Chinese Maritime Power in the

21st Century

This book analyses China’s maritime strategy for the 21st century, integrat-
ing strategic planning, policy thinking and strategic prediction.
It explains the construction and application of China’s military, political,
economic and diplomatic means for building maritime power and predicts
the future of China’s maritime power by 2049, as well as development trends
in global maritime politics. It explores both the strengths and the limitations
of President Xi’s ‘Maritime Dream’ and provides a candid assessment of
the likely future balance at sea between China and the United States. This
volume explains and discusses China’s claims and intentions in the East and
South China Seas, and makes some recommendations for China’s future
policy that will lessen the chance of conflict with the United States and its
closer neighbors.
This book will be of much interest to students of maritime strategy, naval
studies, Chinese politics and International Relations in general.

Hu Bo is a senior researcher at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking Uni-

versity, China.
Cass Series: Naval Policy and History
Series Editor: Geoffrey Till
ISSN 1366-9478

This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars

in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chrono-
logical limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of im-
portant articles as well as reprints of classic works.

59 US Naval Strategy and National Security

The Evolution of American Maritime Power
Sebastian Bruns

60 Modern Maritime Piracy

Genesis, Evolution and Responses
Robert C. McCabe

61 Seapower
A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Fourth Edition)
Geoffrey Till

62 Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial

Theory and Practice
Milan Vego

63 India-China Maritime Competition

The Security Dilemma at Sea
Edited by Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, and TV Paul

64 Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century

Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions
Hu Bo

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

com/Cass-Series-Naval-Policy-and-History/book-series/CSNPH
Chinese Maritime Power in the
21st Century
Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions

Hu Bo
Translated by Zhang Yanpei
Edited and Preface by Geoffrey Till
First published in English 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
business
2049 年的中国海上权力
Originally Published in Chinese by Chinese Development Press
© 2016 China Development Press
© 2020 Routledge
Translated by Zhang Yanpei
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
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or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Hu, Bo, 1981– author. | Yanpei, Zhang, translator. |
Till, Geoffrey, editor, writer of preface.
Title: Chinese maritime power in the 21st century : strategic
planning, policy and predictions / Hu Bo ; translated by
Zhang Yanpei ; edited and preface by Geoffrey Till.
Other titles: 2049 nian de Zhongguo hai shang quan li. English
Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis
Group, 2020. | Series: Cass series : naval policy and history,
1366-9478 ; 64 | “Originally Published in Chinese by Chinese
Development Press © 2016”— Title verso. | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019019707
Subjects: LCSH: Sea-power—China. | Naval strategy. | East China
Sea—Strategic aspects. | South China Sea—Strategic aspects. |
China—Foreign relations—21st century.
Classification: LCC VA633 .H7313 2020 | DDC 359/.030951—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019019707

ISBN: 978-0-367-24469-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-28264-5 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
Contents

List of figures vii

List of tables ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii

1 Three major systematic objectives of Chinese

maritime power 1

2 The connotation and characteristics of Chinese

maritime power 29

3 China’s coastal geostrategy 47

4 China’s exterior line strategy at sea 61

5 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and the Demarcation

of the East China Sea 79

6 A solution to tensions in the South China Sea 95

7 Promoting peaceful power transition between China

and the United States 126

8 Maritime relations with Japan, ASEAN, India,

Australia and Russia 165

9 Deterrence is preferable to fighting 216

vi Contents
10 Tridents beyond armed force 226

11 Conclusion and expectation: China’s maritime power in

the year 2049 253

Index 263
List of figures

3.1 The First and Second Island Chains 57

5.1 Contested Lines in the East China Sea 83
6.1 The South China Sea and the Nine Dash Line 99
List of tables

3.1 Maritime Disputes between China and Its Neighboring

Countries on Sovereignty of Island and Reefs and
Maritime Demarcation 47
10.1 Major differences in the ways agrarian civilizations and
maritime civilizations approach foreign relations 234
Preface

