Philippine Copyright, 2020

by .

FERDINAND G.S. GUJILDE Author dedicates this piece of work to the two women who
gave birth to him four decades apart:
ISBN 978-621-04-0439-5 Janedina, to his older self,
No portion of this book may be copied or repro­ and Anna Fleur, to his younger self, Gustavo.
duced in books, pamphlets, outlines or notes, whether
printed, mimeographed, typewritten, copied in
different electronic devices or in any other form, for
distribution or sale, without the written permission
of the author except brief passages in books, articles,
reviews, legal papers, and judicial or other official
proceedings with proper citation.

Any copy of this book without the corresponding

number and the signature of the author on this page
either proceeds from an illegitimate source or is in
possession of one who has no authority to dispose of
the same.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

BY THE AUTHOR
No. Olbl

ISBN 978-621-04-0439-5
05-PO-00099-0
9786210404395

05-PQ-00099-0

Printed by

rex pnirrrinq compnnq, inc.

Typography & Creative Lithography
84 P. Florentino St.. Quezon City
Tel. No. 857-77-77
 FOREWORD

As of today, our Constitution is the only Constitution in the world

that expressly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public
trust. Section 1 of its Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers)
provides: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."
This simply means that public officers and employees are "public
servants" and their "masters" are the people. Indeed, the people are
so because Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution provides that the
Philippines is a democratic and republican State and "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."
This principle has its roots in the "servant-leadership" teaching
of Jesus Christ which He proclaimed during His Last Supper with His
apostles (Luke 22: 24-26) when He washed the feet of His disciples
(John 13:12-16).
Public officers, therefore, hold a sacred trust. The people demand
nothing more than the best - the utmost - of everything from their
servants. Any act of infidelity to their duty or betrayal of the trust
would be a sin against the people.
Sadly, however, in our times amidst the angst of a confused and
troubled world, this public trust principle and the servant-leadership
teaching are more honored in their breach than in their observance.
Many hold public office for fortune, power and fame. Several have
been elected through massive vote-buying or the use of threats and
force. Graft and corruption in the bureaucracy have become a social
cancer, a scourge, to the great prejudice to the common good and misery
to the people. On the other hand, the people have not been assertive
and jealous enough of their power and authority over their servants,
and are even unmoved or rendered powerless by sins committed by the
servants.

iv V
 Among the principal causes of all these are the lack of sufficient
and adequate knowledge of the true concept of public office, and of
the full understanding of the limitless dimensions of the demanded
virtues, values, and ideals of trusteeship and servant-leadership.
The call of the hour then is to educate all concerned on all these
inadequacies with the ultimate aim of instilling in the minds and hearts
CONTENTS
of public officers and employees the essence of the sanctity of their
duties and responsibilities, as well as in motivating and inspiring the
people to be ever watchful, vigilant and empowered in exacting from Chapter I
their public servants accountability and utmost fidelity at all times in
the pursuit and performance of their sacred task. THE ESSENTIALS

This book of Professor Ferdinand G.S. Gujilde, appropriately

titled LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, provides one of the best initiatory
moves for this education. Among others, it guides and teaches the Public office
readers on the genesis and essentials of public office, the evolution of
Public office, defined 1
the trust relationship, the elaboration of the accountability of public
Public office, no vested right to it 1
officers, and on the corresponding punishments for sins committed by
public officers.
Characteristics of public office
This book then is a "must reading" not only for students of law,
teachers of law, lawyers and other professionals and businessmen, Delegation of sovereign functions
including leaders of the various religions, but more so for our public Sovereign functions, defined
officers and employees and the Filipino people who are the masters in Creation by law
our democratic and republican Philippines. Not by contract
Consultant, defined
I commend and congratulate Professor Gujilde for adding a light Office & contract, distinguished
in the darkness of our beleaguered society. Not by contract, exception
Oath of office
Payment of salary............................................................................ 7
II February 2020. Continuance of position 8
Scope of duties 8
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Designation of position as an office 9
(Ret.) Chief Justice of the
Philippines Public officer

Public officer, defined 9

Private individual as public officer 10
Public officers, enumerated 11

Classification of career service positions

Career service positions, characteristics 11

Career service positions, enumerated 11
Career service positions, sub-classified 12

vii
Noncareer service positions, characteristics
Noncareer service positions, enumerated.
Policy-determining position
Primarily confidential position
Proximity rule
■
Term limit
Disqualifications for elective officers

President and Vice-President

Senator
30
30
31
Primarily confidential position, examples Member, House of Representatives 31
Classifying authority Local elective officials 32
Classification, basis Term limit, when it attaches 32
In nature, discussed Voluntary renunciation 32
Highly technical position Exceptions 33
Highly technical position, examples Disqualification, when it interrupts term 34
Disqualification, when it does not interrupt term 35
Kinds of public officers Disqualification due to term limit, requisites 35
Recall election, effects 36
De jure and de facto officer, defined Conversion of municipality into city, effects 37
De facto and de jure officer, distinguished.... Involuntary loss of title 37
De facto officer and usurper, distinguished. I ^qualifications under the Omnibus Election Code 38
De facto doctrine, discussed Disqualification, when removed 38
De facto exercise of duties, instances False material representation 38
De facto doctrine, elements Disqualifying acts, enumerated 40
Color of right, example I ^qualifications under the Local Government Code of 1991 43
General acquiescence, example Exception 44
De facto officer, entitlement to salary I )isqualification under the Lone Candidate Law 45
I )isqualifications under the Revised Penal Code 46
Chapter II Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
effects on suffrage 46
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS Perpetual special disqualification, when it attaches 46
TO PUBLIC OFFICE Temporary absolute and perpetual special
disqualification, distinguished 47
Authority to prescribe
I ^qualification under the Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act.. 48
Qualifications, when possessed
Exception
Qualifications for appointive officers

Qualifications for elective officers Qualification standards, defined 48

Purpose 48
President & Vice-President
Qualification standards, establishing authority 49
Senator
Supplementary effect 49
Member, House of Representatives
Career service positions, qualifications 50
District Representative
Noncareer service positions, qualifications 50
Party-List Representative
Exceptions 50
Local elective officials
Exception to exception 50
Not more than 24 years old, exactitude.
Education, defined 51
Bachelor's degree requirement 51
Master's degree requirement 51

viii ix
 Exception Appointment, stages of 65
Exception to exception Appointment and designation, distinguished 66
Foreign education, when allowed Appointing authority, discretion of 67
Experience, defined Limitation 68
Relevant experience, acquisition of Noninterference by the Judiciary 68
Training, defined Noninterference by the Legislature 68
Eligibility, defined
Competitive examinations, exceptions from The Civil Service Commission as attesting authority
Barangay Health Worker (BHW) Eligibility
Qualifications Purpose
Sanggunian Member Eligibility (SME) Composition, qualifications and disqualification 70
Qualifications Appointment and term of office 71
Barangay Nutrition Scholar (BNS) Eligibility Prohibitions 71
Qualifications I u t isd iction in appointments 71
Bar and Board Examinations Passers Eligibility Recall of appointment, grounds for 73
Honor Graduate Eligibility (HGE)
Qualifications Kinds of appointment in the civil service
Foreign School Honor Graduate Eligibility (FSHGE)
Qualifications I ’ermanent appointment, defined 74
Veteran Preference Rating (VPR) Eligibility Limitations 74
Skill Eligibility temporary appointment, defined 74
Qualifications When issued 74
Scientific and Technological Specialist (STS) Eligibility. temporary appointment, when invalidated 76
Qualifications Exceptions 76
Hard to fill vacancies, identified 76
Barangay Official Eligibility (BOE)
temporary appointment, when prohibited 77
Qualifications........................................................................ 61 Appointment in an acting capacity 77
Electronic Data Processing Specialist (EDPS) Eligibility 61 Substitute appointment, defined 77
Chapter III Qualifications and entitlements 78
FORMATION OF RELATIONS When effective and allowed 78
( 'oterminous appointment, defined 78
By popular election t oterminous appointment, classified 78
Coterminous with appointing authority (not primarily
By popular election, defined 62 confidential in nature) 78
Popular and federation election, distinguished 62 Qualifications 79
Election, kinds of 63 Coterminous with organizational unit head
(not primarily confidential in nature) 79
By direct provision of law Qualifications........................................................................ 79
Ex-officio, defined 63 (. oterminous (primarily confidential in nature) 80
Qualifications........................................................................ 80
Appointment by competent authority

Appointment, defined 65
Competent authority, identified 65
Coterminous with lifespan of agency........................................... 80
Qualifications........................................................................ 80
X xi
Pre-termination...................................................................... 81
Fixed-term appointment, defined.................................................. 81
Contractual appointment, defined 81 Reclassification, defined 98
Qualifications 81 When prohibited 98
Contractual appointment, length of service 82 Reclassification, effects of 98
Renewal 82 Reclassified position, vested right to it 98
Pretermination 82
When prohibited 83 Other human resource actions
Casual appointment, defined 83
Qualifications 83 Reassignment, defined 99
Duration 99
Renewal 83
Station-specific appointment 100
Non-station-specific appointment 100
Nature of appointment
Reassignment, when justified 101
Reassignment, when deemed constructive dismissal 102
Original appointment, defined Reassignment, remedy against....................................................... 103
84
Probationary period, defined I Mail, defined 103
84
When prohibited 104
84
Duration 104
84
Promotion, defined Administrative supervision and control 104
85
Exception Authority to discipline 104
85
Disqualification Human resource action 105
85
I Mail, remedy against 105
86
When prohibited
Next-in-rank position, defined Designation, defined 105
86
Special promotions
Transfer, defined Acting Capacity and Officer-in-Charge, distinguished 106
87
Next-in-rank
Prohibited rule
transfer Duration 106
88
Unconsented transfer 88 Designees, entitlement to salary 107
Reemployment, defined 89
When issued Presidential power to appoint under the Constitution
89
Reappointment, instances of 89
Nature 107
Reinstatement, defined 90 Limitation 107
Reinstatement to comparable position.... 90 How made 108
Reinstatement to same position 90 Presidential appointees, grouped 109
Reinstatement after pardon, prohibition 91
Pardon, defined Consent, when required........................................................ 109
91
Exception 109
Rationale 92
Consent, when not required 110
Reinstatement after pardon, when allowed 92
Armed forces & police, distinguished 110
Reinstatement after pardon, when automatic.. 93
Date of pardon, implications 94
The Commission on Appointments as confirming authority
Pardon, non-entitlement to back wages 94
Reinstatement after amnesty 95 History and purpose 113
Amnesty, defined 95 Composition 114
Amnesty, coverage 96 Proportional representation, rationale 114
Amnesty and pardon, distinguished 97 How determined..................................................................... 114
Demotion, defined 97 Fractional membership, prohibited conversion 114
Effect on salary 97

xii xiii
 Exception................................................................................ 115 Primary functions, defined................................................... 136
Justiciability............................................................................ 117 Primary functions, examples................................................ 136
Changes in party membership, effects of...................................... 117 Applicability against other elective officials................................. 136
Rationale................................................................................. 137
Kinds of presidential appointment Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.... 137
Without forfeiting his seat, explained......................... 137
Acting capacity appointment......................................................... 118 Local elective officials............................................................ 138
Limitation............................................................................... 118 Applicability against appointive officials...................................... 138
Ad interim appointment................................................................. 119 Rationale................................................................................. 138
Nature..................................................................................... 119 Forbidden office.............................................................................. 139
Ad interim and acting capacity, distinguished................... 119 Term and tenure, distinguished........................................... 139
Efficacy.................................................................................... 120 Midnight appointment, defined.................................................... 139
Ad interim appointment, modes of termination................ 121 Constitutional basis................................................................ 139
Disapproval............................................................................ 121 Rationale................................................................................. 140
Adjournment.......................................................................... 122 Prohibition, scope of....................................................................... 141
Bypassed appointment.......................................................... 122 Exception................................................................................ 142
Revocation of appointment, when allowed.................................. 123 A ppointment during election period............................................. 143
Exceptions............................................................................... 143
The Judicial and Bar Council as recommending authority Appointment of political lame ducks............................................. 144
I .using candidates........................................................................... 144
Purpose ........................................................................................ 123
Rationale................................................................................. 144
Jurisdiction...................................................................................... 123
Winning candidates........................................................................ 145
Supervisory power of the Supreme Court........................... 123
Rationale................................................................................. 145
Limitation............................................................................... 124
Winning or losing candidates......................................................... 145
Composition..................................................................................... 124
Number of members.............................................................. 125
Chapter IV
Manner of appointment and term of office......................... 126
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Prohibited appointments (Constitutional basis........................................................................ 146

Nepotism, defined........................................................................... 127

Norms of conduct
Relative, identified................................................................. 127
Exception....................................................................... 127 ( ommitment to public interest...................................................... 147
Rationale................................................................................. 128 Professionalism.................................................................................... 147
Incompatible office.......................................................................... 129 Professionalism, defined........................................................... 147
Incompatibility, test of........................................................... 129 Unbecoming conduct, defined................................................. 148
Dual or multiple offices.................................................................. 130 lustness and sincerity......................................................................... 149
Holding office, defined.......................................................... 130 Political neutrality........................................................... 149
Rationale................................................................................. 131 Partisan political activity, defined............................................ 150
Exceptions............................................................................... 133 Partisan acts, enumerated..................................................... 150
Ex officio, defined......................................................... 134 Prohibition, constitutional basis......................................................... 151
Ex officio position, examples....................................... 134 Prohibition, statutory bases............................................................... 151
Any other office, defined....................................................... 135 Sanctions..................................................................................... 152
Any other office, examples.................................................... 135 Prohibition, coverage.......................................................................... 152

xiv XV
 Exception................................................................................ 153 Solicitation or acceptance of gifts................................................... 172
Exception to exception................................................. 153 Gift, defined............................................................................ 173
Responsiveness to the public.......................................................... 155 Loans, coverage..................................................................... 173
Nationalism and patriotism............................................................ 155 Exceptions............................................................................... 173
Simple living.................................................................................... 155 Relative, defined........................................................... 174
Simple living, defined............................................................ 155 Acceptance of gifts from foreign governments, when allowed ... 174
Unexplained wealth........................................................................ 156
Unexplained wealth, evidence of.......................................... 156 Corrupt practices of public officers
Unlawful acquisition, prima facie presumption of................ 157
Other legitimately acquired property, defined........... 158 Persuading another to violate rules............................................... 175
Forfeiture................................................................................ 158 Requesting or receiving any gift for intervention........................ 175
Unexplained wealth, basis.............................................................. 159 Contract or transaction, defined........................................... 175
Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth (SALN)......... 159 Receiving any gift, coverage................................................. 176
Rationale........................................................................ 160 Giver, liability of.................................................................... 176
Who files when...................................................................... 160 Requesting or receiving any gift as token of gratitude................ 176
Authority to verify................................................................. 161 Giver, liability of.................................................................... 176
Penalty..................................................................................... 161 Acceptance of private employment............................................... 177
SALN, contents of................................................................... 162 Giver, liability of.................................................................... 177
Inaccurate information, effects..................................... 162 (’.uising undue injury..................................................................... 177
Disclosure of Business Interest and Financial Undue injury, defined............................................................ 177
Connections, contents of.............................................. 163 Causing undue injury, elements........................................... 178
Identification and disclosure of relatives............................. 164 Causing undue injury, how committed................................ 178
Manifest partiality, defined................................................... 178
Duties of public officials & employees Evident bad faith, defined..................................................... 179
Gross inexcusable negligence, defined................................. 179
Act promptly on letters and requests............................................ 164 Unwarranted benefits, defined............................................. 180
Submit annual performance reports............................................. 165 Neglect to act................................................................................... 181
Process documents and papers expeditiously.............................. 165 I fisadvantageous contract............................................................... 181
Reasonable time, how determined........................................ 165 Financial or pecuniary interest....................................................... 181
Signatories to a document, number of................................. 166 Personal or material interest........................................................... 181
Act immediately on the public's personal transactions.............. 166 Personal interest, presumption of......................................... 182
Make documents available to the public....................................... 167 Approval of license, etc................................................................... 182
Exceptions............................................................................... 167 I >ivulging confidential information.............................................. 182
Data privacy........................................................................... 168 Liability................................................................................... 182

Prohibited acts and transactions Chapter V

LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Financial and material interest....................................................... 170
Outside employment...................................................................... 170 Ihree-fold liability rule................................................................... 183
Prohibited practice of profession.......................................... 170 I hsmissal of criminal case, effect on administrative case............ 184
Exception................................................................................ 171 Administrative and criminal liability, distinguished.......... 184
Limitations.............................................................................. 171 Exceptions............................................................................... 185
Recommendation to any private position..................................... 172
Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information................ 172

xvi xvii
 The Arias Doctrine: When and where filed.................................................................... 201
Liability of superior officers over acts of subordinates Effect of withdrawal............................................................... 201
I low acted........................................................................................ 201
Rationale ........................................................................................ 187 Prima facie case, defined....................................................... 201
Exception ........................................................ 187
Preliminary investigation, defined....................................... 201
Who investigates............................................................................. 202
Doctrine of official immunity
I low conducted............................................................................... 202
Rationale ........................................................................................ 189 Right to counsel..................................................................... 202
Good faith, defined................................................................ 189 Formal charge, when issued........................................................... 203
Good faith, examples............................................................. 190 Contents.................................................................................. 203
Good faith, presumption of......................................... 191 Notice of charge, when issued....................................................... 203
Exception................................................................................ 192 Contents.................................................................................. 204
Answer, requisites and contents.................................................... 204
Parliamentary immunity Failure to answer, effects....................................................... 204
Prohibited pleadings, enumerated........................................ 204
Basis................................................................................................. 193 Formal investigation, when conducted......................................... 205
Immunity from arrest............................................................. 193 Submission of position paper or memorandum................. 205
Freedom of speech and debate............................................. 193 Pre-hearing conference.................................................................... 205
Speech or debate, scope of.................................................... 194 Failure to attend, effects......................................................... 205
I learing proper................................................................................ 206
Presidential immunity from suit Right to counsel..................................................................... 206
I lecision............................................................................................ 207
Basis................................................................................................. 196 Finality of decision................................................................. 207
Rationale................................................................................. 196 Exceptions............................................................................... 207
Exception................................................................................ 196 Motion for reconsideration............................................................. 208
Nature ........................................................................................ 196 Grounds.................................................................................. 208
When deemed filed................................................................ 208
Chapter VI Effect of filing......................................................................... 208
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE Appeal.............................................................................................. 209
Unappealable decision, exception......................................... 209
Purpose ........................................................................................ 198
Violation of due process, effect............................................. 209
Disciplining authorities.................................................................. 198 When deemed filed................................................................ 209
Appeal, how perfected.................................................................... 210
The Civil Service Commission as disciplining authority Effect of filing......................................................................... 211
Jurisdiction...................................................................................... 198 Petition for review...................................................................... 211
Petition for review under Rule 43.................................................. 211
Disciplinary cases in the Civil Service Petition for review on certiorari..................................................... 211
Pendency of administrative or criminal case, effects................... 212
Who initiates.................................................................................... 199 Administrative case, when pending..................................... 213
Valid complaint, requisites............................................................. 199
Anonymous complaint, when allowed................................ 200 Administrative offenses and penalties
Show cause order, defined.................................................... 200
Person complained of, identified......................................... 200 Administrative offenses, classified................................................ 213
(irave offenses punishable by dismissal, enumerated................ 213

xviii xix
Serious dishonesty.......................................................................... 213 Violations of the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007
Gross neglect of duty...................................................................... 214
Grave misconduct........................................................................... 214 Grave offense................................................................................... 232
Light offenses................................................................................... 232
Grave and simple misconduct, distinguished..................... 214
Being notoriously undesirable....................................................... 216
Duration and effect of administrative penalties
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude........................ 216
Falsification of official document................................................... 216 Dismissal ........................................................................................ 233
Physical or mental disorder or disability...................................... 217 Demotion ........................................................................................ 234
Acceptance of gift............................................................................ 217 Suspension....................................................................................... 234
Contracting loans............................................................................ 218 Distinguished from preventive suspension......................... 235
Solicitation....................................................................................... 218
Grounds for issuance............................................................. 235
Nepotism ........................................................................................ 218 Duration.................................................................................. 235
Relative, defined.................................................................... 218 Period lower than maximum....................................... 236
Exemptions............................................................................. 219 Effect of authorized leave............................................. 236
Subsequent nepotism..................................................................... 219 Double preventive suspension..................................... 236
Remedy................................................................................... 219 Payment of back wages, when allowed............................... 236
Disloyalty ....................................................................................... 219
Void on its face, instances............................................ 237
Grave offenses punishable by suspension, enumerated............. 220 Exoneration, defined.................................................... 237
Inefficiency and incompetence............................................. 220 Remedies against................................................................... 238
Prejudicial conduct, defined................................................. 221
Fine ................................................................................................. 238
Prejudicial conduct, examples.............................................. 221
Fine, when replaced by suspension...................................... 238
Less grave offenses, enumerated................................................... 223
Reprimand........................................................................................ 239
Light offenses, enumerated............................................................ 224
Removal of administrative penalties or disabilities
Other specific offenses
Sexual harassment Petition to remove, how made....................................................... 239
Favorable recommendation, guidelines for......................... 240
Sexual harassment, defined............................................................ 226
Recommending and removing authority...................................... 241
Persons liable.......................................................................... 226
Effects of removal.................................................................. 241
Work-related sexual harassment, how committed.............. 227
Education or training-related sexual harassment, Extinction of administrative liability
how committed............................................................. 227
Sexual harassment, where else committed.......................... 228 The Aguinaldo doctrine.................................................................. 242
Sexual harassment, how committed, classified and penalized.... 229 Rationale................................................................................. 242
When grave............................................................................ 229 Applicability.................................................................................... 243
When less grave..................................................................... 229 Resignation, effect on administrative offenses............................. 243
When light.............................................................................. 230 Rationale................................................................................. 244
Sexual harassment, where filed...................................................... 231 Exception................................................................................ 244
CODI, composition................................................................. 231
Disqualification...................................................................... 231 The Office of the President as disciplining authority
Term of office.......................................................................... 232
CSC jurisdiction, when acquired................................................... 232 ()ver appointive officers.................................................................. 246
Unreasonable delay............................................................... 232 Exceptions........................................................................................ 246
()ver local elective officers.............................................................. 247

XX xxi
Grounds ........................................................................................ 247 I ’ower of contumacy....................................................................... 259
Oppression, defined............................................................... 247 Power to delegate............................................................................ 260
Dereliction of duty, examples............................................... 248 Power to discipline......................................................................... 260
Abuse of authority, examples............................................... 248 Scope of disciplinary authority............................................ 261
Hearing and investigation.............................................................. 249 Rationale........................................................................ 261
Duration.................................................................................. 249 Concomitant prerogatives........................................... 262
Rights of respondent.............................................................. 249
Preventive suspension.................................................................... 249 Rules of Procedure
When imposed....................................................................... 250
Duration.................................................................................. 250 Coverage........................................................................................... 263
Salary....................................................................................... 251 Form................................................................................................. 263
Decision, form and notice............................................................... 251 Anonymous complaint, when acted..................................... 263
Suspension, effect on right to be elected.............................. 251
Removal, effect on right to be elected................................... 251 Procedure in criminal cases
Appeal.............................................................................................. 252
Execution pending appeal..................................................... 252 (Grounds for criminal complaint, enumerated.............................. 263
I low acted........................................................................................ 264
The Ombudsman as disciplining authority
Preliminary investigation
Objective.......................................................................................... 253
Who investigates............................................................................. 264
Qualifications................................................................................... 253
Procedure ........................................................................................ 265
Appointing authority............................................................. 253
Where complaint is not under oath...................................... 265
Term of office.......................................................................... 253
Where respondent does not file counter-affidavit............... 265
Prohibited pleadings.............................................................. 266
Independence
Clarificatory hearing, when conducted................................ 266
Nature.............................................................................................. 254 Approving authority...................................................................... 266
Aspects of independence................................................................ 254 Cases under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction, enumerated...... 267
Creation by the Constitution................................................. 254 In relation to office, test................................................ 269
Fiscal autonomy...................................................................... 254 Relation to office, failure to allege............................... 271
Insulation from executive supervision and control............. 254 Notice to parties.............................................................................. 273
Motion for reconsideration............................................................. 273
Powers, functions & duties Effect of filing......................................................................... 273

Source of power............................................................................... 255 Procedure in administrative cases

Power to investigate and prosecute.............................................. 255
Administrative complaint, grounds for......................................... 273
Concurrent jurisdiction to investigate.................................. 256
Private acts of public officers................................................ 274
Power to direct performance of duty............................................ 257
Public officers covered, enumerated.............................................. 274
Power to request assistance............................................................ 258
Power to publish............................................................................. 258 Elective officials...................................................................... 275
Appointive officials of GOCCs............................................. 275
Public disclosure, exemption................................................ 258
Original charter, meaning............................................. 275
Power to determine causes of corruption...................................... 259
Nonmilitary personnel.......................................................... 276
Power to promulgate rules............................................................. 259
Over its own personnel.......................................................... 276
Power to examine bank accounts and records.............................. 259
Exceptions........................................................................................ 277

xxii xxiii
 Impeachable officers 277 No injunction policy against the Ombudsman
Members of Congress 278
(»vcr its investigation 296
Members of the Judiciary 278
Writ of injunction, qualified 296
Public school teachers 279
Any court, identified 297
Rationale 280
Exception 297
Estoppel, exception to exception 280
(>ver its decision or findings 298
How initiated 281
Administrative offenses, prescription 281
How acted 282 Chapter VII
Grounds for outright dismissal, enumerated 282 TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Grievance or request for assistance, nature of 282
Resignation
By whom handled 283
When and how acted upon 283 Resignation, defined 299
Effect of non-compliance 283 Rationale 299
Option to refer 285 Resignation, how made 299
Administrative adjudication, how conducted 285 300
When effective
Prohibited pleadings 285 300
Resignation, when considered tendered
Submission of verified position papers 286 301
Resignation, when completed
Clarificatory hearing 286 301
When acted upon
Rights of parties 286 301
Suspension of date of effectivity, when allowed
Formal investigation 287 301
Lifting of suspension
Rights of parties 287 302
Resignation, withdrawal of
Failure to appear, effects 289 Resignation, effects on administrative case 302
Affidavits as direct testimony 289 Rationale 303
Rendition of decision 289 Exception 303
Finality of decision 290 Resignation, when prohibited 305
Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation 290
Appeal 290 Dismissal or removal
Appeal, effects of 291
Execution of decision 291 I lismissal, defined 306
Mandatory character of recommendation 291 Requisite 306
I Jismissal, when constructive 306
Preventive suspension
I lismissal, effects on administrative case 307
Nature 292
Distinguished from suspension as penalty 292 Retirement
Purpose 293
Duration Compulsory retirement 3
293
Longer period, rationale 293 Rationale
Requisites for issuance Extension of service, when allowed... 3
295
Strength of evidence, who determines 296 Optional retirement 309
Retirement laws, how construed 309

xxiv
 Abolition of office Exception ........................................................................................ 332
Quo warranto......................................................................... 332
Abolition of office, authority.......................................................... 309 Election protest...................................................................... 333
Exception................................................................................ 310 Impeachment and quo warranto, distinguished.......................... 333
Abolition of office, when valid....................................................... 310 Quo warranto against elective and appointive officers,
When done in bad faith......................................................... 311 distinguished.......................................................................... 335

Reorganization Quo warranto against appointive officers

Reorganization, when it terminates relations............................... 311 Quo warranto, purpose.................................................................. 335
Reorganization, authority............................................................... 312 Who files........................................................................................... 335
Exception................................................................................ 312 Exception................................................................................ 336
Power of the President to reorganize............................................. 312
Against whom................................................................................. 337
Rationale................................................................................. 312
lurisdiction....................................................................................... 337
Constitutional basis................................................................ 313
I’lescriptive period.......................................................................... 338
Statutory basis........................................................................ 313
Rationale................................................................................. 338
Implications............................................................................ 315
Exception................................................................................ 339
Exception................................................................................ 316
Reorganization, when valid............................................................ 316
Quo warranto against elective officers
When done in good faith....................................................... 317
When done in bad faith......................................................... 318 Quo warranto, defined................................................................... 341
Reorganization, preference for appointment................................ 320 Ineligibility............................................................................. 341
Disloyalty................................................................................ 341
Impeachment
Initiation of quo warranto proceedings
Impeachment, defined..................................................................... 321
Nature and purpose............................................................... 321 Barangay officials............................................................................ 342
History.................................................................................... 321 Municipal officials........................................................................... 342
Impeachable officers and grounds, enumerated.......................... 322
Regional, provincial or city officials.............................................. 343
Betrayal of public trust, defined........................................... 322
Member, House of Representatives............................................... 343
Other high crimes................................................................... 323
'ienator.............................................................................................. 344
Impeachment, initiation and limitation......................................... 324
I 'resident and Vice-President.......................................................... 344
Manner of filing..................................................................... 324
Required vote to impeach..................................................... 324
Recall
Articles of Impeachment, contents.............................. 324
One-year bar rule................................................................... 325 Recall, defined................................................................................. 344
Impeachment proceeding and impeachment case, Recall election, defined.......................................................... 345
distinguished.......................................................................... 325 Rationale................................................................................. 345
First-to-file scheme................................................................. 326 Recall, who initiates against whom on what ground.................. 345
Impeachment court......................................................................... 327 Recall petition, how filed where.................................................... 346
Required vote to convict........................................................ 328 Recall petition, when filed.............................................................. 346
Penalty..................................................................................... 328 Rationale.................................................................................. 346
Judicial review................................................................................. 329
Next regular election, defined............................................... 347
Impeachment Rules, promulgation............................................... 330
Recall, when effective...................................................................... 347
Impeachment as exclusive mode of removal................................ 331

xxvi xxvii
 Expulsion

Who may be expelled..................................................................... 348

Jurisdiction............................................................................. 348
Expulsion, grounds for.................................................................... 349

End of term for elective officers

Chapter I
Prohibition against holdover capacity.......................................... 350
Exception................................................................................ 350 THE ESSENTIALS
End of term for appointive officers Public office
Abandonment Public office, defined.
By lapse of time............................................................................... 352 Public office is a public trust.1 It is the right, authority, and duty,
Rationale................................................................................. 352 i mated and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
By acceptance of another position................................................. 352 by law or enduring at pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
By failure to assume........................................................................ 353 Invested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government,
Penalty..................................................................................... 353 lo Ih> exercised to benefit the public.2
Rationale................................................................................. 353 It is not a property within the sense of constitutional guarantees
ol due process, but is a public agency. In a popular representative
Death government, officers are mere agents and not rulers of the people,
where no one has proprietary or contractual right to an office, but
where every officer accepts office pursuant to law and holds it in trust
lor the people.3
It is personal to the incumbent and is not a property that passes
to his heirs. When protestee dies during pendency of election protest,
his widow cannot substitute him to continue his counterclaim for
damages.4

Public office, no vested right to it.

A public officer charged with dishonesty may be
preventively suspended without prior notice and hearing,
but suffers no injury because he or she has neither vested
nor absolute right to the public office he or she occupies.5

'Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution

2F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, cited in Laurel
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
■'Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-16887, Nov. 17,1920
4Abeja v. Tanada, G.R. No. 110272, Aug. 30,1994
5Carabeo v. CA, G.R. Nos. 178000 and 178003, Dec. 4, 2009

xxviii 1
 2 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The right to notice and hearing is not essential to due
process of law in administrative proceedings. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is not so
in administrative proceedings.
Suspension of an officer pending trial for misconduct
is universally accepted as fair. Notice and hearing are not
prerequisites to suspension unless required by statute?
Where appointment does not specify office or station,
appointee may be transferred or assigned from one unit to
another or to any other station with or without his or her
consent, as a result of merging of offices or if exigency of
service requires, provided it affects no substantial change in
title, rank, and salary.7
But although there is no vested right in an office, which
may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has,
in a sense, a right to his or her office. If that right is to be
taken by law, the terms should be clear in which the purpose
is stated.8
Thus, a law that says appointed public officers are to
serve un til age of 65 years applies prospectively only. Without
provisions expressly or impliedly making it applicable to
incumbent officers then in office, it is not justified to construe
it to legislate faithful servants out of office.’
Characteristics of public office
Characteristics of a public office include delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and designation of the
position as an office.’"
‘Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-16887, Nov. 17, 1920
'Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 2005
’Ryan v. Green (1874), 58 N.Y 295, cited in Segovia v Noel, G.R. No. L-23226,
March 4,1925
’Segovia v. Noel, G.R. No. L-23226, March 4,1925
"’F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices & Officers, cited in Laurel v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Chapter I 3
THE ESSENTIALS
I Megation of sovereign functions.
Delegation to the individual of some sovereign functions of
government is the most important characteristic in determining
whether a position is a public office or not."
Sovereign functions, defined.
Sovereign functions refer to either legislative, execu­
tive, or judicial functions exercised for public benefit,12
* *either
directly or indirectly.
Implementation by an ad hoc body of programs on utilization of
culture, arts, literature, and media as vehicles for history, economic
endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of
nccomplishment in every Filipino, is executive in nature and is thus a
sovereign function.13
Administration of a state university by a government scholar in
her capacity as student regent is a sovereign function as she performs
legitimate government function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, sciences, and arts and giving professional and
technical training.14
Promotion of continuing book publishing industry development
through active participation of the private sector to ensure adequate
nupply of affordable, quality-produced books for domestic, and export
market is a sovereign function.15
Creation by law.
The legislature creates the office, defines its powers, limits its
duration, and annexes compensation. This done, legislative power
ceases.16 * * *
"F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices & Officers, cited in Laurel v.
I k’Hlcrto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
l2F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices & Officers, cited in Laurel v.
I lesierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
13Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
l4UP v. CIR, 107 Phil 848 (1960), cited in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059,
)nn. 22, 2008
’’Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, Sept. 11, 2009
’’Myers v. US (1926), 272 U.S., 52; 71 Law. Ed„ 160, citing 1 Annals of Congress,
•181, 582; Madison the Federalist, Nos. 47, 46, cited in Government of the Philippine Is­
lands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1,1927
4 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The creation and abolition of public offices are primarily legislative
functions. Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing
officer's right to continue in the position held and that such power may
be exercised for various reasons, such as lack of funds or in the interest
of economy.
However, in order for abolition to be valid, it must be made in good
faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.'7
Being primarily legislative, the President cannot create an office
under the guise of his continuing authority to reorganize administrative
structure of the Office of the President. It does not envision, much less
include authority, to create an office under it.
Such continuing authority refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions that all point to situations where a body or an office is
already existent but needs to be modified or altered.
The creation of the fact-finding truth commission is not one of the
powers delegated by Congress to the President, apart from offending
equal protection clause as it singles out the immediately preceding
administration only.1"
But the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including creation of offices in the department or agency within the
Executive Branch based on his residual power19 and authority to change
organizational units and key positions in any department or agency.30
Not by contract.
Civil service law does not cover contract for consul­
tancy services. Consultancy position is not found in the in­
dex of position titles approved by the Departmen t of Budget
and Management. Accordingly, it does not need approval of
l7Canonizado v. Aguirre, 380 Phil. 280, 286 (2000)
'"Sec. 31, Book ID, E.O. 292, Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7, 2010
'“Sec. 20, Book HI, E.O. 292, cited in Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745,
Oct. 16,1997
a'Sec. 62, R.A. 7645, cited in Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16,
1997
THE ESSENTIALS
the Civil Service Commission.21 Consultancy services are not
considered government service for retirement purposes.22
Consultant, defined.
A consultant is one who provides profes­
sional advice on matters within his special knowl­
edge or training. There is no employer-employee
relationship in the engagement of a consultant
but that of client-professional relationship.23
Services of contract of service and job order workers
are not covered by Civil Service Law and rules thus, not
creditable as government service. They do not enjoy the
benefits enjoyed by government employees such as leave,
PERA, representation and transportation allowance, and
thirteenth month pay.24
Contract of service refers to engagement of services
of an individual, private firm, other government agency,
non-governmental agency', or international organization as
consultant, learning service provider, or technical expert to
undertake special project or job within a specific period.25
Job order refers to piece work or intermittent or
emergency jobs such as clearing of debris on roads, canals,
waterways, etc. after natural or man-made disasters or
occurrences and other manual or trades and crafts services
such as carpentry, plumbing, electrical, and the like. These
jobs are of short duration and for a specific piece of work.2"
2ICSC Res. No. 93-1881, May 25, 1993; COA Circ. No. 95-001, Jan. 20, 1995, citing
( '!><'< Iffice Memorandum No. 55, series of 1993, cited in Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No». 168951 and 169000, July 17,2013
22CSC MC No. 38, series of 1993; CSC Res. No. 95-6939, Nov. 2,1995, cited in Justice
Arturo Orion's Dissenting Opinion in A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC, cited in Posadas v. Sandigan-
bnynn, G.R. Nos. 168951 and 169000, July 17,2013
MCSC Res. No. 95-6939, Nov. 2, 1995, cited in Justice Arturo Brion's Dissenting
(Iplnion in A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC, cited in Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 168951
rtltd 169000, July 17,2013
"'Sec. 7.4, Joint CSC-COA-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 2017 on Rules and Regula-
IlttnH Governing Contract of Service Workers in the Government
“Sec, 5.1, Joint CSC-COA-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 2017 on Rules and Regula­
tions Governing Contract of Service Workers in the Government
"'’See. 5.4, Joint CSC-COA-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 2017 on Rules and Regula­
tions Governing Contract of Service Workers in the Government
6 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Office and contract, distinguished.
The most important characteristic which
distinguishes office from employment or contract
is that creation and conferring of an office in­
volves delegation to the individual of some sov­
ereign functions of government, to be exercised
by him to benefit the public, that some portion
of sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being,
to be exercised for the public benefit.27
Not by contract, exception.
That public office is not created by contract does not
necessarily preclude contractual government employment.
It merely emphasizes legislative authority to create public
office.
A person may hold any public office in government by
virtue of a contract.2* Government agencies, are authorized to
enter into service contracts with other government agencies,
private firms, non-government agencies or individuals for
services related or incidental to their respective functions
and operations, whether on part-time or full-time basis.29
Contractual personnel, or those whose employment
in government is in accordance with special contract
to undertake specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
exceeds one year, and performs or accomplishes specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with minimum
direction and supervision from the hiring agency, are
considered noncareer service employees?"
2?F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, cited in Laurel
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
“Sec. 1(a), R.A. 7080
“2.0, Rules and Regulations Governing Contract of Service and Job Order Work­
ers in the Government, CSC-COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 1, series of 2017, June 15,2017
“'Sec. 9, E.O. 292
Chapter I 7
THE ESSENTIALS
Oath of office.
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office and
a prerequisite to full investiture of the office?*1 *Only
* * when the public
officer satisfies this prerequisite can his or her right to enter into the
ppNltlon be considered plenary and complete. Until then, he or she has
none nt all, and for as long as he or she has not qualified, the holdover
nlflcer is the rightful occupant.32 A public officer who fails to take oath
l<> signify his or her acceptance of the office and the undertaking to
I'M'CUle the trust confided in him or her cannot assume office?3
Payment of salary.
Compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to it34 Public officials include elective and
a ppo 1 n t i ve officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
Ihe career or noncareer service including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount?5
A student regent is still a public officer even if she receives mere
nllttwiince and even pays tuition?6 Under particular circumstances,
i nmpensation includes allowances for personal expenses, commissions,
Iri'H, honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
ii'Mfltulion, or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages?7
Even if public officer did not receive any compensation during
li'iiure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary
criterion to determine nature of position. It is not conclusive. Salary is a
mi'i'e incident and forms no part of the office.
■’’Chairman Chavez v. Ronidel, 607 Phil. 76, 83 (2009), cited in Republic v. Sereno,
I fit, No. 237428, May 11, 2018
“Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999
■’’Martin & Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and Election Law,
|>. 140 (1983); Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 253, p.
I(<2; Words and Phrases, "Failure to Qualify," citing State v. Boyd, 48 N.W. 739, 751, 31,
Nob. 682
•’’■’Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 2, 2002, dted in Serana v. Sandigan-
linynn, G.R. No. 162059, Jan. 22, 2008
■“’Sec. 3(b), R.A. 6713
“■Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, Jan. 22, 2008
1715 C.J.S. Compensation, p. 654, cited in Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April
I .’, 21X12
8 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
An office without salary or fees annexed is a naked or honorary
office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for public good, as
opposed to a lucrative office or an office for profit, one to which salary,
compensation, or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.38
Continuance of position.
The element of continuance or permanency is not indispensable.
If other elements are present, it can make no difference, whether there
be but one act or a series of acts to be done, whether the office expires
as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior.3*
That the executive order creating a national commission
characterizes it as an ad hoc body which existence terminates upon
completion of all activities related to its purpose does not make it less
of a public office.40
Scope of duties.
In order that acts may be done within scope of official authority,
it is not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or be specifically
directed or requested by a superior officer.
It is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his or her control or supervision, or that they have
more or less connection with such matters, or that they are governed
by a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the
officer acts.41
As a rule, a public officer is not personally liable to one injured
in consequence of an act performed within scope of his or her official
authority, and in line of official duty.42 A public officer is not liable for
damages that a person may suffer arising from just performance of
official duties and within scope of assigned tasks43 as it would virtually
“Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
■’’Pearson, C.J., cited in Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
40Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 21X12
4’43 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86, cited in PASI v. Lichauco, G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006
4243 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86, cited in PASI v. Lichauco, ibid.
43Orodo v. COA, G.R. No. 75959, Aug. 31, 1992, cited in Agpalo, Philippine Ad­
ministrative Law, 2004 Ed, p. 473, cited in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp., G.R-'
No. 141309, June 19,2007
Chapter I 9
THE ESSENTIALS
be n charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
lor monetary claims without its consent.44
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages
III his or her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being
Hillside scope of authority are no longer protected by the mantle of
Immunity for official actions.45
Designation of position as an office.
Where the National Internal Revenue Code does not authorize
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to designate a private individual as
custodian of distrained property, such designation does not make
him a public officer. The power to authorize a private person to act
»i« custodian does not include power to appoint as public officer.46 No
I >i't son can be validly appointed to an inexistent position, not being in
llie state college plantilia,47
Public officer
Public officer, defined.
Several laws define who a public officer is. The Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder refers to a public officer as any person
holding any public office in government by virtue of an appointment,
election or contract.48
The Revised Penal Code defines public officer as any person
who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, takes part in performance of public functions in
government, or performs in it or any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class.4’
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary as public
officers, whether in classified or unclassified or exemption service
^Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 86147, Feb. 26,1990, cited in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune
Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
’’Meneses v. CA, G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, cited in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune
htbncco Corp., G.R. No. 141309, June 19,2007
46Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747
47Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, Oct. 6, 1995
'"Sec. 1(a), R.A. 7080
4*Art. 203, Revised Penal Code
10 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Chapter I II
THE ESSENTIALS

receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.5" But this

definition of public officer is expressly limited to application of that law.
Public officers, enumerated.
It does not apply when determining jurisdiction of die Ombudsman. Public officials include elective and appointive officials and
For while salary may be a usual criterion to determine whether an employees, permanent or temporary, whether in career or non-career
individual is a public officer, it is not necessary. It is a mere incident and Mtrvlce, including military and police personnel, whether or not they
forms no part of the office.51 twelve compensation, regardless of amount.57
These varying definitions may have cast doubt on the identity of a
public officer. But the most important characteristic which distinguishes
Classification of civil service positions
office from employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of
Civil service positions are classified into either career service or
an office involves delegation to individual of some sovereign functions
noncareer service positions.58
of government, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the
time being, to be exercised to benefit the public.
Caroer service positions, characteristics.
When powers conferred are of this nature, the individual who
Career service positions are characterized by entrance based on
exercises them is a public officer52 *who
* thus refers to an individual
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
invested with some portion of sovereign functions of government, to
ex aminations,5’ or based on highly technical qualifications, opportunity
be exercised for public benefit.55
lor advancement to higher positions, and security of tenure.60
Private individual as public officer.
Career service positions, enumerated.
A private person may be held liable for graft and
(a) Open career positions for appointment to which
corruption if charged in conspiracy with a public officer51
prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
either as coprincipal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee charged with a crime.55 (b) Closed career positions that are scientific, or
highly technical in nature including faculty and academic
A private sector representative appointed to the
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and
National Book Development Board is considered a public
technical positions in scientific or research institutions that
officer as she performs sovereign function to promote
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
continuing development of the book publishing industry
through active participation of the private sector, to ensure (c) Positions in the Career Executive Service, namely.
adequate supply of affordable, quality-produced books for Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
domestic and export market.56 Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
“Sec 2(b), R.A. 3019 President;
5,Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
52F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, cited in Laurel
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
55ER. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers cited in Laurel ’’Sec. 3(b), R.A. 6713
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002 ”E.O. 292, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec. 6(2), cited in CSC v. Javier,
’’Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 21X17 ( fit. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
’’Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 5,<Sec. 2(2), Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
’"Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 147026-27, Sept. 11,2009 ""Sec. 7, Chapter 2, Title 1(A), Book V, E.O. 292, died in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22,2008
 12 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(d) Career officers, other than those in the Career
Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such
as the Foreign Service Officers Ln tire Department of Foreign
Affairs;
(e) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces that maintain a separate merit system;
(f) Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations whether performing governmental or propri­
etary functions, who do not fall under the noncareer service;
and,
(g) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi­
skilled, or unskilled.61
Career service positions, subclassified.
Career positions are subclassified according to nature
of appointment, divided into permanent and temporary
status.
A permanent appointment is issued to a person who
meets all requirements for the position to which he or
she is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with provisions of law and
promulgated rules and standards.
A temporary appointment is issued, in the absence
of appropriate eligible individuals and when it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, to a person
who meets all requirements for the position to which he
or she is being appointed except appropriate civil service
eligibility, provided that such temporary appointment
does not exceed twelve months, and appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available.62
6,Sec. 7(2), Chapter 2, Title 1(A), Book V, E.O. 292, cited in CSC v. Pililla Water Dis­
trict, G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
62Sec. 27, Chapter 5, Title 1(A), Book V, E.O. 292, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
THE ESSENTIALS
Noncareer service positions, characteristics.
Positions that do not fall under career service are considered non-
i >ueer positions characterized by entrance on bases other than those of
lilt1 usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for career service, and, ten-
1111' which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-termiiius
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his or her pleasure,
nr which is limited to duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.63
Noncareer service positions, enumerated.
(a) Elective officials and their personal or confidential
staff; (b) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who
hold their positions at pleasure of the President and their
personal and confidential staff; (c) Chair and members of
commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff; (d) Contractual personnel or
those whose employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific
period, which in no case exceeds one year, and performs
or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision
from the hiring agency; and, (e) Emergency and seasonal
personnel.64
The constitutional mandate that appointments in the civil service
lire made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, by competitive examination,65 applies only to career service
positions.
It does not apply to noncareer service positions that are policy­
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as they are
excluded from the merit system and officers and employees appointed
In it may be dismissed at pleasure. These positions involve highest
degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent
“Sec. 9, Chap 5, Title 1(A), Book V, E.O. 292, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
Mi. 22, 2008
MSec. 9, E.O. 292
“See. 2(2), Art. 1X(B), 1987 Constitution
14 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature
But appointments to these noncompetitive positions are also
made according to merit and fitness, but not determined by competitive
examinations but by other modes that may be prescribed by law such
as a certain, level of academic degree.67
The primary purpose in declaring a position as policy-determin­
ing, primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these cat­
egories from competitive examination as a means to determine merit
and fitness. But these positions are covered by security of tenure, al­
though considered noncompetitive only in the sense that appointees to
it do not have to undergo competitive examinations to determine merit
and fitness.68
Policy-determining position.
It is one charged with duty to formulate a method
of action for government or any of its subdivisions. A city
engineer does not occupy a policy-determining position as
his job is to execute policy, not make it.69
Primarily confidential position.
Primarily confidential positions fall under noncareer
service. Unlike career positions, primarily confidential and
other noncareer positions do not have security of tenure. The
tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminus with that of,
or at pleasure of appointing authority. However, confiden­
tial employee may be appointed or remain in position even
beyond compulsory retirement age of 65 years.78
Proximity rule.
Every appointment implies confidence, but
much more than ordinary confidence is reposed
“De Los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, Aug. 31, 1950
67The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by Ber-
nas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 912
“CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997
“De Los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, Aug. 31, 1950
’“Sec. 12, Rule XIII, CSC’s Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
Chapter I 15
THE ESSENTIALS
in the occupant of a position that is primarily
confidential which denotes not only confidence
in aptitude of appointee for the duties of office
but primarily close intimacy which insures free­
dom of discussion, delegation, and reporting
without embarrassment or freedom from misgiv­
ings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.71
From this ruling, the proximity rule was
derived.72 A primarily confidential position is
characterized by close proximity of positions of
appointer and appointee as well as high degree
of trust and confidence inherent in their relation­
ship73 that allows unfettered communication and
discussion on the most confidential matters.74
In classifying a position as primarily confi­
dential, its functions must not be routine, ordi­
nary and day-to-day in character.75 A position is
not necessarily confidential though the one in of­
fice may sometimes hold confidential matters or
documents.76
Indeed, physicians handle confidential mat­
ters. Judges, prosecutors and court stenographers
generally handle matters of similar nature. The
Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation
of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints
against judges of lower courts, which are confi­
dential in nature.
71 De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
17.1264,Feb. 22,2008
72CSC v. Pililla Water District, G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
71Borres v. CA, G.R. No. L-36845, Aug. 21, 1987, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
17.1264,Feb. 22, 2008
”CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008, cited in CSC v. Pililla Water District,
I ill. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
7(lTrin v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 85670, July 31, 1991; Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177
(1068), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
7*l'ria v. Sto. Tomas, 276 Phil. 923 (1991); Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968), cited
III < SC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008, cited in CSC v. Pililla Water District, G.R.
No. 1*10147, March 5, 2013
 16 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Officers of the Department of Justice like­
wise investigate charges against municipal judg­
es. Assistant Solicitors in the Office of the Solici­
tor General often investigate malpractice charges
against members of the Bar.
All of these are confidential matters, but
such fact does not warrant conclusion that office
or position of all government physicians and all
judges, as well as assistant solicitors and officers
of the Department of Justice are primarily confi­
dential in character.77
Primarily confidential position, examples.
The following positions are classified as primarily
confidential: PNB Chief Legal Counsel,78 Confidential Agent,
Office of the GSIS Auditor,79 Sangguniang Bayan Secretary,8’
Secretary to the City Mayor,81 Senior Security and Security
Guard, Office of the Vice-Mayor,82 Secretary to the Board
of a government corporation,83 City Legal Counsel, City
Legal Officer or City Attorney,84 Private Secretary,85 Board
Secretary of a state college,86 and Corporate Secretary of the
GSIS Board of Trustees.87
^Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22,2008
78Besa v. PNB, 144 Phil. 282 (1970), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22,
2008
^Salazar v. Mathay, 165 Phil. 256 (1976), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
Feb. 22, 2008
"Cortez v. Bartolome, G.R. No. L-46629, Sept. 11,1980, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R.
No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
’'Samson v. CA, 230 Phil. 59,65 (1986), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22,2008
B2Borres v. CA, G.R. No. L-36845, Aug. 21, 1987, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
“Gray v. De Vera, 138 Phil. 279 (1969), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22,2008
"Hilario v. CSC, 312 Phil. 1157 (1995), Grio v. CSC, G.R. No. 91602, Feb. 26, 1991,
cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22,2008
’’Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22, 2008
“Gloria v. De Guzman, 319 Phil. 217 (1995), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
Feb. 22,2008
87CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22,2008
Chapter 1 17
THE ESSENTIALS
Tire corporate secretary of a government-owned or
controlled corporation occupies a primarily confidential
position as it is clearly in close proximity and intimacy with
appointing power and calls for highest degree of confidence
between appointer and appointee.
The nature and duties attached to the position
points to its highly confidential character,88 *as she reports
directly to the board of directors, without an intervening
officer in between them." In such an arrangement, the
board expects from the secretary nothing less than highest
degree of honesty, integrity, and loyalty, which is crucial to
maintaining between them freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom of misgivings or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.90 *
Classifying authority.
There is no law that defines or sets definite criteria
for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil
service. Neither is there a law that enumerates positions
classified as primarily confidential. What is available is
classification by the Civil Service Commission of civil
service positions as primarily confidential,” but it, and those
made by legislative or executive branches, does not bind the
Court.92 * *
The rule stays that executive and legislative iden­
tification or classification of primarily confidential, policy­
determining or highly technical positions in government
is no more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose
judicial review, especially in the event of conflict.
Far from what is merely declared by executive or
legislative fiat, it is the nature of position that finally
""Bones v. CA, G.R. No. L-36845, Aug. 21, 1987, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
17,1264, Feb. 22,2008
"Grio v. CSC, G.R. No. 91602, Feb. 26,1991, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
I'nb, 22, 2008
"CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008, citing De los Santos v. Mal-
Inm, 87 Phil. 298 (1950)
’'CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
"CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19,1997, Grio v. CSC, G.R. No. 91602, Feb. 26,
I'M I, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22,2008
 18
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy
determining or highly technical, and no department is better
qualified to make such ultimate finding than the judicial
branch.”
The CouTt determines the nature of a particular
position, such as whether it is primarily confidential, without
being bound by prior classifications by other bodies94 that
are merely considered initial and inconclusive to the Court.”
Where findings of various government agencies like the
Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals are in
conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as
final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.96
Despite having been previously declared as primarily
confidential positions either by their respective appointing
authorities or the legislature thus, the Court on various
occasions did not consider these positions as primarily
confidential, brought upon by their remoteness to the
position of appointing authority:
City Engineer,’7 Asst. Secretary to the Mayor,’8
Customs Police Force or Port Patrol members,” Special
Asst, of the Central Bank Governor, Export Department,*101’ * * 104
Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I, Supervising Clerk I and
Stenographer in the Office of the President,’01 Management
and Audit Analyst I of the Finance Ministry Intelligence
”CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb. 22,2008
’’Piero v. Hechanova, 124 Phil. 1022, 1026 (1966), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22,2008
’’Laurel v. CSC, G.R. No. 71562, Oct. 28, 1991, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
’’’Firestone Ceramics v. CA, 372 Phil. 401, 424 (1999), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R.
No. 173264, Feb. 22, 2008
97De Los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil 298 (1950), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22,2008
’“Samson v. CA, 230 Phil. 59, 65 (1986), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22, 2008
’’Piero v. Hechanova, 124 Phil. 1029 (1966), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
Feb. 22,2008
'"Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr., 121 Phil. 568, 569 (1965), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
101Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264, Feb.
22, 2008
Chapter I 19
THE ESSENTIALS
Bureau,"12 Provincial Administrator,'” PAGCOR Internal
Security Staff,'0" Casino Operations Manager,105 and Slot
Machine Attendant.106
Classification, basis.
Notwithstanding any statutory classification to
the contrary, it is still the nature of position, as may be
ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy determining or highly technical.107 *
The nature of position still controls, despite the fact
that later enactments, like the Administrative Code of 1987™
and the 1987 Constitution,109 omitted the phrase in nature
in defining policy determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical positions.110
In nature, discussed.
It is not enough that the law calls the posi­
tion primarily confidential to make it such. It is
the nature of duties that makes a position primar­
ily confidential.111 * * *
While the law expressly provides all em­
ployees of casinos and related services are clas-
"*2Tria v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 85670, July 31,1991, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
'“Laurel v. CSC, G.R. No. 71562, Ort. 28, 1991, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22. 2008
104CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22. 21X18
105Pagcor v. Rilloraza, 412 Phil. 114 (2001), cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No. 173264,
Feb. 22,2008
'“Pagcor v. Angara, G.R. No. 142937, Nov. 15,2005, cited in CSC v. Javier, G.R. No.
173264, Feb. 22, 2008
l07Piero v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-22562, Ort. 22, 1966, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R.
No. 123708, June 19, 1997
’“Sec. 12(9) Book V, E.O. 292, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19,1997
'"’Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708,
June 19,1997
""CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997
'"Delegate Bemas, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, 571-572, cited
In CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997
 20 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
sified as confidential employees1'2 and the Civil
Service Commission resolved employees in casi­
nos and related services are confidential appoin­
tees by operation of law,"3 a member of the Inter­
nal Security Staff of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation does not hold a pri­
marily confidential position where job descrip­
tion is struck by the ordinary, routine and quo­
tidian character of his duties and functions,1,4 not
involving such close intimacy between him and
appointing authority as would ensure freedom
from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust."5
Highly technical position.
Highly technical means something beyond ordinary
requirements of the profession."6 It requires occupant
to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or
superior degree. While the position of city engineer is
technical, it is not highly so. As a matter of fact, his duties are
eminently administrative in character and could very well
be discharged by non-technical men with executive ability."7
Highly technical position, examples.
It refers to closed career positions that are scientific, or
highly technical in nature. It includes faculty and academic
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and
technical positions in scientific or research institutions that
establish and maintain their own merit systems.’”1
l,2Sec. 16, P.D. No. 1869, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19,1997
"’CSC Resolution No. 91-830, July 1. 1991, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708,
June 19,1997
"‘CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19,1997
"Torres v. CA, G.R. No. L-36845, Aug. 21,1987, cited in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No.
123708, June 19,1997
"“Delegate Bernas, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, 571-572, cited
in CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19,1997
"7De Los Santos v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881, Aug. 31,1950
"8Sec. 7(2), Chapter 2, Title 1(A), Book V, E.O. 292, cited in CSC v. Pililla Water
District, G.R. No. 190147, .March 5, 2013
Chapter I 21
THE ESSENTIALS
Kinds of public officers
One is the truth of a man,
the other is what is thought of him.™
De Jure and de facto officer, defined.
De jure means "[ejxisting by right or according to law."’2" De facto
means "in point of fact."’2' To speak of something as being defacto is thus.
Io say that it is "(ajctual [or] existing in fact."*122 Being factual though not
being founded on right or law, de facto is, therefore, "illegitimate but in
elfect."123
A de facto officer is one who possesses an office and who openly
exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even
I hough such appointment or election may be irregular.124
He possesses an office, and discharges its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere
volunteer.125
Consequently, the acts of de facto officer are as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons interested are concerned.126 As such, de facto officer cannot be
made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office.127 * * * * *
A de facto officer derives appointment from one having colorable
mithority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
"’CSC V. Joson, 473 Phil. 859 (2004), citing Ridout v. State, 30 S.W. 2d. 255 (1930),
died in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, Dec. 10, 2013
,20Black's Law Dictionary 458 (8th Ed., 2004), cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC,
I tee. 10, 2013
’’’Black's Law Dictionary 448 (8th Ed., 2004), cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC,
Dec, 10,2013
l22Black's Law Dictionary 448 (Sth Ed., 2004), cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC,
Dre. 10, 2013
’“Black's Law Dictionary 448 (8th Ed., 2004), cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC,
I Ire. 10,2013
’’‘General Manager, PPA v. Monserate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, cited in
Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015
’“Dimaandal v. COA, 353 Phil. 525, 534 (1998), citing the Philippine Law Diction­
ary, p. 162, cited in Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015
”6Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013, cited in Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015
,27Sampayan v. Daza, G.R. No. 103903, Sept. 11,1992
 22 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS 23
Chapter I
THE ESSENTIALS

appointment is valid on its face. He possesses an office and discharges As against a mere usurper, it is the color of authority,
its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto
from appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent from a usurper134 who possesses an office and undertakes to
be not a mere volunteer.128 ncl officially without any color or right or authority, either
Where representatives of ex-officio members of the National actual or apparent. A usurper is no officer at all.135
Amnesty Commission were not appointed but merely designated to act
as such, they cannot be considered de facto officers and are not entitled Da facto doctrine, discussed.
to receive honoraria their own principals are prohibited to receive.129
The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
More so when an employee is merely designated in acting lluwie of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
capacity, he is not entitled to difference in salary between his regular llili'rested are concerned136 137as they
* * * cannot
** always investigate the right
position and the higher position to which he is designated.'*1 ol one assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right
Io assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
De facto and de jure officer, distinguished. nuch.,w
An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer Public interest demands acts of persons holding, under color
de jure, and is one who has reputation or appearance of being ol title, an office created by a valid statute be likewise deemed valid
the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, Insofar as the public, as distinguished from the officer in question, is
has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold.131 concerned.13"
The difference between the basis of authority of a de jure Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto
officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, doctrine has been formulated, not to protect the de facto officer
the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference principally, but rather to protect the public and individuals who get
between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, Involved in official acts of persons discharging duties of an office
the other is what is thought of him.132 without being lawful officers.'39

De facto officer and usurper, distinguished. De facto exercise of duties, instances.

