6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty.
Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
NUISANCE
1. PEDRO J. VELASCO vs. MERALCO
 FACTS: In 1948, Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of
South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. He sold two (2) of
these to Meralco and maintained the last one as his residence.
In 1953, Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance
of 10-20 meters away from Velasco’s house without prior building
permit or authority from the Public Service Commission. The company
also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only
an interlink wire fence (previously a sawale wall) on the boundary with
appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused
by transformers. Such, Velasco contends, constitute a nuisance which
has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his
property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were
vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The
audible sound from different areas in Velaso’s property was measured
in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the average
intensity levels of residences.
ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound? YES
HELD: The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual
or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others,
and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain
against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that
such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such
disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage,  1 being guilty
of causing nuisance.
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, but it must be a noise
which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the
vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The test is whether rights of
property of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise
in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond
the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of
holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine
it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another
owner who though creating a noise is acting with reasonable regard
for the rights of those affected by it.  December 16, 1971 was made as of June 12, 1972. Hence, it is quite
In Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson provides:
The determinating factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is
not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and
valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact
dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions.
Thus the impartial and objective evidence points to the sound emitted
by the Meralco's substation transformers being of much higher level
than the ambient sound of the locality. The conclusion must be that,
the noise continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an
actionable nuisance for which the Velasco is entitled to relief, by
requiring the Meralco company to adopt the necessary measures to
deaden or reduce the sound at the Velasco’s house, by replacing the
interlink wire fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material,
since the relocation of the substation is manifestly impracticable and
would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who are
being serviced from the substation.
In Kentucky case, the average of three readings along the plaintiff's
fence was only 44 decibels but, because the sound from the sub-
station was interminable and monotonous, the court authorized an
injunction and damages. In the present case, the three readings along
the property line are 52, 54 and 55 decibels. Thus, Velasco's case is
manifestly stronger.
2. HOA OF EL DEPOSITO vs LOOD
47 SCRA 174
FACTS: Petitioners filed on April 15, 1970 this action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside respondent court's
questioned denying petitioners' motions for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of their
houses and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
Jesus and Halo Halo in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El
Deposito" from the Spanish times), pending final outcome of Civil
Case No. 11078 filed by them before respondent court.
Petitioners' action below was one for declaratory relief to declare as
null and void as ex post facto legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89,
as amended, of respondent Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting
squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under
which ordinance, petitioners claimed, respondents were summarily
demolishing and removing their houses and improvements.
Petitioners raise as issues also the issue of validity and
constitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended as
questioned by them in their action below, and whether respondent
Engineer may remove or demolish their houses without a special court
demolition order under said challenged ordinance; and furthermore,
"whether the filing of the petition for compulsory registration in LRC
Cad. Case No. N-6, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-511 which placed in issue
the status of the land as demanded for reasons of public interest
where the houses and other improvements of the petitioners as
claimants in the cadastral proceeding are found, precludes the
enforcement of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amd."
The comment of the therein respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, asserting its ownership of the property since its
survey in 1910 as conducted for the Metropolitan Water District and
approved by the Director of Lands said therein that within the property
which had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the old
Metropolitan Water District (with a total area of 132,597 square
meters, of which 14,138 square meters are used for public roads) 6 are
"aqueducts and an underground reservoir", and that its predecessor-
in-interest (Nawasa) had sold a portion (16,409 sq. meters) of the
property to the Municipality of San Juan (on which are constructed the
municipality's elementary school, home economics building and
gymnasium), leased a portion thereof (4,102 sq. meters) for the
municipality's public high school, and "leased some lots to those who
have squatted on the said property." 50,000 square meters or five
hectares of the property were likewise leased by the Nawasa to the
Pinaglabanan Commemorative Commission (created by Executive
Order No. 263 of the President of the Philippines dated August 15,
1957) 7 for a 99-year period from August 21, 1963 for the site of the
national shrine to commemorate the "Battle of Pinaglabanan" on
August 28 and 29, 1896 between the Katipunan revolutionaries and
the Spanish garrison defending the gunpowder dump (called the
"polvorin") in San Juan, Rizal. Final entry of the dismissal order of
clear that as of now, there exist no proceedings, cadastral or
otherwise, questioning the public character of the land and asserting
petitioners' alleged claims of ownership thereto.
RULING:
On the main issue at bar, the Court is satisfied that by no means may
respondent court be said to have exceeded its authority or gravely
abused its discretion in issuing its questioned orders denying
petitioners' motion below for a writ of preliminary injunction allegedly
"to maintain the status quo" and stay demolition and removal of their
illegal constructions found to be public nuisances per se and serious
hazards to public health, 8 by virtue of the following principal
considerations:
Petitioners' lack of right to the injunction sought by them was further
shown in the Court of Appeals' decision of February 4, 1969, where it
noted that "their very evidence, their documentary proof, would justify
that their houses were built upon land of the Metropolitan Water
District, that is to say, of the Philippine Government, therefore, such
tax declarations of petitioners' houses themselves are the best proof of
their admission that their possession of the lands they occupy was not
and could not be adverse" 14 and that "their shanties pose a veritable
danger to public health." 15
xxx
5. No error, much less abuse of authority or discretion, could be
attributed to respondent court's statements and reasons for denying
the injunction sought by petitioners, as per its order of March 30, 1970,
denying reconsideration, as follows:
... The issues raised by the pleadings to determine whether or
not the petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction, or a status quo, in the words of the petitioners, had
been resolved several times not only by this Court but also by
the Court of Appeals, and this Court believes that insofar as
the same grounds are concerned, they are res judicata
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 1
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the land in
question is public land, in the sense that it is untitled.
However, as the government now contends, the land in
question is clothed with a public purpose to be utilized for
public service by the government. This fact has not been
denied and as a matter of fact, the petitioners admit that the
land in question is public land. ...
6. The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance
No. 89-Amended need not be resolved in this proceeding, as it should
first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in the action
below. Suffice it to note that the Solicitor General appears to have
correctly stated the actual situation in that petitioners do not dispute
the authority of the San Juan council to pass ordinances providing for
the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance in
question may not be faulted for being ex post facto in application since
it "does not seek to punish an action done which was innocent before
the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present and
continuing act of unlawful occupancy of public property or properties
intended for public use." 16 At any rate, the decisive point is that
independently of the said ordinance, petitioners' constructions which
have been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without provision
for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without
building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of
the main water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater
Manila area) may be abated without judicial proceedings under our
Civil Code. 17
As stated in Sitchon vs. Aquino, 18 the police power of the state
justifies the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings of
public nuisances per se. No error, much less any abuse of discretion,
grave or otherwise, may therefore be attributed against respondent
court in having issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of
public health and welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by
petitioners to allow them to continue occupying the land in question
with their condemned constructions and structures.
3. THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO vs. HON.
GUARDSON LOOD, Judge of The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI
FACTS: Petitioners occupy a public land with a total area of 132,597
square meters, of which 14,138 square meters are used for public
roads and some parts are aqueducts and an underground reservoir".
Petitioners' filed a declaratory relief to declare as null and void as ex
post facto legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89 of respondent
Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting squatting on public property and
providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance, petitioners
claimed, respondents were summarily demolishing and removing their
houses and improvements. Respondent Judge denied the preliminary
injunction sought to stay demolition and removal of petitioners' houses
and structures.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' houses and structures are
nuisances per se.
RULING: YES. The Court is satisfied that petitioners’ illegal
constructions are public nuisances per se and serious hazards to
public health.
Petitioners failed to show that they have even a color of title to entitle
them to exercise the right of possession to the premises in question.
On the other hand, the land is admittedly public land and consequently
the petitioners have no right to possession thereof.
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the land in question is
public land, in the sense that it is untitled. However, as the government
now contends, the land in question is clothed with a public purpose to
be utilized for public service by the government. This fact has not been
denied and as a matter of fact, the petitioners admit that the land in
question is public land.
Petitioners' very evidence, their documentary proof, would justify that
their houses were built upon land of the Metropolitan Water District,
that is to say, of the Philippine Government, therefore, such tax
declarations of petitioners' houses themselves are the best proof of
their admission that their possession of the lands they occupy was not
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
and could not be adverse” and that "their shanties pose a veritable
danger to public health."
Petitioners' constructions which have been duly found to be public
nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of
waste matters and constructed without building permits contiguously to
and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water pipelines which
supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated
without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.
As stated in Sitchon vs. Aquino, the police power of the state justifies
the abatement or destruction by summary proceedings of public
nuisances per se. No error, much less any abuse of discretion, grave
or otherwise, may therefore be attributed against respondent court in
having issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of public
health and welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by
petitioners to allow them to continue occupying the land in question
with their condemned constructions and structures.
4. SOLIS vs. PUJEDA
FACTS: The defendant Benedicta Pujeda is the owner of a strip of
