Abstract

The historical, political and geopolitical, civil, and cultural background of modern
Belarus significantly influences its current democratic degree. In this paper, I am aiming to
find out, how Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka and political elites rule the country. I
will examine the nature of propaganda and what role it plays in the country. I want to look
closer at the events of the 2020 elections and figure out, how they changed political
opposition, the political involvement of Belarusians, and what role is assigned to both state-
owned and independent media.

Keywords: propaganda, manipulation, protests, media, freedom of speech, human

rights, state-owned media, alternative media, journalism, journalists

The moving force of propaganda

In this section, I want to start by defining what propaganda is. I try to study its history
and context, as well as analyze its nature and define its features.
The success of a politician, an opinion leader, or a party much depends on the
effectiveness of a designed image and the way target groups perceive and respond to that
image. Creating the image, and as a consequence, a certain public opinion is one of the
primary elements for those wanting to be in power. A complex strategy for building the
image of various political factors is made of several elements. One of those elements, which
has the potential of being the most powerful one, is the manipulation of public consciousness.
In other words, a technique meant to shift the public consciousness in the direction, that
would be beneficial and give the opposing side an upper hand.
Propaganda is no doubt one of the most commonly used manipulation techniques.
When we look the term up in the Oxford English Dictionary, we read:” systematic
propagation of information or ideas by an interested party, esp. in a tendentious way in order
to encourage or instill a particular attitude or response” (The Oxford English Dictionary,
1989). Harold Lasswell, an American political scientist, defined propaganda as “the
expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a
view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined
ends and through psychological manipulations.” (Lasswell, 1971, p.214–222). Garth Jowett
and Victoria O'Donnell argue that propaganda is linked closely with persuasion since humans
use communication as a form of soft power through the development and cultivation of
propaganda materials (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012).
Historically, the terms’ roots go back to 1622, when the Congregation of Propaganda
of Faith was created during the times of the Counter-Reformation and Thirty Years' War. The
Pope established propaganda as a means of coordinating efforts aimed at people's perception
of the doctrines of the Catholic Church and the ideological fight against Protestants and the
non-Catholic public as a whole. The term “propaganda” wasn’t commonly spread up to the
XX century. During World War I, it was widely used to describe persuasion tactics.
Originally, propaganda was defined as the spread of biased opinions and ideas, usually via
lies and deception. Since then, this word started to mean mass influence or persuasion
through the symbol and psychological manipulation of individuals.
Manipulation and propaganda success primarily depends on how visible it is to the
public. The audience is to believe everything’s happening organically, naturally, and is
inevitable. Manipulation techniques in most cases are released by means of mass media. The
media take away most of the information and disinformation that the audience uses to assess
socio-political reality. The attitude to problems and phenomena, even the approach itself,
what to consider a problem or phenomenon, is largely predetermined by those who control
communications (Parenti, 2010). With the rapid development of the Internet and social
media, we can observe the following manipulation techniques used by politicians:

● Creating a favorable environment for the promotion of a political leader and/or a

party. It includes a set of issues and topics, that create media agenda and as a result set
a special tone, which later triggers a desired response from the audience.
● Transformation of the information flow, which can be carried out in various ways
(distortion of information, both in the form of lies and in a lighter form of partial
distortion)
● Silencing
● Use of selected facts only, without providing alternative ones, that could refute the
proposed point of view
● Creating information noise. This technique blocks adequate and critical perception of
facts by making them invisible among other, less important news

