ARTICLE 80

DECLARADOR vs. GUBATON

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006 R.A. No. 9344

FACTS:

Frank Bansales, 17 yrs old at the time of the commission of the crime, attacked, assaulted and stabbed
with a knife his teacher, YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple
fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused her immediate death. The charge
against Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse
of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the
imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of
murder.

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari assailing that
portion of the decision of the trial court’s decision suspending the sentence of the accused and
committing him to the rehabilitation center.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to
the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.

RULING:Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence
in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts
charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability
chargeable against him.

However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful
offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served
thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the
government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for
a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or
responsible person under whose care he has been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may
require the DSWD to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and
his family.

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MICHAEL PADUA v. PEOPLE

GR No. 168546, 2008-07-23

Facts:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6] otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs.

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and... aiding one another, not being
lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana... fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua's counsel manifested that
his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits
granted to first-time offenders under Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no
objection.
Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order stating that the former plea of Padua of not... guilty was
considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision dated February
6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor
and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
968[16] (P.D. No. 968),... otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act
No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the said laws.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any
person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. Padua
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition

Issues:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua's petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's
order denying his petition for probation?

Ruling: The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua's petition for certiorari.

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua's petition for probation shows that the RTC neither
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and
adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua's petition for probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to... wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. - Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the

Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24
of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous... hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11[32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law
considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as...
predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from
availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the
chance to mend their ways.

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People v. Sarcia

GR No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009

Facts:

A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-appellant and upon review of the
evidence by the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape. The prosecution alleged that accused-
appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA who was then 5 years old.AAA was playing with her
cousin and two other children in a neighbor’s house when accused invited her to the backyard of the
house and raped here. AAA’s cousin witnessed what happened.The RTC found accused-appellant guilty
and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral
damages of P50,000.00.The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review and then
transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. Accused-appellant denied having
committed the crime and interposed the following defenses: The inconsistency in the testimonies of
AAA and her cousinThe inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed. The
delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was committed.Absence of proof
of force or intimidation Medical report on negative lacerations. The CA affirmed the conviction but
modified the penalty imposed to death and increased the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 and awarded
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages. The case was elevated
to the SC for further review.

RA 9344 took effect while the case was pending before the SC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

2. If so, whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.
3. Can accused-appellant avail of the retroactive effect of RA 9344 with regard to automatic
suspension of sentence.

Ruling:

1. Guilty as charged.

Inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin – Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight
of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed

Inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed – Discrepancies regarding exact
dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a
witness. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed the information is sufficient.

Delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was committed) – The rape
victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an
indication of deceit. In the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere
concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to
defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently
justified by the complainant’s father in the latter’s testimony (they had to wait until they saved enough
amount of money for litigation).

Absence of proof of force or intimidation – Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since
none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free
consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.
Medical report on negative lacerations – A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of credibility that is sufficient to convict the
accused.

2. Penalty improper. The proper imposable penalty for accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death. However, accused-
appellant is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because he was 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and
time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he
reached 18 years of age in 1996.

In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.

Civil indemnity maintained. Imposition of exemplary damages proper. Moral and exemplary damages
increased to P75,000 and P 30,000.00. Reason: award of moral damages is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. For exemplary damages, the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

3. No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant by

the RTC cannot be suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged.

However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21.

Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.
However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344
which provides for confinement of convicted children.

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines

GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)

Facts:Petitioner was a minor whose age is above15 but below 18 years old when he raped aminor when
the latter was left alone in her house. In violating the minor, he threatened tokick the latter if she would
shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appealinvoked a suspension of sentence
pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was convicted bythe trial court and before the case was elevated to
the CA, he was already 22 years old.

Issues:Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.Whether petitioner is entitled to a

suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 ofRA9344.

Held:No. Since his age is above 15 and below18, the finding of discernment is necessary todetermine if
he would be exempt from criminal liability. In this case, his act of waitingfor the victim’s parents to
leave the house before defiling the latter and threatening tokick her if she should shout prove that
petitioner can differentiate what is right andwrong.Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of
sentence, can no longer be availed since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial court,he was
already 22 years old. Sec 40provides that If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
childin accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspendedsentence
for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one(21) years.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO

G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011

Facts:

Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the then 5-year-old
victim. The crime was committed when appellant was only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant
was already 25.

Issue:

Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal liability of an
accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the suspension of sentence of one
who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.

Held:

The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward testimony of the
victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during the
commission of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it
was proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that the accused
understood the consequences of his action.

Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua instead of the
death penalty.As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the
Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.

However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence provided in
Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty of a capital offense. The
Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act to uphold the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law. What was to be considered was the fact that accused committed the crime at a
tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any training facility in
accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate
action in accordance to the said provision.

