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Integrated review of stealth technology and its role in airpower

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 Stealth Technology & Airpower

Integrated Review of Stealth Technology and its Role in Airpower

G.A. Rao1, S.P. Mahulikar2,*

1
PhD Student, 2Assistant Professor
*
Corresponding Author, E–mail: spm@aero.iitb.ac.in, Fax: (+91)-22-5722602

Department of Aerospace Engineering

Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay

P.O. IIT Powai, Mumbai – 400076, INDIA.

1
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

ABSTRACT PDIT probability that aircraft is

This paper discusses the evolution of airpower detected, identified and tracked by threat [-]
and the ever-increasing component of stealth PH susceptibility [-]
technology in dictating warfare, based on the PK probability of kill [-]
need felt in the literature to integrate and place PK/H vulnerability [-]
them in the right perspective. Hence, the role PLGD probability that threat
of stealth aircraft and the dominance of all propagator is launched / fired
aspects of stealth technology, especially in possibly guided, and may hit
recent conflicts, are reviewed. The integration aircraft directly or detonate
of the fundamental aspects of stealth sufficiently close to cause
technology, through its classification, types of damage [-]
aircraft signatures: especially radar, infrared, PS probability of survival [-]
and visual signatures, their sources of origin, rf recovery factor [-]
modelling techniques, and methods of signature R range [m]
reduction are discussed. Due to the increasing S survival rate [-]
importance of infrared signatures relative to S/N signal to noise ratio [-]
radar signatures, infrared signatures are also T temperature [K]
closely examined and analysed. Hence, the Z impedance []
lock-on and surveillance ranges of infrared Greek Scripts
detectors are compared. Future projections in  characteristic dimension of
stealth technology, especially based on the role object [m]
of anti-stealth technologies, are also elaborated.  ratio of specific heats [-]
Keywords: aircraft, airpower, air-superiority,  Stefan Boltzmann constant
heat-seeking missile, infrared, radar, signatures, [W/m2-K4]
stealth, survivability, visual, warfare  emissivity [-]
 wavelength [m]
NOMENCLATURE
 frequency [s1]
co velocity of light in vacuum
8  Radar Cross Section [m2]
[310 m/s]
Subscripts
E electric field [V/m]
a air
EB black body emission at a
ac aircraft
particular wavelength [Wm–2m–1] af airframe
G antenna gain [-] aw adiabatic wall
Gm mission goal [-] i natural number
h convective heat transfer inc incident
coefficient [Wm2K–1] J jammer
hp Planck’s constant [Js] l local flow parameter
H aircraft altitude [km] m material
J/S jammer to signal ratio [-] max maximum
k Boltzmann constant min minimum
[1.380710 JK–1]
–23
R radar
Lac number of aircraft launched [-] scat scattered
M Mach number [-] sky sky parameter
n refractive index [-]
P power [W] Abbreviations
PA probability that threat is active AAM Air-to-Air Missile
and ready to engage [-] BPR Bypass Ratio

2
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

C3 Command Control nuclear weapon is distant because of the

Communication following tremendous international pressure,
CEP Circular Error Probability and hence possessing nuclear weapon is not of
DLIR Downward Looking Infrared much importance in a tactical warfare. In such
ECM Electronic Counter Measure a situation, technologies like The Stealth
ESM Electronic Support Measure Technology, provide a quantum leap in military
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared power, and will shape the future warfare and
IEEE Institute of Electrical and geopolitical situation. Therefore, stealth
Electronics Engineers technology is kept as a closely guarded secret
IR Infrared by the countries possessing it, and hence, there
IRAP Infrared Absorbing Paint is an obvious dearth of information in open
IRST Infrared Search and Tracking literature. This has resulted in several schools
MAM Mission Attainment Measure of opinion and consequently misconceptions,
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence and hence, the need for a consolidated but
System comprehensive overview, aimed at
MOMS Measure Of Mission Success demystifying this topic.
NATO North Atlantic Treaty 1.3 Objectives and Scope
Organization The aim of this paper is to review the state of
NEFD Noise Equivalent Flux Density the art stealth technology and its role in modern
RAM Radar Absorbent Material warfare. To begin with, the evolution of
RCS Radar Cross Section airpower and stealth technology over the years
SAM Surface to Air Missile is reviewed, and then the basics of stealth
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technology and its classification are discussed
WW World War in detail. The principle of radar operation,
sources of radar signatures, their modelling,
1.0 INTRODUCTION and techniques for reducing these signatures
Wars have been fought right since the birth of are discussed. Thereafter, discussion on
human civilization, and the nature of warfare various passive signatures of an aircraft
has never been the same; it has been changing includes - the sources of IR signatures in an
with time and place. Speed, initiative and aircraft, the threat posed by IR-seeking
surprise have always been the major deciding missiles, techniques for reducing IR signatures,
factors. Prior to the advent of aircraft in and modelling techniques for prediction of IR
military, wars were limited to land and sea. signature level of an aircraft. Visual signatures
Aircraft gave a new dimension to warfare. and methods of reducing them are also
1.1 Background discussed. An analysis based on comparison
In this highly technology driven world, wars between radar and infrared signatures, and a
have also become more technical and description of potential anti stealth technologies
unconventional, as reflected from the Gulf War is finally presented.
and Kosovo Conflict of the last decade and
Afghanistan War at the starting of this century. 2.0 AIRPOWER
These wars unambiguously exhibited the It did not take much time for aircraft to find
importance of airpower and stealth technology, their way and establish their importance in
and limited the role of ground troops. warfare, after their invention in 1903.
1.2 Motivation Establishing control over the air is the prime
Today the number of countries possessing motive of every military force, because no war
nuclear weapons is quite large, but the number has been won without having dominance /
of countries having the capability of making control over the air. The evolution of airpower
stealth aircraft is limited. In the present world is now chronologically outlined.
scenario, the possibility of any country using a
3
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

