LAND REFORM IN EL SALVADOR: AN OUTGROWTH OF REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION By Arthur C. Sanchez Political Science - 471 Dr. Christopher A. Leu December 18, 1981The Basis Of A Revolution Today's El Salvador is in the midst of conflict based on a variety of social, economic and political problems. In a country which maintains one of the highest percentages of fertile and arable land in Latin America, it is estimated that 75 percent of the children less than 5 years of age suffer from malnutrition.+ paily per capita intake of food was 1,930 calories and 43 grams of protein in 1975; both fell well below the recommended minimums of 2,600 calories and 65 grams of protein established by the United Nations. In Bl Salvador, infant mortality experiences a death rate of 78.7 per 1,000 births. Adult life expectancy is estimated to be 56 years of age.? Besides health problems, B1 Salvador maintains gross inequalities within its population. In 1976, the top 5 percent of the population received 38 percent of the nation's income; the bottom 20 percent of the population received only 2 percent of the nation's income.? Annual per capita income in 1976 was $510.00, and average daily wages in 1973 were $1.10. In 1973, the average wage in the manufacturing and service sector was $1.63 per day.4 Although El Salvador is the smallest of the Latin American nations and maintains a population density of 505 per square mile, fewer than 2 percent of the population owns 60 percent of the fertile farmland.° With the second highest population density and a growth rate of 3.16 percent, the majority of El Salvador's land is planted with coffee, sugarcane and cotton for export. Sixty percent of El Salvador's population lives in these rural areas.° ‘he majority are employed by large private plantations as laborers, while the remainder attempt to scrape a living from rocky hillside plots. Thefertile valleys and lowlands have long been owned by the oligarchy known as Los Catorce ("The Fourteen Families"). In the realm of education, functional illiteracy among the rural inhabitants is said to be approaching 95 percent. In El Salvador's housing population, 86 percent of the rural population have no access to electricity, 51 percent have no water supply, and 30 percent have access to safe arinking water.” Despite all the problems which exist in El Salvador possibly the most pressing is the fact that the political voice of the people has constantly been repressed; the ruling oligarchy exercises absolute control over the country's economic and political life. A coalition exists between the aristocracy and the military. the rule of both has been maintained through the armed forces as well as the private armies of the rich. The Beginnings of Revolution After the end of the colonial epoch in 1824, the local white or mestizo elite expanded their wealth and power mainly at the cost of the peasants.® ‘hus, the peasants were pushed back towards the more remote and barren agricultural areas. In 1881-1883, the coffee based government created its own labor force by abolishing communal lands (ejidos). With the government decree outlawing the ejidos, coffee growers expanded their plantations (hincas) to the cool high- lands of western El Salvador. Ever since the creation of the large coffee plantations, peasant unrest in El Salvador has existed. In 1885 and 1898 resistance movements sprang up against the despolia- tions.? unrest of the peasants has continued throughout E1 Salvador's history; in a later movement, judges who had been instrumental individing peasant lands were retaliated against by peasants who cut off their hands. By 1912, the government established the National Guard in order to control the peasants. The oligarchy continued to maintain direct political control in Bl Salvador until the late 1920's. During this time, Salvadorean farmworkers created the first "regional" union; the Regional Federation of Salvadorean Workers continued to expand until by 1932 it maintained 72,000 members. up until 1932 politics had been a game played only within the oligarchy, involving inter-family struggle for control of the state. Due to the oligarchy's dependence on foreign markets, the "Golden Age" of the oligarchy ended in 1932. Coffee exports fell in value from $16 million in 1928 to $4.8 million in 1932 as the kottom fell out of the coffee market during world-wide depression in 1929.1° with unemployment at an all time high and no idle land to provide subsistence, thousands of Salvadoreans were forced to migrate. In the Honduras, 40 percent of United Brand's Fruit plantation laborers had come from El Salvador Due to the crisis, the Regional Federation of Salvadorean Workers began to mobilize; the Union defied government bans on unions and organized textile, railroad workers, artisans, peasants and farm- workers. Due to the influence of the Russian revolution, the workers opened schools and created a worker-peasant alliance. As the movement spread, protests continued to break out; on May Day, 1930, 80,000 workers and peasants marched into E1 Salvador demanding a minimum wage for farmworkers and relief centers for the unemployed. During this time the oligarchy began to worry, because of the economic and social crisis, and turned to the nilitary for aid. Strikes, student protests and armed battles with the National Guard in rural areasbecame an everyday occurrence. In 1931, under mounting pressures, President Arturo Araujo was elected to the government, in what has been called the only free election in El Salvador's history. The oligarchy further intensified revolutionary sentiment when it refused to recognize Salvadorean Communist Party victories in municipal and legislative elections. President Arturo Araujo was removed from office and his Vice President, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was put in power. These incidents left no alternative; on January 22, 1932, the revolution was to take place in the cities, rural areas and military establishments. Three days before the uprising was to take place, spies betrayed the leaders and the revolt was crushed before it had begun; although the uprising had been called off, rural areas of the country never found out -- communication had since broken down. On January 22, 1932, thousands of peasants, farmworkers and primarily indians left their homes to march into the cities. Government offices were stoned and masses occupied city halls and police posts; shops and houses of the rich were burnt. The government retaliated with all of its power. In the initial attack, four thousand people were killed. General Martinez, a right wing hard liner, was held historically responsible. Within the next week, the army and para~ military forces hired by the oligarchy killed between fifteen and thirty thousand people. Peasant leaders were hung and left for days in village squares; anyone with indian features was lined up in 1 after it was all over, the groups of 50 and shot by firing squads.) massacre would be remembered forever by the people of El Salvador as the "Matanza". Over four percent of the population had been killed The Communist Party was liquidated, as was the Regional Federation ofSalvadorian Workers. Indians ceased