1
 Propaganda in Belarus and its peculiarities
I will use the gathered knowledge from the previous section and talk about Belarusian
propaganda. I am going to illustrate its presence by giving examples. Later in this section, I
will explain how Belarusian propaganda differs from others.
Political propaganda, being a powerful means of political manipulation, plays a
special role in shaping public opinion, contributes to changing views, attitudes, political
thinking. Propaganda is a sphere of geopolitical and ideological confrontation. It aims to
reach the desired picture of the world, its effectiveness translates into modifying the behavior
of states, groups, institutions, and individuals. Propaganda serves to legitimize power by
justifying the actions of the authorities, creating and fighting imaginary political enemies. Its
impact is aimed at the release of the wanted (by a political leader) emotions in society.
In the Belarusian political system, which I will cover in more detail later in this work,
sociotechnical and propagandistic influence evolves around two groups of emotions: fear and
aggression and enthusiasm. The Belarusian government’s actions are highly mobilizing,
intending to trigger collective reactions and marginalize individual responses. Alyaksandr
Lukashenko, who has conducted yet another electoral fraud in 2020 and has been the self-
proclaimed president since mastered the art of propaganda and uses it to his advantage. His
Imaginarium is made out of visions of a sovereign country, full independence from Russia,
the economic success of the country, a strong and reliable president being a political authority
in the global arena.
Alyaksandr Lukashenko is well aware of the power media holds, so he is relatively
open to public statements and contact with journalists. However, only on his own conditions.
The politician cooperates with state-regulated media and journalists, without giving
independent media resources any access. A situation where Alyaksandr Lukashenko is being
interviewed by a journalist representing broad-based opposition is only likely to occur in
one’s dreams. Belarus 1, a TV channel supported and financed by the government, has been
a major propaganda tool throughout all of Lukashenko’s six terms, starting in 1994 (just like
other channels such as ANT, NTV, STV). Television has been reporting news in a very
1980’s Soviet Union-based style with grain harvest and tractor production, and, of course, the
great leader watching every move of civil servants (Walker, 2020). Taking into consideration
the practical absence of alternative free media and occupied media agenda, Belarusians are
from inception more malleable to propaganda. Thus, Lukashenko’s leadership is non-
alternative in any way, neither when it comes to political activities, nor media presence.
Generally speaking, he makes the center of ideology, which at this point is inseparable and is

2
way more personified than the communist one. The focus on his creature is even higher than
it was on heads of state and authorities in the USSR (Usau, 2007, p.41). Originally,
Alyaksandr Lukashenkas’ ideology presented him as a “man of people”, “the good father”
(from Belarusian - baćka), the defender of the country from the evil (evil in most cases being
Western countries' relations and any manifestation of democracy and dissent).
Despite disinformation and propaganda not being the same, they complete each other.
Disinformation is the intentional, professional, and systematic use of fake information. The
channels of Belarusian propaganda distribution start with official state communication
channels. Additionally, public institutions (schools, colleges, universities) are a pivot of
indoctrination of the youth. The BRSM (The Belarusian National Youth Union ) is an
ideological pioneer organization working with kids and teenagers up to the age of 16. It is
present in every state school or college and holds great power in conducting brainwashing at
a stage of secondary education. (Usau, 2007, p.44). I personally remember how we were
pressured to join the BRSM and threatened with potential academic difficulties in the future
if we decided to disobey. A compulsory course “Fundamentals of the Ideology of the
Belarusian State” was introduced in the universities in 2003 out of Lukashenko’s fear of the
potential spread of liberalism and pluralism among students (Matthews, 2020). I also can’t
but mention cyber-enabled disinformation. It includes bots, trolls, hackers, and fake accounts
that release fake news and controversial statements. Social media and traditional means of
communication duplicate that information, semiotic chaos appears, reliable messages get lost
in a mass flow. The circle has closed.
Propaganda is the strong tool of the weak. While Lukashenko was facing internal and
external crises after the 2020 elections and during protest outbreaks, the propaganda worked
with a vengeance to keep the ideology going. Belarusian propaganda has no precise narrative
axis that builds an immanent strategy of legitimization of Alyaksandr Lukashenko’s
leadership. It’s flexible and adjustable. Individual story threads are introduced depending on
occasions and current needs. As opposed to Russia, Belarusian propagandist projects are of a
short-term and ad hoc character. The primary goal of the Belarusian regime is not to
strengthen the vision of the country in geopolitical content just like in the Russian case.
Propaganda aims to implement the particular interests of a narrow group of elites and
Lukashenko himself.