2.1 World War - I SAM in destroying aircraft. Both America and

Israel faced heavy losses because of Russian
The WW-I saw the aeroplane move from an
origin SAMs. After these wars, the need for a
oddity to a combat entity, a weapon system in
stealth aircraft was realised, which resulted in
its infancy, but with tremendous potential.
many classified programs, such as the Have
Though it was used primarily as a combination
Blue program in the mid seventies, for the
of observation post and artillery spotter, WW-I
development of stealth aircraft and associated
aviation showed its potential mobility and
technologies [3].
increasing lethality. The lack of efficient night
2.4 Post cold war
fighting technology limited the scope and
The end of the cold war brought a marked
effectiveness of night air operations. The
change in the world equilibrium. The fall of
German Zeppelins used for bombing Britain,
communism was a great victory for USA and
were the first to exploit the concept of aerial
its NATO allies [4]. Two wars have been
bombing. The Gothas, a large bomber
fought in the past decade, and a third at the
appearing in the German fleet by 1917, was
beginning of this century in Afghanistan. The
used extensively in night attacks against Paris,
stealth fighters and bombers were a product of
other French towns, and London. The lack of
the cold war era, but it was only in the Gulf war
accuracy of the bombers, however, resulted in
that they could make their mark and change the
many unintentional casualties [1].
definition of warfare forever. Even though the
2.2 World War – II
defence budget is shrinking every year [5],
The WW-II saw a significant use of air power
there has been a substantial progress in stealth
by many nations. Germany’s bombing over
technology, especially for the development of
France and Poland made their ground forces
air superiority fighters [6] and UAVs [7].
quickly victorious. Pearl Harbour
2.5 Air superiority
demonstrated the havoc caused by massive
Airpower has assumed an important role; the
surprise air attacks. Although WW-II multi-
US Department of Defence defines Strategic
role night fighters (and night bombers)
Air Warfare as [8], “Air combat and supporting
provided considerably more impact than
operations designed to effect, through the
attempts during the interwar years, the net
systematic application of force to a selected
effect of WW-II night attack was less than the
series of vital targets, the progressive
effect of day fighters with similar missions.
destruction and disintegration of the enemy's
Airpower was not only used in a close air
war-making capacity to a point where the
support role attacking enemy infantry, but also
enemy no longer retains the ability or the will
used for attacking at an enemy’s vital military,
to wage war. Vital targets may include key
commercial, and industrial centres. But the
manufacturing systems, sources of raw
accuracy of bombing was not good, for
material, critical material, stockpiles, and
instance, only 7% of all bombs dropped by the
power systems”. It is the key to virtually every
Eighth Air Force hit within 1000 feet of their
type of military operation; ground, naval and
aim point [2]. The invention of radar just prior
amphibious campaigns usually require some
to WW-II proved to be an important element of
kind of air complement. To ensure success in
the air defence system, and forever changed the
these operations, commanders strive to control
nature of warfare.
the air space so that they can make air attacks
2.3 Cold war
against the enemy without significant
Soon after WW-II, cold war gripped the world;
opposition, and to prohibit enemy air attacks on
both factions were trying their best in evolving
their own assets, i.e. to establish a condition /
superior military aircraft. The Southeast Asian
state known as Air Superiority, in its extreme
Conflict in between 1963-72 and the Yom
form, Air Supremacy. Air superiority is
Kippur War between Israel and Arab nations in
defined by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as [8],
1973 demonstrated the lethal capacities of
“that degree of dominance in the air battle of
4

one force over another which permits the
conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea and air forces at a given time
and place without prohibitive interference by
the opposing force”.
3.0 STEALTH TECHNOLOGY AND
COMBAT ANALYSIS
Stealth is one of the key factors required for
establishing air superiority in modern warfare.
Stealth can be defined as, “The act of moving,
proceeding, or acting in a covert way”.
Aircraft Stealth technology essentially deals
with reducing the aircraft signatures and
observables, thus providing the aircraft with the
capability of evading the enemy’s air defence
system. The advent of the laser-guided bomb
revolutionized precision land attack, for it
could function with an average CEP of less
than 20 feet from the aim point [9]. The recent
marriage of modern stealth attack aircraft and
precision-guided munitions has created a potent
weapon that can penetrate almost any current
defence and destroy almost any target. Stealth
aircraft can make successful offensive attacks
with much less supports. For example, the
apparent advantages that sophisticated surface-
to-air defences once held are currently
countered by stealth technology. Stealth is a
concept that is applied not only to aircraft, but
also to ships, submarines, tanks, armoured
vehicles, etc. Though stealth aircraft cost much
more than a conventional fighter, the cost is
justified by the high survivability exhibited in
hostile environments, where conventional
fighters fail.
3.1 Gulf war
The F-117A stealth fighter aircraft used by
USA, attacked most of the heavily fortified
targets and crippled Iraqi military headquarters,
power stations, C3 sites, air defence operation
centres, airfields, ammo-bunkers, biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapon plants. It was
the only allied jet that could strike targets
inside Baghdad's city limits, thus giving critical
initial breakthrough in the war. It is estimated
that thousands of anti-aircraft guns and over 60
surface-to-air missile batteries protected the
city, but despite this seemingly impenetrable
5
Stealth Technology & Airpower
shield, F-117A penetrated the skies over the
city and bombed it with impunity, unscathed by
enemy guns [10]. Air Superiority was
established in a short time, and earlier than
anticipated.
Although the stealth fighter accounted for
only 2-3% of the total force of 1,900 fighters
and bombers, the F-117A executed 40% of
strategic target attacks using laser-guided
bombs. In all during Desert Storm, the F-117A
conducted more than 1,250 sorties, dropped
more than 2,000 tons of bombs and flew more
than 6,900 hours. The air campaign was
effective in causing Saddam Hussein to
dramatically change his position with regard to
abandoning Kuwait, as reported in [11].
3.2 Stealth capabilities
Stealth aircraft have some distinct advantages
in the battlefield as compared to their non-
stealth counterparts. Stealth aircraft like F-
117A are better suited for attacking ground
targets, because they can fly at relatively high
altitudes over enemy territory unlike
conventional aircraft that go terrain hugging to
avoid detection. Higher altitude also gives a
broader situational awareness and less fatigue
to the pilot, allows targets to be detected at a
greater range, and gives a vertical bomb
impact, improving the accuracy and penetration
[12]. Stealth aircraft require less sophisticated
bombs, because the trajectory followed by the
bomb is simpler when released due to the
straight and steady flight that a stealth aircraft
can manage to fly at high altitudes, without
worrying about the enemy defence systems.
Stealth aircraft, because of their ability to
penetrate hostile regions, can provide the
much-needed initial breakthrough in the war
that makes the enemy vulnerable to subsequent
attacks by conventional aircraft. They are
capable of destroying multiple targets in a
single mission, and prove to be cost effective in
the long run. All the above factors result in
high morale and confidence of the troops.
Today, one F-117A, flying a single sortie and
dropping one bomb, can accomplish what it
took 95 sorties and 190 bombs during the
Vietnam War. In terms of today's technology,
a typical strike mission without stealth would

require 32 planes with bombs, 16 fighter
escorts, 8 Wild Weasel aircraft to suppress
enemy radar, 4 aircraft to jam enemy radar
electronically, and 15 tankers to refuel the
group. The same mission can be accomplished
with only eight F-117As and two tankers to
refuel them [13]. In the Gulf War, for example,
the total cost of approximately 2,000 tons of
laser-guided bombs dropped by the F-117A
force was roughly US$ 146 million; that same
tonnage in Tomahawk land attack cruise
missiles would have been US$ 4.8 billion [14].
3.3 Stealth technology gap
At present very limited countries have the
technology to build exclusively stealth aircraft.
The F-117A, which originated from the Have
Blue program in late seventies, was the world’s
first stealth fighter. Ever since then US has
been pursuing many classified programs for the
development of stealth technology. The highly
confidential nature of this technology and the
resulting reluctance to share this high-end
technology with any other country has resulted
in a technology difference between the NATO
member countries, as reported in [15].
Consequently, some of the NATO commanders
are worried about the lack of interoperability in
military missions between US and other NATO
allies, as reported in [16].
3.4 Classification of stealth technology
There are many elements of Aircraft Stealth,
classified by the type of signatures emitted by
the aircraft. Figure 1 illustrates different
aircraft signatures and their sources, which can
be broadly classified as active or passive.
Except for the audio waves, all other types of
signatures are electromagnetic in nature.
3.4.1 Active
Active signatures are produced when the
enemy illuminates the aircraft with some
signal, and uses the characteristic of the
reflected signal to obtain necessary
information. For example, the criss-crossing of
searchlights were used in WW-I for locating
aircraft, but this technique proves
counterproductive in modern warfare, as it is
not possible to detect high-flying aircraft with
searchlights; moreover, the ground flashers
make themselves vulnerable to air attacks.
6
Stealth Technology & Airpower
Radar is the most widely used signal to
illuminate the target aircraft. In most of the
cases, the frequency of the signal used is of the
order of few hundred MHz or more, because
signals with lower frequency do not provide
sufficiently accurate data. Signals with higher
frequency are attenuated more during
propagation, and therefore have less range.
3.4.2 Passive
Passive signatures are produced because of the
signals emitted by the aircraft as an inevitable
consequence of its existence and mission. The
aircraft radiates signals over a large frequency
range that consists of audio waves, radio
waves, and radiation in the infrared and visible
spectrum. Passive systems have the great
tactical advantage of being covert, i.e., they do
not give away their location in pursuit of the
target. In addition, the enemy target is unaware
of being detected; hence, it does not initiate
countermeasures.
3.5 Combat effectiveness
The combat effectiveness of an aircraft in a
hostile environment depends on many factors
like the threat, aircraft capabilities, and
operational environment. The various elements
of combat analysis are briefly categorised as
follows:
3.5.1 Mission attainment measure (0 < MAM
< 1)
It is the effectiveness of an aircraft in the
offensive view of its mission. It is the relative
measure / ability of the aircraft to accomplish
its mission objectives in presence of the threat,
but without considering the threat effects.
Hence, this concept holds when the defence
forces are equipped with infinite resources, or
if the threat is insignificant.
3.5.2 Survival rate (S)
It is the effectiveness of an aircraft in the
defensive view of the mission, and is defined as
the ratio of number of aircraft that return to the
number of aircraft sent on a particular mission.
Survival rate depends on the survivability of an
aircraft in a hostile environment; hence, it
reflects total consciousness of the threats posed.
3.5.3 Measure of mission success (MOMS)
In a warfare, it is not feasible to be purely
offensive or defensive; hence, the above two

