India and weapons of mass destruction

India has developed weapons of mass destruction in the form of nuclear and chemical

weapons and is known to possess nuclear weapons currently. Although India has not released
any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India
has 160 nuclear weapons[1] and has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 200
nuclear weapons.[9] In 1999, India was estimated to have 800 kilograms (1,800 lb) of
separated reactor-grade plutonium, with a total amount of 8,300 kilograms (18,300 lb) of civilian
plutonium, enough for approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons.[10][11] India has conducted nuclear
weapons tests in a pair of series namely Pokhran I and Pokhran II.[12]
India is a member of three multilateral export control regimes — the Missile Technology Control
Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. It has signed and ratified the Biological
Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. India is also a subscribing state
to the Hague Code of Conduct. India has signed neither the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty nor the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, considering both to be flawed and
discriminatory.[13] India previously possessed chemical weapons, but voluntarily destroyed its
entire stockpile in 2009 — one of the seven countries to meet the OPCW extended deadline.[14]
India maintains a "no first use" nuclear policy and has developed a nuclear triad capability as a
part of its "Minimum Credible Deterrence" doctrine.[15][16][17]

Biological weapons[edit]
Further information: History of biological warfare

India has ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and pledges to abide by its
obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an
offensive BW program. India does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch
an offensive BW program. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to
produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to
sophisticated ballistic missiles.[18]
No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in
delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in October
2002, the then President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam asserted that "India will not make biological
weapons. It is cruel to human beings".[18]

Chemical weapons[edit]
Further information: Chemical weapon

In 1992, India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), becoming one of the original
signatories of the CWC in 1993,[19] and ratified it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-
Army Chief General Sundarji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does
not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only
in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India
has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons
system at its command.
In June 1997, India declared its stock of chemical weapons (1,045 tonnes of sulphur mustard).[20]
[21]
 By the end of 2006, India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical
weapons/material stockpile and was granted extension for destroying the remaining stocks by
April 2009 and was expected to achieve 100 percent destruction within that time frame.[20] India
informed the United Nations in May 2009 that it had destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons
in compliance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. With this India has become
third country after South Korea and Albania to do so.[22][23] This was cross-checked by inspectors
of the United Nations.
India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own
chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has an extensive
civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of
chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States and Taiwan.[24]

Nuclear weapons[edit]
See also: India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement

Further information: Strategic Forces Command

As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:
As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest
devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope
Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened,
she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.[25]
Nehru pursued a policy of formally foregoing nuclear weapons while at the same time
constructing a civilian nuclear energy program, and by extension the capability to make a nuclear
bomb. This policy was motivated by a conventional weapons superiority over its rivals Pakistan
and China.[26] India built its first research reactor in 1956 and its first plutonium reprocessing plant
by 1964.[27][28][29] India's nuclear programme can trace its origins to March 1944 and its three-
stage efforts in technology were established by Homi Jehangir Bhabha when he founded the
nuclear research centre, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.[30][31]
India's loss to China in a brief Himalayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi
government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Chinese
aggression.[32] By 1964 India was in a position to develop nuclear weapons.[33] Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri opposed developing nuclear weapons but fell under intense political pressure,
including elements within the ruling Indian National Congress. India was also unable to obtain
security guarantees from either the United States or the Soviet Union. As a result, Shastri
announced that India would pursue the capability of what it called "peaceful nuclear explosions"
that could be weaponized in the future.[26]
India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), under Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The test used plutonium produced in the
Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for
peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes. This also stimulated the early work of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[34] During the 1970s and the 1980s Prime Ministers Indira
Gandhi, Morarji Desai, and Rajiv Gandhi opposed weaponizing its nuclear program beyond
PNE's and theoretical research. In 1982, Indira Gandhi refused to allow the Defence Research
and Development Organisation to develop active nuclear weapons, but also approved
the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme that would develop missiles to deliver a
nuclear warhead if India developed one. India also supported international nuclear non-
proliferation and arms control efforts.[26]
The situation changed again in the late 1980s after the 1987 Brasstacks crisis and the beginning
of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In 1989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave Defense
Secretary Naresh Chandra approval to develop the bomb. Chandra continued the program
through successive governments in the 1990s after Gandhi lost power in the 1989 general
election. India most likely completed weaponized nuclear warheads around 1994.[26] India
performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti") under Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In 1998, as a response to the continuing tests, the United States
and Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been lifted.[35]