to use their traditional dress and customs; their language was also abandoned for fear of being killed. For years after, the National Guard maintained severe control in the rural areas. Even today, social gatherings of peasants are broken up when a police patrol arrives in a village. In rural areas, it became forbidden by law for more than five persons to gather in one place; formation of peasant groups was also prohibited. Thus began fifty years of military rule, each succeeding dictator in service to the oligarchy. The system continues to keep the populace out of the political process and subjected to constant repression. During the last fifty years, the coffee oligarchy has attended to financial matters while the army has continued to protect the oligarchy's wealth. In the next thirteen years, General Martinez's policies were designed to protect the oligarchy and preserve the status quo. Because of fear of reviving the worker- peasant alliance, laws were passeé to impede mechanization. Due to continued crisis in the coffee sector, the oligarchy turned toward cotton production with the hope of cashing in on war-related shortages in the late thirties and early forties. The sector grew rapidly, and again the peasantry were displaced as plantations took over the coastal lowlands. Diversification of Interests With this new dependency on foreign markets, unrest began to emerge. In 1944, a small, democratic sector within the military launched a coup to overthrow General Martinez.1? although Martinez gained the upper hand on the rebels, a general strike was called andMartinez was forced from office. With the overthrow of Martinez, a power struggle developed within the oligarchy. On one side of the oligarchy its members wanted to end the country's dependence on the fluctuating foreign agriculture markets. In order to accomplish this, a coalition of military men, technological entrepreneurs and American and Salvadorean foreign investment brokers had formed an alliance with the export sector of the coffee oligarchy. Due to the post-war boom of coffee prices, earnings of Salvadorean coffee growers had risen from $18.7 million to $76 million.?? Thus, part of the oligarchy had decided to invest in industry. Although conserva- tive coffee growers opposed the move, a compromise was reached within the oligarchy; it was agreed that since conservative growers viewed their land as a source of wealth, the land distribution would remain undisturbed. So began the modernization of El Salvador; with United States and other foreign investors eager to invest abroad, Bl Salvador was ideally suited to produce manufactured goods and profit, since labor was both cheap and abundant. In order to permit development and expansion of modern Salvadorean cepitalism, the first order of business was to remove the anti-irdustrial laws which General Martinez had imposed. A new President, Colonel Oscar Osorio, was elected. Although the election was widely considered fraudulent, it was representative of a new era of technocratic reform. A government office was created to coordinate the development of commerce, industry and mining. The state's power increased and new taxes were increased on coffee exports, so that the resources could be transfered to the new areas of investment. With increased growth, new roads and damswere built which opened land along the Pacific Coast for expanding cotton and cattle growth. As the rapid industrialization progressed, its effects were also noticeable on the populace; because of decreasing available land and jobs in rural areas, the rural popula~ tion began to move to the cities where they lived in slums or turgurios. Those who found employment in the new industries worked for an average of $4.00 a day, while the rest lived with no basic services and little chance of employment.‘ ‘his created a problem for the new industries; although the industries did produce manufac- tured goods that were previously imported, the concentration of wealth in so few hands meant that the country's internal market was small. only a privileged few of the population were able to buy items such as ham, jellies, soap and crepe peper. One solution to the problem was to break up the concentrations of land owned by the cotton, coffee and cane growers. This would enable a caste of small farmers to emerge with adequate purchasing power to aid industrial growth and also limit the nation's dependency on food imports, thus lowering the cost of feeding El Salvador's labor force. This solution was never to take place; agrarian reform meant violating the basic terms which had brought industry to the nation. Still the land could not be touched. Thus, the understanding was to remain; no program, no government, and no person would tcuch the pillar of oligarchy wealth. The Central American Common Market Since agricultural reform was both out of the question and political suicide, all development would have to take place on the existing patterns of land tenure. Thus, another alternative was tobe used; if a program of economic integration was implemented between E1 Salvador and four of its neighbors, it was believed new markets for industrial output, new investment and a solution to El Salvador's pressing masses could ke found. Not only did £1 Salvador see economic integration as panacea, but the United Nations did as well. ‘Thus, in the late 1950's, the Economic Commission for Latin America ("ECLA") established a plan for economic integration. The plan's emphasis was placed on the mutual development of El Salvador and four other countries through eliminating competition and duplica- tion of capacity. Also specified by the ECLA was a restricted and highly regulated role for foreign investment. Neither Salvadorean businessmen nor the United States cared for such regulation. According to the United States, if foreign capital were put into El Salvador and other Latin American countries, it could prevent future situations such as had occurred with the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (1950-1954).1> xt woulé furthermore create a flow of capital in the region and redirect trade between the Central States and Latin America. After some negotiation, the restrictions on foreign investments, mutual cooperation and balanced development were removed. In 1961, the Central American Common Market ("CACM") was establishea.