concepts cannot by themselves characterise the
scenario. Hence, a third concept is defined as
the product of the offensive and defensive
elements of the mission. This concept is a
relative measure of the aircraft’s overall
mission success, and is mathematically defined
as [17],
MOMS = SMAM. (1)
The number of aircraft launched (Lac) is given
by,
Lac = Gm / MOMS. (2)
Hence, if S is increased, larger is the value of
MOMS and hence, less number of aircraft are
required to accomplish the mission goal. In
certain cases, the performance of the aircraft
and its MAM may be reduced to increase S, but
generally the decrease in MAM is less as
compared to the increase in S. Though MOMS
may be reduced (which is practically unlikely),
it only means that more number of sorties will
have to be flown by the more survivable
aircraft, to accomplish the total goal. However,
there will be more survivor aircraft to sustain
the operations for a longer period in warfare,
due to fewer replacement aircraft / aircrews.
This reduced demand for replacements is of
paramount importance in an intense conflict,
because the time, effort and money required for
building aircraft and training aircrew is
tremendous as compared to the time available
in warfare. High survivability also has a
positive impact on the psychology of the
soldiers. Thus, survivability is the most
important factor required for air combat and for
effectively achieving air superiority.
3.6 Survivability
As seen from the above analysis, survival rate,
which depends on the survivability of an
aircraft, is one of the most important factors
deciding the outcome of a war. Survivability is
defined as the ability of aircraft to avoid and /
or withstand a man made hostile environment,
without suffering an abortive impairment of its
ability to accomplish its designated mission.
Mathematically it is defined as [17],
PS = 1 – PK, (3)
where, PK = PHPK/H. (3.1)
7
Stealth Technology & Airpower
Aircraft with better survivability return from a
mission more often, and consequently more
aircraft are available for subsequent missions.
Linear changes in survivability produce
exponential changes in force effectiveness; for
instance, in the Gulf War; 1% increase in
survivability of aircraft: from 98% to 99%, for
100 aircraft, increased the force effectiveness
by 26%: from 3151 targets to 3970 targets [18].
3.6.1 Susceptibility (PK)
The inability of an aircraft to avoid being
detected and hit by the adversary in the pursuit
of its mission, due to one or more inherent
weaknesses of the aircraft, and is given as [17]
PH =
PAPDITPLGD. (4)
Susceptibility is dynamic in nature; prior to the
advent of shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles,
aircraft used to fly low for evading detection by
the ground based enemy radars, because when
flying low, the aircraft is in the field of view of
the ground based radar for a short time, thus
reducing their susceptibility. Thereafter, heat-
seeking missiles became popular and,
especially MANPADS, proved to be one of the
main dangers to low flying aircraft. Thus, low
flying aircraft that can be easily detected by IR
detectors, are tracked, engaged and eventually
hit; hence, are more susceptible as compared to
high flying aircraft that are difficult to engage,
even if they are detected. The U2, a light
aircraft designed to fly at high altitudes but not
at great speeds, was detected but could not be
engaged by a missile, due to its high-flying
altitude [19]. The first step of any threat
system is to quickly detect, locate, and identify
the aircraft accurately, followed by tracking,
targeting, launching, etc. Essential Element
Analysis performed over the damage of an
aircraft in a hostile environment, leads to
‘detection’ as the initial element, which if
followed by subsequent chain of events,
ultimately leads to the destruction / damage of
the aircraft. Stealth technology, which reduces
aircraft observables, helps aircraft to avoid high
loss rates, reach their objectives, and operate at
a high level of system effectiveness [20]. It
also follows that in case of a conflict between

requirement of low detection and low tracking
rate of the lethal missile, preference must be
given to low tracking rate. An enemy aircraft
that cannot be tracked upon detection is as
dangerous as not being detected at all.
3.6.2 Vulnerability (PK/H)
It is the inability of the aircraft to withstand one
or more hits by the enemy’s artillery / defence
system. Aircraft’s vulnerability is defined as
the conditional probability of the aircraft being
killed given a hit, PK/H. Each component of the
aircraft has a Vulnerability Level. Hence,
mission critical components that are highly
vulnerable if damaged, can lead to an aircraft
kill, and therefore demand redundancy.
4.0 RADAR SIGNATURES
RADAR (Radio Detecting and Ranging) is
used for detecting, locating, tracking, and
identifying objects at considerable distances. It
operates by transmitting electromagnetic
energy (radio waves) towards the objects, and
observing the echoes returned from them.
Figure 2 shows the various types of radar used
and their operating range as encountered by an
aircraft as it enters a hostile region [21]. Lower
frequency range (0.1-1.0 GHz) is used for
surveillance and detection (VHF, UHF, S-
Band), medium frequency range is used for
tracking the target, used mostly by SAM
launchers (C, X), and higher frequency range is
used by radar onboard aircraft (Ku, K, Ka).
Table 1 gives IEEE Letter Band nomenclature
of radars described above [22].
Radar Cross Section is the area of an
imaginary perfect reflector that would reflect
the same amount of energy back to the
receiving radar antenna, as reflected by the
actual target. The IEEE dictionary defines
RCS as a measure of the reflective strength of a
target, defined as, 4 times the ratio of the
power per unit solid angle scattered in a
specified direction, to the power per unit area
of a plane wave incident on the scatterer from a
specified direction [23], and is given as,
2
Escat
 = Lim 4R2· 2 . (5)
R 
Einc
8
Stealth Technology & Airpower
Figure 3 shows the main surfaces
responsible for radar scattering / reflection in
an aircraft [24]. Some part of the reflected
signal may be in the direction of other
conducting surfaces, causing multiple or
sequential reflections (also termed as retro-
reflection); the resultant RCS is a vectorial sum
of all these returns. The superposition of
individual echoes in conjunction with the
highly specular return from the various flat
surfaces and retro-reflectors, and the possible
depolarisation of the scattered field coupled
with interference between the signals can cause
widely varying echo amplitude with small
change in the view angle (termed as
scintillation).
4.1. RCS computation
The RCS of an object is a complex function of
the shape, size and the ratio of the target
dimension, to the wavelength of the impinging
radar wave. Depending on the ratio between
impinging wavelength () and the characteristic
target dimension (α), RCS may lie in one of the
three regions [25]:
i. Rayleigh Region ( >> α) - In this region,
 varies smoothly with , and is
proportional to the reciprocal of fourth
power of the wavelength and square of the
body volume.
ii. Resonant Region (  α) - Rapid changes
in  are likely to occur in this region (due
to interactions between various scattering
mechanisms). In the case of a sphere, a
creeping wave travels around the sphere
and back towards the receiver, where it
interferes constructively or destructively
with the specular backscatter.
iii. Optical Region ( << ) - Here  varies
smoothly with the wavelength and tends
to some definite value (most of the radar
operate in this region). In this region,
RCS is highly sensitive to the size, shape
and material properties of the target.
Some of the scattering analysis techniques
applicable for targets in the optical region
are [20, 26]: - Physical Optics (PO),
Source Distribution Technique (SDT),