3
 Belarusian protests. A fight for democracy

The elections will be very interesting, and after the elections, it will get even more
interesting. I promise you that
- Alyaksandr Lukashenko
Here, I want to break down the course of events of the 2020 protests. I will try to
analyze what triggered Belarusians to fight for freedom. In addition, this section is partly
dedicated to state media.
Alyaksandr Lukashenko has now ruled the country continuously since 1994, which is
six terms or 28 years in total. He was called “Europe’s last dictator” by European media with
barely any opponents to be afraid of, thus the 2020 elections seemed to be yet another
deliberately won fight (Dorokhov & Goncharenko, 2020). Truth is, the 1994 elections were
the first and only ones, where Lukashenko’s victory was free and fair (Wesolowsky, 2020).
The presidential office’s expectations of routine and unprepossessing elections vanished due
to the economic crisis and inadequate approach to handling the COVID-19 pandemic. Those
factors were the point of no return. Coronavirus began to widely spread in Belarus at the
beginning of March, right when Lukashenko’s election campaign started to gain momentum
(Yeliseyeu, 2020). Lukashenko has not introduced any quarantine measures and regulations,
keeping the borders of the country open. He made statements on official television, calling
the pandemic “corona-psychosis” and suggesting that vodka, steaming in a sauna, and
agricultural work in fresh air is the best treatment. An online survey carried out in April 2020
shows, that 74% of Belarusian city residents wish they were more well informed about the
epidemic situation in the country (Yelkin & Dorokhov, 2020).
In 2020, Lukashenko ended up having three main rivals representing the opposition:
Siarhiej Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, and Valery Tsapkala. However, none of them ended
up being registered as official candidates. Tsikhanouski (often described as a “prisoner of
conscience”) was arrested on the pretext of assaulting a policeman (Dorokhov &
Goncharenko, 2020). The reason for the arrest of Babaryka was a charge of a criminal
mechanism organization, which, according to the State Control Committee of Belarus, was
involved in money transfer to offshore accounts and money laundering. Belarusian authorities
referred to information from Latvia, claiming that 640 million dollars were laundered by the
bank and transferred to Latvia. In July 2021 Viktar Babaryka was found guilty in a phony
trial. The court jailed him for 14 years (Kiselyova & Tétrault, 2021). Marya Kalesnikava, one
of the leading democratic political activists and head of Babaryka’s electoral campaign, was

4
sentenced to 11 years (Belarus Protest Leader Kolesnikova Jailed for 11 Years, 2021).
Valery Tsapkala was accused of accepting a bribe from a Belarusian businessman of Turkish
origin in exchange for obtaining a contract for the construction of a High Technology Park in
Minsk. Based on that information Central Election Commission refused to register Babaryka
and Tsapkala as a candidate for president. Sviatlana Tsikhanouska, Siarhiej’s wife, was
registered as a presidential candidate and became a symbol of democratic hope among
Belarusians.
On Election day (9 August 2020), most entry roads on the outskirts of Minsk were
blocked by the police. At midday, Internet access was shut down on the whole territory of the
country. National communications company Beltelekom stated that the main reason was a
service cyber attack on Belarus from abroad. Practical absence or weak Internet connection
lasted for a couple of following days, leaving Belarusians cut out from the rest of the world
and each other. According to the #KeepItUp report, the Internet in Belarus was turned off for
a total of 121 days from August to December 2020 (#KeepItOn, 2021, p.23). Telegram was
the only working instant messaging app at that time (Coalson, 2020). In the evening,
Belarusian state television aired exit poll results, according to which Lukashenka won the
election with a significant advantage, receiving 80.23% of the votes. His main rival,
Tsichanouska, according to government results received only 9.9% (Roth, 2020). Mass
protests outbroke across the whole country. The estimated number of participants in the
protests reaches up to 200 000 - 500 000 people (depending on the date). During the
Belarusian protest movement, around 6700 people were arrested shortly after Election day,
many of those detained were tortured and faced violence and sexual abuse at the hands of the
security services (Abdurasulov, 2020). It is impossible to give an overall number of injured,
detained, and imprisoned people during protests in Belarus. According to numerous sources,
the minimal estimate of injured is 1,400, including children, at least 32,000 were arrested.
The authorities and the KGB (Committee for State Security) deny torture and police brutality
against civilians. As of 31 March 2022, 1110 people are considered political prisoners
(Viasna 96, n.d.)
An important role in mobilizing opponents against the regime belongs to the IM
service Telegram, which became a source of information, sharing commentary, and an
environment where independent media can exist. The Nexta Telegram channel run by
Sciapan Pucila is a perfect example. During the campaign and the post-election protests, the
audience of the channel increased from 100,000 to 1,768 000. Its popularity is based on the
fact that people send materials from different parts of the country to see clearly what is

5
happening and coordinate their actions based on broadcasts from Nexta. Since October 2020,
Nexta channel and its logo are considered extremist. Telegram in its nature turned into a
political actor in the confrontation between Belarusians and an authoritarian regime. Indeed,
social networks only highlight the mood but also mobilize the protestors by giving a great
feeling of community and belonging, sticking to a “one for all and all for one" rule.
Although many state-owned media employees joined struck and quit their job after
elections as a sign of protest against state propaganda, the media agenda didn’t much change
its narrative line. Belta agency has published controversial video material on social media. To
present the allegedly violent character of protests, they used a Catalan 2019 protest photo to
prove violence, calling protesters “animals” and “bought-out and sold-out scum”. Belta
leaves a link to a Telegram channel, where the video was first posted. That same anonymous
channel spread a video, where Tsikhanouska asks Belarusians not to protest and stop
resisting, while reading a scripted text, before being forced out of Belarus to Lithuania
(Belarus State News Circulates Misleading Anti-Opposition Video, 2020). More examples of
the use of propaganda and manipulation techniques will appear in the following part of the
work.