One of the most obvious aspects of today’s world is that it is changing fast,
not least in the maritime domain – and that is a domain that many people
think is in itself likely to grow in importance as the 21st Century develops.
Increasingly, countries around the world are taking the maritime future
more seriously than they did before, in all of its many aspects. The extent to
which the ‘blue’ part of their national economies is increasingly being more
thought about and better regulated and managed is an indication of the sea’s
value as a source of resources – oil, gas, fish and who knows what else in
the future – and as an advantageous way of transporting goods around the
world. Marine environmentalists are likewise more obviously stepping into
the discussion by pointing out the role of the sea as a symptom and a regula-
tor of the world’s climate and the imperative need for its greater protection.
Contemporary strategists, on the other hand, tend to stress the continuing
strategic significance of seapower.
Another aspect of current maritime change that is attracting a great deal
of sometimes alarmed attention is the growth of specifically Chinese mari-
time power and its possible effects on a global maritime order that emerged
from the Second World War but which is now facing the prospect of trans-
formative change. Uncertain futures make people nervous, and the sheer
scale of China’s actual and potential maritime rise makes calculations about
its possible future impact particularly hazardous.
In these circumstances, the world needs to watch what China is doing
and assess its likely consequences. The problem is that much of this is still
ambiguous both in terms of what is actually happening and more especially
in what it might mean for everyone else. As a result, there is huge diversity in
Western interpretations of both these things. ‘Dragon-slayers’ tend to take
a bleak view of both matters. For them, China is engaged in a deliberate and
conscious plan to wrest strategic dominance away from the United States; it
even said to have a target date in mind, 2049, the hundredth anniversary of
the final victory and establishment of the People’s Republic of China.1 Chi-
nese thinking, it is claimed, is based on its own hard-won strategic culture,
not least of the ‘warring-states period,’ and is comprehensive in scope, inte-
grating soft power and hard power, political and legal pressure, and all the
xii Preface
advantages of economic growth; China has, they say, a marked inclination
to break the rules by exploiting its advantages, say in digital technology,2
and an emphasis on the rapid expansion of its military power together with
an increasing readiness to use it.
Others, and not necessarily mere ‘panda-huggers,’ dispute the scale of
the challenge and point out the many hurdles ahead for China even if it
did aim at maritime dominance. The notion, for example, that the growth
of the Chinese economy will be sustained at the very high rate it enjoyed
at the start of the 21st century is now widely disputed by Western experts;
this, combined with the country’s depressing demographic trajectory and
its great environmental problems, is likely to be an increasingly worrying
preoccupation of the Chinese government, which, such people think, seems
likely to take its mind off world leadership even if it ever had such aspira-
tions in the first place.
Another group of Western skeptics, however, accept much of the argu-
ment that a significant shift in the balance of power particularly between
China and the United States is indeed likely to take place and many indeed
would go further proposing that the level of challenge to the existing world
order is much greater than that posed by the Soviet Union in Cold War days
because it is so much more comprehensive and is based on a degree of indus-
trial and economic strength that Moscow never enjoyed. More importantly
perhaps, China is integrated into the world economy and its corresponding
political order in a way that Russia never was, and so there are very real
disincentives for the Chinese leadership to threaten ‘the system.’ Economic
interdependence, in short, will constrain political adventurism just as the
Manchester School said it would in the 19th Century. The only thing that
might turn China into an enemy is to treat it as one. Instead, its rise should
be seen less as a threat and more as an opportunity to adjust the current
order into more realistic, sustainable and perhaps even ‘fairer’ directions.3
This pulls us into that most contentious of areas, the assessment of not
only what another country is doing but what this shows (or perhaps doesn’t)
about what the intentions of its leaders are. This task requires some famili-
arity with the thought processes of the people on the ‘other side of the hill.’
Empathy of this sort has always been difficult even among Europeans who
share much culture and historical experience, as Basil Liddell Hart discov-