Geometrical Optics (GO), and
Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD).
The backscatter RCS value at a given
aspect is assessed by considering the aircraft to
be made up of a collection, N, of the most
important scatterers, such as the flat plate,
dihedrals, corners, antennas, edges, etc., and is
given by [25],
2 In order to reduce RCS by a significant amount,
 N

= 

 i 1
σ i  e j2πR i  ,

where, i is the complex RCS (magnitude and
phase) of the scatterer, and depends on the view
angle, relative position, polarization, and
frequency, of the impinging wave, and (2·Ri)
is the round-trip phase difference from the
radar to the ith scatterer. A simpler approach is
to assume that the individual scattered waves
are randomly distributed in phase, and the
resulting approximate RCS of the aircraft at the
aspect of interest is the sum of the backscatter
RCS from each of the scatterer (termed as the
noncoherent sum), and is given as,
N
= σ
i 1
i .
The upper bound on the backscatter RCS
occurs when the returns from all scatters are in
phase, given by the coherent sum as, max =
2 body concept, uses this technique.
 N 
  σi  . (8)
 i 1 
4.2 Radar detection range
The maximum range, Rmax, of radar depends on
its operating frequency. Lower frequency radar
waves are less attenuated in propagation, but if
the frequency is too low, the antenna size
required can be impractical. Tracking radars
require good accuracy and necessary resolution
for precisely tracking the targets. Hence,
guided missiles or direct anti aircraft gun
systems operate at a high frequency. The range
of monostatic radar is given as [27],
1/4
 PR  G R 2  λ 2  σ 
Rmax =   .
 4π   (S/N) min 
3
The maximum detection range of the radar
varies as a function of the fourth root of the
Stealth Technology & Airpower
target’s RCS. Thus, achieving tactically
meaningful reductions in the detection ranges
of threat radar, necessitates significant
reductions in the aircraft RCS; for instance, to
reduce the detection range by half, RCS has to
be decreased by 16 times.
4.3 RCS reduction
(6) an aircraft has to use several RCS reduction
techniques simultaneously. The amount and
type of RCS reduction techniques incorporated
depend on several factors like cost, mission
effectiveness, mission profile, etc. The main
techniques of RCS reduction can be broadly
classified in the following four categories: -
4.3.1 Shaping
The RCS is reduced by reducing the scattering
of incident wave back in the same direction, by
appropriate shaping of the airframe and other
RCS contributing objects. This is particularly
effective against monostatic radars, in which
the transmitter and the receiver are collocated.
There are two distinctly different approaches to
(7)
establish the overall shape of the aircraft [28]:
i. By adapting a compact, smooth blend
external geometry. The B-2 bomber,
which is a derivative of the flying wing-
ii. By adapting a faceted configuration using
flat surfaces, arranged to minimise normal
reflection back towards the illuminating
radar. The Lockheed F-117A is based on
this philosophy (illustrated in Fig. 4).
There are other features common to both the
above-mentioned methods of RCS reduction:-
a. Minimise the overall size of the aircraft.
b. Eliminate cockpit transparencies by
treating them with a thin conducting layer,
thus reducing the radar reflections
amplified by the cavity effect caused by the
cockpit and other devices inside the
cockpit.
c. A clean external geometry without
(9) protuberances and gaps. Hence, all
weapons should be carried inside the
aircraft.
d. Highly swept leading edges with rounded
wing tips.
9

e. Avoid flat and re-entrant surfaces likely to
be normal to the incident radiation, for
example, having a V shaped tail instead of
vertical tail.
f. Use of composites that have impedance
comparable to that of air, and thus are poor
reflectors of the radar beam.
g. Design any internal structure within
external radar transparent skins like
composites by using multifaceted shapes,
to reduce reflections in a given direction.
h. The RCS of an onboard radar antenna can
be comparable to that of the aircraft [29],
and should be avoided. Hence, the F-117A
relies on FLIR and DLIR passive detection
systems for surveillance and tracking [30].
i. Buried engines with air intakes and
exhausts located over the upper surfaces of
the wing, thus masking the intake from the
incident radar waves from below.
j. A screen placed over the air intake
effectively to close the radar cavity with
mesh size less than the wavelength of the
illuminating radar waves.
k. Appropriate shaping of the intake lips and
inlet ducts (S shaped curve).
4.3.2 Distributed loading
This technique essentially consists of covering
the scatterer with suitable material called Radar
Absorbent Material (RAM). The RAM reduces
scattering by absorbing some part of the
incident radiation, either by admitting and then
by internally attenuating the impinging signal
(Attenuating RAM), or by internally generating
reflections that interfere with the reflection
from the front surface (Resonant RAM).
When a radar signal travels through the air
and then impinges upon the surface of the
aircraft, the ratio of the intensities of reflected
signal to incident signal is given by [31] as,
|Zm  Za| / (Zm + Za). Thus, if the impedance of
the material is same as that of air (typically 377
), the intensity of reflected radiation is low.
However, most of aircraft is made of metals
that have low impedance and hence, high
reflectance to radar waves. The RAM should
have impedance equivalent to that of air, and it
should be capable of rapidly absorbing the
10
Stealth Technology & Airpower
energy of the impinging signal. In order to
absorb energy, materials must generate induced
currents that are - in phase with the incident
fields. Carbon is mostly used for energy
dissipation, but materials, like the lossy-
dielectrics, whose indices of refraction are
complex numbers (the imaginary part is
responsible for losses) can also be used for
energy dissipation [25]. Magnetic absorbers,
which dissipate energy because of magnetic
losses, consist of rubber, polyurethane,
fluroelastomer, or silicone matrix loaded with
ferrites or graphite. The energy absorbed
depends on the angle of incidence of the wave,
its wavelength, thickness of the RAM and its
properties. This system can reduce more than
20 dB of scattered radar energy over the 2-18
GHz band [32]. Another technique, known as
the circuit analog RAM, where the inductance
and capacitance of the RAM can be tailor
made, utilizes lossy material deposited in
specific geometric patterns. In general, RAM
techniques are effective in the optical regime.
4.3.3 Active Interference
If the combination of wavelength and aircraft
characteristic dimension is in the Rayleigh or
Resonant regimes, impedances are introduced
at various locations over the aircraft surfaces,
which change the charge flow over the surface
and hence, RCS. This method also has the
capability of controlling RCS by selectively
closing and opening of switches that alter the
amount of interference on the aircraft surface.
4.3.4 Passive Interference
Here special configurations such as resistive
sheets, machined port in the body, or the size
and shape of the interior cavity, are designed to
present optimum impedance at the aperture.
This technique is not widely used because it is
difficult to design configurations for all aspects
and frequencies of the impinging radar waves.
It should be noted that the techniques
used for RCS reduction have their associated
set of penalties, and may conflict with
conventional philosophies of aircraft design.
For example, the subsonic F-117A has a lift to
drag ratio of 7.5, as compared to other non-
stealth fighter aircraft that have a lift to drag
ratio of 9 to 12, in spite of supersonic