land in the barrio of Calibuyo, municipality of Tanza, Cavite, lying
along a stream known as the estero of Calibuyo.
Prior to the institution of this action, the plaintiffs constructed a dam of
stone or concrete across said stream in order to obtain water for
irrigation purposes, and one of the wings of the dam was made to rest
upon the bank which belongs to Benedicta Pujeda. As a result of this
construction, not only were several square meters of land belonging to
Benedicta Pujeda appropriated by the plaintiffs for purposes of
construction, but several hundred additional square meters lying along
the stream above the dam and belonging to her were flooded by the
rise of the water consequent upon the building off the dam. Believing
herself to be aggrieved by this, Benedicta Pujeda, with the aid of one
Roman Arañas, on or about July 20, 1918, made an opening in that
portion of the dam which abuts upon her property, to the extent
necessary to free the water that had accumulated upon her property.
The perforation thus effected in the dam was about 1 meter wide and 2
meters deep.
Thereafter the present action was instituted by the plaintiffs to restrain
Benedicta Pujeda (with whom is joined her husband Valentin Giongco)
and Roman Arañas from interfering with the reparation of the dam by
the plaintiffs, and to enjoin the same defendants from molesting the
plaintiffs in the use of said dam in the future.
ISSUE: WON the dam is a private nuisance.
HELD: The question whether the plaintiffs have justified the invasion
by them of the rights of Benedicta Pujeda in the manner above stated,
for it is evident that if the building of the dam by the plaintiffs was
unauthorized, so much of the construction as rests upon the land of
Benedicta Pujeda constitutes a private nuisance and may be lawfully
demolished or removed by her or by any person acting under her
directions. It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that they had
legal authority to build the dam.
In this connection it appears that when this work was first undertaken
several years ago, the plaintiffs expected to obtain the approval of the
Director of Lands for the project, and at that time they promised to
indemnify Benedicta Pujeda for any damaged caused to her by the
construction of the dam. However, after the work had progressed to a
certain extent, the Director of Lands ordered its removal. Later, the
Director of Lands proposed as a reasonable solution of the
controversy that, if the plaintiffs desired to continue with the
construction of the dam, they should within thirty days deposit with the
Bureau of Lands the sum of P371.68 to cover the damage that would
probably be done to Benedicta Pujeda. This deposit was apparently
made. Still later, upon further protest from Benedicta Pujeda, security
was given by bond to the extent of P1,000. The Director of Lands
having thus, inferentially at least, approved the project under the
conditions stated, the plaintiffs proceeded with the construction, and
reliance is now placed by them upon the authority thus granted by the
Director of Lands as sufficient justification for their continuing the work.
Assuming, as we do, that the Director of Lands intended, by the
communications referred to in the decision of the trial judge, to
authorized the undertaking referred to, we are nevertheless of the
opinion that under the facts appearing of record he had no power to
confer such authority.
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 2
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
By article 143 of the Law of Waters, an easement of buttress can be
imposed by administrative authority with respect to land lying adjacent
to public or private waters; but in such case it is required that an
investigation of record shall be made before the easement of buttress
is decreed.
For the purposes of this decision it may be taken for granted that the
Bureau of Lands is the proper repository of the administrative authority
conferred in said article with respect to the decreeing of the easement
in case of public waters, and the Director of Lands may be assumed to
be the proper official to conduct the investigation and make the
appropriate order. Nevertheless, the making of the investigation of
record is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of the power. This
implies that the interest parties shall have an opportunity to be heard
and that record be made of the proof adduced with reference to the
proposed servitude and the damage to result therefrom. These
formalities are essential; otherwise the decreeing of the servitude
would be obnoxious to the constitutional provision which forbids the
taking of property without due process of law. The administrative
investigation contemplated in article 143 of the Law of Waters must
proceed along the lines of a judicial inquiry, at least to the extent of
giving the parties an opportunity to be heard and making record of the
proof pertinent to their respective contentions.
In the case now before us no investigation of record was made. About
all that appears to have been done was that the watermaster, as
representative of the Director of Lands, inspected the site of the dam
and recommended that it be removed, reporting that it had been a
failure. The letters referred to by the court as constituting a license
from the Director of Lands to the plaintiffs to proceed with the work,
under the conditions already stated, show a praiseworthy effort on the
part of that official to adjust the controversy upon a fair basis, but they
afford no legal warrant for the plaintiffs to proceed with the
construction of the dam.
It appears that the land owned by Benedicta Pujeda is of the class
known as friar lands; and his Honor, the trial judge, seems to have
supposed that section 19 of Act No. 1120, referring to these lands,
gives the Government special authority to construct, or to authorized
another to construct, improvements of this character upon such lands.
However, we discover nothing in said provision which, when rightly
interpreted, could be considered as conferring upon the Director of
Lands any such extraordinary power as has been here claimed.
It results that the dam in question has been constructed without
legal authority, and the action instituted by the plaintiffs cannot
be maintained. The judgment appealed from will therefore be
reversed, and the defendants will be absolved from the
complaint.
Under the prayer of their cross-complaint the defendants Benedicta
Pujeda, with her husband, Valentin Giongco, are entitled to an order,
which will be accordingly entered, requiring the plaintiffs within a
reasonable time to remove so much of the dam as constitutes a
burden upon the land of Benedicta Pujeda, and to the extent
necessary to avoid the flooding or her land by the obstruction of the
dam. In addition to this, judgment will be entered that the same
defendants recover of the plaintiffs the sum of P80, plus the further
sum of P6.80 for each year from April, 1915, until the obstruction
mentioned shall have been removed, as ordered. No special
pronouncement will be made as to costs of either instance.