Neutron bombs[edit]
R Chidambaram, who headed India's Pokhran-II nuclear tests, said in a 1999 interview with
the Press Trust of India that India is capable of producing a neutron bomb.[36]
India's no-first-use policy[edit]
India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear
doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government
released a draft of the doctrine[37] which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence
and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also maintains that India
"will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should
deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorise the use of nuclear weapons would be made by
the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s)'.[37] According to the NRDC, despite the
escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002, India remained committed to its
nuclear no-first-use policy.
India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Indian Air
Force officer, Air Marshal Tej Mohan Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services
SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. It is also responsible
for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the
CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorised to order a nuclear strike
against another offending strike. The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon reiterated a
policy of "no first use" against nuclear weapon states and "non use against non-nuclear weapon
states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence
College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic
culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence.[38][39] In April 2013 Shyam Saran, convener of
the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that regardless of the size of a nuclear attack
against India, be it a miniaturised version or a "big" missile, India will retaliate massively to inflict
unacceptable damage.[40]
In 2016, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned the no first use policy, asking why India
should "bind" itself when it is a "responsible nuclear power". Later he clarified that this was his
personal opinion.[41] Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in 2019 said that in the future, India's no first
use policy might change depending upon the "circumstances".[42][43] In a January 2022 statement,
however, the Ministry of External Affairs reiterated India's doctrine of "maintaining a credible
minimum deterrence based on a No First Use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states".[17][44]

Indian nuclear triad[edit]

See also: Nuclear triad

Air-launched nuclear weapons[edit]

The Mirage 2000 of the Indian Air Force is believed to be assigned the nuclear strike role, operating from
Maharajpur Air Force Station.

Nuclear-armed fighter-bombers were India's first and only nuclear-capable strike force until 2003,
when the country's first land-based nuclear ballistic missiles were fielded.[45]
In addition to their ground-attack role, it is believed that the Dassault Mirage
2000s and SEPECAT Jaguars of the Indian Air Force are able to provide a secondary nuclear-
strike role.[46] The SEPECAT Jaguar was designed to be able to carry and deploy nuclear
weapons and the Indian Air Force has identified the jet as being capable of delivering Indian
nuclear weapons.[47] The most likely delivery method would be the use of bombs that are free-
falling and unguided.[48]
Three airbases with four squadrons of Mirage 2000H (about 16 aircraft with 16 bombs from 1st
and 7th squadrons of the 40th Wing at Maharajpur Air Force Station) and Jaguar IS/IB (about 32
aircraft with 32 bombs from one squadron each at Ambala Air Force Station and Gorakhpur Air
Force Station) aircraft, are believed to be assigned the nuclear strike role.[45]
Land-based ballistic missiles[edit]

Agni-V during its first test flight on 19 April 2012

The estimated 68 nuclear warheads[45] of land-based nuclear weapons of India are under the
control of and deployed by the Strategic Forces Command,[49] using a variety of both vehicles and
launching silos. They currently consist of six different types of ballistic missiles, the Agni-I,
the Agni-II, Agni-III, Agni-IV, Agni-V, Agni-P and the Army's variant of the Prithvi missile family –
the Prithvi-I. However, the Prithvi missiles are less useful for delivering nuclear weapons
because they have a shorter range and must be deployed very close to the India–Pakistan
border.[26] Additional variants of the Agni missile series have recently been inducted including the
most recent, the Agni-IV[50] and the Agni-V, which is currently being deployed.[51] Agni-VI is also
under development, with an estimated range of 8,000–12,000 km and features such as Multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or Maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs).[52]
[53]

The Agni-V ballistic missile at Republic Day parade.