capability. This is because of the faceted
configuration, highly swept leading edges and
low wing aspect ratio, adapted on F117-A to
reduce its RCS [30].
4.4 Electronic warfare
Electronic Warfare, which deals with deceiving
the enemy’s air defence system, is the main
difference between stealth technology and low
observable technology. Stealth technology
encompasses the concepts of “camouflage,
conceal, and deceive”, and low observables
technology is restricted to “camouflage and
conceal only”. Figure 5 shows the main
components of electronic warfare [33].
4.4.1 Electronic support measures (ESM)
The responsibility of ESM is to intercept and
analyse all the radiated signals in the
environment, and extract information about the
various threats present in the hostile region.
The ESM determines the appropriate response
for countering the threat and increasing the
survivability of the aircraft, which is then
passed on to the ECM system (elaborated in the
next section) for execution. The bandwidth of
ESM system is very wide and may include
radar, IR and optical regions of the radiation
spectrum.
4.4.2 Electronic countermeasures
These are the techniques employed by the
aircraft to fool or deceive various enemy
detectors, and are classified as active or
passive. Active countermeasures consist of
devices that deliberately generate and radiate
signals to compete with the true signals, in
order to disrupt the intended function of the
enemy device. These include techniques like
noise jamming of radars, electronic decoys, etc.
Passive techniques make use of devices like
chaff, flares, corner reflectors, etc., designed to
reflect the intercepted radar radiation, in order
to compete with the true target returns, and
either cancel or hide the true target position.
One of the most significant effects of RCS
reduction is on the capability of the jammer
(carried by the aircraft) to jam enemy radars.
The echo from the target aircraft and the
jamming signal are emitted from the aircraft in
the direction of the ground based enemy radar.
11
Stealth Technology & Airpower
The power required by the jammer is given by
[33],
PR  G R σ J
PJ =   , (10)
GJ 4π  R S
2
where, J/S can be as high as 10 dB. The power
required is thus directly proportional to aircraft
RCS. Conventional aircraft require powerful
jamming equipments that are bulky, and also
produce large amount of heat, which in turn
may increase the IR signature of the aircraft.
The minimum range below which the jammer
is unable to jam the enemy radar is the “burn-
through range” given by,
1/2
P GR σ J 
R=  R    . (11)
 PJ  G J 4π S 
For a stealth aircraft, this range is much smaller
as compared to a conventional aircraft, because
of the square root dependence on aircraft RCS.
5.0 PASSIVE SIGNATURES
These include acoustic, visual, infrared, and
other miscellaneous signatures that are
produced by the aircraft due to its operation.
Infrared and Visual signatures are more
important amongst the passive signatures, and
are elaborated.
5.1 Infrared signatures
The IR radiation is emitted by virtue of the
body temperature. The IR signature level of an
aircraft depends on the contrast generated due
to the difference between the IR emission level
of the aircraft and its background as perceived
by the infrared detector, in its operating
wavelength band. The IR emission for a black
body is a function of frequency and absolute
temperature, and is given by Planck’s Law as,
2π  h p  ν 3  n 2
 .
EB = (12)
c 2 o  exp(h p  ν/k  T)  1
The peak wavelength of radiation is given by
Wien’s Displacement Law, which can also be
derived from Planck’s Law as,  =
2893/T. (13)
The attenuation of IR radiation in the
atmosphere is highly dependent on wavelength
of radiation and, temperature and composition
of the radiation participating gases. In the

practical range of IR radiation wavelength,
there exist a number of so called “windows”
where the transmittance is high, between which
there are absorption bands mainly due to the
presence of H2O (vap.) and CO2 in the
atmosphere. There are two main windows of
interest from stealth point of view; the first
atmospheric window is from 3-5 m that
corresponds to the radiation emitted by the hot
parts of the propulsion system. Heat-seeking
anti-aircraft missiles utilise this window for
locking-on to the aircraft. The second
atmospheric window, 8–12 m, is used for both
tracking and surveillance. In this band, even IR
emissions from large surfaces at relatively low
temperatures, such as the kinetically heated
airframe can be detected. However, the 8-12
m band is less effective in environments with
high H2O (vap.) content (e.g. marine
environment), due to significant scattering that
reduces transmissivity. At low altitudes or in
cloudy weather conditions, the transmittance of
the atmosphere is low. At higher altitudes
where the H2O (vap.) and CO2 content is less,
the radiation transmitted travels over large
distances because of less attenuation by the
intervening atmosphere [34].
Figure 6 shows the two cases of an analysis
performed to obtain the dependency of
blackbody emission on temperature. In Case-I
the black body emission is obtained, while in
Case-II the contrast between the blackbody
emission and a black background at 15C is
estimated. Table 2 summarises the results for
these two cases, which show that the emission
in the 3-5 m range is highly dependent on
temperature, as compared to the 8-12 m range.
Since most of the earlier generation heat-
seeking missiles use the 3-5 m band for lock-
on, the lock-on range is a stronger function of
temperature than the detection range, which
uses the 8-12 m band.
The detection range of an IR detector is
proportional to the square root of the emissive
power, which in turn is a function of the
temperature, as summarised for various cases in
Tab. 2. Thus for Case –II the detection range is
proportional to T3.44 in the 3-5 µm band, and
12
Stealth Technology & Airpower
T1.9 in the 8-12 µm band. Therefore, to reduce
the detection range of the IR detector by half,
the temperature of the emitting body should be
reduced by 1.22 times in the 3-5 µm band, and
1.44 times in the 8-12 µm band.
5.2 IR Plot
Figure 7 shows a typical IR plot for a military
aircraft [17]. When viewed from front and
sides, the plume and the airframe contribute to
IR signature, plume being the major source.
The radiation is most intense at the two peaks
of the line centred at 4.3 m, which is absorbed
by CO2 in the atmosphere. When viewed from
the tail side, the engine hot parts become the
major source of IR radiation. The absence of
radiation at 2.7 and 4.3 m is due to the
absorption by H2O (vap.) and CO2 in the
atmosphere; and is termed ‘line inversion’.
The main contributors of IR signature in
helicopters are the exhaust plume, exhaust duct,
tail boom heated by exhaust plume, and the
direct view of hot engine parts like the turbine
blades. Figure 8 shows the predicted IR plot
for Bell 205 (UH-1H) helicopter, in 3-5 m
band [35]. When viewed from the rear, a
typical IR guided SAM can achieve a lock on
from 4-6 km, because of the direct view of
engine parts at 600-700C. The hot tail pipe
metal also provides a strong source for IR
missiles for all the rear aspects.
5.3 IR threat
The IR seekers have exploited techniques to
acquire and intercept airborne targets, by
passively detecting IR energy from the aircraft.
Other advantages of IR seekers are that they do
not require active impingement of radio
frequency on the target, as in the case of radar-
homing missiles. The US made Stinger
missiles (IR guided and shoulder launched),
used against the Soviets in Afghanistan, proved
to be very successful, and was one of the prime
reasons for the failure of the Soviet campaign
in Afghanistan. Present generation IR-
detectors are known to provide radar
comparable detection range, and are cheaper to
manufacture and easy to use [36].
The IR missiles are classified as SAM (e.g.
MANPADS) and AAM, and are listed in Tab. 3