PEOPLE v. URBAN SALCEDO et al.,

FACTS:

On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabug, Reina Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving their duty shift as nurses
at Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan.Joel Guillo, the hospital accountant, on the
other hand, had just finished his duty and decided to rest in the doctors quarter.

At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by Khadaffy
Janjalani and Abu Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and took control over said
hospital.Previously,however, another group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu Umran hiked towards
Lamitan for the sole purpose of reinforcing the group of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya.However,
upon reaching the vicinity of the hospital, a firefight had already ensued between the military forces and
the group of Janjalani and Sabaya.Simultaneously, the band also became entangled in a firefight with a
civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet, who was killed during the encounter.Moments later, the band
fled to different directions, with its members losing track of one another.

On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of Abu Ben in
Sinagkapan, Tuburan.The next day, Himsiraji Sali with approximately 60 followers also joined the
group.It was only on the third week on July that year that the whole group of Abu Sayaff was completed,
when it was joined by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. “Abu Umran.”

On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded and was warned
of the consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate with the ASG.Hence, the ASG formed a
“striking force” that then proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.

On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from the other hostages and taken to Zamboanga
City by Abu Arabi with two other ASG members on board a passenger watercraft to stay at a house in
Sta. Maria.Later on October 13, 2001, a firefight broke out between the ASG and the military, giving Joel
Guillo and 3 other hostages the opportunity to escape from their captors.On even date, Sheila Tabug
was released together with 2 other hostages from Dos Palmas, allegedly after paying ransom.Reina
Malonzo was soon after also released by order of Khaddafy Janjalani on November 1, 2001.

Hence, criminal informations for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7659 were filed against 17 ASG members on August 14,
2001, October 29, 2001, March 6, 2002, and March 12, 2002.As defense for the accused-appellants, 11
of the 17 of them raise the defense of alibi.The defense of being deep penetration agents of the military
was conversely raised by 2 accused-appellants, Urban Salcedo and Kamar Jaafar. It was further averred
that some of the accused-appellants were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for fear for
their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of them, namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon
Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors at the time the alleged
kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344 (otherwise known as theJuvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-appellants

After due trial, the courta quo, on August 13, 2004, rendered the appealed decisions which convicted all
the accused-appellants of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: Yes

CRIMINAL LAW: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Ransom

The defense itself admitted that the kidnapped victims who testified for the prosecution had been able
to point out or positively identify in open court all the accused-appellantsas members of the ASG who
held them in captivity.Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses were unwavering in their account
of how accused-appellants worked together to abduct and guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off
military forces who were searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how ransom was demanded
and paid.The prosecution likewise presented two former members of the ASG who testified that they
were part of the group that reinforced the kidnappers and helped guard the hostages.They both
identified accused-appellants as their former comrades.

In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants could muster are denial and alibi,
and for accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged minority.Accused-
appellants’ proffered
defense are sorely wanting when pitted against the prosecutions evidence.It is established jurisprudence
that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-
appellants.More so where, as in the present case, the accused-appellants failed to present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time
of the commission thereof.

Furthermore, the detention of the hostages lasted for several months and they were transferred from
one place to another, being always on the move for several days.Thus, in this case, for accused-
appellants’ alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all those months.This they
were not able to do, making the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.

People of the Philippines Vs Allen Mantalaba

GR No. 186227 July 20, 2017

FACTS:

The Task Force Regional Anti Crime Emergency Response (RACER) received a report from
aninformer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling shabuat Purok 4
Brgy 3,Agao District, Butuan City. A buy bust operation was conducted composed of 2 police officers
(PO1 Pajoand PO1 Simon and 2 poseur-buyer).Around 7 in the evening when the poseur-buyer
approachedMantalaba and handed the 2 pieces of Php 100.00 marked bills in exchange of a
sachet of shabu. Theposeur buyer went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction
has been completed andthey rushed to the place and handcuffed Mantalaba. In the presence of
barangay officials, the policeofficers found a big sachet of shabu and the marked money that
Mantalaba thrown on the ground.The laboratory examination revealed that the substance
recovered from Mantalaba is an illegaldrugs (methamphetamine hydrochloride). Thereafter,two
information were filed against him for violationof Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165, selling and possession
of dangerous drugs respectively.The RTC find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and meted a penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua forselling shabuwithoutconsideringhis minority at the time of the commission
of the crime. He was alsosentence for 6 yrs and 1 day, as minimum, to 8 yrs as maximum of
Prision Mayor, applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, for illegal possession of shabu.The CA
affirmed in toto the decision of RTC. Hence this appeal. Appellant argued that the lowercourt gravely
erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to provehis guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: W/Nminority of Mantalaba at the time ofthe commission of the crime may be admitted
asprivilege mitigating circumstances and entitles him to ISLAW.