An officer defacto is distinguished from a mere usurper The de facto doctrine was established to contemplate
or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color situations where duties of the officer were exercised:
of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and
(a) Without known appointment or election, but
assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title
under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as
or color or right to such office.'33

l28Dimaandal v. COA, 291 SCRA 322, 329 (1998), cited in NAC v. COA, G.R. No.
156982, Sept. 8,2004
l29NAC v. COA. G.R. No. 156982, Sept. 8, 2004
“Dimaandal v. COA, G.R. No. 122197, June 26, 1998
'•"McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, Third Ed., pp. 376-377, cited in Co-
dilla v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, Nov. 23, I960
'■■"CSC v. Joson, 473 Phil. 859 (2004), citing Ridout v. State, 30 S.W. 2d. 255 (1930),
cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, Dec. 10, 2013
'■'’McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, Third Ed., pp. 376-377, cited in Co-
dilla v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, Nov. 23,1960
'“CSC v. Joson, 473 Phil. 859 (2004), citing Ekern v. McGovern, 142 N.W. 595 (1913),
cited in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, Dec. 10,2013
l35H.S. De Leon and H.M. De Leon, Jr., The Law on Public Officers and Election
I ,mv 112, (2008) citing 63A Am. Jur. 2d 1082, cited in A M. No. 13-04-03-SC, Dec. 10, 2013
l36Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013, cited in Laud v. People, G.R. No.
199032, Nov. 19, 2014
137A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, Dec. 10, 2013, cited in Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032,
Nov. 19,2014
'“Gonzales v. Comelec, 129 Phil. 7, 29 (1967), cited in Laud v. People, G.R. No.
199032, Nov. 19,2014
'“Monroy v. CA. 127 Phil. 1, 7 (1967), cited in Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032,
Nov. 19,2014
 24 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit
or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he
assumes to be;
(b) Under color of known or valid appointment
or election, where the officer failed to conform to some
precedent requirement or condition, for example, a failure
to take oath or give a bond, or similar defect;
(c) Under color of known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there
was [a] want of power in the electing or appointing body, or
by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the
public; and
(d) Under color of election, or appointment, by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such.1*1
De facto doctrine, elements.
In order for de facto doctrine to apply, all of these elements must
concur: (a) there must be a de jure office, (b) there must be color of right
or general acquiescence by the public, and (c) there must be actual
physical possession of office in good faith.141
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de
facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must
be in actual possession of office under color of title or authority.142
Color of right, example.
After being duly appointed as vice-executive judge, he
has colorable right to office even if subsequently divested of
'*'Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 192 citing State v. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449; Wilcox v.
Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y], 231; 21 Am. Dec. 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass., 445; 23 Am.
Rep., 323, cited in A.M. No. 13-O4-03-SC, Dec. 10,2013
141Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460, 472 (1995), cited in Laud v. People, G.R.
No. 199032, Nov. 19, 2014
,42State v. Babb, 124 W. Va. 428, 20 S.E. (2d) 683. (McQuillin, Municipal Corpora­
tions, Vol. 3, Third Ed., p. 383), cited in Codilla v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, Nov. 23,
1960
Chapter I 25
THE ESSENTIALS
I he position by virtue of a supervening legal technicality. As
Much, the search warrant he issued remains valid.143
The official acts of a third ranking municipal councilor,
who was irregularly designated as acting mayor, were cured
of any legal infirmity after they were subsequently endorsed
and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to
office.144
General acquiescence, example.
There is general public acquiescence when search
warrant application was regularly endorsed to the vice­
executive judge by the office of the clerk of court under his
apparent authority as such.145 *
Da facto officer, entitlement to salary.
A de facto officer is entitled to be paid for actual services rendered,
rxcept where there is a sitting de jure officer.1411
The general rule is where there is a de jure officer, the defacto officer
In not entitled to salaries and emoluments even if he occupied office
In good faith. Except when de jure officer occupied a lower position
under protest and subsequently appointed to disputed higher position,
llu* de jure officer is entitled to salary differential to avoid double
rompensation.147
Designation of a Supply Officer Ill as Acting Provincial Treasurer
lor Administration by the governor is defective for lack of authority to
designate. As such, he is not entitled to the salary attached to the latter
office. The right to salary is based on assumption the appointment or
designation was made in accordance with law.
The nature of designation and absence of authority for the gover­
nor to designate do not make the designee a de facto officer because he
did not derive his appointment or designation from one having color-
nble authority to appoint or designate.148
lwLaud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, Nov. 19, 2014
’“Codilla v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, Nov. 23, I960
,45Laud v. People, supra
l4'*Sampayan v. Daza, G.R. No. 103903, Sept. 11, 1992
l47General Manager of PPA v. Monserate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002
14HDimaandal v. COA, G.R. No. 122197, fune 26,1998

Chapter II
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Authority to prescribe.
It is inarguable that Congress has plenary authority to prescribe
qualifications to a public office. It may not however prescribe
qualifications such that the President is entirely stripped of discretion,
thus converting appointment to a mere ministerial act.1
Qualifications, when possessed.
Qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are
continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election, or of assumption to office, but during
officer's entire tenure.2 * 4 * *
Exception.
In one case that probably belongs to a league of its
own, it was held citizenship requirement under the Local
Government Code of 1991 need not be possessed by an
elective official at the time of election, but must be at the
time he is proclaimed or at the start of term of office to which
he has been elected, at the latest.
The law speaks about elected officials, not candidates,
and does not specify any particular date or time when
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
whi ch must consist of at least one year resi dency immedia tely
’Gonzales, Neptali A,, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election
Law, 1966 Ed., p. 173, citing Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30,1964, cited
in Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
2Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013,696 SCRA420, cited in Lico
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205505, Sept. 29,2015
26
Chapter II 27
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
preceding election day, and age, at least 23 years on election
day?
Qualifications for elective officers
Qualifications common to all elective officers: no person is elected
to public office unless he or she is a Filipino citizen, of sufficient age,
residence, registered as a voter, and able to read and write.* In case of
local elective officials, it further qualified able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect?
President and Vice President.
No person may be elected President or Vice President unless
a natural-born Filipino citizen, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty of age on the day of election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election?
Senator.
No person shall be a Senator unless a natural-bom Filipino citizen,
mid, on the day of election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
Ilian two years immediately preceding day of election.7
Member, House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives is composed of not more than 250
members from legislative districts apportioned among provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with number of their
respective inhabitants, and based on a uniform and progressive ratio,
mid those elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations as may be provided by
law."
;tSec. 39, Local Government Code of 1991, cited in Frivaldo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
120295, June 28,1996
4Art. VII, Secs. 2 and 3, Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6,1987 Constitution; Sec. 9, R.A. 7941;
Ari. VIII, Secs. 3 and 7, R.A. 6731
•''Sec. 39(a), Local Government Code of 1991; Sec. 10, R.A. 10742
‘Secs. 2 and 3, Art Vll, 1987 Constitution
7Sec. 3, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
"Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), 1987 Constitution
28 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
District Representative.
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless a natural-born Filipino citizen and,
on the day of election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read
and write, and, except party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he or she shall be elected, and
its resident for not less than one year immediately preceding
day of election?
Party-List Representative.
A person qualifies to be nominated as party-list
representative if a natural-bom Filipino citizen, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for not less than one
year immediately preceding election day, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization sought
represented for at least ninety days preceding election day,
and is at least 25 years of age on election day.10
A Filipino citizen who belongs to marginalized and
underrepresented sector which his or her sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition seeks to represent,
and able to contribute to formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.11
In case of the youth sector nominee, at least be 25
but not more than thirty years of age on election day. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains thirty during his
or her term is allowed to continue in office until expiration
of term.12
Local elective officials.
An elective local official must be Filipino citizen, registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in case of sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan member, the district where he or she
intends to be elected, a resident in it for at least one year immediately
’Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
'"Sec. 9, R.A. 7941; Sec. 1, Rule 4, Res. No. 9366, Feb. 21, 2012
"Sec. 1, Rule 4, Res No. 9366, Feb. 21,2012
12Sec. 9, R.A. 7941; Sec. 1, Rule 4, Res. No. 9366, Feb. 21,2012
Chapter 11 29
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
iiivceding election and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
dialect.1’
Candidates for governor, vice-governor or member of the
mingguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
mingguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty three-years of age on election day.14 Candidates for mayor or
vice-mayor of independent component cities, or municipalities must be
ill least twenty-one years of age on election day.15 *
Candidates for sangguniang panlungsod or bayan member must be
at least eighteen years of age on election day.11' Candidates for punong
barangay or sangguniang barangay member must be at least eighteen
years of age on election day.17 * *
Candidates for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chair and members
must be Filipino citizens, at least eighteen but not more than 24 years
i il age on election day, resident of the barangay for at least one year, a
qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan in the barangay where he or
hIu- intends to be elected.1*
Not more than 24 years old, exactitude.
It means the oldest elective SK official is exactly 24
years of age on election day. Under the old law where it
says SK candidates should not be more than 21 years old on
election day, the Chair who was 21 years, ten months and 25
days old on election day was disqualified for being overage.
The Local Government Code of 1991 speaks of years,
not months or days and a year consists of 365 days. In
computing years, first year is readied after completing the
first 365 days. So 21 is 21 cycles of 365 days. Not more than
21 years old is not the same as less than 22 years old.1’
'•'Sec. 39(a), Local Government Code of 1991
l4Sec. 39(b), Local Government Code of 1991
l!1Sec. 39(c), Local Government Code of 1991
"'Sec. 39(d), Local Government Code of 1991
"'See. 39(e), Local Government Code of 1991
'"Sec. 10, R.A. 10742
'’Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18,1997

.30 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Disqualifications for elective officers
Term limit.
Term limit is widely criticized for curtailing free choice of the
sovereign people as to negate essence of democracy. In one case, it was
argued the mode by which one assumes office does not matter, be it
election or succession, because the purpose of term limit is to prevent
monopoly of power. Correct, if prevention of political dynasty is the
only reason for term limit. But there is another constitutional policy,
which is, to enhance freedom of choice of the people.20
It is argued however that disqualifying from the race local elective
official who exceeded term limit does not enhance freedom of choice of
the people.2' Instead, it narrows down choices of the sovereign will.
But it is feared continuous service and frequent reelections lend
to develop a proprietary interest in the position and to accumulate
those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely
or to transfer these posts to members of their families in subsequent
election.22
In another case, it was held conversion of municipality into a city
does not convert office of the municipal mayor into a local government
post different from a city mayor, the territorial jurisdiction, and
constituency having remained the same.
To hold otherwise allows the mayor to hold office as such for
eighteen consecutive years over same territory and constituency.
This defeats (the] intent of the law, which is to avoid evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over same territory as a result of
prolonged stay in same office.23
President and Vice-President.
The President and Vice-President are elected by direct
vote of the people for a term of six years. The President is
not eligible for any reelection and no person who succeeded
as president and served as such for more than four years is
“Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998
21 Borja v. Comelec, ibid.
“Borja v. Comelec, ibid.
“Latasa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003
Chapter 11 31
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
qualified for election to the same office at any time. No Vice-
President serves for more than two successive terms.2*
Senator.
The term of office of Senators is six years.25 No Senator
serves for more than two consecutive terms.26 Election in a
special election counts as one term. We speak of term, and
if a person is elected Senator in a special election, he or she
serves only for the unexpired portion of that particular term
plus one more term.27
After reaching term limit, a senator either rests for three
years or six years to qualify to run again. During election
following expiration of the first twelve years, whether such
election be on third or sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years.2*
Member, House of Representatives.
No member of the House of Representatives serves
for more than three consecutive terms of three years each.2*
No party-list representative serves for more than three
consecutive terms.30 Once elected, both district and party­
list representatives are treated alike with same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in
making laws that directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors and are also subject to same term limit of three years
for a maximum of three consecutive terms.”
”Sec 4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
•“'First par.. Sec. 4, Ari. VI, 1987 Constitution
'’Second par.. Sec. 4, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
"Davide, Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. II, p. 592, cited in Socrates
v i onielec, C.R. No. 154512. Nov. 12, 2002; Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3,
pM«
“2 Record 590 (Session of Aug. 7, 1986), cited in Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495,
•« pt. 3, 1998
■'‘Sec. 7, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 14, R.A. 7941
"Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466. Feb. 11, 2010
32 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Local elective officials.
The three-term limit, service for more than three
consecutive terms disqualifies an elective local official to
run for fourth term. It is both a constitutional32 and statutory
disqualification33 for elective local officials. The Constitution
fixes term of office of elective local officials to three years,
not to exceed three consecutive terms.34 It applies to ba rangay
officials who are not allowed to serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position.35
Term limit, when it attaches.
For term limit to apply, election and full service to same position
for three consecutive terms are required.3* Any deviation from this,
be it the manner by which one assumes office or whether he or she
completes service for full term, generally interrupts term and does not
count as one.
Succession is not election. Succession by operation of law removes
the term from count. Thus, term of office of a vice-mayor who succeeded
as mayor after the latter died does not count.37
In the middle of his third term, the highest ranking municipal
councilor succeeded as vice-mayor by operation of law. Thereafter, he
ran again as municipal councilor. Succession to the position of vice­
mayor vacated the position of councilor. Thus, for a time he ceased to
be a councilor, an interruption that placed him outside three-term limit
rule. This is so even if he continued to hold public office and did not
become a private citizen during the interim because it was for another
position.3"
Voluntary renunciation.
Voluntary' renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt continuity of sendee for the full term
“Art. X, Sec. 8, 1987 Constitution
■“Sec. 43(b), Local Government Code of 1991
•“Art. X, Sec. 8, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 2, R.A. 9164, as amended by R.A. 9340
“Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184S36, Dec. 23, 2009
“Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998
“Montebon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008
Chapter II 33
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
for which he or she was elected.3’ It means abandonment.
To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign."
Voluntary' renunciation is more general and embracing than
abandonment and resignation.41 The expansive interpre­
tation of voluntary renunciation is aimed to close all gaps
that an elective official may seize to defeat three-term limit
rule, in a way that voluntary renunciation is unavailable as a
mode of defeating three-term limit rule.42
Exceptions.
But even if renunciation is not voluntary, it still does
not interrupt. The law does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption that does not
affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes of
three-term limit rule. Even if renunciation is involuntary, like
preventive suspension, extended illness and force majeure, it
does not interrupt because title to office is not lost.43
Interruption involves no less than involuntary loss of
title to office. While preventive suspension looks involuntary,
it does not result in loss of title to office as evidenced by
lack of permanent replacement. There is only temporary
cessation of exercise of authority.
It does not interrupt term continuity. Instead, it gives
rise to presumption no less than the suspended official
fabricated administrative case that spawned preventive
suspension to skirt term limit.
Preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment
or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires
an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be
dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension
"Art. X, Sec. 8, 1987 Constitution
"•Webster's Third New lnt'1. Dictionary (1993), p. 1922, cited in Aldovino v. Corne­
ll . (;.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
4I11 Record, ConCom 591 (Aug. 1, 1986), cited in Aldovino v. Comelec, C.R. No.
Dec. 23,2009
"Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
‘’Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
34 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
as an effective term interruption circumvents more potently
than voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly
disallows as an interruption.44
Even if it is suspension as a penalty, it still does not
interrupt term. A serious extended illness, inability' through
force ntajeure, or enforcement of suspension as penalty, to cite
some involuntary' examples, may prevent an office holder
from exercising functions of the office for a time being
without forfeiting title to it.4’
Suspension as a penalty does not interrupt term of
office of a punong barangay. It counts as one term. This despite
hypothetical ruling that an elected mayor who on his first
term was twice penalized with suspension for misconduct
may still run for three more successive terms, the first term
having been effectively' interrupted by suspension as a
penalty.
Such interpretation of law wounds its very spirit for, in
effect, it rewards elected official for his misconduct. When an
elected official is suspended, he shortens neither his term nor
his tenure. He is still the rightful holder of office and must
be considered as having served a full term during period of
suspension.46 The third term of office of a pimoitg barangay
who was prevented from fully serving due to penalty of
suspension, is counted as one full term, disqualifying him
from running for same position.47
Disqualification, when it interrupts term.
If disqualification became final and the official is unseated prior
to end of term, it interrupts continuity' of service of term. A few months
before final term of the mayor ended, he was disqualified with finality
and a writ of execution forced him to vacate. Such final and executory
disqualification that forced the mayor to vacate his position amounts to
“Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184S36, Dec. 23, 2009
°Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
“Bernas, S.J., cited in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberto A. Abad in
Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, cited in Opinion No. 2010—4, Aug. 17.
2010 by Blandino M. Maceda, CESO III, DILG V RD
"Opinion No. 2010-4, Aug. 17, 2010 by Blandino M. Maceda, CESO 111, DILG V
Regional Director
Chapter II 35
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Involuntary severance from office in compliance with writ of execution
Issued against him.46
Disqualification, when it does not interrupt term.
But where disqualification became final after term end, it does not
ailed continuity of service as there is no more term to interrupt, thus it
< iMints as one term, even if technically, the official was not elected.
An official who lost election protest with finality after end of term
was not entitled to the office and thus was never validly elected. In
nhort, he was not elected. It was argued that since there was no valid
vleilion, the term should not count. He is still considered to have
Imvn elected and served full term because the decision that he lost the
• lei lions became final after end of term. It has no practical use and legal
value since he assumed and continuously exercised functions of the
ollii e from start to end of term.4'1
Another official who lost election protest with finality after end
<■1 term argued he was a mere caretaker of the office or de facto officer.
I Ims, it should not count. It does not matter, he exercised powers and
i*li|oyed perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay' on indefinitely'.
Although he was not elected, hence, one of the elements is missing,
■ lill, the limitation applies.50These cases signal how zealously the court
guards three-term limit rule. It should be strictly interpreted in favor of
limitation rather than its exception.51
Disqualification due to term limit, requisites.
In order to constitute disqualification for purposes of three-term
limit rule, two requisites concur: election for three consecutive terms
Im same position, and, full service for three consecutive terms for same
position. In the first requisite of election, the mayor is disqualified
because indeed he was elected, though not proclaimed and thus did not
immediately serve as such. But in the second requisite of full service, he
is not disqualified because the opponent who was proclaimed winner
sei veil as such for two years.
”l.onzanida v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999
•'Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, Jan. 23, 2006
“’Rivera v. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007
""Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
36 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Pending resolution of election protest during such period, he
was relegated as an ordinary citizen since the opponent, being the
presumptive winner, acted as mayor. Finality of resolution at a later
date does not erase the fact that prior to it, he did not serve as mayor and
had no legal right to it. It is erroneous to say he was merely temporarily
unable or disqualified to perform functions of elective post because he
was not proclaimed winner, but someone else.52 * *
Recall election, effects.
Any gap between date term ends and date of election
interrupts, no matter how short the period is. Immediate
re-election after term end counts, subsequent election like
recall does not.
On his supposed third term, the mayor lost the election
but won recall election covering same term. The mayor was
not elected for three consecutive terms. After he lost election
for third term and prior to his election in recall, he was a
private citizen for nearly two years. Defeat in election for
third term disrupted continuity of his term as mayor.55
Once three-term attaches, immediate reelection to
fourth term is proscribed. Any gap between date third term
ends and date of election for fourth term interrupts, no
matter how short the period is.
A mayor was elected and fully served three consecutive
terms. So, he did not run the fourth time in the regular
election. But during recall election, he ran and won again
as mayor. What is prohibited is immediate reelection for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for same office following end of third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election is no
longer covered because it is not an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms and the intervening period
interrupts continuity of service.”
52Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013
’’Adormeo v. Comelec, 426 Phil. 472 (2002)
“Socrates v. Comelec, 440 Phil. 106 (2002)
Chapter II 37
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Conversion of municipality into city, effects.
Conversion of a municipality into a city' does not
interrupt term of office, as both involve same territory and
constituency. A municipal mayor was elected and served
as such for three consecutive terms. During third term
however, the municipality was converted into a city. The
cityhood charter provided all elective municipal officials
continue to perform their functions in a holdover capacity'
until elections were held for city officials.
But conversion of municipality into a city did
not convert office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from a city' mayor, the territorial
jurisdiction and constituency having remained the same.
To hold otherwise allows the mayor to hold office as such
for eighteen consecutive years over same territory and
constituency. This defeats intent of law, which is to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over same territory as a result of prolonged stay in the same
office.55
Involuntary loss of title.
While Latasii instructively highlights three-term limit is not
violated if a rest period or break in service intervenes between terms or
tenure, Lonzanida, Adormeo, and Socrates establish the law contemplates
complete break from office during which the official steps down and
ceases to exercise power.5*
Term interruption exempting a local elective official from three-
term limit rule involves no less than involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left office for a length of time,
however short. Loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary’,
interrupts term. But temporary inability or disqualification to exercise
functions, like suspension, does not interrupt because title to office
is not lost. The suspended official is simply barred from exercising
functions, but retains title to office.
Voluntary’ renunciation refers to voluntary relinquishment of and
loss of title to office. It does not include temporary cessation of exercise
“Latasa v. Comelec. G.R. No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003
“Aldovino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
38
of power or authority that may occur for various reasons, like preventive
suspension, serious extended illness and force majeure. Preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation. It does
not require relinquishment of office or loss of title. It merely requires
an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed after a
preventive suspension is imposed.57
Disqualifications under the Omnibus Election Code.
Any person declared by competent authority as insane or incom­
petent, or sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, re­
bellion or for any offense for which he or she was sentenced to a penalty
of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude
is disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.58
Disqualification, when removed.
Those sentenced by final judgment may still
qualify if given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The
disqualifications to be a candidate are deemed removed
upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity
or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration
of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified.59
Also disqualified are those whose certificate of candidacy is
denied or cancelled due to false material representation in its contents
as required.60 A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be prevented
from running, or if elected, from serving, or prosecuted for violation of
election laws.61 *
False material representation.
It refers to qualifications or eligibility.63 *Eligible means
having the right to run for elective public office, that is,
57Aldovino v. Comelec, C.R. No. 184836. Dec. 23, 2009
5SSec. 12, Omnibus Election Code
■’’Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code
“Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code
61Salcedo v. Comelec, 371 Phil. 377 (1999), cited in Bautista v. Comelec, C.R. Nos.
154796-97, Oct. 23, 2003
“Fermin v. Comelec, C.R. No. 179695, Dec. 18, 2008, cited in Aratea v. Comelec,
C.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9, 2012
Chapter II 39
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
having all qualifications and none of ineligibilities to run for
public office.65
Material misrepresentation involves qualifications to
hold public office like citizenship, age, residence, voter's
registration, and literacy. It does not include innocuous
mistakes like use by a woman of surname of her husband
who is previously married to another, making their marriage
bigamous and void. It does not deceive voters about her
qualifications.6*
Any misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy
must not only be material, it must also be deliberate and
willful.65 While totality of evidence may not be conclusive,
still, it is enough to preponderate in favor of the candidate
he did not make material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy.66
But even if candidate did not deliberately and willfully
misrepresent, he or she is still disqualified if the certificate
of candidacy is void from the beginning. The candidate
may still not be considered a candidate to begin with, not
because of false material representation but because of
disqualification.
Where candidate was elected and served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor and filed certificate
of candidacy for city mayor after the municipality was
converted into a city on his third term, and inserted a
footnote after the phrase / am eligible and indicated Having
Served three consecutive terms as municipal mayor and now
running for the first time as city mayor, certificate of candidacy
was cancelled for violation of three-term limit rule but not
for false material misrepresentation.67
6,O.xford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010), cited in Aratea v.
< oinrlec, G.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9, 2012
“Salcedo v. Comelec, 312 SCRA 447
'■’Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, C.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995, cited in Fomier
v < ’omelec, G.R. No. 161824, March 3, 2004
“Fomier v. Comelec, C.R. No. 161824, March 3, 2004
“Latasa v. Comelec, 463 Phil. 296 (2003), cited in Aratea v. Comelec, C.R. No.
I'l!»29, Oct. 9, 2012
40 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
It does not refer only to details of age, citizenship, or
residency, among others, which the law requires candidate
to state under oath to possess in the certificate of candidacy.
It also asks candidate to certify under oath his eligibility,
and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even
though it does not specifically ask number of terms elected
and served in an elective position, such fact is material in
determining a candidate's eligibility, and his qualification
for the office.
When a candidate knows fully well he had been
elected, and had served, as mayor for more than three
consecutive terms yet he still certified he was eligible to
run for mayor the next succeeding term, it constitutes false
material representation as to his qualification or eligibility
for the office.
Likewise, a certificate of candidacy does not ask
whether a candidate has been convicted by final judgment
of any criminal offense. A person convicted with finality for
falsification penalized by prision mayor accessorized with
perpetual special disqualification is deprived of suffrage or
to be elected to or hold public office perpetually. As such,
he is ineligible to run for public office. If he states in his
certificate of candidacy he is eligible to run, he commits false
material representation.6"
While there is no explicit ruling that violation of three-
term limit rule constitutes false material representation, cer­
tificate of candidacy may still be cancelled under Sec. 78w if
predicated on violation of three-term limit rule.70
Disqualifying acts, enumerated.
Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is
a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission on Elections of having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce, or corrupt voters or public officials performing
“Aratea v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229, Oct 9, 2012
"’Rivera III v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 167591 and 170577, May 9,2007
’’’Ong v. Alegre, 515 Phil. 442 (2006), cited in Aratea v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229,
Oct. 9,2012
Chapter II 41
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
electoral functions,7’ as when candidate was disqualified by the
Commission on Elections after voters admitted to have received
money to vote for him and discovery of unexplained money in
pay envelopes with inscription to vote for him, destined for the
teachers a day before elections;72
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his or her
candidacy,” like forcing and intimidating watchers of other
candidates to leave ballot box and election paraphernalia for a
precinct, giving her followers free hand to fill up official ballots
in her favor, and assaulting a baraugay, creating tumultuous
commotion or disturbances, scaring away and preventing voters
from casting votes, snatching ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia including official ballots, stuffing them with
spurious ballots enhancing her candidacy, directly or indirectly,
through her husband;74
(c) spent in election campaign in excess of allowable
amount,75 as when a proclaimed governor was disqualified after
spending P23,730,784 on television campaign commercials alone,
way above maximum allowable election expense of P4,576,566 at
1*3 each for 1,525,522 registered voters in the province where he
presented himself as candidate;76
(d) made any prohibited contribution like when a candi­
date gives, free of charge, directly or indirectly, transportation,
food and drinks or things of value five hours before and after a
public meeting, on the day preceding and on the day of election,
or to give or contribute, directly or indirectly, money or things of
value for such purpose;77
Or when a candidate, his or her spouse or any relative
within second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, or his or
her campaign manager, agent or representative, during campaign
period, on the day before and on the day of election, directly
or indirectly, donate, give or contribute in cash or in kind, or
undertake or contribute to construction or repair of roads, bridges.
’’See. 68(a), OEC
’’Nolasco v. Comelec, C.R. Nos. 122250 and 122258. July 21, 1997
”Sec. 68(b), OEC
’‘Diangka v. Comelec, G.R. No. 139545, Jan. 28, 2000
’Sec. 68(c), OEC
’"Ejerdto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 212398, Nov. 25, 2014
”Sec. 68(d), OEC
42 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
schoolhouses, pucriculture centers, medical clinics and hospitals,
churches or chapels, cement pavements, or any structure for
public use or for use of any religious or civic organization.
Excluded from prohibition are normal and customary
religious dues or contributions, such as religious stipends, tithes
or collections on Sundays or other designated collection days, as
periodic payments for legitimate scholarships established and
school contributions habitually made before prohibited period.7"
(e) made any prohibited solicitation and receipt of
contribution from public or private financial institutions except
when it is a loan to a candidate made in accordance with laws
and regulations and in the ordinary course of business, natural,
and juridical persons operating public utility or in possession of
or exploiting any natural resources, natural and juridical persons
who hold contracts or subcontracts to supply government or any
of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or
services or to perform construction or other works.
Natural and juridical persons who were granted franchises,
incentives, exemptions, allocations, or similar privileges or con­
cessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions
or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs), natural and juridical persons who, within
one year prior to election day, were granted loans or other accom­
modations in excess of Pl00,000 by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including GOCCs,
educational institutions which received grants of public funds
amounting to no less than Pl00,000, Civil Service officials or
employees, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), or foreigners and foreign corporations.”
Or when a candidate solicits or receives, directly or indirectly,
any aid or contribution of whatever form or nature from any
foreign national, government, or entity to influence election
results.™ Or when a candidate holds dances, lotteries, cockfights,
games, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, entertainments, or
cinematographic, theatrical, or other performances to raise funds
’’Sec. 104, OEC
”Sec. 95, OEC
""Sec. 96. OEC
Chapter It 43
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
for his or her election campaign from start of election period up to
and including election day.81
(f) violated other provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code such as election campaign or partisan political activity
outside campaign period® during manual elections, removal,
destruction, obliteration, or in any manner defacement or
tampering with, or prevention of distribution of lawful election
propaganda,85 excessive election propaganda expenses through
mass media,84 threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent
device, or other forms of coercion,85 unlawful electioneering,"*
release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds,87 solicitation
of votes or undertaking any propaganda, on election day, for or
against any candidate or any political party within polling place
or within its thirty-meter radius;8"
(g) a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country unless said person waived his or her status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
residence requirement provided for in election laws;” (h) nuisance
candidates;*’ and (i) commission of false material representation
in the certificate of candidacy.”
Disqualifications under the Local Government Code of 1991.
These persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position, those:
(a) Sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more
of imprisonment, within two years after serving of sentence.”
"’Sec. 97, OEC
“Sec. 80, OEC
“Sec. 83. OEC
“Sec. 86. OEC
“Sec. 261(e), OEC
“Sec. 261(k), OEC
“Sec. 261 (v), OEC
""Sec. 261(cc)(6), OEC
“Sec. 68, OEC
‘"’Sec. 69, OEC
”Sec. 78, OEC
“Sec. 40(a), Local Government Code of 1991

44 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Exception.
While Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after
lapse of two years from time he serves sentence, it does
not cover cases where the Revised Penal Code or a special
penal law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,
which disqualifies the convict to run for public office.
Final conviction for two counts of statutory rape and six
counts of acts of lasciviousness that carry principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal pursuant to Art. 41
of the Revised Penal Code, which carries accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Art. 30
disqualified him to run for public office, despite lapse of two
years from service of commuted prison term.
The word perpetual in the accessory penalty connotes
lifetime restriction and does not depend on the length of
the prison term imposed as its principal penalty.” Thus,
a candidate convicted with finality for ten counts of
falsification and penalized with prision mayor is perpetually
disqualified from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. Such perpetual disqualification
took effect upon finality of judgment of conviction, which
was before filing of certificate of candidacy.”
While Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 disqualifies from running for any elective position
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or punishable by one year or more of
imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence, thus
allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after
lapse of two years from the time he serves his sentence, it
does not cover cases where the law, either the Revised Penal
Code or a special penal law, imposes a penalty, either as
principal or accessory, which disqualifies convict to run for
elective office.
An example would be Art. 41 of the Revised Penal Code
which imposes penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
as an accessory to penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
’’Jalosjos V. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013
”Aratea v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9, 2012
Chapter 11 45
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
temporal while Art. 30 provides penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification that deprives convicted felon of privilege to
run for elective office.
The import of Art. 41 in relation to Art. 30 is more
direct and specific in nature, insofar as it deprives candidate
to run for elective office due to his conviction, as compared
to Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
broadly speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude and
those punishable by one year or more of imprisonment
without any consideration of certain disqualifying effects to
one's suffrage.”
(b) Removed from office as a result of an administrative
case; (c) convicted by final judgment for violating oath of
allegiance to the Republic; (d) with dual citizenship**
A candidate who is a dual citizen disqualified to run for
public office is barred from even becoming a candidate and his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from beginning.
It could not have produced any other legal effect. As such, the
second placer is proclaimed winner and the rule of succession
does not apply.”
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases
here or abroad; (f) permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who acquired right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
same right after the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect;
and (g) the insane or feeble-minded.”
Disqualification under the Lone Candidate Law.
In addition to disqualifications under the Omnibus Election Code
and the Local Government Code of 1991, whenever evidence of guilt is
strong, these persons are disqualified to run in a special election called
to fill vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
Any elective official resigned from his or her office by accepting
an appointive office or for whatever reason which he or she previously
occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his or her resignation,
,5Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013
*Sec. 40(b), (c) and (d). Local Government Code of 1991
”Maquiling v. Comelec, C.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
"Sec. 40(e), (f) and (g). Local Government Code of 1991
46 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
and, any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens,
harasses, intimidates, or actually causes, inflicts, or produces any
violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss, or disadvantage
to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of
the immediate member of his or her family, honor, or property that is
meant to eliminate all other potential candidate.**
Disqualifications under the Revised Penal Code.
A person convicted by final judgment for an offense punished with
accessory penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
for public office which deprives right to vote in any election for any
popular elective office or to be elected to such office.1"1
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, effects on
suffrage.
The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
exercise of suffrage deprives offender perpetually or during
term of sentence, according to the nature of said penalty,
of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, offender is
not permitted to hold any public office during period of
disqualification."”
A person convicted by final judgment for an offense
punished with accessory penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification for public office, profession or calling
which deprives office, employment, profession, or calling
affected and disqualifies from holding similar offices or
employments either perpetually or during term of sentence,
according to extent of such disqualification.'”
Perpetual special disqualification, when it attaches.
It takes effect immediately once judgment of conviction
becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does
not depend on duration of principal penalty, or on whether
convict serves jail sentence. Once judgment of conviction
**Sec. 4, R.A. 8295
’"’Art. 30(2), Revised Penal Code
"”Art. 32, Revised Penal Code
'“Art. 31, Revised Penal Code
Chapter 11 47
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office
the convict may hold at the time of his conviction becomes
vacant upon finality of judgment and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.
When judgment of conviction finalized on October 23,
2009 thus, the convict became ineligible perpetually to hold,
or to run for, any elective office before he filed his certificate
of candidacy on December 1, 2009."”
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in
his certificate of candidacy he is eligible to so run.
Temporary absolute and perpetual special disqualification,
distinguished.
Accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualifica­
tion disqualifies convict for public office and for the right to
vote, such disqualification to last only during term of sen­
tence."" Accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualifica­
tion deprives convict of the right to vote or to be elected or
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from tem­
porary special disqualification, which lasts during term of
sentence.105
A proclaimed mayor was thus disqualified for having been
convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, and sentenced for each count to imprisonment of
four years and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor as maximum."*'
'“Aratea v. Comelec. C.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9. 2012
""Arts. 30 and 27, par. 3, Revised Penal Code, cited in Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil.
770(1968)
'“Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770 (1968), cited in Aratea v. Comelec, C.R. No. 195229,
Oct. 9,2012
'""Aratea v. Comelec. C.R. No. 195229, Oct. 9, 2012
 48 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Disqualification under the Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act.
One who is related within second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity to any incumbent elected national official or to any incumbent
elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official,
in the locality where he or she seeks |to be) elected, and one who is
convicted by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude, is
disqualified to run for SK elections.107
Qualifications for appointive officers.
Appointments in the civil service is made only in accordance to
merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except
as to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical, by competitive examination.108
Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic
units in a certain course, seminars attended, and others may be valuable
but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests
of the service.ICH
Qualification standards, defined.
These are minimum and basic requirements for government
positions in terms of education, training, experience. Civil Service
eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for successful
performance of duties of the position."0
Purpose.
They serve as basic guide in selection of employees and
in evaluation of appointments to all government positions.1"
"’’Sec. 10, R.A. 10742
"“Sec. 2(2), Art. 1X-B, 1987 Constitution
""Gaspar v. CA, G.R. No. 90799, Oct. 18, 1990, cited in Lapinid v. CSC, G.R. No.
96298, May 14, 1991
""First sentence, first par.. Sec. 31, Part I, Rule VIII. CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
'"Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 31, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14. s.
2018
Chapter II 49
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Qualification standards, establishing authority.
The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualifica­
tion standards are responsibility of the department or agency, with as­
sistance and approval of the Civil Service Commission."2
Agencies are encouraged to set specific or higher standards for
their positions, including required competencies. These standards are
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for approval, and once
approved, the agency uniformly and consistently adopts them in
selection and appointment of employees. The approved qualification
standards are adopted by the Civil Service Commission in attestation
of appointments of the agency concerned."1
Agencies that are authorized by their charters to establish their
own qualification standards do so in accordance with the Civil Service
Commission's guidelines. Their qualification standards are submitted
for its confirmation or notation."4 An appointment to a position without
an approved or confirmed qualification standards by the Civil Service
Commission, as the case may be, shall be disapproved or invalidated."5
Supplementary effect.
Qualification standards for certain positions prescribed
by a special law, such as Foreign Service Act,"6 PNP Act,"7
BFP/BJMP Act,"" Local Government Code of 1991,"’ prevail.
However, in instances when any of the education, training,
experience or Civil Service eligibility is not provided under
the law, lacking requirements are proposed and submitted
by the agency concerned to the Civil Service Commission
for approval.120
,l2Second par.. Sec. 31, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"’Third par.. Sec. 31, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Cite. No. 14, s. 2018
""Fourth par.. Sec. 31, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""Second par., Sec. 33, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"‘R.A. 7157, cited in first par., Sec. 34, Part I, Rule VW, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14,
s. 2018
"’R.A. 8551, cited in first par.. Sec. 34, Part I, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14,
s. 2018
""R.A. 9263, as amended by R.A. 9592, cited in first par.. Sec. 34, Part I, Rule Vlll,
CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"’R.A. 7160, cited in first par.. Sec. 34, Part 1, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14,
s.2018
‘“First par.. Sec. 34, Part I, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018

50 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Career service positions, qualifications.
Appointees to career service positions must meet education, train­
ing, experience, eligibility', and competency requirements prescribed in
the Qualification Standards manual or CSC-approved agency qualifi­
cation standards for their positions at the time of issuance of appoint­
ment.121
Noncareer service positions, qualifications.
Appointees to casual, contractual, and coterminous positions that
are not primarily confidential in nature must meet education, training
and experience requirements of positions as proposed by the respective
Agency heads and approved by the Civil Sendee Commission. Pending
submission and approval of the agency qualification standards,
qualification requirements provided under the CSC Qualification
Standards Manual shall be used as bases in attestation of these non­
career appointments.122
Exceptions.
Eligibility is not required for appointments to casual,
contractual, and coterminous positions but preference
should be given to civil service eligibles. However, if duties
of position involve practice of a profession regulated by
the Philippine Bar/Board or special laws, and/or require
licenses such as those required for positions under Category
IV of CSC MC No. 11, s. 1996, as amended, corresponding
professional license and /or certificate of registration shall be
required.123 Appointees to primarily confidential/personal
staff positions are exempt from qualification requirements.124
Exception to exception.
Except those whose duties involve practice
of profession regulated by the Philippine Bar/
Board laws and/or require licenses such as those
required for positions listed under Category’ IV of
CSC MC No. 11, s, 1996, as amended, and those
121Sec. 35, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
122First par.. Sec. 37, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
'^’Second par.. Sec. 37, Part I, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
,24Sec. 38, Part I, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter II 51
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
specifically required by a special law, such as the
positions of Provincial, City, Municipal Admin­
istrator, Information Officer and Legal Officer
required under specific provisions of the 1991
Local Government Code to have first grade civil
service eligibility or its equivalent and R.A. No.
1080 (Bar) eligibility, respectively.125
Education, defined.
It refers to forma) or nonformal academic, technical, or vocational
studies that enable candidate to successfully perform duties and
responsibilities indicated in the126 127 * * * Description Form122 of the
Position
position to be filled.12’
Bachelor's degree requirement.
To meet relevant bachelor's degree requirement in the
Qualification Standards Manual, the appointee must have
completed from a CHED-recognized college or university
a bachelor's degree whose curriculum either includes, or is
supplemented by, twelve academic units of the subject or
course, which enables the candidate to successfully perform
duties and responsibilities of position to be filled in the
Position Description Form.1”
Master's degree requirement.
A graduate of the Master's degree or Certificate in
Leadership and Management (C-Pro) from the Civil Service
Commission is considered to have met master's degree
requirement to comply with education requirement for
division chief and executive or managerial positions.1®
Completion of the degrees of Bachelor of Laws and
Doctor of Medicine from a CHED-recognized institution
125Sec. 38, Part I, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’“Sec. 42, Part II. Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
127DBM-CSC Form No. 1, Revised 2017, cited in Sec. 42. Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC
Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
l2Sec. 42, Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
12Sec. 49, Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
‘®Sec. 50, Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
52 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
is considered appropriate education for appointment to
division chief and executive or managerial positions or other
positions requiring master's degree, the duties of which do
not involve practice of profession covered by Bar or Board
laws.131
Exception.
R.A. No. 1080 eligibles are exempt from master's degree
requirement for division chief and executive or managerial
positions, which duties and responsibilities involve practice
of profession or belong to the same occupational group
or functionally related positions as that of the professions
regulated by Bar or Board laws.132 * *
Exception to exception.
However, a master's degree shall be re­
quired if the executive or managerial or division
chief position does not involve practice of profes­
sion or does not belong to the same occupational
group or functionally related positions as that of
the professions regulated by Bar or Board laws,
provided that this does not apply to lawyers and
doctors.135
Career Executive Sendee (CES) or Career Service
Executive (CSE) eligibles are likewise considered to have
met master's degree requirement for purposes of meeting
education requirement for division chief and executive or
managerial positions.13*
Foreign education, when allowed.
Certification issued by the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) that a one-year diploma postgraduate
course acquired from foreign or local institutions is
equivalent to a master's degree is considered appropriate
131Sec. 51, Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
132First par., Sec. 51, Part U, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’■“Second par.. Sec. 51, Part IL Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
,3*Sec. 53, Part II, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter II 53
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
to meet education requirement for appointment to division
chief and executive or managerial position.135
Certification issued by CHED that a degree obtained
from foreign schools is equivalent to a bachelor's or
master's degree is considered valid document to meet
education requirement for positions requiring completion
of a bachelor's or master's degree.136
Experience, defined.
It refers to previous jobs in either the government or private
sector, whether full-time or part-time, which, as certified by the
Human Resource Management Officer or authorized officials of the
previous employer, are functionally related to the duties in the Position
Description Form of the position to be filled.137
Relevant experience, acquisition of.
Relevant experience acquired through a Job Order or
Contract of Service covered by contract or Memorandum of
Agreement13" or through volunteer work, on full-time basis,
as certified by the Human Resource Management Officer or
authorized officials,1” or through designation covered by
an Office or Memorandum Order,1*1 may be considered for
meeting experience requirement.1*1
Experience in first level positions may be considered
for meeting experience requirement of second level
positions when acquired in the same occupational group or
functionally related positions.1*2
Training, defined.
It refers to formal or nonformal training courses and HRD
interventions such as coaching, mentoring, job rotation, seminars,
,35Sec. 47, Part II, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14. s. 2018
,3*Sec. 48, Part II, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
,37Sec. 56, Part III, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
lwSec. 57, Part III, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’■"Sec. 58, Part HI, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’“Sec. 60, Part III, Rule Vlll, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"'Secs. 57, 58 and 60. Part III, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’■“Sec. 59, Part III, Rule VIII, CSC Memo. Orc. No. 14, s. 2018
 56 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
in the corresponding Master List issued by concerned DILG
office for first level positions.150
Barangay Nutrition Scholar (BNS) Eligibility.
It is granted to a barangay-based volunteer worker
responsible for delivering nutrition services and other
related activities such as community health, backyard
food production, environmental sanitation, culture, mental
feeding, and family planning to the barangay,'5' equivalent
to second grade after completion of at least two years of
continuous and satisfactory service in the barangay.'52
Qualifications.
A barangay-based volunteer worker must have rendered
at least two years of continuous and satisfactory nutrition
services and other related activities such as community
health, backyard food production, environmental
sanitation, culture, mental feeding, and family planning to
the barangay as certified by the nutrition action officer and
attested by the district city* nutrition program coordinator,
resident in the barangay for at least six years, and can speak
the dialect, completed at least high school education,
completed prescribed ten-day training course and twenty-
day practicum in the barangay, obtained a passing mark in
the accomplishment of targets set in the action plan, listed
as BNS issued by the National Nutrition Council, and was
not employed in, and did not receive any form of salary
or compensation from, the government during the service
requirement.153
Bar and Board Examinations Passers Eligibility.
The bar examinations and examinations given by
various boards of examiners of the government are declared
civil service examinations, and shall, for purposes of
lwGranl of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3, 2019
,s,Sec. 2. P.D No. 1569
'“Sec. 6, P.D No. 1569
'“Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3, 2019
Chapter II 57
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
appointment to positions in classified service which duties
involve knowledge of the respective professions, except
positions requiring specialized knowledge not covered by
ordinary board examinations, be considered equivalent to
first grade regular examination given by the Civil Service
Commission if the profession requires at least four years of
study in college and the person has practiced his profession
for at least two years, and equivalent to second grade regular
examination if the profession requires less than four years of
college study.154
Honor Graduate Eligibility (HGE).
Students who finish their four-year or longer courses
from schools, colleges and universities of good standing
as determined by the Secretary' of Education'55 with at
least cum laude honors'56 are conferred second grade civil
service eligibility' for those who occupy positions requiring
application of knowledge and skill outside their field of
study or, first grade civil service eligibility for those who
occupy positions within their respective fields of study.157
Civil service eligibility' to college honor graduates is
granted in the hope their immediate absorption in public
service assures their participation in public affairs and buoys
up quality of civil service.15"
Qualifications.
The grantee must have graduated summa cum laude,
magna cum laude, or cum laude, in their Baccalaureate
or Bachelor's degree, regardless of number of years of
completion, graduated from school year 1972-1973 and
thereafter, and, with baccalaureate or bachelor's degree
recognized by the Commission on Higher Education (for
those who graduated from private Higher Education
Institutions), or with baccalaureate or bachelor's degree
l54Sec. 1, RA. 1080
l55Sec. 1. PD No. 907
1%Sec. 2, PD No. 907
,57Sec. I, PD No. 907
,58PD No. 907

58 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
included in the charter duly approved by the Board of
Trustees or Regents (for those who graduated from state or
local universities or colleges).15’
Foreign School Honor Graduate Eligibility (FSHGE).
It is considered appropriate for first and second level
positions in the government that do not involve practice of
profession and are not covered by bar, board, or other laws.'60
Qualifications.
Upon submission of required documents, thiseligibility
is granted individuals who must be Filipino citizens who
graduated surnrna cum laude, magua cum laude, cum laude, or
its equivalent in their baccalaureate degree beginning school
year 1972-1973. In case of citizenship issues or concerns,
applicable Philippine laws and regulations are observed.
Also, the grantee must have graduated from a
reputable foreign school as verified by the Department of
Foreign Affairs through the Philippine Foreign Service
Posts, have not been found guilty of any crime involving
moral turpitude or of infamous, disgraceful or immoral
conduct, dishonesty', drunkenness, or addiction to drugs,
have not been previously found guilty of offenses relative
to, or in connection with, the conduct of a civil service
examination and have not been dismissed from government
service for cause.*161 *
Veteran Preference Rating (VFR) Eligibility.
It is granted to Philippine Veterans Affairs Office-
certified World War II veteran, or his or her spouse or any
one of his or her children who failed and lacks no more than
ten points in either the Career Service Professional, Career
1Mwww.csc.gov.ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3,
2019Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances
'“CSC Res. No. 1302714, Dec. 17, 2013, cited in Grant of Eligibility Under Special
Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.ph/20l4-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html ,
visited July 3, 2019
l61CSC Res. No. 1302714, Dec. 17, 2013, cited in Grant of Eligibility Under Special
Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html,
visited July 3, 2019
Chapter 11 59
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE
Service Sub-Professional, Fire Officer, or Penology Officer
Examinations.'63
Veteran preference rating in civil service examinations
is granted to veterans to recognize their invaluable service
to the country.163 But on account of their age and/or lack of
necessary qualifications however, many veterans, including
their widow or wife, cannot avail of preference rating.
In cases where veteran or his wife failed to avail of such
preference thus, it is extended to any one child of a veteran
in civil service examinations.'64
Skill Eligibility.
Passing the civil service examination is not required for
appointment to positions that require skills not measurable
by paper and pencil examination. Depending on position
category, required eligibility may either be dispensed with or
obtained by passing a skills test administered by the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority or completion
of one-year satisfactory actual work performance.'65
Qualifications.
Granted to incumbents of positions under Category
II'66 who meet these qualifications: temporary status of
appointment, rendered service under temporary status for
one year or at least ten months, rendered very satisfactory
actual work performance for two rating periods during the
one-year temporary appointment.
Category II refers to positions the required eligibility
for which can be obtained by completing one year of very
satisfactory actual work performance under temporary
status.'67
,63Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3, 2019
,63E.O. 132, s. of 1948, cited in E.O. 790, s. of 1982
,6*E.O. 790, s. of 1982
,65CSC Memo Cite. No. Il, s. of 1996, as amended
"*CSC Memo Circ. No. 11, s. of 1996, as amended
l67Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.l4.html, visited July 3, 2019
 60 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Chapter II 61
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICE

Scientific and Technological Specialist (STS) Eligibility.

It is granted to a person who has bachelor's degree
with major or specialization in any field of applied science,
biological, biophysical, physical and engineering sciences
and pure and applied mathematics including statistics.166
A person whose field of specialization is appropriately
covered by a board examination may utilize civil service
eligibility arising from it.lw Otherwise, the scientific and
technological specialist concerned is conferred a civil
service eligibility if he or she is determined to be qualified
by a committee composed of the Chair, National Science
Development Board, the Commissioner, National Institute
of Science and Technology, and the Chair, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission. The Chair or representative of the
Civil Service Commission may sit in the deliberations of the
Committee, as may be necessary.”0
Qualifications.
A scientific and technological specialist may qualify for
conferment of eligibility if, as determined by the Committee,
he fully meets requirements of three years research and/or
teaching experience in pertinent field, or an earned graduate
degree”1 or completion of a patented invention or has earned
a master's degree or doctorate degree in any enumerated
field of study172 73 * school recognized by the Commission
from
* * * 171
on Higher Education at the time of filing of application.
sangguniang barangay members, and Sangguniang Kabataan
Chairs who were elected in the 1982 Elections or thereafter,
and to appointive barangay officials: barangay treasurer and
barangay secretary who were appointed by the duly elected
punong barangay'75 based on number of years of service to the
barangay, pursuant to the rules and regulations issued by the
Civil Service Commission.'76
Qualifications.
The grantee must have completed the term of office
specified by prevailing law for elective barangay officials or
the term of office corresponding to the appointing punong
barangay for appointive barangay officials, name is included
in the corresponding Master List issued by the Department
of Interior and Local Government Office concerned, and,
was not employed in, and did not receive any form of salary
or compensation from, the government during the service
requirement.177
Electronic Data Processing Specialist (EDPS) Eligibility.
It is conferred on passers of proficiency test or training
course conducted by the Department of Information and
Communications Technology on the following computer
courses: Systems Analysis and Design or Computer
Programming on Java, MS Access, and Visual Basic.17*

Barangay Official Eligibility (BOE).