[37]. These missiles have primarily originated
from former Soviet block and Western block
countries, and have proliferated worldwide.
Some of these missiles are available with
terrorist groups, posing a serious threat to
aircraft and helicopters in peacekeeping
operations. Early missiles used uncooled
detector technology operating in the Short-
Wave IR waveband (1.9-2.6 m), and were
limited to hitting the hot exposed exhaust metal
of the aircraft. Modern cooled detectors have
higher sensitivity in the Mid-Wave IR band (3-
5 m), and are capable of lock-on from all
aspects. Figure 9 shows the lock-on range of
an IR seeker versus contrast intensity, for some
of the common heat-seeking missiles. The IR
imaging system has the highest detection range.
It should be noted that the survivability of an
aircraft depends on the detection range. Figure
10 qualitatively shows the decrease in
survivability of the aircraft with increase in its
detection range by heat-seeking missiles [38].
5.3.1 Flight envelop constraint based on IR
signature
Figure 11 shows the loci of constant IR
signature levels as seen by the detector on the
ground, of a typical aircraft operating in the dry
mode of the engine [39]. Any one of these loci
could be NEFD, which is the threshold value of
the IR detector, depending upon the state of the
detector technology. For an aircraft under
threat of IR detection from ground, it is safe to
fly above this locus.
5.4 Sources of IR radiation and their
reduction
Generally, the positive contrast between the
aircraft and its background / surroundings is
responsible for its IR signatures. However,
strong negative contrast with the background /
surrounding also produces IR signatures that
can be tracked by an IR seeker. Figure 12
summarises the major sources of IR radiation in
a typical aircraft.
5.4.1 Powerplant
The heat generated in powerplant is radiated
outward from the cowlings, nacelle, and the
exhaust nozzle. The engine casing and the
exhaust nozzle are grey bodies and emit
13
Stealth Technology & Airpower
radiation in the entire spectrum, unlike the
exhaust plume that emits only in a narrow
wavelength band. Gray body emission is
always more critical, because enemy IR
detectors can detect a portion of the emitted
radiation that corresponds to their wavelength
band. Internal parts of the gas turbine engine,
like turbine blades and afterburner flame
holders can become a major source of
radiation, if visible from rear. A difficulty to
compound this situation further is the drive to
achieve improved powerplant performance by
increasing the cycle temperature, which
increases the amount of radiation emitted [40].
Increasing BPR of the engine or using local
heat insulation can reduce the engine casing
temperature and hence the IR signatures. Since
the emission is proportional to the sixth power
of temperature (in 3-5 μm band), moderate
reduction in the casing temperature reduces
emission by an appreciable amount. Reducing
surface emissivity by using suitable surface
coating and treatment also reduces emission.
When appreciable cooling of exposed surfaces
is not possible, susceptibility to IR missiles is
reduced by restricting the angle in which the
hot metal surfaces of the exhaust system are
visible, by masking the engine within the
airframe [34]. Placing engine exhaust ducts
over the wings hide the hot engine parts and the
exhaust plume, to a large extent from ground
based IR detectors, as in the case of B-2
bomber.
5.4.2 Exhaust plume
For gases, absorption and emission of thermal
radiation, is a consequence of coupled intra-
molecular vibrational and rotational energy
transitions of gas molecules. As there are
several modes of vibration and rotation,
radiation is emitted at a number of different
wavelengths. The number, width, and emissive
powers of the various bands, depend on the gas
composition, pressure, temperature, and
thickness of gas volume. Band emissions
exhibited by gases have a higher order of
dependency on temperature as compared to
black body emission [41]. Since the
temperature of the plume is less than 3000 K,
H2O (vap.) and CO2 bands are dominant. The

bands of H2O (vap.) are centred at 1.9, 2.7, 2.8,
6.7 and 21 m, and for CO2, they are centred at
2.7, 4.3 and 15 m [42]. Since the plume
length is much greater than that of the aircraft,
plume radiation is visible from a wider aspect
as compared to engine casing radiation.
High BPR and non-afterburning engines
result in lesser plume temperature and smaller
plume length (Fig. 13). Modern generation
stealth aircraft like the F-22 have supercruise
capability, wherein the engine generates the
necessary power, without afterburners.
Supercruise capability, dictated by stealth with
respect to IR detection, has made the problem
of cooling of turbine blades even more severe.
The 2-D nozzles reduce emitted IR radiation,
due to increase in perimeter to cross sectional
area ratio of the nozzle, thereby promoting
rapid mixing with the freestream flow, and
partly blocking the direct view of the internal
hot parts [44]. Figure 14 shows the exhaust
nozzle used on F-117A [30]. The penalty
associated with such a nozzle is the high
backpressure experienced by the engine, which
reduces the net power delivered by the engine.
For producing the same amount of power, the
engine must operate at a higher temperature,
which in turn increases the amount of IR
radiation emitted. The same is true regarding
the additional weight of an IR suppression
system.
5.4.3 Airframe
The airframe although at a lower temperature
difference with the ambient as compared to the
plume or the engine casing, provides a
relatively large surface area for contrast.
Modern day all-aspect IR missiles use radiation
from the airframe (which includes the engine-
heated rear fuselage) for locking-on the aircraft
in the frontal aspect. Engaging an aircraft form
the frontal aspect has two distinct advantages.
Firstly, the aircraft can be destroyed before it
penetrates the enemy territory. Secondly, the
probability of kill is high because of the high
tracking rate, which reduces the reaction time
available to the aircraft for countermeasures.
The airframe is a strong source of IR emission
especially during supersonic Deep Penetration
14
Stealth Technology & Airpower
mode, due to skin friction (aerodynamic)
heating.
The forward stagnation region of aircraft
nose, wings leading edges, and rear fuselage,
are at higher temperatures, compared to other
regions. This leads to localized bright spots on
the airframe, which increases the overall IR
signature level of the aircraft, especially in the
frontal aspect. Hence, the emissivity of the
coating has to be optimized for both the
atmospheric windows, depending on the
mission. It is desirable to treat the various
regions of the airframe with coatings of
different emissivity, such that the overall
signature is optimized for both the atmospheric
windows, leading to an optimum camouflage.
Hot parts like the heat exchanger and oil
cooler also emit IR radiation. The wavelength
of peak emissions from an aircraft flying at
Mach 2 in the stratosphere is around 7 m, and
that due to the plume is about 4 m. Sun glint
off the airframe opaque surfaces and
transparencies (cockpit canopy) may be a
potential source for an IR seeker, because the
Sun is an extremely intense source of radiant
energy. More than 6% of solar energy occurs
at wavelengths longer than 2 m [34]. Sun
glint can be avoided by surface treatment with
IRAP, but it may cause the overall temperature
of the airframe to increase. A better way is to
use several flat surfaces and thus minimise the
angles over which the reflected solar radiation
can be detected.
5.5 IR signature level estimation
The IR signature level of an aircraft depends on
the contrast between the IR emission level of
the aircraft and the background (which is
generally the sky), in the detector’s wavelength
band. The total IR signature level of an aircraft
is the sum of IR signature levels of the plume,
airframe, and engine casing.
5.5.1 Engine casing radiation
A comprehensive treatment for calculating the
IR radiation emitted by the engine casing is in
[39]. The engine layout commencing from the
last stage turbine exit plane onward rearwards,
is approximated as three coaxial ducts, with gas
flows in the core and annuli, and freestream