HELD: YES.A violation of Section 5 RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, inSection 98, where the offender is minor, the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall
become reclusionperpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated
as it has adopted thetechnical nomenclature of penalties provided in the RPC.Consequently, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixingthe penalty that should
be imposed. Applying this rule, Mantalba being minor, the proper penalty shouldbe one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Necessarily, also applying theISLAW, the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prisionmayor
and the maximum penalty shall be taken from medium of reclusion temporal, there being no
othermitigating nor aggravating circumstances. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case
because thepenalty which has been originally an indivisible where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a
divisible penaltyby virtue of minority.Therefore a penalty of 6 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, and 14 yrs 8mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum would be the proper
imposable penalty.

People vs Monticalvo

FACTS:

In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sarisari store of
AAA's mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari
store.Appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house. AAA acceded and went
ahead. Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, followed them. Analiza saw appellant
undress AAA by removing the latter's shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw
Analiza.Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB
what she sawAppellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant made her
lie down. Hethen placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull movements.Afterwards,
appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit downfor a while and then sent her home.When AAA arrived at
their house around 7:30 p.m., shewas asked by her mother, BBB, where she came from and why she
came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant brought her there and
had sexual intercourse with her.Defense witness, presented appellant's Certificate of Live Birth to prove
that the latter was only 17 years oldduring the commission of the crime, 9 December 2002CA:Appellant
Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA who is suffering from mental disorder or is
demented or has mentalDisability, thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:Whether there is merit in the appellant’s assertion of his minority during the commission of the
crime

HELD :Yes, At the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only
17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant
toArticle 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amendedART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person
under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minorunder eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following
rules shall be observed:(2) Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.Applying the
privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal,
being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua — the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape.
Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof specifically
provides for its retroactive application, thus:SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty
of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
thecourt shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of thepronouncement of his/her guilt.SEC 40. Return of
the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought beforethe court for execution
of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge thechild in accordance with this
Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain speci7ed period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.Suspension of the sentence lasts
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of 21 years old. The age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court was promulgated
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the
said law is already moot and academicWHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1)
appellant is found guilty of rape under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and not under subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating
circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion
temporal

PEOPLE v. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL

GR No. 172707, Oct 01, 2013

FACTS:

The accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping oneanother and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by forceand intimidation, and the use of high powered
firearms, willfully,unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Leeof her liberty
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as infact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for her releaseamounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) to
thedamage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan.During the hearing, after the victim and her son
testified, Karimmanifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to"guilty."
The presiding judge then explained the consequences of achange of plea. Upon hearing the
change of plea, the other appellantslikewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferredwith them and explained to each of them the consequences of a changeof plea, their desire to
change the pleas they entered.Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After
theypleaded guilty, the trial court directed the prosecution to presentevidence, which it did.

ISSUE: Whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense was validly entered.

RULING: No. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed toensure that accused-appellants
fully understood the consequences of theirplea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records that
Karim had themistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposablepenalty and that
both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him thatsuch plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty
pursuant to Article 63 of theRevised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that
incases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty isnot affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances

ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO v. PEOPLE,

GR No. 176102, 2014-11-26

Facts: petitioner with homicide under Alejandro Dequito testified that he, together with his compadre
was at the gate of Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony of the high school students.
While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached
the victim and stabbed the latterwith the appellant's left arm around the neck of the... victim, appellant
stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.the mother of the deceased stated that her son stayed for
more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,however, when her son
went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her son's stab wound had a
complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the day after.The medico legal
expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim was organ failure overwhelming infection.The
underlined cause of death was a stab wound.The appellant narrates his statement of facts in this
manner He testified that he was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching the high school
graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way
home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.The men attacked and started to box him. After the
attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who attacked
him.Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four
men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked
why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend,... who was
graduating that day.

RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged... sentenced him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision... mayor, as maximum;

CA... affirmed the petitioner's conviction... but modified the penalty

Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years of prision correccional as
minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum.The petitioner insists,
however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor
should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
Issues:

whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic
Act No. 9344

Ruling:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty,... Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six months and one... day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No.
9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be... to impose an illegal penalty, and would
cause the Court to deliberately violate the law the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate
minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower
the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,... hich disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not
qualify for... probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial
court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict
with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns
21 years of age
ARTICLE 89

PEOPLE V ROGELIO BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory
arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not
excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego).
On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo
case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before
the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be
“no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further,
the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will
only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the
Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a
summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability
based solely on the act complained of.

