
– EGPWS for general aviation only uses GPS positioning
– GPS altitude is the primary input to “Geometric Altitude”
used to compare with terrain and obstruction heights
Effect on
Safety of Life Systems

• ADS and ADS-B

– Most aircraft ADS systems take their position from an FMS
for reporting, but this is often heavily biased to GPS
(GNSS) data

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– ADS-B uses the same positions so errors in GPS (GNSS)
could affect collision avoidance
– Aeronautical data-links use GPS timing for synchronisation
Effect on
Safety of Life Systems
• GNSS-LS or GLS
– Can a satellite navigation system really be used for blind
landings?
• Precision Landing Systems

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GNSS

MLS
ILS

APPROACH

LANDING
Effect on
Safety of Life Systems

• GNSS-LS or GLS
– The EGNOS test-bed has been shown to work well for
NPA and APV 1 and 2

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– Can a space-based system really be used for blind
landings?
• Integrity
• Failure Warnings
• Time to Alarm
– Failure of GNSS could mean worldwide or regional loss of
landing aids
Precision Landing
Systems
SBAS
GNSS

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MLS
ILS

ABAS APPROACH
(MMR)

GBAS/GLS
LANDING
Utilities

• Power systems are synchronised using GPS time

• Cellphone networks use GPS time for
synchronisation of their networks and for charging

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• Other utilities are making increased use of GPS
time – some without long-term back-up
Commerce and Banking

• Commerce and Banking transactions are

now reliant on GPS timing

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Effect on
Reporting Systems
• Road Tolling and Congestion Charging
– Future systems may rely partly or wholly on GPS/Galileo

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Effect on
Reporting Systems

• Vehicle Management
– Many systems rely on GPS
– Others use integration with independent radionavigation

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aids but are biased towards GPS
Effect on
Reporting Systems

• Personal Locating Systems

– Most automobile navigation systems rely heavily (if not
totally) on GPS positioning

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– Assisted-GPS positioning is heavily favoured as the system
to meet cellular phone requirements
Effect on
Reporting Systems

EU 112 / UK 999

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DIRECTIVE 2002/22/EC OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of
7 March 2002
on universal service and users' rights relating
to electronic communications networks and
services
(Universal Service Directive)
Effect on
Reporting Systems

UK 999 Mobile Facts & Figures

• Approximately 65,000 - 999/112 calls daily

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• Less than 20,000 are Emergencies
• Balance are misdials/accidental
• More than 60% of genuine calls are from mobiles
• Only 25% of Emergency Authorities can accept
location information electronically
• Peak is midnight-2am New Years day – 1750 calls
per 15mins
The Volpe Report

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Vulnerability Assessment
of the
Transportation Infrastructure
Relying on the
Global Positioning System
August 29, 2001
 The Volpe Report

22 May 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63

The DoT, in consultation with the DoD, shall

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undertake a thorough evaluation of the
vulnerability of the national transportation
infrastructure that relies on GPS.
This evaluation shall include sponsoring an
independent, integrated assessment of risks to
civilian users of GPS-based systems, with a view
to basing decisions on the ultimate architecture of
the modernised National Airspace System on
these evaluations.
 The Volpe Report

• Scope
– Includes analysis of the uses of GPS for civil aviation,
maritime and surface transport (also considers utilities,
communications and banking)

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– Considers the impact of short and long term outage of GPS
– Recommends steps that the US Government and the user
community might take to minimise the impact such outages
would have on safety and operations
– Study period to 2010
 The Volpe Report

• Civilian use of GPS growing rapidly

– High quality of service
– Low cost

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– Ease of use
• Why is civilian use of GPS vulnerable?
– Low signal power
– Single civil frequency
– Easily JAMMED or interfered with
– Competition for Radio Spectrum
– Over-reliance through lack of knowledge
 The Volpe Report

• Main Findings
– Use of GPS as sole-means source of position and timing is
unacceptable

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– Loss of the GPS signal could cause or have severe impact
in terms of safety, environmental and economic damage
– Augmentations help mitigate some damaging effects, but
back-up systems are needed to cover total loss of GPS
signals
– With growing use, GPS is a tempting target
 The Volpe Report

• Recommendations
– Safety must be maintained if GPS is lost
– The level of risk for each critical application must be determined

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before deciding:
• Is a back-up system required?
• How complex (costly) does the back-up system need to be?
 The Volpe Report

• Findings on Unintentional Disruption

– GPS susceptible to:
• Ionospheric effects

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• Signal blockage
• Interference
– Effects most noticeable to single-frequency users
– Number of users of GPS for timing and synchronisation is
rapidly increasing; some applications are critical
 The Volpe Report

• Recommendations on Unintentional Disruption

– Encourage GPS modernisation programmes
– Protect the spectrum allocations

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– Certify receivers for critical use
– Raise user awareness of how best to combat degradation
or loss of GPS
– Implement systems to report and locate unintentional
interference
 The Volpe Report

• Findings on Intentional Disruption

– Potential attacks include:
• Jamming - easy to do
• Spoofing - C/A code well known

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• Disruption of ground stations - good security already
available
• Attacks on satellites - unlikely
 The Volpe Report

• Recommendations on Intentional Disruption

– Consider making military anti-jam technology available
– Consider use of military anti-spoofing

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– Create a two-way dialogue on reporting of threats and
outages

Navsys 7-Antenna Array

 The Volpe Report

• Findings Specific to Transportation

– Vulnerability can be reduced but not eliminated;
therefore:

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• GPS cannot be sole-source of position or timing
• Maintenance of safety in life-threatening situations requires
back-up systems; these may be:
– terrestrial or space-based
– on-board the vehicle
– or covered by procedures
 The Volpe Report

• Recommendations on Transportation
– Create awareness of need for back-up systems or procedures
(including training)
– Analyse GPS back-up options

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– Continue Loran-C modernisation
– Encourage the use of autonomous integrity monitoring
– Ensure timely warning in critical applications
– Develop a policy for future infrastructure to meet these
vulnerabilities and publish in the FRP
Will Galileo Help?

• Galileo has similar vulnerabilities to those of GPS

• 30 more satellites will make GNSS more robust
• Diversity of frequencies, signal structures and

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coding will reduce interference risk and make
jamming and spoofing more difficult
• Separate Ground Control segments will reduce risk
of total failure and make terrorist attack more
difficult
Since Volpe

• GPS has become a critical part of economic

infrastructure (and Galileo will follow)
• Many more studies – not only in USA

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• Consideration of what Back-up aids and
procedures are available and appropriate
• Latest Report from FAA– GPS back-up for
Position, Navigation and Timing,
dated August 22, 2006
Professor Terry Moore
Director IESSG
The University of Nottingham

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University Park
Nottingham
NG7 2RD
UK

• Telephone: +44 (0) 115 951 3886

• Fax: +44 (0) 115 951 3881
• Email: terry.moore@nottingham.ac.uk
• WWW: www.nottingham.ac.uk/iessg