Media in Belarus during and after the 2020 elections

I will look further into the media agenda, statistics, and information broadcasting.
Following the election events of August 2020, the Belarusian authorities began to put
pressure on the media. Journalists working on state television who expressed support for the
opposition were dismissed. Journalists from Russia were put in their place. Apart from that,
journalistic activity in Belarus faces massive repression and discrimination. Starting from
hindering the distribution of newspapers and confiscation of equipment, ending with searches
in editorial offices, and blocking media sites (Przetacznik & Tothova, 2022). Security
services targeted journalists, preventing them from broadcasting the events.
According to the Centre for East European (ZOiS) and International studies report,
published in March 2021, social and online media are the primary sources of information for
70.6% of Belarusians. Only 10% of respondents watch state television. The overall dynamics
show that 65% of respondents do not have confidence (“do not trust at all” or ‘rather do not
trust”) in state communication channels and media (Belarus at a Crossroads: Attitudes on
Social and Political Change, 2021).

6
 Picture 1. The main source of information among Belarusians. Source: (Belarus at a
Crossroads: Attitudes on Social and Political Change, 2021). ZOiS
The suppression of press freedom and the persecution of journalists is part of the
process of clearing the information field, followed by the monopolization of media content.
The authoritarian regime of the government hinders journalists and the media in every
possible way, thereby cutting off Belarus from the democratic, pluralistic world community
and leaving the country's residents without sources of reliable information about what is
happening. With the further success of such actions of the state apparatus, Belarusians will
have open legal access only to state propaganda. After 2020, Belarusian independent media
has faced the biggest amount of aggression and discrimination since the country established
independence in 1991 (PERSECUTION OF JOURNALISTS AND MASS MEDIA IN
BELARUS, 2021). Belarusian Agency of Journalism has registered 480 cases of detentions of
journalists, 97 facts of administrative arrests, and at least 62 facts of physical violence against
journalists in 20202 alone.
As far as state-run media are concerned, the focus is no wonder still mainly on Alyaksandr
Lukashenko. Neither television nor the press did not highlight the elections process. Only
superficial news reports appeared every now and then. Some characteristic features typical of
state media agenda are:
● The “main candidate” is the center of attention. The statistics related to the elections
show that Lukashenka, participating in the presidential race for the sixth time, was the
focus of attention of all state media. In the period from May 25 to August 8, 2020,

7
 Lukashenka occupied 75% of the airtime allocated to all presidential election
candidates in the programs "Nashi Novosti" and "Panorama News". In Radyjofakt in
the period from May 25 to August 8, 2020, the same indicator was 73%. only regional
media showed lower results.
● Ignoring and humiliating opponents. The state media were not so supportive of
Lukashenko's rivals. The candidates were mentioned in passing. For example, when
news about the registration of presidential candidates was published or broadcast. The
percentage of candidates' presence in Mahilouskaja Prauda was 0.019%. It follows
from this that their names were mentioned only in the context of the data provided by
the Central Election Commission. The same media that did cover Lukashenka's rivals
did it in a negative or extremely negative way. This is especially noticeable in contrast
to the "main" figure in the elections. The statements about Lukashenka were neutral,
positive, or very positive. The state-owned media that really covered the alternative
candidates presented them in a negative or extremely negative light. Red news bars
were used to visualize information. This type of assessment contrasted with the
presentation of the "main" presidential candidate, who received very positive,
positive, or neutral coverage (visualized with green and white stripes).
● Low priority in the issue of election coverage. Surprisingly, the state media covered
the presidential election for the most part with restraint throughout the election
campaign. The presidential elections gained significance only during early voting, that
is, five days before the elections themselves. During this period, the state media
mobilized, attempting to motivate citizens to vote in advance. In addition,
campaigning in support of the incumbent president was actively conducted.
Alexander Lukashenko addressed the citizens during the early voting
(Coverage of the 2020 Presidential Elections in Belarusian Media. Final Report |
Baj.by, 2020).