PEOPLE V ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA

G.R. No. 201447 August 28, 2013

Facts: Anastacio Amistoso (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City
with the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The
Information specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266A. RTC found Amistoso
guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to
Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Having been convicted of Qualified
Rape, he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (Ph₱75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Ph₱50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals, affirmed Amistoso’s
conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages. Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. SC affirmed with
modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on
the amounts of damages awarded. Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents
and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on
December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) and attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death
Report.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso, unaware of
its client’s demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision. The Court required
Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate which he complied accordingly.

ISSUE: Does Amistoso’s death extinguish him of his criminal liability?

Held: Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the
accused dies prior to final judgment: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed Given
the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably,
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon
Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death.

PEOPLE v. RONIE DE GUZMAN

GR No. 185843, 2010-03-03

Facts:

Appellant was indicted... for two counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and
trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each... count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or
a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed... modified it with an
additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral
damages ,appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted marriage on August 19, 2009,
solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing
Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City attesting to the
existence of a valid and legal marriage between them... finding the marriage to have been contracted in
good faith, and the motion to be legally in order.

Issue:
That he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment,
pursuant to Article 266-C[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Ruling:

The motion should be granted.

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:... x x x x

By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.

the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him.We applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the
offender and the offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity,[6] to
totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been imposed
upon those found guilty of the felony. we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant
to have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of... their mutual love for
each other and their desire to establish a family of their own.

Public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the
solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344
and Article 266-C of the RP

Appellant Ronie de Guzman is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant
Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.

CABUGAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163879, July 30, 2014

Facts:

Ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma.
At 5 o’clock that samea fternoon, Palma’s mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the
clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing in family medicine gave
medicines for the pain and told Palma’s parents to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to
persistent abdominal pains, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth
General Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30 in the
morning. Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination, the initial impression was Acute Appendicitis, and hence,
he referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon. Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and read the
CBC and ultrasound results. The administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JR were
ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours. JR complained again of
abdominal pain and his parents noticed a swelling in his scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR
vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses on-
duty relayed JR’s condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gave orders via telephone.9Accused continued
medications to alleviate JR’s abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had
loose bowel movements and was unable to sleep. The following morning, JR’s condition worsened, he
had a running fever of 38°C. JR’s fever remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given
Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR’s condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o’clock in the
afternoon, JR’s temperature soared to 42°C, had convulsions and finally died. The Death Certificate
dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death: Immediate cause:
CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST An Information was filed against accused for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.

Negligent in the performance of their duties:

1. the accused, as the attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle
changes that may occur. Rather, they left the monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians
who are just on residency training and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and
competence with those of physicians who are merely new doctors still on training. Not having personally
observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the accused relinquished their duty and
thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In
situations where massive infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the
condition of the patient is serious which necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of attending
physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.

2. the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not take
steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection that was
ongoing inside the body of JR even when the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical
region where the appendix can be located

3. There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to find
outwhat disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the disease causing the health
problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis, according to expert
testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused. But the
accused could not have found out the real disease of JR because they were treating merely and
exclusively the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the manifested symptoms. In
fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as
signs of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of the accused allowed the
infection to spread inside the body of JR unabated

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners’ conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising
from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

Ruling:

AS TO DR. YNZON’S LIABILITY:

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it
bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.14

With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence
on record. The court a quoand the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to
observe the required standard of care expected from doctors.

In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to
perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo.
From the witness examination, it is clear that if JR’s condition remained unchecked it would ultimately
result in his death, as what actually happened in the present case. Another expert witness for the
defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would perform a personal and
thorough physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours.
From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed
to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.

ARTICLE 90

ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS II

G.R. No. 125066

FACTS:

A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.

On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging the
petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:

We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case,
“the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan
Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information.” However, this Section
cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

ARTICLE 91

PEOPLE v. MIZPAH R. REYES

GR Nos. 74226-27, 1989-07-27

Facts:

In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City that the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of "Mizpah Reyes,
single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under TCT No. T-9885. They
further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized deed of sale
executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon examination of the
document, they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that... accused also
made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on
May 2, 1950. The document was referred by the complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation
(N.B.I.) for examination of the... signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding
that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by
the sisters of the accused and after conducting an... investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations both for falsification
of public document, the first in Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly... making it appear in the
notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a
parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second in Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly
making an untruthful... statement of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by stating that accused
was single.

Issues:"The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime
Ruling:

In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten (10) years should have started from May 26,
1960 (sic). Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations were filed,
the crimes for... which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have already prescribed.