*® under the framework of the Central American Common Market. El Salvador did indeed industrialize; in 1950 direct Unites States investment was $19.4 million, and by 1967 the total had risen to $45 million.!7 put £1 Salvador's panacea was not to materialize. By seducing foreign capital, tax incentives, free trade zones and cheap labor, E1 Salvador had succeeded in only creating a heighteneddependency on the United States. During the 1960's, El Salvador continued to receive less than 1 percent of direct U. S. investment The majority of foreign investment went to industries which required large amounts of industrial inputs not locally available. As a result, El Salvador began to experience severe strains in her economic balance of payments. In addition, duplication of industry and unequal sharing of benefits began within the CACM. Within the five members of the CACM, six oil refineries had been established and less developed countries such as the Honduras and Nicaragua were having to pay more for imports than before, since the more developed nations attracted more foreign investments. As a result, regionally produced goods were often more expensive than foreign products. As a result of tensions between the Honduras and E1 Salvador in 1969, the Soccer War resulted; Honduras had begun a campaign against Salvadorean products and refused to renew a migration treaty with El Salvador. In addition, the Honduran government was under pressure to carry out land reforms; thus, the Honduran agrarian xeforms began by expropriating the lands of Salvadorean immigrants. Salvadorean immigrants were thus driven out of the Honduras and on July 14, 1969, the war began.1® the war resulted in El Salvador losing its largest market for industrial goods, both the Honduras and Nicaragua. To add to El Salvedor's problems, many of the 300,000 Salvadoreans who were in the Honduras had been forced to leave, thus creating a profound impact on El Salvador's worsening political and economic situation.The Beginning of Crisis Because the majority of returning Salvadoreans had been farm- workers, the government of El Salvador promised to give the new returnees land. This never did come to pass, however; instead, the farmworkers were herded into camps and eventually forgotten. some migrated to the already swelling slum communities in the large cities; soon these masses would only help fan fires demanding a political voice and economic reforms. Althcugh the Central American Common Market had collapsed, the Salvadorean industrial sector had succeeded in securing new markets in Europe and the United States. Thus, an urban working sector was growing in size and organization; pressure against government repression was increasing as the new middle class demanded both a political voice and economic reforms. Although organizing was still hindered by restrictive labor legislation, two unions were created. One of these, the General Confederation of Unions ("GCS"), was pro-government and said to be influenced by the AFL-CIO. The other was the Unified Federation of Salvadorean Unions which was said to be influenced by the outlawed Communist Party Along side the unions political groups also grew; professionals, bureaucrats and small businessmen succeeded in forming the Christian Democratic Party ("PDC") which supported moderate reforms. The intellectuals and middle class also formed their own party, The National Revolutionary Movement ("NRM"). More militant political sectors also created their own party, the Nationalist Democratic union ("NDU") or legal arm of the outlawed Community Party.*?Movements For Reform By the 1960's a wave of strikes began to hit El Salvador's cities; teachers, bus drivers and industrial workers fought with the National Guard and police in defiance of labor laws. Government repression was intensified to control the growing unrest, but the popular unrest only grew worse. In 1961 the popular unrest inten- sified again by several years of low coffee and cotton prices. As a result, in the time between 1961 end 1962, four different juntas came to power; the last, Colonel Julio Riveras, was to be among the first of El Salvador's governments to attempt some type of moderate reform. 7° The main reason for the government's reform program was to avoid another Cuban-type revolttion and pacify the population. Riveras' regime coincided with the John F. Kennedy Alliance for Progress and was praised by Kenney. According to Kennedy, "Govern- ments of the civil-military type in El Salvador are the most effective 21 whe Rivera in containing communist penetration in Latin America." regime began by announcing numerous decrees to deal with reforms it felt were long overdue. Some of these were reforms for higher wages and improved working conditions for hundreds of thousands of cotton and coffee plantation workers; ancther was the tightening of controls over income tax and corporation tex collections. The most controver- sial of the reforms was a specific diet for plantation laborers. The newly-prescribed diet was created so that enough calories and vitamins would be able to sustain the average plantation laborer. The Rivera regime held power for five years and at the end of those five years only some small wage benefits for labor materialized Planters and industrialists constantly fought against the reformsbecause of the additional costs they would incur. Despite this, the Rivera government opened the way for the emergence of the first opposition parties and contested elections since 1931. It had also succeeded in its scheme for industrialization; thus it aided in strengthening organized labor. With elections in 1967, Colonel Fidel Sanchez Hernandez was elected by the traditional government party, the Party of National Conciliation ("PcN").?? although Hernandez attempted to follow the same pattern of reform as the Rivera regime, the Hernandez regime was never able to inact any significant new legislation. Due to the intensity of the opposition from both right and left, Colonel Hernandez's prine goal ended up trying to survive rather than reform. As pressures for basic and economic reforms mounted, the Christian Democratic party continued to grow; by 1972 the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and the Nationalist Democratic Union decided to create a united front, the National Opposition Union ("UNO"). In the election against the PCN, the UNO candidate, Napoleon Duarte, won by a clear margin. Both the ruling class and the military responded by using massive fraud to deny UNO a victory. Still, the ruling class refused to acknowledge the need for reform and a wave of repression was unleashed against UNO by the PCN. UNO's candidate Duarte and other leaders were excited; the National University was closed and for the next two years trade unions were taken over and imprisoned or exiled. Persecution of the Catholic Church and rural inhabitants led to bloody massacres. A civilian and @ progressive sector of the limitery did attempt a counter-coup, but it failed because military aid from Nicaragua and Guatemala. Aid was 12reportedly directed by the Central American Defense Council ("CONDECA") which was funded and promoted by the United states to control subversion and police the area. It has also been said that united States advisors coordinated troops activities from their communications center in the United States Embassy in El Salvador. The 1972 election had esteblished massive unrest and Colonel Arturo Molina, the PNC's candidate, became the beneficiary of the 1972 fraud. In the moderate party UNO, who had opposed the PNC, many of the leaders were in exile and the people began to lose faith in the electorial system. Many felt there was nothing to prevent massive fraud from taking place next time around. hus, two militant left groups emerged -- the Popular Liberation Forces ("FPL") and the People's Revolutionary Army ("ERP"). ‘The people had decided to resort to arms. Although the Communist Party in E1 Salvador continued to insist on a peaceful road to change by seeking alliance with the petty bourgeois sector, there was much disagreement from