5. RAMCAR, INC. vs. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL
FACTS: Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair
and body building shop at General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila, while
the seven private respondents reside near or around the shop.
The nature of the corporation's activities, actually engaged in, consists
in repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles, and involves the
use of tools and machinery that give rise to much noise and
annoyance during all hours of the day up to nighttime; and its
employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. Respondents
brought an action before the CFI of Manila to abate the said
establishment as a nuisance.
ISSUE: 1. WON, Ramcar’s auto repair and body-building shop is a
nuisance. YES; 2. WON there can be damages from nuisance. YES
HELD: (1) It appears that Ramcar has been granted a license and
permit to operate a garage. Section 5 of Ordinance No. 2830 of the
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
City of Manila, restricts the kinds of business, buildings and
establishments that may be built on commercial zones and the
enumeration of permitted activities includes "6. Garage and gasoline
service stations". A body building shop is not within the purview of
"garage", which designates a shop for storing, repairing and servicing
motor vehicles, being merely a modern substitute for the ancient livery
stable.
It is clear that the business of Ramcar, Inc. is not a mere garage or
automobile repair and painting shop, within the contemplation of
Section 5 of the City Ordinances. Besides the usual services of vehicle
storage, of supplying gas, and of making repairs, the shop also
assembles and rebuilds car and truck bodies which require more than
ordinary labor and skill and involves the use of tools and machinery
with the concomitant noise created by the use of those tools and
machines. While repair work may be considered as a necessary
incident of a garage or gasoline service station for purposes of
goodwill when they involve minor repairs, body assembling or
rebuilding certainly makes such kind of business more than a mere
garage and gas service station and, for zonification purposes, should
not be confused with and must be separated from a garage or gas
service business.
(2) The award of damages arising from a nuisance is enshrined under
the NCC:
ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude
the right of any person injured to recover damages for its
past existence.;
and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code states:
ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to
special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this
Code . . .
However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is
only on account of its location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it
is not necessary, to remove all building an structures built in the place
where it is presently located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized
for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.
6. TIMONER VS PEOPLE
125 SCRA 830
FACTS: In the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor
of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen,
Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front
of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the
same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail
together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into
the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway.
Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual
Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one
Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, for non-
compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court against Lourdes
Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls.
Petitioner alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well
as nuisances per se. Petitioner contends that the sealing off of
complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public
nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral,
were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal
Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two
policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal
by inducement.
ISSUE: Whether the barbershop did constitute a public nuisance
RULING: YES
Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public
nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code,
to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 3
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of water;
or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A
public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal A private nuisance is one that is not
included in the foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's
main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the
Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said
barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus:
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in
point, there is no semblance of any legality or right
that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall
and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially
in a highway where it does not only constitute a
menace to the health of the general public passing
through the street and also of the unsanitary
condition that is bred therein as well as the
unsightly and ugly structures in the said place.
Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that
there was a license, permit or toleration of the
defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for
a number of years does not lend legality to an act
which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects
the community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons and the general
public which posed a danger to the people in
general passing and using that place, for in
addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the
invasion of its rights — the fact that it is in a public
place and annoying to all who come within its
sphere xxx xxx xxx
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have
been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3,
Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public
nuisance without judicial proceedings.
ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance
are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local
ordinance; or
[2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely
implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health
Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty,
petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
7. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines)
FACTS: Petitioner Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder
of a Mastercard bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by
Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren on an Asian tour, Aznar made
a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention
of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to