The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major
consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental
principle. Being more than a... statute of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse
of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. While the law
on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the... legislature as an impartial arbiter between two
contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of
the state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405.] Hence, in the... interpretation of
the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted [People
v. Moran, supra; People v. Parcel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956).] The
application... of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code
would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to
be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was... recorded in the Registry of
Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal
informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more
than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order
quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.

Sermonia v. CA

GR 109454, 14 June, 1994

Facts:

Petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage where he argued that actions for his crime of bigamy was
barred by prescription as his second marriage was registered in the Office of the Civil Registry more the
15 years before the action against it was initiated. He argued that the discovery of his crime should be
counted from the date he registered his second marriage, and the rule of constructive notice should
apply as the registration to the Office of the Civil Registry was a notice to the world. That the petitioner
was no intention to conceal the said second marriage.
Issue:

Whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of
the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered
with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

Held:

No, the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in
secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal
his legal impediment to contract another marriage. Considering such concealment of the bigamous
marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from
the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost be
impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social
institution cherished and protected by law.

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES

GR No. 102342, 1992-07-03

Facts:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation
of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.The offense
was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.The referral-complaint of the police was received by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.The corresponding information was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.The petitioner moved to quash the
information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied.the petitioner first
argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure:Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila
and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when
the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to
before the fiscal by the offended party She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to
Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Section 2. Prescription shall begin
to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and...
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law
not included in the Penal Code.

Issues:the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

Ruling:

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in... the last paragraph obviously
refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which
is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by... that rule... the Court feels that if
there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act
No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules... on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.

It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the
period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done
only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

PCGG vs Desierto

G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007

Facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to
inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate
actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of
the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-
behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is
undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement
by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of
the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the
purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which
financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the
Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's
insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that
in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was
able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required
percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the
General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo,
NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage
requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only
P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents
violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft
Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal
of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents
and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21,
1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order
dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.

Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices
of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

Held:

On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no
probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the
courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality
as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same
way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1)
when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3)
when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it
is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.

No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
PANAGUITON, JR. v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ

G.R. No. 167471, November 25, 2008

Facts

Rodrigo Cawili and Ramon Tongson, borrowed money from Luis Panaguiton, Jr. amounting to P1.9
million, and issued check in favor of Panaguiton in payment of the said loans.

Upon presentment of payment on 18 March 1993, the check were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Panaguiton made formal demands to pay upon Cawili and
Tongson, on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, respectively.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
Bilang

22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

The ACP dismissed the complaint against Tongson because the case had already prescribed.

Issue

Whether or not prescription has set in.

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. Since B.P. 22 does not
provide for prescription within the special law.

The Supreme Court also held that, under the Act No. 3326, the running of the prescriptive period is
tolled upon the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Because at the
time the Act 3326 was created, preliminary investigation for offenses was vested by justices of the
peace.
However, with the subsequent changes in the set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
proceeding should now be understood either executive or judicial in character. To rule otherwise would
deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION v. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.,

GR No. 169588, 2013-10-07

Facts:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate
and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle... immobile by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang,... Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and [left]
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.

Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in
their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein
respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2)John Does forcibly removed the clamp on
the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered
immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia,... Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-
Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.

A preliminary investigation took place on May28, 2003.Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a
case charging Jadewell president... with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-
1935.respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he
removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing... of a clamp on the
wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but
to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car.

Issues:

The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following
grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to
state facts... that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

Ruling:

The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for... the violation of special laws
and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does
not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not
apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,[27] this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was... interrupted.[28] (Citation omitted)

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or... information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting... a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the... date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period
had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the
dismissal of the case against respondents.

ARTICLE 93

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO v. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO

GR No. 139033, Dec 18, 2002

Facts:

Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge
issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years
later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed
upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed

Held:

No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to
run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed
only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles
93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom

BENJAMIN PANGAN Y RIVERA v. LOURDES F. GATBALITE

GR NO. 141718, 2005-01-21

Facts:

The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction.During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda,
counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioner's constant absence at hearings.the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court... affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.Despite
due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with
the notation that he no longer resided at... the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to
appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the
decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.Pursuant to the
order of arrest... the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention
Cell.petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court .Petitioner
contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that the straight penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years having been able to continuously evade
service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under
No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code.

In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner's detention was pursuant to the order of
commitment (mittimus), issued by... the Municipal Trial Court... respondent Judge rendered the
decision, which is the subject of this present appeal, which pronounced:

"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

"There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty."

Issues:

When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run?

Ruling:

THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A

CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.