Appropriate civil service eligibility is granted to”4
elective barangay officials: the punong barangay, regular

'“Sec. 2, PD No. 997

'“First par.. Sec. 3, PD No. 997
”°Second par.. Sec. 3, PD No. 997
'^Third par., Sec. 3, PD No. 997
l72Sec. 1, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Provisions of PD No. 997 (Re­
'75Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
vised 2009), cited in Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.htm), visited July 3, 2019
csc.gov.ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3, 2019
,76Sec. 393(b), Chapter 4, Title I, Book III, Local Government Code of 1991
l73Grant of Eligibility Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
l77Grant of Eligibility* Under Special Laws and CSC Issuances, www.csc.gov.
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.html, visited July 3, 2019
ph/2014-02-27-38-08/2014-02-27-07-40.14.hlml, visited July 3. 2019
,74Sec. 393(b), Chapter 4, Title I, Book III, Local Government Code of 1991
”"CSC Res. No. 90-083, Jan. 22, 1990

Chapter III
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Relationship with public office may either be formed by popular
election, direct provision of la w or appointment by competent authority.'
By popular election
Popular election, defined.
Popular election refers to conduct of polls, including listing of
voters, holding of electoral campaign, casting and counting of ballots,2 * * * *
consolidation and transmission of results and canvassing of returns?
It embodies popular will and expresses the sovereign power of the
people? It is the means by which the people choose their officials for a
definite and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being
the exercise of governmental powers?
Popular and federation election, distinguished.
Popular election involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote as opposed to
federation election where the electorate does not directly
vote, but indirectly through their popularly elected punong
barangays or SK Chairs who vote for their federation officers
pursuant to their respective constitutions and bylaws.
'Art. 203, Revised Penal Code
’Rule 1, Sec. 3(c), A.M. No. 07-1-15-SC; Javier v. Comelec, C.R. Nos. L-68379-81,
Sept. 22, 1986, cited in Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512,519; Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA
796, cited in Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512, 519 (1991)
’Rule 1, Sec. 3(b), A.M. No. 10-4-l-SC
‘Hontiveros v. Altavos, 24 Phil. 636 (1913), cited in Taule v. Santos. 200 SCRA 512.
519(1991)
’Garchitorena v. Crvscini, 39 Phil. 258 (1918)
62
Chapter III 63
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
In a constitutional context, popular election is
the conduct of polls, including registration, campaign,
casting, counting, and canvassing of votes, none of which
characterizes election of federation officers?
Election, kinds of.
There are two kinds of election, one regular and the other special.
A regular election refers to one provided by law on such dates at regular
intervals to elect officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions.
An election conducted outside of this definition is special, either
it fills out a vacancy before expiration of the full term for which the
incumbent was elected,7 or it holds or continues a failed election?
By direct provision of law
Appointments to office are intrinsically executive? The power to
appoint on the part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be
persisted in, would, enable it to gradually absorb to itself patronage
and control of greater part of the functioning agencies of the state and
county governments, and, thus, endowed, it would be little short of a
legislative oligarchy.'0
But the Revised Penal Code" however enumerates a person may
become a public officer by direct provision of law. Seemingly, this
implies appointment to public office may be done by a legislative act.
But the law does not directly or specifically appoint a person by name.
What it does is provide consequent, incidental, accessory, or concurrent
positions for persons already appointed to or occupying a public office.
These are public officers appointed ex-officio.
Ex-officio, defined.
It means from office; by virtue of office. It refers to
an authority derived from official character merely, not
‘Taule v. Santos, G.R. No. 90336, Aug. 12, 1991
’Outline Reviewer in Political Law, p. 513, by Antonio E.B. Nachura
"Lucero v. Comelec, G.R. No. 113107, July 20, 1994
’Chief Justice Robertson, Taylor v. Commonwealth, (1830), 3 J.J. Marshall, 4010,
cited in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927
"Sibert v. Garrett, (1922), 246 S.W., 455, cited in Government of the Philippine Is­
lands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979. April 1, 1927
"Art. 203, Revised Penal Code
 64
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position.
It likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or
as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for services in said position as these services
are already paid for and covered by compensation attached
to principal office.12
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Chief Justice, 15 Clerk of the
Supreme Court,” Secretary of Justice and a representative of Congress
serve as ex-officio Chair,” Secretary,16 and Members of the Judicial and
Bar Council, respectively,12 which principal function is to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary.18
The Senate President serves as ex-officio Chair of the Commission
on Appointments that acts on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of Congress from their submission.1’
A position added by direct provision of law does not provide for an
appointing authority, implying that a separate issuance of appointment
by competent authority is not required or becomes redundant.
Where the law provides or identifies appointing authority, it
presupposes relations are formed through appointment by competent
authority and not by direct provision of law even if it appears to identify
the occupant of the position as eligible for appointment.
As such, the law should afford such appointing authority
sufficient discretion to choose and not limit prospective appointee to
“Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCR A 317 (1991)
"Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
”Sec. 8(3), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
”Sec. 8(3), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 8(3), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
12Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
'"Sec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
Chapter III 65
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
only one eligible. Otherwise, it amounts to legislative encroachment on
the power and prerogative to appoint.20
Appointment by competent authority
Appointment, defined.
It is the selection, by the authority vested with power, of an
individual who is to exercise functions of a given office.21
Competent authority, identified.
Competent authority is the appointing officer or
authority that is the person or body authorized by law to
appoint in the Civil Service.22 Appointing authority refers to
the person or body duly authorized to issue appointments
and other human resource actions in the civil service.23
In case appointing officer or authority delegates
authority to issue appointments to a next-in-rank official in
the same agency, as authorized by law, a copy of the Office
or Board Resolution or Order for said purpose is submitted
to the CSC FO with jurisdiction.24
Where the National Internal Revenue Code does not
authorize the Bureau of Internal Revenue to designate a
private individual as custodian of distrained property, such
designation does not make him a public officer. The power
to authorize a private person to act as custodian does not
include the power to appoint as public officer.23
Appointment, stages of.
Where applicable or required under the Constitution, government
appointment involves three steps, first, nomination by the President,
second, confirmation by Commission on Appointments, and third,
“Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
’’Philippine Political Law by Justice lsagani A. Cruz, 1987 Ed., p. 180, cited in
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993; Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 158-159.
cited in Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
“First par.. Sec. 7(a)(8), Rule III, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Sec. 4(b), Rule 1,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
24Second par.. Sec. 7(aX8), Rule 111, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan. 268 SCRA 747
 66 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
assumption to office as a form of acceptance. The first two steps are
mere offer of a post, the last step of acceptance completes appointment.26
Appointment is the sole act of the appointing authority while
acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Appointment is not complete
without acceptance best evidenced by assumption to office. It could be
refused. The Governor-General is not empowered to force upon the
judge of one district appointment to another district against his will.27
An appointment accepted by appointee cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority and remains in force and in
effect until disapproved by the Civil Service Commission2* that is
authorized to recall appointment initially approved, but only when
such appointment and approval are proven to disregard applicable
provisions of civil service law and regulations.29 * * * * * * *
Upon issuance of appointment and the appointee's assumption
of the position in the civil service, he acquires a legal,50 not just an
equitable right to the position?1 This right is protected not only by
statute, but by the Constitution as well, which cannot be taken away
either by revocation of appointment or by removal except for cause and
with previous notice and hearing.’2
Appointment and designation, distinguished.
There is a great difference between appointment and
designation. While appointment is selection by proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise powers and
functions of a given office, designation merely connotes
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in public service by virtue of an earlier
^Lacson v. Romero, G.R. No. L-3081, Oct. 14, 1949
27Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322, G.R. No. 16808, Jan. 3, 1921
“Sec. 9, Rule V, Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative
Code, cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
”Debulgado v. CSC, 237 SCRA 184, 200 (1994), cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No.
131136, Feb. 28, 2001
“Mauna v. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994), cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No.
131136, Feb. 28, 2001
■’’Aquino v. CSC, 208 SCRA 240, 248 (1992), cited in De Rama v. CA. G.R. No.
131136, Feb. 28,2001
“Aquino v. CSC, 208 SCRA 240, 248 (1992); Mauna v. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, 398
(1994), cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
67
Chapter III
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
appointment” as where the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chair of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief
Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in
nature.”
But when appointment is used in its legal or ordinary
acceptation, it includes nomination or designation,”
especially where the retirement law” does not intend
distinction between appointment and designation.
Thus, the basic salary rate of the position to which the
public officer was merely designated was used as basis for
computation of his retirement benefits, instead of the lower
salary rate of the position he was appointed to. Retirement
laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and
hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina
to continue earning his livelihood.37
Appointing authority, discretion of.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice that he or she may exercise freely according
to his or her judgment, deciding who is best qualified among those
who have necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative
of the appointing power” that is given ample discretion in selection
and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is
management prerogative that is generally unhampered by judicial
intervention.”
“Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991, cited in Dimaandal v. COA, G.R.
No. 122197, June 26, 1998
“Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCR/X 158-159, cited in Santiago v. COA, G.R. No.
92284. July 12. 1991
"Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
“Sec. 9 of E.O. 966, cited in Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
“Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991
“Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, G.R. No. 65439, Nov. 13, 1985, cited
in Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
“Ocampo v. Subido, 72 SCRA 443 (1976), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines
v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
 68
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Limitation.
While power to select and appoint employees is
employer prerogative that may be exercised without
being held liable, it must be done in good faith to advance
employer's interest and not to defeat or circumvent rights
of employees under special laws or under valid agreements,
and not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite."
Noninterference by the Judiciary.
Being essentially discretionary, its exercise may not be controlled
by the courts41 and cannot be subject of an application for a writ of
mandamus absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion."
No matter how impressive an argument the track record of a
public servant is in favor of his consideration for appointment, it is
a matter addressed to the appointing authority, in the exercise of its
sound judgment and discretion, and does not suffice to grant the court,
whose duty is merely to apply the law, the power to vest in the public
officer a legal title he does not have.4’
The choice of an appointee from among qualified candidates
or applicants is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and interests of service
that can best be made by the head of office concerned familiar with
organizational structure and environmental circumstances within
which the appointee must function.44
Noninterference by the Legislature.
The law does not impose a rigid or mechanical standard on
appointing power. The appointing authority enjoys sufficient discretion
to select and appoint employees based on their fitness to perform duties
and to assume responsibilities of the position to be filled.45
"GSIS v. Ayroso, 96 SCRA 213 (1980), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines v.
CSC G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
"Lusterio v. 1AC, 199 SCRA 255, cited in Sevilla v. CA, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992
"Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, Oct. 6, 1995
"Manalang v. Quiloriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954
“Lusterio v. 1AC, 199 SCRA 255, died in Sevilla v. CA, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992
"Pilar v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 258 (1967),
cited in Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
Chapter III 69
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
At least sufficient discretion, if not plenary, should be granted
to those entrusted with responsibility of administering the offices
concerned. They are in the position to determine who can best
fulfill functions of office. Unless the law speaks in mandatory and
peremptory tone, there should be full recognition of the wide scope of
such discretionary authority. The power of appointment is essentially
a political question involving considerations of wisdom that only the
appointing authority can decide.44
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. It
is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers. In other words,
choice of appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing
power.
When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer thus, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President
to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on
the President, such conferment necessarily carries discretion of whom
to appoint.
Even in the pretext of prescribing qualifications of the officer,
Congress may not abuse such power as to divest appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of discretion to pick his or her choice.
Consequently, when only one individual can meet qualifications
prescribed by Congress, such enactment effectively eliminates
discretion of appointing power to choose, and it constitutes irregular
restriction on power of appointment.
When the law says appointee is the incumbent city mayor, it limits
appointing authority to only one eligible. Since only one qualifies to the
post, the President is precluded from exercising discretion to choose
whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans essential
element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature
of appointment.
It manifestly abuses congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly,
while conferment of appointing power on the President is a perfectly
legislative valid act, the proviso limiting his choice to one certainly
encroaches his prerogative."
“Reyes v. Abeleda, 22 SCRA 825 (1968), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines v.
CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10,1989
"Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
 70 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
While it is inarguable that Congress has plenary authority to
prescribe qualifications to public office, it may not however prescribe
qualifications such that the President is entirely stripped of discretion,
thus converting appointment to a mere ministerial act."
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be." Even
if the law might seemingly suggest the undersecretary is next in line
to the secretary'5" the President, in case of vacancy in the office of the
secretary, is not constrained to appoint the undersecretary as acting
secretary.*51 *
The Civil Service Commission as Attesting Authority
Purpose.
The Civil Service Commission, as the centra) personnel agency
of the government, establishes a career service and adopts measures to
promote morale, efficiency', integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service.53
It strengthens merit and rewards system, integrates all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks,
and institutionalizes management climate conducive to public
accountability.55
Composition, qualifications and disqualification.
The Civil Sendee Commission is composed of a Chair
and two Commissioners who are natural-bom Filipino
citizens and, at the time of their appointments, at least 35
years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in elections immediately preceding their appointment.54
“Gonzales, Neptali A., Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election
Law, 1966 Ed., p. 173, citing Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30,1964, cited
in Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
"Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
5l’Sec. 10(5), Chapter 2, Book IV, E.O. 292, cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No.
164978, Oct. 13, 2005
’’Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13,21X15
’’First sentence, Sec. 3, Art. I.X(B), 1987 Constitution
^Second sentence. Sec. 3, Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 1(1), Art. 1X-B, 1987 Constitution
Chapter III 71
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Appointment and term of office.
The Chair and Commissioners are appointed by the
President with consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a period of seven years without reappointment. On those
first appointed, the Chair holds office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five y'ears, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy is only' for unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.55
Prohibitions.
No Member of the Civil Sendee Commission
shall, during his or her tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he or she engage in the practice
of any profession or in the active management or control of
any' business which in any way may' be affected by' functions
of his or her office, nor shall he or she be financially
interested, directly' or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any’ franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.56
Jurisdiction in appointments.
While the Civil Service Commission is empowered to approve
all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the
civil service and disapprove those where appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications,57 its authority is
limited to check whether appointee possesses appropriate civil service
eligibility or required qualifications. If appointee does, his or her
appointment must be approved. If not, it should be disapproved. It
may' not employ any other criterion when it acts on an appointment.5"
’’Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution
’’Sec. 9(h), Art. V, PD No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree, cited in Central Bank of
the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
“Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56. April 10, 1989
 72 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
When the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Civil Service Commission has no alternative but attest
to appointment in accordance with civil service laws.” It exceeds its
power when it revokes appointment of one in favor of another whom
it believes is more qualified for the position bank physician. It cannot
substitute its will for that of the appointing authority."
It has no authority to revoke an appointment on ground another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct appointment of a substitute of its choice otherwise
it encroaches on discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that appointee should possess
minimum qualifications required by law.61
It is not required that appointee ranks first in comparative
evaluation sheets of the Placement Committee according to criteria
of eligibility, education, work experience, productivity, performance,
attendance, integrity, initiative, leadership, physical characteristics,
and even personality traits.62
Even if appointee ranks lower, he may still be appointed provided
he possesses minimum qualifications. The Civil Service Commission
has no authority to review appointments made by other offices except
only to ascertain if appointee possesses required qualifications.63
The determination of who among the aspirants with minimum
Statutory qualifications is preferred belongs to appointing authority
that may also consider informal qualifications of intangibles such as
resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition,
future prospects, and best interests of the service.64 *The Civil Service
Commission cannot disallow an appointment because it believes
another person is qualified, much less can it direct appointment of its
own choice.63
wLuego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327,331 (1986), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines
v. CSC. C.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10,1989
"Ocampo v. Subido. 72 SCRA 443 (1976), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines
v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
‘'Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10,1989
"Lapinid v. CSC. G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
"Pilar v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 258 (1967),
cited in Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
“Gaspar v. CA, G.R. No. 90799, Oct. 18, 1990, cited in Lapinid v. CSC, G.R. No.
96298, May 14, 1991
“Lapinid v. CSC, G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
Chapter III 73
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
When it acknowledges both aspirants are qualified for the
position in controversy, but one was appointed over the other, that
alone renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting
further on appointment except to affirm its validity.
It is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of Civil
Service Law requirements. When appointee is qualified and other legal
requirements are satisfied, it has no choice but attest to appointment in
accordance with Civil Service Laws.
The stamping of the words approved as temporary on face of
appointment, purportedly in deference to the final action taken in the
protest and on condition there is no pending administrative case against
appointee nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely
affect approval of appointment, does not change the character of the
appointment which was clearly described as permanent.
What was temporary was the approval of appointment, not
appointment itself. What made the approval temporary was the
fact it was made to depend on such conditions and verification of
qualifications of appointee to the position.66 But notwithstanding initial
approval of an appointment, the Civil Service Commission may recall
it on certain grounds.67
Recall of appointment, grounds for.
Notwithstanding initial approval of an appointment, it
may be recalled on any of these grounds: (a) non-compliance
with procedures or criteria provided in the agency's Merit
Promotion Plan, (b) failure to pass through the agency's
Selection or Promotion Board, (c) violation of existing
collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion, or (d) violation of other existing civil
sendee law, rules, and regulations.6*
Where the only ground to recall appointment of mu­
nicipal employees is violation of constitutional prohibition
“Luego v. CSC, G.R. No. L-69137, Aug. 5, 1986
"Sec. 20, Rule VI, Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative
Code, cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
“Sec. 20, Rule VI, Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Revised Administrative
Code, cited in De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28,2001
 74
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
against appointments made within two months immedi­
ately prior the next presidential elections, the appointment
made by the outgoing mayor is affirmed as the prohibition
applies only to the President or Acting President.w
Kinds of appointment in the civil service
The employment status in the civil service is determined by
appointment issued, which can be any of these: permanent, temporary,
substitute, coterminous, fixed term, contractual, or casual.70
Permanent appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued to a person who meets all qualification
requirements of the position to which he or she is being appointed to,
including appropriate eligibility, in accordance with provisions of law,
rules and standards promulgated to pursue it.71
Limitations.
While power to select and appoint employees is
employer prerogative that may be exercised without
being held liable, it must be done in good faith to advance
employer's interest and not to defeat or circumvent rights
of employees under special laws or under valid agreements,
and not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.71
Temporary appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued to a person who meets education,
experience, and training requirements for the position to which he or
she is being appointed to, except for appropriate eligibility.73
When issued.
It may only be issued in the absence of an applicant
who meets all qualification requirements of the position
wDe Rama v. CA, C.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
’“Sec. 9, Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
7,Sec. 9(a), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’’GSIS v. Ayroso, 96 SCRA 213 (1980), cited in Central Bank of the Philippines v.
CSC, C.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
’’First par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter III 75
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
as certified by the appointing authority. It shall not exceed
twelve months, reckoned from date it was issued but
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified eligible
who is willing to accept appointment becomes actually
available.74
A temporary appointment to a position which involves
practice of profession may be issued to a person who lacks
required experience or training but only in the absence of
an applicant who meets all qualification requirements of the
position as certified by appointing authority.75
When there are no qualified faculty in the region, place
or locality, as certified by appointing authority, temporary
appointments may be issued until required Master's degree
is met or complied with.76
But a board secretary who was earlier terminated
for loss of trust and confidence but subsequently became
eligible, cannot invoke for reappointment the resolution of
the Board of Trustees of a state college imploring its faculty
and administrative employees who were temporarily
appointed for lack of civil service eligibility to exert effort to
acquire it within three years from temporary appointment.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole
factor for reappointment, other factors need to be considered
by appointing authority such as performance, degree of
education, work experience, training, seniority, and more
importantly, whether applicant enjoys trust and confidence
of appointing authority.
Such board resolution must yield to the Civil Service
Commission policieson issuanceof temporary appointments.
When it directed that temporary appointments were
effective only up to a specific date,77 it did so pursuant to the
general purpose of civil service law to ensure and promote
constitutional mandate regarding appointments only
’'First par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ No. 14, s. 2018
”Fourth par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
76CSC MC No. 25, s. 2017, cited in fifth par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ.
No. 14, s.2018
’’Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, Oct. 6.1995
 76 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
according to merit and fitness and to provide within public
service a progressive system of personnel administration to
ensure maintenance of an honest and efficient, progressive
and courteous civil service.7"
For that matter, it is vested with the function, among
others, to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for
the dvil service and adopt plans and programs to promote
economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration
in government.7’
Temporary appointment, when invalidated.
A temporary appointment issued to a person who does not meet
any of the education, training, or experience requirements for the
position shall be invalidated.®
Exceptions.
Temporary appointment may not be invalidated
if it involves positions that are hard to fill, or other meri­
torious cases as may be determined by the Civil Service
Commission,’1 or as provided by special law such as Medi­
cal Officer or Specialist,"-’ Special Science Teacher,53 Faculty,”
and police officer” positions.
Hard to fill vacancies, identified.
They refer to vacancies for which agencies
found difficulty in recruitment for reasons such
as, lack of skills of applicants, inadequate expe-
’"Sarnson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654, 658-659 (1986), cited in Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. 116183, Oct. 6,1995
'’Sec. 12(3), Chapter 3(A), Book V, E.0.292, cited in Gloria v. DeGuzman, G.R. No.
116183, Oct. 6, 1995
"Third par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"'Third par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
!2PD No. 1424, further amending R.A. 1243, as amended by R.A. 2251 or the Hos­
pital Residency Law, cited in third par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“R.A. 8496 or the Philippine Science High School System Act of 1997, cited in third
par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
”R.A. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, cited in third par..
Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“R.A. 8551 or the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998, cited in third par., Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter III 77
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
rience, applicant expectation of high salary, lack
of professional license, competition with private
sectors, and overseas jobs.”
Temporary appointment, when prohibited.
In no case shall a temporary’ appointment be issued for positions
that involve practice of profession regulated by bar or board law for lack
of the required license and/or certificate of registration.57 A temporary'
appointment issued to a person who meets all requirements of the
positions shall be disapproved.8"
Appointment in an acting capacity.
An acting appointment is merely temporary, one that
is good only until another appointment is made to take its
place.” Hence, the right to hold office as acting city engineer
is merely temporary. It lapses upon appointment of a
permanent city engineer, especially where he was merely
designated as acting city engineer. A mere designation
does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the
position or office he occupies in an acting capacity.®
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary' nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill
an office for a limited time until appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office.”
Substitute appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued when the regular incumbent of a
position is temporarily unable to perform duties of position, as when
incumbent is on an approved leave of absence, under suspension, on a
scholarship grant or is on secondment.”
"‘Occupational Shortages and Surpluses, 2013-2014 Integrated Survey on Labor
and Employment, Philippine Statistics Authority, LABSTAT Updates, March 2016, cited
in Appendix A, Glossary of Terms, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’’Second par.. Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Seventh par., Sec. 9(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"’Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 784, cited in Sevilla v. CA, G.R. No. 88498, June 9,1992
®Scvilla v. CA, C.R. No. 88498, June 9. 1992
’’Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., G.R. No. 93711, Feb. 25, 1991, cited in Pimentel v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
’"First par.. Sec. 9(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
 78
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Qualifications and entitlements.
A person who is issued a substitute appointment to
a position whose duties involve practice of a profession
covered by bar or board or special laws is required to possess
appropriate professional license. The substitute appointee
is entitled to salaries and benefits attached to position
except those benefits requiring longer period of service for
availment.”
When effective and allowed.
It is effective only until return of incumbent.** It is
allowed only if leave of absence of incumbent is at least
three months, except in case of teachers.95
Coterminous appointment, defined.
Coterminous with organizational unit head’"3 (not primarily confi­
It is issued to a person whose tenure is limited to a period specified
dential in nature).10* It is an appointment coexistent with term or tenure
by law or whose continuity' in service is based on trust and confidence
of organizational unit head to which he or she is assigned, who is not
of appointing authority or head of organizational unit where assigned.**'’
the appointing authority'.105
When appointment of the General Manager of a water district is
based on majority vote of the Board of Directors and whose continuity
in service is based on latter's trust and confidence or coexistent with its
nature, it is co-terminous.”
Coterminous appointment, classified.
Coterminous with appointing authority9* (not primarily confidential
in nature).’* It is an appointment coexistent with the term or tenure of
the appointing authority.
’’Second par.. Sec. 9(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’’First par.. Sec. 9(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
’’First par.. Sec. 9(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ No. 14, s. 2018
*Sec. 9(d), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14. s. 2018; CSC v. Pililla Water District,
C.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
"CSC v. Pililla Water District. C.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
"Sec. 9(dXl), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018; CSC v. Pililla Water Dis­
trict. G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
"Second par.. Sec. 9(d)(2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
““Sec. 9(dXl), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018; CSC v. Pililla Water Dis­
trict. C.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
Chapter 111 79
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Qualifications.
Eligibility is not required for appointment, except
those whose duties involve practice of profession regulated
by Philippine Bar/Board or special laws and/or require
licenses such as those positions listed under Category IV of
CSC MC No. 11,s. 1996, as amended, but preference should
be given to civil service eligibles.101
But appointees must meet education, training, and
experience requirements of positions as proposed by the
respective Agency Heads and approved by’ the Commission.
Pending submission and approval of agency qualification
standards, qualification requirements provided under CSC
Qualification Standards Manual shall be used as bases to
attest these coterminous appointments.1"2
Qualifications.
Eligibility' is not required for appointment, except
those whose duties involve practice of profession regulated
by the Philippine Bar/Board or special laws and/or require
licenses such as those positions listed under Category IV of
CSC MC No. 11, s. 1996, as amended, but preference should
be given to civil service eligibles.10"
But appointees must meet education, training, and
experience requirements of the positions as proposed by' the
respective Agency Heads and approved by the Commission.
Pending submission and approval of the agency qualification
standards, the qualification requirements provided under
““Third par.. Sec. 9(dX2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"“Second par.. Sec. 9(dX2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
‘“Sec. 9(dX2). Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""Second par.. Sec. 9(dX2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
ln5Sec. 9(dX2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Grc. No. 14, s. 2018
“"Third par., Sec. 9(d)(2), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
80 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
the CSC Qualification Standards Manual shall be used to
attest these coterminous appointments.'"7
Coterminous (primarily confidential in nature). It is an appointment
to positions determined by law or declared by the Commission to be
primarily confidential in nature, which duties and responsibilities
imply not only in confidence in the aptitude of appointees but primarily
close intimacy which insures freedom of discussion, delegation and
reporting without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or
betrayals of personal trust.1"
Qualifications.
Appointees to primarily confidential positions are
exempt from qualification requirements, except those
whose duties involve practice of a profession regulated by
the Philippine Bar or Board or special laws and/or require
licenses.'"
Coterminous with lifespan of agency. It is an appointment to a position
that is coexistent with lifespan of the agency based on its Staffing
Pattern as approved by the DBM or the GCG.1,0
Qualifications.
Eligibility' is not required for coterminous appointment,
except those whose duties involve practice of profession
regulated by' the Philippine Bar/Board or special laws and/
or require licenses such as those positions listed under
Category IV of CSC MC No. 11, s. 1996, as amended, but
preference should be given to civil service eligibles."1
But appointees must meet education, training and
experience requirements of positions as proposed by the
respective Agency Heads and approved by the Commission.
Pending submission and approval of agency qualification
standards, qualification requirements provided under CSC
'"Second par.. Sec. 9(dX2). Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
'"First sentence. Sec. 9(dX3), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ No. 14, s. 2018
'"Second sentence. Sec. 9(d)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""Sec. 9(d)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"'Sixth par., Sec. 9(d)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter 111 81
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Qualification Standards Manual shall be used to attest these
coterminous appointments."1
Pretermination.
It need not be renewed annually and the lifespan of
the agency is indicated on the appointment. However, if per­
formance of appointee is below Satisfactory, the appointing
authority may terminate services of, or replace appointee
after notifying the latter at least thirty days prior to date of
termination of appointment."3
Fixed term appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued to a person with a specified term of
office, subject to reappointment as provided by law, such as Chairperson
and members of commissions and boards, SUC President, and Head of
Agency appointed by the Board."4
Contractual appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued to a person whose employment
in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake
local or foreign-assisted projects or a specific work or job requiring
special technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period.
This includes appointments to positions that are coexistent with
the duration of a particular project based on the agency's Staffing
Pattern as approved by the DBM or the GCG"! or when appointment
is co-existent with duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made or subject to availability of funds for the same."*
Qualifications.
Eligibility is not required for appointment, except
those whose duties involve practice of profession regulated
by the Philippine Bar/Board or special laws and/or require
"’Fifth par., Sec. 9(d)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ No. 14, s. 2018
"’Sec. 9(dX4), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"*Sec. 9(e), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"’First par.. Sec. 9(0, Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"‘Sec. 14(1), CSC Res. No. 91-1631, Dec. 27. 1991, cited in CSC v. Pililla Water Dis­
trict, C.R. No. 190147, March 5. 2013
82 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
licenses such as those positions listed under Category IV of
CSC MC No. 11, s, 1996, as amended, but preference should
be given to civil service eligibles."’
But appointees must meet education, training, and
experience requirements of positions as proposed by the
respective Agency Heads and approved by the Commission.
Pending submission and approval of agency qualification
standards, qualification requirements provided under CSC
Qualification Standards Manual shall be used to attest these
contractual appointments.1"1
Contractual appointment, length of service.
Contractual appointments are limited to one year, but may be
renewed every year, based on performance, until completion of project
or specific work.11’ The inclusive period of contractual appointment
is indicated on the face of appointment for purposes of crediting
services.110
Renewal.
Reappointment or renewal of contractual appoint­
ments to the same position shall be submitted to the CSC
for notation only, without need for approval or validation.
However, reappointment of contractual appointments
to another position shall be submitted for approval or
validation by the CSC FO concerned.'21
Pretermination.
If performance of appointee is below satisfactory
or where funds have become insufficient or unavailable,
appointing authority may terminate services of, or replace
appointee after notifying the latter at least thirty days prior
to date of termination of appointment.122 *
"’Fourth par.. Sec. 9(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""Third par.. Sec. 9(dX4), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"“Second par.. Sec. 9(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""First par., Sec. 9(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"'Seventh par.. Sec. 9(0, Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
,22Second par., Sec. 9(0, Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter 111 83
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
When prohibited.
In no case shall a contractual appointment be issued
to fill a vacant plantilia position or a contractual employee
performs duties and responsibilities of vacant plantilia
position.121 The appointee performs work or job under
his or her own responsibility with minimal direction and
supervision from the employing agency.124
Casual appointment, defined.
It is an appointment issued only for essential and necessary
services where there are not enough regular staff to meet demands of
service and for emergency cases and intermittent period not to exceed
one year.'25
Qualifications.
Eligibility is not required for appointment, except
those whose duties involve practice of profession regulated
by the Philippine Bar/Board or special laws and /or require
licenses such as those positions listed under Category IV of
CSC MC No. 11, s, 1996, as amended, but preference should
be given to civil service eligibles.
But appointees must meet education, training and
experience requirements of positions as proposed by the
respective Agency Heads and approved by the Commission.
Pending submission and approval of agency qualification
standards, qualification requirements provided under CSC
Qualification Standards Manual shall be used to attest these
casual appointments.’2"
Renewal.
Reappointment or renewal of contractual appoint­
ments to same position shall be submitted to the CSC for
notation only, without need for approval or validation.
However, reappointment of contractual appointments
l22Sixth par.. Sec. 9(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"4Fifth par.. Sec. 9(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
'“First par.. Sec 9(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
""Second sentence, second par., Sec. 9(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
 84 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
to another position shall be submitted for approval or
validation by the CSC FO concerned.127
Nature of appointment
The nature of appointment may either be original, promotion,
transfer, reemployment, reappointment, reinstatement to comparable
position, demotion, or reclassification.
Original appointment, defined.
It is the initial entry into career or noncareer service.128 But original
appointees in career service with permanent status of appointment
undergo probationary period fora thorough assessment of performance
and character. The duration of probationary period is generally six
months or depending on duration required by the position.'”
Probationary period, defined.
It refers to period of actual service following issuance
of permanent appointment where appointee undergoes
thorough character investigation and assessment of
capability to perform duties of position enumerated in the
Position Description Form.”0
Promotion, defined.
It refers to advancement of a career employee from one position
to another with increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by
law, and usually accompanied by increase in salary. Promotion may be
from one department or agency to another or from one organizational
unit to another within same department or agency.”1
Exception.
But any upward movement from noncareer service to
career service and vice versa is not considered promotion
but reappointment.112
127Fourth par., Sec. 9(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
128Sec. 11(a), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. 14, s. of 2018
l2*First par.. Sec. 14, Rule V, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
lxlSecond par., Sec. 14, Rule V, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
”'First par.. Sec. 11(b). Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
’’’First par.. Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter ill 85
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Disqualification.
An employee found guilty of administrative offense
and penalized with demotion, suspension, or fine is
disqualified for promotion for the same period of suspension
or fine. In case of demotion, the period of disqualification
for promotion is within one year.111 But mere pendency
of administrative case against any employee does not bar
promotion.11*
When prohibited.
During period of 45 days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election, any government
official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary
or remuneration or privilege to any government official
or employee, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, is guilty of an election offense.115
**
Special promotions.
Special promotions based on awards and/or acts of conspicuous
courage and gallantry as provided under special laws are exempt from
qualification requirements but subject to specific validation require­
ments as provided under these special laws or their implementing rules
and regulations:116
(a) Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees;117 * 119
(b) Bureau of Fire Protection and Bureau of Jail
Management Penology Professionalization Act of 2004;,M
(c) Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998;’”
11}Fourth par.. Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
13*Third par., Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
115Sec. 261(g)(2), Omnibus Election Code
‘“Fifth par., Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
117Sec. 6, R.A. 6713, cited in fifth par.. Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14,
s. of 2018
lwSec. 10, R.A. 9263, as amended by R.A. 9592, cited in fifth par., Sec. 11(b), Rule IV,
CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
119Sec. 31, R.A. 8551, cited in fifth par.. Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14,
s. of 2018

86 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(d) Instituting the Lingkod Bayan Award as the Presidential
Award for Outstanding Public Service.'4"
Next-in-rank rule.
There is neither mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the
civil service law that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference
in appointment or promotion. What it provides is that they would be
among the first to be considered for vacancy, if qualified, and if vacancy
is not filled by promotion, it is filled by transfer or other modes or
appointment.40141 *
Next-in-rank position, defined.
It refers to position that by reason of hierarchical
arrangement of positions in the agency or in the government
is determined to be in the nearest degree of relationship to
a higher position as contained in the agency's System of
Ranking Positions.143
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration
for promotion to higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow he
and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to next higher position.
Where both Customs Collector I and II are qualified thus, the
Customs Collector I and not the next-in-rank Customs Collector 11, may
be promoted to Customs Collector 111, where the former141 possesses
superior qualifications and competence compared to the next-in-rank
employee who merely meets minimum requirements for the position.144
The next-in-rank rule applies only to promotions and not to
positions created in the course of a valid reorganization.14’
I40E.O. 508, as amended by E.O. 77, died in fifth par., Sec. 11(b), Rule IV, CSC
Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
l4lTaduran v. CSC, C.R. No. L-52051, July 31, 1984. died in Santiago v. CSC. G.R.
No. 81467, Oct. 27, 1989
'“Appendix A, Glossary' of Terms, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'"Santiago v. CSC, G.R. No. 81467, Oct. 27, 1989
144Sec. 4, CSC Res. No. 83-343, cited in Santiago v. CSC, G.R. No. 81467, Oct. 27.
1989
14,Panis v. CSC, G.R. No. 102948, Feb. 2, 1994, cited in Cotiangco v. Province of
Biliran, G.R. No. 157139, Oct. 19, 2011
Chapter III 87
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Transfer, defined.
It is movement of employee from one position to another that
is of equivalent rank, level or salary' without gap in service involving
issuance of appointment146 without which reassignment to another
station does not amount to transfer.
Reassignment of mediator arbiters, who were appointed as
such in the National Capital Region without specifying a station or
particular unit of the Department of Labor, from one organizational
unit to another of the same agency, is not transfer for they were neither
removed as mediator arbiters nor appointed to new positions.147
The availability of security of tenure that protects against
unconsented transfers amounting to illegal removal depends, in the first
instance, upon the nature of appointment.14" Thus, the rule that outlaws
unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only
to an officer who is appointed and not merely assigned to a particular
station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers agency head to periodically reassign
employees and officers in order to improve service of the agency. The
use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management
to harness abilities of employees to promote optimum public service
cannot be objected to.14’
The principal appointed as such in the Bureau of Public Schools,
Department of Education, without mentioning her station, cannot
claim security of tenure as principal of one school or any particular
station.150 She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public
service requires, even without her consent.151 She thus has no right of
choice.153
The transfer may be from one organizational unit to another in
the same department or agency' or from one department or agency
'“First par.. Sec. 11(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'“Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 546 (1994), cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas,
G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995
’“Hojilla v. Marino, G.R. No. L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965, cited in Brillantes v. Guevarra,
C.R. No. L-22586, Feb. 27, 1969
'4llSta. Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637 (1970), cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.
No. 116418, March 7,1995
'“Brillantes v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-22586, Feb. 27, 1969
,5,Miclat v. Ganaden, G.R. No. L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro v. Valencia. G.R. No.
L-18352, Aug. 30,1963, cited in Brillantes v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-22586, Feb. 27, 1969
l53Brillantes v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-22586, Feb. 27, 1969
 88 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
to another, provided however, that any movement from non-career
service to career sendee and vice versa is not considered as a transfer
but reappointment.153
Prohibited transfer.
Any public official who makes or causes any transfer
of any officer or employee in the civil sendee including
public school teachers, within election period except upon
prior approval of the Commission on Elections, is guilty of
an election offense.15*
Unconsented transfer.
While temporary transfer or assignment of personnel
is permissible even without employee's prior consent, it
cannot be done when transfer is a preliminary step toward
his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his
service, or force his resignation. Such transfer circumvents
provision that safeguards tenure of office of those who are
in the Civil Service.155
Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of the civil sendee. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to employees removed without
cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which
tantamount to illegal removals.156
Where transfer memorandum neither shows it is
temporary nor lasts until a permanent replacement is found,
it becomes indefinite, a feature that violates security of
tenure.157
’"Second par., Sec. 11(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
,5*Sec. 261(h), Omnibus Election Code
’"Bentain v. CA, 209 SCRA 648-649, citing Sta. Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia
v. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116, cited in Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, Aug. 15, 2000
,56Bentain v. CA, 209 SCRA 648-649, citing DECS v. CA 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez v.
Comelec, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138, cited in Gloria v. CA, G.R.
No. 119903, Aug. 15,2000
,57Cloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, Aug. 15, 2000
Chapter 111 89
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Reemployment, defined.
It refers to appointment of a person who has been previously
appointed to a position in government sendee but was separated from
it as a result of reduction in force, reorganization, retirement, voluntary
resignation, or any non-disciplinary action such as dropping from rolls
and other modes of separation. Reemployment presupposes gap in
service.15"
No prior authority from the Commission is required to reemploy
a person previously retired or resigned and who has not reached
compulsory retirement age of 65.159
When issued.
It is issued as a result of reorganization, devolution,
salary standardization, renationalization, recategorization,
rationalization or similar events.
Reappointment, instances of.
(a) The issuance of appointment from temporary to permanent,
career to noncareer or vice versa, noncareer to another noncareer, all
of which entails no gap in sendee, is considered as reappointment.
Noncareer employees who are appointed for the first time in career
service under permanent status are required to undergo probationary
period for six months.161
(b) The renewal of temporary, contractual and casual
appointment upon expiration of appointment or subsequent
appointment of substitute teachers, which entails no gap in service,
is considered as reappointment. A temporary appointment may be
renewed in the absence of an applicant who meets all qualification
requirements of the position as certified by appointing officer or
authority and provided performance rating of employee is at least
Satisfactory.162
Acquisition of civil sendee eligibility is not the sole factor for
reappointment. When temporary appointment of a board secretary
’“First par.. Sec. 11(d), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'“Second par.. Sec. 11(d), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
’“First par.. Sec. 11(e), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“'Sec. ll(eXl), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
’“See. 11(e)(2), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
90 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
is terminated for loss of trust and confidence, she cannot compel
appointing authority to reappoint heron ground she is now eligible. Still
to be considered by appointing authority are performance, degree of
education, work experience, training, seniority, and more importantly,
whether she enjoys trust and confidence of appointing authority to
reappoint her to a primarily confidential position.
(c) Personal or coterminous staff of elective officials, who
continue to serve in a coterminous capacity upon reelection of said
elective officials, are issued new appointments. But the nature of
appointment is reappointment.16*
In the same manner, personal or coterminous staff of officials
whose terms of office ended and are subsequently absorbed or rehired
by succeeding official without gap in their service are issued new
appointments, the nature of which is reappointment16' that presupposes
no gap in service.1'*
Reinstatement, defined.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of new appointment that
is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in that it is
vested according to his or her best lights, the only condition being that
appointee possesses qualifications required by law. Exercise of such
discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by
the Court, as long as it is exercised properly by appointing authority.167
Reinstatement to comparable position.
Appointment to comparable position is issued to
restore a person, as a result of a decision, to a career position
from which he or she has, through no delinquency or
misconduct, been separated but subject position is already
abolished.16"
Reinstatement to same position.
Issuance of appointment is not needed to restore a
person, as a result of a decision, to a career position from
'“Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, Oct. 6, 1995
'“First par.. Sec. ll(eX3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'“Second par.. Sec. 1 l(eX3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'"Third par., Sec. 11(eX3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
'“Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, Oct. 6, 1995
'“First par.. Sec. 11(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter III 91
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
which he or she has, through no delinquency or misconduct,
been separated from service and subject position is still
available.16’
The employee has a vested right to his or her former
item. Hence, he or she is deemed not to have left the service
and therefore has no gap in service. He or she is entitled
to payment of back salaries including allowances and all
benefits which would have accrued if he or she has not been
separated.1™
Reinstatement after pardon, prohibition.
Pardon does not restore right to hold public office or suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by terms of pardon.171 It looks
to the future. It is not retrospective.172
Pardon, defined.
It is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with execution of laws, which exempts individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he or she committed.
It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it
is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.1™
The mere grant of a pardon to a public officer or employee who
is unfaithful to public trust and sentenced to disqualification from
voting and from holding such office, does not create presumption that
recipient of pardon has thereby suddenly become morally eligible once
more to exercise right to vote and to hold public office.
“"Second par.. Sec. 11(f), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14. s. of 2018
17nSec. 12(d), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
,71Art. 36, Revised Penal Code
•’’Morris v. Hartfield, 197 S.E. 251, cited in Monsanto v. Factoran. G.R. No. 78239,
Feb. 9, 1989
'™U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 160, 160-1, cited in Bemas, the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
Notes and Cases, Part I, 1974 Ed., p. 355, cited in Monsanto v. Factoran. G.R. No. 78239,
Feb. 9,1989
 92 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Although extended absolute pardon, the assistant city treasurer
convicted of complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents accessorized with forfeiture of office, needs to apply for
reappointment to office forfeited by reason of her conviction.*174
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of conviction175 although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to
that office.174
A pardon does not restore right to hold public office or suffrage
unless such rights be expressly restored by its terms177 and that penalty
of reclusion perpetua carries perpetual absolute disqualification the
offender suffers even though pardoned as to principal penally, unless
the same has been remitted expressly in the pardon.175
Rationale.
Public office is intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety, and benefit of the common good. It cannot
be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on
automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that
the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable.
A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.17’
Reinstatement after pardon, when allowed.
The President is required to be completely explicit if pardon
he extends is intended to wipe out not merely the principal but also
accessory penalty of disqualification from holding public office and
'’•Monsanto v. Factoran. G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
17,lllinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U5. 92, 33 L.E. 550; Page v. Watson, 192 So.
205, 126 ALR, 249; State v. Hazzard, 247 P. 957 and In re Stephenson, 10 So. 2d 1, cited in
Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
17459 Am. Jur. 2d 40, cited in Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9,1989
177Art. 36, Revised Penal Code
175Art. 41, Revised Penal Code
17,Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Chapter III 93
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
from voting and to restore recipient of pardon to exercise of such
fundamental political rights.150
Where pardon is absolute, complete, unambiguous and unquali­
fied, it fully restores all civil and political rights, which naturally in­
cludes right to seek public office even if convicted of plunder that
involves moral turpitude and accessorized with perpetual absolute
disqualification. The pardoning power of the President is unfettered by
law151 and cannot be limited by legislative action.
Its exercise is discretionary in the President and may not be
interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds
constitutional limits.1” The power to pardon cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action.1” A pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action.154
The declaration that pardoned convict is restored to his civil and
political rights substantially complies with requirement of express
restoration. The right to seek public office falls under the whole gamut
of civil and political rights.15’
Reinstatement after pardon, when automatic.
But if pardon is based on innocence of individual, it affirms
innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent, as if not found
guilty' of the offense charged. When a person is pardoned because he
did not truly commit offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, restoring him to his clean name, good
reputation, and unstained character prior to finding of guilt.
When pardon exculpates public officer from administrative
charge based on acquittal on pure innocence in the criminal case for
qualified theft on the very’ same acts for which he was dismissed, and
directs his reinstatement, he need no longer apply to be reinstated to his
'“Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
181 Arts. 36 and 41, Revised Penal Code, cited in Vidal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666,
Jan. 21, 2015
'“Vidal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, Jan. 21,2015
’“Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38 (1940), Pelobello v. Palatine, 72 Phil. 441,
442(1941)
'“Monsanto v. Factoran, 252 Phil. 192, 207 (1989)
'“Vidal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, Jan. 21,2015
 94 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
former employment, he is restored to his office ipso facto upon issuance
of clemency.'"'’
Date of pardon, implications.
It is not material when pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted
pardon, the assistant city treasurer is deemed to have abandoned her
appeal and her unreversed conviction in the lower court assumed
character of finality.'"7
Pardon granted after conviction frees offender from all penalties
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on innocence, which is rare, it cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.”"
Pardon, non-entitlement to back wages.
A public officer convicted of a crime accessorized with forfeiture
of public office, though extended absolute pardon, is not entitled to
receive back pay for lost earnings and benefits.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.1'" It makes
no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by offender. It does not oblige the government to repair what has been
suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it
can be required.”1
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
"“Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989, cited in Garcia v. Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75025, Sept. 14, 1993
'"'Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
'“Comm. Of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E. 2d 95, cited in
Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
""Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
'"Morris v. Hartsfield, 197 S.E. 251, cited in Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
Feb. 9. 1989
’’’Illinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 33 L Ed. 550, 554-555, citing Knote v.
United States, 95 U.S. 149, cited in Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Chapter 111 95
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission
and conviction of the crime. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.192
But where public officer was pardoned based on pure innocence,
his automatic reinstatement to government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to public officer who is innocent
from the start and to repair what he suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service.
To rule otherwise defeats very intention of executive clemency, to
give justice to the public officer. Moreover, the right to back wages is
afforded to those illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated
or to those otherwise acquitted of charges against them.'”
Reinstatement after amnesty.
In one case, amnesty extinguished any criminal liability for acts
committed in connection, incident or related to Oakwood mutiny
without prejudice to grantee's civil liability for injuries or damages
caused to private persons.'”
It restored civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees
that may have been suspended, lost, or adversely affected by virtue
of any executive, administrative, or criminal action or proceedings
against grantee in connection with subject incidents, including criminal
conviction of any form, if any.1”
Amnesty, defined.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to
rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or
the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects
of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law
of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself. It so overlooks and
'”67 C.J.S. 576-577; Page v. Watson, 192 So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249, 253, cited in Mon
santo v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
'”Sabello v. DECS, G.R. No. 87687, Dec. 26, 1989, cited in Garcia v. Chair of the
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75025. Sept. 14, 1993
'”Sec. 4(a), Proc. No. 75, Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
190793, June 19, 2012
'”Sec. 4(b), Proc. No. 75, Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
190793, June 19, 2012
 96
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense.1’1’
In the same case, all enlisted military and police personnel with
a certain rank, whose applications for amnesty would be approved are
entitled to reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws and
regulations but are not however entitled to back pay when they have
been discharged or suspended from service or unable to perform their
military or police duties.”7
But commissioned and noncommissioned military officers and
police personnel with a certain rank whose application for amnesty will
be approved are not entitled to remain in the service, reintegration, or
reinstatement into the service nor back pay.”"
All military and police personnel granted amnesty who are not
reintegrated or reinstated are entitled to retirement and separation
benefits, if qualified under existing laws and regulation, as of the time
of separation, unless they have forfeited such retirement benefits for
reasons other than the acts covered by proclamation. Those reintegrated
or reinstated are entitled to their retirement and separation benefits
upon their actual retirement.'”
Amnesty, coverage.
In still the same case, over 300 heavily armed military officers
and enlisted men were criminally charged with coup d'etat after
they surreptitiously took over a hotel, disarmed its security guards,
planted explosive devices around the building and within its vicinity,
held hostage several innocent civilians, aired grievances against the
incumbent president, called for her resignation, her cabinet members
and top military and police officials and withdrew their support from
government, more popularly known as the Oakwood mutiny.2"
''"'People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil. 690 (2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344
(1997), cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
”7Sec. 4(c), Proc. No. 75, Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
190793, June 19,2012
’’’Sec 4(d), Proc. No. 75, Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
190793, June 19,2012
'“’Sec. 4(e), Proc. No. 75. Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No.
190793, June 19, 2012
"’Magdalo v. Comelec. G.R. No. 190793, June 19,2012
Chapter 111 97
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
When the succeeding President granted amnesty to all active
and former police and military personnel as well as their supporters
who have or may have committed crimes in relation to the mutiny, it
was limited only to acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
the Articles of War or other laws. It did not cover rape, acts of torture,
crimes against chastity, and other crimes that may have been committed
for persona) ends.3"
Amnesty and pardon, distinguished.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such
it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof,
whereas amnesty’ by Proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.2”
Demotion, defined.
It is movement of an employee from a higher position to a lower
position where he or she qualifies, if a lower position is available. The
demotion entails reduction in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank,
which may or may not involve reduction in salary.203 *A reassignment
that diminishes any of these categories suffices to constitute demotion,
even if it does not diminish salary?"
Effect on salary.
Where demotion is due to reorganization or
rationalization, employee is allowed to continue to receive
salary of higher position.205 But where demotion is a result
of disciplinary’ action, a notice of salary adjustment to the
next lower salary grade with same salary step is issued to
employee.21*
“'Sec. t. Proclamation No. 75, Nov. 24, 2010, cited in Magdalo v. Comelec. G.R. No.
190793, June 19, 2012
“’People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil. 699 (2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344
(1997), cited in Magdalo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
“’First par., Sec. 11(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14. s. 2018
“•Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, Oct. 10, 2000
“’Second par.. Sec. 11(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“"Sec. 12(e), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14. s. 2018

98 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
In cases where demotion is voluntary or at the instance
of employee, he or she is allowed to receive same step of
salary grade of the position where he or she voluntarily
sought appointed. A written consent shall be secured from
the demoted employee.207
Reclassification, defined.
It is a form of staffing modification and/or position classification
action that is applied only when there is substantial change in regular
duties and responsibilities of the position.2®1 Reclassification is the
generic term for changes in staff/position classification that includes
upgrading, downgrading, and recategorization.204
When prohibited.
In local government units, no reclassification is allowed
except when the position is actually vacant.210
Reclassification, effects of.
It may change any or all position attributes: position title, level,
and/or salary grade.2’1 It generally involves a change in position title
and may be accompanied by an upward or downward change in
salary.212
Reclassified position, vested right to it.
Reclassification of position requires issuance of
appointment but it is ministerial on the part of the appointing
officer or authority.212
The appointment of an incumbent permanent
employee whose position was reclassified is approved or
validated, regardless of whether he or she meets qualification
“"Third par.. Sec. 11(g), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“"First sentence, first par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“"Fourth sentence, first par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
2wSec. 325(f), KA. No. 7160, cited in fourth par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo
Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
-’’’Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
2,2Third sentence, first par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
2”Second par.. Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter 111 99
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
requirements of the position involved. The incumbent of the
reclassified position has a vested right to it but shall not be
promoted unless he or she meets qualification requirements
of the next higher position.214
Other human resource actions
Reassignment,2” detail,2” and designation217 are human resource
actions that do not require issuance of appointment but nevertheless
require an Office Order issued by the appointing officer or authority.2”1
Reassignment, defined.
It is movement of an employee across organizational structure
within same department or agency, which does not involve a reduction
in rank, status, or salary.2” A diminution in any one of these categories
suffices to constitute demotion and amounts to virtual dismissal. Even
if salary is not diminished, but either rank or status is, reassignment
amounts to demotion or dismissal.220
A reassignment that virtually removes power to supervise over
41 employees who are part of a Division Chief's staff and subordinates,
diminishes her status as it reduces her to a mere subordinate. While
the reassignment that diminishes her status is temporary, it diminishes
just the same, especially where reassignment is indefinite, it likewise
diminishes rank.221
Duration.
Reassignment of employees with station-specific
place of work indicated in their respective appointments
within geographical location of the agency is allowed only
for a maximum period of one year. Restoration or return
to original post or assignment shall be automatic without
2,4Third par., Sec. 11(h), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
2,sSec 13(a), Rule IV, CSC Memo Grc. No. 14, s. of 2018
2l6Sec. 13(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
2l7Sec. 13(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
2”Sec. 13, Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
2”Sec. 13(a), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
““’Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, Oct. 10, 2000
^’Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, Oct. 10, 2000
100 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
need of any order of restoration or revocation of the order of
reassignment.222
But where the special order of reassignment does not
set a definite date or duration and merely says return is
subject to a separate special order, it amounts to a floating
assignment that diminishes status or rank and violates
security of tenure.223
Station-specific appointment.
An appointment is considered station-specific when
the particular office or station where position is located is
specifically indicated on the face of appointment paper, or
the position title already specifies station, such as Human
Resource Management Officer, Accountant, Budget Officer,
Assessor, Social Welfare and Development Officer, and such
other positions with organizational unit or station-specific
function. Such position titles are considered station-specific
even if place of assignment is not indicated on the face of
appointment.224
Non-station-specific appointment.
If appointment is not station-specific, the one-year
maximum period of reassignment within geographical
location of the agency does not apply. However, the
employee concerned may request to recall reassignment
citing his or her reasons. The reassignment may also be
revoked or recalled by appointing officer or authority or be
invalidated by the Civil Service Commission or a competent
court, on appeal.225
Appointments to the staff of the Civil Service
Commission are not appointments to a specified public
office but rather appointments to particular positions or
ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position
Director IV, without specification of any particular office or
station. The reassignment of two Directors from the Central
“Sec. 13(a)(1), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, Oct. 10, 2000
224Sec 13(a)(1), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
225Sec. 13(a)(2), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter III 101
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Office of the Civil Service Commission, over which they did
not acquire a vested right, to its regional offices, does not
remove them without lawful cause, much less violate their
constitutional right to security of tenure226 provided it does
not substantially change title, rank, or salary.227 *
Where appointment of a principal does not refer to any
particular station or school, she could be assigned to any
station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific school. She may be assigned to any station or school,
as the exigencies of public service require even without her
consent.221' She has no right of choice.229
In default of any particular station stated in their
respective appointments, public officers cannot assert
security of tenure based on mere assignments. A contrary
rule erases altogether demarcation line repeatedly drawn
between appointment and assignment as two distinct
concepts in the law of public officers.230
Reassignment, when justified.
Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest
or exigency of public service, that refers to situations where delivery of
basic or vital services will be disrupted or emergency or crisis situations
or there is a need to respond to demands of public service,231 or that
services of a physician in another station is, in the opinion of the Health
Secretary, utilized more effectively,232 unless proven otherwise or if it
constitutes constructive dismissal.233
“6Femandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995
^Sta. Maria v. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637, (1970), cited in Fernandez v. Sto, Tomas, G.R.
No. 1)6418. March 7, 1995
^Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623, cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No.
116418, March 7, 1995
^Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138, 143, cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.
No. 116418, March 7, 1995
^Ibanez v. Comelec, 19 SCRA 1012-1013, cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.
No. 116418, March 7, 1995
231 First sentence, Sec. 13(a)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
^Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, 118 Phil. 728 (1963), cited in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.
No. 116418, March7, 1995
233First sentence. Sec. 13(a)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
102 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Reassignment, when deemed constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal exists when an official or
employee quits his or her work because of the agency
head's unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations,
which render continued work impossible because of
geographic location, financial dislocation and performance
of other duties and responsibilities inconsistent with those
attached to the position.234 Hence, the employee is illegally
dismissed.235
This may occur although there is no diminution
or reduction in rank, status or salary of the employee.236
Reassignment that results in constructive dismissal must be
sufficiently established.237
Reassignment of a Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools in Quezon City as Superintendent
of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as it
best fits his qualifications and experience, being an expert
in vocational technical education is more than temporary as
the Superintendent is described as fit for the reassigned job,
being an expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the transfer memorandum
to show reassignment is temporary or lasts until permanent
replacement is found. There being no period specified or
found, reassignment is indefinite, which feature definitely
violates security of tenure of the Superintendent.23"
Reassignment that constitutes constructive dismissal
may be any of the following:
(a) Reassignment of an employee to perform
duties and responsibilities inconsistent with duties and
responsibilities of his or her position such as from a position
of dignity to a more servile or menial job;2”
234Second sentence. Sec. 13(a)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“’Third sentence. Sec. 13(a)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“"Fourth sentence, Sec. 13(aX3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“’Last sentence. Sec. 13(a)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“"Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, Aug. 15, 2000
“"Sec. 13(a)(3Mi), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter III 103
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
(b) Reassignment to an office not in the existing
organizational structure;’®
(c) Reassignment to an existing office but employee
241
is not given any definite set of duties and responsibilities;24
(d) Reassignment that will cause significant financial
dislocation or will cause difficulty or hardship on the part of
the employee because of geographical location;242 or
(e) Reassignment that is done indiscriminately or
whimsically because the law is not intended as a convenient
shield for the appointing or disciplining officer to harass
or oppress a subordinate on the pretext of advancing and
promoting public interest such as reassignment of employees
twice within a year, or reassignment of career service officials
and employees with valid appointments during change of
administration of elective and appointive officials.243
Reassignment, remedy against.
The employee may appeal reassignment order within fifteen days
upon receipt to the Commission or its regional office with jurisdiction,
as provided under specific law, if he or she believes reassignment is
unjustified.244 Pending appeal, reassignment shall not be executory.245
The decision of the Civil Service Regional Office may be further
appealed to the Commission within fifteen days from receipt.246
Reassignment of public health workers, public social workers,
publicschool teachers, and other professions covered by special laws are
governed by their respective laws. But these Riles apply suppletorily.247
Detail, defined.
It is the temporary movement of an employee from one depart­
ment or agency to another that does not involve a reduction in rank,
24OSec. 13(a)(3Xii), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
24lSec 13(a)(3)(iii), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
242Sec. I3(a)(3)(iv), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
243Sec. I3(a)(3)(v), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
244First sentence, Sec. 13(aX4), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
245CSC v. Pacheo, G.R. No. 178021, Jan. 25,2012, cited in second sentence. Sec. 13(a)
(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
246Third sentence, Sec. 13(a)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
247Sec. 13(a)(5), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14. s. of 2018
104 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
status, or salary.248 It shall be covered by an agreement manifesting ar­
rangement between the agency heads that it shall not result in reduc­
tion in rank, status, or salary of the employee, duration of detail, duties
to be assigned to employee, and responsibilities of the parent agency
and receiving agency.249
When prohibited.
Any public official who makes or causes any detail of
any officer or employee in the civil service including public
school teachers, within election period is guilty of an election
offense, except upon prior approval of the Commission on
Elections.250
Duration.
Detail without consent shall be allowed only for a
period of one year.251 Detail with consent shall be allowed
for a maximum of three years. The extension or renewal of
detail is discretionary on the parent agency.252
Administrative supervision and control.
During period of detail, the parent agency relinquishes
administrative supervision and control over detailed
employee to the receiving agency. In this regard, the receiving
agency has these responsibilities: monitor punctuality
and attendance of employee, approve requests for leave,
evaluate employee's performance, grant authority to travel
and exercise other acts necessary to effectively supervise the
employee, provided, a report on said matters is submitted to
the parent agency for record purposes.253
Authority to discipline.
The authority to discipline detailed employee is still
vested in the appointing officer or authority of parent agency'
248Sec. 13(b), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ No. 14, s. of 2018
249Sec 13(b)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“°Sec. 261(h), Omnibus Election Code
“’Sec. 13(b)(2), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
2S2Sec. 13(b)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
’“Sec 13(b)(6), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter III 105
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
where he or she belongs. Authority to discipline includes
determination of existence of prinia facie case against detailed
employee, issuance of a formal charge, issuance of order
of preventive suspension if the case so warrants, conduct
of formal investigation, and rendering of decision on the
administrative case.254
With respect to the administrative case arising from
acts done by the employee in the receiving agency, it has the
right to initiate or file complaint against detailed employee
subject to provisions of the 2017 Rules of Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS).255
Human resource action.
All human resource actions and movements,
including monetization of leave credits, concerning detailed
employee, shall still be under jurisdiction of parent agency
notwithstanding that employee is detailed in another
agency.2*
Detail, remedy against.
The employee may appeal detail order within fifteen days upon
receipt to the Commission or regional office with jurisdiction if he or
she believes detail is unjustified. Pending appeal, detail order shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. The decision of
the regional office may be further appealed to the Commission within
fifteen days from receipt.237
Designation, defined.
It is a movement that involves an imposition of additional and/
or higher duties to be performed by a public official or employee that
is temporary and can be terminated anytime at pleasure of appointing
officer or authority. Designation may involve performance of duties
of another position, except designation as officers or members of
Committees such as BAC, HRMPSB, PMT, on a concurrent capacity or
on full-time basis.258
“’First par.. Sec 13(b)(9), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“^cond par.. Sec. 13(b)(9), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“Sec. 13(b)(10), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“’Sec. 13(b)(5), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“•First par.. Sec 13(c), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
106 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Acting Capacity and Officer-in-Charge, distinguished.
A designation in acting capacity entails not only
exercise of ministerial functions attached to position but also
exercise of discretion since the person designated is deemed
to be incumbent of the position.259
Officials designated as Officer-in-Charge enjoy limited
powers confined to functions of administration and ensuring
that the office continues its usual activities. The Officer-in-
Charge may not be deemed to possess power to appoint
employees as the same involves exercise of discretion
beyond power of an Officer-in-Charge, unless designation
order issued by proper appointing officer or authority
expressly includes power to issue appointment.260
A mere designation does not confer upon the designee security
of tenure in the position or office which he or she occupies in an acting
capacity only.26'
Duration.
For positions with incumbents who temporarily
cannot perform duties of position due to vacation or sick
leave, study leave, scholarship, maternity leave, special
assignments, designation should be synchronized with
absence of incumbent, unless earlier revoked or recalled by
appointing officer or authority.262 *
However, designation of employees may be renewed
every year in the exigency of service but not to exceed two
years.261 For positions without incumbents, a designation
may be made only for a maximum of one year. However,
designation of employees may be renewed every year in the
exigency of service but not to exceed two years.264
259CSC Res. No. 000778, March 24, 2000, cited in second par.. Sec. 13(c), Rule IV,
CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“"CSC Res. No. 000778, March 24, 2000, cited in third par.. Sec. 13(c), Rule IV, CSC
Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“'Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116283, Oct 6, 1995
“"First sentence. Sec. 13(c)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
“’Second sentence. Sec. 13(c)(3), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
2MSec. 13(c)(4), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14, s. of 2018
Chapter III 107
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Designees, entitlement to salary.
Designees cannot be granted salaries of positions
they are designated to. However, allowances that go with
performance of functions such as Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) or Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) may be granted as provided
under provisions of the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) or appropriation ordinance of the respective local
sanggMMwm, provided, grant of the same is specifically stated
in the designation order.265
Presidential power to appoint under the Constitution
Nature.
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving
exercise of discretion.266 The power to appoint is vested in the Chief
Executive262 that is essentially a grant of power to execute laws. But the
President alone and unaided could not execute laws. He must execute
them by assistance of subordinates.
As the President is charged specifically to take care that laws be
faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of
express words, is that as part of his executive power, he should select
those who were to act for him under his direction in execution of laws.
The further implication must be, in the absence of any express limitation
respecting removals, that as his selection of administrative officers is
essential to execution of laws by him, so must be his power of removing
those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.266
Limitation.
The appointing power is exclusive prerogative of
the President, upon which Congress may not limit, except
those resulting from need to secure concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from exercise of limited
“"Sec. 13(c)(7), Rule IV, CSC Memo Circ. No. 14. s. of 2018
"“Concepcion v. Paredes (1921), 42 Phil. 599, cited in Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927
“rManalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
“"Fisher Ames, 1 Annals of Congress, 474, cited in cited in Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979. April 1, 1927
 108 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
legislative power to prescribe qualifications to a given
appointive office.269 270
The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and
partly executive. The legislature creates office, defines its
powers, limits its duration, and annexes compensation. This
done, legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing
to do with designating the person to fill the office.
If legislature determines powers, honors, and
emoluments of an office, it should not designate the officer.
The nature of things restrains and confines legislative and
executive authorities in this respect, and the Constitution
stipulates independence of each government branch.370
How made.
The President nominates and, with consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoints heads of executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of armed forces from rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in the Constitution.
He also appoints all other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.271
The President has power to appoint during recess
of Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointment is effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of
Congress.272
2h9Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954
270Myers v. US (1926), 272 U.S., 52; 71 Law. Ed., 160, citing 1 Annals of Congress,
581, 582; Madison the Federalist, Nos. 47, 46, cited in Government of the Philippine Is­
lands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927
271 First par.. Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369, Aug. 11, 1999
^Second par., Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R.
No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
Chapter 111 109
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Presidential appointees, grouped.
There are four groups of government officers to be appointed by
the President: First, heads of executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in the Constitution.273
Consent, when required.
Only presidential appointments enumerated in
first group require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.274 Appointments of such officers are initiated
by nomination and, if the Commission on Appointments
confirms it, the President appoints.275
Other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President under the Constitution are Chairs and Commis­
sioners of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, Commission on Audit and regular members of the
Judicial and Bar Council who are appointed by the President
with consent of the Commission on Appointments.276
Exception.
Not all officers whose appointments are
vested in the President under the Constitution
require consent of the Commission on Appoint­
ments. While the Constitution affords President
power to appoint certain officers, it likewise spec­
ifies such appointment does not require consent
for these positions: ex officio members of the Judi­
cial and Bar Council like the representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Mem­
ber of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector,277 Members of the Supreme
273First sentence, par. 1., Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
274Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987; Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369, Aug. 11, 1999
275Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No.
79974, Dec. 17,1987
276Sec 1(2), Art. IX-B, Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C, Sec 1(2), Art. IX-D, Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution
277Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII. 1987 Constitution
 110 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Court and judges of lower courts,278 the Ombuds­
man and his Deputies.7”
Since seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
Congress2" may be filled by appointment by the President
by express constitutional provision,2’1 it is indubitable that
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
are among other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in the Constitution2"2 as well as members
of the regional consultative commission appointed by the
President from a list of multi-sectoral bodies to assist and
participate in enactment of organic acts for each autonomous
region.*20
Consent, when not required.
Appointments of senior officers of the Philippine
National Police who were promoted to ranks of Chief
Superintendent and Director need not be confirmed. The
Philippine National Police is not akin to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines as they are separate and distinct from each
other. No less than the Constitution distinguishes.2"
Armed forces and police, distinguished.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is com­
posed of a citizen armed force that undergoes
military training and service and keeps a regular
force necessary to secure the State2*5 whereas the
police force is civilian in character.2"6
27"Sec. 9, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
2”Sec. 9, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
“"Sec. 5(2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Deles v. The Commission on Consti­
tutional Commissions, C.R. No. 83216, Sept. 4, 1989, 177 SCRA 259, 260
“'Sec. 7, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Deles v. The Commission on Consti­
tutional Commissions, C.R. No. 83216, Sept. 4, 1989, 177 SCRA 259, 260
“’First sentence, Sec. 16, Art. Vll, 1987 Constitution, cited in Deles v. Tire Com­
mission on Constitutional Commissions, C.R. No. 83216, Sept. 4, 1989, 177 SCRA 259, 260
2OSec. 18, Art. X, 1987 Constitution, cited in Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974,
Dec. 17, 1987
“"Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
2"5Sec. 4, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369,
Aug. 11, 1999
“"Sec. 6, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369,
Aug. 11, 1999
Chapter III 111
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
A law further distinguishes, no element
of police force shall be military nor shall active
members of the armed forces occupy any of its
positions.2"7 The police force is different from and
independent of the armed forces and military
ranks are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police.
Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the
Philippine National Police do not fall under first category,
and the Commission on Appointments need not confirm
their appointments even if ranked equal to that of colonel or
naval captain.2"8
Congress cannot by law expand power of confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence, like the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.™
Provisions of law2*1 empowering the Commission on
Appointments to confirm public officials whose appoint­
ments are not required to be confirmed by the Constitution
is unconstitutional. Even if officers to be appointed may be
higher in rank than some officers whose appointments are
to be confirmed, their appointments still do not need confir­
mation if they are not enumerated in the first group. To il­
lustrate, appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires
no confirmation even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in
armed forces or a consul in consular service.2”
Second, all other government officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law.2” When Congress creates inferior
offices and omits to provide for appointments to them, or provides in
an unconstitutional way for such appointment, the officers are within
“’Sec. 2, R.A. 6975, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
“•Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
“*Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994
“"Secs. 21 and 31, R.A. 6975, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11,
1999
“'Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987
292Second sentence, first par., Sec. 16, Art. Vll, 1987 Constitution; Sarmiento v.
Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987; Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
112 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
meaning of the clause officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law and power to appoint such officers
devolves on the President.*2”
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint.2** Congress cannot, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the
President to government officers additional to those expressly men­
tioned in the Constitution2” whose appointments require confirmation.2*
Undeniably, the Chair and Commissioners of the National Labor
Relations Commission are not among the officers enumerated in the
first group that require confirmation. They are referred to as those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.2” While
their appointments were upheld, the law2” authorizing the President
to appoint them is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires
confirmation.2”
Also, since the Chair and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights are not among the positions mentioned in the first group that
require confirmation, it follows their appointment by the President does
not need review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
While their appointment is not specifically provided for in
the Constitution unlike the Chairs and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, they
are among the officers whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint.™ That law is in the form of an Executive Order authorizing
the President to appoint them.1"'
2”USC. Cont.. Par. II, p. 529, citing Op., Atty. Gen. 213, cited in Sarmiento v. Mison,
G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987
’’’Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 16. Art. VIL 1987 Constitution; Sarmiento v.
Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987; Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
’’’First sentence. Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Calderon v. Carale,
G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
2*Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
’’’Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
’’’Sec. 13, R.A. 6715, amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, cited in Calderon v.
Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
’’’Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
™Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989, 172 SCRA 160, cited in
Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992
■1°’Sec. 2(c), E.O.163, May 5,1987, cited in Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April
13, 1989, 172 SCRA 160, cited in Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23. 1992
Chapter HI 113
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs, a bureau head, is not one of those within first group of
appointments where consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The position of heads of bureaus is deliberately excluded
from appointments that need confirmation.-102 But the President is
expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs.™
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.™ The phrase in the President
alone emphasizes authority of Congress to decide whether appointment
of officers lower in rank should be preserved for the President alone or may
be shared with courts, heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.™
The Commission on Appointments as confirming authority
History and purpose.
The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm
certain presidential appointments contemplates a system of checks and
balances between executive and legislative branches of government.™
Under the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required its consent. It thus became a venue of horse-trading and similar
malpractices.307 The 1973 Constitution that placed in the President
absolute power to appoint with hardly any check by the legislature,
abused such power.
The 1987 Constitution framers thus imperatively established
a middle-ground by subjecting certain high government positions to
confirmation and allowing other positions within exclusive appointing
power of the President.™
™Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987
™Sec. 601, R.A. 1937, as amended by PD No. 34, Oct. 27, 1972. cited in Sarmiento
v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17,1987
™Third sentence, first par.. Sec. 16, Art. VU, 1987 Constitution; Sec. Sarmiento v.
Mison, G.R. No. 79974, Dec. 17, 1987; Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
™The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary by
Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 765
™Sarmiento 111 v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369, Aug. 11, 1999
■’•’’Sarmiento 111 v. Mison, 156 SCRA 556, cited in Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369, Aug. 11, 1999
™Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, Aug. 11, 1999
114 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Composition.
The Commission on Appointments consists of the Senate
President, as er officio Chair, twelve Senators and twelve Members
of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system.’"’
Proportional representation, rationale.
Proportional representation checks on majority party
in the Senate and helps maintain balance of power. No party
can claim more than what it is entitled to. To allow it to
elect more than its proportional share of members confers
greater party share in the Commission on Appointments
membership and more power to impose its will on minority,
who by same token, diminishes its rightful membership in
it.
It also assures representation of any political party who
succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided the
number of senators so elected enables it to put representative
to the Commission on Appointments. ’10
How determined.
In one case that involves the Senate, the mathematical
formula to determine proportional representation as agreed
by parties is — number of senators of a political party
divided by total number of senators elected and multiplied
by twelve seats.
Thus, when four different parties are represented
by 15, 5, 3 and 1 senators, they are entitled to 7.5, 2.5, 1.5
and .5 members in the Commission on Appointments,
respectively.’"
Fractional membership, prohibited conversion.
The fractional half membership cannot be converted
into a whole membership, say, 7.5 to 8 or .5 to 1, as it increases
wSec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
’’"Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
’"Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
Chapter III 115
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
representation of one party and correspondingly reduces
representation of the others to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. Otherwise, it results in the
anomaly of 13 senators or more, where the Constitution
allows only twelve.
To disturb the resulting fractional membership of
political parties by adding together two halves to make a
whole, breaches rule on proportional representation as it
gives majority party added member by utilizing fractional
membership of minority party that is deprived of half a
representation.
The provision on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion
to majority party’ in the Senate to disobey it, otherwise the
party' with majority representation in either House can,
by sheer force of numbers, impose its will on the hapless
minority.’11
Exception.
Except by force of circumstance, where only two parties
compose the Senate represented by 23 Senators belonging
to majority party and one Senator as lone opposition, a
fractional membership may be rounded up into one member
for minority' party.’1’
But while prohibition against rounding off may result
in less than 12 members, it is not mandatory' to elect 12
Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives
to it. The Constitution does not require election of twelve
Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives
in order for the Commission on Appointments to function.
What is required is that there be at least majority of entire
membership.
Other Constitutional collegial bodies perform their
functions even if not fully constituted and even if their
composition is expressly' specified by the Constitution
’l2Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
’”Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), cited in Guingona v. Conzales, G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20,1992
 116 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
like the Supreme Court,314 Civil Service Commission,315
Commission on Elections,316 or the Commission on Audit317
so long as there is required quorum, usually a majority of its
membership.
The Commission on Appointments may perform
its functions and transact its business even if only ten
Senators are elected to it as long as quorum exists,31’ which
is at least thirteen members, provided at least four members
constituting quorum should come from either House.31’
In the Senate thus, these guidelines are laid down
accordingly: (a) a political party or coalition must have
at least two duly elected Senators for ever}' seat in the
Commission on Appointments and, (b) where there are
more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party or coalition with a single Senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat in it.330
In another case that involves the House of
Representatives, when one political party represents 80%
of House membership, it is entitled to ten members in the
Commission on Appointments, and remaining two seats are
apportioned to next largest party and principal opposition
in the House.
To be able to claim proportional membership in it, a
political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House
membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least
17 district representatives. An opposition party with
only one member representing less than 1% of the House
membership is not entitled to one of twelve House seats.
314Sec. 4, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20, 1992
315Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution, cited in Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20, 1992
316Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution, cited in Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20, 1992
317Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D, 1987 Constitution, cited in Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20, 1992
3”Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
3”Sec. 10, Chapter 3, Rules of the Commission on Appointments, cited in Guingona
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
““Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
Chapter III 117
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
despite endorsement of nine district representatives who are
members of another party.321
Justiciability.
The legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by
the Constitution, is justiciable. Even if it were political in
nature, it would still come within power of judicial review322
under expanded jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme
Court which includes authority to determine whether any
government branch or instrumentality gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.323
Where what is involved is how to resolve fractional
membership, the issue is constitutional which, when prop­
erly raised in context of alleged facts, procedural questions
acquire relatively minor significance324 and transcendental
importance to the public of the case demands they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside procedural techni­
calities.325
Changes in party membership, effects of.
The House of Representatives has authority to change
its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time changes that may transpire in political
alignments of its membership. But such changes must
be permanent and do not include temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political
loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shift of
allegiance from one political party to another.
By force of political realignment in the House of
Representatives, it may revise its representation in it by
“'Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
322Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, Dec. 21, 1989, cited in Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R.
No. 86649, July 12, 1990
323Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649,
July 12, 1990
“‘Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989), cited in Guingona v. Gonzales. G.R. No.
106971, Oct. 20, 1992
32SOsntena v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750 (1991), cited in Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 106971, Oct. 20, 1992
 118 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
withdrawing the seat occupied by a member of a political
party which membership substantially decreased and giving
it to another newly reorganized political party.116
Kinds of presidential appointment
Acting capacity appointment.
in case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President such as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.127
But the acting secretary need not be the undersecretary even
if seemingly he or she is next-in-rank, as the law provides the
undersecretary temporarily discharges the duties of the secretary in the
latter's absence or inability to discharge his duties for any cause or in
case of vacancy of the said office.32"
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.329
Limitation.
As provided by law, acting appointments cannot exceed
one year330 as a safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. But there is no abuse
where the President issued ad interim appointments to those
earlier appointed acting secretary immediately upon recess
of Congress, and way before the lapse of one year.331
“‘Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, Dec. 21, 1989
“’Pimentel v. Ermita, C.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
“"Sec. 10(5), Chapter 11, Book IV, E.O. 292, cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No.
164978, Oct. 13, 2005
""’Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978. Oct. 13,2005
“"Sec. 17(3), Chapter 5, Title 1, Book III, E.0.292, cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
“’Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
119
Chapter III
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Ad interim appointment.
The President has power to appoint during recess of Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments are effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
next adjournment of the Congress.332
Nature.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once appointee qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes it permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of
Congress.313
It is not temporary even if ad interim literally means in
the meantime or for the time being. It is not the meaning nor
the use intended in the context of Philippine law. It is not
descriptive of the nature of appointment. Rather, it is used to
denote the manner in which the appointment was made.331
Thus, the ad interim appointments of the Chair and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections, being
permanent in character, do not violate335 constitutional
prohibition against their appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity.336
Ad interim and acting capacity, distinguished.
Both ad interim and acting capacity appointments are
effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are
extended only during recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
"“Second par.. Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
"“Mailbag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
""*PLM v. IAC, 140 SCRA 22 (1985), cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036,
April 2, 2002
"“Matibag v. Benipayo, C.R. No. 149036, April 2. 2002
“"Last sentence, Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution, cited in Matibag v.
Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
 120
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Moreover, ad interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection,
acting appointments are not. Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important offices, but if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing need for confirmation.357
Efficacy.
Under the Constitution, when the President appoints
during recess of Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
such appointment is effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of
Congress.35" It remains effective until such disapproval or
next adjournment, signifying it can no longer be withdrawn
or revoked by the President.
The Constitution imposes no condition on the efficacy
of an ad interim appointment, and thus it takes effect
immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and
exercise, as a de jure officer, all powers pertaining to it.3”
When the President appoints while Congress is in
session, and the appointment requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, the appointee assumes
office only upon its consent. It is not so with reference to ad
interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual
chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without
loss of time. His title to such office is complete.350
An ad interim appointee who qualified and assumed
office becomes at that moment a government employee and
thus part of civil service. He enjoys constitutional protection
that no officer or employee in the civil service is removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.351
’’’Joaquin C. Bemas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
A Commentary 772 (1996), cited in Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13.2005
■""Second par.. Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Matibag v. Benipayo,
G.R. No. 149036, April 2. 2002
’■"Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
■"“Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971),
cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
"'Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution, cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2. 2002
Chapter III 121
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irre­
vocable once appointee qualified into office. Its withdrawal
or revocation is possible only if it is communicated to ap­
pointee before the moment he qualifies, and any subsequent
withdrawal or revocation tantamount to removal from of­
fice.355
***
Ad interim appointment, modes of termination.
The Constitution specifies two causes, in the form of
resolutory conditions, to terminate ad interim appointments.
One is disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
and the other is adjournment of Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on it.30
Disapproval.
Once disapproved, the ad interim appointee can no
longer be extended a new appointment. It is a final decision
of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointing authority of the President.
It is a decision on the merits, a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to consent after deliberating on qualifications
of appointee.
Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal
from such decision, disapproval is final and binding on
appointee as well as on appointing power. In this instance,
the President can no longer renew appointment not because
of constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because
of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to
withhold its consent.355
An ad interim appointment ceases efficacy upon
disapproval. The incumbent cannot continue holding
office over positive objection of the Commission on
Appointments.355
"’Concurring opinion, Justice Cesar Bengzon in Erana v. De Dios, 85 Phil. 17
(1949), cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
"’Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
355Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
"’Guevara v. Inocentes, 16SCRA 379 (1966), cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002