Imprisoned, because they were journalists

Finally, I want to talk about repressions and suppression of human rights and freedom
of speech. I will present some stories of Belarusian journalists to illustrate the context better.
As The 2021 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) states,
Belarus is the most dangerous country in Europe for journalist activity. Violence, censorship,
and harassment against journalists put Belarus down at 158th place in the ranking (2021

8
World Press Freedom Index: Journalism, the Vaccine Against Disinformation, Blocked in
More Than 130 Countries, n.d.).
In addition to the above factors, the Belarusian government restricts the work of major
news portals in every possible way, significantly complicating and/or completely stopping
their work. On May 18, 2021, the Ministry of Information decided to restrict access to
Internet resources TUT.BY. A message appeared on the official website of the department
that the grounds for blocking were "numerous facts of violations of the Law on Mass Media
regarding the placement of prohibited information in a number of publications."
(Ограничение доступа к интернет-ресурсам Tut. by, 2021). On the same day, the State
Control Committee opened a criminal case against the employees of the publication,
suspecting them of "tax evasion on a particularly large scale". TUT.by was one of the few
independent media portals in Belarus. The site actively covered the protests against the
regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenko, including sharing information about the Belarus
Solidarity Foundation (BYSOL) which helps victims of repression. In August 2021, the court
of the Central District of Minsk recognized the portal TUT.by and its new project Zerkalo.io,
as extremist materials.
Marina Zolotva, who’s been TUT.by’s editor-in-chief continuously since 2004, was
detained along with other 14 TUT.by workers on 18, May 2021. She was accused of
complicity in tax evasion on a particularly large scale. The journalist is in pre-trial detention
center No. 1 in Minsk, the court upheld the preventive measure in the form of detention.
She’s been jailed for 317 days now. Human rights activists recognized Zolotova as a political
prisoner.
Katsiaryna Andreeva and Daria Chultsova. They were detained together in an
apartment on the "Square of Changes" in Minsk. On November 15, they worked there as
Belsat journalists during a protest action. After 7 days of administrative arrest, Daria and
Katsiaryna were not released. They were exposed to criminal article 342: organization and
preparation of actions that grossly violate public order. On February 18, they were sentenced
to 2 years of imprisonment in a general regime colony. Katsiaryna and Daria have been jailed
for 501 days now.
Igar Losik was detained on June 25, 2020, in his apartment. Before that, a search was
conducted there. On the same day, it became known that the administrator of the popular
Еelegram channel was accused of "preparing for a violation of public order." For 41 days
(from December 15, 2020, to January 25, 2021) he was on a hunger strike in protest against
the new charges. On December 14, 2021, the Gomel Regional Court, at a closed session in

9
pre-trial detention center No.3, sentenced Losik to 15 years in a high-security colony. Human
rights activists recognized Losik as a political prisoner. He’s been jailed for 644 days now.
Those are just some of the stories of journalists. In fact, there are thousands of those,
who are currently in prison for doing their job - being a window to the world and providing
us, normal people with truthful and transparent information, that every human being is
entitled to. However, the Belarusian reality is that the regime is completely indifferent and
merciless to freedom of speech. Any kind of freedom at all.

Summary
Belarus, that’s been considered a soft version of dictatorship, has created a strong
authoritarian regime. Thanks to an established system of propaganda, restricted Internet
access, and the practical absence of a free journalistic environment, Alyaksandr Lukashenko
(who’s been the self-proclaimed president since 2020) has eliminated any channels of
manifestation of democracy. The paper addressed features of Belarusian propaganda. I came
to the conclusion that Belarusian authorities play a significant role in managing freedom of
media and speech. It is clear that political activists and media platforms need international
support, as well as citizens in the country, fact-checking organizations, and democratic legal
organizations. It now is a top priority to fill in the vacuum of justice in Belarus, protect
configured rights and legal remedies.

References

Abdurasulov, A. (2020, August 14). Belarus election: Exiled leader calls weekend of

'peaceful rallies'. BBC. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53780685

Belarus at a crossroads: attitudes on social and political change. (2021, March 25).

Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS). Retrieved March 31,

2022, from https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/belarus-at-a-crossroads-attitudes-on-

social-and-political-change

10
Belarus protest leader Kolesnikova jailed for 11 years. (2021, September 6). RTE.

Retrieved March 30, 2022, from https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2021/0906/1244933-

belarus/

Belarus State News Circulates Misleading Anti-Opposition Video. (2020, August 18).