ered when he interviewed senior German military officers shortly after the
Second World War and was sometimes surprised by their views.4 How much
more difficult, then, for Westerners to fully understand the outlook of a
large and powerful country on the other side of the world with 5,000 years
of rich and largely separated experience behind it?
Given this problem, it is perhaps understandable that onlookers should
sometimes unconsciously make the further assumption that there is only
one Chinese outlook that they need to get to grips with, because that would
seem to flow naturally from a regime that appears to many democratic
Westerners to be distinctly autocratic and authoritarian in its control of
 Preface  xiii
opinion. Justifying this, they would point to the regime’s policing of the
Internet and its one-party rule. But, in fact there is more variety of thought
than sometimes appears to the outside world. It is certainly true that China
has its hawks, but their views can be given undue prominence by the West-
ern media not least because they sometimes seem to provide such a striking
contrast to the official narrative of China’s maritime rise being essentially
peaceful both in aspiration and in preferred outcome.5
For this reason, there is a very real need for the outside world to have
the chance of reading more substantial first-hand Chinese accounts of the
extent and the consequences of China’s maritime rise. Professor Hu Bo has
provided just such an account, although its readers should probably take
to heart that this is a Chinese view, if a very authoritative one, not the Chi-
nese view. The more exposure Western observers have to the varying views
of Chinese scholars, officials and military officers, the less the chance of
both sides colliding in a fog of mutual incomprehension – just as they did in
1793, as Professor Hu points out, when Lord Macartney first encountered
the Qianlong emperor.
Professor Hu, a Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research at
the prestigious Peking University, directs its Centre for Maritime Strategy
Research. As such he specializes in maritime strategy, international security
and Chinese diplomacy. He is the author of several books and a large num-
ber of chapters and articles on issues relating to China’s maritime strategy
and policy. He is widely considered to have extensive influence in China’s
academia and maritime policy circles, and has spoken at a number of lead-
ing colleges and think tanks in the United States. In short, Professor Hu is a
leading expert on China’s maritime power, and his views should be available
to a wider audience in the West. Unfortunately, examples of such in-depth
analysis remain few and far between, and the appearance of this book is to
be welcomed.
As subsequent chapters will show, the work is comprehensive both in the
sea-related subjects that it covers and in the depth of its analysis of, first, the
aspirations behind China’s maritime rise and, second, its consequences for
the Indo-Pacific region and the wider world order. The book is strikingly re-
alistic in discussing the hurdles that must be overcome before China can be-
come a real maritime power perhaps by the middle of this century. In China
itself, and in the community of China-watchers,6 there is also an important
second level of debate going on about the extent to which China should be
seeking to turn itself into a full-fledged maritime power. Many would argue
that historically China was, and its strategic circumstances dictate that it
remains, essentially a continental power and that this requires more modest
maritime aims. This is indeed a long-running debate, specifically about the
strategic identity of the country and whether it is naturally ‘continental’ or
‘maritime.’
Some have argued that it has been a maritime power and perhaps might
be again. Such was the proposition of Professor Lo Jung-pang (1912–1981)
xiv Preface
who assisted Joseph Needham in his seminal works on China and its his-
tory and who ended up teaching at the University of California at Davis.
Professor Lo argued that in the Northern Song, Yuan and early Ming pe-
riods, China was ‘more of a sea power than a land power.’ If ultimately
these impulses failed or petered out, there is still much to be learned from
them.7 Continual public references to the ‘rejuvenation’ or ‘revitalization’ of
Chinese seapower and, indeed, the major use now made of the remarkable
15th-century exploits of Admiral Zheng He strongly suggest the need for
care when suggesting that China’s maritime rise should be seen essentially
as a new departure.8
In this book, however, the author argues that the United States, given
its geo-strategic location, can afford to devote a higher proportion of its
resources to the maritime endeavor, and so China’s trying to match, still
less surpass, the United States as the dominant global maritime power in