within and outside of the party. Thus, part of the Communist Party split and formed the Popular Liberation Forces ("FPL"). Within the Christian Democratic Party, the seme thing happened, thus resulting in the formation of the People's Revolutionary Army ("ERP") .23 Both groups established a two-sided approach toward their objectives; on the military side they conducted small scattered actions against the government security forces, retaliation against government spies and tortures, and kidnappings for ransom. In an effort to educate and build roots, the militant groups began among the peasants and farn- workers; they helped peasants build wells and roads to inaccessible villages. Meanwhile, the progressive clergy began to participaterural cooperatives were organized and the clergy began to teach that injustice was sin. Soon programs began spreading to the population in the slums and the labor sector, Between 1975 and 1977 three more new organizations emerged; although they were linked to underground groups, they fast were becoming the main vehicle of political expres- sion for those people who had lost faith in the electorial system. These groups were the People's Revolutionary Block ("BPR"), the Front for United Popular Action ("FAPU") and the People's League ("LP-28"). Bach organization represented a large number of different sectors of the population. With conditions in the cities and countrysides worsening and the average family in 1975 needing $704.00 per year for basic necessities, the BPR decided to focus on these conditions since 80 percent of the population earned significantly less.?* BPR strategy began by creating a class consciousness and incorporating the masses in the revolutionary struggle. They began in the country- side as other groups before them. They organized land invasions, led demonstrations demanding minimum wages in coffee fields, and lower prices for seed and fertilizer for the peasants. In the cities, workers were organized around wage demands, bus fares and managerial abuse. In slums, also, dwellers éemonstrated for housing and running water. Merchants stages sit-ins for lower rents in market stalls In among the poorest of the urban workers, the BPR organized lottery vendors. Reform With Repression In order to counter the growing unrest, the Molina government found it necessary to develop both a repressive and mild reform solu- tion. In attempts to stop the popular unrest, the Molina government 14reactivated the Democratic Nationalist Organization ("ORDEN"), which proclaimed to be a civic organization, but in reality is para- military network spies, informers and enforcers, founded by General Medrano in the mid-60's to combat subversion. ORDEN maintained a policy of terror, particularly in the rural sector, by invading homes of suspected left sympathizers and breaking up meetings of popular organizations. Government troops also accelerated anti-subversive activities; during numerous demonstrations, demonstrators were machine- gunned by the Molina regime. In June, 1976, the Molina regime could see no other way out but to announce an agrarian reforn program. Under the name rans~ formacion Agraria", the new program was to be initiated. Plans called for only 4 percent of the land to be affected and that property owners would be justly compensated by the government. ‘Through these efforts it was felt that approximately 12,000 small land owners could be created.*° Along with part of the plan the Molina regime also attempted to create a transformation in the industrial sector Foreign capital was given generous tax breaks and credits; a new free trade zone was also established. In order to keep wages low and foreign capital content, repression was exercised to keep the workers! movement in the city and countryside under control. From 1970 to 1975, foreign investment rose fron $66.6 million to $104.5 million. A study done in 1974 revealed that foreign capital was involved in at least half of all Salvadorean business. ‘he overall plan of the Molina regime?® was to expand El Salvador's internal market so that new investments would flow in from payments for expropriated lands. Although the Molina regime succeeded in the industrial portion of the plan, the agrarian reform portion would never materialize. The 15Molina regime presented the agrarian plan to the oligarchy without previously consulting them. The Hill, Llach and Regalado Duenas family groups reacted in total opposition; they composed the largest of the landowning dynasties and supported all-out repression. Among the majority of the bourgeoise, especially those who were dependent on growing coffee, cotton, and cane, the reaction was the same. After three months of conservative protests, led by the National Private Enterprise Association and an extremist land owner's group known as Faro, the Molina regime reversed itself and the agrarian reform was abandoned. Only the DeSola family, the largest coffee exporters, sympathized to some extent with the Molina regime's agrarian program. Being tightly linked to United States capital, they favored the development of a restrictive democracy based on an expanded middle class. Also in support of the agrarian plan was the United States Embassy and a handful of members of industrial bourgeoise. Due to the Molina regime's effort to create an agrarian reform, in 1977 Molina was abandoned by the ruling class. His "life insurance" policy for the oligarchy was tossed aside, and Molina himself was accused by the press as being a communist. An Attempt to Regress The oligarchy's answer to growing unrest was General Carlos Huberto Romero. Romero had been Molina's Minister of Defense and also had been in charge of ORDEN. He was considered to be a hard line conservative who saw no need for land reform. As the manager of La Carrera, the largest cotton plantation in El Salvador, put it "We'ze confident that General Romero will restore tranquility to the 16countryside."*7 Thus, Romero represented a regression to the rule of backward, agrarian interests. The new Romero regime's first concern was to end the growing unrest in the countryside; thus the Catholic Church was targeted as a major source of the unrest. This was due to the church's support for a program of land reform; also, many progres- sive Roman Catholic priests had been working with the impoverished peasants, in most cases helping them organize groups to campaign for land reform. In particular, the Jesuits had also sharply criticized the government in the past year for abandoning their land reform effort. In April, 1977, a Jesuit priest was machine-gunned to death while on his way to mass by unknown assailants.?® Numerous right- wing death squads began to operate, many with names such as the White Warriors Union ("UGB"), the Anti-Conmunist Armed Forces of Liberation War of Elimination ("FALANGE") and Organization for the Liberation from Communism ("OLC"). By 1979, ORDEN, the government para-military organization, had expanded to 100,000 members.”