The legislature wrote "should evade the service of sentence" to cover or include convicts like him who,
although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or apprehended by government for the
service of their sentence.With all the powers of government... at its disposal, petitioner was able to
successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) yearsThis is
approximately 3 years and 5 months longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of the... penalty imposed
on him.The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was promulgated in
absentia and an order for petitioner's arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court

The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence began on
August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also began to run on that
day considering that no relief was taken... therefrom.Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]or was
[he],... ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he flee to some foreign country with which
[our] government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year prescriptive period of his... penalty ran
continuously from August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and
was never interrupted

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

this Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code,
applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest... and as a consequence never
evaded... sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began.

ARTICLE 95
Torres v. Gonzales

Facts:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted conditional pardon by the president
on condition that he "would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20
counts of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986,
Justice Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the SC
questioning the validity of the arrest order. He claimed that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

Issue:

Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his condition pardon?

Held:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

ARTICLE 97,98,99
PABLO C. FRANCISCO V COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS

G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely
maligning them on four different days.

Petitioner’s woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to
control his outburst and blurted —

“You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . .
Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.”

After nearly ten (10) years, Makati MeTC found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of
the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional “in each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleqed in the information(s),” ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria
Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit. He was acquitted in the other information for
persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case
to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed his conviction. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced “in
each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . “

After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision of the RTC became final.

The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a
warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the
MeTC denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his
conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
imposed.

RULING: Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, clearly mandates that “no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction,”

Thus, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.

COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

The accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur. On June 25, 2000, Rufino on their way to the store together with
his wife, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone and suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were
serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment. The RTC rendered
judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the
law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted
homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the
RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty
and may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide.With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC. Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those
who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit
their right to apply for that privilege. Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness
of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him
to apply for probation. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty
of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.
This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 EN BANC)

FACTS:

In the present controversy, petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias Boyet was indicted for
Violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act. The Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct upon the person of one AAA, who was
then a sixteen (16) year old minor, by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and private
part against her will and without her consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and
psychological development of the complainant.

After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things,
that even assuming he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same was
done without the victim’s consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her.
Surprisingly, when asked to comment on the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), relying
heavily on People v. Abello, opined that petitioner should have been convicted only of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in view of the prosecution’s failure to
establish that the lascivious acts were attended by force or coercion because the victim was asleep at
the time the alleged acts were committed.

The CA rendered a Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG. In modifying the RTC Decision,
petitioner was found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.

ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct?

COURT’S RULING:

Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim
did not consent either it was done through force, threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived
of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the lascivious conduct is
covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the
act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable
by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a
child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should be liable under
Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and
she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may
still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.

There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any lascivious act, taking into account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth, as well as, in harmony with the
foremost consideration of the child’s best interests in all actions concerning him or her.51 This is equally
consistent with the with the declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from
all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.52
Besides, if it was the intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders liable only of Article
266-A of the RPC, which provides for a lower penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly
made such statements.

As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 are present in the case at bar

ENRIQUE ALMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188191March 12, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner is accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicideand multiple
physical injuries. On 8 January 2007 the MTC found him petitioner guilty andsentenced him to suffer
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filedan Application for Probation on
7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of hisconviction only upon being served the warrant
for his arrest. The prosecutor opposed hisapplication on the ground that he was known to be
uncooperative, habitually absent, and hadeven neglected to inform the court of his change of address.
The MTC denied his application,thus petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
denial of his application forprobation. Upon appeal the RTC reversed and set aside the ruling of MTC and
remanded the case to the latter. CA however reversed the RTC ruling and upheld the MTC’s decision in
denying the application for probation

ISSUE:

Is petitioner entitled to probation?

RULING:

No, petitioner is not entitled to probation. Probation is not a right but a mereprivilege, an act of grace
and clemency conferred by the State, and may be granted bythe court to a deserving defendant.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely uponthe discretion of the court. It is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organizedsociety, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
Probation is a specialprivilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender.

NEIL E. SUYAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 189644. July 2, 2014

Facts:

Suyan was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, for drugpossession. He pleaded
guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him tosuffer the penalty of six years of prision
correccional. He filed his application forprobation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of sixyears.While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both
forviolation of Section 16 of RA 6425. Two separate Information were filed againsthim. Because of this,
the Chief of Parole and Probation Office, Atty Navarro,recommended the revocation of his probation,
citing recidivism. Navarro alsopointed out that Suyan was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditionsof his probation, in view of his incarceration.

The RTC ordered the revocation of Suyan’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence. Suyan then
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, arguingthat he was not accorded due process. Finding
merit in his petition, the CA orderedthe remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, the
RTCconducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.The Parole and Probation Office file a Violation Report
where it stated thatprobationer Suyan showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and
insteadcontinued with his illegal drug activities despite counseling and warning from theOffice. The
prosecution likewise filed its Formal Offer of Evidence where itattached a certification from another
court that Suyan has already served hissentence on the drug charges against him. Suyan filed his
Comment but did otdispute the certification.After hearing, the RTC issued a Order revoking the
probation. Suyan appealedwith the CA but the dame was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.