Kuala Lumpur and on July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren
left Cebu for the said destination.
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was
not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets
to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in
cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his
card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to
use blacklisted cards. Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines
on August 10, 1994.
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against
Citibank, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence
blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and
grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them
from buying certain items in their tour. He further claimed that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful
blacklisting of his card. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his
Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the
signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card
in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. It also
contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance
and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the
dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate, and that its liability for
any action or incident which may be brought against it in relation to the
issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to P1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven whichever is lesser.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank and is therefore entitled to damages.
RULING: NO. In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed
that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in
several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia,
particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was humiliated
when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a
blacklisted card.
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar
failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the "hot list." Aznar
in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his
Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed such fact
from the dishonor of his card. The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is
not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was
blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s own admission
that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore,
his Mastercard was accepted and honored.
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar
by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard
was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the
words "DECL OVERLIMIT" however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not
sufficiently established by petitioner.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually
see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide
evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi,
who handed to him said computer print-out. Indeed, Aznar failed to
demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was
generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which
limits its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven, whichever
is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being
unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger amount even
though damage may be clearly proven. This Court is not precluded
from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of a contract if the
attendant facts and circumstances show that they should be ignored
for being obviously too one-sided.56
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 4
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by Citibank,
notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award damages in favor of
petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be
awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause
of the injury.
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other
party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually
established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained
by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are
recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue
embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by
Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated
that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court
cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by
preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that
would make it answerable for said suffering.
As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private
respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his
credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
8. ROBLEZA VS CA
FACTS: It appears that on June 24, 1979, in General Santos City,
petitioner Julita A. Robleza, with the consent of her husband, petitioner
Jesus Robleza, sold a parcel of land to spouses Elpedio and Marianne
Tan.
At present, this lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19727 in the name of respondent corporation.  made in the presence and within the observation of private
For said purpose, petitioners executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of the Tan spouses over the lots supposedly for and in consideration of
the sum of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) which was therein
acknowledged to have been allegedly paid. Incidentaly, says the
respondent court, Elpedio Tan is the baptismal godson of petitioners
and his mother was a schoolmate of petitioner Julita Robleza. In fine,
the parents of Elpedio Tan and petitioners have known each other for
more than forty years and are close to each other.  respondent insists that said petitioner came in 1981. However, when
Petitioners, claiming that they did not receive a single centavo from the
Tans and maintaining that the purchase price of ten thousand pesos
(P l0,000.00) appearing on the face of the deed of sale was not the
true purchase price, presented in evidence two checks issued by
Elpedio Tan which represented the actual stipulated price.
When it became clear to petitioners that the Tan spouses did not really
intend to pay the agreed price of the subject lots, they demanded the
return of their certificates of title. It was at this juncture that Elpedio
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
Tan admitted to petitioners that he had transferred the titles to the lots
in his name and that he had mortgaged the lots and turned over his
certificates of title to respondent corporation. Petitioner Jesus Robleza
demanded confirmation of that information and so he and Elpidio Tan
proceeded to the office of respondent corporation in Bacolod City. That
was sometime before February 5, 1980. True enough, as confirmed by
Romeo Uy, the general manager of respondent corporation, petitioner
found out that the two lots were used as collaterals and that the
certificates of title were in the possession of the private respondent.
Apprised of the true facts on the status of the said two lots and the