° Most members of these organizations have been said to be retired soldiers, small landowners, thugs and a frightened middle class. By June, 1977, the entire Jesuit order received a death threat ordering them to leave the country or face extinction; it was signed by the White Warriors union. Besides the clergy, other groups also were singled out as targets by right-wing death squads. Both the Christian Federation of Salvadorean Peasants ("FECCAS") and the Union of Field Workers ("utc") became targets because of their participation in the peasant and rural worker unions organized by the BPR. By November, 1977 the Romero regime attempted to control popular organizations by passing numerous repressive laws. It became forbidden for more than three people to meet in one place if criticism of the government wasbeing discussed; a law prohibiting the distribution of "false and tendentious" information that would affect adversely the public order. The law also forbade the nailing of such information to foreign countries if it would lead to the loss of international prestige. Because of the Romero regime's excessive repression and violence, it became condemned by nany international organizations, such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States ("OAS"), and the United States State Department. Although in the past the United States had supported groups that were eager to take the hand of United states capital and jointly lead the country toward industrial growth and profit, the Romero regime only represented backward agrarian interests. The Romero regime had been one of the bloodiest periods of repression since the 1932 massacre. In the first six months of 1979, 406 people were killed.*° to aaa to the violence, the Left retaliated by occupying embassies and assassinating key government officials. After the fall of the Somoza government in Nicaragua, the United States began to pressure Romero to ease up on his policy of repression and attempt some type of compromise. But it was too late; both sides had gone too far and were emersed in conflict. When Romero called for "national dialogue", neither the popular organizations nor the traditional opposition would listen. A Ray of Hope In October, 1979, a coup backed by the United States ousted the hard line Romero regime. Colonels Arnoldo Majano and Jaime Abdul 18Gutierrez came to power promising economic, social and political reforms. >+ The new government was composed of a compromise between progressive military officers committed to structural reform and a United States backed faction. In an attempt to regain the people's confidence, the new government decided to share their power with three civilians from previously excluded parties. The progressive military sector selected Jose Napoleon Duarte's running mate from the 1972 elections, Guillermo Ungo. Ungo was the leader of the Social Democratic Party. Also selected was Ramon Mayorga, an independent from the Central American University. The United States backed sector looked for a representative in the business sector; thus, Mario Andino, a manager of the local Phelps-Dodge Corporation, was selected. The future looked hopeful for the new government; its civilian members were considered honest, well-educated and committed to reforms. But there were serious problems in the making. When the new cabinet was created, many of the leaders were taken from the Social Democratic Party. The Moderate Social Democrats had been in the process of trying to make the party more responsive to the political climate created by the left's mass organizations. Thus the center lost a large share of the leaders to the new government There was also doubt of whether or not the oligarchy would stand by and allow its interests to be expropriated. Probably the most fatal blow to the new government was thet its civilian members did not represent a significant social base; the years of repression and electorial fraud created membership in militant and radical organiza- F 32 tions such as the BPR, FAPU, LP-28 in the tens of thousands. 19Immediate response to the new government was negative; many of the left's organizations believed it was simply a United States plot to isolate the left and hold off on creating real representation. Some also argued that although they would like to believe the govern- ment objectives were to serve the interests of the people, they did not believe that after so many years of death and violence the armed force could have a change of heart. In an attempt to prove them- selves, the new government announced they would implement the reform proposed by the Popular Forum during the final days of the Romero regime. In response, the majority of the left organizations decided to give the government time to keep its promises. With the new government in power,, demands were high, mass organizations filled the streets demanding full accounting of disappeared political prisoners. Public meetings and civil disobedience were everywhere. For the first time in 50 years, the government had opened a small democratic space and the people were taking advantage of it and moving beyond it. In attempts to satisfy the people, the government set up a commission to investigate the fate of disappeared persons; secret government cemeteries were found. The government's para- military force ORDEN was abolished by decree; ironically much of it went underground and resurfaced in the shape of several of the right's terrorist groups. Slowly, the bourgeoise became outraged at the government's permissiveness and the fine line between the enlightened sector and the old agrarian sector began to fade. Civilians on the government sensed their influence declining. Twelve members of the cabinet pushed for the removal of Mario Adnino because he opposed radical land reform; despite this, army members of the government refused to remove Andino. In addition, on the 28th of 20December, 1979, civilian heads of government as well as twenty-two ministers called for the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Colonel Guillermo Garcia. Guillermo was accused of ordering unwarranted army attacks on demonstrators; during the government's first two weeks, the death rate surpassed the first 9-1/2 months under the Romero regime.?? civilian heads of the government, Ungo and Mayorga, were further frustrated when the military part of the government refused to have General Carlos Alberto Medrano arrested for crimes against the state; Medrano was the chief organizer of ORDEN. On January 3, 1980, Gillermo Manuel Ungo and Ramon Mayorga along with the entire cabinet, except Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia, resigned; the civilian sector of the government had become tired of being used as a window-dressing for international consumption. Thus, its civilian members quit in protest of the ruling classes’ opposition to basic reforms The center had collapsed, and within a week the Christian Democrats had rejoined with the left. Ex-civilian head of the govern- ment, Guillermo Manuel Ungo, was row president of the Democratic Revolutionary Front ("FDR"). The FDR represents all lefts in a united front. In order to attempt to maintain a civilian government, the Bl Salvadorean government has brought back the 1972 electorial candidate Jose Napoleon Duarte as president. Duarte is accused by the left of selling out to the military and the oligarchy. As one Latin American diplomat stated, "If Garcia is minister of defense and Duarte is