Ruling:

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by incurring
absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his supervising
officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and... warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded him by
the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he is unworthy
to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.

SORIANO v. CA

G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property after being involved in a vehicular accident
which killed Isidrino Daluyong. His application for probation was granted and among the terms and
conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific
employment or pursuing a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (c) indemnify the heirs of the
victim Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure
to indemnify the heirs of the victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioner’s commission of
another crime while he was awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the motion and instead
directed petitioner to submita program of payment of the civil liability imposed on him. Based on the
information provided by the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still failed to satisfy his civil liability. Soriano
was made to explain his non-compliance and to submit his program of payment immediately otherwise
he would be cited for contempt. For continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation was
revoked on October1994for his failure to: (a) meet his family responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific
employment, (c) satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d) cooperate with his program of
supervision.Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals claiming that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt and revoking his
probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding that Soriano’s “stubborn unwillingness” to comply with
the orders of the trial court “shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong.”A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether the revocation of petitioner’s probation is lawful and proper

RULING:YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere
privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court subject to certain terms and conditions.
Having the power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to revoke it in a proper case and
under appropriate circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in violating the terms and conditions of his
probation, he cannot anymore assail the revocation of his probation. Soriano claims that his non-
compliance was due to his poor financial condition and that it was impossible for him to formulate a
program as he only relies on his parents for support and he was in no position to comply with the same.
He even questioned the constitutionality of the requirement imposed as this harped on his alleged
poverty. –This requirement is NOT violative

ARTICLE 100

JOSE G. GARCIA v. CA

GR No. 119063, 1997-01-27

Facts:

On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit
of Complaint" [1] charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos,"
with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as... amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public
Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla,
the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. [2]... on or before the 2nd
day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and
without the said marriage having been... dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic]
discovered in 1989, to... the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83 of the said
court. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the
offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the petitioner's admissions in... his testimony given-
on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his
complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered
the commission of the offense as early as 1974.Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), [4] the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was
punishable by prision mayor, [5] an afflictive penalty [6] which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to
Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by
the petitioner.

This court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for the
offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25 of the
same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen

(15) years as provided in Article 92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of
the accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the
offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed in... this case on November 15,
1991. The argument presented by the prosecution that it was difficult for the complainant to obtain
evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time
the evidence was secured will not hold water.

Issues:
The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's
order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.

(a) the trial court erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription;

Finally, the petitioner reiterated that the prescriptive period was interrupted several times by the
private respondent's numerous trips abroad.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the
petitioner discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case
was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the... discovery of the offense, then the
15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. [16] It further held that the quash of an information
based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal,
[17] for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is "'totally extinguish[ed]' by the
prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not
deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense

It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since
extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to
quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows... that facts outside the information itself
may be introduced to prove such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed
where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense
charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa, this Court stated:

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of
said allegations whose truth and veracity are... hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of
People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not
denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief justice
Moran supports this... theory. [27]
Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as
enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article
91 of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of prescription shall not run when the... offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute
the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private
respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides,... these were made long after the petitioner discovered
the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information
was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.

ARTICLE 103

Pangonorom v. People

GR No. 143380, April 11, 2005

Facts: On July 10, 1989, Carlos R. Berba was driving a car belonging to his morther. With him inside the
car were his mother Mary Berba, who was seated in front beside him, and his auntie Amelia Berba, who
was at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA when their car was bumped from behind by MMTC
Passenger Bus driven by herein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car
which was estimated at P42,600.00. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio
Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs. The MMTC bus driven by the
accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the second lane and
bumped his car. Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a driver since 1976, having worked
as a truck driver in Mindanao. The trial held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property.

Issue: Whether or not MMTC, bus company, is estopped and therefore subsidiary liable to the incident.