the foreseeable future would be far too demanding. But just because China
should not aspire to be the maritime power should not mean that it gives
up on being a maritime power. Professor Hu argues that China’s economic
strength and local strategic interests in the South and East China Seas re-
quire it to develop real maritime power. Although its more distant interests
in terms of markets, supplies and its willingness to accept more responsibil-
ity in defending the international system against such threats as piracy and
international terrorism will also require China to have an expeditionary ca-
pability to be effective further afield, it will remain an essentially regional
rather than a global maritime power like the United States. Nonetheless,
this will demand a process of ‘stepping out’, which is well underway. How-
ever, even this represents a major shift in China’s ideas and perceptions of
itself that needs noting.
In this ‘stepping out’ process, he argues, China faces four sets of very
considerable challenges. The first is the willingness and ability of China to
make the necessary effort given all its other pre-occupations, despite the
fact that such a policy of maritime stepping out has the highest level of po-
litical support. Success in this endeavor will require a holistic approach that
takes in and properly integrates all aspects of the maritime domain, not just
the naval and military ones.
The second set of challenges are the military-technical and operational
demands of such ‘far-sea’ ambitions in terms of naval capabilities and access
to facilities in the wider world. Certainly, China has impressed the world
with its carrier program and other such advances, but there is a world of dif-
ference between having the equipment and exploiting it to maximum effec-
tiveness. Moreover, China conspicuously lacks, though is fast accumulating,
the 24/7 operational experience of the Indian, and still less of the US navies.
The third and perhaps most obvious set of challenges are the constraints
of geography, most obviously China’s limited access to the open ocean
given the existence of the first and second island chains, and the ‘temporary
separation’ of Taiwan. The importance of Taiwan not only as unfinished
 Preface  xv
business from civil war and revolutionary days but also as ‘the cork in the
bottle’ of China’s maritime aspirations is given some prominence in Profes-
sor Hu’s book. China’s attitudes toward the island disputes that sometimes
convulse the South and East China Seas are articulated too, and in some
detail. The interesting point is made here that these disputes are to be seen
as an obstacle in China’s pursuit of maritime power rather than a cause of it.
The fourth, related, set of challenges are the attitudes toward China’s rise
exhibited by China’s neighbors, near and far. Accordingly, Professor Hu
analyzes the attitudes and actions of Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Aus-
tralia and India, drawing sometimes uncompromising conclusions about
their differing responses to China’s rise and the need for some accommo-
dation on both sides. This verdict applies most strongly, of course, to the
response on the United States and on the degree of its willingness to accept
that there can be ‘two tigers on the same mountain.’ Despite the fact that
times are changing and the prospects of major inter-state war might cur-
rently seem remote, the alarmist views of at least some influential circles in
many of these countries to China’s rise mean that China must recognize the
abiding need for traditional deterrence through strength, on the same prin-
ciple as that articulated by US Navy’s recently reconstituted 2nd Fleet in
the Atlantic: ‘Preparing to Fight So We Don’t Have To.’9 For all concerned,
Professor Hu argues, there is a need to ‘steady the ship’, because, objectively,
threats of such conflict do exist. In this, the need for China to take a holis-
tic all-round approach is given some emphasis. There is the suggestion that
an effective Chinese foreign policy should, by dealing with such problems
objectively, facilitate the development of maritime power rather than simply
and crudely make use of it.
Whatever their reaction to the detailed analysis in this book, and it would
not be surprising if it elicits a fair amount of disagreement, Western readers
are sure to find this relatively rare in-depth Chinese analysis of the country’s
maritime future both illuminating and challenging. The book repays close
attention and detailed reading because it is rich in argument, authoritative
in approach and far from being simply a restatement of well-known and
official Chinese government views. Both the author and the Series Editor
are grateful to its hard-working translator and to the two anonymous but
highly regarded external reviewers of the original manuscript for their de-
tailed comments and suggestions, which have proved extremely helpful in
preparing this book for publication.