not the commander ir chief, then Mr. Duarte is an 34 adornment. United States officials also have their doubts about whether Duarte has the power to control the government's security forces.On the positive side, Duarte has announced a land reform program which began on March 6, 1980. Phase I Land Reform The program began initially with two parts; Phase I is to affect all properties over 500 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres which, according to the decree, anounts to 376 hectares and covers approximately 16 percent of the country's agricultural land. In the second part of the program, Phase II, all properties between 100 or 150 and 500 hectares are affected. The quantity of the land will be the determining factor on whether 100 or 150 hectares will be used in establishing the requirements for Phase II. In all, 1,739 properties, or 23 percent, will be involved in this phase. In order to compensate the lands' prior owners, the government has decided that owners will receive compensation in cash and government bonds; owners will also be encouraged to invest in industry.?° Since the implementation of Phase I in March, 1980, E1 Salvador's land reform program has not gone as smoothly as its promoters had hoped. Due to a number of factors, the initial phase has been seriously compromised. one of these is 69 percent of the land in farms over 500 hectares is either used for pasture or not cultivated at all. tn addition, only 9 percent of the nation's coffee land is affected by Phase I, since most of the coffee plantations are less than 500 hectares.°° Thus, Bl Salvador's major cash crop and the backbone of the oligarchy's power have vertually gone untouched. Despite this, landowners have desperately attempted to undermine the land reform. Both through legal neans involving the government and illegal means, the landowners have fought back. When landowners saw 22that the land reform program was to be initiated, many landowners liquidated their assets by driving tractors and farm machinery to Guatemala; wholesale slaughter of livestock was reported -- some reports allege that up to 30 percent of the nation's total cattle has been slaughtered. It is estimated that one month after the reform was initiated between 25 percent and 40 percent of El Salvador's farm machinery had been illegally removed.37 In addition, some wealthy landowners geban to subdivide their land among relatives in an attempt to escape the land reform program. In order to halt the land transfers, Enrique Alvarez Cardolva, Minister of Agriculture, froze all property transfers on October 15, 1980.78 Despite this, it appears that the landowners did succeed in attempts of decapitaliza~ tion and subdivision on a significant portion of the land. Although resistance to land reform has beer stiff, it is estimated that one- third of landowners have taken advantage of the government's terms Many of these landowners already had interests in other sectors of the economy, and have left El Salvador for a safer political climate such as Guatemala City or Miami. Of the landowners in El Salvador many fought the land reform throuch the government itself. It has been established that large sums of money have been passed from landowners to military officers in attempts to undermine the land reform program. Furthermore, lanélords have created a Devolution of the Land Committee in order to lobby for the return of their land. The Committee is known to be headed by a Colonel Castillo, as well as members from the Ministry of Defense. Thus, through government collusion, as many as 68 properties have been returned to their former owners,°? although some were returned because they were improperly registered as over 500 hectares. Possibly, the most ironic 23aspect of the land reform program is that is has failed to reach El Salvador's really poor. In cooperatives which have been organized, membership has been restricted to permanent residents, including managers, skilled workers and tenant laborers. Because of passage of the 1961 minimum wage law, plantation owners have relied largely on landless labor. Thus, El Salvador's land reform program excluded 65 percent of the rural population, or 312,000 families, according to 1980 statistics. 4° Besides the bureaucratic shortcomings and passive resistance to E1 Salvador's land reform program, there has also been violent resistance. The five progressive military officers who led the October 15, 1979 coup have since been forced to leave the country only two garrisions are now under the conmand of remaining progressive officers’), the rest have been placed under the command of officers loyal to Colonel Garcia, the Minister of Defense. Divisions have continued to deepen between the hard line and progressive military officers. In the civilian part of government, crises have continued cabinet level ministers have continued to resign with greater frequency as violence and repression has grown. With the military in charge of implementation of the land reform program, these changes in the El Salvador's government have had significant impact Through haré line sectors of the military, the landowners have fought the land reform program by intimidating the nation's peasant sector. According to Jorge Villacarta, one of the reforn's top planners and Undersecretary of Agriculture, "From the very first moment that the implementation began, what we saw was a sharp increase in official violence against the very peasants who were the supposed 42 "beneficiaries' of the process. Three weeks later, Villacarta 24resigned. Since December, 1980, to January, 1981, six Americans have been killed by right-wing opponents to land reform; two of these were Michael P. Hammes and Mark David Peralman, who had been advisors to the Salvadorean government's land reform program. Only one week before his death, Hammes stated in a Washington Post interview that the right was responsible for 80 percent of El Salvador's bloodshed In May, 1980, the El Salvadorean government's technicians from the Institute for Agrarian Reform ("ISTA") went out on strike to protest the massive repression and harassment of ISTA personnel by the National Guard.*? rt has been alleged that the real objective of the military has been to use land reform to destroy the left. Haciendas have become military outposts and occupying forces have received lists of suspected members of popular organizations from ORDEN. According to an ISTA technician when land reform was initiated, "The troops came and told the workers the land was theirs now. They could elect leaders and run it themselves. ‘The peasants could not believe their ears, but they held elections that very night. ‘The next morning, the troops came back, and I watched as they shot every one of the elected leaders."*4 Despite this, a New York Times article stated that the El Salvadorean government's ISTA has reported that 14.9 percent of the country's total farmland is now owned by cooperatives which have benefited 386,000 Salvadoreans.