122 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Adjournment.
Ad interim appointment also ceases, also, upon next
adjournment of Congress, simply because the President
may then issue new appointments not because of implied
disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction
during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution,
the Commission may affect adversely interim appointments
only by action, never by omission.
If adjournment of Congress were an implied
disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior to it,
then the President could no longer appoint those so by­
passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President
may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason
for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not
their disapproval allegedly inferred from such omission
of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said
adjournment of Congress, the President is free to make ad
interim appointments or reappointments.546
Thus, the ad interim appointments of the Chair and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections and
their subsequent renewals do not violate54’ prohibition
on reappointments546 because there were no previous
commitments that were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment.54*
Bypassed appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is bypassed because of
lack of time or failure by the Commission on Appointments
to organize is another matter. A bypassed appointment is
one that has not been finally acted upon on merits by the
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session
of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission
■'“Guevara v. Inocentes, 16SCRA379 (1966), cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002
■“’Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
■“"Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution, cited in Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002
■“’Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002
Chapter III 123
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew ad interim
appointment of a bypassed appointee.550
Revocation of appointment, when allowed.
Appointments extended by an Acting President remain effective,
unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of office.551 *
The Judicial and Bar Council as recommending authority
Purpose.
Its creation is a significant innovation introduced by the 1986
Constitutional Commission in response to suggestion553 of practicing
lawyers to forestall as much as possible influence of partisan politics.
In the past, when appointment of judges had to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, judges had to kowtow to members
of legislative body to get an appointment or request support for its
confirmation.555
Jurisdiction.
The principal function of the Judicial and Bar Council is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary. It may however exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.554
Supervisory power of the Supreme Court.
The Judicial and Bar Council is under supervision of,555
and exists as an office subordinate to, the Supreme Court.
It neither assumes an existence separate from judiciary. It
is not intended to be an independent Constitutional body
55OMatibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2. 2002
J5’Sec. 14. Art. VU, 1987 Constitution
553The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by
Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 881
555Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 437 (1991), cited in The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by Bemas, SJ.. 1996 Ed., p. 881
554Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII
555Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
 124 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
but a Constitutional office created and expressly subjected
to supervision by the Supreme Court.556
As an incident of its power to supervise the Judicial and
Bar Council thus, the Supreme Court has authority to insure
it faithfully executes its constitutional duties. Wearing its hat
of supervision, the Supreme Court is empowered to inquire
into processes leading to nomination for Chief Justice to
determine whether nominee was eligible to be a candidate
to the position to begin with.157
Limitation.
But the Supreme Court cannot dictate on the Judicial
and Bar Council results of its assigned task, i.e., who to
recommend or what standards to use to determine who
to recommend. It cannot even direct the Judicial and Bar
Council on how and when to do its duty, but it can, under
its power of supervision, direct it to take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties, if the duties are not being performed because of its
fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting
performance.35*
Composition.
It is composed of the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chair, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of Congress as ex-officio Members3”
and four regular members who are340 a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.36' The Clerk of the Supreme Court
serves as Secretary ex-officio and keeps a record of its proceedings.362
’’‘Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
“’Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
““De Castro v. JBC, 632 Phil. 700 (2010), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018
3WSec. 8(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
’"’Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 448 (1991), cited in The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 881
“'Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
’“See. 8(3), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
Chapter III 125
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Number of members.
In the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the
framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the
four regular members, three representatives from major
branches of government, the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chair
representing judicial department, the Secretary of Justice
and a representative of Congress as ex-officio members
representing executive and legislative departments, respec­
tively.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress
is entitled to one representative to it, each House sent a
representative to it, not together, but alternately or by
rotation.363
In 1994 however, its seven-member composition
was substantially altered. An eighth member was added
to it as two representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in it, with each having one-half of a
vote364 based on assumption that when the provision on
its composition was approved, the legislature would be a
unicameral body. Hence, only one member of such body
was placed in the Judicial and Bar Council.
Whence then should the legislative member come
from — the Senate or from the House of Representatives?
The solution found for this question as practiced before is
that a member each comes from both Houses but they each
have only half a vote.365 But in 2001, the Judicial and Bar
Council en banc allowed representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each.366
’“Chavez v. JBC. G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
364Lisl of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex-Officio Secretaries
and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council,
rollo, pp. 62-63, cited in Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
“The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by
Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 882
’“List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex-Officio Secretaries
and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council,
rollo, pp. 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Sane Executive Meeting, Jan. 12, 2000 and Min­
utes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001, cited in Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242,
April 16,2013

126 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
This numerical composition is unconstitutional. In
opting to use the singular letter a to describe representative
of Congress, the Filipino people through the framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one seat in the
Judicial and Bar Council. Had the intention been otherwise,
the Constitution, could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.-*’
The total is seven, not eight. In so providing, the
framers simply recognized the Legislature, not because it
was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government. **
The lone representative of Congress is entitled to
one full vote, disallowing scheme of splitting it into half,
between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this
unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process,
it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution
authorized.
To permit splitting of one vote into two or more clear­
ly circumvents the constitution that should not be counte­
nanced. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned
one member of Congress sitting in the Judicial and Bar
Council, it is sensible to presume that this representation
carries with him one full vote.*9
Manner of appointment and term of office.
The President appoints the regular members of the
Judicial and Bar Council fora term of four years with consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Of the members first
appointed, representative of the Integrated Bar served for
four years, professor of law for three years, retired Justice for
two years, and private sector representative for one year.™
The four-year term allows staggering of appointments for
purposes of continuity.”1
"Chavez v. JBC, C.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
"Chavez v. JBC, C.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
"Chavez v. JBC. C.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
■™Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
”’Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 448 (1991), cited in The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 881
Chapter III 127
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
The requirement that regular members be appointed
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments allows
a political check on the President's appointing authority
which otherwise would be the sole political influence on
judicial appointments.”3
Prohibited appointments
Appointment of relatives or nepotism, or of political lame ducks,
appointment to incompatible office, dual or multiple offices, forbidden
office, midnight appointments, and those made during election period
are prohibited.
Nepotism, defined.
It is appointment issued in favor of a relative within third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity on any appointing authority,
recommending authority, chief of bureau or office, and person exer­
cising immediate supervision over appointee.”3
Relative, identified.
The word relative and members of the family refer to
those related within third degree of either consanguinity or
affinity.”4 Where appointee is the daughter of a member of
the Commission en banc that appointed her, appointment
was nullified because they are relatives within first civil
degree of consanguinity.”5
Exception.
By way of exception, these are not covered
by prohibition: persons employed in a confiden­
tial capacity, teachers, physicians, and members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”*1
”3Cavetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 490-491 (1991), cited in The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, by Bernas, S.J., 1996 Ed., pp. 881-882
373Sec. 59, Chapter 1, Title A, Book V, Administrative Code of 187, cited in CSC v.
Cortes, C.R. No. 200103, April 23. 2014
”*Second par.. Sec. 59, Chapter 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987
375CSC v. Cortes. C.R. No. 200103, April 23,2014
”*Sec. 59, Chapter I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, cited in CSC v. Cortes,
C.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
 128
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
All appointments in the national, provincial, city, and municipal
governments or in any of its branches or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of appointing or recommending authority, or of chief of bureau
or office, or of persons exercising immediate supervision over him or
her, are prohibited.177
The prohibition applies even if appointing authority is composed
of a group of individuals as a body, like the Commission on Human
Rights en banc that appointed the daughter of one of its members. While
the en banc, a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives
to speak of, the prohibitive veil on nepotism still applies. If acts that
cannot be legally done directly be done indirectly, all laws become
illusory.’7'
Rationale.
It is to take out discretion of appointing or recom­
mending authority on the matter of appointing or
recommending for appointment of a relative. It insures
objectivity of appointing or recommending official by
preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.17’ It is
one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and efficiency
of its personnel.3'"
The father's abstention from voting on appointment
of his daughter by the Commission en banc where he is a
member does not cure nepotistic character of his daughter's
appointment because the evil sought avoided by prohibition
still exists. His mere presence during deliberation for
appointment of his daughter created an impression of
influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality
of the appointing authority.3**
377First par.. Sec. 59, Chapter I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987
37fCSC V. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
’’’Dcbulgado v. CSC, C.R. No. 111471, Sept. 26, 1994,237SCRA 184, cited in CSC v.
Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
■’'“CSC v. Dacoycoy, 366 Phil. 86 (1999), cited in CSC v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103,
April 23,2014
■"’CSC v. Cortes, C.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Chapter ill 129
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Incompatible office.
Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the
functions of the two. Where one office is not subordinate to the other,
nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent or
repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares
acceptance of one is the vacation of the other.
The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from
nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to
be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which
would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other.
The offices must subordinate, one over the other, and they must,
per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are
incompatible at common law.3®
Incompatibility, test of.
There is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices performing functions of
both as long as there is no incompatibility.3*3
The crucial test to determine whether incompatibility
exists between two offices is3*4 whether one office is
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one has the right to
interfere with the other3® as when the duties of one agency
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on,
and review of, the actions of another agency.3®
The concurrent appointment as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
(CPLC), whose duties include giving independent and impartial
legal advice on the actions of heads of various executive departments
and agencies, and as Chair of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), an agency under the executive department,
involves incompatible offices.
■"’People v. Green, 13 Sickels 295, 58 N.Y. 295, 1874 WL 11282 (N.Y.), cited in Public
Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
■"’Quimson v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705, 709 (1956), cited in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
•"'Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
•"’People v. Green, 13 Sickels 295, 58 N.Y. 295, 1874 WL 11282 (N.Y.), cited in Public
Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30,2006
""Public Interest Center, Inc v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
 130 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The actions of the PCGG Chair are reviewable by the CPLC who
will be required to give legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG
Chair and review any investigation conducted by the PCGG, which
may involve himself as PCGG Chair. In such cases, questions on his
impartiality will inevitably be raised, a situation the law seeks to avoid
in prohibiting holding of incompatible offices.
The appointment to the PCGG Chair is not required by the
primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions
of the PCGG Chair involve recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by a former president, his family and associates and the investigation of
graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the president.
On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass
a different matter, that is, review and drafting of legal orders referred
to him by the president. It thus fails to comply with constitutional
standard of compatibility3*7 that says unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
holds any other office or employment in the government or any of its
subdivision, agency or instrumentality, including government owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.-1*"
Dual or multiple offices.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, the President,
Vice-President, Cabinet Members, and their deputies and assistants
are prohibited to hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.3*’
Holding office, defined.
To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same,
or to be in possession and administration.’*’
Holding any other office pertains to both appointment
and designation because appointee or designee performs
duties and functions of office. The constitutional prohibition
against dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible
'"’Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, C.R. No. 138965, June 30. 2006
“"Sec. 7, Art. 1X-B, 1987 Constitution, cited in Public Interest Center. Inc. v. Elma.
C.R. No. 138965, June 30,2006
•’’’First par.. Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
’“’Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Ed., p. 749, cited in Funa v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 184740, Feb. 11, 2010
Chapter III 131
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
offices, refers to holding of office, and not to nature of
appointment or designation.
It does not matter whether the Department of Trans­
portation and Communications Undersecretary concurrently
serves as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Administrator
of Marina in a temporary’ designation capacity.”1
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by government or any of its subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.”2
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not normally
imposed on other public officials or employees such as Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
it stricter prohibitions.”’
But aside from the President and Vice-President, this prohibition
applies only to Cabinet Members, their deputies and assistants. Public
officials ranked equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant
Secretary are not covered by prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General.”*
It neither applies to the PCGG Chair nor the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary nor an
assistant secretary, even if the former may have same rank as the latter
positions.”5
Rationale.
It is aimed to prevent concentration of powers in the
executive department officials, specifically the President,
”’Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, Feb. II, 2010
’’’First par.. Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
’’’Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA317 (1991)
”*U.S. v. Mouat, 124 US 303 (1888), cited in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R.
No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53
’’’Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, C.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53
132
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Vice-President, Cabinet Members, and their deputies and
assistants.*3*
Being head of an executive department is no mean
job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,
specialized knowledge, skills and expertise.
The practice of designating Cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants as members of governing bodies or
boa rdsof various government agenciesand instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
became prevalent when the president exercised legislative
powers during martial law.
Newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and gov­
ernment-owned or controlled corporations proliferated as
created by presidential decrees and other modes of presi­
dential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the
board with corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems,
allowances and other perquisites of office.
This practice of holding multiple government offices or
positions soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials
who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self­
enrichment. Particularly odious and revolting to the people's
sense of propriety and morality in government service was
the report of the Commission on Audit that several persons,
including the first lady, served as members of governing
boards of ten to 29 governmental agencies, instrumentalities
and corporations, with the first lady holding 23. This blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes
of discontent with the Marcos regime.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a
department head's ability and expertise, he should be
allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without
distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention
and energy among too many positions of responsibility,
which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
^Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, Feb. 11, 2010
Chapter III 133
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Surely, the advantages to be derived from this
concentration of attention, knowledge, and expertise,
particularly at this state of our national and economic
development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin
and taking in more than he can handle.3”
Exceptions.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
must be literally interpreted to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-
President being appointed as Member of the Cabinet3* or
acting as President3* and the Justice Secretary being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.*"
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the
1987 Constitution is to impose stricter prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their
deputies, and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in government during their tenure,
the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal
severity.
The executive order limiting Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold two
positions in government and government corporations is
unconstitutional as it actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment that directly contravenes express
mandate of the Constitution. The prohibition imposed
on the President and his official family embraces all, the
disqualification absolute.
But the prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment against the President and his official
family does not apply to posts occupied without additional
’’’Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, Feb. 22,
1991
’’“Sec. 3(2), Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 amd 83815, Feb. 22. 1991
3*Sec. 7, pars. (2) and (3), Art. Vll, 1987 Constitution, cited in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, Feb. 22, 1991
*”Sec. 8(1), Art. Vll, 1987 Constitution, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, Feb. 22, 1991
 134 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by primary functions of office.
For such additional duties and functions to not
transgress constitutional prohibition, they must be required
by primary functions of the official concerned, who is to
perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law, without receiving any additional compensation for it.*1
Ex-officio, defined.
Ex-officio means from office; by virtue of of­
fice. It refers to an authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon
individual character, but rather annexed to offi­
cial position.
It likewise denotes an act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that con­
ferred by the office.
The ex-officio position being actually and
in legal contemplation part of principal office, it
follows the official concerned has no right to re­
ceive additional compensation for his services in
said position, as these services are already paid
for and covered by compensation attached to his
principal office.*02
Ex-officio position, examples.
An ex-officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain of­
fice, and without further warrant or appoint­
ment.*05 To illustrate, by express provision of law,
the Secretary of Transportation and Communi­
cations is the ex-officio Chair of the Board of the
“’Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, Feb. 22,
1991
“’Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
“’ISA Words and Phrases, p. 392, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
Chapter 111 135
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Philippine Ports Authority,*0* and the Light Rail
Transit Authority.*05
The President chairs the National Security
Council in an ex-officio capacity with the Vice-
President, Executive Secretary, Secretaries of Na­
tional Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment,
and Local Government as members in similar
capacity.*06
The Secretary of Labor and Employment
chairs the Board of Trustees of the National
Manpower and Youth Council of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration while the
Secretaries of Finance and Budget sit in the Mon­
etary Board.*07
The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other
office within contemplation of constitutional prohibition but
are properly imposition of additional duties and functions
on said officials.*0"
Any other office, defined.
If functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions fall under the purview of any other office
prohibited by the Constitution.*0*
Any other office, examples.
An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting
as member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement
*°*Sec. 7, E.O 778, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317(1991)
“’Sec. 1, E.O. 210, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary. 194
SCRA 317 (1991)
*°"E.0.115, Dec. 24, 1986, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary,
194 SCRA 317 (1991)
“’Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
“"Martin v. Smith, 140 A.L.R. 1073; Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District,
173 A.L.R. 407, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and
83815, Feb. 22, 1991
““Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
i
 136 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such
positions that confer official management functions and/
or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.410
But even if the DOTC Undersecretary does not receive additional
compensation when designated officer in charge of the Office of the
Administrator of Marina, she still falls under stricter constitutional
prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices where it is not
clearly shown that she is designated in an ex-officio capacity as required
by primary functions of her office.4"
Primary functions, defined.
The term primary used to describe functions refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function.412 The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary
functions.4”
Primary functions, examples.
Examples of designations to positions by virtue of
one's primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and
Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the
Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as
Chair of the Maritime Industry Authority414 and the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
Applicability against other elective officials.
No elective official is eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure415 unless
410Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
‘"Funa v. Executive Secretary, C.R. No. 184740, Feb. 11, 2010
4I233A Words and Phrases, p. 210, citing Collector of Revenue v. Louisiana Ready
Mix Co., La. App., 197 S.2d 141, 145, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Sec­
retary, 194 SCRA317 (1991)
4,JCivil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary’, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
4,4Sec. 7, PD No. 474, cited in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991)
4,5Par. 1, Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution
Chapter III 137
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
he or she resigns elective position. The appointment of an elective
official who accepts appointment without first resigning his elective
position is invalid. But he does not forfeit his elective seat.4"'
The law directing the president to appoint the incumbent city
mayor as chair and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority
contravenes this constitutional prohibition. The fact that the expertise
of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the
body politic is of no moment.417
Rationale.
It expresses policy against concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or
employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery' of public services. It affirms that a
public office is a full-time job.418
The basic idea is to prevent a situation where a local
elective official will work for his appointment in an executive
position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.41’
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
No Senator or Member of the House of Represen­
tatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any of its subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat.420
Without forfeiting his seat, explained.
Incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts only after they have been appoint­
ed to another government office, while other in­
cumbent elective officials must first resign their
posts before they can be appointed, thus running
4,6Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
417Flores v. Drilon. G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
418Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22,1993
4”Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 546, cited in Flores v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
420Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
138 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
the risk of losing the elective post as well as not
being appointed to the other post.421
Local elective officials.
No elective or appointive local official is eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.422
The ineligibility of an elective official for appointment
remains al) throughout his tenure or during incumbency. He
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered for appointment. As long as he is an incumbent,
an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another public office.
But where incumbent city mayor was, without
resigning, appointed as chair of Subic Authority, he does
not automatically forfeit his elective office, where the law
authorizing such appointment was nullified.423
Applicability against appointive officials.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official holds any other office or employment
in the government or any of its subdivision, agency or instrumentality,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.424
No member of the armed forces in active service shall, at any time,
be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in
government including government-owned or controlled corporations
or any of its subsidiaries.425
Rationale.
A public officer or employee should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without distraction
421 Flores v. Drilon, C.R. No. 104732, June 22,1993
422Sec. 94, Local Government Code of 1991
"’Flores v. Drilon, C.R. No. 104732, June 22,1993
"4l’ar. 2, Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution
,25Sec. 5(4), Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution
Chapter 111 139
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
of other governmental duties or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy
among too many positions or responsibility, which may
result in haphazardness and inefficiency.426
Forbidden office.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives is
appointed to any office that may have been created or its emoluments
increased during the term for which he was elected.422
Term and tenure, distinguished.
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction
between term and tenure.*3* The term means the time during
which the officer may claim Io hold office as of right, and
fixes interval after which several incumbents succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office. It may be shorter than the
term for reasons within or beyond power of the incumbent.424
Midnight appointment, defined.
Midnight appointment refers to those appointments made within
two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections.430
Constitutional basis.
It is based on constitutional prohibition against a
President or Acting President from making appointments
two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public sendee or endanger
public safety.431
"'’Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary. 194 SCRA 317 (1991), cited in
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
"’Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
"“Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000
"’Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12,21-22 (1946); Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683, 694
(1957); Paredes v. Abad, 155 Phil. 494 (1974); Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 240 (1984), cited in
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000
430Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 617 Phil. 808-813 (2009), cited in The Provincial
Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22. 2015
"‘Sec. 15. Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
 140 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Rationale.
It appears prohibition is directed against two types
of appointments: those made for buying votes and those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within two months preceding a
presidential election and are similar to those declared
election offenses.02
Under the Omnibus Election Code, any person who
gives or promises any office or employment in order to
induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against
any candidate or withhold his vote in the election is guilty of
the election offense of vote buying.01
Any appointing officer who appoints or hires any new
employee during period of 45 days before a regular election
and thirty’ days before a special election is guilty of election
offense of prohibited appointment.414***
Appointments of lower court judges unquestionably
made during period of ban fall within operation of first
prohibition relating to appointments considered intended
to buy votes or influence election. While filling of vacancies
in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, such
appointments are void in the absence of showing of any
compelling reason to justify appointment during the ban. On
the other hand, there is a strong public policy for prohibition
against appointments made within period of ban.415
The second type of prohibited appointment refers to
the so-called midnight appointments.*3* The issuance of 350
appointments by the outgoing President in one night and
the planned induction of almost all of them in a few hours
before inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere
ailn re: appointment of Valenzuela. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
‘"Sec. 261(a), Omnibus Election Code, cited in In re: appointment of Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. Nov. 9, 1998
414Sec. 261(g), Omnibus Election Code, cited in In re: appointment ol Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9,1998
435bi re: appointment of Valenzuela. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
"*ln re: appointment of Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
Chapter III 141
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness
and other conditions, and thus deprive new administration
of the opportunity to make corresponding appointments.437
Prohibition, scope of.
The previous ruling that voided appointment of lower court judges
during period of ban433 is now reversed. The prohibition is confined
only to appointments made in the Executive Department and does
not extend to appointments in the Judiciary439 as the 1987 Constitution
likewise mandates any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within ninety days from its occurrence.440
It imposes on the President the imperative duty to appoint a
Member of the Supreme Court within ninety days from occurrence of
vacancy, which failure clearly disobeys the Constitution.441 Even for
vacancy in lower courts, the President issues appointments within
ninety days from submission of a list of three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council.442
If midnight appointments made in haste and with irregularities,
or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his
administration to subvert policies of the incoming President or for
partisanship,443 appointments to the Judiciary made after the Judicial
and Bar Council was established would not suffer from such defects
because of its prior processing of candidates.
The establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to its unhurried and deliberate prior process ensures there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
The intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council eliminates
danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made to buy votes in
a coming presidential election, or to satisfy partisan considerations. The
°7Aytona v. Castillo, C.R. No. L-19313, Jan. 19, 1962, cited in In re: appointment of
Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9,1998
°*/n re: appointment of Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
°*De Castro v. JBC, C.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
““Last sentence, Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
“'De Castro v. JBC, C.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
“’Sec. 9, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
4°Aytona v. Castillo, C.R. No. L-19313, Jan. 19, 1962, cited in De Castro v. JBC, C.R.
No. 191002, March 17, 2010
 142 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
i FORMATION OF RELATIONS
experience from time of establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council
shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed
by people influential with the President could not always be assured
of being recommended for consideration of the President, because they
first had to undergo vetting of the Judicial and Bar Council and pass
muster there. Indeed, the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council was
precisely intended to depoliticize the Judiciary by doing away with
intervention of the Commission on Appointments.444
Exception.
The prohibition against midnight appointment applies
only to presidential appointments.445 It does not apply to
appointments made by local chief executives.44* There is
no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during last days of his or her tenure.447 * *
Thus, the mayor who just assumed office cannot seek to
recall appointments of fourteen municipal employees made
by his predecessor within two months prior to presidential
elections.44* Neither can the governor nullify permanent
appointment of a Cooperative Development Specialist made
five days prior to end of term of her predecessor.44’
Although it is conceded that no law prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during last days
of their tenure, the Civil Service Commission may prohibit
local elective officials from making mass appointments
immediately before and after elections450 to professionalize
the civil service.451 *As such, the 89 appointments made by
the outgoing city mayor within a month he left office were
disapproved.451
444De Castro v. |BC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
M5De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
‘"The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22. 2015
447De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
“•De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001
“*The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
45nCSC Res. No. 010988, June 4,2001, cited in The Provincial Government of Aurora
v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22. 2015
45lThe Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco. G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
‘'"Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 617 Phil. 808-813 (21X19), cited in The Provincial
Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
Chapter III 143
But where appointment was extended under the new
resolution disapproving all appointments issued by elective
appointing officials after elections up to June 30, except if
appointee is fully qualified for the position and underwent
regular screening processes before the election ban as shown
in the Promotion and Selection Board report or minutes of
meeting,453 it is valid even if made five days before end of
term of the appointing governor where appointee fully
qualified for the position and had undergone regular
screening process before election ban.454
Appointment during election period.
During period of 45 days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, any head, official or appointing officer
of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or
local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary
or casual, or creates and fills any new position, is guilty of an election
offense.455
Exceptions.
Such appointment may be made upon prior authority'
of the Commission on Elections when it is satisfied the
position to be filled is essential to proper functioning of the
office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be
filled in a manner that may influence election.45*
A new employ'ee may' be appointed in case of urgent
need, provided the Commission on Elections is notified
within three days from appointment. Any appointment or
hiring in violation of this provision is null and void.457
4532.1, CSC Res. No. 030918, Aug. 28, 2003. cited in The Provincial Government of
Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22,2015
454The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
4S5First sentence, first par.. Sec. 261(g)(1), Omnibus Election Code
45*Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 261(gX 1), Omnibus Election Code
‘’’Second par.. Sec. 261(gX>), Omnibus Election Code
 14-1 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Appointment of political lame ducks.
Prohibition against appointment of defeated candidates within
one-year following their defeat4” and appointment or designation of
elective official to any public office or position during his or her tenure4”
are intended to help eradicate political opportunism and spoils.4"
Losing candidates.
No candidate who lost in any election is, within one year after
such election, appointed to any government office or any government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries,461
except losing candidates in barangay elections.462 *
Rationale.
Manifestly, it is to discontinue much-criticized
practice, so common in the past, of candidates-reject being
nonetheless allowed to enter or reenter public service by a
grateful executive for whom they had rendered considerable
service during campaign.
In a very real sense, such appointments or reappoint­
ments defied the will of electorate, particularly if the same
were made shortly after election in which the appointee had
been rejected.
Hence, in deference to popular sentiment, it is now
provided that appointments of these candidates can be
permitted only after expiration of one year from date of
their defeat in elections. The disqualification is not made
permanent because defeat in an election does not mean that
the candidate is entirely unfit for public office.465
4”Sec. 6, Art. 1X(B), 1987 Constitution
45'Sec. 7, Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
““The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary by
Bemas, S.J., 1996 Ed., p. 923
“‘Sec. 6, Art. !X(B), 1987 Constitution
“-’Sec. 94(b), Local Government Code of 1991
465lsagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 Ed., p. 322
Chapter III 145
FORMATION OF RELATIONS
Winning candidates.
No elective official is eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.464
If elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning his
elective position, appointment is invalid but he does not forfeit his
elective seat.465
Rationale.
The purpose is to require elective officials to devote
their full attention and time to their basic work instead of
permitting them to dilute their efficiency in several positions
being discharged by them, for which they may even be
allowed to collect extra compensation.466
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by primary functions of his
position, no appointive official holds any other office or employment
in government or any of its subdivision, agency or instrumentality,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.467
Winning or losing candidates.
Also, candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment cannot be appointed as Chair
or Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission,466 Commission on
Elections,469 and the Commission on Audit,470 among others.
“'First par.. Sec. 7, Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
•“Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993, cited by Bemas, S. J. in The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed. p. 923,
•“Isagani A. Cruz. Philippine Political Law, 1998 Ed., p. 321
“’Second par.. Sec. 7, Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
"Sec. 1(1), Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
“"Sec. 1(1), Art. IX(C), 1987 Constitution
470Sec. 1(1), Art. IX(D), 1987 Constitution

Chapter IV
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a
trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be."
- Jeremy Bentham1
Constitutional basis.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.1
These constitutionally enshrined principles, oft-repeated in case
law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments and thus
should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.3
Norms of conduct
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees** mandates every public official and employee to
observe commitment to public interest, professionalism, justness and
sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism
and patriotism, and simple living as standards of personal conduct in
the discharge and execution of official duties.5
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his
executor, John Bowring" Vol. II, Chapter IV, p. 423, London (1843), cited in Morales v CA
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
■Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
’Duque 111 V. Veloso, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012. citing Japson v CSC G.R. No
189479, April 12,2011
*R.A. 6713
’Sec. 4, R.A.6713
146
Chapter IV 147
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Commitment to public interest
Public officers always uphold public interest over and above
personal interest. All government resources and powers of their
respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively,
honestly, and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public
funds and revenues.6
Professionalism.
Public officers perform and discharge their duties with highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill. They
enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers
or peddlers of undue patronage.7 * *
Professionalism, defined.
Professionalism is defined as the conduct, aims, or
qualities that characterize or mark a profession. A profes­
sional refers to a person who engages in an activity with
great competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is
to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, profi­
cient or polished."
As a norm of conduct for public officers, observance of
professionalism also means upholding integrity of public office by
endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dis­
pensers or peddlers of undue patronage." A public official or employee
should avoid any appearance of impropriety affecting integrity of
government services.’
But failure to abide by norms of conduct on professionalism is
not a ground for administrative disciplinary action.10 Instead, the
“Sec 4(a), R.A. 6713
7Sec. 4(b), R.A. 6713
“Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc, G.R. No. 154499, Feb. 27, 2004, citing
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, cited in Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No.
178454, March 28, 2011
’Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011
10Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 176127, Jan. 30, 2009
 148 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Implementing Rules grants incentives and rewards to officials and
employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on
their observance of the norms of conduct."
Those who comply with the high standard set by law are reward­
ed. While those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable
treatment, the Implementing Rules does not sanction those who fail to
observe these norms of conduct.
It merely affirms as grounds for disciplinary action only acts
declared unlawful or prohibited by the law. It specifically enumerates
acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and
failure to abide by the norms of conduct on professionalism is not one
of them.”
While acceptance of money by a public officer to process issuance
of land title by an agency other than the office she occupies may create
perception she is a fixer, it was not committed in the performance of
official duties.
As such, the public officer who reneged on her promise to return
the money advanced to pay for an aborted transaction is not liable for
violating norms of conduct as they are not broad enough to apply even
to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one's
office. But she is liable for conduct unbecoming a public officer as it
applies to broader range of transgressions not only of social behavior
rules but of ethical practice.*13
Unbecoming conduct, defined.
Unbecoming conduct means improper performance
and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules
not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical
procedure or prescribed method.14
"Rule V, Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Pub­
lic Officials and Employees, April 21,1989, cited in Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,
C.R. No. 176127, Jan. 30, 2009
”Rule X, Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Pub­
lic Officials and Employees, April 21,1989, cited in Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,
C.R. No. 176127, Jan. 30,2009
l3Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011
l4Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory Ong, el al.. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, Aug. 24,
2010, cited in Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011
Chapter IV 149
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Justness and sincerity.
Public officers remain true to the people at all times. They must act
with justness and sincerity, not discriminate against anyone, especially
the poor and the underprivileged. At all times, they [must] respect
the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety, and
public interest.
They do not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their
office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except
with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms
are coterminous with theirs.15 *
The court employees' conduct of shouting at each other and
quarreling within court premises during working hours exhibit
discourtesy and disrespect to their co-workers and to the court itself.16
The menacing attitude of an employee is without excuse, particularly
against a superior in office hierarchy, and falls short of the standard of
justness and sincerity, even if committed outside office hours. The law
of good manners and proper decorum is law during as well as outside
office hours.”
Political neutrality.
Public officers serve everyone without unfair discrimination and
regardless of party affiliation or preference.” As such, civil servants are
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity to ensure
they remain focused on efficient administration of government affairs,
to do away with the spoils system which is anathema to the meritocracy
principle that is at the heart of the civil service system and to shield
officers and employees from vagaries of politics.1’
15Scc. 4(c), R.A. 6713
"’Quiroz v. Orfila, A.M. No. P-96-1210, May 7, 1997, cited in Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R.
No. 174321, Oct. 22,2013
”Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, Oct. 22, 2013
"Sec. 4(d), R.A. 6713
l’CSC Res. No. 1600298, March 29, 2016
 150 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Partisan political activity, defined.
It refers to any act designed to promote election or
defeat of a particular candidate or party to public office.20
Partisan acts, enumerated.
Under Resolution of the Commission on Elections,
it includes forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees, or other groups of persons to solicit votes and/
or undertake any campaign for or against a candidate or
party, holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies to solicit and/or
undertake any campaign for or against a candidate or party,
making speeches, announcements, or commentaries, or
holding interviews for or against election of any candidate
or party for public office or, directly or indirectly soliciting
votes, pledges, or support for or against any candidate or
party.21
Under Memorandum Circular of the Civil Service
Commission, it includes being a delegate to any political
convention, or a member of any political party or directorate,
or an officer of any political club or other similar political
organizations, receiving any contributions for political
purposes, either directly or indirectly or becoming publicly
identified with the success or failure of any candidate or
party.
It also includes wearing t-shirts or pins, caps or any
other similar election paraphernalia bearing names of
candidates or political party except as authorized by the
Commission or being a watcher for a political party or
candidate during election.
It even includes consistent presence in political rallies,
caucuses of, and continuous companionship with certain
political candidates and/or political party in said political
activities, causing the employee to be closely identified
with such candidate and/or with political party', giving
2tlSec. 1(4), Res. No. 10049, Feb. 1, 2016, cited in llie Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No.
001,2016, March 29, 2016
2lSec. 1(4), Res. No. 10049, Feb. 1, 2016, cited in the Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No.
001, 2016, March 29, 2016
Chapter IV 151
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
personal, financial or other monetary contribution, supplies,
equipment, and materials to benefit a candidate and/or
political party or utilizing government resources such as
personnel including job orders or contract of service hirees,
time and properties for political purposes.22
Under settled jurisprudence, it includes distribution of
handbills or leaflets,23 attendance at political meetings and
caucuses,24 or distribution of letters indicating intention to
run for public office.25
Prohibition, constitutional basis.
The 1987 Constitution prohibits civil service officer or employee
from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.25 It likewise insulates the armed forces from partisan
politics by prohibiting member of the military from engaging, directly
or indirectly, in any partisan political activity.22
Prohibition, statutory bases.
The Omnibus Election Code prohibits any officer or employee in
the civil service, any officer, employee, or member of the armed forces,
or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other paramilitary units, existing or may hereafter
organized, directly or indirectly, to intervene in any election campaign
or engage in any partisan political activity.25
The Local Government Code of 1991 is more specific when it
prohibits local official or employee in the career civil service to engage
directly or indirectly in any’ partisan political activity or take part in any
election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall. It likewise prohibits
use by such local official or employee of his or her official authority or
“CSC Memo. Circ. No. 09,1992, died in the Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 001,2016,
March 29, 2016
“People v. De Venecia, C.R. No. L-20808, July 31,1965, cited in Joint CSC-Comelec
Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
“Trinidad v. Valle, A.M. No. 2258-CFI, July 20, 1981, cited in Joint CSC-Comelec
Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
“Vistan v. Nicolas, A.M. No. MTJ-87-79, Sept. 13,1991, died in Joint CSC-Comelec
Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
*Sec. 2(4), Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 5(3), Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution
“Sec. 261(i), Art. XXII, Omnibus Eledion Code
 152 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
influence to cause performance of any political activity by any person
or body.29
The Civil Service Act of 1959 likewise prohibits officers and
employees in the civil service, whether in the competitive or classified,
or noncompetitive or unclassified service, from engaging directly or
indirectly in partisan political activities or take part in any election.30
Finally, the Administrative Code of 1987 says no officer or
employee in the Civil Service including members of the armed forces,
shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official
authority or influence to coerce political activity of any other person or
body.”
Sanctions.
It also considers act of engaging, directly or indirectly,
in partisan political activity by one holding a nonpolitical
office as ground for disciplinary action.32 Without prejudice
to criminal and civil liability, engaging, directly or indirectly,
in partisan political activities by members of the civil
service is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of
one month and one day to six months for the first offense,
dismissal from service for the second offense.33
Prohibition, coverage.
The prohibition against partisan political activity applies to
Civil Sendee members in all government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, state universities and
colleges, whether their appointments are permanent, temporary,
contractual, or even casual, career officers holding political offices in
an acting or officer-in-charge capacity, and, uniformed and armed AFP
and PNP members.”
’’Sec. 93, Local Government Code of 1991
'"Sec. 29, R.A. 2260
3,Book V, Title 1(A), Chapter 8, Sec. 55, E.0.292, s. 1987
“Book V, Title I, Chapter 7, Sec. 46(bX26), E.O. 292, s. 1987
"Sec 46(D)( 10), Rule 10, CSC Res. No. 1101502, Nov. 8, 2011
”Joint CSC-Comelec Ore. No. 001, 2016, March 29, 2016
Chapter IV 153
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Exception.
It does not apply to the President, Vice-President and
other elective public officials,35 Cabinet members,36 personal
and confidential staff of these officials,37 and members of the
reserve corps of the AFP.38
Those holding political offices like elective officials are
exempted from prohibition.39 Public officers and employees
holding political offices may take part in political and
electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any
of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election
Code."
Exception to exception.
But barangay officials are not exempted and
are therefore prohibited from engaging in par­
tisan political activities.” More than any other
elective officials, political neutrality is specifi­
cally required of barangay officials whose election
is described, nay, mandated, to be nonpartisan in
character.42
The barangay is a basic unit or base of the
pyramid of both social and political structure.
Prudent policy dictates it be insulated from influ­
ence of divisive and debilitating partisan politics.
Aside from legislative and consultative powers,
barangay officials act as agents for neutral com­
munity action such as distribution of basic servic­
es and as instruments in conducting plebiscites
and referenda.
"Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, Feb. 22, 2010, cited in the Joint CSC-Comelec
Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
■'‘Santos v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-16133, Nov. 6, 1959, cited in the Joint CSC-Comelec
Circ. No. 1, March 29,2016
“Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 001, 2016, March 29, 2016
"Cailles v. Bonifacio. G.R. No. L-45937. Feb. 25, 1938
’’Sec. 261(i), Art XXII, OEC
"Book V, Title 1(A), Chapter 8, Sec. 55, E.0.292, s. 1987; Sec 93, Local Government
Code of 1991
"Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 001, 2016, March 29, 2016
"Sec. 38, First par., OEC
 154 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Also, the punong barangay, together with
members of the lupong tagapayapa, exercises ad­
ministrative supervision over barangay concili­
ation panels that settle local disputes. Even the
punong barangay settles or helps settle local con­
troversies either through mediation or arbitra­
tion. It would definitely enhance objective and
impartial discharge of these duties if barangay of­
ficials are shielded from political party loyalty."
The prohibition is not absolute, however. It
does not include exercise of the right to vote*4 or
to preserve public order, if he or she is a peace
officer4' and does not extend to acts enumerated
as partisan political activity under the Omnibus
Election Code and Comelec resolution, when
performed to enhance chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to public office by a
political party or coalition.46
Also, it does not mean civil sendee employ­
ees stay silent the whole time. Public expressions,
opinions or discussions of probable issues in a
forthcoming election, or on attributes of or criti­
cisms against probable candidates to be nomi­
nated in a forthcoming political party convention
arc not considered partisan political activity.47
They may express their views on current is­
sues, or mention names of certain candidates for
public office whom they support4* but should not
use their official authority or influence to cause
"Occena v. Comelec, 127 SCRA 404 (1984)
“Sec. 26l(i), Art. XXII, OEC; Sec. 29, R.A. 2260; Sec. 93, LGC of 1991; Sec. 5(3), Art.
XVI, 1987 Constitution; Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, Feb. 22, 2010, cited in Joint
CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 1, March 29,2016
‘■'Sec. 261(i). Art. XXII, OEC
“Sec. 79, OEC; Seneres v. Comelec. G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, cited in Joint
CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
"Sec. 79, OEC; Seneres v. Comelec, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, cited in Joint
CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
“Sec. 93, LGC of 1991; Book V, Title 1(A), Chapter 8, Sec. 55, E.O. 292. s. 1987;
Sec. 29, R.A. 2260; Quinto v. Comelec. G.R. No. 189698, Feb. 22, 2010, cited in Joint CSC-
Comelec Circ. No. 1, March 29, 2016
Chapter IV 155
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
performance of any political activity by any per­
son or body.4*
Even social media functions such as liking,
commenting, sharing, reposting, or following a
candidate's or party's account'4’ are allowed un­
less these are resorted as a means to solicit sup­
port for or against a candidate or party during
the campaign period.51* * *
Responsiveness to the public.
Public officers extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to
the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when public interest
requires, they provide information of their policies and procedures in
clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information,
public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage
suggestions.
They simplify and systematize policy, rules, and procedures,
avoid red tape, and develop an understanding and appreciation of
socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in
depressed rural and urban areas.52 *
Nationalism and patriotism.
Public officers are at all times loyal to the Republic and to the
Filipino people, promote use of locally produced goods, resources,
and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and
people. They endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty
against foreign intrusion.55
Simple living.
Public officers and their families lead modest lives appropriate
to their positions and income and do not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.54
"Sec. 93, Local Government Code of 1991
wDisini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, cited in Joint CSC-
Comelec Circ. No. 1, March 29,2016
’’Joint CSC-Comelec Circ. No. 001, 2016, March 29, 2016
52Sec. 4(e), R.A. 6713
’-’Sec. 4(f), R.A. 6713
'•Sec. 4(g), R.A. 6713

156 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Simple living, defined.
Basically, modest and simple living means maintaining
a standard of living within the public official or employee's
visible means of income as correctly disclosed in his income
tax returns, annual statement of assets, liabilities and net
worth, and other documents relating to financial and
business interests and connections.54
The point of the command is that, even if public officer is
independently wealthy, he should not live in a manner that flaunts his
wealth.*56
Unexplained wealth.
If in accordance with provisions of the Act Declaring Forfeiture
in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer,57 a public official is found to have
acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name
of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact is a
ground for dismissal or removal and administrative suspension of the
public official concerned for an indefinite period until investigation of
wealth is completed.5*
Unexplained wealth, evidence of.
Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents
of such public official may be taken into consideration,
when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be
satisfactorily shown.
Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive
expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse
or any of their dependents including but not limited to
activities in any club or association or ostentatious display
of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a nonofficial
character by any public official when such activities entail
®Sec. 8, Rule VI, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
56The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, Fourth Ed., by Joaquin G. Bemas,
S.J., p. 486
’'R.A. 1379
"Sec. 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP Big. 195, March 16, 1982
Chapter IV 157
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income,
are likewise taken into consideration to enforce this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.59
But frequency of foreign travel, by itself, is not proof
of unexplained wealth of a public officer or employee. It
must be established the trips abroad are beyond his financial
capacity, taking into account his salary and his other lawful
sources of income.
Without a reasonable estimation of foreign travel costs
of public officer and his spouse, there is no way to determine
whether these were within their lawful income. Twenty-six
foreign trips taken by two individuals in a span of nine years
is not beyond financial capacity of the public officer and
his spouse where they established other sources of lawful
income."
Unlawful acquisition, prima facie presumption of.
Whenever any public officer or employee had acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property, said property, is presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.61
But such prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisi­
tion arises only when amount of property is manifestly out
of proportion to the salary of the public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legiti­
mately acquired property.
Where the DPWH Undersecretary proved he has
sources of income other than his salary, and his spouse
also earning substantial income from her businesses, the
prima facie presumption was overcome by evidence to the
contrary.62
”Sec. 8. R.A. 3019, as amended by BP Big. 195, March 16, 1982
"Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, Nov. 23, 2007
6,Sec. 2, R.A. 1379
“Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, Nov. 23, 2007
158 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Other legitimately acquired property, defined.
It means any real or personal property,
money or securities which the public officer has
at any time acquired by inheritance and its in­
come, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a
public officer or employee, or any property or its
income already pertaining to him when he quali­
fied as public officer or employee or the fruits and
income of the exclusive property of the spouse.“
Purchase by installment, inheritance, dacion
en pago by which defaulting debtor settles his
outstanding account with property of the spouse
and foreclosure of mortgage, are deemed legiti­
mate modes of acquiring several real properties
over a span of 22 years, especially where the last
two modes are exercised in regular conduct of
lending business of the spouse.64
It does not include property unlawfully
acquired by respondent, but its ownership is
concealed by its being recorded in the name of,
or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, de­
scendants, relatives, or any other person, proper­
ty unlawfully acquired by respondent, but trans­
ferred by him to another person or persons on or
after efficacy of the law and property donated to
respondent during his incumbency, unless he can
prove to the satisfaction of the court that the do­
nation is lawful.65
Forfeiture.
If public officer is unable to satisfy the court he has
lawfully acquired the property in question, the court forfeits
such property in favor of the State, provided no judgment is
rendered within six months before any general election or
within three months before any special election. In addition.
'''Sec. 1(b), R.A. 1379
“Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, Nov. 23,2007
“Sec. 1(b)(1), (2) and (3), R.A. 1379
Chapter IV 159
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
the court may refer the case to the corresponding Executive
Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.**
Unexplained wealth, basis.
Public officials and employees are obliged to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,
their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests
including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under
eighteen years of age living in their households.6'
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
The filing of SALN is an essential requirement to one's
assumption of a public post. It has constitutional, legal, and
jurisprudential bases.6*
On accountability of public officers, the 1987 Cons­
titution requires a public officer or employee to, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth,6*
This provision requires all public officers and
employees, regardless of rank, to declare their assets and
liabilities upon assumption to office, as may be required
by law. However, it likewise imposes a positive duty
and a heavier onus on the President, the Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with genera) or flag
ranks to publicly disclose their assets and liabilities.70
Under the law, public officials and employees are
obliged to accomplish and submit declarations under
oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests
“Sec. 5. R.A. 1379
"Sec. 8, R.A. 6713; Sec. I, Rule VII, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
“Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
“Sec. 17, Art. XL 1987 Constitution, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11,2018
’"PhilippineSavings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, Nov. 20,
2012, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