flow over the exposed engine casing. The
casing temperature is obtained from a steady
state multimode heat transfer modelling of the
engine layout that includes surface radiation
interchange in conjunction with internal and
external convection.
5.5.2 Plume radiation
The plume structure depends on many factors
like the shape and size of the nozzle, pressure
and temperature at the nozzle exit, and the
freestream ambient conditions. For functional
modelling of plume radiation, the shock
structure can be neglected, because the pressure
ratio across the exhaust nozzle of an aircraft is
not comparable to that in the case of a rocket
nozzle. The approximate correlation for
axisymmetric plume temperature distribution is
in [45]. For two-dimensional nozzle plume, the
model is constructed by splitting a scaled
axisymmetric plume, and by inserting a
rectangular section of constant property lines in
between. A semi-empirical scaling factor is
used to account for the differences in mixing
rates between axisymmetric and non-
axisymmetric plumes [46].
5.5.3 Airframe radiation
The temperature of the aerodynamically heated
airframe is found from the non-linear equation
[39],
h  (Taw  Taf )  ε  η  (Taf4  Tsky
4
), (14)
where,
 γ 1 2 
Taw  Tl  1  rf   Ml  , (14.1)
 2  corrosive, may damage the internal parts of the
for calorically perfect model. Once the
temperature of the airframe is obtained, the
amount of radiation emitted in the detector’s
wavelength band is obtained from Planck’s
Law.
5.6 Visual signature
Visual signatures depend on the contrast
between the aircraft and its background. The
range over which an aircraft can be observed
by naked eye is not large, but if augmented by
sophisticated optical tracking system, may be a
cause of concern. The use of night vision
equipment that can operate on starlight using
the principle of image intensification, augment
the visual signature.
15
Stealth Technology & Airpower
5.6.1 Airframe
Airframe is the most important contributor of
visual signature, due to its large area. Apart
from making the aircraft small, the contrast of
the airframe with the background can be
reduced by using paints of different reflectivity
and colours, which reduce the range of visual
detection, and can confuse the enemy, since the
actual range, attitude and type of aircraft, is no
longer obvious. A technique for aircraft
operating against uniform background is to use
local lighting on the airframe, to disguise dark
areas such as air intakes and other cavities or
shadowed regions [48]. The glint problem can
be minimised by using flat surfaces in lieu of
rounded surfaces.
5.6.2 Rotor or propeller blade
The rotation of blades results in a glint effect,
which is more severe in helicopters, where the
frequency of rotation is less. Using a larger
number of blades of smaller length rotating at a
higher frequency and coated with an
appropriate paint, substantially reduces the
glint.
5.6.3 Plume
An opaque exhaust plume leaves a trail behind
the aircraft for an enemy to follow. Efficient
design of engine combustor can reduce the
amount of smoke formed. Chemical additives
such as chloro-fluro-sulfonic acid can be added
in to the exhaust system for changing the size
of the exhaust particles, and hence to reduce the
contrails [48]. However, such chemicals being
engine.
5.6.4 Aircraft lighting
The external lighting on an aircraft makes itself
visible to the neighbouring aircraft when flying
in a formation or during refuelling. Internal
lighting in the cockpit is for the pilot, which
also increase the aircraft visibility. Non-
flickering dim lights located on the upper side
of the aircraft and fluorescent displays on the
control panel, substantially reduce the visual
signatures.

6.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
New technological innovations render the
existing technologies obsolete; even a single
innovation can change the balance between the
attacker and defender, thereby making the
whole game of warfare very dynamic. The
emergence of IR detection in anti-stealth
technology is an outcome of this philosophy;
hence, it is worthwhile examining Radar and
IR.
6.1 Radar versus IR
The history of radars is much older than IR
detectors. Radar was the only device used for
surveillance of the sky until few years ago, but
recently IR detection systems like IRST are
being used in conjunction with radar.
Primarily, IR seekers were used for short-range
applications like tracking and lock-on, as in
heat-seeking missiles. This was mainly
because of limitations in IR detecting element
material and cooling technology. Modern
generation IR detectors use thermal imaging,
which employ an array of detectors to build a
spatial map of the scene [49]. These are
capable of detecting radiation in a wider
spectrum, and are inherently immune to IR
countermeasures like IR flares that appear as a
point source (ignored by the detector).
However, such systems are hitherto not popular
in heat-seeking missiles because of the weight
and size restrictions (due to the associated
electronic complexities and loss in robustness
due to stringent cooling requirement of the
detector). The next generation IR imaging
systems will use large area, multi-spectral /
multi-colour staring arrays with considerable
front end processing, to provide multi-
wavelength spatial detection.
The major advantage of IR detector is the
passive nature of its detection and ease in
usage. The IR seekers do not emit active
radiation like the radar, which commits self-
betrayal by emitting radar waves towards the
target. Hence, IR seekers are not easily
detected by the oncoming aircraft unlike the
radar stations, which are prone to electronic
countermeasures and physical damage by anti-
radiation missiles (missiles guided by the
transmitted radar waves).
16
Stealth Technology & Airpower
The pulse width governs the minimum
detection range in monostatic radars [50], thus
active radar homing missiles that use
monostatic radars cannot see the target in the
terminal phase. Though semi-active homing
missiles do not face this problem, the
illuminating station is always at a risk of being
destroyed by anti-radiation missiles carried by
the aircraft. Passive homing IR missiles track
the target even in the terminal phase and have
fire-and-forget capabilities, thereby enhance
their lethality, as compared to radar homing
missiles.
The first generation stealth aircraft like F-
117A and B-2 bomber were primarily designed
to evade the Soviet radar, and used more of
RCS reducing techniques. Incorporation of
stealth features for RCS reduction results in
penalties in terms of shape and hence,
aerodynamic performance of the aircraft [30],
and makes their stealthy appearance obvious, as
compared to incorporation of IR suppression
features, which involve the use of a retrofit
device, or the futuristic trend of emissivity
optimization of gray surfaces participating in
radiation interchange. The estimated weight
for signature reduction and associated
equipment in case of a helicopter is 40 kg for
radar camouflage, and 20 kg for IR camouflage
[51]. Reduction in the radar detection range
calls for huge reduction of the aircraft RCS,
whereas, even a moderate drop in the aircraft
body temperature results in substantial decrease
in the IR seeker’s detection range. The RCS
has to be reduced by 12 times as compared to
temperature, for reducing the detection range
by half in radar and IR lock-on ranges,
respectively.
Between 1979 and 1993, IR guided
missiles have destroyed more than 89% of all
downed aircraft and helicopters, out of which
many of the missiles were shoulder-fired [36].
Hence, IR signatures and associated
technologies will shape the course of
developments in stealth technology, and
therefore, modern generation stealth aircraft are
incorporating more of IR camouflage
techniques.