Ruling: No. There is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer’s subsidiary civil liability
unless it appears that the accused-employee’s primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied
because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time after the verdict of conviction shall
have become final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be
satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the
enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio
becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied
because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after
a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its
accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio’s insolvency.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Eduardo Mangawang

Facts: Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one
ofits passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC charging Ancheta
withreckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On 1999, the accused was finally convicted of the said
crime.The accused-appellant appealed to the CA however, the CA dismissed the appeal hence, the
judgementbecame final and executory.PRBLI, Ancheta’s employer appealed repeatedly claiming
that it was not served with a copy of thedecision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime
charged. Finally, the bus company by filing amanifestation for motion invoked the case of Ozoa vs Vda.
de Madula. On 2001, the trial court grantedthe motion and giving due course to the appeal of the PRBLI.
The petitioner laments that the counsel it provided to defend the accused was remiss in
theperformance of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC decision, the November 10, 2000
Resolutionof the CA, as well as the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC; consequently, it was not explained of
its civilliability to the heirs of the deceased, thus depriving the petitioner of its right to due
process. Thepetitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it of its right to
question itscivil liability to the heirs of the deceased, considering the gross negligence of the counsel
that it hadprovided the accused.

Issue: Whether or not herein petitioner was denied the right to due process when the CA dismissed
theappeal of the owner?

Ruling: No. The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the
saiddecision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary
liabilityprovided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party
insubstance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of
theRTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA. Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect
its interest by taking actual participation in the defense ofits employee, Ancheta, by providing him with
counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fatebecause his failure is its failure. The petitioner,
as the employer of the accused, would thereby beapprised of the progress of the case and the
outcome thereof from time to time through the saidcounsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise
the petitioner of the progress of the case is thus notequivalent to lack of due process. Since the
petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee (Ancheta),the PRBLI
cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process. Indeed, to allow an employer to
dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from thedecision of the RTC would be to annul,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.The Court cannot second guess
whether Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as appellant in the CA wasthrough the negligence of his
counsel or because of the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crimecharged and it was purposeless
and futile for him to still file such brief. Thus, the decision of the CAdismissing the appeal of the
petitioner is affirmed.

TORTS LG FOODS v. Pagapong-Agraviador

GR NUMBER: 158995 September 26, 2006

FACTS :Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was
hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. In time, an Information for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Bacolod City. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed
suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of
September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case. On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the
spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased
driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioners as
defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras’ 7-year old son, claiming that they had
exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the
deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action on the part of the Vallejera couple. In an Order dated September 4, 2001, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the same court, the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to
dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. April 25, 2003, the CA denied the
petition and upheld the trial court averring that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the
responsibility charged was the petitioner’s subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, it was held that responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal
Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter’s
insolvency.”

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SPOUSES VALLEJERA IS FOUNDED ON ART. 103 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AS AVVERED BY LG FOODS OR ON ART. 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

RULING

Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made
to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal
case filed against him nor his insolvency. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the
failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7year old son.
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible
liabilities may be enforced against the offender. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.

DETAILS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT BUT MIGHT GET ASKED ANYWAY Article 2180. The obligation
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are
liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they

observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Article 2176. Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Dr. SOLIDUM vs PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014

Facts:

Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. A
group of doctors including the appellant. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and
went into a coma8 His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He
could no longer see, hear or move. The parent of Gerald lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending
physicians. The City Prosecutor’s Office filed information solely against Dr. Solidum. The RTC and the CA
convicted the appellant. The SC acquitted the appellant, however;

Issue: Whether the accused acquitted from criminal liability is Civilly Liable

Held:
No, the Court clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil
liability. But the Court cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that
have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the
injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by
Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by
Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent
evidence.

ARTICLE 104

People of the Philippines v Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros

G.R. No. 181084

FACTS: ABC, is the daughter of appellant, Montesclaros, and was a minor at the time of the incident.
Montesclaros worked as a waitress in a beer house. Montesclaros and ABC were renting a room in a
house owned by Tampus, who was a barangay tanod. On April, 1995, ABC stated that she was in the
house with Montesclaros and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They forced her to drink beer and
when she became intoxicated she was now very sleepy then she overheard Tampus requesting her
mother, Montesclaros that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her. Montesclaros agreed and
instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he was finished. Montesclaros left for work essentially leaving
Tampus alone with the victim. She fell asleep and when she woke up she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain all over her body noticed that her
panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her genitals. Montesclaros
arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant ignored her. A similar
incident ensued on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was
at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report
the previous incident to anyone. Same thing happened as Monteclaros ignored her again when the
victim told her about the incident. Without other recourse she filed two Complaints. She accused
Tampus of rape she declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with co-accused
Montesclaros, her mother, who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. The victim also stated a similar
incident effectively filing two separate cases. The trial court appreciated in Montesclaros’ favor the
mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her
of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
convicted Tampus of two counts of rape and found Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision to implicate Ida Montesclaros as an accomplice in the
rape of ABC accurate?

RULING: Yes, Montesclaros is accountable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The requisites that are needed are
fulfilled to find Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between Montesclaros and Tampus to commit the rape
of ABC. Montesclaros had knowledge of and agreed to Tampus' intention to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when

ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express
consent to Tampus' plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that
the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of
the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.