non-payment of the purchase price by the Tan spouses, said general
manager of respondent corporation refused to return the certificates of
title but signified his willingness to accept other collaterals provided a
partial payment of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) would first be
made by Elpedio Tan. 
For failure of the Tans to pay their outstanding obligation to private
respondent, the mortgage on the two lots was foreclosed and the
same were sold on June 17, 1981 to respondent corporation in a
public auction sale conducted by the City Sheriff of General Santos
City.
Robleza for the nullification of the aforesaid deed of sale for want of
consideration and for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title
issued to private respondent. Petitioners claim that they have always
been in possession of the subject property, that neither the Tan
spouses nor private respondent ever took possession thereof and that
respondent corporation acted in bad faith.
ISSUE: WON respondents acted in bad faith making petitioners
entitled to damages.
HELD: Yes.
It may be true that, when the mortgage was constituted, respondent
corporation could have had the right to rely on the veracity of Tan's
claims respecting his legitimate use of said titles therefor. However, it
is uncontradicted that long before the foreclosure proceedings, there
occurred two events erosive of any pretension of good faith by private
respondent. Firstly, when a lawyer of respondent corporation went to
General Santos City for the purpose of fencing the land, he was
prevented from doing so and was, instead, informed by petitioners
about the non-payment by the Tan spouses of the purchase price and
given xerox copies of the bouncing checks of Elpedio Tan. Secondly,
when petitioner Jesus Robleza thereafter went to Bacolod City, he fully
informed the manager of respondent corporation of what transpired
during the first incident and of the fraud which Tan had perpetrated on
petitioners, which actuations of petitioner were later confirmed by the
latter and by Tan . 
Thus, as early as the time when respondent corporation's lawyer went
to see the property, bad faith had set in since, in that posture, it was
incumbent upon respondent corporation to initiate the proper legal
remedies for the protection of its supposed alleged rights. Its failure to
do so is strongly indicative of bad faith for, if it really believed that it
had every right to the possession of the land as a mortgagee, it would
not have treated the matter so lightly and with indifference. Its
unexplained silence may be deemed a recognition and an admission
on its part that petitioners are the true owners of the subject lots. The
categorical refusal of petitioners to surrender possession of the land
and their unequivocal declaration that they are the true owners thereof,
respondent's agents who did or said nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
may be given in evidence against respondent corporation  and, in this
case, should be considered as evidence adverse to it.
Respondent corporation would make capital over the initial uncertainty
of the testimonial evidence as to when petitioner Jesus Robleza went
to Bacolod City for the meeting hereinbefore discussed. Private
confronted with the aforestated deed of sale executed in favor of Jong
See on February 5, 1980 as a frame of reference, said petitioner
emphatically established that he visited the Bacolod office prior to
February 5, 1980 . And, We have ample reason to believe petitioner's
contention.
As earlier narrated, during the meeting in Bacolod City it was agreed
that respondent corporation would return the certificates of title to
petitioners on the condition that Tan should first make a partial
payment of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00). This is specifically the
reason why petitioner Jesus Robleza later consented and even signed
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 5
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
as a witness in the aborted deed of sale of one of the lots in favor of
Jong See, the very purpose of which was to raise the aforesaid
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00), expecting to thereby
recover at least the other lot. Also, under such circumstances, it is
absurd to consider petitioner's act as an implied ratification of the deed
of sale sought to be rescinded as private respondent would want Us to
do. On the contrary, respondent corporation's agreeing to return the
titles to petitioners is an admission and an ac knowledgment of
petitioners' superior right of ownership; it is thus estopped from
claiming otherwise.
It is likewise uncontroverted that petitioners were and have been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lot during all the time
that Elpedio Tan and, later, respondent corporation were holding the
supposed titles thereto. Even after its lawyer went there for the first
time to fence the land, and subsequently when petitioners met with the
manager of respondent corporation, the latter never took actual
possession nor did it demand transfer of possession to it. It is an
unusual departure from the natural course of things for respondent
corporation to remain silent over the adverse claims of petitioners.
Such passivity only serves to fortify the conclusion that respondent
corporation was aware of the illegality of its claim.
Based on the evidence of record the petitioners are entitled to
damages. It is said, however, that the law on damages is merely
intended to repair the damage done by putting the plaintiff in the same
position, as far as pecuniary compensation can do, that he would be
had the damage not been inflicted and the wrong not committed. Moral
damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff; they are designed to
compensate for the actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. 
Considering, further, that petitioners were never dispossessed of the
subject lots, although their right of disposition and alienation thereover
was impaired, an award of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) as moral
damages, in addition to the compensatory and exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court, is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
9. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND
BENJAMIN MENDIONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: herein petitioner delivered to Guaranteed Industries the mild
steel plates which the latter ordered. As payment thereof, Albenson
was given a check drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
However, when presented for payment, the check was dishonored for
the reason that the account was closed.
Upon further inquiry, petitioner found out from SEC that the president
of “Guaranteed” was Eugenio S. Baltao. And upon another inquiry
from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, E.L. Woodworks was
registered in the name of “Eugenio Baltao”. And in addition to that,
upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation,
Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject
check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." as it turns out, the manager