160 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen years of age living in their households.71
Rationale.
The requirement of filing SALN is enshrined
in the Constitution to promote transparency in
the civil sendee and deters government officials
bent on enriching themselves through unlawful
means. The importance of requiring submission
of a complete, truthful, and sworn SALN is a
measure to defeat corruption.
Full disclosure of wealth is necessary to
particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate,
opportunities for official corruption, and main­
tain a standard of honesty in public service.
Through it, the public can monitor movement
in the fortune of a public official. It serves as a
valid check and balance mechanism to verify
undisclosed properties and wealth. Failure to
file a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubt
integrity of the officer and normally amounts to
dishonesty.72
Who files when.
All public officials and employees, except those
who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers, and casual
or temporary workers, file under oath their SALN and a
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and those of their spouses and unmarried children under
eighteen years of age living in their households, within
thirty days after assumption of office, on or before April
30 of every year thereafter and within thirty days after
separation from the service.73
Being on leave from government service, even without
pay, is not synonymous with separation from government
’’Sec. 8, R.A. 6713, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
”Hon. Casimiro v. Rigor, 749 Phil. 917 (2014), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018
”Sec. 8, R.A. 6713; Sec. 1, Rule VII, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
161
Chapter IV
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
service thus does not necessarily exempt public officer from
filing SALN. Suffice it to say that one does not cease to
become a government employee only because one officially
leaves. On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public
officials and employees are required to file a SALN.
That the public officer did not receive any pay for the
periods she was on leave does not make her a government
worker "serving in an honorary capacity" to be exempted
from the SALN laws.74
Authority to verify.
Within thirty days from date of their assumption of
office, all public officials and employees are required to
execute necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman
to obtain from all appropriate government agencies,
including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents
as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their
business interests and financial connections in previous
years, including, if possible, the year when they first
assumed any office in the Government.”
Penalty.
It is so important for purposes of transparency and
accountability' that failure to comply with such requirement
may result not only in dismissal from public service but
also in criminal liability.74 Non-compliance is not only
punishable by imprisonment and/or fine, it may also result
in disqualification to hold public office.77
Faithful compliance with requirement of filing SALN is
rendered even more exacting when public official concerned
is a member of the Judiciary.” Failure of a judge to file it
for five consecutive years without explanation violates the
requirement. While every' office in government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
’‘Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
”Sec. 8(A), R.A. 6713
’‘Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
”Sec. 11, R.A. 6713, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
”Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
 162
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the Judiciary.”
SA LN, contents of.
It contains information on: (a) real property, its
improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value, and current
fair market value; (b) personal property and acquisition
cost; (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand
or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like; and (d) all financial
liabilities, both current and long term."0
But adjusted market value of real properties bears
no significance to the issue of whether a public officer and
his spouse had capacity to acquire several real properties
including two residential houses, fifteen residential and
eight agricultural lots.
The relevant valuation is acquisition cost of these
real properties vis-h-vis financial capacity of the DPWH
Undersecretary and his spouse at the time of their acquisition.
Any appreciation or depreciation in value of real properties
after their acquisition until present has no bearing.”
Inaccurate information, effects.
Inaccurate information in the SALN, such
as discrepancies in the year and mode of acquisi­
tion of declared properties, and their imprecise
descriptions, does not amount to gross miscon­
duct and dishonesty, both having the important
element of intention.
The candid admission by the public officer
of his shortcomings in properly and completely
filling out his SALN, his endeavor to clarify its
entries and provide all other necessary informa­
tion, and his submission of supporting docu­
ments as to acquisition of real properties, negate
any intention to conceal his properties. And since
’’Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman, 675 Phil. 467 (2011), cited in
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
""Sec. 1(a)(1), Rule VII, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
"'Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG, G.R. No. 169982, Nov. 23,2007
Chapter IV 163
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
these properties were lawfully acquired, there is
no justification to hide them.
At most, public officer is guilty of negli­
gence for having failed to ascertain his SALN
was accomplished properly, accurately and in
more detail, penalized by payment of amount
equivalent to his salary of six months."2
Some leeway should be accorded public
officials. They must be given opportunit}’ to ex­
plain any prima facie appearance of discrepancy.
Where explanation is adequate, convincing and
verifiable, the assets cannot be considered unex­
plained wealth or illegally obtained.
The corrective action to be allowed should
only refer to typographical or mathematical rec­
tifications and explanation of disclosed entries. It
does not pertain to hidden, undisclosed, or unde­
clared acquired assets that the official concerned
intentionally concealed by one way or another
like, for instance, the use of dummies.83
Disclosure of Business Interest and Financial Connections,
contents of.
It contains information on any existing interest in, or any
existing connection with, any business enterprises or entities,
whether as proprietor, investor, promoter, partner, shareholder,
officer, managing director, executive, creditor, lawyer, legal
consultant or adviser, financial or business consultant, accountant,
auditor, and the like, name and addresses of business enterprises
or entities, dates when such interests or connections were
established, and such other details as will show nature of the
interests and connections.”
The Court unanimously imposed ultimate penalty of
dismissal from service upon a regional trial court interpreter
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leaves and
’’Pleyto V. PNP-CIDG. G.R. No. 169982, Nov. 23,2007
’’Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128. Aug. 17, 2016, 801 SCRA
46, cited in Republic v. Sereno, C.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
MSec. 1(a)(2), Rule VII, Rules Implementing R.A.6713
 164 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
with prejudice to re-employment for dishonesty and for failure
to disclose her business interest, which was a stall in the market
for a continued period of four years. Ever}' employee is obliged
to submit sworn statement as the public has a right to know
employee's assets, liabilities, and net worth and financial and
business interests.”
Identification and disclosure of relatives.
It shall be the duty of every public official or employee,
to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and
information, his relatives in the government in the form,
manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission.”
Duties of public officials and employees
In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are obliged to:
Act promptly on letters and requests.
Within fifteen working days from receipt, they respond to letters,
telegrams, or other means of communications sent by the public,
containing the action taken on the request.87
Despite written and verbal requests and constant follow-up for
a period of two months without any feedback, the concerned officers
clearly failed to disclose crucial information sought within fifteen
working days.”
While failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen
days is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand on the
first offense, it may result in suspension from 1-30 days on the second
offense and dismissal on the third offense.”
“’Rabe v. Flores, 338 Phil. 919 (1997), died in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11,2018
“Sec. 8(B), R.A. 6713, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
’’See. 5(a), R.A. 6713
“Bueno v. Ombusdman, G.R. No. 191712, Sept. 17, 2014
“Sec. 52(CX13) and (15), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, died in Bueno v. Ombusdman, G.R. No. 191712, Sept. 17, 2014
Chapter IV 165
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Submit annual performance reports.
Within 45 working days from end of year, all heads or other
responsible officers of government offices and agencies and of
government-owned or controlled corporations, render a performance
report of the agency or office or corporation concerned. It is open and
available to the public within regular office hours.1*1
Process documents and papers expeditiously.
Within reasonable time from preparation, all official papers
and documents must be processed, completed and contain, as far as
practicable, not more than three signatories. In the absence of duly
authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer-in-charge
signs for and in their behalf.”
Reasonable time, how determined.
Reasonable time is determined in accordance with
these rules:
(a) When the law or applicable rule issued in
accordance with it prescribes a period within which a
decision is to be rendered or an action taken, it shall be
followed.
(b) Otherwise, the head of department, office or
agency issues rules and regulations prescribing, among
other things, what is reasonable time, taking into account
these factors:
(b.l) Nature, simplicity or complexity of
the subject matter of the official papers or docu­
ments processed by said department, office or
agency;
(b.2) Completeness or inadequacy of re­
quirements or of data and information necessary
for decision or action;
(b.3) Lack of resources caused by circum­
stances beyond control of the department, office
or agency or officials or employee concerned;
““Sec. 5(b), R.A. 6713
”Sec. 5(c), R.A. 6713
166 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(b.4) Legal constraints such as restraining
orders and injunctions issued by proper judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative authorities;
(b.5) Fault, failure or negligence of the
party concerned which renders decision or action
not possible or premature; and
(b.6) Fortuitous events or force majeure.'”
Signatories to a document, number of.
Except as otherwise provided by law or regulation, and as far
as practicable, any written action or decision must contain not more
than three initials or signatures. In the absence of the duly authorized
signatory, the official next-in-rank or officer-in-charge or the person
duly authorized signs for and in his behalf.
The head of department, office, or agency prescribes, through an
appropriate office order, rules on the proper authority to sign in the
absence of the regular signatory, as follows:
(a) If there is only one official next in rank, he automatically
becomes the signatory;
(b) If there are two or more officials next in rank, the
appropriate office order prescribes order of priority among
officials next in rank within same organizational unit; or
(c) If there is no official next in rank present and available,
head of department, office or agency designates an officer­
in-charge from among those next lower in rank in the same
organizational unit.”
Act immediately on the public's personal transactions.
They attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services
of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.***
”S<!c. 4, Rule VI, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
”Scc. 5, Rule VI, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
**Sec. 5(d), R.A. 6713
Chapter IV 167
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Make documents available to the public.
All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily
available for inspection by the public within reasonable working
hours.”
Exceptions.
(a) such information, record, or document must be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or security or
conduct of foreign affairs;
(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of
an individual in imminent danger;
(c) the information, record, or document sought
falls within concepts of established privilege or recognized
exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record, or document comprises
drafts of decisions, orders, rulings, policy decisions, memo­
randa, etc.;
(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature
where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy;
(f) it would disclose investigator)’ records compiled
for law enforcement purposes or information which if
written would be contained in such records, but only to the
extent that production of such records or information would:
(f.l) interfere with enforcement proceedings; (f.2) deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
(f.3) disclose identity of a confidential source and in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source; or (f.4) unjustifiably disclose
investigative techniques and procedures; or
168 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(g) it would disclose information which premature
disclosure would: (g.l) in the case of a department, office,
or agency which agency regulates currencies, securities,
commodities, or financial institutions, be likely to lead to
significant financial speculation in currencies, securities,
or commodities, or significantly endanger stability' of any
financial institution; or (g.2) in the case of any department,
office, or agency be likely or significantly to frustrate
implementation of proposed official action*
In any of these administrative offenses, lack of bad faith and malice
does not exculpate from administrative liability. There is nothing in the
law and its implementing rules that require a finding of malice or bad
faith in the commission of these administrative infractions.97 * *
Data privacy.
While the Data Privacy Act protects fundamental
human right to privacy of communication while ensuring
free flow of information to promote innovation and growth,
secures and protects personal information in information
and communications systems in government and private
sector* in that processing of sensitive personal information
and privileged communication is prohibited, it is subject to
certain exceptions’" and does not apply to the following:
(a) Information about any individual who is or was
an officer or employee of a government institution that relates
to the position or functions of the individual, including1"’ the
fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of
the government institution,101 the title, business and office
telephone number of the individual,102 *the classification,
salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the
individual,105 and the name of the individual on a document
*Sec. 3, Rule IV, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
"’Bueno v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 191712, Sept. 17, 2014
’'Sec. 2, Chapter I, R.A. 10173
'"Sec. 13, Chapter III. R.A. 10173
'“Sec 4(a), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
10lSec. 4(a)(1), Chapter 1, R.A. 10173
lu2Sec. 4(aX2), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
105Sec. 4(aX3), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
Chapter IV 169
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
prepared by the individual in the course of employment
with the government.101
(b) Information about an individual who is or
was performing service under contract for a government
institution that relates to services performed, including
terms of contract, and name of the individual given in the
course of performance of those services.105
(c) Information relating to any discretionary benefit
of a financial nature such as granting of a license or permit
given by the government to an individual, including name
of individual and exact nature of benefit.11*
(d) Personal information processed for journalistic,
artistic, literary, or research purposes.107
(e) Information necessary in order to carry out
functions of public authority which includes processing of
personal data for the performance by the independent central
monetary authority and law enforcement and regulatory
agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated
functions.10" But nothing in the law is construed as to have
amended or repealed the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,101
Foreign Currency Deposit Act,110 and the Credit Information
System Act.111
(f) Information necessary for banks and other
financial institutions under jurisdiction of the independent
central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to
comply with the112 Credit Information System Act11’ and the
Anti-Money Laundering Act,111 and other applicable laws."5
101Sec. 4(a)(4), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
105Sec. 4(b), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
1(*Sec. 4(c), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
ln7Sec. 4(d), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
'“"Sec. 4(e), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
1WR.A. 1405. cited irt Sec. 4(e), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
1IOR.A. 6426, cited in Sec. 4(e), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
’"R.A. 9510, cited in Sec. 4(e), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
,,2Sec. 4(f), Chapter I, R.A. 10173
"’R.A. 9510, cited in Sec. 4(0, Chapter I, R.A. 10173
ll4R.A. 9160, as amended, cited in Sec. 4(0, Chapter I, R.A. 10173
u5Sec. 4(0, Chapter I, R.A. 10173
 170 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(g) Personal information originally collected from
residents of foreign jurisdictions in accordance with laws
of those foreign jurisdictions, including any applicable data
private laws, which is being processed in the Philippines.1'6
Prohibited acts and transactions
In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following are
acts and transactions prohibited of any public official and employee for
being unlawful:
Financial and material interest.
They shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring approval of their office."7 Financial
and material interest is defined as pecuniary or proprietary interest by
which a person will gain or lose something.""
Outside employment.
During their incumbency, they shall not own, control, manage
or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law."’
Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions.120
Prohibited practice of profession.
All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than exercise of their functions as local
chief executives12' because they are required to render full
time service and should therefore devote al) their time and
attention to performance of their official duties.122
""Sec. 4(g), Chapter 1, R.A. 10173
"7Sec. 7(a), R.A.6713
""Sec. 1(a), Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
"’Sec. 7(b)(1). R.A.6713
'“See. 7(bX2), R.A. 6713
l2'Sec. 90(a), R.A. 7160, tiled in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
,22Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
Chapter IV 171
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Exception.
But this does not apply to punong barangay and barangay
kagawad. While certain elective local officials like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no
such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay.
Since they are excluded from any prohibition, they
are presumed allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay holds regular sessions
only twice a month.
But a punong barangay who is also a lawyer should
procure prior permission or authority from the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government as required by civil service
regulations.123
*2
Sanggunian members may also practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours124 since they are required to hold
regular sessions only at least once a week.125
Limitations.
Sanggunian members who are members of the bar shall
not appear as counsel before any court in a civil case where
a local government unit or any government office, agency,
or instrumentality is the adverse party126 or in any criminal
case where an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office,127 or collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official128 and, use government
123Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
,2*Sec. 90(b), R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
,25Sec. 52(a), R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
'“Sec. 90(bXl), R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738. Feb. 19, 2008
127Sec. 90(bX2), R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19,2008
'“Sec. 90(bX3). R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa. A.C No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
 172 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
property and personnel except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending government interest.1”
Doctors of medicine may practice their profession
even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency provided the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation from it?”
Since the law itself grants them authority to practice
their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in
schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need
for them to secure prior permission or authorization from
any other person or office for any of these purposes.131
Recommendation to any private position.
Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise
that has a regular or pending official transaction with their office?”
These prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the
case of public officials or employees authorized to engage in private
practice of their profession. But the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any manner before the office
he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition likewise
applies?33
Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
They shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available
to the public, either to further their interests, or give undue advantage
to anyone or, to prejudice the public interest?”
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts.
They shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift,
gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from
'”Sec. 90(bX4). R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
'"Sec. 90(c), R.A. 7160, cited in Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
l3'Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008
'“See. 7(bX3), R.A. 6713
'“Last par.. Sec. 7(b), R.A. 6713
'•“Sec. 7(c), R.A. 6713
Chapter IV 173
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with
any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office.'35
Gift, defined.
Gift refers to a thing ora right disposed of gratuitously,
or any act of liberality, in favor of another who accepts it,
and includes simulated sale or its ostensibly onerous
disposition?”
Loans, coverage.
Loan covers simple loan and commodatum as well as
guarantees, financing arrangement, or accommodation
intended to ensure its approval. Commodatum refers to a
contract whereby one of the parties delivers to another
something not consumable so that the latter may use the
same for a certain time and return it?37
Exceptions.
The prohibition against solicitation and acceptance of
gifts does not include:
(a) Unsolicited gift of nominal value or insignificant
value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a
favor from a public official or employee or given after the
transaction is completed, or service is rendered. As to what
is a gift of nominal value depends on the circumstances of
each case taking into account the salary of the official or
employee, the frequency or infrequency of the giving, the
expectation of benefits, and other similar factors.
(b) A gift from a member of his family or relative
on the occasion of a family celebration, and without any
expectation of pecuniary gain or benefit?”
'•“Sec. 7(c), R.A. 6713
'•“Sec. 1(0. Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
l37Sec. 1(0, Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
'■“Sec. 1(0, Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
174 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Relative, defined.
Relative refers to any and all persons re­
lated to a public official or employee within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
including bilas, inso, and balae.'3*
(c) Nominal donations from persons with no regular,
pending, or expected transactions with the department,
office or agency with which the official or employee is
connected, and without any expectation of pecuniary gain
or benefits.
(d) Donations coming from private organizations
whether local or foreign, which are considered and accepted
as humanitarian and altruistic in purpose and mission.
(e) Donations from government to government
entities.'40
But nothing is construed to restrict or prohibit any
educational, scientific, or cultural exchange programs
subject to national security requirements.'*'
Acceptance of gifts from foreign governments, when
allowed.
As to gifts from foreign governments. Congress
consents to:
(a) The acceptance and retention by a public official
or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received
as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(b) The acceptance by a public official or employee
of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or
medical treatment; or
(c) The acceptance by a public official or employee
of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely
outside the Philippines such as allowances, transportation,
food, and lodging, of more than nominal value if such
acceptance is appropriate or consistent with national
""Sec. 3(k), R.A. 6713
,40Sec. 1(f), Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
'"Sec. 7(c), R.A. 6713
Chapter IV 175
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
interests, and permitted by the head of office, branch or
agency to which he belongs.'*2
Corrupt practices of public officers
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are declared unlawful:
Persuading another to violate rules.
Persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection
with official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.'*5
Requesting or receiving any gift for Intervention.
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.'*4
Contract or transaction, defined.
A transaction, like a contract, is one that involves
some consideration as in credit transactions. Thus, the
preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted
by a prosecutor does not fall within the ambit of contract as
the element of consideration is missing.'*5
This restrictive interpretation of the term transaction
was reiterated when bribery under the Revised Penal Code
is differentiated with violation of Sec. 3(b) of R. A. 3019 that is
limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law.'**
'*2Sec. 7(c), R.A. 6713; Sec. 1(f), Rule X, Rules Implementing R.A. 6713
'•’Sec. 3(a), R.A. 3019
'“See. 3(b), R.A. 3019
’’’Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, cited in People v.
Sandiganbayan, C.R. No. 188165, Dec. 11, 2013
'**Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007, cited in People v. San­
diganbayan, G.R. No. 188165, Dec. 11, 2013
 176 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Thus, the alleged desistance of the Justice Secretary from
pressuring certain persons to execute affidavits implicating target
personalities involved in a plunder case against a former president and
in connection with pending application for admission into the witness
protection program of the government, cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as contract or transaction as defined within
the ambit of the fourth element of the offense because no monetary
consideration as in credit transaction is involved.1"
Receiving any gift, coverage.
Receiving any gift includes act of accepting directly
or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of
the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself
or of any member of his family or relative within fourth
civil degree either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the
occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances
manifestly excessive.1"
Giver, liability of.
Aside from criminal liability, the person giving the
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is permanently or
temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from
transacting business in any form with the Government.1*'
Requesting or receiving any gift as token of gratitude.
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or
other pecuniar)’ or material benefit, for himself or for another, from
any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has
secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit
or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given.150
Giver, liability of.
Aside from criminal liability, the person giving the
gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is permanently or
'"People v. Sandiganbayan, C.R. No. 188165, Dec. 11,2013
'"Sec. 2(c), R.A. 3019
'"Last par.. Sec. 3, R.A. 3019
l50Sec. 3(c), R.A. 3019
Chapter IV 177
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from
transacting business in any form with the Government.15'
Acceptance of private employment.
Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment
in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him
during pendency or within one year after its termination.'52
Giver, liability of.
Aside from criminal liability, the person offering or
giving to the public officer such employment is permanently
or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from
transacting business in any form with the Government.'53
Causing undue injury.
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Govern­
ment, or giving any private party* unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This applies to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.'51 * * 54
Undue injury, defined.
Undue injury is akin to that civil law concept of actual
damage.155 Undue has been defined as more than necessary,
not proper, illegal, and injury is any wrong or damage
done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or
property, that is, invasion of any legally protected interest
of another.'54
'“Last par.. Sec. 3, R.A. 3019
'“Sec. 3(d), R.A. 3019
'“Last par.. Sec. 3, R.A. 3019
'“Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019
,55Santos v. People, C.R. No. 161877, March 23,2006
l54Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 850 (1998), cited in Santos v. People,
G.R. No. 161877, March 23,2006 '
 178 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Causing undue injury, elements.
It has the following essential elements: (a) the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions, (b) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,
and (c)his action caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.157
Causing undue injury, how committed.
The second element provides different modes by
which the crime may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
When all three are alleged in the same Information, it does
not mean the indictment charges three distinct offenses.'”
It may be committed either by dolo, as when accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa,
as when accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.15*
Mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per sc are
not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the
act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident
or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should
both be gross and inexcusable. It is further required that any
or all of these modalities ought to result in undue injury to
a specified party.'“
Manifest partiality, defined.
There is manifest partiality when there is a clear,
notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side or person rather than another'6' as when the Labor
,57Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan, C.R. No. 84571, Oct. 2, 1989, cited in Santos v. People,
C.R. No. 161877, March 23,2006
'“Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982
,5*Santos v. People. G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006; Cabello v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 57841, July 30. 1982, cited in Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002
'““Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 57841, July 30, 1982. cited in Sistoza v.
Desierto, C.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002
'“'Uriarte v. People, G.R. No. 169251, Dec. 20,2006, citing Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,
454 Phil. 34, 72 (2003)
179
Chapter IV
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Arbiter issued a writ of execution in haste despite pendency
of motion for reconsideration against the order directing its
issuance and an alias writ of execution despite issuance of a
restraining order.'“
Evident bad faith, defined.
Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment
but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will.'*3
It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes,'64 as when the airline manager
not only prevented the passenger from enjoying his right
to a first class seat, worse, he imposed his arbitrary will
and forcibly ejected him from his seat, humiliated him of
having to go to the tourist class compartment, threatened
to be thrown out of the airplane in the presence of many
passengers just to give way to a white man passenger whose
right to it has not been established, all in violation of the
contract of transportation.'65
But there is no evident bad faith when public officer
approved the questioned disbursement after relying on
certification of the bookkeeper on the availability of funds
for the expenditure.166
Gross inexcusable negligence, defined.
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious* 59
'“Santos v. People, G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006
'“Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998, cited in Sistoza v.
Desierto, C.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002
'“Words & Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 5. p. 13, citing Warfield Natural Gas v. Allen,
59 S.W. (2d) 534, 538, cited in Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966
,6SAir France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966
'“Alejandro v. People, G.R. No. 81031, Feb. 20, 1989, cited in Sistoza v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002
 180 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS Chapter IV 18)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may adequate reason through manifest partiality, evident bad
be affected.'*7 faith or gross inexcusable negligence as when the public
officers who checked test papers in a licensure examination
There is no gross inexcusable negligence where public
gave high passing scores in certain subjects even if the
officer relied upon supporting documents apparently
answers were either prayer recitals or love letter.17*
dependable as well as certifications or regularity made
by public officers of three office divisions of the Bureau of
Corrections before affixing his signature on the purchase Neglect to act.
order. Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter
The act of relying upon a subordinate's certification
pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly,
of regularity cannot be considered gross inexcusable
from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
negligence.1- Albeit misplaced, reliance in good faith by a
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or
head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary
giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other
responsibility rests negates an imputation of conspiracy
interested party.175
by gross inexcusable negligence to commit graft and
corruption.170
Disadvantageous contract.
Unwarranted benefits, defined. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly' disadvantageous to it, whether or
The term "unwarranted" is neither vague nor highly
not the public officer profited or will profit thereby176
imprecise and elastic term that has no common law meaning
or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
Financial or pecuniary interest.
precedents.171 It is not uncertain. It means lacking adequate
or official support, unjustified, unauthorized,173 or without Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in a
justification or adequate reason.173 business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what is
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.177
penalized is the act of a public officer in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving
any private party' benefits, advantage or preference which Personal or material interest.
are unjustified, unauthorized, or without justification or Directly' or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or
having a material interest in any' transaction or act requiring approval
of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises
167Sistoza v. Desierto, C.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002 discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does
'“Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002 not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel, or group.
1—Alejandro v. People, G.R. No. 81031, Feb. 20, 1989, cited in Sistoza v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 144784, Sept. 3, 2002
,70Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No 101535, Jan. 3,1995; Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R.
No. 144784, Sept. 3,2002
,71Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982
173Webster, Third New International Dictionary, p. 2514, cited in Gallego v. Sandi­
ganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982 l7*Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982
17,Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dept, of Justice, C.D. Pa. 405 F.Supp. 8, 175Sec. 3(f), R.A. 3019
12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 3-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket 17*Sec. 3(g), R.A. 3019
Part, p. 19, cited in Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982 177Sec. 3(h), R.A. 3019
 182 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Personal interest, presumption of.
Interest for personal gain is presumed against those
public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly
unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the
board, panel or group to which they belong.'”
Approval of license, etc.
Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or
benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to
such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative
or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.”'’
Divulging confidential information.
Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date."*1
Liability.
Aside from criminal liability, the person urging
the divulging or untimely release of such confidential
information is permanently or temporarily disqualified in
the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any
form with the Government.1,1
”*Sec. 3(i), R.A. 3019
"’’Sec. 3(j), R.A. 3019
'“Sec. 3(k), R.A. 3019
""Last par., Sec. 3, R.A. 3019
Chapter V
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Three-fold liability rule
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under
a three-fold responsibility for violation of their duty or for a wrongful
act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for the same act.' An action for each proceeds
independently of the others?
This applies with full force to sexual harassment which culpability
is not determined solely on the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act when
the public officer is charged with the administrative offense, not the
criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.
As such, defenses of lack of intent and element of demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor are not available, both issues
are immaterial in an administrative case. Even if element of demand
or request is essential in an administrative case, it is not necessary that
it be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from acts of offender.
Holding and squeezing shoulders of the subordinate, running his
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, conversing inappropriately
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise
of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones, resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a
sexual favor?
’Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191, 198 (1999), cited in Office of the President
and PAGC v. Cataquiz, C.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
’Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, Adm. Matter No. P-89-290, Jan. 29,
1993,218 SCRA 1, cited in Domingo v. Rayala, C.R. No. 155831, Feb. 18,2008
"Domingo v. Rayala, C.R. No. 155831, Feb. 18, 2008
183
 184 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Dismissal of criminal case, effect on administrative case.
Dismissal of criminal charges does not operate to dismiss
administrative charges because they are separate and distinct from
each other. Removal from office is not a bar to administrative liability.
Prior dismissal does not bar other penalties like disqualification and
forfeiture?
Administrative and criminal liability, distinguished.
Obviously, administrative liability is separate and
distinct from penal and civil liability.*5 The distinct and
independent nature of administrative from criminal pro­
ceeding can be attributed to: first, the difference in quantum
of evidence required, and correla lively, procedure observed
and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single
act may offend against two or more distinct and relative
provisions of law, or that same act may give rise to criminal
as well as administrative liability'.6 * * *
Accordingly, dismissal of criminal case by the Ombudsman does
not foreclose administrative action’ against the General Manager whose
absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive upon the Office of
the President that subsequently’ found him administratively liable.
The pronouncement made by' the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect
respondent from administrative prosecution.’
A contrary ruling unsettles as it undermines the very purpose of
administrative proceedings, that is, to protect public service and uphold
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.’
’Office of the President and PAGC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
5Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 199 (1999). cited in Office of the President and
PAGC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445. Sept. 14, 2011
“People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, citing Paredes v. CA, C.R.
No. 169534, July 30,2007, cited in Office of the President and PAGC v. Cataquiz, C.R. No.
183445, Sept. 14,2011
’Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290, Jan. 29, 1993,
cited in Office of the President and PAGC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
’Office of the President and PAGC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
"Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161067, March 14, 2008, citing Valencia v. San­
diganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, June 29, 2004, cited in Office of the President & PAGC v.
Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
Chapter V 185
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Exceptions.
But where the very basis of administrative case
against public officer is his conviction in the criminal action
which was later on set aside by' the Supreme Court upon
a categorical and clear findings that acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular,
his acquittal in criminal case necessarily entails dismissal
of administrative action against him, because in such a
case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the
administrative suit.10 *
But if there are two criminal cases and there is variance
between elements of two offenses charged, causing undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party' unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his or her official ad ministra ti ve or jud icia I
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence," and failure of accountable
officer to render accounts,12 *innocence
* in one criminal case
does not extend to another even if both cases hinge on the
same set of evidence. Prior demand to liquidate is not an
element of the crime of failure to render accounts.15
The Arias Doctrine:
Liability of superior officers for acts of subordinates
The head of an office or agency' can rely to a reasonable extent
on the good faith of their subordinates and cannot be held liable in
conspiracy with them if it turns out the transaction is illegal.
Otherwise, it sets a bad precedent if a head of office plagued
by all too common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence—
suddenly swept into a conspiracy’ conviction simply' because he did
not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly' trace every
step from inception, and investigate motives of every' person involved
’“Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16, 1997
"Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019, cited in Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014
’’Art. 218, Revised Penal Code, cited in Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July
7,2014
’’Lumauig v. People. G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014
 186 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving
authority.14
An auditor who approved payment for a deed of sale in favor of
the government on the strength of the report of his subordinates who
had the first opportunity to examine the documents, is not liable for
conspiracy with his subordinates, if it turned out to be overpriced and
the supporting documents falsified.15
Mere signature of the head of procuring authority in the award
of a contract and the contract itself, without anything more, cannot be
considered a presumption of liability absent showing he was motivated
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith in failing to ensure
eligibility of the construction company in whose favor the contract was
awarded, more so where there is no clear evidence he was aware of
such ineligibility.16
Mere signature does not result to a liability of the official involved
without any showing of irregularity on the document's face as to
warrant its detailed examination.17 *Liability depends upon the wrong
committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a government
agency.”
Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of
transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically
become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he
had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active
and knowing participation in it must be proved by positive evidence.
The fact that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the
rounds does not necessarily follow he becomes part of a conspiracy in
an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each supposed
conspirator must be established. ”
14Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989), cited in Joson Ill v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
’’Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, Dec. 19, 1999; Data v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 82512, Dec. 19, 1999
,6Joson 111 v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
l7Garcia, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 747 Phil. 445 (2014), cited in Joson III v. Commission
on Audit G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
’’Albert v. Gangan. 406 Phil. 231 (2001), cited in Joson III v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7,2017
’’Albert v. Gangan, 406 Phil. 231 (2001), cited in Joson 111 v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
Chapter V 187
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Rationale.
Heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who
prepare documents as there are hundreds of them that
routinely pass through their hands.
It is impossible for the head of office to personally
probe records, inspect documents, investigate motives of all
individuals involved in the transaction before signing as the
final approving authority.
There has to be some added reason why he should
examine each voucher in such detail. If the amount is
understandable considering rapid increase of market value,
it is not an added reason.7"
There should be other grounds than the mere signature
or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.”
Exception.
Foreknowledge by the head of office of the irregularity
attendant in the delivery of lumber that had been confiscated
by the government illustrate ground other than mere
signature.
Such foreknowledge, evidenced by his prior letter
acknowledging the materials intended for the bridge
construction had been confiscated, should have alerted
and prompted him, at the very least, to inquire into the
transaction and verify whether the proper legal documents
to recover ownership of the confiscated lumber had been
rectified or submitted. Instead, he immediately signed
disbursement voucher and ignored the fact that the lumber
he authorized payment for had already been confiscated in
favor of the government.2
^Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, Dec. 19, 1999; Dafa v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 82512, Dec. 19, 1999
11 Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 801-802 (1989), cited in Joson III v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
2Escara v. People, 501 Phil. 532 (2005), cited in Joson III v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
 188 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Also, the Arias doctrine does not apply where there
is no allegation of conspiracy between superior and
subordinate in fraudulent cash advances made by the
paymaster amounting to millions of public funds, more so
where the head of office had foreknowledge of facts and
circumstances suggesting irregularity that constitutes added
reason to prevent the irregularity that the head of office had
reason to suspect all along, failing which makes him liable
for neglect of duty.*25
Conversely, the recommending authority who inter­
viewed applicants and evaluated their papers for exten­
sion of temporary resident visa of foreign nationals cannot
invoke approval of higher authority to escape liability, if it
turned out irregular.
The approving authority had to rely on his evaluation
and recommendation and cannot be expected to review
every detail of each application transmitted for its approval.
It cannot be argued the approval cured the defective
application and absolved administrative lapse.21
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter negotiations.
But there should be other grounds than mere signature or
approval appearing on the voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.25
There exists a ground other than signatures appearing
on the emergency purchase or repair documents that should
have prodded respondent to conduct a more than cursory
examination of the documents. The absence of certification
and signature of the end-user that would justify the
emergency repair and/or purchase is glaring.26
^Cesa v. Ombudsman, C.R. No. 166658, April 30, 2008
2,Ledesma v. CA, C.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
25A rias v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989), cited in Republic v. Arias, C.R. No.
188909, Sept. 17, 2014
“Republic v. Arias, C.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17, 2014
Chapter V 189
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY' OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Doctrine of official immunity
Damnum absque injuria.0
Mistakes committed by public officers in the performance of duty
are not actionable wrong absent any clear showing they were motivated
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Good faith in the
performance of official acts is presumed.26
Even assuming the head of procuring entity erred in not ensuring
eligibility documents were attached to the contract, he cannot be held
personally liable for the disallowed amount absent showing he was
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, and
clear evidence he was aware of the ineligibility of the construction firm,
as he was not the one directly responsible for the absence of eligibility
documents.
Likewise, it unjustly enriches to the prejudice of the head of
procuring entity to make him personally liable for the disallowed
amount considering that the hotel is being enjoyed and utilized by the
provincial government.29
Rationale.
Public officers should not be hampered in performing their duties
or in deciding for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest
mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an
erroneous interpretation, if any al all, is in the nature of damnum absque
injuria.30
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice
or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The acts of public officers
are protected by presumption of good faith.”
Good faith, defined.
It refers to a state of mind manifested by acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of honest intention to
’’Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
“Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
2’)oson 111 v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223762, Nov. 7, 2017
■"Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
■“Sanders v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-46930, June 19, 1988, cited in Farolan v. Solmac
Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
 190 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its
absence should be established by convincing evidence.”
Good faith, examples.
Members of the Commission on Races are not liable
for damages even if they nullified horse race results, forcing
the Philippine Race Club to reimburse losing tickets after
it awarded winning tickets earlier, since they acted in their
official capacity in the honest belief they had power to do
so, as evidenced by their on-the-spot investigation of what
marred the race.”
An erroneous but honest interpretation of a municipal
resolution done in the scope of duty does not result in bad
faith. The mayor and treasurer who enforced it are not
personally liable for business losses incurred by a private
individual as a result thereof.”
Customs officials acted with prudence and in good
faith when they withheld immediate release of importation
due to a report from another authority it contained restricted
materials.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds
himself to perform duties of his office faithfully and to use
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. In the discharge of his duties thus, he
is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful
men use in the management of their affairs.
Where there is doubt as to disposition of various
importations of cellophane or film products, the customs
officials acted with prudence when they withheld release
pending necessary clarificatory guidelines. Even if they
erred in withholding the release because importation is not
restricted after all, it is still an honest mistake and whatever
”Abando v. Lozada, G.R. No. 82564, Oct. 13, 1989, cited in Farolan v. Solmac Mar­
keting Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
“Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio. G.R. No. 11944, Aug. 31, 1960
“Tuzon v. CA. G.R. No. 90107, Aug. 21. 1992
Chapter V 191
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
damage it may have caused to the importer is damnum absque
injuria.35
Mistakes committed by public officers are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The acts
of public officers are protected by the presumption of good
faith.*
Good faith, presumption of.
Good faith is always presumed and it is
upon him who alleges the contrary that the bur­
den of proof lies.” All things are presumed to be
correctly and solemnly done.*
Honest belief and good faith of scientists, who are
not lawyers, that they had authority to appoint and be
appointed, spares criminal liability but not administrative
liability.” Good faith negates criminal liability, shown in
liquidation by way of salary deduction."
A public officer is not personally liable for acts done
within scope of authority, even if erroneous, provided it
is done in good faith, and even if it injures third parties,
provided it is done within scope of his official authority and
in the line of duty.
To make acts fall under scope of official authority, it is
not necessary that it be prescribed by statute or specifically
directed or requested by the superior officer. It is sufficient
that they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision.
“Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
“Sanders v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-46930, June 19, 1988, cited in Farolan v. Solmac
Marketing Corp.. G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
”U.S. v. Rafinan, 1 Phil. 294; Guillen v. CA, G.R. No. 83175, Dec. 4, 1989, cited in
Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
“Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp., C.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991
“Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 168951 and 1689000, Nov. 27,2013
"Panganiban v. People, G.R. No. 211543, Dec. 9, 2015
192 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Error in the exercise of authority is covered by
immunity provided it is done within scope of authority in
good faith, without willfulness, malice, or corruption.41
Exception.
There is no general immunity arising solely from
occupying a public office. Public officers can be held
personally liable for acts claimed in the performance of
official duties if they acted ultra vires or if there is bad faith.42
When a public officer goes beyond scope of his duty
and acts in bad faith, he is not entitled to protection of his
office. When a governor suspended and dismissed quarry
superintendent in defiance of final order of higher authorities
to reinstate him, it amounts to bad faith for which he is
personally liable for damages.4’
But while there is no general immunity arising solely
from occupying a public office and that public officers can
be held personally liable for acts claimed in the performance
of official duties if they acted ultra vires or if there is bad
faith, the Solicitor General who lawyers for the government,
cannot be impleaded respondent to a counterclaim to a case
he filed and acted as such.
It must be filed in a separate case. To allow counter­
claim against the Solicitor General in his capacity as
government lawyer leads to mischievous consequences,
especially for the Solicitor General who handles high profile
and controversial cases.
A lawyer does not enjoy special immunity from
damage suits. When he acts in the name of a client however,
he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same
case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any
claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should
be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action.44
‘’Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 11944, Aug. 31, 1960
42Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 91391, January 24,1991
°San Luis v. CA, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989
“Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 91391, January’ 24, 1991
Chapter V 193
LIABILITY' AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Parliamentary immunity
Basis.
The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity, a funda­
mental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world, to enable and encourage a public representative
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary he enjoys to the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom the exercise of such liberty' may occasion offense.45
Immunity from arrest.
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while Congress is
in session.46The immunity applies for as long as Congress is
in session, whether or not the legislator involved is actually
attending it.47 * *
Freedom of speech and debate.
Super-citizens.**
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress
or in any of its committees.4’ It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by it
disorderly or unbecoming its member.50
45Osmefta, Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 868-69 (1960), cited by Bemas, S.J., in The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed., p. 643
“First sentence. Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
47II Record 182-184, 195, cited by Bemas, S.J., in The 1987 Constitution of the Re­
public of the Philippines: A Commentary', 1996 Ed., p. 643
“U.S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R.
No. 223451, March 14, 2018
“Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
50Osmefta, Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 868-69 (1960), cited by Bemas, S.J., in The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed., pp. 643-
644
 194
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The speech or debate clause does not turn Senators and
super-citizens53 whose spoken
District Representatives into51 52
words or actions are rendered absolutely impervious to
prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the
privilege on members of Congress” not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good.5*
It is intended to protect them against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their
decision-making prerogatives.55 Such grant of legislative
privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose
and plain language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or
debate,5* which may enable reckless men to slander and even
destroy others,57 is
* not a cloak of unqualified impunity.”
Its invocation must be as a means of perpetuating
inviolate the functioning process of the legislative depart­
ment. The parliamentary nonaccountability thus, granted
to members of Congress is not to protect them against
persecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people's representatives, to perform the functions of
their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.59 *
Speech or debate, scope of.
But the requirement that speech or debate must be
made in Congress or in any of its committees does not
refer merely to the locale of speech or debate but, more
importantly, also as to its nature."’
"Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
52U.S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, C.R
No. 223451, March 14, 2018
"Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, C.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
"Pobre v. Santiago. 613 Phil. 359 (2009), citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 US 367, 71
S.Ct. 783 (1951), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
55I’obre v. Santiago, 613 Phil. 365 (2009), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen,
C.R. No. 223451, March 14,2018
“Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
,7U.S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, C.R.
No. 223451, March 14, 2018
"Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, C.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
"Pobre v. Santiago. 613 Phil. 352, 360 (2009), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigo­
men, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
<,0Bemas, S.J., in The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Com­
mentary, 1996 Ed., p. 644
Chapter V 195
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
The expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by them, either
in Congress or outside premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance
of the acts in question.61 *
The act of a Member of the House of Representatives
causing publication in several newspapers of general
circulation of an open letter to the President alluding to
military officers to be under the control of unnamed planners
and possibly unwitting tools of the plans, docs not fall under
the privilege of speech or debate.
In doing so, the Member did not perform his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
of its Committees, especially when the letter was published
when Congress presumably was not in session.63
Likewise, statements of a Senator describing a business­
man as front or dummy in response to media interviews
during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings
in the Senate are not covered by the parliamentary speech or
debate privilege.
The statements are clearly not part of any speech
delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were
also not spoken in the course of any debate in said forum.
It cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were
made in the official discharge or performance of his duties as
a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the
legislative process.
To participate in or respond to media interviews is not
an official function of any lawmaker. It is not demanded by
6lJimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876,878 (1966), cited by Bemas, S.J., in The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed., p. 644
“Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 124 Phil. 296 (1966), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigo­
men, C.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
 196 Chapter V 197
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting
laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his
duties and legislate without having to communicate with
the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is
not a legislative act,63 but is political in nature.64
Presidential immunity from suit
Basis.
While the 1973 Constitution was amended in 1981 to immunize
the President from suit during his tenure,65 the 1987 Constitution did
not preserve it as it was already understood in Philippine jurisprudence
that the President may not be sued during his tenure."1
Rationale.
It is to assure exercise of presidential duties and
functions is free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being theChief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the officer-holder's
title, also demands undivided attention.67
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against him.
It cannot be argued that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue
of the affidavit-complaint filed by the President, she may subsequently
have to be a prosecution witness under trial court jurisdiction as to
indirectly defeat privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she exposes herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.
There is nothing in law that prevents the President from waiving
the privilege. The President may shed protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to court jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
It is a decision that cannol be assumed and imposed by any other
person.6’

Exception.
But presidential decisions may be questioned before
courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.68

Nature.
The privilege of immunity from suit is personal to the incumbent.
It pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office, not by any other person in the President's

“Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018

MU.S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), cited in Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R.
No. 223451, March 14, 2018
“Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1973 Constitution, cited by Bemas, S.J., in The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed., p. 738
"’ll Record 423, cited by Bemas, S.J., in The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Ed., p. 738
"’Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988
“Medrana v. Office of the President, 188 SCRA 818.824, cited in Gloria v. CA, G.R.
No. 119903, Aug. 15,2000 “Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, Nov. 14,1988

Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Purpose.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the
character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public
officers and employees, the object sought is not to punish the officer or
employee but to improve public service and preserve public faith and
confidence in our government.1
Disciplining authorities.
It refers to the person or body duly authorized by law to impose
the penalty provided for by law or rules.2 It may either be the Civil
Service Commission,3 the Office of the President, the Ombudsman, or
the disciplining authorities of agencies and local government units.**
The Civil Service Commission as disciplining authority
Jurisdiction.
The Civil Service Commission hears and decides administrative
cases or matters instituted by or brought before it, directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and reviews decisions and actions
of its offices and other government agencies.5
'Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138. Feb. 16, 2005; Remolona v. CSC, 414 Phil.
590, 601 (2001), cited in Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, Aug. 13, 2008
2Sec. 3(j), Rule 1, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’Sec. 5, Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
*Sec. 9, Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
■’See. 5, Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
198
Chapter VI 199
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
It cognizes these disciplinary cases:6 decisions brought before
it on petition for review,7 complaints brought against its officials
and employees both in the central office and regional offices,8 and
complaints against officials who are not presidential appointees or
elective officials.’
It also includes decisions of disciplining authorities imposing
penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on appeal,111 decisions of
disciplining authorities imposing penalties not exceeding thirty days
suspension or fine equivalent to thirty days salary but violating due
process," requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard
by its regional offices,12 appeals or petitions of review from orders of
preventive suspension,13 and such other actions or requests involving
issues arising out of or in connection with these enumerated cases.'*
Disciplinary cases in the Civil Service
No officer or employee in the Civil Service is suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.15
Who initiates.
Administrative proceedings may be initiated by the disciplining
authority motu proprio or upon complaint of any other person.16
Valid complaint, requisites.
No complaint against an official or employee is given due course
unless it is written, subscribed, and sworn to by complainant.'7
‘Sec. 7(A), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’Sec. 7(A)(1), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 7(A)(2), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Sec. 7(A)(3), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'“Sec. 7(A)(4), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 7(A)(5), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'2Sec. 7(A)(6), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'■'Sec. 7(A)(7), Rule 2, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'*Sec. 7(A)(8), Rule 2. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
”Sec. 46(a), Book V, E.O. 292
,6Sec. 10, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
,7First sentence, first par., Sec. 11, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service
200 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Anonymous complaint, when allowed.
No anonymous complaint is entertained unless the act
complained of is of public knowledge or allegations can be
verified or supported by documentary or direct evidence.”
In cases initiated by proper disciplining authority or an authorized
representative, a show cause order is sufficient.”
Show cause order, defined.
It refers to the written document requiring a person
to explain, or justify before the disciplining authority or its
duly authorized representative within a given period why
no disciplinary action shall be taken against him or her.30
The complaint is written in clear, simple and concise language,
and in a systematic manner as to apprise the person complained of,
about the nature and cause of accusation and to enable him or her to
intelligently prepare a defense or answer or comment.21
Person complained of, identified.
It refers to the person who is subject of a complaint but
who is not yet issued a notice of charge or formal charge by
disciplining authority'.22
It contains full name and address of complainant and of the
person complained of as well as his or her position and office, narrates
relevant and material facts which shows acts or omissions allegedly
committed, certified true copies of documentary evidence and
affidavits of witnesses, if any, and certification or statement of non­
forum shopping.25
"Sec. 12, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 11, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service
“Sec. 4(bb), Rule 1,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’First sentence, second par.. Sec. 11, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Sendee
“Sec. 4(t), Rule 1, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Third par.. Sec. 11, Rule 3,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Chapter VI 201
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Absence of any of these requirements may dismiss complaint
without prejudice to its refiling upon compliance.*24
When and where filed.
Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative
complaint may be filed anytime with the Commission or any of its
regional offices, heads of departments, agencies, national government,
local government units, state universities and colleges or local
universities and colleges, and government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters except as may be provided by law.25
Effect of withdrawal.
Withdrawal of complaint neither outrightly dismisses
it nor discharges the person complained of from any
administrative liability.26 * *
How acted.
Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority preliminarily investigates to
determine existence of a prima facie case.22
Prima facie case, defined.
It refers to evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor
of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by
other evidence.2"
Preliminary investigation, defined.
It is a mandatory proceeding undertaken to determine
whether a prima facie case exists to warrant issuance of a
formal charge or notice of charge.29
“Fourth par.. Sec. 11, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
25Sec. 13, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
26Sec. 16, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“First sentence, first par.. Sec. 17, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service
“Sec. 4(u), Rule 1,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 18, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
202 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Who investigates.
The disciplining authority may create an investigating committee
or designate an investigator for such purpose.-10 For cases filed before
the Commission or any of its regional offices, preliminary investigation
may be entrusted to lawyers of other agencies31 *and similar officials by
way of deputation to conduct preliminary and formal investigation.”
How conducted.
It may be conducted in any of the following manner: (a) requiring
submission of counter affidavit or comment and/or other documents
from the person complained of within five days from receipt of
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance; (b) ex-parte
evaluation of records; (c) darificatory meeting with parties to discuss
case merits.33 *
When complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, it or
its authorized representative issues a show-cause order directing
the person complained of to explain within same period why no
administrative case should be filed against him or her. Failure to submit
a comment, counter-affidavit or explanation waives it and preliminary
investigation may be completed even without it.5*
Right to counsel.
The right to counsel may be exercised even during
preliminary investigation.35
A preliminary investigation commences within a non-extendible
period of five days upon receipt of complaint by disciplining authority
and terminates within twenty days thereafter. However, the disciplining
authority may extend such periods in meritorious cases.36
■’"Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 17, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service
’'Fourth par., Sec. 19, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
”Sec. 113, Rule 22, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’■’First par., Sec 19, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’Second par.. Sec. 19, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
’’Third par., Sec. 19, Rule 4.2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
■'"Sec. 20, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Chapter VI 203
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Within five days from termination of preliminary investigation,
the investigating officer or body submits confidential Investigation
Report with recommendation and the complete records of the case to
the disciplining authority.37
In the absence of prima facie case, the complaint is dismissed. If
a prima facie case is established after preliminary investigation, the
disciplining authority may issue either a formal charge or notice of
charge.36
Formal charge, when issued.
After finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority
formally charges the person complained of, who is now called
respondent.”
Contents.
It specifies the charge, briefly states material or rele­
vant facts, which may be accompanied by certified true
copies of documentary evidence, sworn statements covering
testimony of witnesses, directs the charge be answered in
writing, under oath in not less than three days but not more
than ten days from its receipt, advises respondent to indicate
in the answer whether a formal investigation is demanded,
and notifies respondent he or she may opt to be assisted by
a counsel.*"
Notice of charge, when issued.
In instances where complaint was initiated by a person other
than disciplining authority, the latter may issue a written notice of
charge against the person now called respondent, attaching copies of
complaint, sworn statement, and other documents submitted."
’’Sec. 21, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"Sec. 22, Rule 4, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’First sentence. Sec. 23, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“Second sentence. Sec. 23, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
"First sentence, first par.. Sec. 24, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service
 204 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Contents.
It contains the charge against respondent with a
statement that a prima facie case exists," directs the charge
be answered in writing, under oath in not less than three
days but not more than ten days from its receipt, and notifies
respondent he or she may opt to be assisted by counsel of
choice and may elect to have a formal investigation."
If respondent received notice of charge with incomplete
attachments, he or she may request for lacking documents within ten
days from its receipt and the period to answer does not run until the
same is received by respondent.*'
Answer, requisites and contents.
The answer, which is in writing and under oath, is specific and
contains material facts and applicable laws, if any, including original or
certified copies of documentary evidence, sworn statements covering
testimonies of witnesses, if there be any." When disciplining authority
determines the answer is satisfactory, the case is dismissed. Otherwise,
investigation proceeds.**
Failure to answer, effects.
If respondent fails or refuses to answer formal charge or
notice of charge within given period, he or she is considered
to have waived right to answer and the case is decided based
on available records.*7
Prohibited pleadings, enumerated.
The disciplining authority does not entertain requests
for clarification, bills of particulars, motions toeither dismiss.
"Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 24, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service
"Third sentence, first par., Sec. 24, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Sendee
“Second par.. Sec. 24, Rule 5. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
"First par.. Sec. 26, Rule 6, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Sendee
“Second par.. Sec. 26, Rule 6,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
"Sec. 27, Rule 6, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Sendee
205
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
quash, reconsider, or extend time to file answer. If filed, it is
noted without action and attached to case records.*4
Formal investigation, when conducted.
It is conducted where case merits cannot be decided judiciously
without it, or when respondent elects to have one, in which case, it is
held not earlier than five days nor later than ten days from receipt of
respondent's answer or upon expiration of period to answer.*’
It is finished within thirty days from issuance of formal charge
or notice of charge unless extended by disciplining authority' or its
authorized representative, or heads of agencies, or the Commission in
meritorious cases.40
Submission of position paper or memorandum.
At any stage of proceedings, parties may, based on their
mutual consent, submit position paper or memorandum
and consider the case submitted for decision without any
need for further hearings.51
Pre-hearing conference.
At the commencement of formal investigation, the hearing officer
conducts a pre-hearing conference for parties to appear, consider
and agree to stipulate facts, simplify issues, identify and mark their
evidence, waive objections to admissibility of evidence, limit number
of witnesses, set date of subsequent hearings and such other matters as
may aid in the prompt and just resolution of the case.”
Failure to attend, effects.
Conduct of a pre-hearing conference is mandatory.
Failure of any party to attend may cause submission of case
for decision based on available records upon appropriate
“Sec. 25, Rule 5, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"First sentence. Sec. 34, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
’"Second sentence. Sec. 34, Rule 8,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“Sec. 35, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“First par.. Sec. 36, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 206 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
motion of the present party.53 The designated prosecutor
or hearing officer who fails to appear at the pre-hearing
conference, without justifiable reason, may be liable for
neglect of duty.54
Hearing proper.
Hearings are conducted continuously on dates set by the hearing
officer or as agreed upon during pre-hearing conference.55 If respondent
fails or refuses to appear or not represented by counsel during a
particular hearing despite due notice, investigation proceeds and
respondent is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.56
Unless the hearing officer directs otherwise, prosecution first
presents its evidence, followed by respondent's evidence in support of
his or her defense. There may be rebuttal or surrebuttal.57 *
Right to counsel.
If, after being apprised of the right to counsel,
respondent appears without aid of a counsel, he or she is
deemed to have waived the right to it.59 *While investigations
conducted by an administrative body may be akin to criminal
proceedings, fact remains that party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, and the
administrative body has no duty to furnish him or her with
counsel. The option belongs to the public officer.59
Any counsel who is a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines appearing before any hearing or investiga­
tion, manifests orally or in writing his or her appearance.
A lawyer or counsel who works for the government is re­
quired to present authority to practice profession from his or
her agency head or the agency head's authorized represen-
53Third par.. Sec. 36, Rule 8,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’Fourth par.. Sec. 36, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
“First par.. Sec. 37, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Third par.. Sec. 37, Rule 8.2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’First par., Sec. 40, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Second par., Sec. 38, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
"Remolona v. CSC, 362 SCRA 804
Chapter VI 207
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
tative.“ A private prosecutor may be allowed to appear pro­
vided the public prosecutor directly controls and supervises
over the private prosecutor at all times.61
Decision.
Within fifteen days after conclusion of formal investigation, the
hearing officer reports and recommends to disciplining authority
material facts established during investigation, findings and their
supporting evidence.62 The disciplining authority decides case within
thirty days from receipt of formal investigation report.63
Finality of decision.
A decision rendered by the disciplining authority
or CSC regional offices reprimanding or suspending
respondents for not more than thirty days or fining an
amount not exceeding thirty days' salary, is not appealable.
It is final and executory unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. Respondent may however appeal or
petition for review on ground of violation of due process.14
If suspension exceeds thirty’ days or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, the decision finalizes and
becomes executory after lapse of reglementary period to
appeal or move to reconsider and no such pleading is filed.65
Exceptions.
In spite of the statutory provisions that finalize
decisions of certain administrative agencies, the Supreme
Court cognizes petitions questioning these final decisions
where lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
violation of due process, or erroneous interpretation of law
is brought to its attention.1*
“First par.. Sec. 39, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
‘'Second par.. Sec. 39, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
“Sec. 47, Rule 8,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Sec. 48, Rule 9,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“First par.. Sec 49, Rule 9, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Second par.. Sec. 49. Rule 9, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
“Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, G.R. No. L-43890, July 16, 1984, cited in
Chung Fu Industries (Philippines), Inc v. CA, G.R. No. 96283, Feb. 25, 1992
 208 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Motion for reconsideration.
The party adversely affected by the decision may move to recon­
sider with the disciplining authority who rendered it within fifteen
days from its receipt unless otherwise provided by law. However, pri­
vate complainant may move to reconsider the decision of CSC Regional
Office.”
Grounds.
It is based on any of these: (a) new evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; or
(b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on record;
or (c) errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant.**
A motion to extend time to move to reconsider is not allowed.*9
Only one motion for reconsideration is entertained. If a second motion
for reconsideration is filed notwithstanding its proscription, the finality
of action is reckoned from denial of the first motion for reconsideration.7’
When deemed filed.
A motion for reconsideration sent by registered mail or
private courier service is deemed filed on the date stamped
on the envelope or courier pack which is attached to case
records. In case of persona) delivery, it is deemed filed on the
date stamped on it by the proper office.71
Effect of filing.
Filing of a motion for reconsideration within 15-day
reglementary period stays execution of the decision sought
to be reconsidered.77
*7First par.. Sec. 61, Rule 12,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“'Sec. 63, Rule 12, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“'Second par.. Sec. 61, Rule 12, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
'’Sec. 64, Rule 12, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
7lSec. 62, Rule 12, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
72Sec. 65, Rule 12, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Sendee
Chapter VI 209
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Appeal.
Decisions of disciplining authorities that suspend for a period
exceeding thirty' days or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary
may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen days
from its receipt. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office
head is appealable to the Commission, it may be initially appealed to
the department head and then finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, it is executory except when penalty is dismissal from service,
in which case it is executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.73 74
Unappealable decision, exception.
A decision rendered by disciplining authority or CSC
Regional Offices penalizing reprimand, or suspension for not
more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary, is not appealable. It is final and executory
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
However, respondent may appeal or petition for review
when the issue raised is violation of due process.79
Violation of due process, effect.
If on appeal, the Commission finds the disciplining
authority violated respondent-appellant's right to due
process, it dismisses the case against respondent and orders
his or her immediate reinstatement with payment of back
wages and other benefits. However, dismissal of the case is
without prejudice on the part of disciplining authority to
refile it in accordance with law.75 *
When deemed filed.
An appeal sent by registered mail or private courier
service is deemed filed on the date stamped on the envelope
or courier pack attached to case records. In case of personal
delivery, it is deemed filed on the date stamped on it by
the proper office.7* Once perfected, an appeal cannot be
’’Sec. 66, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
74Sec. 49, Rule 9, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
75Sec. 70, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’‘First par.. Sec. 66, Rule 13,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 2)0 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
withdrawn except upon motion duly approved by the
* 73 * * *
appellate body.77
Appeal, how perfected.
To perfect an appeal or petition for review, appellant or petitioner
submits the following documents:7"
(a) Memorandum containing” grounds relied upon for
the appeal or petition for review,"1 certified true copies of the
assailed decision, resolution or order,"1 and certified true copies of
documents, or evidence relevant to the case."2
It is filed with the appellate authority, copy furnished
disciplining authority that submits case records systematically
and chronologically arranged, paged and securely bound to
prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen days from receipt,
to the appellate or higher authority;®
(b) Proof of service of a copy of the memorandum to the
disciplining office;"4 (c) proof of payment of required fee;"’ and (d)
a statement or certificate of non-forum shopping."6
If appellant or petitioner fails to comply with any of these
requirements within reglementary period, the Commission directs
compliance within a period of not more than ten days from receipt,
with a warning that failure to comply is construed as failure to perfect
an appeal or petition for review and causes dismissal with prejudice to
its refiling."7
"Second par.. Sec. 66, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
'"First par.. Sec. 68, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’Sec. 68(a), Rule 13, 2017 Rules onAdministrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 68(a)(1), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 68(a)(2), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 68(a)(3), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
®Sec. 68(a), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"‘Sec. 68(b), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
®Sec. 68(c), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Sec. 68(d), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Last par., Sec. 68(a), Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
Chapter VI 211
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Effect of filing.
Except for cases requiring confirmation of the Depart­
ment Secretary concerned and cases decided by the CSC
Regional Offices, an appeal or petition to the Commission
does not stop the decision or resolution from being execu­
tory."
Petition for review.
Decisions or resolutions rendered by CSC Regional Offices may
be elevated either by the complainant or respondent to the Commission
by way of petition for review within fifteen days from receipt.**
Except in cases involving sexual harassment, a decision or
resolution of disciplining authority in an agency exonerating respondent
or dismissing a complaint for lack of prima facie case or issuance of a
formal charge for a lower offense is not subject to appeal or petition for
review before the Commission.*"’
Petition for review under Rule 43.
A party may elevate a decision or resolution of the Commission
before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.”
Petition for review on certiorari.
Substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
all that is needed to support administrative findings of fact.”
While it should no longer be disturbed, even if such substantial
evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant,” judicial review
remains justified when there has been denial of due process, or mistake
“Sec. 69, Rule 13,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“Sec 71, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
‘"’Sec. 72, Rule 13, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Gvil Service
’’See 73, Rule 13,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
73 A ng Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762
(1984), died in Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev't. Corp. v. Factoran, G.R. No. 75501,
Sept. 15,1987
’’Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 (1984), cited in Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Dev't. Corp. v. Factoran, G.R. No. 75501, Sept. 15, 1987
212 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative
proceedings’4 or where procedure which led to factual findings is
irregular, when palpable errors are committed, or when grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.95
Pendency of administrative or criminal case, effects.
Except as otherwise provided by law, pendency of an administra­
tive or criminal case does not disqualify respondent from promotion
and other human resource actions or from claiming maternity or pater­
nity benefits.96
Retirement benefits of retiring employees may only be withheld if
employee has a pending administrative case which outcome involves
possible pecuniary liability on the part of employee, and the law
specifically authorizes withholding of retirement benefits. In no case,
however, shall the terminal or accrued leave benefits of a retiring
employee be withheld because of a pending administrative case.
The head of agency where the administrative case against a
retiring employee is pending ensures that said case is terminated
or resolved within a period of three months from effectivity date of
retirement of the concerned employee. After lapse of such period and
the case has not been terminated or resolved, without justifiable reason
and/or without fault or delay attributable to the retiring employee, the
retirement benefits due shall be immediately released to him or her
without prejudice to outcome of the case.
The concerned quasi-judicial agency where case is pending shall
determine and resolve issues pertaining to aforesaid fault and/or
delay. For this purpose, appeal taken by the employee shall constitute a
justifiable reason for the non-release of his or her retirement benefits.97 * *
’’Atlas Dev't. & Acceptance Corp. v. Gozon, 64 O.G. 11511 (1967), cited in Atlas
Consolidated Mining & Dev't. Corp. v. Factoran, G.R. No. 75501, Sept. 15, 1987
"Ateneo de Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 (1986); Int'l. Hardwood 4
Veneer Co. of the Phils, v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country ClubCorp. v. NLRC,
118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; Eusebio v. Socie-
dad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569, cited in Atlas Consolidated Mining & Dev't. Corp,
v. Factoran, G.R. No. 75501, Sept. 15, 1987
’’First par.. Sec. 46, Rule 8,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"Sec. 6, Rule Ill, CSC Res. No. 1300237, Jan. 30,2013 or the Implementing Rules &
Regulations of R.A. 10154
Chapter VI 213
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Administrative case, when pending.
An administrative case is construed as pending when
disciplining authority has issued a formal charge or notice of
charge to respondent.96
Administrative offenses and penalties
Administrative offenses, classified.
Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, punishable by either dismissal" or suspension of
six months and one day to one year for first offense and dismissal for
second offense,100 less grave, punishable by suspension of one month
and one day to six months for first offense, and dismissal from service
for second offense101 and
* light, punishable by reprimand for first offense,
suspension of one to thirty days for second offense and dismissal from
service for third offense,103 *depending on their gravity or depravity and
effects on government service.105
Grave offenses punishable by dismissal, enumerated.
The following are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from
service:10*
Serious dishonesty.105
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in
any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception
or fraud in securing his examination, registration or appointment.
Dishonesty is understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
or defraud, unworthiness or lack of integrity.106
’’’Second par., Sec. 46, Rule 8, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Ser­
vice
"Sec. 50(A), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’“Sec. 50(B), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
101Sec. 50(D), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
103Sec. 50(F), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
l05Sec. 50, Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
10*Sec. 50(A), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
105Sec. 50(A)(1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(1), Book V, E.O. 292
’“"Concerned Citizen v. Gabral, Jr., 514 Phil. 209, 219 (2005); Sevilla v. Gocon, 467
Phil. 512, 521 (2004) citing Aquino v. The General Manager of the GSIS, 130 Phil. 488, 492
(1968) cited in Republic v. Arias, G.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17, 2014
 214 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The act of recommending approval despite lack of certification
from end-users does not constitute dishonesty but a form of gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct."'7
Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed
in the course of performance of duty. If a public officer is dishonest,
or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, it affects his right to
continue in office.
The private life of a public officer cannot be segregated from
his public life. Dishonesty reflects on the fitness of a public officer to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.10"
Gross neglect of duty.11"
Cross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as
other persons may be affected.
It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own property. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable."0
Grave misconduct."1
Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government
official.112 *
Grave and simple misconduct, distinguished.
As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave
misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
l07Republic v. Arias. G.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17, 2014
'“Remolona v. CSC, 362 SCRA 804
lwSec. 50(A)(2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(3). Book V, E.0.292
"°CSC v. Rabang, 572 Phil. 316,322-323 (2008), cited in Republic v. Arias, C.R. No.
188909, Sept. 17,2014
"'Sec. 50(A)(3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(4), Book V, E.O. 292
n2Golangco v. Atty. Fung, 535 Phil. 331, 341 (2006), cited in in Republic v. Arias,
G.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17, 2014
Chapter VI 215
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest."’
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate
to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer.114 An act, to constitute misconduct, must not
be committed in his private capacity and should bear a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.115
An employee who menaced and aimed his loaded firearm at a
provincial director in resentment of his poor performance rating is
guilty of grave misconduct even if committed outside office hours
because the acts were intimately connected to the office of the offender,
committed as consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if
it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element
of the crime in the abstract.11"
Likewise, a municipal mayor who threatened to kill by aiming
a gun at a municipal councilor who was delivering a privilege speech
during a public hearing, committed acts intimately connected with the
discharge of his official mayoralty functions because it retaliates attacks
against his performance as a mayor. If he were not the mayor, he would
not have been irritated or angered by whatever the municipal councilor
might have said in his privilege speech.
An act that is the consequence of the discharge of the employee's
official functions or the performance of his duties, or that is relevant to
his office or to the discharge of his official functions is justly considered
as service-related"7 deserve administrative reprobation especially if
the offensive overt acts are committed within premises of their public
offices.118 *
The failure to exercise functions diligently when he recommended
for approval documents for emergency repair and purchase in the
absence of signature and certification by the end-user, in complete
"’Golangco v. Atty. Fung, 535 Phil. 331, 341 (2006), cited in in Republic v. Arias.
G.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17, 2014
114Narvasa v. Sanchez Jr., C.R. No. 169449. March 26,2010, died in Ganzon v. Arlos,
G.R. No. 174321, Oct. 22,2013
"’Largo v. CA, C.R. No. 177244, Nov. 20, 2007, cited in Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No.
174321, Oct. 22, 2013
""Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, Oct. 22, 2013
117Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136806, Aug. 22, 2000, dted in Ganzon v.
Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, Oct. 22, 2013
""Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, Oct. 22, 2013
216 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
disregard of existing rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds thereby
causing undue injury to the government.119
Being notoriously undesirable.120
The test of being notoriously undesirable is two-fold: whether it
is common knowledge or generally known as universally believed to
be true or manifest to the world that public officer committed the acts
imputed against him, and whether he had contracted the habit for any
of the enumerated misdemeanors.121
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.'22
Moral turpitude is defined as everything done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals, an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowman, or to
society in general123 contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.124
Falsification of official document.125
Under the Revised Penal Code, falsification is committed by a
public officer or employee who takes advantage of his official position
to falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:'26
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or
rubric,127 causing it to appear that persons participated in any act or
""Republic v. Arias, C.R. No. 188909, Sept. 17,2014
120Sec. 50(A)(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(6), Book V, E.O. 292
,2,San Luis v. CA. G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989
122Sec. 50(A)(5), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 10), Book V, E.O. 292
'“Teves v. Comelec, 604 Phil. 717 (2009); Villaber v. Comelec, 420 Phil. 930 (2001);
Dela Torre v. Comelec, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) citing Zari v. Flores, 183 Phil. 27 (1989), 1RRI
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97239, May 12,1993, 221 SCRA 760, cited in Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R.
No. 219603, Jan. 26, 2016
l24Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA 319 (1979), cited in Magno v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147904,
Oct. 4, 2002
'“Sec. 50(A)(6), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 13), Book V, E.O. 292
l26Art. 171, Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
l27Art. 171(1), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
Chapter VI 217
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate,120 attributing to
persons who participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them,*129 making untruthful statements in
a narration of facts,130 altering true dates,131 making any alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning,132
issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original,133 or
134intercalating any instrument or note relative to its issuance
in a protocol, registry, or official book.131
Physical or mental disorder or disability.
Physical or mental disorder due to immoral or vicious habits.135
Under the Government System Insurance (GSIS) Act of 1997, the
following disabilities are deemed total and permanent: complete loss
of sight of both eyes, loss of two limbs at or above ankle or wrist,
permanent complete paralysis of two limbs, brain injury resulting
in incurable imbecility or insanity, and such other cases as may be
determined by the GSIS.136
These disabilities must not be suffered by a member due to
misconduct, notorious negligence, habitual intoxication, or willful
intention to kill himself or another137 *as would entitle him or her
monthly income benefit for life equal to basic monthly pension effective
from date of effectivity subject to certain conditions.1-36
Acceptance of gift.
Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing
in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such
fee, gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
123Art. 171(2), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
129Art. 171(3), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
L30Art. 171(4), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
131 Art. 171(5), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
132Art. 171(6), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
133Art. 171(7), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
134Art. 171(8), Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title 4, Revised Penal Code
135Sec. 50(A)(7), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(bX19), Book V, E.0.292
'■’‘Sec. 16(d)(D), R.A. 8291
137Sec. 15, R.A. 8291
13aSec. 16(a)(D), R.A. 8291
218 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded
to other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft
laws.139
Contracting loans.
Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with
whom the office of the employee has business relations.'40
Solicitation.
Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity,
favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value in the course
of one's official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions
of one's office.
The propriety or impropriety of these acts is determined by its
value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the
motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or
manifestly excessive by its very nature.141
Nepotism.142
All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of
the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision
over him, are hereby prohibited.143
Relative, defined.
The word relative and members of the family referred to
are those related within third degree either of consanguinity
or of affinity.144
139Scc. 50(A)(8), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(9), Book V, E.O. 292
l40Sec. 50(A)(9), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(23), Book V, E.O. 292
,4,Sec. 50(A)(10), Rule 10. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
l42Sec. 50(A)(11), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(30), Book V, E.O. 292
"’Sec. 59(1), Book V, E.O. 292
144Sec. 59(1), Book V, E.O. 292
Chapter VI 219
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Exemptions.
The following are exempted from operation of rules on
nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity,
(b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, provided, however, that in each
particular instance full report of such appointment shall be
made to the Commission.145
Subsequent nepotism.
This restriction does not apply to a member of any family who,
after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau,
contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention of both husband and wife may be
allowed.146
Remedy.
In order to give immediate effect to these provisions,
cases of previous appointments that contravene them
are corrected by transfer, and pending such transfer, no
promotion or salary increase is allowed in favor of the
relative or relatives who are appointed in violation of these
provisions.147 * *
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairs or heads
or bureaus and offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.140
Disloyalty.
Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino
people14’ is committed by public officers or employees who fail to resist
rebellion by all the means in their power, or by continuing to discharge
145Sec. 59(2), Book V, E.O. 292
'“Sec. 59(2), Book V, E.O. 292
,47Sec. 59(3), Book V, E.O. 292
'“Second par., Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
‘“Sec. 50(A)(12), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
220 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
duties of their offices under control of the rebels or by accepting
appointment to office under them.150 Disloyalty to duly constituted
government includes rebellion, sedition, violation of firearms laws, or
any crime against national security.151
Grave offenses punishable by suspension, enumerated.
The following are grave offenses punishable by suspension of six
months and one day to one year for first offense and dismissal from
service for second offense:152 less serious dishonesty,15’ oppression”4
disgraceful and immoral conduct,155 and inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties.156
Inefficiency and incompetence.
The grave offense of inefficiency and incompetence
in performance of official duties157 may also be punishable
by demotion where the guilty person suffers diminution in
salary corresponding to the next lower salary grade with the
same salary step.158
Other grave offenses punishable by suspension include frequent
unauthorized absences or habitual absenteeism,159 habitual tardiness in
reporting for duty causing prejudice to office operations,160 loafing from
duty during regular office hours,161 refusal to perform official duty,162
150Art. 137, Revised Penal Code
151Sec. 27, R.A. 8189
152Sec. 50(B), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
153Sec. 5O(BX1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
154Sec. 50(B)(2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in lhe Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(2), Book V, E.O. 292
l55Sec. 50(B)(3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(5), Book V, E.O. 292
,56Sec. 50(B)(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(8), Book V, E.0.292
157Sec. 50(BX4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
15"Sec. 50(C), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
,59Sec. 50(B)(5), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 14), Book V, E.O. 292
160Sec. 50(BX6), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(14), Book V, E.O. 292
161Sec. 50(B)(7), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 14), Book V, E.O. 292
162Sec. 50(B)(8), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 17), Book V, E.O. 292
Chapter VI 221
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
gross insubordination,163 and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.164
Prejudicial conduct, defined.
The term prejudicial in connection with offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service means
detrimental or derogatory to a party, naturally, probably, or
actually bringing about a wrong result.165
It is an administrative offense which need not relate
to official functions of public officer,166 as long as it tarnishes
image and integrity of his or her public office.167 It may or
may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules.16"
Prejudicial conduct, examples.
A court employee who forged some receipts to
avoid her private contractual obligations is not liable for
misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service because her acts did not directly relate to or connect
with performance of her official duties.169
Similarly, the offense committed by the employee in
selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption
cards to his officemates during office hours is not grave
misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service.170 Just as a city prosecutor who summoned an elite
163Sec. 50(B)(9), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
164Sec. 50(B)( 10), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in lhe Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(27), Book V, E.O. 292
16SManhit v. Ombudsman, 559 Phil. 262-263 (2007), cited in Ombudsman v. Castro,
C.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
,66Balasbas v. Monayao, C.R. No. 190524, Feb. 17, 2014, cited in Ombudsman v.
Castro, C.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
,67Pia v. Gervacio, C.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013, citing Avenido v. CSC, G.R. No.
177666, April 30,2008, cited in Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
'“Espifia v. Cerujano, 573 Phil. 254,263 (2008), cited in Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R.
No. 172637, April 22, 2015
169Mariano v. Roxas, 434 Phil. 742, 751 (2002), cited in Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R.
No. 172637, April 22, 2015
170Cabalitan v. DAR, 515 Phil. 421 (2006), cited in Ombudsman v. Castro, G.R. No.
172637, April 22,2015
222 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
police team for a matter purely personal to her, to help
her brother and sister-in-law to compel another to accept
a depreciated vehicle in exchange for bum checks, is not
guilty of misconduct, as there is no nexus between these acts
and her official functions, but of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service.171
The Chair of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
accused of dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of
public documents, and gross neglect of duty for irregularly
extending several temporary resident visas to foreign
nationals with questionable documents was instead found
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of service
for which he was suspended for six months and one day
without pay.172
Where the act of condonation of penalties and
reduction of fines by the General Manager is without basis
in law, much less necessary approval of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority Board, managerial prerogative
does not apply. It results in government revenue losses,
amounts to undue prejudice to the best interest of service
and sets dangerous precedent to the justice system of the
government.173
Notably, the Court also considered these acts or
omissions conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office,
failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to
safekeep public records and property, making false entries
in public documents, and falsification of court orders.174
Other grave offenses punishable by suspension also include
directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any
transaction requiring approval of one's office.175 Financial and material
l7lOmbudsman v. Castro, C.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
,72Ledesma v. CA, C.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
l71OP & PACC v. Cataquiz, C.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
l74CSIS v. Mayordomo, C.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011, cited in Ombudsman v.
Castro, C.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
l75First sentence, Sec. 50(B)(l 1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service
Chapter VI 223
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
interest is defined as pecuniar)' or proprietary interest by which a
person gains or loses something;176
Owning, controlling, managing, or accepting employment as offi­
cer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in
any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licenses by one's office,
unless expressly allowed by law;177
Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information
officially known by reason of one's office and not made available to the
public, to further one's interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or
to prejudice public interest;17*
Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees for any
purpose contrary to morals or public policy or any commercial purpose
other than by news and communications media for dissemination to
the general public;179
Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise
which has a regular or pending official transaction with one's office,
unless such recommendation or referral is mandated by law, or
international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the
function of one's office.”"
Less grave offenses, enumerated.
The following are less grave offenses punishable by suspension
of one month and one day to six months for first offense, and
dismissal from service for second offense:”1 simple neglect of duty,”2
simple misconduct,1111 discourtesy in the course of official duties,194
l76Second sentence, Sec. 50(B)( 11), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service
,77Sec. 50(B)( 12), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
l7"Sec. 50(B)(13), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
,79Sec. 50(B)(14), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
"“Sec. 50(B)( 15), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
""Sec. 50(D), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Gvil Service
,,2Sec. 50(D)(1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
IMSec. 50(D)(2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
""Sec. 50(D)(3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(7), Book V, E.O. 292
224 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
violation of existing Civil Service Law165
19*and * * of serious nature,1*6
* * * rules
insubordination,1"7 habitual drunkenness,IRS and unfair discrimination
in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference.1”
It also includes failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities
and net worth, and disclosure of business interest and financial
connections including those of one's spouse and unmarried children
under eighteen years of age living in one's household;1"1
Failure to resign from one's position in the private business
enterprise within thirty days from assumption of public office when
conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest oneself of one's
shareholdings or interest in private business enterprise within sixty
days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises,
provided, however, that for those who are already in the service and
conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or
divest himself or herself of said interest within these periods, reckoned
from date when conflict of interest had arisen191 and engage directly
or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding nonpolitical
office.1"
The less grave offense of simple dishonesty is punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months for first offense,
six months and one day to one year for second offense and dismissal for
third offense.1"
Light offenses, enumerated.
The following are light offenses punishable by suspension of one
month and one day to six months for first offense, six months and one
1S9Sec. 50(D)(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(bX 12), Book V, E.O. 292
1#6Sec. 50(DX4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
lwSec. 50(D)(5), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(25), Book V, E.0.292
"“Sec. 50(D)(6), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(15), Book V, E.O. 292
'"‘Sec. 50(D)(7), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'"Sec. 50(D)(8), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"Sec. 50(D)(9), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'"Sec. 50(D)(10), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(26), Book V, E.O. 292
'"Sec. 50(E), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Sendee
Chapter VI 225
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
day to one year for second offense, and dismissal from service for third
offense:194
Simple discourtesy in the course of official duties,1" improper
or unauthorized solicitation of contributions from subordinate
employees in the case of teachers or school officials from school
children,196 violation of reasonable office rules and regulations,197 *
habitual tardiness,196 gambling prohibited by law,199 refusal to render
overtime service,2™1 disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to
entering the service,201 and borrowing money by superior officers from
subordinates.202
The following are also considered light offenses: willful failure to
pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due the government.203 The
**
term just debts applies only to claims adjudicated by a court of law or
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor;201
lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative halls and offices
without authority;2®
Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private enterprises that
are not intended for charitable or public welfare purposes or even in
the latter cases, if there is no prior authority;206 Failure to act promptly
on letters and request within fifteen working days from receipt, except
l94Sec. 50(F), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
195Sec. 50(F)(1), Rule 10. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'“"Sec. 50(F)(2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(ll), Book V, E.O. 292
197Sec. 50(F)(3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(12), Book V, E.O. 292
196Sec. 50(F)(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
199Sec. 50(F)(5), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(bX16), Book V, E.O. 292
“"Sec. 50(F)(6), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 17). Book V. E.O. 292
“"Sec. 50(F)(7), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)( 18), Book V, E.O. 292
““Sec. 50(F)(8), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(20), Book V, E.O. 292
““Sec. 50(F)(9), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(22), Book V, E.O. 292
““Sec. 50(FX9), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
““Sec. 50(F)(I0), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(28), Book V, E.O. 292
““Sec. 50(F)( 11), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(b)(29), Book V, E.0.292