Geoffrey Till

Notes
1 Such, for example, is the view expressed in Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year
Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower
(New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2016).
xvi Preface
2 “US Accuses a Chinese Giant of Tech Theft,” New York Times, 29 Jan 2019; Dan
Strumpf, “Huwai Sees Years to Address UK Concerns Over Software,’ Wall
Street Journal, 9–10 February 2019.
3 For an example of this kind of assessment, see Hugh White, The China Choice:
Why America Should Share Power (Carlton, VIC: Black Inc. Publishers, 2012).
4 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London: Cassell and Co., 1948).
5 One such flurry was caused by the reports of Major General Luo Yuan, a retired
academic at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing giving a speech
in Shenzhen in which he reportedly claimed that sinking two US Navy aircraft
carriers would resolve any disputes in the East or South China Sea. James Seidel,
“‘Sink Two Aircraft Carriers’: Chinese Admiral’s Chilling Recipe to Dominate
the South China Sea”. News Corp Australia Network, 2 January 2019.
6 Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, China Goes to Sea:
Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009) is a good example of this.
7 For an account of Professor Lo’s views, see Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power,
1127–1368, edited and with commentary by Bruce A. Elleman (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2012).
8 Chia Lin Sien and Sally K. Church, eds., Zheng He and the Afro-Asian World
(Melaka, Malyasia: PERZIM, 2012) is a good example of the Zheng He narrative.
9 Vice-Adm Andrew L. Lewis, Commander 2nd Fleet cited in Susan McFarland
“Navy Relaunches Atlantic Fleet to Eye Russia” UPI 25 August 2018.
Acknowledgments