of E.L. Woodworks is the son of Eugenio S. Baltao, who is also named
Eugenio Baltao who also manages that business in the same building
as private respondent.
When the Fiscal’s office gave opportunity for Eugenio S. Baltao to
submit controverting evidence, it was deemed a waiver. Respondent
claimed to have no knowledge of the complaint against him and filed a
motion for reinvestigation. He claimed to never have had any dealings
with Albenson and the check was not issued by him and further, the
said check was not his. The Provincial Fiscal reversed the findings and
exonerated respondent Baltao on the ground that the latter was not
notified of the complaint against him.
Because of this alleged unjust filing of a criminal case, respondent
Baltao filed a complaint for damages.
Issue: whether the criminal complaint can be considered as a ground
for damages.
Held: No. Article 19 of the civil code is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights which set the standard to be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights, but also in the performance of
one’s duties. This provision shows that even if a right is granted by
law, it may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction
“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
(Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who,
whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which
causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and
that is, the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not
distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently".
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not
independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an
award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the
circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of
damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner could not be said to have violated the aforementioned
principles. What prompted it to file a case for BP 22 was due to the
failure to collect the amount due on a bounced check which they
honestly believed to have been issued by herein private respondent.
They conducted inquiries and discovered that the president and the
signature on the check belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. It did not
know that there were in fact 3 people named Eugenio Baltao:
Eugenio Baltao Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, and Eugenio Baltao III.
Further, when the counsel for the respondent replied to the letter of
demands, it never mentioned the fact that there are 3 persons having
the same name. The other 2 Baltaos doing business in the same
building, petitioner had every reason to believe that Eugenio Baltao is
the same person. It did not even clarify the issue at first hand. It
belatedly raised this issue only after the criminal case had been filed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act
of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.True, a civil action for damages for
malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more
specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In
order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3)
elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that
the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing
the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case
against him, even if he is later on absolved, may
file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious
prosecution.
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of
petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the
criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent
to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the
dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount
to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an
adverse decision does notipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees
to the winning party.
10. ZACARIAS OARDE and PRESENTACION MOLAR vs. COURT
OF APPEALS
Facts: the original tenant-tiller of the land was Francisco Molar who is
the father of Presentacion and the father-in-law of Oarde. Francisco
also had another son Basilio, the latter being the father of Rogelio. The
Spouses Guerrero sold to Rogelio a property some time in October
1987.
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 6
6th Set Case Digests for Torts 2015-2016 (Atty. Rucel Cayetano) by: Angit, Masiga, Respicio, Solis & Douglass ®
Oarde testified that he had been tilling the land since he was married
to a daughter of Francisco on April 29, 1964. He testified that in a
barrio assembly in order to have a Summary List of tenant-tillers where
it was discovered that some tenants tilled properties of other people. It
was discovered that Oarde tilled 2 lots, though he alleged that he was
tilling only 1. But this information was only provided by Pedro
Cervantes, and that the survey was conducted without Zacarias.
On the claim of plaintiff Presentacion Molar in Civil Case 7960, she
alleged that she is a tenant-lessee of the land in question previously
owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land in 1965.
Before, she owned a carabao but sold it. She caused the land to be
worked on "Pakyaw" basis, hiring different persons for different work.
She actually does not till the land.
According to Zacarias Oarde who testified in behalf of Presentaction
(sic), the latter began tilling in 1968. She is not married and she only
hires laborers to till the land. It was Francisco Molar who distributed to
his children the land they are farming. Presentacion hires laborers to
prepare and plant the land. She does not actually till the land.
On the other hand, defendants in both cases claim that plaintiffs
Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are not tenant-tillers of the
land in question.
"actual expenses" and the additional amount of P4,000.00 which they
incurred in this appeal. Petitioners claim P10,000.00 as moral
damages for their "economic, physical and emotional sufferings" which
were the "inevitable and proximate result of their being ousted from the
land without any justifiable cause." They leave to the sound discretion
of this Court their claim for exemplary or corrective damages. 
Respondent Court denied the claims for "moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees . . . for lack of legal and/or factual
basis."We find no error in such ruling.
The award of attorney's fees depends upon the circumstances of each
case and lies within the discretion of the court. We scoured the records
and, like the Court of Appeals, found no legal, factual or equitable
justification for the award of attorney's fees.
Likewise, we deny the claim for moral and exemplary damages. Aside
from the naked allegations of physical and emotional sufferings,
petitioners failed to substantiate their claims. Likewise, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another,
but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
socially deleterious actions. In this case, no harmful act can be
attributed to the private respondents which warrants the award of
exemplary damages.