Land-based ballistic missiles

Name Type Range (km) Status

Prithvi-I   Short-range ballistic missile 150 Deployed

 Prithvi-II   Short-range ballistic missile 250–350

Prithvi-III   Short-range ballistic missile 350–600

Agni-I Medium-range ballistic missile 700

Shaurya Medium-range ballistic missile 700-1900

Agni-P Medium-range ballistic missile 1,000–2,000

Agni-II Medium-range ballistic missile 2,000–3,000

Agni-III Intermediate-range ballistic missile 3,500–5,000

Agni-IV Intermediate-range ballistic missile 4000

Agni-V Intercontinental ballistic missile 5,000–8,000

Intercontinental ballistic missile & MIRV 8,000– Under

Agni-VI
capable 12,000 development

Sea-based ballistic missiles[edit]

K-15 Sagarika SLBM

The Indian Navy has developed two sea-based delivery systems for nuclear weapons,
completing Indian ambitions for a nuclear triad, which may have been deployed in 2015.[54][55]

A conceptual drawing of INS Arihant

The first is a submarine-launched system consisting of at least four 6,000 tonne (nuclear-
powered) ballistic missile submarines of the Arihant class. The first vessel, INS Arihant, was
commissioned in August 2016. She is the first nuclear-powered submarine to be built by India.[56]
[57]
 A CIA report claimed that Russia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion
program.[58][59] The submarines will be armed with up to 12 Sagarika (K-15) missiles armed with
nuclear warheads. Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 km.
This missile has a length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry a pay load of up to
500 kg.[60] Sagarika has already been test-fired from an underwater pontoon, but now DRDO is
planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the
services of the Russian Navy.[61] India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic
missile version of the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. According to Indian defence
sources, the Agni-III SL will have a range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 mi).[62] The new missile will
complement the older and less capable Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
However, the Arihant class ballistic missile submarines will be only capable of carrying a
maximum of four Agni-III SL.
The second is a ship-launched system based around the short range ship-launched Dhanush
ballistic missile (a variant of the Prithvi missile). It has a range of around 300 km. In the year
2000 the missile was test-fired from INS Subhadra (a Sukanya class patrol craft).
INS Subhadra was modified for the test and the missile was launched from the reinforced
helicopter deck. The results were considered partially successful.[63] In 2004, the missile was
again tested from INS Subhadra and this time the results were reported successful.[64] In
December 2005 the missile was tested again, but this time from the destroyer INS Rajput. The
test was a success with the missile hitting the land based target.[65]

Sea-based ballistic missiles

Name Type Range (km) Status

Dhanush Short-range ballistic missile 350 Operational[66]

Sagarika (K- Submarine-launched ballistic

700 Operational
15)   missile

K-4 Submarine-launched ballistic 3,500 Tested[67]

 missile

Submarine-launched ballistic
K-5 5,000 Under Development[68]
missile

Submarine-launched ballistic
K-6 6,000 Under Development[69]
missile

International response[edit]
India is not a signatory to either the NPT or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 17 nuclear reactors
are subject to IAEA safeguards. India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as
late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution[70] which urged all
non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.[71] India voted against the
UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on 10 September
1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-
bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition,
India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the
treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose
whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral reiterated
India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear
weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only
certain types of tests."
In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved safeguards agreement
with India under which the former will gradually gain access to India's civilian nuclear reactors.
[72]
 In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver allowing it to access
civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[73] The implementation of this waiver
makes India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is
still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[74][75]
Since the implementation of the NSG waiver, India has signed nuclear deals with several
countries including France,[76] United States,[77] Mongolia, Namibia,[78] Kazakhstan[79] and
Australia[80] while the framework for similar deals with Canada and the United Kingdom are also
being prepared.[81][82][75]

Domestic legislation[edit]
India has a number of laws in whole or in partial measure that deal with the regulation of
weapons of mass destruction.[83] They include the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their
Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005.[83] In April 2022 a bill was tabled
to amend the 2005 act to include the financing of proliferation.[84]