6.2 Anti stealth technologies
Stealth technology reduces the susceptibility of
an aircraft, by making it less visible to the
enemy detectors like the radar, IR detectors,
etc. On the other hand, advances in the
detector technology have improved their
sensitivity, thereby making the aircraft more
susceptible. Some of these potential anti-
stealth technologies are discussed below.
6.2.1 Bistatic radar
Bistatic radar uses antennas at different
locations for transmission and reception of
radar waves. Most of the stealth aircraft are
designed for evading monostatic radar, by
minimising the echo in the incident direction,
but the aircraft may send an echo in another
direction, large enough to be picked up by the
bistatic receiver [52]. The main disadvantage
of bistatic radar is its limited detection range in
certain aspects, which is overcome by a radar
net that consists of one transmitter in
conjunction with multiple receivers. The main
disadvantage of bistatic radar and radar net is
the synchronisation between the transmitter and
the receiver.
6.2.2 Ultra-wide band radar
These transmit nanosecond or shorter pulse at
giga-watt power level, consisting of thousands
of different frequencies in the pulse, ranging
from few hundred MHz to several GHz [53].
The aircraft RAM and electronic
countermeasure techniques are not effective
against such radars.
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
(i) Stealth technology is the key to achieving
air superiority in modern warfare.
(ii) Stealth aircraft are especially better
suited for bombing missions than
conventional aircraft, and can achieve
mission objectives effectively at a much
lower overall cost.
(iii) Reduction of radar and IR signatures
significantly enhance the survivability of
an aircraft in a hostile environment,
thereby leading towards air superiority.
17
Stealth Technology & Airpower
(iv) In case of a conflict between requirement
of low detection and low tracking rate of
the lethal missile, preference must be
given to low tracking rate features, based
on lethality.
(v) Relative to radar based threats; heat-
seeking missiles will continue to pose a
greater threat to aircraft and helicopters,
because of their simplicity and easy
availability.
(vi) The effectiveness of Electronic Warfare
techniques is much higher with stealth
aircraft.
(vii) Developments in IR detector technology
have significantly increased their
capabilities in terms of range and
sensitivity, due to which IR signatures
will play a greater role in determining the
next generation stealth features.
(viii) The IR signature level in the 3-5 μm band
is a stronger function of temperature than
in the 8-12 μm band. Hence, 8-12 μm
band will be more popularly used in the
future, as it can better detect an aircraft
stealthy with respect to IR.
(ix) The requirements of RCS reduction are
far more stringent as compared to IR
signature reduction, since IR detection
range is a much stronger function of
temperature as compared to the
dependence of radar detection range on
RCS.
(x) The incorporation of IR stealth features
in an aircraft are not obviously visible as
compared to the incorporation of radar
stealth features, especially considering
the future trend of emissivity
optimisation of grey surfaces
participating in radiation interchange.
(xi) Stealth technology is dynamic because of
the challenges posed by parallel
developments in anti-stealth technology.
Hence, the coming generation stealth
aircraft will significantly differ in
concept and form, from the present
known stealth aircraft.

Acknowledgement: The authors wish to thank
the Aeronautics Research and Development
Board (Propulsion Panel), Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, for the financial support.
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 Stealth Technology & Airpower

Journal of the American Helicopter

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20
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

Aircraft Signatures

Active Passive

Radar
Airframe
Infrared Acoustic Visual Miscellaneous
Engine Casing Airframe Navigational
Engine Intake Engine Parts
Radar
Weapons Airframe Engine Exhaust Engine Exhaust
and Glow Communication
Canopy Exhaust Plume Airframe Countermeasures
Canopy Glint
Sun glint
Aircraft lighting

Fig. 1 Classification of aircraft signatures.

(km)
X-Band Al
Ku-Band Al VHF Surveillance 21
UHF Surveillance
18
S-Band Surveillance 15
C-Band SAM 12

C/X-Band SAM 9
6
3
0
(km) 500 400 300 200 100 0

Fig. 2 Types of radar and their range of operation [21].

21
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

CORNER
DIFFRACTION
EDGE
SPECULAR DIFFRACTION
SURFACE
RETURN CREEPING INTERACTION
WAVE ECHO
RETURN
TIP
DIFFRACTION CAVITY
RETURN

TRAVELING WAVE
CURVATURE ECHO
DISCONTINUITY
RETURN
GAP OR SEAM
ECHO

Fig. 3 Sources and types of radar reflection in an aircraft [24].

Aircraft nose

Radar antenna
Radar antenna
Fig. 4 Principle of using faceted surfaces to reduce RCS.

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Electronic Support Electronic Electronic Counter

Measures (ESM) Countermeasures (ECM) Countermeasures (ECCM)

Active Passive

Fig. 5 Components of electronic warfare [33].

22
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

105 105

3-5 μm 3-5 μm
104 8-12 μm 104 8-12 μm

103 103

102 102

101 101

100 100
500 500
200 1000 200 1000
T(K)
(a) Black body emission T (K) at 15C
(b) Contrast with background

Fig. 6 Emission versus temperature plot in 3-5m and 8-12 m bands.

1 1

0
0
2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.2

30 80

1 0 4
0

0 0
2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.8 5.2
WAVELENGTH, m

Fig. 7 IR signature level plot of typical fighter aircraft from various aspects [17].

23
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

3-5 m 90

135 45
overall
helicopter

tailpipe

180 0
Power turbine

Exhaust
Plume heated plume
tail boom

225 315

270

Fig. 8 Predicted breakdown of Bell 205 (UH-1H) IR signature level in 3-5μm band [35].

20

16 Imaging IR

12 Stinger

8 SA-7(ltd)

4
SA-7(ltd)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Contrast Radiant Intensity (W/Sr)

Fig. 9 Lock-on Range of some common heat seeking missiles [36].

Ps

DETECTION RANGE
Fig. 10 Probability of survival of aircraft versus detection range of missile [38].

24
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

11.0 Signal = 0.5 W/m2

10.0 Signal = 2 W/m2

9.0

8.0

7.0
Signal = 5 W/m2
6.0
H (km)
5.0

4.0

3.0 NEFD = 50 W/m2

2.0

1.0 Signal = 200 W/m2

0
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2

M
Fig. 11 Loci of IR signature level on flight envelop (dry rating) [39].

SOLAR
REFLECTION
ANTI-
ICERS
SKIN
EMISSION

EXHAUST PLUME
HEAT
HEATED SURFACE
EXCHANGER

EXHAUST
PLUME
ENGINE HOT
METAL

Fig. 12 Sources of IR emission in a typical aircraft [17].

25
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

15

10 260C
WITHOUT AFTERBURNER
371C 149C
Thrust 15,800 lb
5

0 66C

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

0 Distance from face of
316C 204C
tailpipe (ft)
194C
5 93C 66C
538C
10 427C
WITH AFTERBURNER
15 Thrust 23,500 lb

20

Fig. 13 Exhaust temperature contour of a typical engine with and without afterburning [43].

Side view

Installation Sketch
Engine

Vertical tension posts

(21 per tailpipe)

Engine

Section B-B
Section A-A

Fig. 14 Engine exhaust layout of F-117A [30].

26
 Stealth Technology & Airpower

Tab. 1 IEEE Radar letter-band nomenclature [22].

Band Nominal Frequency Band Nominal

Designation (MHz) Designation Frequency (GHz)
HF 3-30 X 8-12
VHF 30-300 Ku 12-18
UHF 300-1000 K 18-27
L 1000-2000 Ka 27-40
S 2000-4000 V 40-75
C 4000-8000 Mm 100-300

Tab. 2 Temperature correlations in 3-5 m and 8-12 m bands (T in K).

3-5 m 8-12 m

CASE I (emission in W/m2) 9.158191016T6.52 7.10109106T2.97

CASE II (contrast in W/m2) 8.246171017T6.88 2.96195108 T3.80

Tab. 3 Common heat-seeking missiles and their origin [37].

Missile Type Soviet Block Missile Western Missiles

Surface to Air SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14, Chaparral, Mistral, Redeye, Stinger
(SAM) SA-16, SA-18
Air to Air AA-2, AA-3, AA-5, AA-6, AIM 4D, AIM 9L/M (Sidewinder),
(AAM) AA-8, AA-10, AA-11, PL- ASRAAM, MICA, Mistral, Python-3,
2, PL-5B, PL-7 R.530, R.550, Shafrir, Stinger

27

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