The term ‘maritime power’ has been used ubiquitously and clamorously in
China in recent years. More than an insistent appeal by the masses and the
elites, it is by now a national strategic goal set by the government. Although
in terms of geography China has always been a land–sea combination state,
in ancient times China also had notable maritime activities. However, this
is the first time in the Chinese history that the nation as a whole is orien-
tating toward the sea. It tends to be very difficult for China, as such a large
country, to make a concerted effort to unite on a single task, but building
maritime power is no doubt a huge exception to this. Since its proposal,
this strategy has received widespread attention, support and participation
from various sectors of society. As a result, China’s maritime practices are
currently undergoing dynamic development in politics, economics, military
affairs, diplomacy, culture and so on.
Obviously, China has already made great strides in the building of mar-
itime power. Chinese navy’s modernization achievements are evident and
are accelerating progress toward a comprehensive ‘Blue Water’ navy: the
‘Liaoning’ aircraft carrier has formed some fighting capacity, and two other
domestic made aircraft carriers are being built; 052D advanced destroyers
and new world-class 055 destroyers, both of which have comparatively strong
regional air-defense and long-distance ocean combat capabilities, are being
ordered and going into commission in bulk. After two important reforms,
respectively, in 2013 and 2018, China’s maritime law enforcement forces
have been integrated and strengthened into the China Coast Guard (CCG),
marking the end to the period of ‘Five Dragons Governing the Seas’. On the
issues of Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, China has changed from
its previous passive stance to continuously and actively experiment with a
policy of ‘throwing down the gauntlet.’ It has established the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), has undertaken construction pro-
jects in the South China Sea, and displayed impulsive determination in pro-
tection of its rights and great comprehensive strength. Furthermore, China’s
ability to control situations is rapidly increasing in both the East and South
China Seas. Beyond its offshore areas, China is actively moving toward the
deep seas and oceans, participating in north and south polar affairs, while
xviii Acknowledgments
also taking part in global marine governance like antipiracy, search and
rescue, and marine environmental protection.
Not surprisingly, China’s maritime ascendency has attracted wide
world concerns, countermeasures and overreactions. The United States
has assumed China as the largest maritime strategic competitor and con-
ducted strategic responses like its Rebalance to Asia Pacific and Free and
Open Indo-Pacific initiatives. In order to check China’s rising power, the
United States uses maritime disputes involving China to play the security
card, thereby taking advantage of the situation by adding military deploy-
ments in the Western Pacific on a large scale, adding more and more stra-
tegic pressure on China. While incidents of ‘unscripted’ and ’dangerously
close’ encounters between Chinese vessels and aircrafts and their American
counterparts are occurring increasingly frequently, the risk of exchange of
fire is also escalating sharply. With the excuse of Chinese maritime threat,
Japanese military attention is accelerating its shift toward the ‘south west’,
deploying advanced military equipment on a large scale to Okinawa, which
lies next to the East China Sea. The concerns and doubts of India, Australia
and other countries outside of the East Asia region toward China’s maritime
strategy are intensifying, as some of them even following the example of the
United States to take action against China. From China’s perspective, many
diverse vertical and horizontal alliances are forming against it.
From 2009 to 2016, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and some other neigh-
boring countries had engaged in many serious maritime confrontations with
China, using almost all the tools and means of politics, diplomacy, econ-
omy, the law and the military. Examples include Scarborough Shoal Inci-
dent (2012), the Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands)
(2012), the South China Sea Arbitration (2013–2016) and the Zhong Jiannan
Incident (2014). Although the situations in both the East and South China
Seas are cooling down since 2017, the disputed issues and conflicts have not
yet been solved.
Meanwhile, as to the Chinese people, the situation of near seas is frustrat-
ing, and China is far away from being a genuine maritime power from any
point of view. Dreams and reality still appear to be at opposite ends of the
earth. A beautiful dream and a brutal reality make it all the more difficult
for the Chinese people to conceal the discontent and anxiety in their hearts.
Can or cannot China become a maritime power? When can a dream dating
back over a century be realized?
In the 2012 report of 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party (NCCCP), China formally put forward the plan of constructing itself
as a maritime power; in the 2017 report of 19th NCCCP, Chinese leaders
further emphasized the accelerating construction of maritime power. It is
a good start for national policy propaganda, while in the academic level
there are a series of questions left: what are China’s reasonable maritime
power objectives? What type of maritime power would it become? How
would China utilize its various steadily mounting forces and what type of
 Acknowledgments  xix
path would it take in its pursuit of becoming a maritime power? How should
China cope with its maritime relationships between neighbor countries and
major powers like the United States in the construction of maritime power?
The more means of action available, the greater the outside world’s attention
and backlash. How best to coordinate the utilization of enhanced capacity
and methods, relieve pressure from the outside world and counter hostile
actions in order to better pursue China’s own interests?
Clarifying these basic questions is not only essential for China’s strate-
gic planning and practice, but also essential for the world’s rational un-
derstanding of China’s peaceful rise, particularly the fundamentals of its
maritime rise. China’s maritime rise may be the largest geopolitical event in
the 21st century, though facing severe challenges and difficulties.
I am very fortunate to experience a period of unprecedented transfor-
mation in China’s maritime activities, to have the opportunity to embrace
an era even more exciting than when Zheng He explored the Indian Ocean.
With such a magnificent historic backdrop, proactively participating in the
course of China’s emergence as a maritime power, through my own modest
abilities, is my lifelong wish.
This book has strived to describe the maritime situation that China is
facing comprehensively and objectively, and to answer the above-mentioned
questions in a balanced way: considering both feasibility and necessity; ex-
amining both the objectives and means; and exploring the meanings of mar-
itime power with comprehensive angles of military, politics and economics.
I sincerely hope that this book can inspire and expand the thought processes
of policymakers and officials, can be a starting point to elicit further ideas
for related intellectual research, can offer positive energy for pertinent pub-
lic opinion propaganda and guidance related to the sea, and can attract
more citizens to offer themselves to the planning and construction of a mar-
itime power.
The process and outcome of China’s pursuit of maritime power not only
depends on China’s choices, but also the reactions of the international com-
munity, especially the United States and China’s maritime neighbors. In this
book, I also want to provide the readers outside China with a Chinese per-
spective to understand China’s maritime rise, promoting better maritime
interactions between China and the international community.
The publication of this book is inseparable from the efforts of Routledge
Press, especially senior editor Andrew Humphrys, and it is also great honor
to be included in the series edited by Prof. Geoffrey Till. Geoff has read the
manuscript of this book carefully and given very detailed suggestions for
modification, and the big favor of writing the Preface, which clarifies my
arguments and made this book much easier to read for our Western readers.
This book has been revised on the basis of my Chinese book ‘2049 年的中
国海上权力’ published in 2015. Ms. Zhang Yanpei at London School of Eco-
nomics translated the original Chinese version into English, and Dr. Lian
Chenchao at King’s College London assisted in revising and supplementing
xx Acknowledgments
some information and annotations for Chapter 8. I have also benefited much
from the comments of two anonymous reviewers arranged by Routledge
Press. In the process of revision and publication, Toshi Yoshihara at the
Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Lyle J. Goldstein at US
Naval War College, Øystein Tunsjø at Norwegian Defense University Col-
lege, Madame Fu Ying and General Yao Yunzhu have given many insightful
comments and enthusiastic proposals.
Finally, I should acknowledge Peking University Institute of Ocean Re-
search, which sponsored this research and the translation fee, but the insti-
tute’s greatest favor is to give me a comfortable research environment.
1 Three major systematic
objectives of Chinese
maritime power1