226 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;-'1'7
Failure to process documents and complete action on documents
and papers within reasonable time from preparation, except as
otherwise provided in the rules implementing the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;2™ Failure to
attend to anyone who wants to avail of office services, or act promptly
and expeditiously on public transactions;2"'
Engaging in private practice of one's profession unless authorized
by the Constitution, law or regulation or the head of the office where the
employee or official is assigned, and provided that such practice will
not conflict with one's official functions;210
27 Pursuit
** of private business,
vocation or profession without permission required by Civil Service
rules and regulations.211
Other specific offenses
Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment, defined.
It refers to an act, or a series of acts, involving any unwelcomed
sexual advance, request or demand for a sexual favor, or other verbal
or physical behavior of a sexual nature, committed by a government
employee or official in a work-related, training or education-related
environment of the person complained of.212 * * * *
Persons liable.
Any government official or employee, regardless of
sex, is liable for sexual harassment when he or she2” directly
participates in execution of any act of sexual harassment as
defined by the Rules,21’ induces or directs another or others
to commit sexual harassment as defined by the Rules,2”
2o7Sec. 50(F)( 12), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"Sec. 50(F)(13), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"Sec. 50(F)(14), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
210Sec. 50(F)( 15), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2,,Sec. 50(F)(16), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service;
Sec. 46(bK24), Book V, E.O. 292
212Sec. 3(aa), Rule 1, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2,aSec. 51 (A)(V), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2”Sec. 5l(A)(V)(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
21sSec.51(A)(VXb), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
cooperates in the commission of sexual harassment by
another through an act without which the sexual harassment
would not have been accomplished,216 or cooperates in
the commission of sexual harassment by another through
previous or simultaneous acts.217
Work-related sexual harassment, how committed.
Work-related sexual harassment is committed under
following circumstances:
(a) Submission to or rejection of the act or series of
acts is used as a basis for any employment decision including
but not limited to, matters related to hiring, promotion,
raise in salary, job security, benefits, and any other human
resource action affecting the applicant or employee;21’ or
(b) The act or series of acts have the purpose or effect
of interfering with the complainant's work performance,
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment,■21'' or
(c) The act or series of acts might reasonably be
expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort,
offense, or humiliation to a complainant who may be a co­
employee, applicant, customer, or word of the person com­
plained of.220
Education or training-related sexual harassment, how
committed.
Education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed against one who is under actual or constructive
care, custody or supervision of offender or against one whose
education, training, apprenticeship, internship, or tutorship
2,6Sec 51 (A)(V)(c), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2,7Sec. 51(A)(V)(d), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2”Sec. 51(A)(IV)(a)(l), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
2l?Sec. 51(A)(lV)(a)(2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
220Sec. 51(AXIV)(aX3). Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
 228
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
is directly or constructively entrusted to, or is provided by,
the offender when:
(a) Submission to or rejection of the act or series
of acts as basis for any decision affecting complainant,
including but not limited to, giving of a grade, granting of
honors or scholarship, payment of stipend or allowance, or
giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration;221 *or* *
(b) The act or series of acts have the purpose or
effect of interfering with the performance, or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive academic environment of
the complainant,-222 or
(c) The act or series of acts might reasonably be
expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort,
offense, or humiliation to a complainant who may be a
trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee, or ward of the person
complained of.22-1
Sexual harassment, where else committed.
The offense may also take place in these instances:22*
in workplace or office premises or of the school or training
institution,225 in any place where parties were found as a
result of work or education or training responsibilities or
relations,226 at work or education or training-related social
functions,227 while on official business outside office or school
or training institution or during work or school or training-
a,Sec. 51 (A)(IV)(b)( 1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“Sec. 51(AXIV)(hX2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
2*3Sec. 51(AXIVXbX3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
22*Sec. 5l(A)(IVXc), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
225Sec. Sl(AXIVXcXl), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“'Sec. 51(AXIVXcX2), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“’Sec. 51(AXlVXcX3), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
Chapter VI 229
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
related travel,228 at official conferences, fora, symposia or
training sessions,22’ or by telephone, cellular phone, fax
machine, or electronic mail.230
Sexual harassment, how committed, classified and penalized.
The offense of sexual harassment may be classified as grave
punishable by dismissal,231 less grave,232 or light,233 depending on the
constitutive act.
When grave.
It becomes grave offense punishable by dismissal
from service if it includes, but not limited to the following
acts: unwanted touching of private parts of the body like
inner thighs, genitalia, buttocks, and breast,23* sexual
assault,235 malicious touching,236 requesting for sexual favor
in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign
travels, favorable working conditions or assignments, a
passing grade, granting of honors or scholarship, or grant
of benefits or payment of stipend or allowance,237 and other
analogous cases.238 *
When less grave.
It becomes less grave offense if it includes, but not
limited to the following acts: unwanted touching or brushing
against a victim’s body,23’ pinching not falling under grave
““Sec. 5l(A)(rVXc)(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
2MScc. 51(AXIVXcX5), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
23nSec. 5I(AXIVXcX6), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“'Sec. 51(AX0, Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
232Sec. 51 (A)(ll). Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’See. 51 (A )(l II), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“*Sec. 51(AX0(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
““Sec. 51 (A)(IXt»), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“‘Sec. 5l(A)(0(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’See. 51(AXIX*1), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
““Sec. 51(AX0(e), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“"Sec. 51(AXHX»), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 231) LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
offenses,2*1 derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes
directed toward members of one sex, or one's sexual
241 verbal abuse with
orientation or used to describe a person,24
sexual overtones,242 *and other analogous cases.241
When light.
It becomes light offense if it includes, but not limited
to the following acts: surreptitiously looking at a person's
private part or worn undergarments,244 making sexist
statements and uttering smutty jokes or sending these
through text, electronic mail including but not limited to
social media platform, causing embarrassment or offense
and carried out after offender has been advised that they
are offensive or embarrassing or, even without such advice,
when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive
or vulgar,245 malicious leering or ogling,246 display
* of sexually
offensive pictures, materials, or graffiti.242
It also includes unwelcomed inquiries or comments
about a person's sex life,248 unwelcomed sexual flirtation,
advances, propositions,24’ making offensive hand or body
gestures at an employee,250 persistent unwanted attention
with sexual overtones,251 unwelcome phone calls with sexual
24OSec51(z\)(llXb), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
24,Sec. 51(AXll)(c), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
242Sec. 51(AX10(d), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
242SeC 51(A)(IIXe), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
244Sec. 51 (zX)(111 )(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
245Sec. 51(AXIHXb), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
•46Sec. 51(AXlHXc), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
242Sec. 51(A)(lll)(d), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
248Sec. 51(zXXHIMe), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
2”Sec. 51(AXIIIX0, Rule 10,2017 Ruleson Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2HSec. 51(A)(lll)(g), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
‘"Sec. 51(AXIIIXh), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
Chapter VI 231
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or
insult to the receiver,252 and
* * other analogous cases.251
Sexual harassment, where filed.
A complaint for sexual harassment is filed with the Committee
on Decorum and Investigation (CODl) created in all national or local
agencies of the government, state or local colleges and universities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.251
CODl, composition.
In a work-related environment, it is composed of at
least one representative each from management, accredited
union, if any, second level employees, and first level
employees, duly selected by the unit concerned.255
In an educational or training institution, it is composed
of at least one representative from the administration,
teaching and nonteaching staff and students or trainees, as
the case may be, duly selected by the level concerned.256 The
head of office who fails to create a CODl shall be charged
with neglect of duty.252
Disqualification.
When complainant or person complained of is a
member of the Committee, he or she is disqualified from
being its member or the complaint may be filed directly with
the Civil Service Commission.258
“2Sec. 51(AXIIIX'), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’Sec. 51 (A)(lllXj), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“•First par.. Sec. 14, Rule 3, 2017 Ruleson Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’Second par., Sec. 14, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“"Third par.. Sec. 14, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“’Sixth par.. Sec. 14, Rule 3,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“"Fourth par., Sec. 14, Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
 232 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Term of office.
The agency may formulate its own rules governing the
term of office of its members which should not be more than
two years.2”
CSC Jurisdiction, when acquired.
In case a complaint for sexual harassment is filed with the
Commission, it is remanded to the agency where alleged offender is
employed. However, the Commission may cognize the case under any
of the following circumstances:
(a) the agency has no COD1, (b) disciplining authority is
subject of complaint, (c) subject of complaint is a CODI member,
or (d) there is unreasonable delay in complying with periods
provided in the Rules to investigate and adjudicate sexual
harassment complaint.2"
Unreasonable delay.
There is unreasonable delay when any of periods set
in the Rules lapsed for a period of more than thirty' days
without justifiable reason.26'
Violations of the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007262
Grave offense.
Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic
and/or other gain or advantage is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.265
Light offenses.
The following light offenses are punishable by 30-day suspension
without pay and mandatory attendance in Values Orientation Program
for first offense, three-month suspension without pay for second
-”Fifth par.. Sec. 14, Rule 3,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
•"’First par.. Sec. 15, Rule 3,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
^’Second par.. Sec. 15. Rule 3, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“R.A. 9485
^’Sec. 51(B)(1), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
233
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
offense, and dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public
service for third offense:264
Refusal to accept application and/or request within prescribed
period or any document being submitted by a client;265 failure to act
on an application and /or request or failure to refer back to the client a
request which cannot be acted upon due to lack of requirements within
prescribed period;266
Failure to attend to clients who are within premises of the office or
agency concerned prior to the end of official working hours and during
lunch break;262 failure to render frontline services within prescribed
period on any application and/or request without due cause;2"
Failure to give the client a written notice on the disapproval of
an application or request;26’ and imposition of additional irrelevant
requirements other than those listed in the first notice.220
Duration and effect of administrative penalties
In meting out punishment, same penalties are imposed for similar
offenses and only one penalty is imposed in each case. The disciplining
authority may impose penalty of removal from service, demotion in
rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an
amount not exceeding six months' salary, or reprimand.221
Dismissal.
The penalty of dismissal permanently separates respondent from
service, without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.222
Dismissal inherently cancels eligibility, perpetually disqualifies
from holding public office, bars from taking civil service examinations,
and forfeits retirement benefits225 except terminal leave benefits and
2MSec. 51(B)(lI)(g), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
265Sec. 51 (B)(IIXa), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
266Sec. 51(B)(H)(b), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
262Sec. 51 (B)(llXc), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
26ftScc. 51(B)(U)(d), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
-'’“Sec. 51(B)(ll)(e), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
220Sec. 51 (BXHX0. Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“'Sec. 46(d), Book V, E.O. 292
222Sec. 56(a), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’First sentence. Sec. 57(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service
 234 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
personal contributions to Government Service Insurance System,
Retirement and Benefits Administration Service or other equivalent
retirement benefits system.374
In case dismissed respondent is exonerated, he or she is
immediately reinstated without loss of seniority rights with payment of
back wages and all benefits which would have accrued as if respondent
has not been illegally dismissed.375
Demotion.
Demotion diminishes salary corresponding to the next lower salary
grade with the same step.376 It inherently disqualifies respondent from
promotion for one year.377 In
378case demoted respondent is exonerated, he
or she is restored to former salary grade with the same salary step and
paid with salary differentials during period of demotion.37"
Suspension.
Suspension temporarily ceases work for a period not exceeding
one year.375 Suspension of one day or more is considered a gap in
continuity of service. During period of suspension, respondent is not
entitled to all monetary benefits including leave credits.3™
The penalty of suspension inherently disqualifies respondent from
promotion corresponding to period of suspension.351 In case suspended
respondent is exonerated, he or she is immediately reinstated to
former post without loss of seniority rights and paid back wages and
all benefits which would have accrued as if respondent has not been
illegally suspended.3"2
’’"Second sentence. Sec. 57(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service
375Sec. 58(d), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
376Sec. 56(b), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’See. 57(b), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
378Sec. 58(b), Rule 10,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’First sentence. Sec. 56(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service
’"“Second sentence, Sec. 56(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service
“"'Sec. 57(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"’Sec. 58(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Service
Chapter VI 235
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Distinguished from preventive suspension.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is designed
merely as a measure of precaution so that respondent
may be removed from the scene of alleged misfeasance or
nonfeasance while case is being investigated.30
Grounds for issuance.
The proper disciplining authority, upon motion or motu
proprio, may issue an order of preventive suspension against
respondent upon issuance of formal or notice of charge, or
immediately thereafter if:38*
(a) charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave
misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, other
offenses punishable by dismissal from service, or an
administrative offense committed on its second or third
instance penalized with dismissal from service,®5 and (b)
respondent is in a position to exert undue influence or
pressure on witnesses and/or tamper with evidence.®6
But the proper disciplining authority may reassign
respondent to another unit or agency subject to same periods
prescribed as alternative to preventive suspension.®7
Duration.
Unless otherwise provided for by law, the disci­
plining authority may preventively suspend respon­
dent for a maximum period of ninety days in case of
national agencies including government-owned or con­
trolled corporations with original charters, state univer­
sities and colleges, or sixty days in case of local govern­
ment units including local universities and colleges.3"
’"’Sec. 28, Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’""Sec. 29, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“"Sec. 29(A), Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’"'Sec. 29(B), Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“’Sec. 30, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
“"First sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
 236 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
When administrative case against respondent under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by disciplining
authority within period of preventive suspension, respon­
dent is automatically reinstated in the service unless delay
in case disposition is due to fault, negligence, or petition of
respondent, in which case, the period of delay is not includ­
ed in the counting of period of preventive suspension.2”
Any period of delay caused by motions filed by
respondent is added to period of preventive suspension
subject to these conditions:1*1
Period lower than maximum. Where order of
preventive suspension is for a period less than the maximum
period, the disciplining authority undertakes to finish
formal investigation within said period and is precluded
from imposing another preventive suspension;2”
Effect of authorized leave. Should respondent be
on authorized leave, preventive suspension is deferred or
interrupted until such time that said leave has been fully
exhausted;2’2
Double preventive suspension. If respondent is
preventively suspended in another case, duration of second
preventive suspension runs simultaneously with the first
preventive suspension without prejudice to the service of
the remaining period of the second preventive suspension.2”
Payment of back wages, when allowed.
When the Commission declares an order of preventive
suspension void on its face, respondent is immediately
reinstated and paid back wages corresponding to period of
“"Second sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7, 2017 Rules oil Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
’"Third sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
■''Fourth sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
^Fifth sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
“’Last sentence. Sec. 31, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Sendee
237
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
illegal preventive suspension without awaiting outcome of
main case.®4
Void on its face, instances.
In relation to preventive suspension order,
the phrase void on its face imports any of these
circumstances,”3 it was issued by one who is not
authorized by law,”6 not premised on any of the
conditions under the Rules,”7 issued without a
formal charge or notice of charge or with defec­
tive formal charge or notice of charge,2*1 or while
order is lawful in that it is based on enumerated
grounds, but duration of the imposed preven­
tive suspension has exceeded prescribed periods,
payment of back wages corresponds to the excess
period only.2**
When order of preventive suspension is invalidated but
not based on any of these reasons, respondent is reinstated
but not paid back wages pending final outcome of principal
case. If decision exonerates or penalizes reprimand only,
respondent is paid back wages. Else, no.™
Exoneration, defined.
It contemplates finding of not guilty for the
offense or offenses charged. It does not include
downgrading of charge to a lesser offense. Even
if respondents be eventually found innocent of
charge against them, it does not give rise to pay­
ment of back wages corresponding to period of
preventive suspension in the absence of any find­
ing of its illegality.101
”*Sec 33(a), Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
”5Sec. 33(a), Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
”6Sec. 33(a)(i), Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
^Sec. 33(a)(ii), Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
”"Sec. 33(aXiii). Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
2wSec. 33(a)(iv), Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’Sec. 33(b), Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’Sec. 33, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Gases in the Civil Service
 238 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Remedies against.
Respondent may appeal to the Commission within
fifteen days from receipt of preventive suspension
order. Pending appeal, order is executory. A motion for
reconsideration from order of preventive suspension is not
allowed. In case such motion is filed, it is noted without
action and attached to case records. It neither stays execution
of the order nor stops running of reglementary period to
appeal.™2
Preventive suspension is executory if imposed by the
Commission unless temporarily restrained by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.™3
Fine.
The amount of fine does not exceed six months salary of res­
pondent, computed based on salary rate of respondent when decision
becomes executory. It is paid within a period not exceeding one year
reckoned from date when decision becomes final and executory.™*
The penalty of fine inherently disqualifies respondent from
promotion for same period he or she is fined.™5 In case fined respondent
is exonerated, he or she shall be refunded with amount of fine.™"
Fine, when replaced by suspension.
The disciplining authority may allow payment of fine
in place of suspension if any of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) When functions or nature of office is impressed
with national interest such as those involved in maintenance
of peace and order, health and safety, and education;™2
’“First par.. Sec. 32, Rule 7,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
■™3Second par., Sec. 32, Rule 7, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
™*Sec. 56(d), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’“Sec. 57(d), Rule 10. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
30“Sec. 58(a), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
™2Sec. 52(1 Xa), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
239
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
(b) When respondent is actually discharging
frontline functions or those directly dealing with public and
human resource complement of the office is insufficient to
perform such function;™"
(c) When respondent committed offense without
utilizing or abusing powers of his or her position or office;™’
or
(d) When respondent already retired or otherwise
separated from government service and penalty of
suspension could not be served anymore, the fine may be
sourced from accumulated leave credits or whatever benefits
due the respondent.310
Failure of respondent to pay fine or its part reverses
to the original penalty of suspension. As such, respondent
serves original penalty of suspension imposed, irrespective
of amount already paid.3"
Reprimand.
Reprimand is an official rebuke against a person's behavior that is
neither accessorized with any penalty nor temporarily ceases work. In
the event the penalty of reprimand was imposed on appeal as a result of
modified penalty of suspension or dismissal from service, respondent
is entitled to payment of back wages and other benefits which would
have accrued during period of suspension or dismissal.312
Reprimand is not accessorized with any penalty.313 A warning or
admonition is not considered a penalty.31*
Removal of administrative penalties or disabilities
Petition to remove, how made.
Subject to existing procedures, a dismissed official or employee
may petition the Civil Service Commission for favorable recommenda-
™"Sec. 52(1 )(b), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
•™*Sec. 52(1 )(c), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
310Sec. 52(1 )(d). Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
31lSec. 52(4), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
312Sec. 56(e), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
313Sec. 57(e), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
3,*Sec. 57(f), Rule 10, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
240 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
tion to remove administrative penalties or disabilities upon submission
of the following:
A certified true copy of the decision or resolution in disciplinary
case, favorable recommendation by the disciplining authority or head
of office from which he or she was dismissed, affidavit or certification
from reputable members of the community where he or she resides
that he or she is a good parent or family member and/or neighbor,
law-abiding and active member of community and civic organizations,
proof of non-pendency of an appeal or petition for review relative
to one's disciplinary case before any court or tribunal, and proof of
payment of filing fee.315
Favorable recommendation, guidelines for.
Apart from compliance with these requirements, grant
of favorable recommendation to remove administrative
penalties and disabilities are subject to these guidelines:116
(a) Petitioner demonstrates through specific and
positive action and behavior he or she has become a useful
member of the community;317
(b) A minimum of three years should have lapsed,
from time decision to dismiss petitioner from service
finalized, in order that petitioner may be considered as to
have truly undergone moral reformation;3”
(c) In addition to these requirements, the petitioner
seeking to remove administrative penalties and disabilities
must have recognized or accepted his or her guilt in his or
her petition to show remorse of the consequences of his or
her act;3”
(d) Where petitioner is above 65 years of age, the
Commission may favorably recommend removal of his or
her administrative penalties or disabilities, provided that
’’■“Second par., Sec. 78, Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
3,6Sec. 79, Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’l2Sec. 79(a), Rule 15,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
1,6Sec. 79(b), Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’“Sec. 79(c), Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
Chapter VI 241
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
he or she complies with requirements and submit proof of
moral reformation;320 and
(e) in cases where the person is found guilty of
depriving the government of money or property, restitution
is required before the Commission favorably recommends
removal of administrative penalties or disabilities.111
Recommending and removing authority.
Upon receipt of a request sufficient in form and substance, the
Commission may refer it to appropriate regional office to conduct
background investigation and submission of recommendation within
sixty days from receipt of directive.122
In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the
Commission, the President may commute or remove administrative
penalties or disabilities imposed upon an official or employee in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as the President
may impose in the interest of service.323
Effects of removal.
Subject to existing rules and regulations, the grant of
request to remove administrative penalties or disabilities
restores subject employee's privilege to be employed in
government sendee, unless the President specifically orders
otherwise.324
But restoration of civil sendee eligibility and privilege
to take civil service examinations does not apply to those who
were found guilty of any form of examination irregularity.125
•“"Sec. 79(d), Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’Sec. 79(e), Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
’’’Sec. 80, Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
-“’Sec. 78, Rule 15,2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
'’’■‘First par.. Sec. 78, Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
’’■’Second par.. Sec. 78, Rule 15, 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
 242 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Extinction of administrative liability
The Aguinaldo doctrine.
Before, an elective public official cannot be removed for adminis­
trative misconduct committed during a prior term if he or she is elected
to a successive term. Reelection to office condones the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him™ pursu­
ant to the Aguinaldo doctrine.
It considers reelection to office as the condoning act by the
electorate of misconduct committed by an elective official during his
or her previous term. Pending administrative cases involving acts
committed in the prior term are dismissed once the official is reelected
to another term.
A municipal mayor was administratively charged with corruption
and maladministration in the disbursement of public funds for
improving and asphalting a road that is allegedly a private property.
While case was pending, he was reelected to another term.
Since the term of office during which the acts charged were
allegedly committed already expired and the mayor was subsequently
reelected, the issue of whether he was validly suspended has become
academic and is now merely of theoretical interest. He is no longer
amenable to administrative sanctions for any acts committed during
his former tenure.-327
Offenses committed or acts done during a previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal. This is especially true
where the Constitution provides the penalty in proceedings for removal
does not extend beyond removal from office, and disqualification from
hold ing office for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed.329
Rationale.
Theunderlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms, and that reelection to office condones officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
32<,z\guinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, Aug. 21, 1992
“Lizarez v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1966
12H6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2d 401; Montgomery v. Newell 40
S.W. 23rd 418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com'rs King­
fisher County v. Shutter, 281 p. 222; State v. Blake 280 P. 388; In re: Fedula 147 A. 67; State
v. Wald 43 S.W. 217, cited in Pascual v. PB of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. L-l 1959, Oct. 31, 1959
Chapter VI 243
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
remove him or her.32’ While pending criminal prosecution
for graft committed by an elective officer during one term
may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term if he
or she is reelected to the same office, such suspension must
be issued anew upon a supplemental order.3’"
The Court should never remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
deprives the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a person to office, it must be
assumed they did this with knowledge of his or her life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave any fault or
misconduct, if he or she had been guilty of any. It is not for
the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to overrule
the will of the people.331
Applicability.
The Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply anymore. The doctrine of
condonation is bereft of legal bases. The concept of public office as a
public trust and corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning administrative offense, and
there is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the notion that
election for a different term fully absolves administrative liability
arising from the offense done during a prior term.332
Resignation, effect on administrative offenses.
Generally, resignation does not moot administrative case filed
prior to resignation.33’ Precipitate resignation of a government employee
3N43 Am. Jur p. 45, citing Atty'. Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala 121,63 See. 599, 50 L.R.AJNS]
553). As held in Comant v. Bregan (1887|, 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50
|NE| 553, cited in Pascual v. PB of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. L-l 1959, Oct. 31, 1959
'"Oliveros v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974
33,Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. L-l 1959, Oct. 31, 1959
“Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
"'Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
 24-1 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from service does not
moot administrative case against him.3’1
Rationale.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions—
that of separation from service — may no longer be imposed
on a resigned Cashier at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer,
there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if
she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged
against her, namely, disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits.'”
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when facing administrative sanction. Resignation of a public servant
does not preclude finding of any administrative liability to which he or
she shall still be answerable.’-'*
Court jurisdiction is not lost by the mere fact that respondent
public official had ceased in office during pendency of his case357 and
it does not preclude finding of any administrative liability to which he
shall still be answerable.”8
Exception.
But in those cases, the Court found public officials
subject of administrative cases resigned, either to prevent
continuation of a case already filed”’or to preempt imminent
filing of one, as when the Cashier who resigned by filing a
’"Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, A.M. No. P-03-1726, July 22, 2004,
died in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr„ C.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007
”5Pagano v. Nazarro Jr., C.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007, cited in Ombudsman v,
Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
”*Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, April 6, 2005, cited in Pagano v. Naz­
arro Jr., G.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007
’’’Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998), died in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 495 Phil.
10,16-17(2005)
’’’OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, Aug. 20, 2004, cited in Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, 495 Phil. 10, 16-17 (2005)
■’’’Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 495 Phil. 10, 16-17 (2005); Tuliao v. Judge Ramos, 348 Phil.
404, 416 (1998), dting Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, June 11,1975, Secretary’ of Justice v.
Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, April 22,1997, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679,
July 27, 2011
Chapter VI 245
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
certificate of candidacy previously received notice to explain
why no administrative charge should be filed against her for
cash shortage in her accountabilities.”0
But neither situation obtains where the Deputy
Director of the Department of Finance was forced to resign.
Thus, resignation was neither his choice nor his own doing,
especially where the administrative case was filed exactly
one year and two months after his resignation.”1
While the rule says resignation of an officer or
employee does not prejudice filing of other administrative
or criminal case against him for any act committed while still
in the service,”2 it cannot be argued that a public servant's
resignation does not bar his administrative investigation,
prosecution and adjudication for as long as breach of conduct
was committed while the public official or employee was
still in service.
Otherwise, any official, even if he has been separated
from service fora long time may still be subject to disciplinary
authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.3*3 This interpretation
is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law
which is to improve public sendee and to preserve public
faith and confidence in the government, and not to punish
public official concerned.”4 A public official who validly
severed his ties with the civil sendee can no longer be subject
of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed.”5
If the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to State interests, other legal mechanisms are
available to redress the same.”* Under the three-fold liability
•”°Pagano v. Nazarro Jr., G.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007; Oca v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823
(2004), cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
■"’Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
”2Sec. VI(1), CSC M.C. No. 38, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679,
July 27,2011
"•'Ombudsman v. Andulan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27,2011
’"Office of the Ombudsman v. Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, Aug. 13,2008; Remolona
v. CSC, 414 Phil. 590,601 (2001); Bautista v. Negado, 108 Phil. 283 (1960), cited in Ombuds­
man v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
"’Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
"*Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
 246 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
rule, wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.547
If the public official was spared of administrative liability by
virtue of a valid resignation, criminal cases for estafa and graft and
corruption may still be filed against him. If found guilty, he may not
only be meted out penalty of imprisonment, but also penalties of
perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of
any prohibited interest.54*
The Office of the President as disciplining authority
Over appointive officers.
Presidential appointees are under direct disciplining authority
of the President54’ pursuant to the well-entrenched principle that
presidential power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.™
Exceptions.
As a general rule, all officers appointed by the President are
removable by him, except when the law expressly provides otherwise.
Also, there are instances when the Constitution expressly separates
presidential power to appoint from power to remove like in the case of
Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President but can
only be removed by impeachment. 551
Judges of lower courts are appointed by the President but can only
be removed by the Supreme Court®2 that has exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel. Thus, it can oversee
their compliance with laws and take administrative action in case
of violation,®5 *even if a municipal circuit trial judge is a presidential
appointee.
•547Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 478 (2009 ed.J; Hector
S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon Jr., The Law on Public Officers and Election Law 262
(6th Ed., 2008), cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, C.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
’’’Sec. 9, R.A. 3019, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679. July 27,2011
■“’Office of the President & PACC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
®°Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil. 961, 974 (1997), cited in Office of the Presi­
dent & PAGC v. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, Sept. 14, 2011
“‘Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012
“’Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4,2012; Sulit v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4,2012
“’Sec. 6, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
Chapter VI 247
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
No other branch of government may intrude into this power
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers and
undermining independence of the judiciary. A case for undue delay
in disposition of a criminal case is basically administrative in nature,
hence only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.®4
Chairs and Commissioners of the Constitutional Bodies and the
Ombudsman are appointed by the President but can only be removed
by impeachment.’®
Over local elective officers.
A verified complaint for disciplinary action may be filed
against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city before the Office of the
President.”4 But this jurisdiction is shared with the Ombudsman.®7
A similar complaint may be filed against any elective municipal
official before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President.™ But a similar complaint may
be filed against any elective Barangay official before the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Bayan concerned whose decision is final and executory.®’
Grounds.
An elective official may be disciplined, suspended or removed
from office on any of these grounds: disloyalty to the Republic,™
culpable violation of the Constitution,’41 dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty.®2
Oppression, defined.
Also known as grave abuse of authority, oppression is
a misdemeanor committed by a public officer who, under
color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any
®4Dolalas v. Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 118808, Dec. 24, 1996
“’Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012
’®Sec. 61(a), Local Government Code of 1991
“7Hagad v. Dadole, 241 SCRA 242
™Sec. 61(b), Local Government Code of 1991
“’Sec. 61(c), Local Government Code of 1991
’“’Sec. 60(a), Local Government Code of 1991
®'Sec 60(b), Local Government Code of 1991
®2SeC. 60(c), Local Government Code of 1991
 248 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.363
Dereliction of duty, examples.
Failure for an unreasonable length of time by a court
sheriff to enforce writs of execution in various civil cases for
collection of sum of money, which is a ministerial duty on
his part, is dereliction of duty.*3** Misconduct, a transgression
of some established or definite rule of action, is a dereliction
of duty.1*5 *
Other disciplinary grounds include commission of any offense
involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor,”* abuse of authority,3*7 and unauthorized absence for fifteen
consecutive working days, except in case of members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Panlungsod, Bayan, and Barangay,”* application for,
or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant in another country,3*9 and such other grounds as may be
provided in the Local Government Code of 1991 and other laws. An
elective official may be removed from office on these enumerated
grounds by order of the proper court.370
Abuse of authority, examples.
Any abuse in the exercise of power to preventively
suspend is penalized as abuse of authority.371 A court sheriff
who delays deposit of final amount he received by virtue of
his office and fails to deliver other amounts to Clerk of Court
manifest conduct unbecoming a government employee,
tantamount to grave abuse of authority.373
’"Romero v. Villarosa Jr., A M. No. P-11-2913, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 32, 41-42;
Sps. Stilgrove v. Sabas, 538 Phil. 237,244 (2006), cited in Ombudsman v. Caberoy, G.R. No.
188066, Oct. 22, 2014
3WAquino v. Martin, A.M. No. P-03-1703, Sept. 18, 2003
3*5Japson v. CSC, G.R. No. 189479, April 12, 2011, cited in Balasbas v. Monayao,
G.R. No. 190524, Feb. 17,2014
3**Sec. 60(d), Local Government Code of 1991
■*7Sec. 60(e), Local Government Code of 1991
•’"Sec. 60(0, Local Government Code of 1991
3*9Sec. 60(g), Local Government Code of 1991
370Sec 60(h), Local Government Code of 1991
’’’See. 63(d), Local Government Code of 1991
’’’Romero v. Villarosa, A.M. No. P-11-2913, April 2, 2011
Chapter VI 249
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Hearing and investigation.
Within seven days after administrative complaint is filed, the
Office of the President or the Sanggunian concerned, as the case may be,
requires respondent to submit verified answer within fifteen days from
receipt, and investigates case within ten days after receipt of answer.373
Duration.
From start, case investigation terminates within ninety
days.374 But no investigation is held within ninety days
immediately prior to any local election.375
When respondent is an elective official of a province or highly
urbanized city, hearing and investigation are conducted in the place
where he or she renders or holds office. For all other elective officials,
venue is where Sanggunian concerned is located.37*
Rights of respondent.
The respondent is accorded full opportunity to appear
and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him, and to require
attendance of witnesses and production of documentary
evidence in his favor through compulsory process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.377
Preventive suspension.
Preventive suspension may be imposed by the President, if
respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or
an independent component city,37* by the governor, if respondent is an
elective official of a component city or municipality,379 or by the mayor,
if respondent is a Baraitgay elective official.3™
373Sec. 62(a), Local Government Code of 1991
”4First sentence. Sec. 66, Local Government Code of 1991
375Sec. 62(c), Local Government Code of 1991
37*Sec 62(b), Local Government Code of 1991
377Sec. 65, Local Government Code of 1991
378Sec. 63(a)(1), Local Government Code of 1S>91
379Sec. 63(a)(2), Local Government Code of 1991
3aoSec. 63(a)(3), Local Government Code of 1991

250 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
When imposed.
Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time
after issues are joined, when evidence of guilt is strong,
and given gravity of the offense, there is great probability
the continuance in office of respondent could influence
witnesses or pose a threat to safety and integrity of records
and other evidence.5"'
Duration.
Any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials does not extend beyond sixty days,3® provided that
in the event several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he or she cannot be preventively suspended
for more than ninety days within a single year on same
ground or grounds existing and known at the time of first
suspension.3®
Compared to other period of preventive suspension
imposed by other disciplining authorities, the shorter period
of sixty days prescribed3® as maximum period of preventive
suspension of local elective officials is justifiable and deemed
sufficient not only because respondent involved is elected
by the people, but more precisely because it may only be
ordered after issues are joined.
It means that before order of suspension is issued,
all preliminary requirements and exchanges had been
completed and respondent had already filed counter­
affidavit when case is ready for resolution if parties do not
opt for a formal hearing. The preparatory procedure before
such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume
a lot of time.3"5
■"’First sentence. Sec. 63(b), Local Government Code of 1991
•““Second sentence, Sec. 63(b), Local Government Code of 1991
“’Third sentence. Sec. 63(b), Local Government Code of 1991
’"‘See. 63, R.A. 7160, cited by Regalado, /. in his concurring opinion. Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
“’Regalado, /., concurring opinion, Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April
6, 1995
Chapter VI 251
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Upon expiration of preventive suspension, the
suspended elective official is deemed reinstated in office
without prejudice to continuation of proceedings against
him, which is terminated within 120 days from the time
he was formally notified of the case against him. However,
if delay in case proceedings is due to his fault, neglect, or
request, other than the appeal duly filed, duration of such
delay is not counted in computing time of case termination.™*6
Salary.
During preventive suspension, respondent official
does not receive salary or compensation. Upon subsequent
exoneration and reinstatement however, he is paid full salary
or compensation including such emoluments accruing
during such suspension.™7
Decision, form and notice.
Within thirty days after end of investigation, the Office of the
President or the Sanggunian concerned decides in writing stating clearly
and distinctly facts and reasons for it, copies of which are immediately
furnished respondent and all interested parties.™"
Suspension, effect on right to be elected.
The penalty of suspension does not exceed unexpired
term of respondent or a period of six months for every
administrative offense, nor does it bar candidacy of
respondent so suspended as long as he or she meets
qualifications required for the office.3**
Removal, effect on right to be elected.
The penalty of removal from office as a result of an
administrative investigation bars candidacy of respondent
for any elective position.*0 In case respondent pursues
3"6Sec. 63(c), Local Government Code of 1991
“'Sec. 64, Local Government Code of 1991
“"Second sentence. Sec. 66(a), Local Government Code of 1991
3wSec. 66(b), Local Government Code of 1991
*°Sec. 66(c), Local Government Code of 1991

252 LzWV ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
candidacy and wins, prohibition stays. Election is not a
mode of condoning administrative offense, and there is no
constitutional or statutory- basis to support the notion that
election for a different term fully absolves administrative
liability' arising from offense done during a prior term.
The doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal bases.
The concept of public office as a public trust and corollary­
requirement of accountability to the people at all times is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post.”1
Appeal.
Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty days from
receipt, be appealed”2 to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in case of deci­
sions of Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod or component cities,”3 and, to
the Office of the President, in case of decisions of the Sangguniang Pan­
lalawigan and Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities. Decisions of the Office of the President are final and
executory.”*
Execution pending appeal.
An appeal does not prevent decision from becoming
final and executory-. In the event respondent wins appeal,
respondent is considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension during its pendency. In the event
appeal exonerates, respondent is paid his salary and such
other emoluments during its pendency.”5
3,1 Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
‘ G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014
”2Sec. 67, Local Government Code of 1991
”3Sec. 67(a), Local Government Code of 1991
”*Sec. 67(b), Local Government Code of 1991
”5Sec. 68, Local Government Code of 1991
Chapter VI 253
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
The Ombudsman as disciplining authority
Objective.
It is to enforce state polity- to maintain honesty and integrity in
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption,”6 and the standard of accountability in public service
that emphasizes public office is a public trust, and public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.”7
Qualifications.
The Ombudsman and his Deputies are natural-bom citizens of
the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty
years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members
of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman
must have for ten years or more been a judge or practiced law in the
Philippines.”9
Appointing authority.
The Ombudsman and Deputies are appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointment requires no
confirmation. All vacancies are filled within three months
after they occur.31"
Term of office.
The Ombudsman and Deputies serve for a term of
seven years without reappointment. They are not qualified
to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation from office.**"
”6Sec. 27, Art. 11, 1987 Constitution, cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President,
G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014
’’’Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President,
’•First par.. Sec. 8, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 5, R.A. 6770
■""Sec. 9, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
■“"Sec. 11, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
 Chapter VI 255
254 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE

Hence, the Ombudsman cannot be exempt from an incident

Independence.
of judicial power, that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
Freedom from insidious tentacles of politics.*"
preventive suspension order, clearly strays from the concept's rationale
of insulating the office from political harassment and pressure."6
Nature.
To insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from outside pressure Powers, functions and duties
and improper influence, the 1987 Constitution as well as the Ombuds­
Beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
man Act of 1989 endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
preserver of the integrity of public service."7
prosecutor^' powers virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial
intervention. The Court consistently refrains from interfering with the
exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence in­ Source of power.
herent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as champion The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature
of the people and preserver of integrity of public service.*” of the 1987 Constitution"" that enumerates its powers, functions and
duties,*" and at the same time authorizes Congress to legislate addi­
Aspects of independence. tional powers. Hence, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was enacted which
gave it more powers, including power to directly remove, suspend,
Creation by the Constitution. The office cannot be abolished,
fine, censure and prosecute public officers at fault.*10
nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed,
altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or is
amended.*1" Power to investigate and prosecute.
The Ombudsman investigates*" and prosecutes*12 on its own, or
Fiscal autonomy. The office may not be obstructed from freedom
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
to use or dispose of its funds for purposes germane to its functions,*”
employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."’
political branches of government so as to impair said functions.
This power includes investigation and prosecution of any crime
Insulation from executive supervision and control. Those within
whether or not the acts or omissions relate to, connected or arise from
the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.*"5
performance of duties. It is enough that the act or omission is committed
Evidently, these aspects of independence intend to protect the by a public official."*
Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure. That
The Ombudsman and his or her deputies, as protectors of the
being the case, the concept of its independence cannot be invoked as
people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form
basis to insulate it from judicial power constitutionally vested unto
the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as
impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
""Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
"'Espinosa v. Ombudsman, 397 Phil. 829, 831 (2000), dted in Gonzales v. Office of
"'Gonzales III v. Office of the President, C.R Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014 the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012
"’Espinosa v. Ombudsman, 397 Phil. 829.831 (2000), cited in Gonzales v. Office ol ""/Xrt. XI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Ledesma v. CA, G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012 •"Sec. 13, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
•"Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28,2014, cited in "°Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 and 120428, Sept. 27, 1995, cited in Om­
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 budsman v. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009
*®*hr Re: COA Opinion, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, cited in Gonzales III v. "‘See. 13(1), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
Office of the President. G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014, cited in Morales v. CA, C.R.
‘"Sec. 15(1), R.A. 6770
Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
"’Sec. 13(1), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
•"Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28,2014, cited in
"*Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6. 1995
Morales v. CA. G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
 256 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
or manner against officers or employees of government, or of any of its
subdivision, agency or instrumentality, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.415
Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees that emanates
from the Constitution itself, to exercise such other powers or perform
such other functions or duties as Congress may prescribe through
legislation.416 417
The Ombudsman also investigates and initiates proper action to
recover ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and prosecute parties involved,4,7 while the Presidential
Commission on Good Government retains authority to investigate
wealth ill-gotten or unlawfully acquired before February 25, 1986.
Thereafter, it pertains to the Ombudsman.418
Concurrent jurisdiction to investigate.
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate is not ex­
clusive.41’ Its jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the San­
diganbayan is concurrent with all government investigatory
agencies duly authorized to conduct preliminary investiga­
tion under the Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only
qualification that the Ombudsman may take over the inves­
tigation at any stage in the exercise of its primary jurisdic­
tion.420
While the 1987 Constitution confers on the Ombuds­
man the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient,421 it
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law
to investigate and prosecute public officials.
415Sec. 12, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution, Ledesma v. CA, G.R. No. 161629, July 29,2005
416Camanag v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 121017, Feb. 17, 1997
417Sec. 15(11), R.A. 6770
"’Republic v. Sandiganbayan & Argana, G.R. No. 115906, Sept. 26, 1994
"’Cojuangco Jr. v. PCGG, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2,1990, cited in Honasan v. DOJ
Panel of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
‘“Honasan v. DOJ Panel of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
"'Sec. 13(1), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
Chapter VI 257
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 was enacted to
empower it with primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, it may take over, at any
stage, investigation of such cases from any government
investigatory agency.
And, pursuant to the authority to lay down its own
procedure, the Ombudsman recognized its concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative government agencies in
prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.422
Under constitutional authority, the Ombudsman
has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a
public official. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear
that jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been
committed by any officer or employee during his tenure of
office.425
While it may be true that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official, its authority to investigate is
merely a primary and not an exclusive authority.424
The Department of Justice, being the principal law
agency of the government that acts as its legal counsel and
prosecutor empowered to investigate commission of crimes
and prosecute offenders, may thus investigate a senator
for the crime of coup d'etat even if he receives salary grade
31 under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and not the
regular courts.425
Power to direct performance of duty.
The Ombudsman directs, upon complaint or at its own instance,
any public official or employee of the government, or any of its
subdivision, agency or instrumentality, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
""Honasan v. DOJ Panel of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
"5Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, Nov. 21,1990, cited in Honasan v. DOJ Panel
of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
"‘Sanchez, v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, Nov. 9, 1993, cited in Honasan v.
DOJ Panel of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 3, 2004
"'Honasan v. DOJ Panel of Investigators, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
 258 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.426
The Ombudsman may direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his or her office involving disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.427
Power to request assistance.
The Ombudsman may request any government agency for assis­
tance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.42*
Power to publish.
The Ombudsman may publicize matters covered by investigation
when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence,42’ provided
that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine
what cases may not be made public, provided further that any publicity
issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true.4*’
Public disclosure, exemption.
When circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence, the Office of the Ombudsman may publicize in a
fair and balanced manner the filing of a complaint, grievance
or request for assistance, and the final resolution, decision or
action taken on it, provided however, that prior to such final
action, no publicity is made of matters which may adversely
affect national security or public interest, prejudice safety
of witnesses or case disposition, or unduly expose persons
complained against to ridicule or public censure.431
426Sec. 13(2), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(2), R.A. 6770
427Sec. 13(4), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(4), R.A. 6770
‘“Sec. 13(5), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(5), R.A. 6770
42“Sec. 13(6), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
•'"Sec. 15(6), R.A. 6770
“'Sec. 2, Rule V, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
Chapter VI 259
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Power to determine causes of corruption.
The Ombudsman determines causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corrupt ion in government and recommend
their elimination and observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency.432
Power to promulgate rules.
The Ombudsman promulgates its rules of procedure and exercises
such other powers to perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.433
Power to examine bank accounts and records.
The Ombudsman administers oaths, issues subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum, and takes testimony in any investigation or inquiry,
including power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records.434
Power of contumacy.
The Ombudsman may punish for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court and under same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein.435
In the exercise of its power to investigate and prosecute, the
Ombudsman is authorized to designate or deputize prosecutors for
assistance under his or her supervision and control. Once deputized,
the prosecutor cannot legally act on his or her own and refuse to prepare
and file the Information as directed, which defiance or disobedience
amounts to contumacy.4*1
A prosecutor directed by the Ombudsman to file attempted rape
against a mayor but instead filed a case for acts of lasciviousness only
may be cited for contempt, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over
prosecutors.437
432Sec. 13(7), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(7), R.A. 6770
433Sec. 13(8), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
434Sec. 15(8), R.A. 6770
,wSec. 15(9), R.A. 6770
4VSec. 21, R.A. 6770, cited in Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
437Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
260 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Power to delegate.
The Ombudsman may delegate to tine Deputies, or its investigators
or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure effective
exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties provided
under the Ombudsman Act of 1989.“*
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military is not prohibited
from performing other functions affecting nonmilitary personnel.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving nonmilitary'
personnel, like police officers who are civilian personnel of the
government, for investigation by the Deput)' for Military' Affairs.4"
The Ombudsman may utilize personnel of his office and/or
designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government sendee to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
in investigation and prosecution of certain cases under his supervision
and control.4"
The memorandum circular authorizing transfer of a case involving
a police officer accused of child abuse from the Deputy Ombudsman
to the Military Ombudsman does not violate civilian character of the
Philippine National Police as it is merely issued in the exercise of its
power to utilize, designate, and deputize its own personnel.4"
Power to discipline.
The Ombudsman directs the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault,*442 or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law443 and recommends
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensures compliance therewith,444 or enforces its disciplinary authority445
provided, that refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with
its order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
""Sec 15(10), R.A. 6770
4WAcop v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, Sept. 27, 1995; Lacson v. Casaclang, G.R.
No. 120428, Sept. 27, 1995
4*"Sec. 31, R.A. 6770, cited in Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, Sept. 27,1995;
Lacson v. Casaclang, G.R. No. 120428, Sept. 27, 1995
“'Agbay v. Military Ombudsman, G.R. No. 134503. July 2. 1999
442Sec. 13(3), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
“’Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
444Sec. 13(3), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
445Sec. 21, R.A. 6770
Chapter VI 261
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act
or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer.1"’
Scope of disciplinary authority.
The Ombudsman has full administrative disciplinary
authority, covering entire gamut of administrative adju­
dication which entails authority' to receive complaints,
investigate, hear, summons witnesses, require production
of documents, preventively suspend public officers and
employees pending investigation, determine and impose
appropriate penalty based on evidence.447
The enumerated powers of the Ombudsman in the
Constitution are not exclusive. The Constitution authorized
Congress to legislate additional powers. Hence, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 was enacted which gave it more
powers, including power to directly remove, suspend, fine,
censure, and prosecute public officers at fault.44*
Rationale.
It reveals manifest legislative intention to
vest full administrative disciplinary authority
on the Ombudsman, intending him or her to be
an activist watchman and not merely a passive
one,44'’ departing from classical model whose
function is merely to receive and process people's
complaints against corrupt and abusive govern­
ment personnel.
As protector of the people, it is armed with
the power to prosecute erring public officers and
employees, giving him or her an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and cor-
“*Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
‘"Ombudsman v. CA, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, cited in Ombudsman v. Bel­
tran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009
“’Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 and 120428, Sept. 27, 1995, cited in
Ombudsman v. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009
^Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 and 120428, Sept. 27, 1995, cited in
Ombudsman v. CA & Armilla, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006
 262 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
nipt practices and such other offenses that may
be committed by such officers and employees.450
The Ombudsman is a real party-in-interest in
administrative cases because it stands to suffer if a decision
adverse to it attains finality. If deprived of administrative
authority, the Ombudsman's power to enforce its mandated
functions as the protector of the people is derailed.451
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist
watchman, the Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted to it by
the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, if these
actions are reasonably in line with its official function
consistent with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplin­
ary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officers, including Members of the
Cabinet and key executive officers, during their tenure.452 *
Concomitant prerogatives.
It can, on its own, investigate any apparent
illegality, irregularity, impropriety, or inefficiency
committed by any public officer or employee not
excepted from its disciplinary authority.451
It can and must act on administrative com­
plaints against them. It can conduct administra­
tive adjudication proceedings.
It can determine their guilt. At its discre­
tion, it can fix the penalty in case of guilt. It can
order the head of the office or agency to which
the guilty public officer belongs to implement the
penalty imposed. It can ensure compliance with
implementation of the penalty it fixed.454 *
45OUy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001, cited in Ombuds­
man v. CA & Armilla, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006
“'Ombudsman v. Beltran. G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009
4S2Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014, cited in
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
4USec. 15(1), R. A. 6770
454Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
263
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Rules of Procedure
Coverage.
These rules apply to all criminal and administrative complaints,
grievances or requests for assistance and such other matters cognizable
by the Office of the Ombudsman.455
Form.
Complaints may be in any form, either verbal or in writing. For its
speedier disposition however, it is preferable that it be in writing and
under oath.45* If complaint is not under oath or is based only on official
reports, the investigating officer during preliminary investigation
requires complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate it.457 * *
Anonymous complaint, when acted.
A complaint that does not disclose identity of com­
plainant is acted upon only if it merits appropriate consid­
eration, or contains sufficient leads or particulars to enable
taking of further action.455
Grievances or requests for assistance may likewise be verbal or in
writing. In any case, the requesting or complaining party must indicate
his or her address and telephone number, if any.4”
Procedure in criminal cases
Grounds for criminal complaint, enumerated.
A criminal complaint may be brought for an offense in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"" the Act Declaring Forfeiture
455Sec. 2, Rule I, A.O. No. 7 or lhe Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
'“First and second sentences, first par.. Sec. 3, Rule I, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of lhe Ombudsman
4$7Sec. 4(a), Rule I, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman
455Last sentence, first par., Sec. 3, Rule I, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman
“"Second par.. Sec. 3, Rule I, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman
4"'R.A. 3019, as amended
264 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer**'**the
* Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees,*2 bribery,*3 and for such
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to
office.*4
How acted.
Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer recom­
mends whether it may be dismissed outright for want of palpable mer­
it, referred to respondent for comment, indorsed to proper government
office or agency with jurisdiction over the case, forwarded to appropri­
ate office or official for fact-finding investigation, referred for adminis­
trative adjudication or subjected to preliminary investigation.*5
Preliminary investigation
Who investigates.
Preliminary investigation may be conducted by any of these:
Ombudsman Investigators, Special Prosecuting Officers, Deputized
Prosecutors, Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct
preliminary investigations or lawyers in the government service so
designated by the Ombudsman.4*
Those designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman are under
his or her supervision and control*7 and may be cited for contempt if
his or her lawful orders are defied, such power of contumacy being
granted by law as a means to enforce such lawful orders. Despite
repeated orders of the Ombudsman to file a case for attempted rape
against a municipal mayor thus, a designated prosecutor who defied
*'R.A. 1379, as amended
•“R.A. 6713
*3Sec. 2, Chapter II, Title VII, Revised Penal Code
*4Sec. 1, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
*5Sec. 2, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
**Sec. 3, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
*7Sec. 31, R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited in Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801. April 6, 1995
Chapter VI 265
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
such orders and insisted she found him liable, and thus filed a case for
acts of lasciviousness only,*" may be held liable for contempt.*’
Procedure.
Preliminary investigation of cases falling under jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts are conducted in the manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court,4™ subject to the following provisions:4”
Where complaint is not under oath.
If complaint is not under oath or is based only on official
reports, the investigating officer requires complainant or
supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate
it.472
After such affidavits are secured, the investigating
officer orders respondent, attaching to it a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, to submit within
ten days from receipt, counter-affidavit and controverting
evidence with proof of service on complainant who may
file reply affidavits within ten days after service of counter­
affidavit.473
Where respondent does not file counter-affidavit.
If respondent does not file counter-affidavit, inves-
igating officer may consider comment filed by him or her, if
any, as answer to complaint. In any event, respondent shall
have access to evidence on record.474 *
*"Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
“’Sec. 15(g), R.A. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited in Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
4™Sec. 3, Rule 112, Rules of Court
47,Sec. 4, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
472Sec. 4(a), Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman
473Sec. 4(b), Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman
474Scc. 4(c), Rule 11, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman
 266 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS Chapter VI 267
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE

Prohibited pleadings. Cases under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction, enumerated.