‘> other reports have stated that beneficiaries have been members of para~ military groups and hard line governmental collaborators. on May 14, 1980, Colonel Abdul Gutierrez announced no more land reforms beyond Phase I, and Decree 207 will be carried out, thus eliminating Phase II, It is estimated that this new policy will xeduce El Salvador's land reform program by 50 percent. The Phase IIpart of the land reform program is considered to be the heart of reform; this is because Phase II affects 23 percent of El Salvador's farmlands, approximately 1,750 pieces of property, or eight times more than Phase I. Furthermore, Phase II would affect 70 percent of the nation's coffee production, which is the economic backbone of El Salvador's oligarchy and absorbs a greater share of labor than any other crop. This move has been seen as a political ploy designed to ease the fears of coffee owners whose support is necessary to the government. “3 Land to the Tiller Decree 207 After the elimination of the original Phase II of the land reform program, Decree 207 was created and has now taken the place of the original Phase II. Decree 207, also known as "Land to the Tiller" is designed to expropriate approximately 150,000 rented plots, providing a renter's plots altogether do not exceed 7 hectares in size. By April 28, 1980, this program is to have taken place and tennant cultivators will be allowed to buy them from the government through a thirty-year installment plan.‘7 According to Salvadorean land reform officials, the Decree 207 came as a complete surprise because they were neither consulted nor participated in the planning. As one official put it, “The decision to implement Land to the Tiller is a case in point. No prior studies were made, and only a rough implementation strategy has been prepared . . . . Except for the decree itself, there is very Little on which to base its implementation". Thus, the only people who actually know the details of the land reform are the people who created it. According to the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID) and Salvadorean land reform officials, little is known about the immediate needs of the Salvadorean peasant farmer. Because of this, AID and Salvadorean land reform officials tend to be skeptical of Decree 207. Furthernore, it has been alleged by AID that the organization which is to supply the small farmers credit, Banco De Foments Agropecuarie, "does not have the institutional capacity, not to speak of the resources, to serve the credit needs of some 160,000 Decree 207 beneficiaries."4® Despite the bureaucratic problems with Decree 207, there have also been sources who claim that Land to the Tiller is not practical for El Salvador. AID officials heve already begun to express problems; in a recent memo, experts state "The creation of an impossibly complex land registry snarl as perhaps 200,000 or more parcels suddenly need definition, registry and mortgage management is a real possibility. Similarly, credit, input delivery and especially marketing services must be created for the beneficiaries who formerly, in many cases, deperded on their patronos for such services."49 Experts from Oxfan-America have also tended to be skeptical of Decree 207; they state that Salvadorean small farmers already have plots which are too small and infertile to support them, thus they predict Decree 207 will result in more erosion, lower yields, and increased dependence on chemical fertilizers, which the peasants cannot afford. In addition to this, implementation of Decree 207 is said to be almost non-existent. Many tenants are reluctant to claim their land because the government lacks the capability or desire to protect them. In some cases, landowners who previously rented to the peasant are now evicting renters to prevent them from claiming title to the land, or making them sign papers 27giving up any claims. The emergence of Land to the Tiller program is not as big a mystery as it sounds; a United States AID memo admits Decree 207 was “designed virtually in its entirety by Americans and slipped in legislation without (Salvadorean ‘and reform officials) being consulted." It is believed that United states state Department induced the program because they felt more independent farmers could provide a new base of popular support for present Salvadorean government. According to a United States AID official, "No one is more conservative than a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits."°>+ Thus, it is said the United states’ chief motivation in supporting land reform has not been to help the poor, but to keep them from joining the left. The Land to the Tiller program is not new; the original Land to the Tiller program was implemented in Viet Nam. Under Roy Posterman, the program was created to win allegance of Vietnamese peasants away from the National Liberation Front. ‘Today, the United States has found itself in a similar situation; the United states backed government of El Salvador lacks the popular support and is fighting a largely rural-based guerrilla movement that maintains wide support of the peasantry. As in Viet Nam, the United States has responded with a program of rural pacification and counter-insurgency. The Land to the Tiller program in Viet Nam was used as a component to Phoenix program. Operation Phoenix was run by former Central Intelligence Director, William Colby; the land reform generated rural support for the regime while the main concept of the program is a combination of civil and military operations under one unified manage- ment. Thus, the sole purpose was to defeat the enemy, both politicaland militarily. Essentially, this is known as the "carrot and stick" routine -- land reform is the carrot, and counter-insurgency is the stick. During the program implementation in Viet Nam, 30,000 Vietnamese peasants were killed for being alleged Viet Congo guerrillas or sympathizers.°? Today, Roy Posterman is under contract to a private organiza~ tion which has employed him as an advisor on land reform in EL Salvador. Posterman's work is currently being subsidized by the American Institute for Free Labor Development ("AIFLD") which was started in 1961 and is a known recipient of CIA funds. The AIFLD objective is said to be to counter the efforts of radical or socialist unions; thus it is supported by representatives of major multinationals -- of these, one-half make up its board of directors. up until 1967, the CIA channeled funds into the AIFLD through fictitious foundations. Today, major funding comes from the state Department's AID. Since 1962, 300,000 Latin Americans have been trained in AIFLD centers; training includes subjects such as recog- nition and analysis of extremist propoganda. Because of AIFLD's actions in El Salvador, many unions in the United States have condemned it; one such union is the Santa Clara, California AFL-CIO. The International Longshoremen and Warehouseman's Union have also refused to load military cargos bound for El Salvador. 7o add to the AIFLD's problems, it also appears conservative Salvadorean landowners have also been unhappy with United States' attempts to implement Land to the Tiller. In January, 1981, two United States citizens working for the AIFLD with Posterman were shot to death in a restaurant in San Salvador; it was alleged by most observers, as well as the Wall Street Journal, that the killings were done by the right.