Basilio Molar, a witness for the defendants testified that Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero owns only one parcel of land in Gotob and this was
previously farmed by his father Francisco Molar. After Francisco
Molar's death, the land was tilled by witness Basilio Molar.
Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are only helpers. From the
share of the tenant-tiller Francisco Molar, Presentacion and Zacarias
get their share.

The trial court held that Petitioners Molar and Oarde were not lawful
tenants of private respondents. As noted above, public respondent-
affirmed the trial court's ruling in regard to Petitioner Molar, bur
reversed it with respect to Petitioner Oarde. It ordered the
reinstatement of Oarde as a tenant and awarded him damages in the
sum of P5,850.00.

Before us, Petitioner Molar prays that she be declared as a lawful

tenant, and Petitioner Oarde asks that the damages awarded to him
be increased from P5,850.00 to P13,850.00. Private respondents do
not question the Decision of public respondent.

Issue: WON petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary damages as

well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses?

Held: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the

following: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical
relationship of tenancy. 

Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of

"personal" cultivation. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her
immediate family or farm household. Instead, she hired other people to
do all phases of farm work. Even her co-petitioner testified that she did
not actually till the land and that she merely paid laborers to perform
such task.

We are not impressed by petitioner's reliance on numerous

certifications of administrative agencies that she was a tenant of Lot 1.
Assessing the evidence in hand, both lower courts concluded that
Petitioner Molar was not a tenant. The certifications issued by
administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on courts.

Furthermore, these documents were based merely on bare ex

parte allegations of different persons. Even worse, Molar's own
witness, Jose Neo, "an employee of DAR," testified that "he did not in
any way participate in the preparation of the document presented in
evidence." 

Petitioners plead that they were "dispossessed of their landholding"

and "compelled to litigate and incur expenses in the prosecution of this
suit," which entitle them to attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. Further, they also pray for an award of P6,000.00 as

“Look at the birds.  They don't need to plant or harvest or put food in barns because your heavenly Father feeds them.  And you are far more valuable to Him
than they are.  Matthew 6:26 7