No motion to dismiss is allowed except for lack of The Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original juris­
jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for bill of particulars diction in al) cases involving:
be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in
(a) Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Prac­
complainant's affidavit be clarified, it may be particularized
at the time to ask clarifying questions during clarificatory tices Act4" and bribery481
* *482 * one or more accused are
where
hearing.475 officials occupying these government positions, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time offense
Clarificatory hearing, when conducted. was committed:4®

If, after filing of requisite affidavits and their support­ (1) Officials of executive branch occupying
ing evidences, there are facts material to the case which the positions of regional director and higher,485 otherwise
investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he or she classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which parties and Position Classification Act of 1989484 specifically
are afforded opportunity to be present but without right to including:485
examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned.476
(a) Provincial governors, vice-gov­
Where appearance of parties or witnesses is imprac­ ernors, members of the sangguniang panlala-
ticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in wigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
writing, where questions desired to be asked by the investi­ engineers, and other provincial department
gating officer or a party are reduced into writing and served heads,-486 * * *
on the witness concerned who is required to answer the
same in writing and under oath.477 (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, mem­
bers of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
Upon termination of preliminary investigation, the investigating treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
officer resolves case and forwards its records to designated authorities city department heads;4"7
for their appropriate action.478

Approving authority.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed
without written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases
falling within jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy
Ombudsman in all other cases.4”
•75Sec. 4(d), Rule 11, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman
•’‘First sentence. Sec. 4(f), Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman
’’’Second sentence, Sec. 4(f), Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman
’’’First par.. Sec. 4(g), Rule 11, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman
*”Second par.. Sec. 4(g), Rule II. A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman
""R.A. 3019, cited in Sec. 4(a), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and fur­
ther amended by R.A. 10660
48lSec. 2, Chapter 11, Title VII, Book II, Revised Penal Code, died in Sec. 4(a), PD
No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by R.A. 10660
482Sec. 4(a), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
“’Sec. 4(a)(1), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
““ILA. 6758, cited in Sec. 4(aXl), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and
further amended by R.A. 10660
•“Sec. 4(a)(l), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A.10660
""Sec. 4(aXl)(a), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
•“Sec. 4(aXl)(b), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
 268 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
(c) Officials of diplomatic service
occupying position of consul and higher;4™
(d) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank,-**’
(e) Officers of the Philippine Na­
tional Police while occupying position of
provincial director and those ranked senior
superintendent and higher;4*1
(f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, officials, and prosecu­
tors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor,"”’
(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or con­
trolled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.492
* 491
(2) Members of Congress and its officials
classified as Grade 2749' under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989,-494 * *
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice
to constitutional provisions,-495
4“Sec. ‘1(a)(1)(c), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
499Sec. 4(a)(1)(d), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
4WSec. 4(aXlXe), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
491Sec. 4(aXlX0. PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
492Sec. 4(aX 1 Xg), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended
by R.A. 10660
*°Sec. 4(aX2), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
494R.A. No. 6758, cited in Sec. 4(a)(2), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861,
and further amended by R.zV 10660
‘'■Sec. 4(aX3). PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
Chapter VI 269
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
(4) Chair and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to constitutional
provisions;499 and
(5) All other national and local officials classi­
fied497 as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.4*1
(b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by public officials
and employees enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by P.D. No. 1861, and further amended by R.A.
No. 10660 in relation to their office.4*4
In relation to office, test.
While murder will never be the main func­
tion of a public officer and no public office will
ever be a constituent of murder,Sandiganbayan
assumes jurisdiction if there is intimate relation
between offense charged and office of the accused
or discharge of his official functions, meaning the
public officer does the offense while performing,
though improperly and irregularly, his official
functions and he cannot commit it without hold­
ing his public office."4"
When the Information alleges accused is a
public officer and jailer, who took advantage of
his public position, committed the offense in re­
lation to his office, and conspired to kill a deten­
tion prisoner, it passes a test of whether it was
‘"See. 4(a)(4), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
497Sec. 4(a)(5), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A. 10660
‘“’R.A. No. 6758, cited in Sec. 4(a)(5), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861,
and further amended by R.A. 10660
*"Sec. 4(b), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A.10660
“"Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152389, April 14, 2005
“'People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613 (1960), cited in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005
270 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
committed in relation to public office because the
duty of a jail guard is to ensure safe custody and
proper confinement of detained persons.
Even if victim were not a prisoner, Sandi­
ganbayan still acquires jurisdiction if the Informa­
tion particularizes intimate relationship between
offense charged and accused public officer's of­
fice.”
The offense of acts of lasciviousness is com­
mitted in relation to public office if it is intimately
connected with the office of offender. While it is
true that public office is not an element of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, he could not have
committed the crime charged if not for his posi­
tion as presiding judge who had power to recom­
mend appointment of a bookbinder.
The act of approving or indorsing perma­
nent appointment of complaining witness was
certainly a function of the office of accused so
that his acts are, therefore, committed in relation
to his office.”
But this is not a catch-all provision, it is a general
law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and
offenses committed by high-ranking officials in relation to
their office, subject to exceptions.*50*
The Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction even if
offense is committed by a public officer who occupies
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher in relation
to office, where another law brings it somewhere else505 like
to the Regional Trial Court that the law expressly grants
exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of drugs law,506
’“’Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, C.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005
’“’Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, C.R. Nos. 146646-69, March 11, 2005
50*De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
’"’De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
5<*R.A. 9165, dted in De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
Chapter VI 271
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
written defamations and libel,” or election offenses under
the Omnibus Election Code.5™
Also, offenses committed by members of the Armed
Forces in relation to their office5™ or service-connected
crimes or offenses,510 are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
but by court-martial. Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses
and felonies committed by public officers is not determined
solely by the pay scale.5”
Relation to office, failure to allege.
Even if the Information failed to allege the
jailer |who] committed crime in relation to his of­
fice, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction.
One case did not require Information to
allege that accused public officer committed of­
fense in relation to his office before the Sandigan­
bayan could assume jurisdiction over the case.512
But another case clarified the Information must
allege that offense was committed by public of­
ficers and employees in relation to their office.513
To avoid confusion, the Court set out the
policy that trial court must determine whether
crime was committed in relation to public office.
If related, it transfers [the] case to the Sandigan­
bayan as if it were originally filed with it. Other­
wise, trial court sets aside challenged orders, pro­
ceeds with trial and decides.5’*
‘“’Morales v. CA. 347 Phil. 493, 506 (1997); People v. Benipayo, 604 Phil. 317 (2009),
cited in De Lima v. Guerrero. G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
5™Sec 268, Omnibus Election Code, dted in De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781,
Oct. 10, 2017
5™De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
”°R.A. 7055, dted in De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10,2017
5llDe Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Od. 10, 2017
5l2Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, Nov. 21, 1990, cited in Crisostomo v. Sandi­
ganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005
’’’Aguinaldo v. Domagas, G.R. No. 98452, Sept. 26, 1991, dted Crisostomo v. San­
diganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005
’’’Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994, cited in Crisostomo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005
 272 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
But where a special drugs law5” expressly
affords exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-
related cases to the Regional Trial Court, even if
committed by high-ranking public officers like a
Justice Secretary, jurisdiction is vested upon Re­
gional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme
Court as drugs court regardless of whether516
violation of illegal drug trading517 is
* *committed
* in
relation to the public official's office.5”
Jurisdiction over offenses and felonies com­
mitted by public officers is not determined solely
by the fact that they were committed in relation
to their office.51’
(c) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986“
But even if these offenses were committed by high-
ranking public officials, the Regional Trial Court acquires
exclusive original jurisdiction where information does
not allege any damage to government or any briber}', or,
alleges damage to government or bribery arising from same
or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not
exceeding one million pesos.521
The special significance and clear import of this522 * *
proviso is to strengthen further functional and structural
organization of the Sandiganbayan*0 to streamline cases
it handles by delegating to Regional Trial Courts some
cases involving high-ranking public officials. Allowing the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over a drugs-related
5,5R.A. 9165, cited in De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
5,6De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
“Sec. 5, Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in relation to Sec. 3(jj), Sec. 26(b) and Sec.
28, R.A. 9165, cited in De Lima v. Cuerrero, G.R. No. 229781. Oct. 10, 2017
5,"De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10,2017
5”De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
“Sec. 4(c), PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amended by
R.A.10660
521 Fifth par.. Sec. 4. PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, and further amend­
ed by R.A. 10660
“De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
“R.A. 10660, cited in De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
Chapter VI 273
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
case involving a Justice Secretary defeats purpose of the law
to unclog its dockets.526
Cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombuds­
man that are cognizable by municipal trial courts, including those sub­
jects to the Rule on Summary Procedure may only be filed in court by
information approved by the Ombudsman or the proper Deputy Om­
budsman.525
Notice to parties.
Parties are served with copy of resolution finally approved by the
Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy' Ombudsman.526
Motion for reconsideration.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution is allowed, to be filed within five days
from notice with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in
cases where information has already been filed in court.527
Effect of filing.
The filing of motion for reconsideration does not bar
filing of corresponding information in Court on the basis of
the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the
motion.526
Procedure in administrative cases
Administrative complaint, grounds for.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers
include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all
public officers.525
“De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017
“Sec. 5, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
“Sec. 6, Rule II, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
“Sec. 7(a), Rule 11, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman. as amended by A.O. No. 15, Feb. 16,2000
“Sec. 7(b), Rule 11, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 15, Feb. 16, 2000
“Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. Nos. 196231-32, Jan. 28, 2014, cited in
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10. 2015
 274 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
An administrative complaint may be filed for acts or omissions
contrary to law or regulations, unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory, inconsistent with the general course of an agency's
functions though in accordance with law, based on a mistake of law
or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts, in the exercise of discretionary
powers but for an improper purpose, otherwise irregular, immoral
or devoid of justification, due to any delay or refusal to comply with
referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any deputy against the
officer or employee to whom it was addressed, and such other grounds
provided for under the Administrative Code of 1987”*’ and other
applicable laws.551
Private acts of public officers.
Even if dishonesty arises from private acts or acts
not related to performance of duty, it affects [the] right of
public officer to continue in office. A civil service employee
may be dismissed from government service for an offense
not related to work or not connected with performance of
his official duties, like a postmaster who faked civil service
eligibility of his wife.
The purpose of administrative discipline is not to pun­
ish public officer but to improve public service and preserve
public faith and confidence in government. Dishonesty, in
order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of performance of duty. If a public officer is dishon­
est, or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, it affects
his or her right to continue in office.
The private life of a public officer cannot be segregated
from his or her public life. Dishonesty reflects on fitness of
a public officer to continue in office and the discipline and
morale of the service.552
Public officers covered, enumerated.
All elective and appointive officials of government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of
550E.O.292
B,Sec. I, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Sec. 19, Ombudsman Act of 1989, cited in
Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
“’Remolona v. CSC, 362 SCRA 804
275
Chapter VI
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
the Cabinet, local governments, government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries are subject to disciplinary authority
of the Office of the Ombudsman.555
Elective officials.
While the Local Government Code of 1991 says
administrative complaint against any elective official of a
province, highly urbanized city, independent component city
or component city is filed before the Office of the President,55*
it does not withdraw power of the Ombudsman granted by
the Ombudsman Act of 1989555 to have disciplinary authority
over all elective officials.55*
Nothing in it indicates repeal, expressly or impliedly,
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The two
statutes are not so inconsistent or irreconcilable as to compel
the Court to uphold one and to strike the other. Implied
repeal is not favored and courts must generally assume
their congruent application. Thus, the Ombudsman and
the President have concurrent jurisdiction to preventively
suspend elective officials of a highly urbanized city accused
of falsification.557
Appointive officials of GOCCs.
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations is confined
only to those with original charters, it does not include those
created under the Corporation Code.5*
Original charter, meaning.
Original charter means chartered by special
law as distinguished from corporations organized
under Corporation Code.5” The Ombudsman has
555Sec. 2, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Sec. 21, R.A. 6770
"*Sec. 61(a), Local Government Code of 1991
s“Hagad v. Dadole, 241 SCRA 242
5*Sec. 21, Ombudsman Act of 1989
557Hagad v. Dadole, 241 SCRA 242
s"Khan Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006
■5”Juco v. NLRC, 303 Phil. 307 (1997), cited in Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
125296, July 20, 2006
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
no jurisdiction over officers of the Philippine
Airlines accused of using their positions to secure
a hauling and janitorial contract for a private
corporation where they are shareholders. While
Philippine Airlines is a government-owned or
controlled corporation, it is without original
charter as it is originally a private corporation
seeded by private capital and created under the
general corporation law.540
Nonmilitary personnel.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military is not
prohibited from performing other functions affecting
nonmilitary personnel. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may
refer cases involving nonmilitary personnel, like police
officers who are civilian personnel of the government, for
investigation by the Deputy for Military’ Affairs.541
The Ombudsman may utilize personnel of his office
and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in government service to act as special investigator
or prosecutor to assist in investigation and prosecution of
certain cases under his supervision and control.542
The memorandum circular authorizing transfer of a
case involving a police officer accused of child abuse from
the Deputy Ombudsman to the Military Ombudsman does
not violate civilian character of the Philippine National
Police as it is merely issued in the exercise of its power to
utilize, designate and deputize its own personnel.545 *
Over its own personnel.
The provision of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 that em­
powers the President to remove the Deputy Ombudsman or
the Special Prosecutor from office for any ground provided
54OKhan, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2(X)6
M,Acop v. Ombudsman, C.R. No. 120422, Sept. 27, 1995; Lacson v. Casaclang, G.R.
No. 120428, Sept. 27, 1995
’“Sec. 31, R.A. 6770, cited in Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, Sept. 27, 1995;
Lacson v. Casaclang, G.R. No. 120428, Sept. 27, 1995
“’Agbay v. Military Ombudsman, G.R. No. 134503, July 2, 1999
Chapter VI 277
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
for removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process,*544 is
unconstitutional for violating independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman, which certainly cannot be inferior, but is
similar in degree and kind, to the independence similarly
guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Com­
missions since all |of] these offices fill the political interstices
of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence
and proper functioning.545
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials
in the Executive Department are subject to disciplinary
authority of the Office of the Ombudsman, cannot but
seriously place at risk its independence, which, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them
tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out his or her
mandate.
It directly collides not only with its constitutionally-
guaranteed independence, but inevitably with principle
of checks and balances its creation seeks to revitalize.544
Any form of presidential control over it diminishes its
independence.547
Exceptions.
The Office of the Ombudsman has no disciplinary authority over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or Members of
Congress and the Judiciary.545
Impeachable officers.
The President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme
Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
544Sec. 8(2), R.A. 6770, cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
Jan. 28, 2014
"'Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Jan. 28, 2014
544Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Jan. 28, 2014
"’Commissioner Florenz Regalado, Record of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 2, July 26, 1986, p. 294, cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
Jan. 28, 2014
"’Second par.. Sec. 2, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Sec 21, R.A. 6770
 278
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.5*’
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains power to inves­
tigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed
by officials removable by impeachment, to file verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.550 It is the only
body authorized to investigate even officials removable by
impeachment.551
Members of Congress.
Each House determines rules of its proceedings, punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and, with concurrence
of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, does not exceed
sixty days.552 *
Members of the Judiciary.
The Supreme Court en banc has power to discipline
judges of lower courts or order their dismissal by majority
vote of members who actually deliberated on issues in the
case and voted on it.55’
If criminal complaint against a judge arises from
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
and refer it to the Supreme Court to determine whether the
judge acted within scope of his duties.
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is admin­
istratively liable for serious misconduct and inefficiency un­
der the Rules of Court, and also criminally liable under the
Revised Penal Code for falsification.
5*’Sec. 2. Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
’’“Second par.. Sec. 2, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Sec. 22, R.A. 6770, cited in
Morales v. CA, C.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015.
55lSec. 22, R.A. 6770, cited by Regalado, J. in his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
552Sec. 16(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
’’’Second sentence. Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
Chapter VI 279
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
However, without administrative action taken by the
Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service,
investigation by the Ombudsman amounts to encroachment.
The Ombudsman should refer the matter of the certificates
of service to the Supreme Court because it has necessary
records to show true status of his pending case load.55*
Public school teachers.
While the Ombudsman Act of 1989555 and the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers556 overlap jurisdiction over
administrative cases against erring public school teachers,557
the latter law however grants original jurisdiction55" over
them to the Investigating Committee headed by the Division
School Superintendent of the Department of Education.559
Administrative charges against a teacher is heard
initially by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least be ranked division
supervisor, where teacher belongs, as chair, a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the
Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools.
The committee submits its findings and recom­
mendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty'
days from termination of hearings: Provided, however, that
where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all committee members are appointed by
the Secretary of Education.560
”*Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464
’’’R.A. 6770
’’"R.A. 4670
’’’Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
’’"Ombudsman v. Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007, cited in Ombuds­
man v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10,2008
’’’Ombudsman v. Galicia, C.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
’“Sec. 9, R.A. 4670
 280 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Rationale.
The purpose of the law is to impose a sepa­
rate standard and procedural requirement for
administrative cases involving public school
teachers. It must be given consideration and the
Ombudsman must yield.5*'
But the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does
not oust the Ombudsman of its concurrent jurisdiction
over erring public school teachers,5*1 as it is constitutionally
empowered to investigate any act or omission that appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.563
The phrase illegal act or omission of any public official
encompasses any crime committed by a public official
or employee, even if the act or omission is not related or
connected with performance of official duty.564
Estoppel, exception to exception.
While the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers specifically covers and governs admin­
istrative proceedings involving public school
teachers, the public school teacher is estopped
from assailing jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
because he was given sufficient opportunity to
be heard and submit his defenses.565
Where the public school teacher dismissed
for faking his transcript of records was given due
process and participated in proceedings, he is
estopped from assailing jurisdiction of the Om­
budsman when the decision turns out adverse to
him.566
56,Ombudsnian v. Estandarte, C.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007, cited in Ombuds­
man v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
’“Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
•’“Sec. 13(1), Art. XL 1987 Constitution, cited in Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No.
167711, Oct. 10,2008
■’“Dcloso v. Domingo, G.R- No. 90591, Nov. 21, 1990, cited in Ombudsman v.
Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10, 2008
’“Alcala v. Villar, G.R. No. 156063, Nov. 18, 2003, cited in Ombudsman v. Galicia,
G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10,2008
’“Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, Oct. 10,2008
Chapter VI 281
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
How initiated.
An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint
under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidence
in support of the charge, accompanied by a certificate of non-forum
shopping duly subscribed and sworn to by the complainant or his
counsel.56
567
An administrative proceeding may also be ordered by the
Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative
or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a criminal action or a
grievance complaint or request for assistance.568
Administrative offenses, prescription.
Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not
prescribe.56’ The provision that says the Office of the Ombudsman
may not conduct necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes the complaint was filed after one
year from occurrence of the act or omission complained of5™ does not
refer to prescription of offense but to discretion given to the Ombuds­
man on whether it investigates a particular administrative offense.571 *
It does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting admin­
istrative investigation after lapse of one year, reckoned from the time
alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative
case was filed beyond one year period, the Ombudsman is well within
its discretion to conduct administrative investigation.573
567First par.. Sec. 2, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
’“Second par.. Sec. 2, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
’‘’Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, Sept. 20, 2005; Melchor
v. Gironella. G.R. No. 151138, Feb. 16,2005; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798,824 (2004);
Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001), cited in Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, G.R.
No. 167982, Aug. 13,2008
570Sec. 20(5) R.A. 6770, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27,
2011
571 Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, Feb. 16, 2005, cited in Ombudsman v.
Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
573Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
 282 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
How acted.
Upon receipt of complaint, it is evaluated to determine whether it
may be:
(a) dismissed outright for any ground under the Ombuds­
man Act, provided however, that such dismissal is not mandatory
but merely discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the
Deputj' Ombudsman concerned.573
Grounds for outright dismissal, enumerated.
The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that: complainant has an adequate
remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body,574 or has
no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance,575 or the complaint pertains to a matter outside its
jurisdiction,576 is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad
faith,577 or was filed after one year from occurrence of act or
omission complained of.57"
(b) treated as grievance or request for assistance which
may be referred to the Public Assistance Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for appropriate action.575
Grievance or request for assistance, nature of.
A grievance or request for assistance may consist of
a complaint or request seeking redress or relief concerning
an act or omission of public official or employee, office or
agency alleged to be unreasonable, unfair, oppressive,
discriminatory, improper or inefficient, and which does not
necessarily amount to a criminal or administrative offense.540
575Sec. 4(a), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
574Sec. 20(1), R.A. 6770
575Sec. 20(4), R.A. 6770
""Sec. 20(2). R.A. 6770
577Sec. 20(3), R.A. 6770
576Sec. 20(5), R.A. 6770
575Sec. 4(b), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
"'“See. 1, Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
Chapter VI 283
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
By whom handled.
Grievance or request for assistance is acted upon by
the Public Assistance Office in the Central Office of the
Ombudsman, or in the Office of the respective Deputy
Ombudsman.5"
When and how acted upon.
A grievance or request for assistance is acted upon
immediately upon receipt.5" It is dismissed outright where
it appears to be manifestly frivolous, vexatious, or made
in bad faith, or where it involves a matter purely between
private parties with notice to complainant or requesting
party of the reasons for such dismissal.5"1
It may be referred to the office concerned where the
redress, relief or assistance sought may be acted upon by
another office, with the Public Assistance Office following it
on behalf of complainant.5"
Effect of non-compliance.
Any delay or refusal to comply with re­
ferral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of
the deputies constitutes ground for administra­
tive disciplinary action against the officer or em­
ployee to whom it was addressed pursuant to the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.5,5
In all other cases where the Office of the Ombudsman
cognizes, this procedure is observed:5"6 If grievance or
request is relatively simple and/or requires immediate
""’Sec. 2, Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
""Sec. 3, Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man
""Sec. 3(a), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
""Sec. 3(b), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
"""Sec. 26(4), R.A. 6770; Sec. 5, Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman
"""Sec. 3(c), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
 284 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
action, it may be acted upon by telegram, telephone, or other
means of communication or given special attention by going
to the office or agency concerned.557
Whenever deemed necessary or advisable, a copy of the
grievance or request for assistance, together with pertinent
documents are sent to the public official, employee, or
agency concerned, copy furnished its head and the Resident
Ombudsman, if any, for immediate remedial action, or,
if relief requested may not be complied with, to submit a
written explanation for it,55" which, if found satisfactory,
and/or appropriate action had already been taken on the
grievance or request, it is dismissed and the parties are
informed accordingly.5"9
The Public Assistance Office may arrange a conference
between complainant or requesting party and public official
concerned with a view to satisfactory and expeditious
resolution of the grievance or request.5*1
Upon consideration of facts or information gathered,
a resolution on the grievance or request is made within two
days of which parties are notified, and appropriate steps
taken to insure compliance with it.5”
(c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under
the Ombudsman Act of 1989’” for appropriate administrative
proceedings;5”
M7Sec. 4(a), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
’“Sec. 4(b), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
’"’Sec. 4(c), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
’’“Sec. 4(d), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
w,Sec. 4(e), Rule IV, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
’’’Sec. 23(2), R.A. 6770
5”Sec. 4(c), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
Chapter VI 285
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Option to refer.
While its power to discipline is plenary,5” the Ombuds­
man has option to refer certain complaints to proper disci­
plinary authority to institute appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees.5*5
(d) referred to appropriate office or agency or official for
further fact-finding investigation;5* or
(e) docketed as administrative case for administrative
adjudication by the Office of the Ombudsman.5”
Administrative adjudication, how conducted.
If complaint is docketed as administrative case, respondent is
furnished with copy of affidavits and other evidence submitted by
complainant, and ordered to file counter-affidavit and other evidence
to support defense, within ten days from receipt, together with proof of
its service on complainant who may file reply-affidavit within ten days
from receipt of counter-affidavit.5”
Prohibited pleadings.
These pleadings are prohibited and stricken off
case records, if filed:5** motion to dismiss, although any
ground justifying case dismissal may be discussed in
counter-affidavits or pleadings of party,"" motion for bill of
particulars,6"' dilatory motions including, but not limited
’’’Hagad v. Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, Dec. 12, 1995, cited in Gonzales v. Office of
the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012
’’’Sec. 23(2), R.A. 6770, cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
Sept. 4, 2012; Sulit v, Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, Sep. 4, 2012
’’"Sec. 4(d), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 nr the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7,2003
’’’Sec. 4(e), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
’’’Sec. 5(a), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7,2003
’’’Sec. 5(g), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by ?\.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
""Sec. 5(gXO, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
“"Sec. 5(g)(2), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
 286 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
to, motions for extension of time or postponement, second
motions for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation *n
If the hearing officer finds no sufficient cause to warrant further
proceedings on the basis of affidavits and other evidence submitted by
parties, the complaint may be dismissed. Otherwise, the hearing officer
issues order for:'"’
Submission of verified position papers.
Parties are directed to file, within ten days from receipt
of order, their respective position papers containing only
those charges, defenses and other claims contained in filed
affidavits and pleadings and additional relevant affidavits
and/or documentary evidence parties may attach, on
the basis of which the hearing officer may consider case
submitted for resolution.6"
Clarificatory hearing.
If the hearing officer does not consider case submitted
for resolution after filing of position papers, affidavits and
pleadings, he or she conducts clarificatory hearing on facts
material to the case as appearing in the respective position
papers, affidavits and pleadings filed by parties. At this
stage, he or she may, at his or her discretion and to determine
need for formal trial or hearing, ask clarificatory questions
to further elicit facts or information.605
Rights of parties.
During clarificatory hearing, parties are
afforded opportunity to be present but without
right to examine or cross-examine the party' or
witness being questioned. But parties may be
“’’Sec. 5(gX3), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7. 2003
'"’Sec. 5(b), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17. Sept. 7, 2003
'"’Sec. 5(b)(1), Rule III. A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17. Sept. 7, 2003
'"’First par., Sec. 5(b)(2), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
Chapter VI 287
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
allowed to clarify and elicit answers from oppos­
ing party or witness through the hearing officer
who determines whether proposed questions are
necessary and relevant, in which case, he or she
asks the question in such manner and phrasing
he or she deems appropriate."6
The hearing officer may declare the case submitted for
resolution if he or she finds no necessity to proceed further
based on clarificatory' hearings, affidavits, pleadings, and
position papers filed by parties. He or she may also require
parties to simultaneously' submit reply position papers
within ten days from receipt of order. The parties, if new
affidavits and/or exhibits are attached to the other party's
position paper, may submit only' rebutting evidence with
their reply position papers.607
Formal investigation.
The hearing officer orders conduct of formal inves­
tigation if he or she finds need for it based on clarificatory
hearings, pleadings, affidavits, and position papers filed by
parties, requiring them to file within ten days from receipt
of order their respective pre-trial briefs containing, among
others, nature of charge or charges and defenses, proposed
stipulation of facts, definition of issues, identification and
marking of exhibits, limitation of witnesses, and such other
matters to expedite proceedings.
Parties are not allowed to introduce matters not
covered by position papers, affidavits, and pleadings filed
and served prior to the order to formally investigate.60"
Rights of parties.
Parties are allowed assistance of counsel
and right to production of evidence through
""‘Second par., Sec. 5(b)(2), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or tlw Rules of Procedure of the Of­
fice of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
'"’Sec. 5(bX3), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
'""Sec. 5(bX^), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
 288
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
compulsory process of subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum.""
Conduct of formal proceedings is non-litigious in
nature. Technicalities of law, procedure, and evidence are
not strictly applied. The hearing officer may avail of all
reasonable means to ascertain speedily case facts. He or
she fully controls proceedings and limits presentation of
evidence to matters relevant and necessary to a just and
speedy case disposition6” and sets case for continuous trial
with notice to parties at least ten days before initial hearing.611
But while technicalities may be dispensed with in
administrative proceedings,612 it does not mean rules on
proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare
allegations, without more, are not enough. At the very least,
these must be supported by substantial evidence.613
Bare charge by a lawyer of falsification of deed of sale
against a former social welfare employee, without attaching
its purported copy, does not comply with burden of proof to
establish cause of action. All that is required is substantial
evidence, but where allegations are not duly supported by
necessary evidence, they do not demonstrate justness of her
claims.614 *
The citizen's right to denounce recreant public officials
should not be denied if their incompetence or lack of integrity
or qualification may adversely affect public service. But the
practice of some misguided citizens to subvert noble ends
for which administrative discipline is designed, which is
to purge public service of undesirable officials, is frowned
“"Sec. 5(g), Rule III. A.O. No. 7 or the Rules o( Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7,2003
6,nSec. 5(c), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
6,lSec. 5(d), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
6l2Balasbas v. Monayao, C.R. No. 190524, Feb. 17, 2014
6,3Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 881, 888-889 (1998), cited
in Balasbas v. Monayao, C.R. No. 190524, Feb. 17, 2014
6l4Balasbas v. Monayao, C.R. No. 190524, Feb. 17, 2014
6,5Maspil v. Romero, 158 Phil. 227, 228 (1974), cited in Balasbas v. Monayao, G.R.
No. 190524, Feb. 17, 2014
Chapter VI 289
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
Failure to appear, effects.
Absence of any or both parties at scheduled
hearing not necessarily dismisses the case. In
the absence of adverse party who was duly no­
tified of hearing, party present may be allowed
to present evidence. An absent party who shows
valid cause for absence is afforded opportunity
to cross-examine the witness presented during
his or her absence. In case of two successive un­
justified absence of any party in the proceedings,
the party present may submit case for resolution
based on case records and evidence so far pre­
sented.616 *
Affidavits as direct testimony.
The affidavit of any witness constitutes direct testi­
mony, subject to cross, redirect, and recross-examinations.
But only witnesses whose affidavits are submitted by par­
ties and served on adverse party prior to issuance of order
to conduct formal investigation may be allowed to testify
at hearing unless testimony involves newly discovered
evidence, subject to cross-examination and submission by
adverse party of rebuttal evidence, if any, relevant to said
newly discovered evidence.6”
Rendition of decision.
Not later than thirty days after case is declared submitted for
resolution, the hearing officer submits proposed decision containing
findings and recommendation for review by the Directors, Assistant
Ombudsmen, and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned and approval of the
Ombudsman. With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy
Ombudsmen concerned are the approving authority.
Upon approval, copies .of decision are served upon parties and
the head of office or agency where respondent is an official or employee
for information and compliance with appropriate directive.618
616Sec. 5(d), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
6”Sec. 5(e), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 21X13
61"Sec. 6, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
man, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
 Chapter VI 291
290 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE

Finality of decision. Appeal, effects of.

The decision is final, executor)' and unappealable where An appeal does not stop decision from be­
respondent is absolved of the charge, or convicted but penalized with ing executory. In case penalty is suspension or
removal and respondent wins such appeal, he
censure or reprimand, suspended for not more than one month, or
or she is considered preventively suspended and
fined equivalent to one month salary.61’ In all other cases, the decision
paid salary and such other emoluments not re­
may be reconsidered, reinvestigated,630 or appealed.631 *
ceived by reason of suspension or removal.636
Thus, while respondent penalized with suspen­
Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation.
sion for more than one month has right to appeal,
Whenever allowable, only one motion for reconsid­ its filing does not stay execution.637
eration or reinvestigation may be entertained and resolved
within five days from date of submission for resolution, but Execution of decision.
only if filed within ten days from receipt of decision or or­
The Office of the Ombudsman executes its decision in admin­
der by aggrieved part)'633 on ground of either discovery of
istrative cases as a matter of course. It ensures the decision is strictly
new evidence which materially affects the order, directive
enforced and properly implemented. Refusal or failure by any officer
or decision633 or that grave errors of facts or laws or serious
without just cause to comply with its order to remove, suspend, de­
irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest
mote, fine, or censure is a ground for disciplinary action.638
of movant.634
While no less than the Constitution empowers it to direct the
Appeal. officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official
or employee at fault, and recommend removal, suspension, demotion,
Within fifteen days from receipt of written
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance with it,636 such
notice of decision or order denying motion for
disciplinary authority is not merely recommendatory.630
reconsideration, the decision may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
Mandatory character of recommendation.
review under requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.635 The word recommend in the Constitution should not be
literally interpreted. It becomes mandatory when construed
together with the Ombudsman Act of 1989631 that says refusal
by any officer without just cause to comply with order of
the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure.
6”First sentence, first par.. Sec. 7, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
““See. 8, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
“'Second par.. Sec. 7, Rule III. A.O. No. 7 or lhe Rules of Procedure of the Office
man, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Ganaden v. CA, G.R. Nos.
“’Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 7, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure
170500, 170510-11, June 1,2011
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7,2003
“7ln the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
633Sec. 8, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombuds­
G.R. No. 150274, Aug. 4, 2006, cited in Ganaden v. CA, G.R. Nos. 170500, 170510-11, June
man, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
1, 2011
“’Sec. 8(a), Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
“•Third par.. Sec. 7, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office ot
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003
“■•See. 8(b), Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
““Sec. 13(3), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7. 2003
“'’Ombudsman v. CA & Armilla, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006
635Second sentence, first par.. Sec. 7, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003 “’Ombudsman v. CA & Armilla, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006
 292
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law is a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.''12
This strongly indicates its recommendation is not
merely advisory in nature but is mandatory within bounds
of law.611 The proper office through which it is coursed has
no choice but to implement it.614
This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any
officer concerned. Its power to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority’ but a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged.*05
Preventive suspension
Nature.
By nature, a preventive suspension is not a penalty but only' a
preventive measure.616 Prior notice and hearing are not required
because it is not a penalty but a mere preliminary step in administrative
investigation.617
Distinguished from suspension as penalty.
Jurisprudential law cuts clear distinction between
suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect
of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have
different ends sought achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure,
a preliminary step in administrative investigation, to prevent
“2Sec. 15(3), R.A. 6770
“’Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, Nov. 9, 1993, cited in Ledesma v. CA
G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
“’Ombudsman v. CA & Santos, G.R. No. 167844, Nov. 22, 2006
“’Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, Nov. 9,1993, cited in Ledesma v.CA,
G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
“‘Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“'Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
Chapter VI 293
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
accused from using his or her position and powers and
prerogatives of the office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in case prosecution.
If after such investigation, the charge is established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting
his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed,
or dismissed. This is the penalty.619
Purpose.
Its purpose is to prevent accused from using his or her position
and powers and office prerogatives to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in prosecution of the case
against him or her.6”
Duration.
Preventive suspension continues until case is terminated. But
total period does not exceed six months except when delay in case
disposition is due to fault, negligence, or any cause attributable to
respondent which period of delay is not counted in computing period
of suspension.64"
While jurisprudence provides ninety days, it refers to cases where
law is either silent641 or expressly limits suspension to ninety days.
Where the law expressly' sets the period of suspension not to exceed
six months, preventive suspension for six months without pay' is thus
according to law.642
Longer period, rationale.
Unlike the Civil Service Decree and Local Government
Code of 1991 that allow a shorter 90-day'641 and 60-day
“"Quimbo v. Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886 (2005), cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. No.
217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
“’Quimbo v. Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886 (2005), cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. No.
217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
“"Second par., Sec. 9, Rule 111, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of lhe Office of
the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 116801, April 6, 1995
“'Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA417,427-8 (1991), citing Sec. 13, R.A. 3019,
Sec. 42, I’D 807, cited in Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
‘“Lastimosa v. Vasquez. G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
“’Sec. 42, PD 807, cited by Regalado, /. in his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
 294 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
maximum period of preventive suspension,1**4 *respectively,
6 bill of particulars or for inhibition of investigating officer,
the Ombudsman Act allows preventive suspension to
continue until case terminates but not more than six
months.645
While under the Civil Service Decree, preventive
suspension may be imposed on simple showing the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct,
neglect in performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe respondent is guilty of charge warranting removal
from service, the Ombudsman Act requires such charges
be supported by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify
preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty
days prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991'** as
maximum period of preventive suspension of local elective
officials is justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because
respondent involved is elected by the people, but more
precisely because it may only be ordered after issues are
joined.
It means that before order of suspension is issued,
all preliminary requirements and exchanges had been
completed and respondent had already filed counter­
affidavit when case is ready for resolution if parties do not
opt for a formal hearing. The preparatory procedure before
such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume
a lot of time.
But under the Ombudsman Act, those preliminary
steps are included in the period of preventive suspension
ordered even before issues are joined. They conceivably
include service of subpoena or order for respondent to file
counter-affidavits, the usual resort to motions to extend
time to comply, the improvident recourse to the Supreme
Court to suspend, annul, or otherwise delay proceedings,
as well as filing and resolution of motions to dismiss or for
M4Scc. 63, R.A. 7160, cited by Regalado, /. in his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, C.R. No. 116801, April 6. 1995
M5Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, cited by Regalado, /. in his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
M6Sec. 63. R.A. 7160, cited by Regalado, I- in his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
Chapter VI 295
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
the denial of which also brought all over again through
petitions for certiorari."*7
A case illustrates how proceedings can be delayed by
such procedural maneuvers, where respondents questioned
through repeated resourceful submissions the order of
preventive suspension, and it took twenty months before it
could eventually be reviewed on merits and finally sustained
by the Supreme Court.M‘
That is not all. Even if after formal hearing is scheduled,
respondents can easily resort to same dilatory tactics usually
employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal
actions. Such stratagems obviously results in continued
occupancy by respondent of his office and prejudices case
filed against him or her.
The longer period of six months for preventive
suspension under the Ombudsman Act was evidently
induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and
implement authority of the Office of the Ombudsman
over public officials and employees to deter against illegal,
unjust, improper, and inefficient conduct on their part. As
the agency constitutionally mandated to undertake such
task, it is invested with corresponding authority to enable
it to perform its mission, as easily deducible from pertinent
constitutional provisions creating it and from express
provisions of the Ombudsman Act.64’
Requisites for issuance.
Pending investigation, respondent may be preventively sus­
pended without pay if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his or
her proper deputy, evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct or grave neglect in performance of duty, or (b) charges
“’Regalado, concurring opinion, Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April
6, 1995
“’Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 196719, Sept. 21, 1993, cited by by Regalado, /. in
his concurring opinion, Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995
“’Regalado, I., concurring opinion, Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 116801, April
6, 1995
 296 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
warrant removal from sen-ice, or (c) respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice just, fair and independent disposition of case filed
against him or her.650
In other words, the law sets forth two conditions that must be
satisfied to justify issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending investigation, namely: (1) the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(2) either of these circumstances coexist with first requirement: (a)
charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect
in performance of duty; (b) charge warrants removal from service; or
(c) respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him or her.651
Strength of evidence, who determines.
Whether evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account
evidence before him or her.652 The disciplining authority is
given discretion to decide when evidence of guilt is strong.653 *
No injunction policy against the Ombudsman
Over its investigation.
Any court cannot issue writ of injunction to delay investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, unless there is prima facie evidence that
subject matter of investigation is outside its jurisdiction.656
Writ of injunction, qualified.
Considering textual qualifier to delay, which connotes
suspension of action while main case is pending, the writ of
injunction could only refer to injunctions of the provisional
“"Sec. 9, Rule III, A.O. No. 7 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Om­
budsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, Sept. 7, 2003; first par.. Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, cited in
Morales v. CA, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
65,The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548 Phil. 688, 695 (2007), cited in Morales v. CA,
G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“’Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993), cited in Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 116801, April 6,1995
“’Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 (1960), cited in Lastimosa v. Vasquez, G.R. No.
116801, April 6, 1995
““First par.. Sec. 14, R.A. 6770, cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov.
10. 2015
Chapter VI 297
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE
kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive
relief.655
Any court, identified.
It refers to a prohibition against any court, except
the Supreme Court, from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman.656
But the Court of Appeals may issue temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against
preventive suspension of an elective official issued by the
Ombudsman.
The prohibition against courts other than the Supreme
Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
is ineffective until it is adopted as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
for the purpose.657
Exception.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there
is prima facie evidence the subject matter of investigation, is
outside jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.65*
It has disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only
of impeachable officers. Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.659
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for filing
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.660
"’’Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
"“Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“’Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
““Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10. 2015
““Sec. 21, R.A. 6770, cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“"Sec. 22, R.A. 6770, cited in Morales v, CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
 298 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over
certain administrative cases that are within jurisdiction of
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.1**'
Over its decision or findings.
That no court hears any appeal or application for remedy against
decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court
on pure question of law,1*2 is unconstitutional and invalid. It confines
remedy to a Rule 45 appeal to the exclusion of the remedy of certiorari,
grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts?"
While interlocutory order of preventive suspension issued by
the Ombudsman is unappealable, it may be corrected by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals,*** when issued
with grave abuse of discretion,"* and not directly before the Supreme
Court."*
While the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have concurrent
original jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, it should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.667
"’Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau.
G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013, cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
""Second par.. Sec. 14, R. A. 6770, cited in Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov.
10,2015
‘“Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
""Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“''Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong, G.R. No. 201643, March 12,2014, cited in
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“"Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
“’Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, Nov. 19, 2013, cited in
Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10,2015
Chapter VII
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Resignation
A valedictory, a final act offareivell,
the presidency is now in the past tense.'
Resignation, defined.
Resignation is an act of an official or employee by which he or
she voluntarily relinquishes in writing his or her position effective
on a specific date? It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It
is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of
the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority?
Rationale.
No person can be compelled to render service, a public
official has the right not to serve if he or she really wants
to retire or resign pursuant to the constitutional prohibition
against involuntary servitude?
Resignation, how made.
While the rule says resignation must be done in writing,5 it may be
done constructively. Resignation is a factual question and its elements
'Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
7DTl v. Singun, G.R. No. 149356, March 14, 2008, cited in Sec. 104, Rule X, Memo.
Cite. No. 14, s. 2018
’Ortiz v. Comelec, 162 SCRA 812, cited in DILG Opinion No. 1130, s. 2010, June 23,
2010
*Sec. 18(2), Art. HI, 1987 Constitution, cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2, 2001
5DT1 v. Singun, G.R. No. 149356. March 14, 2008, dted in Sec. 104, Rule X, Memo.
Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
299
 300 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
are beyond quibble, there must be intent to resign coupled by acts of
relinquishment? The validity of resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
expressed. It can be implied. As long as resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
In the absence of any formal letter of resignation, whether the
President resigned is determined from his acts or omissions or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facLs and circumstan­
tial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.’
When effective.
It is effective on a specific date that shall not be less
than thirty days from date of such notice or earlier as
mutually agreed upon by employee and appointing officer
or authority."
The effectivity of a public official's resignation
depends not so much on its terms, e.g., effective at the pleasure
of the President, or at a particular time or on the happening
of a particular contingency, but as a legal proposition, its
acceptance by the proper authority. For quite obviously,
such appropriate authority can disregard the terms of the
official's resignation, and as easily reject as accept it.’
Resignation, when considered tendered.
An official or employee is deemed to have tendered resignation
upon receipt by appointing officer or authority of his or her written
resignation.1" Pending receipt by the official or employee of the action
taken by appointing officer or authority on the resignation, the official
or employee remains in office and retains all powers, duties, and
responsibilities appurtenant to it.”
"Gonzales v. I lernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961), cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2,2001
’Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
"DTI v. Singun, G.R. No. 149356. March 14, 2008. cited in Sec. 104, Rule X, Memo.
Circ No. 14. s. 2018
*)oson v. Nario III, 187SCRA 453, citing I’unzalan v Mendoza, 140 SCRA 153, cited
in DILG Opinion No. 100, s. 2010, June 23, 2010
'"Sec. 104(a), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"Sec. 104(b), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
Chapter VII 301
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Resignation, when completed.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation of an official
or employee, there must be a written intention to relinquish office,” an
act of relinquishment,” acceptance by appointing officer or authority
and a written notice of such acceptance duly served to the official or
employee concerned.14* 3
When acted upon.
The appointing authority acts on the notice of
resignation within thirty days from receipt.15 The acceptance
of resignation is mandatory.16
Suspension of effectivity date, when allowed.
Appointing authority may suspend effectivity date of
resignation despite its initial written notice of acceptance
due to any of these reasons:”
When the country is at war or when any other national
or local emergency has been declared by the appropriate
authority,'" and, when it is necessary to prevent loss of life
or property or in case of imminent danger to public safety
due to an actual or impending emergency caused by serious
accidents, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, or
other disaster or calamity.”
Lifting of suspension.
A resignation previously suspended due to
any of these reasons shall nonetheless be effective
”DT1 v. Singun. G.R. No. 149356, March 14. 2008, cited in Sec. 104, Rule X, Memo.
Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
l3Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, G.R. No. 11883. Jan. 16,
1998, cited in DILG Opinion No. 100, s. 2010, June 23, 2010
I4DT1 v. Singun, G.R. No. 149356, March 14, 2008, cited in Sec. 104, Rule X, Memo.
Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"Sec. 104(c), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14. s. 2018
'“Sec 104(e), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
'’Sec. 104(e), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"Sec. 104(e)(1), Rule X. Memo Orc. No. 14, s. 2018
"Sec. 104(e)(2), Rule X, Memo Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
 302 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
thirty days after circumstances causing previous
suspension ceased as certified by the appropriate
or appointing authority.20
In case resignation of the official or employee remains
unacted upon within such period, it is deemed complete
and operative on the specified date of effectivity or thirty
days from its submission, in cases where effectivity date is
not specified.21
In the interest of service however, the appointing
authority may set a date of effectivity of resignation, but in
no case shall be earlier than the date specified in the letter of
resignation or thirty days from its submission.22
Resignation, withdrawal of.
Until resignation is accepted, tender of resignation is revocable.23
The official or employee concerned may withdraw tender of resignation
any time prior to receipt of notice of acceptance of resignation from the
appointing authority or before lapse of 30-day period given for the latter
to act on the resignation, whichever comes first.24 *Once
* resignation is
deemed complete and operative, its withdrawal does not automatically
restore the employee to his or her former position.23
Resignation, effects on administrative case.
An official or employee under investigation, except those
prohibited by law,20 may be allowed to resign pending decision of his or
her case without prejudice to continuation of proceedings until finally
terminated.27
Generally, resignation does not moot administrative case
filed against the employee prior to date of resignation.2** Precipitate
10
“Sec. 104(e)(3), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
"Sec. 104(c), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Sec. 104(d), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14. s. 2018
“Sec. 104(h), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
24Sec. 104(g), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Sec. 104(h), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
“Sec. 12, R. A. 3019, cited in Sec. 104(j), Rule X. Memo. Circ. No. 14. s. 2018
“Sec. 104(j), Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, *. 2018
2"Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
Chapter VII 303
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from service does not moot administrative
case against him.29
Rationale.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions
— that of separation from service — may no longer be
imposed on a resigned employee, there are other penalties
which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty
of administrative offenses charged against her, namely,
disqualification to hold any government office and forfeiture
of benefits.®
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when facing administrative sanction. It does not preclude finding of
any administrative liability to which the public officer shall still be
answerable."
Court jurisdiction is not lost by mere fact that respondent public
official had ceased in office during pendency of his case12 and it does
not preclude finding of any administrative liability to which he shall
still be answerable.13
Exception.
But in those cases, the Court found public officials
subject of the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent
continuation of a case already filed34 or to preempt imminent
filing of one, as when the Cashier who resigned by filing a
-''Office ol the Court Administrator v. Juan, A.M. No. P-03-1726, July 22, 2004, dtod
in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., G.R. No. 149072. Sept. 21, 2007
“Pagano v. Nazarro Jr.. G.R. No. 149072. Sept. 21, 2007, cited in Ombudsman v.
Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27,2011
"Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A M. No. P-05-1974, April 6.2005, cited in Pagano v. Nazarro
Jr., G.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21,2007
“Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998), cited in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 495 Phil.
10, 16-17 (2005)
“OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, Aug. 20. 2004, cited in Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, 495 Phil 10,16-17 (2005)
"Baquerfo v. Sanchez. 495 Phil. 10, 16-17 (2005); Tuliao v. Judge Ramos. 348 Phil.
404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, June II, 1975, Secretary of Justice v.
Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, April 22, 1997, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan. G.R. No. 164679,
July 27,2011
 304 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
certificate of candidacy previously received notice to explain
why no administrative charge should be filed against her for
cash shortage in her accountabilities.35
But neither situation obtains where the Deputy
Director of the Department of Finance was forced to resign.
Thus, resignation was neither his choice nor his own doing,
especially where the administrative case was filed exactly
one year and two months after his resignation.*
While the rule says resignation of an officer or
employee does not prejudice filing of other administrative
or criminal case against him for any act committed while still
in the service,17 it cannot be argued that a public servant's
resignation does not bar his administrative investigation,
prosecution and adjudication for as long as breach of conduct
was committed while the public official or employee was
still in service.
Otherwise, any official, even if he has been separated
from service for a long time, may still be subject to discip­
linary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.'* This
interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation
of the law which is to improve public service and to preserve
public faith and confidence in government, and not to punish
public official concerned.” A public official who validly
severed his ties with the civil service can no longer be the
subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed."
If the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms
are available to redress the same. " Under the three-fold
’’Pagano v. Nazarro Jr., G.R. No. 149072. Sept. 21, 2007; Oca v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823
(2004), died in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27,2011
’‘Ombudsman v. Andutan. G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
’’Sec. Vl(l), CSC M.C. No. 38, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan. G.R. No. 164679,
July 27, 2011
’’Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27,2011
"Office of the Ombudsman v. Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, Aug. 13, 2008; Remolona
v. CSC, 414 Phil. 590,601 (2001); Bautista v. Negado, 108 Phil. 283 (1960), ated in Ombuds­
man v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
"Ombudsman v. Andutan. G.R. No. 164679, July 27,2011
’’Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No 164679, July 27, 2011
Chapter VII 305
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
liability rule, wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer
may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability."
If the public official was spared of administrative
liability by virtue of a valid resignation, criminal cases for
estafa and graft and corruption may still be filed against
him. If found guilty, he may not only be penalized with
imprisonment, but also perpetually disqualified from office,
and any prohibited interest is confiscated or forfeited in
favor of the government."
Resignation, when prohibited.
The elective local official sought to be recalled is not allowed to
resign while recall process is in progress" and upon filing of a petition
for his or her recall.” As a matter of fact, the official sought to be recalled
is automatically considered candidate* and the list of candidates
includes name of the official sought to be recalled.”
Resignation in defiance of this prohibition constitutes abandon­
ment of office punishable under the Revised Penal Code, Revised Ad­
ministrative Code and such other laws, rules, and regulations."
While the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act disallows a
public officer to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under it or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery/'*
it does not however prevent the act of resignation or retirement per se
but to prevent it from being used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop investigation of a pending criminal or administrative
case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft
Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code.50
"Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 478 (2009 ed.); Hector
S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon Jr., The Law on Public Officers and Election Law,
p. 262 (6th ed., 2008), cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
"Sec 9, R.A. 3019, cited in Ombudsman v. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
"Sec. 73, Chapter 5, Local Government Code of 1991
"Sec. 29, Res. No. 7505, June 6,2005
"Sec. 71, Local Government Code of 1991, as amended by Sec 2, R.A. 9244
"Sec. 26, Res. No. 7505, June 6,2005
“Sec. 29. Res. No. 7505, June 6, 2005
"Sec 12, R.A. 3019
'"Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2. 2001
 306 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Dismissal or removal
Dismissal, defined.
Dismissal is the termination or the act of being discharged from
employment or service for cause. It is the definite severance of an officer
or employee from government service on the initiative of the agency or
office, the Civil Service Commission, Ombudsman, or regular courts.'1
Requisite.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
A civil service eligible is protected by security of tenure,
as such, he cannot be removed except for cause as may
be provided by law.“ But a non-civil service eligible is
removable anytime, with or without cause.54
Dismissal, when constructive.
Assignment to positions lower than previously held, or which,
though of equivalent salary grade and step, drastically changes the
nature of their work without showing of existence of a valid cause for
such demotion, is in effect a removal.55
Assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service
that has a lower rate of compensation is a clear case of demotion
tantamount to removal when no cause is shown for it or when it is not
part of any disciplinary action.56
There is still demotion even if public officer was allowed to receive
the same salary as his previous higher position. Notwithstanding
nondiminution of salary, they have been demoted. This arbitrariness
has no place in a government that nurtures constitutional mandates of
security of tenure and due process.57 * * *
’’Sec. 105, Rule X, Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018
^Sec. 2(3), Art. IX(B), 1987 Constitution
’’Facundo v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-17746, January 31, 1962
MUlep v. Carbonell, G.R. No. L-17807, January 31, 1962
"'Cabagnot v. CSC, G.R. No. 93511, June 3, 1993
56Floreza v. Ongpin, G.R. Nos. 81356-86156, Feb. 26,1990, cited in Cabagnot v. CSC,
G.R. No. 93511, June 3, 1993
57Floreza v. Ongpin, G.R. Nos. 81356-86156, Feb. 26,1990, cited in Cabagnot v. CSC,
G.R. No. 93511, June 3, 1993
Chapter VII 307
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Dismissal, effects on administrative case.
Removal or resignation from office does not bar administrative
liability.5" Despite removal of the General Manager of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority from his position, he can still be held
administratively liable for acts committed during his service and be
made to suffer corresponding penalties. Despite prior dismissal of
criminal charge, subsequent finding by the Office of the President that
he is administratively guilty of charges against him penalized with
dismissal and its corresponding accessory penalties is valid.”
Even if resignation or removal renders impossible imposition of
principal penalty of dismissal, the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any government branch or
instrumentality may be imposed nonetheless.6"
Separation from government, even if it is the most severe of
administrative sanctions that could no longer be imposed, does not
moot accessory administrative liability of disqualification to hold
public office and forfeiture of benefits.61 Notwithstanding impossibility
of effecting principal penalty of dismissal because of prior removal, the
accessory penalties can still be imposed. The rule that the accessory
follows the principal does not apply.62
Retirement
Evett as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses
the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be
able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well,
and was rewarded for it.a
Compulsory retirement.
Unless service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement
shall be compulsory for an employee at 65 years of age. But for purposes
""Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho, A.M. No. CA-05-19-P, Aug. 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 330, 349,
cited in Office of the President & PAGC v. Cataquiz, Sept. 14, 2011
”Office of the President & PAGC v. Cataquiz, Sept. 14,2011
Mln Re: Complaint of Corazon S. Salvador v. Sps. Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M.
No. 2008-20-SC, March 15,2010, cited in Office of the President & PAGC v. Cataquiz, Sept.
14,2011
61 Pagano v. Nazarro Jr., G.R. No. 149072, Sept. 21, 2007, cited in Office of the Presi­
dent & PAGC v. Cataquiz, Sept. 14, 2011
62Office of the President & PAGC v. Cataquiz, Sept. 14,2011
""Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12,1991
308 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
of entitlement to retirement benefits, the employee must have served
for at least fifteen years, provided, that if he or she has less than fifteen
years of service, he or she may be allowed to continue in the service in
accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.64
Retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is
not a result of any contractual stipulation. The constitutional injunction
against impairment of obligations of contracts of insurance can only be
directed against legislation and not resolutions of government agencies
Thus, a government employee found to have exceeded
compulsory retirement age and denied salary and fringe benefits by the
Government System Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees could
not invoke due process for lack of opportunity to be heard, which rules
of procedure do not require notice and hearing.65
Rationale.
The compulsory retirement of public officers upon
reaching 65 years is founded on public policy to maintain
efficiency in government service and at the same time give
the retiring public servants opportunity to enjoy during the
remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps
for their long service and devotion to the government, in the
form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of
civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the
nature of their work and their relations with their superiors
as well as the public would impose upon them.66
Extension of service, when allowed.
The service of a person who reached compulsory
retirement age of 65 years may be extended for a period
of six months, and in meritorious circumstances, may be
extended for another six months. But services during period
of extension are no longer credited as government service.6’
But for a person who completes fifteen years of service
required under the GSIS Law, a maximum period of two
“Sec. 13(b), R.A. 8291
^Beromlla V. GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
“Beivnilla v. GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26,1970
‘’Third par.. Sec. 129, Rule XII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018.
Chapter VII 309
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
years for extension of service may be allowed. Services
rendered during period of extension are credited as part of
government service for purposes of retirement.**
No person who reached compulsory retirement age of
65 years can be appointed to any position in the government,
except to a primarily confidential position,65 in which latter
case he or she is considered automatically extended in the
service until expiry date of his or her appointment or until
his or her services are earlier terminated.'"
Optional retirement.
A government employee who is a member of the GSIS may
retire at sixty and be entitled to retirement benefits provided he or she
rendered at least fifteen years of service and is not receiving a monthly
pension benefit from permanent total disability.
Retirement laws, how construed.
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and
hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood.
After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the
value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should
expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone.”
Abolition of office
Abolition of office, authority.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from legal
precept that power to create includes power to destroy. A public office
is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.
“Fourth par.. Sec 129, Rule XII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018.
“First par.. Sec 129, Rule XIL CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018.
’Second par.. Sec. 129, Rule XII, CSC Memo. Circ. No. 14, s. 2018.
’’Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, July 12. 1991
 310 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it
may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.”
Exception.
The exception, however, as far as bureaus, agencies or
offices in the executive department are concerned, is that the
President's power of control may justify him to inactivate
the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant
him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures71
resulting in termination when it reduces personnel,
consolidates or abolishes offices due to economy and
redundancy of functions.74
Not even force majeure abolishes an office as it presupposes
intention to wholly and permanently do away with it. The total collapse
of the bridge due to flood merely suspended, and did not abolish,
the position of toll collector. When the bridge was rehabilitated and
reopened, the position was similarly and automatically restored '
Mere changes in organization, like rearranging some organiza­
tional units within the Civil Service Commission, merging three of
them to form a new grouping, renaming, and reallocating certain func­
tions by moving some functions from one office to another, to stream­
line its operations and improve delivery of service consistent with
decentralization and devolution to bring it closer physically to govern­
ment employees they are mandated to serve, without termination of
relationship of public employment between the Commission and any
of its officers and employees, do not result in abolition of any public
office.*7** *
Abolition of office, when valid.
Abolition of office is a legitimate mode of terminating relations
provided it is done in good faith. ~ Removal presupposes that the officer
”Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. No*. 142801-802, July 10.2001. cited in
Bagaoisan v. NTA, G.R. No. 152845, Aug. 5,2003
”Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10,2001, cited in
Bagaoisan v. NTA, G.R. No. 152845, Aug. 5, 2003
7*Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2000), cited in Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7,2010
’Busacay v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. L-5856, Sept. 23, 1953
’"Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7. 1995
”Cruz v. Primicias, G.R. No. L-28573, June 13,1968
Chapter VII 311
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
was ousted from office before his term expires. It also implies that the
office still exists after ouster of the occupant. If abolition of office is
by express legal authority, it does not remove the occupant from, but
extinguished his right to, stay in office.
The constitutional mandate that no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law does not apply, because there is no removal or suspension, but
abolition of office which the legislature has authority.7"
When done in bad faith.
But where it is intended to serve personal or political
reasons, or in order to circumvent security of tenure of civil
service employees, it is null and void.7*
If abolition resulting from reorganization, which is
nothing else but separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or other­
wise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and
whatever abolition is done in the name of reorganization, is
void ab initio.
There is invalid abolition resulting from reorganization
where there is a mere change of nomenclature of positions,
or where claims of economy are belied by existence of ample
funds."’
Reorganization
Reorganization, when it terminates relations.
It is the abolition of positions resulting from reorganization that
becomes a mode of terminating official relations. When positions are
validly abolished, it results in loss of security of tenure of affected
government employees.” Reorganization results in termination when
it reduces personnel, consolidates, or abolishes offices due to economy
and redundancy of functions.10
”Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954
"Cruz v. Primicias, G.R. No. L-28573. June 13, 1968
""Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84.127, cited in Banda v. F.rmita, G.R. No. 166620. April
20,2010
“Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,2010
“Canonizado v. Aguirre. 323 SCRA 312 (2000), cited in Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7,2010
 312
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Reorganization, authority.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal
precept that power to create includes power to destroy. A public office
is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.
Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it
may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence."1
Exception.
The exception, however, as far as bureaus, agencies,
or offices in the executive department are concerned, the
President's power of control may justify him to inactivate
the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant
him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures ’*
Power of the President to reorganize.
Jurisprudence well-settled the principle that the President has
power to reorganize offices and agencies in the executive department
in line with his or her constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of legislative
power to reorganize offices under existing statutes."5
Rationale.
The law grants the President the power to reorganize
the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need
of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy, and efficiency. To remain effective and
efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped
by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit
to carry out presidential directives and policies*
"’Buklod ng Kawaning EIl B v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10,2001, cited in
Bagaoisan v. NTA, G.R. No. 152845, Aug. 5,2003
MBuklod ng Kawaning E11B v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10,2001, cited in
Bagaoisan v. NTA, G.R. No. 152845, Aug. 5,2003
""Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,2010
“’Domingo v. Zamora, 445 PhiL 7 (2003), cited in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620,
April 20, 2010
Chapter VII 313
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Constitutional basis.
The President controls all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." This express grant of power of control
in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law."
Statutory basis.
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy,
and efficiency, has continuing authority to reorganize
administrative structure of the Office of the President"
While it may appear this continuing authority is
limited to transfer of functions and offices,"0 the residual
powers of the President includes such powers and
functions as may be provided for under other laws” like
the general appropriations laws that recognize the power
of the President to reorganize the Executive Department”
such as scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities
of departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies through
executive orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President.”
As a matter of fact, no organizational unit or
changes in key positions in any department or agency is
authorized in their respective organization and funded from
appropriations law unless created by law or directed by the
President.”
"Sec. 17, Art. VH, 1987 Constitution, died in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620.
April 20, 2010
"Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary. G.R. No. 166052, Aug.
29, 2007, died in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
"Sec. 31. Book III. Chapter 10, E.O. 292, cited in TMCEA v. CA, G.R. No. 167324,
July 17,2007
’"’Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,2010
”Sec. 20, Chapter 7, Title 1, Book 111, E.O. 292. cited in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No.
166620, April 20, 2010
“Domingo v. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7 (2003), died in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620,
April 20, 2010
’"Sec. 48, R.A. 7645, cited in Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16,
1997
"Sec. 62, R A. 7645, died in Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16,
1997
 314
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
In establishing an executive department, bureau,
or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive
agency's position in the scheme of administrative structure.
Such determination is primary, but subject to the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure.
As far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the power of control may justify
the President to deactivate the functions of a particular
office. Or a law may expressly grant him broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures.”
The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and
in order to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency, has continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President**
For this purpose, he or she may either restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from unit to another”
or transfer any function* or agency’' under the Office of the President
to any other department or agency100 as well as transfer functions101 or
agencies'" to the Office of the President from other departments or
agencies."0
”Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, Aug.
29, 2007, cited in Banda v. Ermita. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
’“Sec. 31, Chapter 10, Title 111, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
v. Zamora, 413 Phil 281 (2001)
Sec 31(1), Chapter 10, Title III, Book 111, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281 (2001)
*Sec. 31(2), Chapter 10, Title III, Book ill. E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora. 413 Phil 281 (2001)
’'Sec. 31(3), Chapter 10, Title 111, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281 (2001)
""Sec. 31(2) and (3), Chapter 10. Title III, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil 281 (2001)
1 "Sec. 31(2), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora. 413 PhU. 281 (2001)
"'"See. 31(3), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora. 413 Phil 281 (2001)
'“Sec. 31(2) and (3), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281 (21X11)
Chapter VII 315
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
When a bureau is attached to the Department of Finance then,
it falls under the Office of the President hence subject to his or her
continuing authority to reorganize."" An agency like the Department
of Health, which is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated
under the law'® mainly tasked with functional distribution of the work
of the President,"* is indubitably under his or her supervision and
control and thus part of the Office of the President. Its structural and
functional reorganization under an executive order is part of the power
and continuing authority of the President to reorganize.107
The streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration,
an agency under the Department of Agriculture, in the interest of
simplicity, economy, and efficiency, is an act well within the authority of
the President motivated and carried out in good faith, especially where
it neither abolished nor transferred offices.""
Implications.
Reorganization involves reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or their abolition by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions."”
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or
consolidate offices in the Office of the President and to
transfer functions or offices, the President implicitly has
power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to
the functional and internal structure of his office, including
modification of functions of such agencies as exigencies of
service may require.110
It takes place when existing structure of government
offices or units are altered, including lines of control,
authority, and responsibility between them."1
'“Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 413 Phil 294-295 (2001), cited in Banda v.
Ermita. G.R. No. 166620, April 20. 2010
""Book IV, E.0.29Z cited in TMCEA v. CA. G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007
'"“Sec. 1, Chapter I, Book IV, E.0.292. cited in TMCEA v. CA. G.R. No. 167324. July
17,2007
'“Sec. 31, Chapter 10, Book III, E.O. 292, cited in TMCEA v. CA, G.R. No. 167324,
July 17,2007
'""Bagaoisan v. NTC, G.R No. 152845, Aug. 5, 2003
'""Canonizado v. Aguirre. 323SCRA312 (2000), cited in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
v. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281 (2001)
""Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20. 2010
"'Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora. 413 Phil 294-295 (2001), cited in Banda v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010