°% 29Conclusion El Salvador today is in a state of turmoil; violence has run rampant and the economy is crumbling. Refugees who have fled their homes in the countryside report the use of tactics similar to in Viet Nam; house and crop burning, as well as search and destroy missions are used to pacify areas of suspected guerrilla organiza- tions. The majority of the violence is said to be coming from the right; this was verified by a group of 174 mayors who released a statement saying, "We know the attacks do not come from the extreme left, and we are officials of the presant government."°* tn the economy, there have been large increases in internal independence, lagging production and strict exchange controls. In the first three months of 1980, the annual inflation rate reached 22.3 percent. The outlook for the future is increased deterioration of El Salvador's balance of payments; this is because imports cannot be reduced without adversely affecting production and living standards. Exports are highly dependent upon the government's ability to control violence in the rural sectors. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in El Salvador, half of 1980's coffee crop remains unsold and world prices are low; the 1981 coffee crop is expected to be down by 30 percent. Production of cotton is epxected to be down 30 to 40 percent. in 1981. The decreased production of export crops has created serious consequences: it is doubtful whether the industrial sector will be able to purchase intermediate industrial goods, thus problems of both urban and rural unemployment will increase. Because of these problems, the possibility of El Salvador's economy collapsing is very real. As an assessment from AID summed it up, "Thus, the outlook is 56 grim. 3010 a 12 13 14 15 16 aq 18 FOOTNOTES “Abuses of Medical Neutrality", Report of the Public Health Commission to Bl Salvador, New York, New York, Committee for Health Rights in El Salvador, July 1980, p. 9. George Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World, New York, New York, Facts on File, 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 459-460. Ibid., p. 454. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador: A Revolution Brews", NACLA Report on the Americas, July-August 1980, Vol. XIV, ie i ere a El Salvador: Anatomy of a Revolution, Pitzer College, California, May 15, 1981, p. 1. John James Guy, "El Salvador: Another Domino", The World Today, London, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 1980, Vol. 36, No. 8, p. 326. El Salvador: Anatomy of a Revolution, Op. Cit., p. 1. Ernest Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry, Garden City, New York, Anchor Book, 1971, p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?", NACLA Report on the Americas, March-April 1980, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Pp. 5. Ibid., p. 7 Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ernesto Richter, "Social Classes, Accumulation and the Crisis of "Overpopulation' in El Salvador", Latin American Perspectives, University of Riverside, Spring/Summer 1980, Vol. VII, No. 2 and 3, p. 128. Central America and the Caribbeen, New York Times, New York, Arno Press, 1980, p. 284. Richter, Op. Cit., p. 115. Armstrong, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?", Op. Cit., p. ll. Richter, Op. Cit., p. 132.19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Kurian, Op. Cit., pp. 453-454 Armstrong, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?", Op. Cit., p. 13 Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 17. Ronda Pearl Rabkin, "United States - Soviet Rivalry in Central America and the Caribbean", Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York, School of International Affairs Fall/Winter 1980/81, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 344 Caribbean Year Book 1979/1980, New York, New York, Caribook Limited, 1980, p. 484. Central America and the Caribbean, Op. Cit., p. 292. Armstrong, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?", Op. Cit., p. 21 Central America and the Caribbean, Op. Cit., p. 292. ul tr Be 283, Armstrong, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?", Op. Cit Ibid., p. 26. Richter, Op. Cit., p. 344. Armstrong, "El Salvador: A Revolution Brews", Op. Cit., p. 9 “Christian Democrats Struggle to Avert Civil War in El Salvador", Latin American Weekly Report, January 11, 1980, p. 1 Roy Bonner, "Agony of El Salvador", The New York Times, February 22, 1981, p. 3, col. 6. Peter Shiras, "The False Promise and Real Violence of Land Reform" Food Monitor, January/February 1981, No. 20, p. 14. Laurence R. Simon and James C. Stephans, Jr., El Salvador Land Reform 1980-1981, Boston, Massachusetts, OXPAII America, Inc., 1961, pp. 22-34. Ibid., pp. 22-34. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., pp. 28-29. Ibid., pp. 37-38.41 42 43 44 45 46 47 438 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 Simon, Op. Cit., p. 14. "Land Reform and Military Terror Sense, March 1981, p. 2, col. Shiras, Op. Cit., p. 17. "Land Reform and Military Terror col. 3. Bonner, Op. Cit., p. 3, col. 6. Shiras, Op. Cit., pp. 15-16. “Land Reform and Military Terror colmea® Simon, Op. Cit., p. 45. Shiras, Op. Cit., pp. 16-17. "Land Reform and Military Terror col. 3. Shiras, Op. Cit., p. 16. Tbid., p. 17. “Land Reform and Military Terror col. 3. Shiras, Op. Cit., p. 19. Simon, Op. Cit., p. 69. in Bs in in in in El Salvador", El Salvador", El Salvador", £1 Salvador", El Salvador", Dollars and Op. Cit., Op. Cit., OpeRCi tes Op. Cit., P 2, a BiBIBLIOGRAPHY "Abuses of Medical Neutrality", Report of the Public Health Commission to El Salvador, New York, New York, Committee for Health Rights in EI Salvador, July 1980. Allen, Nick, "El Salvador: The Hungriest People in Latin America", Food First Alert, San Francisco, California, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981. Armitage, John A "Dubious United States Course in El Salvador", The Christian Science Mor itor, March 3, 1981. Armstrong, Robert, and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador: A Revolution Brews", NACLA Report on the Americas, July-August 1980, Vol. XIV, No. 4. "BL Salvador: Why Revolution?", NACLA Report on the @ticas, March-April 1980, Vol. VIX, No. 2. Bonner, Roy, "The Agony of El Salvador", The New York Times, February 22, 1981, p. 1, col. 6. "Cabinet Crisis Threatens Stability of El Salvador's Government", Latin America Weekly Report, January 4, 1980. Caribbean Year Book 1979/1980, New York, New York, Caribook, Limited, 198 Central America and the Caribbean, New York Times, New York, Arno Press, 1980 "Christian Democrats Struggle to Avert Civil War in El Salvador", Latin American Weekly Report, January 11, 1980. El Salvador: Anatomy of a Revolution, California, Pitzer College, May 15, 1981. "El Salvador: Learning from History", The Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1980. Encyclopedia of Latin America, Boston, Mass., McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974. 1979 Exporters Guide and Key Business Directory - Caribbean and Latin America, San Juan, Puerto Rico, The Witcom Group, 1978. Feder, Ernest, The Rape of the Peasantry, Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, 1971. 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