The Moscow Times. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/18/belarus-state-news-circulates-

misleading-anti-opposition-video-a71186

Coalson, R. (2020, August 12). How Telegram Users Found A Way Through

Belarus's Internet Lockdown. Radio Free Europe. https://www.rferl.org/a/how-

telegram-users-found-a-way-through-belarus-s-internet-lockdown/30780136.html

Coverage of the 2020 Presidential Elections in Belarusian Media. Final Report |

baj.by. (2020, September 30). Baj.by. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://baj.by/en/analytics/coverage-2020-presidential-elections-belarusian-media-

final-report

Dorokhov, V., & Goncharenko, R. (2020, August 6). Belarus elections: Lukashenko′s

authoritarian grip faces test | Europe | News and current affairs from around the

continent. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-president-lukashenko-faces-tough-

election/a-54439090

Dorokhov, V., & Goncharenko, R. (2020, August 6). Belarus elections: Lukashenko′s

authoritarian grip faces test | Europe | News and current affairs from around the

continent. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-president-lukashenko-faces-tough-

election/a-54439090

Jowett, G. S., & O'Donnell, V. (2012). Propaganda & Persuasion (G. S. Jowett & V.

O'Donnell, Eds.). SAGE Publications.

11
#KeepItOn. (2021, March 17). SHATTERED DREAMS AND LOST

OPPORTUNITIES. Access Now. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2021/03/KeepItOn-report-on-the-

2020-data_Mar-2021_3.pdf

Kiselyova, M., & Tétrault, G. (2021, July 6). Belarus jails Lukashenko foe Babariko

for 14 years in 'sham' trial. Reuters. Retrieved March 30, 2022, from

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-jails-former-presidential-contender-

babariko-14-years-2021-07-06/

Lasswell, H. D. (1971). Propaganda Technique In World War I. M.I.T. Press.

Matthews, D. (2020). As students protest, Belarusian universities aid regime

crackdown. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/students-protest-belarusian-

universities-aid-regime-crackdown

The Oxford English Dictionary. (1989).

Parenti, M. (2010). Democracy for the Few. Cengage Learning.

PERSECUTION OF JOURNALISTS AND MASS MEDIA IN BELARUS. (2021, July

1). World Organisation Against Torture. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://www.omct.org/site-resources/files/report_belarus_rsf_omct_english.pdf

Przetacznik, J., & Tothova, L. (2022, February 1). Media environment in Belarus.

European Parliament.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/698922/EPRS_BRI(2022

)698922_EN.pdf

Roth, A. (2020, August 9). Belarus election: Lukashenko's claim of landslide victory

sparks widespread protests. The Guardian.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/09/belarus-election-lukashenko-

landslide-victory-fixing-claims

12
Ограничение доступа к интернет-ресурсам tut.by. (2021, May 18).

Министерство информации. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

http://mininform.gov.by/news/all/ogranichenie-dostupa-k-internet-resursam-tut-by/

2021 World Press Freedom Index: Journalism, the vaccine against disinformation,

blocked in more than 130 countries. (n.d.). RSF. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://rsf.org/en/2021-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-vaccine-against-

disinformation-blocked-more-130-countries

Usau, P. (2007). Ideology of Belarusian State. Propaganda Mechanisms.

Viasna 96. (n.d.). Палітычныя вязні ў Беларусі. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from

https://prisoners.spring96.org/be#list

Walker, S. (2020, August 17). Belarus media strike: 'if we can't do honest journalism,

we won't work'. The Guardian.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/17/belarus-media-strike-if-we-cant-do-

honest-journalism-we-wont-work

Wesolowsky, T. (2020, August 6). Five Factors That Ensure Lukashenka Wins Every

Election In Belarus. Radio Free Europe. https://www.rferl.org/a/five-factors-that-

ensure-lukashenka-wins-every-election-in-belarus/30769963.html

Yeliseyeu, A. (2020, July 3). Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime

Transformation and Future Scenarios. EAST Center. Retrieved March 30, 2022, from

https://east-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Belarus-at-a-Crossroads-Political-

Regime-Transformation-and-Future-Scenarios.pdf

Yelkin, S., & Dorokhov, V. (2020, May 4). Белорусы - за мягкий карантин,

Лукашенко - за парад во время пандемии. DW. https://p.dw.com/p/3bkSq

13
14