316 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
When the President removed exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Printing Office over printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities
and opened it to competition with the private sector except
with printing of election paraphernalia,"2 it neither abolished
the National Printing Office nor removed any of its functions
to be transferred to another agency, it merely altered its main
function by limiting exclusivity of its printing responsibility
to election forms."'
Exception.
Being primarily legislative, the President cannot
create an office under the guise of his continuing authority
to reorganize administrative structure of the Office of the
President. It does not envision, much less include authority
to create an office under it.
Such continuing authority refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason
of economy, or redundancy of functions that all point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but
needs to be modified or altered.
The creation of the fact-finding truth commission is not
one of the powers delegated by Congress to the President,
apart from offending equal protection clause as it singles out
the immediately preceding administration only."4
Reorganization, when valid.
Reorganization is valid provided it is pursued in good faith,"' if
it is to economize and to make bureaucracy more efficient. In which
case, no separation occurs but the position ceases to exist because of
reorganization."6
',2Sec. 1, E.O. 378, Oct 25, 2004, cited in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April
20, 2010
" ’Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,2010
ll4Sec. 31, Book III, E.O. 292, Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7,2010
"'Dario v. Mison. 176 SCRA 84, 127, cited in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620,
April 20. 2010
"6Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8,1989
Chapter VII 317
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the
executive branch of government is subject to condition it be carried out
in good faith. If so, abolition of positions resulting in loss of security of
tenure of affected government employees is valid."’
When done in good faith.
As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in
good faith if it is to economize or make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, dismissal or separation as a result
of reorganization does not occur because the position itself
ceases to exist.
Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and
that the party who alleges bad faith is burdened to prove
it"* Reorganization is not tainted with bad faith where
employees failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts
that limiting budget of the National Printing Office to its
own income abolishes the position, or removes from office
any employee.
Neither did they present any shred of proof of their
assertion that changes in functions were for political consid­
erations that had nothing to do with improving efficiency of,
or encouraging operational economy in the agency.*121'
Where no one is removed from the Department of
Health by force of its reorganization called Rationalization
and Streamlining Plan, it can neither be said to defeat
security of tenure nor politically motivated.
Not even fear of losing jobs suffices to establish bad
faith where no action by the Department is identified that
would unquestionably result in their dismissal, much less
inconvenience suffered during deployment to distant areas.
The need to make health services available and more efficient
to these areas is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary.121
"’Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
""Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, 127, cited in Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620,
April 20, 2010
11MCotiangco v. Province of Biliran. G.R. No. 157139, Oct 19,2011
l2nBanda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
121TMCEA v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007

318 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
When done in bad faith.
Bad faith attends reorganization if any of these
circumstances is present:
(a) Where there is significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department
or agency concerned'22 as when 394 customs personnel
were replaced with 522 new personnel, there is no actual
reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of
personnel by reason of economy or redundancy of functions,
but a revamp of personnel pure and simple123 or, when 22
occupied positions at P25,000 per semester were replaced
with 28 new positions at l’43,000 per semester, it does not
economize that justifies reorganization122 or, when two new
systems services and nine more divisions are created that
significant increase of positions correspondingly follows.12’
Conversely, there is no bad faith where number of
positions at the Provincial Health Office was reduced from
a high of 120 positions to only 98 after reorganization.126
Where the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the National Tobacco Administration decreased from 1,125
positions to 750, it is thus natural that one’s position may be
lost through removal or abolition of an office.127
(b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created12" as
when one office is abolished and another created to absorb
same functions of the abolished office and service.12’ Even
if it appears abolition is tainted with politics however, it
cannot be declared an abuse of power and discretion where
positions created are entirely different from positions
abolished.1®
,22Sec. 2(a), R.A. 6656, cited m Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8, 1989
12>Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8,1989
122Cruz v. Primicias, G.R. No. L-28573, June 13, 1968
12'Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16, 1997
126Cotiangco v. Province of Biliran, G.R. No. 157139, Oct. 19, 2011
127Bagaoisan v. NTC, G.R. No. 152845, Aug. 5,2003
'“Sec. 2(b), R.A. 6656, died in Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8, 1989
1?Sec. 1.1.2, E.O. 132, died in Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct.
16, 1997
'“Facundo v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-17746, Jan. 31, 1962; Ulep v. CarbonelL G.R. No.
L-17807, Jan. 31,1962
Chapter VII 319
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Abolition of office is a legitimate mode of terminating
relations provided it is done in good faith. But where it is
intended to serve personal or political reasons, or in order to
circumvent security of tenure of civil service employees, it is
null and void.131
Removal presupposes the officer was ousted from
office before his term expires. It also implies that the office
still exists after ouster of the occupant. If abolition of office is
by express legal authority, it does not remove the occupant
from, but extinguished his right to, stay in office.
The constitutional mandate that no officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law does not apply, because there is
no removal or suspension, but abolition of office which the
legislature has authority.132
Abolition of office presupposes intention to wholly
and permanently do away with it. The total collapse of
the bridge due to flood merely suspended, and did not
abolish, the position of toll collector. When the bridge was
rehabilitated and reopened, the position was similarly and
automatically restored.133 *
A law reorganizing the judiciary was not arbitrarily
passed if it went through careful and thorough study to
answer grave and pressing problems in the judiciary. The
abolition of existing lower courts does not violate security
of tenure of its occupants because they were not removed
but their offices merely abolished resulting in termination.112
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit135 as when 22 civil service eligible provincial
clerks promoted before due to efficiency were replaced by
the governor with 23 confidential employees based on his
trust and confidence not only in their capacity for work but
also in their personal fitness and loyalty.
l3,Cruz v. Primicias, G.R. No. L-28573, June 13, 1968
132Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954
133Busacay v Buenaventura, G.R. No. L-5856, Sept. 23, 1953
1MDela Liana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982
1 "Sec. 2(c), R.A. 6656, cited in Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954. Aug. 8, 1989
 320
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Political loyalty or disloyalty is not a precondition for
employment or ground for separation of eligibles in the civil
service. The suppression of positions is done in bad faith
and is therefore illegal, unwarranted, and null and void.1*
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in
the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially same functions as the original
offices
(e) Where removal violates order of separation.'"
When reorganization separates personnel, the following
order of removal is followed: casual employees with less
than five years of government service, casual employees
with five years or more of government service, employees
holding temporary appointments, and employees holding
permanent appointments, provided, that those in the same
category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in
terms of performance and merit shall be laid first, length of
service notwithstanding.'"
Reorganization, preference for appointment.
In case of valid reorganization resulting in termination, officers
and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given
preference for appointment to new positions in the approved staffing
pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not
enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.
No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers
and employees have been appointed, including temporary and
casual employees who possess necessary qualification requirements,
among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility for permanent
appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case
there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy­
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature.1**’
'"Cruz v. Primicias, G.R. No. L-28573, June 13, 1968
'"Sec 2(d), R.A. 6656, cited in Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8,1989
'"Sec. 2(e), R.A. 6656, cited in Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug. 8, 1989
'"Sec. 3(a), (b), (c), (d), R.A. 6656, cited in Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, Aug 8,
1989
'•Sec. 4, R.A. 6656
Chapter Vll 321
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Thus, a public officer who is a career executive officer holding
a permanent position at the time of reorganization should be given
preference for appointment as Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue over an outsider of sorts to the bureau, not being an
incumbent officer of the bureau at the time of reorganization.'*'
Impeachment
It is the most formidable weapon
in the arsenal of democracy.'*1
Impeachment, defined.
It is the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution.'*’
Nature and purpose.
It is intended primarily to protect the people as a
body politic and not to punish the offender.'** Impeachment
proceedings are political in nature, exercised by the
legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate
breach of trust reposed by the people in the hands of the
public officer by determining his or her fitness to stay in the
office
History.
A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment roots in Athens and adopted in the United
States through influence of English common law on the
Framers of the United States Constitution. The Philippine
constitutional provisions on impeachment were adopted
from the United States Constitution.'**
'*'Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, Oct. 16,1997
'“Edward S. Corwin, cited injudicial Review of Impeachment: The Judicialization
of Philippine Politics by Franco Aristotle G. Larctna. UST Law Review, Vol. L, AY 2005-
2006, cited in Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
'“Corona v. Senate. G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
'**De Leon & De Leon Jr., The Law on Public Ofticers and Election Law (2003 Ed.),
p. 467, citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th Ed. (1962), p. 374, cited in Gutierrez v.
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011
'“Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
'"Corona v. Senate. G.R. No. 20024Z July 17, 2012
 322 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Impeachable officers and grounds, enumerated.
The President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court,
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.'47
Betrayal of public trust, defined.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeach­
ment under the 1987 Constitution added to existing grounds
of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption and other high crimes.
While it was deemed broad enough to cover any
violation of oath of office,'4* the impreciseness of its definition
also created apprehension that such an overarching standard
may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary
exercise by the legislature.*14''
Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust
that referred to all acts not punishable by statutes as penal
offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue
in office1'4’ could be easily utilized for every conceivable
misconduct or negligence in office.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission eventually found
it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal ofpublic trust
to refer to acts which are just short of being criminal but
constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical
abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism,
and gross exercise of discretionary powers.'51
,47Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
l4"Joaquin G. Bemas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary,
992, (1996), cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President. G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4,2012
’’’Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II. p. 286, cited in Gonzales
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231. Sept. 4, 2012
""Joaquin G. Bemas. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary,
992. (1996), cited in Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012
"'Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II. p. 286, cited in Gonzales
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012
Chapter VII 323
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
In other words, acts that betray public trust as to
warrant removal from office may be less than criminal
but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and
seriousness as other grounds tor impeachment.
It does not cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and
plain errors of judgment. It does not overreach to cover acts
that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as other
grounds for impeachment.
Thus, even if there was inordinate delay in resolution
of a pending motion and unexplained failure to supervise
subordinates in its prompt disposition, it cannot be
considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting removal
for betrayal of public trust, more so where neglect imputed
appears to be an isolated case.152
Other high crimes.
Just as betrayal of public trust, other high crimes elude
precise definition. In fact, records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show the framers could find no better way
to approximate boundaries of other high crimes than by
alluding to it positive and negative examples, without
arriving at its clear cut definition or even a standard for it.'”
The determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense
is a purely political question that the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of Congress.'1-4 The officer impeached cannot petition
the Court to look into narration of facts constitutive of offenses or
preliminarily assess certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical
admission of facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of
defense. These issues require the Court to determine what constitutes
an impeachable offense that is a purely political question.'"
'''Gonzales v. Offi.vol the President, G.R No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012
" Record ol the Constitutional < ommission at 278, 316,272,283-384,286, cited in
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No 160261. Nov. 10, 2003
'"Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
'"Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R No. 193459,
Feb. 15, 2011
324 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFIC ERS
Impeachment, initiation and limitation.
The House of Representatives has exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment'* subject to limitations that include manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one-year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.”7
Manner of filing.
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any of its
Members, which is included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days after.
The Committee after hearing, and by a majority vote
of its Members, submits its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with corresponding
resolution, which is calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt.'*
Required vote to impeach.
A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House is necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution.'*
In case verified complaint or resolution of impeach­
ment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same constitutes Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate proceeds.1"
Articles of Impeachment, contents.
An impeachment complaint need not al­
lege only one impeachable offense. This is not
to say, however, that it must always contain two
'*Sec. 3(1), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
'''Francisco, Jr. v. I louse of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
'*Sec. 3(2), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
'*Sec. 3(3), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
'“’Sec. 3(4), Art, XI, 1987 Constitution
Chapter Vll 325
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
or more charges. The Constitution allows indict­
ment for multiple impeachment offenses, with
each charge representing an article of impeach­
ment, assembled as one set known as the Articles
of Impeachment."1'
One-year bar rule.
No impeachment proceeding is initiated against same
official more than once within a period of one year."12 This
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action within a
period of one year.
The impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action.'“
The rule that deems impeachment proceedings
initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds verified
complaint sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm it, or at the time of the filing of
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the
Secretary General, is unconstitutional."4
Considering the first impeachment complaint was filed
against the Chief Justice on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates constitutional prohibition
against initiation of impeachment proceedings against same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.'45
Impeachment proceeding and impeachment case, distinguished.
Impeachment proceeding refers to filing of complaint before the
Committee on Justice while impeachment case refers to proceedings
"’’Gutierrez v. House of Representative Committee on justice, G.R. No. 193459,
Feb. 15,2011
'“Sec. 3(5), Art XI. 1987 Constitution
'“Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10. 2003
IMSec. 16, Rule 5, House Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress, cited in
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10,2003
'“Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
326 LAW ON I’UBUC OFFICERS
before the Senate. Indeed, impeachment proceeding before the
House Committee on Justice is not the impeachment case proper. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment before the Senate. “*
First-to-file scheme.
Mere filing of impeachment complaint does not
amount to initiation of impeachment proceeding. The
one-year bar rule does not attach upon mere filing of one
impeachment complaint. Other complaints against same
impeachable officer may still be filed within a period of one
year for as long as none has been referred to the Committee
on Justice yet.
Simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints
against same impeachable officer does not violate the one-
year bar rule.
The filing of impeachment complaint is like lighting
of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however,
cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick
torches the candlewick. Referring complaint to the proper
committee ignites impeachment proceeding.
With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints
filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at
the same time. What is important is that there should only
be one candle that is kindled every year, such that once the
candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle.
Whoever files first impeachment complaint does not
exclusively get the attention of Congress that sets in motion
an exceptional one-a-year mechanism wherein government
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless
of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly
desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting
a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in
line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective
complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first
to buttress the case, would be barred by days or even hours
later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Republic v. Sercno, G.R. No. 237428. May 11, 2018
Chapter VII 327
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue
of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into
a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even
without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the
process is precisely intended to effectively weed out worms
in high offices that could otherwise be ably caught by other
prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme unduly strains actual
complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who,
by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable
filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed
aside and restricted from directly participating in the
impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their
counsel and members of the House of Representatives
who sign, endorse, and file subsequent impeachment
complaints against same impeachable officer, risks violation
of the Constitution since they would have already initiated a
second impeachment proceeding within the same year.
Virtually, anybody can initiate a second or third
impeachment proceeding by mere filing of endorsed
impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that
could charge them with knowledge, even members of
the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain
whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at
the time of committing their endorsement.167
Impeachment Court.
The Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators are on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides, but does not vote.1*
As an impeachment court, the Senate is a tribunal composed of
politicians who are indubitably versed in pragmatic decision-making
,67Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R No, 193459.
Feb. 15,2011
'“Sec. 3(6), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
 328 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
and cognizant of political repercussions of acts purported to have been
committed by impeachable officials.1**
As representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether
the purported acts of highest-ranking officials of the country constitute
as an offense to the citizenry. Following this premise, the impeachment
tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the validity or constitutionality of
the Chief J ustice's appointment, nor can their ruling be of jurisprudential
binding effect to the Court. To authorize Congress to rule on public
officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and balances as
it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is
exclusively vested to rule actions for quo warranto.™
Whether Senate Impeachment Rules were followed is a political
question that Ls not within the power of expanded judicial review.171
Required vote to convict.
No person is convicted without concurrence of
two-thirds of all Members of the Senate.172 Impeachment
creates divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting
preexisting factions with the greatest danger that the
decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength
of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt.175
Penalty.
Judgment in cases of impeachment does not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
Ore party convicted shall nevertheless be liable subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.174
’**Paolo Celeridad, Evidence of Character The Burden of Proving the Truth with
respect to the Political Nature of Impeachment Trials by Means of Substantial Evidence.
87 Phil. L.J. 985 (2013), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’"Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’’Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
,72Sec. 3(6), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
’’’The Federalist Papers No. 65, Alexander Hamilton, accessed at http: / / usgov-
info.about.com/library/fed/blfed65.htm.cited in Corona v. Senate. G.R. No. 200242. July
17,2012
174Scc. 3(7), Art XL 1987 Constitution
Chapter VII 329
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Judicial review.
Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to
ensure effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving
the structure of check and balance in the government. The acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to political departments, are proper subjects of
judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.1”
The power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.17* The Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion
of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits,177 or
judicially discoverable standards to determine validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.17*
In deference to the doctrine of separation of powers however, truly
political questions involving impeachment proceedings are beyond
judicial review, such as determination of what constitutes impeachable
offense.
But where there are constitutionally imposed limits on the power
to initiate impeachment conferred upon the House of Representatives,
the Court is duty bound to examine whether it acted within such limits,
such as the manner of filing, required vote to impeach or whether the
House Impeachment Rules on when impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated observes constitutional standards.17*
The question of validity of simultaneous referral of two impeach­
ment complaints against same impeachable officer that allegedly vio­
lated due process and one-year bar rule is justiciable.1""
’”Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17,2012
'’"Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003, cited
in Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
,!7Frandsco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10,2003
'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), cited in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representa­
tives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10,2003
,7*Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10,2003
'""Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, cited in Corona v.
Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
 330 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Impeachment Rules, promulgation.
Congress promulgates its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of initiating all cases of impeachment.1,1
Being a self-execu ting provision, this does not, in any circumstance,
operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the
Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication,
there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must be
used in the context in which it is generally understood, that is, to
make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
promulgation to publication, it is within discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules.
In short, publication is not required. Even if required, lack of, or
more accurately, delay in publication of the Impeachment Rules does
not nullify proceedings taken prior to the efficacy of the Impeachment
Rules that faithfully comply with relevant self-executing provisions of
the Constitution.
Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at
the start of each Congress, the mandated periods'® would already run
or even lapse while awaiting expiration of the fifteen-day period of
publication prior to the efficacy of the Impeachment Rules. In effect,
the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on
the impeachment complaints pending completion of publication
requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation
of impeachment rules is aimed at effectively carrying out the purpose
of impeachment proceedings, there is no grave abuse of discretion
when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules
on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such
situation of early filing and in keeping with effective implementation
of the purpose of impeachment provisions.
In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress
Impeachment Rules is within power of the House to promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
""Sec. 3(8), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
"“Sec. 3, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
Chapter VII 331
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
The rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement procedural aspects of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive
application to pending actions."0
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.""
Impeachment as exclusive mode of removal.
The right to be removed only by impeachment is the strongest
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. It effectively blocks use of
other legal ways of ousting an officer.1"5 An impeachable officer who is
member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached.1**
Thus, the Chief Justice who under the Constitution is required
to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed only by impeachment, cannot,
during incumbency, be charged with disbarment or criminally before
the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries
with it penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which
amounts to removal from office.1"7
Just as the Commissioner of the Commission on Elections who is
an impeachable officer and at the same time a member of the Bar must
first be removed from office via constitutional route of impeachment
before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed
errant resolutions and actions by way of disbarment.'*"
'"’Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459,
Feb. 15, 2011
'“Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, cited in Gutierrez v. House of Repre­
sentatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011
'The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary by Bemas,
S.J., p. 990, 1996 Ed.
'"Jarque v. Ombudsman. A.C. No. 4509, Dec. 5, 1995, 250 SCRA 11, In re: Raul M
Gonzales, A M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 771; Cuenco v. Feman, A.C. No.
3135, Feb. 17, 1988, 158 SCRA 29, cited in Marcoleta v. Borra, A.C. No. 7732, March 30,
2009
'"In Re: Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 (1998), cited in The Constitution of the Re­
public of the Philippines: A Commentary by Bemas, S.J., p. 990, 1996 Ed.
'"Marcoleta v. Borra. A.C No. 7732, March 30, 2009
332 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
But these involve disbarment cases filed against impeachable
officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public office,
none of which raised the issue of whether the impeachable officer
unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void.
The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during
their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted
for an offense penalized with removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot
be charged with disbarment.""
Exception.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing public
officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. Thus, impeachment
is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly
elected impeachable official may be removed from office.1,0
Quo warranto.
The Supreme Court removed its Chief Justice via quo
warranto for failure to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities
and net worth as a member of the career service prior to
her appointment as an Associate Justice and later as Chief
Justice.
Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously. Aside from the difference
in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment
may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and limitations.
The causes of action in the two proceedings are
unequivocally different. In quo warranto, cause of action lies
on usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising
of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission
of an impeachable offense.
An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official's qualifications
to hold office as to render such appointment or election
"’'Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’""Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
333
Chapter VII
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition,
provided requisites for its commencement are present.
Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if they relate to
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement
but nonetheless committed during incumbency of a validly
appointed or elected official, cannot be subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment if the public official concerned
is impeachable, and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action, if otherwise. ”'
Election protest.
Even eligibility of the President and the Vice-President,
both of whom are impeachable officers may be assailed
either by election protest or a quo warranto petition and they
cannot demand its dismissal on ground it can potentially
cause their removal from office through a mode other than
impeachment.
Otherwise, it renders election contests under the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules nugatory. The
Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since
fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced,
and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be
determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore,
have unwittingly curtailed its judicial power by prohibiting
quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.”2
Impeachment and quo warranto, distinguished.
While both impeachment and quo warranto may oust the public
official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature, exercised by the
legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate breach
of trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by
determining his or her fitness to stay in the office.
'"'Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
l,2Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
 334 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
While an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts and involves a judicial determination
of eligibility or validity of election or appointment of a public official
based on predetermined rules.
Aside from differences in their origin and nature, quo warranto
and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these
remedies are distinct as to jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and limitation.
The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally
different. In quo warranto, cause of action lies on usurping, intruding,
or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in
impeachment, it is commission of an impeachable offense.
Stated in a different manner, the crux of the controversy in
quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as
an impeachable officer in the first place.
On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution
for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while respondent's
title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds
the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue
being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant
her removal from office.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different.
Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office that he or she is ineligible to hold.1”
On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses removes respondent from public office he or she
legally holds.1** It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person
from office that he or she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally
hold or occupy.”5
'"Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
”*Sec. 2. Art. XI, 1987 Constitution, dted in Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018
'"Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Chapter VII 335
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Quo warranto against elective and appointive officers, distin­
guished.
Quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election de­
termine eligibility of candidates elected, while quo warranto proceed­
ings referring to offices filled by appointment determine legality of ap­
pointment.'*
Quo warranto against appointive officers
Quo warranto, purpose.
One of the primary purposes of quo warranto is to ascertain whether
one is constitutionally authorized to hold the office he claims, whether
by election or appointment”7 and to prevent continuing exercise of an
authority unlawfully asserted.'*
Who files.
It may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.'*
Emphatically, a quo warranto proceeding is an action by the
government against individuals unlawfully holding office.70" The
issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which
the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an
intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.201
Usurpation of office as a public wrong can only be corrected by
proceed ing in the name of the government itself. Every citizen and every
taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law, in the administration
of law, and in having only qualified officers execute the law.
'•Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No 237428, May 11, 2018
'"State ex ret. Anava v. McBride, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975), cited in Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
'•People v. City ot Whittier (1933) 133 Cal.App. 316,324; 25 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen. 223
(1955), cited in Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
'*Secs. 2. 3, and 5, Rule 66, Rules of Court, dted in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11,2018
“Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
“Republic v. Corpin, 104 Phil. 49, 53 (1958), dted in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018
 336 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
But that interest is not a private, but a public interest. Being such,
it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney,
who are expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo
warranto proceedings against usurpers in the same way that they are
expected to institute proceedings against any other violator of the law.
That general public interest is not sufficient to authorize a private
citizen to institute such proceedings, for, if it was, then every citizen
and every taxpayer would have the same interest and the same right to
institute such proceedings, and a public officer might, from beginning
to end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.™
Exception.
The only time that an individual, in his own name, may
bring an action for quo warranto is when such individual has
a claim over the position in question.™3 A person claiming
to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action
therefor in his own name M
Such a special civil action can only be commenced by
the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled
to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by
another.™5
Thus, a taxpayer who does not claim to be entitled
to the position Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
cannot question appointment of respondent for not having
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.™*
A petitioner who did not aver he was entitled to the
office of the City Engineer could not bring the action of quo
warranto to oust the person appointed to it for being a mere
usurper.™7
’’’Newman V. United States rx rel. Frizzell. 238 US. 537 (1915), cited in Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
"’Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11. 2018
2IMSec. 5, Rule 66, Rule of Court, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Mav
11,2018
"’See. 6, Rule 66, Revised Rules of Court; Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 (1905), cited in
Tarrosa v. Singson. G.R. No. 111243, May 25,1994
"Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25,1994
™7Sevilla v. CA, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), cited in Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243,
May 25, 1994
337
Chapter VII
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Movants-intervenors who are neither individuals
claiming title to the questioned position nor are the ones
charged with usurpation cannot intervene in a quo warranto
proceeding.™"
The question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a
quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain
payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by
someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy it.™9
Against whom.
An action for usurpation of a public office, position or franchise
may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against: (a) a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise; (b) a public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines
without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority to so
act.*210
Jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over quo
warranto petitions211 *but has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue extraordinary writ of
quo warranto.'-11
When commenced by the Solicitor General, the venue for an
action for quo warranto is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of
Manila, in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.213
’“Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
“"Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, cited in Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R.
No. 111243, May 25. 1994
210Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11,2018
21,Sec. 5, Art VIII, 1987 Constitution, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11,2018
’’’Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
2,3Sec. 7, Rule 66, Rules of Court, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11,2018
 338 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
While hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant
of appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs, direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such
writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.214 Direct resort to the
Supreme Court is justified where quo warranto questions qualification
of no less than a Member of the Court, or the Chief Justice for that
matter.214
Prescriptive period.
There is nothing in the Rule that should be construed to authorize
an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office
unless it is commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster,
or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor
to authorize an action for damages in accordance with provisions of the
next preceding section unless it be commenced within one year after
entry of judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in
question.21*
The one-year period is a condition precedent to existence of cause
of action for quo warranto and that the inaction of an officer for one year
could be validly considered a waiver of his right to file the same117 and
acquiescence or consent to the very matter he is questioning.
Rationale.
The reason for the one-year prescriptive period is the
urgency of the matter to be resolved2'* as public interest
requires that rights of public office should be determined
as speedily as practicable.21'* There are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand adoption of
’“Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Assn., Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 635
Phil. 283, 300 (2010), died in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
’■’Republic v. Sereno, G.R No. 237428, May 11,2018
’"“Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Court, cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11,2018
’’’Bumanlag v Fernandez & Sec of Justice, 110 Phil. 107, 111 (1960), dted in Repub­
lic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’"Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic, 109 Phil. 578 (1960), cited in Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May II, 2018
’’Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436 (1951), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018
Chapter VII 339
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
such limitation as there must be stability in the service so
that public business may not be unduly retarded.220
Thus, the government must be immediately informed
or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office
or position in the civil service, as against another actually
holding it, so that the government may not be faced with
the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the
person actually holding the office although illegally, and
another for one not actually rendering service although
entitled to do so.22’
Exception.
But the one-year limitation does not equally apply
when the petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing
a public interest, but government itself seeking relief for a
public wrong and suing for public interest.
When the Solicitor General himself commences the quo
warranto action either upon the President's directive, upon
complaint, or when the Solicitor General has good reason
to believe there is proof that a person usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise, that a public officer does or suffers an act which is
a ground for forfeiture of his office or an association acts as
a corporation without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his
task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the
public and the government are upheld.222
He may thus file the information on behalf of the
people, where general public interests are involved, at
any time, and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the
proceeding.221
’’“Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala, 168 Phil. 328, 334 (1977), citing Unabia v. City
Mayor, 99 Phil. 253,257 (1956), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’’Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic, 109 PhiL 578 (1960), cited in Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’’Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
’’’People v. Bailey, (District Court of Appeal of California), 30 CaLApp. 581, 584,
585, quoting McPhail v. People ex ret. Lambert. 160 III.. 77; 52 Am. St., Rep., 806, cited in
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
 340 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
The quo warranto action is a prerogative writ and no
limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As
a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of
limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right.234 Laches,
acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in performance of duty
on the party of the officers of the state, is not imputable to
the state when acting in its character as a sovereign.225
Certain exceptional circumstances remove the case out
of statute of limitations such as: (a) there was no acquiescence
to or inaction on the part of the petitioner, amounting to
abandonment of his right to the position, (b) it was an act
of the government through its responsible officials which
contributed to delay filing of the action, and (c) the petition
was grounded upon assertion that petitioner's removal from
questioned position was contrary to law.236 * * 221
Where the cause of ouster, chronic failure to file
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth in violation of
the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct
that make a member of the Judiciary not a person of proven
integrity, was not discernible but instead deliberately
rendered obscure, there can be no acquiescence or inaction on
the part of the Republic as would amount to abandonment if
its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate
public interest.
Neither can delay be attributed to it in commencing
the action since respondent deliberately concealed the fact of
her disqualification to the position. Prescription, therefore,
cannot be pleaded against the Republic.217
“’Agcaoili v. Suguitan. 48 Phil. 676 (1929), cited in Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11,2018
asAgcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676 (1929), dting People ex ret. Moloney v.
Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 HL. 125; 64 I.. R.A. 366. cited in cited in Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428. May 11, 2018
236Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala, 168 Phil. 328 (1977), cited in Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428. May 11,2018
“^Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018
Chapter Vll 341
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Quo warranto against elective officers
Quo warranto, defined.
It refers to an election contest relating to qualifications of an
elective official on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic,235
to unseat ineligible person from office, but not to install petitioner in
his place.239
Ineligibility.
Ineligibility refers to lack of constitutional or statutory
qualifications to hold public office and the purpose of
proceedings to declare ineligibility is to remove incumbent
from office.2®
Disloyalty.
Disloyalty is committed by public officers or employees
who fail to resist rebellion by all the means in their power, or
by continuing to discharge duties of their offices under the
control of the rebels or by accepting appointment to office
under them.25' Disloyalty to duly constituted government
includes rebellion, sedition, violation of firearms laws, or
any crime against national security.222 *
Generally, disloyalty to the Republic as a ground for
quo warranto and disqualification to run for public office
does not require a criminal act. A person may be declared
in a special civil action of quo warranto to be disloyal, and
ineligible to hold public office, if evidence preponderates,
although said person has been or will be acquitted of treason.
It is because the law provides as ground of disqualification,
not conviction of candidate of treason or any other act
constituting disloyalty, but the mere fact of being disloyal.225
“’’Rule I, Sec. 3(c), A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
229Lokin v. Comelec. G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
^’Fermin v. Comelec, 595 I’hil. 449 (2008), cited in Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec.
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
221 Art. 137, Revised Penal Code
222Sec. 27, R.A. 8189
a’Casin v. Caluag, G.R. No. L-1939, April 19, 1948
 .342
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Undoubtedly, the object of the law is to disqualify a person, who is
shown to be disloyal to the Philippine government by a preponderance
of evidence in a quo warranto proceeding, to hold a public office in said
government. Of course, a person convicted of the crime of treason or
any other offense constituting disloyalty to the government is, a fortiori,
disqualified to hold a public office.0*
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as offender is not
prosecuted criminally, but administratively to remove him as duly
elected governor for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where quantum
of proof required is only substantial evidence.05
Initiation of quo warranto proceedings
Barangay officials.
A quo warranto petition against an elective barangay official is filed
with the proper Municipal Trial Court06 by any registered voter who
voted in the election concerned1117 within a non-extendible period of ten
days following date of proclamation.0" It could be filed by any voter
although he or she does not claim the office involved.0’
Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not
a contest where parties strive for supremacy because petitioner will not
be seated even if respondent may be unseated.240 The issue is whether
respondent possesses all qualifications and none of disqualifications
prescribed by law.241
Municipal officials.
A quo warranto petition against an elective municipal official is
filed with the proper Regional Trial Court by any registered voter who
voted in the municipal election242 within a non-extendible period of ten
°*Casin v. Caluag, G.R. No. L-1939, April 19, 1948
°'Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, Aug. 21, 1992
°"Sec. 252, OEC
O7Rule 2, Sec. 6, AM. No. 07-4-15-SC
°“Rule 2, Sec. 8, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
1NSec. 219, Election Code of 1971, cited in Javier v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81,
Sept. 22, 1986
24"Lokin v. Comelec. G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22,2010
241 Rule 1, Sec. 3(e), A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
242Rule 2, Sec. 5, AM. No. 10-4-1-SC
Chapter VII 343
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
days counted from date of proclamation.245 It could be filed by any voter
although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved.244
Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not
a contest where parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will
not be seated even if respondent may be unseated.245 The petitioner
in quo warranto proceedings does not occupy the position in dispute.
Where both petitioner and respondent claim to have assumed office as
mayor, quo warranto is improper remedy.246 * * * *
Regional, provincial, or city officials.
Any voter contesting election of any regional, provincial, or city
official on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic may
file quo warranto petition242 within ten days from date respondent is
proclaimed.*24"*
It is filed with the Commission on Elections, it being empowered
to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials.24"
Member, House of Representatives.
A verified quo warranto petition on ground of ineligibility may be
filed by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned,
or any registered voter in the case of party-list representatives, within
fifteen days from June 30 of election year or date of actual assumption
to office, whichever is later,2® either personally with the Office of the
Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal or by
registered mail addressed to the Tribunal Secretary.251
A quo warranto petition may also be filed by any registered voter of
the district concerned against a Member of the House of Representatives,
“■’Rule 2, Sec. 7, A M. No. 10-4-1-SC
244Sec. 219, Election Code of 1971, cited in Javier v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81,
Sept. 22, 1986
245Lokin v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 179431-32. June 22,2010
246Samad v. Comelec, G.R. No. 107854, July 16, 1993
!42Sec. 1, Rule 21, Part V.A., Comelec Rules of Procedure, Feb. 15,1993
24"Sec. 2. Rule 21, Part V.A., Comelec Rules of Procedure, Feb. 15,1993
!**Sec 2(2), Art. 1X(C), 1987 Constitution
^“Rule 18, HRET Rules
“Rule 22, HRET Rules

344 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
on ground of citizenship, at any time during said Member's tenure. It
may also be filed at any time for grounds that occur during term of
office of winning candidate.252
Senator.
A verified quo warranto petition contesting election of any Member
of the Senate on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic
is filed by any registered voter within ten days after proclamation
of respondent25’ with the Senate Electoral Tribunal which is the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the Senate.254
President and Vice-President.
A verified quo warranto petition contesting election of the
President or Vice-President on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to
the Republic may be filed by any registered voter who voted in the
election concerned within ten days after proclamation of winner255 with
the Office of the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal in eighteen
legible copies.25'’
Due to promulgation of new resolution governing recall election
last Jan. 31, 2020, please replace the entire topic on Recall with this:
Recall
An incident of sovereign poiver.™
Recall, defined.
It is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before end
of his or her term of office25" for loss of confidence through an election
called for the purpose.2” Any elective local official may be subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.240
252Rule 18, HRET Rules
“■’Rule 18, 2013 Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
’'’Rule 14, 2013 Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
‘"Rule 16, The 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
““Rule 20, The 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
“'Garcia v. Comelec, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)
“"Garcia v. Comelec, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)
“Sec. 1(a), Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31. 2020
•'"“Sec. 74(a). Chap. 5, Local Government Code of 1991
Chapter VII 345
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
Recall election, defined.
Recall election refers to the election process conducted
pursuant to a valid petition for recall.241
Rationale.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is
an incident of their sovereign power. Without constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental
operations, indispensable for proper administration of
public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described
as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy.242
Recall, who initiates against whom on what ground.
Any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official may be
subject of a recall election on ground of loss of confidence.24' But elective
Sangguniang Kabataan positions are not subject to a recall election.244
It is exercised by registered voters with active registration record
status of a local government unit to which the local elective official
subject of the petition for recall was elected."
Any registered voter in a local government unit supported by the
registered voters in the same local government unit, who are registered
as such during the election in which the local official sought recalled
was elected, may file a petition for recall, subject to the following
percentage requirements:
Voting Population of Local Required Percentage and/or
Government Unit Concerned Minimum Number of Petitioners
Not more than 20,000 At least 25% of the voting popu­
lation
“'Sec. 1(b), Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31. 2020
“‘Garda v. Comelec. 227 SCRA 100 (1993)
“Sec. 70(A), Local Government Code of 1991, as amended by Sec. 1, R.A. 9244;
Sec. 3, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31, 2020
“•Sec. 27(d), R.A. 8189, cited in Sec. 3, Res No. 10649, Jan. 31,2020
“Sec. 69, Chap. 5, Local Government Code of 1991; Sec. 2, Res. No. 10649, Jan.
31, 2020
346 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS Chapter VII 347
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS

elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate

At least 20,000 but not more than At least 20% but not less than
soundness of his or her political policies and decisions.™
75,000 5,000
It is also too late to hold it one year immediately
At least 75,000 but not more than At least 15% but not less than
preceding regular local election not only because it is too
300,000 15,000 close to the next regular election but also because it is costly.27’
Over 300,000 At least 10% but not less than
45,000266 Next regular election, defined.
It means the regular local election where
The required minimum percentage ensures that a recall election
the position of the official sought recalled is to
will not be held in response to the wishes of a small and unrepresentative
be contested and filled by the electorate.272 Thus,
minority.267
a punong barangay cannot bar his recall election
by invoking proximity of the next regular election
Recall petition, how filed where. where his position is not contested, but that of the
In case subject of a petition for recall is an elective official of a Sangguniang Kabataan.273
dty, municipality or barangay, the initiating petitioner personally signs Recall election is potentially disruptive of normal
the petition before the election concerned or his or her authorized working of the local government unit necessitating
representative, and files it with the office of the same election officer. additional expenses. The proscription is due to proximity of
In case subject is an elective provincial official, the initiating the next regular election for the office of the local elective
petitioner personally signs the petition before the provincial election official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's
supervisor concerned and files it with the latter's office.268 replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer
tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall
Recall petition, when filed. election.276

A petition for recall may be filed at any time after assumption
to office of the official sought recalled provided the recall election is
conducted not earlier than one year from date of assumption to office
and not later than one year immediately preceding the next regular
local election.26**
Rationale.
It is too early to hold it within a year from assumption
to office. Electors need to wait one year to prevent
premature action on their parting voting to remove a newly
266Sec. 6, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31, 2020
267Bemzen v. City of Boulder, 186 Colo, 81, 525 P. 2d 416, cited in Angobung v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 126576, Mar. 5,1997
268Sec. 7, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31, 2020
2“Sec. 74(b), Chap. 5, Local Government Code of 1991; Sec. 4, Res. No. 10649, Jan.
32,2020
Recall, when effective.
Recall of an elective local official takes effect only upon election
and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving
highest number of votes cast during the recall election. Should the
official sought recalled receive highest number of votes, confidence in
him is affirmed, and he continues in office.2”
Termination from office of the official sought recalled due to
causes such as removal from office, death, total disability, permanent
270ln Re Bower, 41 III, 777, 242 Ne 2D. 252. died in Angobung v. Comelec, 269
SCRA 245 (1997)
27,Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996
272Sec. 4, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31,2020
2”Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996
’’’Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996
’’’Sec. 72. Chap. 5, Local Government Code of 1991; first par.. Sec. 26, Res. No.
10649, Jan. 31,2020
348 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
incapacity or succession to the next higher position bars recall and
renders it moot and academic.*27" But the official sought recalled is not
allowed to resign upon filing of the recall petition and while the recall
process is in progress.277
Expulsion
Expulsion, when permissible, vindicates the honor
of the legislative body while giving to the constituency
an opportunity to elect anew.-7*
Who may be expelled.
The House of Representatives may, upon recommendation of the
Committee on Ethics,27* censure or reprimand an erring Member with
concurrence of the majority of all its Members. It may suspend or expel
an erring Member with concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
provided, that a penalty of suspension does not exceed sixty days.2™
Upon recommendation of the Committee on Ethics and Privileges,
the Senate may punish any Member for disorderly behavior and, with
concurrence of two-thirds of the entire membership, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension does not exceed sixty calendar
days.281
Jurisdiction.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and
not the Commission on Elections, has exclusive jurisdiction
over expulsion of a sitting party-list representative from the
House of Representatives, including validity of expulsion
from the party-list as it is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress.282
“‘second par., Sec. 26, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31, 2020
“’Sec. 27, Res. No. 10649, Jan. 31,2020
27BAlejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, Sept. 11, 1924
27*Sec. 139, Rule XIX, Rules of the House of Representatives, 16th Congress, as
adopted by the 17th Congress
“"Sec. 140, Rule XIX, Rules of the House of Representatives, 16th Congress, as
adopted by the 17th Congress
“'Sec. 97, Rule XXXIV, Rules of the Senate
“2Lico v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205505, Sept. 29,2015
Chapter VII 349
TERMINATION OF RELAHONS
Expulsion, grounds for.
Members of the House of Representatives may be censured,
reprimanded, suspended, or expelled for violation of any of the
following established Code of Conduct:
(a) A Member shall act at all times in a manner that shall
reflect creditably on the House;
(b) A Member shall adhere to the spirit and the letter of
the Rules of the House and to the rules of the committees;
(c) A Member may not receive compensation or any
pecuniary interest and may not permit compensation or any
pecuniary interest to accrue to the Member's beneficial interest
from any source, the receipt of which would occur by virtue of
influence improperly exerted from the Member's position in
Congress;
(d) A Member shall not hold any other office or employ­
ment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instru­
mentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries, during the Member's term without
forfeiting the Member's seat in the House;
(e) A Member shall not also be appointed to any office
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the Member's
term;
(f) A Member shall not personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice, the electoral tribunals, or any quasi­
judicial or administrative body or be directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiaries, during the
Member's term of office;
(g) A Member shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the government for personal pecuniary benefit or
where the Member may be called upon to act on account of the
Member's office;
(h) A Member shall not acquire or receive any personal
pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will
be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or
resolution authored by the Member that is approved or adopted
350 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
by Congress during the Member's term. It shall be unlawful for
the Member to continue to retain such interest thirty days after
such approval;
(i) A Member may not authorize or allow an individual,
group or organization not under the direction and control of the
House to use the words "Congress of the Philippines", "House
of Representatives" or "Official Business", or any combination of
these words, or the seal of the House of Representatives, or any
other representation thereof on any letterhead or envelope or for
any other purpose; and
(j) A Member shall not disclose any classified information
received in the course of the service with the House of Represen­
tatives, except as authorized by the House of Representatives or
in accordance with it Rules.*2**1
End of term for elective officers
Prohibition against holdover capacity.
When the term of office of elective officials set by the Constitution
expires. Congress cannot legislate to extend it through a holdover
capacity otherwise it amends the Constitution by ordinary legislation.2*4
Exception.
The prohibition against holdover capacity does not
apply to elective Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution. Thus, they can hold on to their positions
in a holdover capacity”5 provided appropriate legislation
allows it
When Congress postponed the October 13, 2016
Barangay and SK Elections to the fourth Monday of October
“°Sec. 139, Rule XIX, Rules of the House of Representatives, 16th Congress, as
adopted by the 17th Congress
2**Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct 18, 2011
“'Sambarani v. Comelec, 481 Phil. 661 (2004), Adap v Comelec. G.R. No. 161984,
Feb. 21, 2007,516 SCRA 403, Montesclaros v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9,2011, cited
in Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18,2011
Chapter VII 351
TERMINATION OJ RELATIONS
20Y7B“' and again to the second Monday of May 2018,it
also allowed all incumbent barangay officials to remain in
office until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified, unless sooner removed or suspended for cause.2™
Even barangay officials who are ex officio members of
the sangguniang bayan, panlungsod or panlalawigan, as the
case may be, continue to serve as such members in the
sanggunian concerned until the next barangay election on the
second Monday of May 2018.”’
The rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists. It cannot apply where such contrary intent
is evident.2®
End of term for appointive officers
If occupant who serves at pleasure of the appointing authority is
terminated, it does not amount to removal but end of term. Officials
holding primarily confidential positions continue to hold office for as
long as confidence on them endures. If they are terminated on ground
of loss of confidence, it does not amount to removal but expiration of
term of office, which are two different modes of terminating official
relations.2”
If appointment does not fix a term of office, it is dependent
upon the pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, replacement does
not amount to removal but expiration of tenure which is a mode of
terminating official relations.x
“•Sec. 1, R.A. 9164, as amended by R.A 9340, 10656, and 10923
“’Sec. 1, R.A. 10952
“■Sec 3, R.A. 10923; Sec. 3, R.A. 10952
“Sec. 3, R.A. 10952
2®Guekeko v. Santos. 76 Phil. 237 (1946), cited in Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No.
196271, Oct. 18,2011
2,1 Hernandez v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-17287, June 30,1965
“’Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, March 30, 1963

352 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Abandonment
By lapse of time.
The law does not fix a period when an employee may be considered
to have abandoned his office?” A period of eleven months was
considered sufficient time of inaction amounting to abandonment?*4
A quo warranto petition must be filed within one year. It is an
expression of state policy that persons claiming right to an office they
were illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover. If
they do not do so within a period of one year, a condition precedent to
the existence of cause of action, they are considered to have abandoned
their office.
An employee removed without investigation and cause is entitled
to be reinstated. But since an unreasonable length of time of one year and
fifteen days interrupted removal and filing of quo warranto petition, his
inaction and sleeping on his rights can be considered abandonment2”
Rationale.
It is not proper that the title to a public office should
be subjected to continued uncertainty and the people's
interest requires that such right be determined speedily as
practicable.2*
By acceptance of another position.
Acceptance of another position, discharge of its functions and ac­
ceptance of salaries constitute abandonment of the former position”7
without right to repossess it after his new appointment was disap-
2*JB
“’Unabia v. City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759, May 25,1956
”*Mesias v. Jover, 97 Phil. 899, citing Nicolas v. United States, 66 L.Ed. 133, died in
Unabia v. City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
^Unabia v. City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
”bTumulak v. Egay, 46 Official Gazette 8, 3693, 3695, cited in Unabia v. City Mayor,
G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
“''Summers v. Ozaeta, G.R. No. 1534, October 25,1948
”*Zandiieta v. de la Costa, 38 O.G. 2358, cited in Summers v. Ozaeta, G.R. No. 1534,
Oct. 25,1948
Chapter VII 353
TERMINATION OF RELATIONS
By failure to assume.
The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take his
oath of office within six months from proclamation is vacated, unless
said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.”*
Penalty.
Refusal to discharge elective office is a criminal offense
punishable by arresto mayor or a maximum Pl,000 fine or
both, imposed upon any person who, having been elected
by popular election to a public office, refuses without legal
motive to be sworn in or to discharge duties of said office.300 * *
If elected person is underage, or otherwise disqualified, his
refusal to be sworn in or to discharge duties of the office is
justified.’01
Rationale.
Once an individual is elected to office by will of the
people, discharge of duties not only becomes a matter of
right, but a matter of duty.™
Death
Official relations terminate upon death. Public office is personal
to the incumbent and is not a property that passes to his heirs. When
protestee dies during pendency of election protest, his widow cannot
substitute him to continue his counterclaim for damages.303
”*Sec. 11, Omnibus Election Code
300Art. 234, Revised Penal Code
301The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 14th Ed., p. 446, by Luis B. Reyes
3O2The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 14th Ed., p. 447, by Luis B. Reyes
“’Abeja v. Tanada, G.R. No. 110272, 30 Aug. 1994
When a woman is silent, listen to her.
That's when she speaks the loudest.

— fgs gujilde