From 1840 onward, becoming a maritime power has been the dream and
pursuit of generations of Chinese elites. Since the turn of the 21st century,
China has extensively accelerated its maritime focus and efforts for the con-
struction of maritime power. Official maritime policies and plans also con-
tinue to be introduced. In May 2003, the State Council’s National Maritime
Economic Development Program announced unequivocally for the first
time the strategic goal of ‘the gradual construction of China into a mari-
time power.’ In November 2012, it was formally declared in the report of the
18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to ‘increase devel-
opment in marine resource potential, develop the marine economy, protect
the marine ecosystems and the ocean environment, resolutely safeguard na-
tional maritime interests, and construct a maritime power.’2
The topic of maritime power has since then officially risen as an impor-
tant part of China’s national strategy. However, this strategy remains highly
theoretical and abstract, especially without a clear systematic objective.
On China’s goals as a maritime power, domestic academic debates have
in fact continued for more than ten years. The former director of the State
Oceanic Administration, Wang Shuguang, once pointed out that China’s
aims as a maritime power ought to be

an advanced marine economy with output value equivalent to above 10

per cent of GDP; strong offshore defense forces, capable of effectively
safeguarding national maritime interests; distinct status as a major
maritime nation, able to play an important role in terms of interna-
tional maritime affairs.3

Liu Zhongmin believes the wider strategy of China’s maritime development

should be grasped from these three levels. First, it should include both in-
ternational and domestic strategic levels. On the international level, China’s
grand maritime strategy needs to build and peacefully develop an interna-
tional environment. Domestically, it should serve sustainable development
and the establishment of a harmonious society. Second, it is a systematic
strategic entity that includes the marine economy, maritime politics, oceanic
2  Three major systematic objectives
management, maritime law and other sub-strategies. Third, it needs to echo
the three main requirements of China’s over-arching strategy, namely devel-
opment needs, sovereignty needs and responsibility requirements.4 These
are two very comprehensive frameworks for the development of maritime
strategies which cover maritime development, the expansion of sea power
and other elements. Although these assertions stem from a strategically ad-
vantageous position, they nevertheless appear too macroscopic and abstract.
Many officials and scholars have also proposed China’s specific objectives
as a maritime power. Admiral Liu Huaqing had once suggested a coastal
defense strategy for the Chinese PLA Navy, defining the boundaries of Chi-
nese naval defense.5 Zhang Wenmu pointed out that the Chinese Navy ‘is
a naval force that can cover territorial waters 120 to 125 degrees longitude
East … China’s sea power is merely a limited power as yet. Its coverage
scope is mainly limited to Taiwan, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and other
sea areas within Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction.’6
These propositions and research findings from their respective profes-
sional fields, such as the military and economic development, propose aims
and directions. They present important reference value in China’s construc-
tion of a maritime power, but they generally tend to lack considerations
on strategy as a whole. Ideas and plans concerning the road to a maritime
power have gradually evolved into two polarized extremes: either to overem-
phasize the building of sea power and sea control, in pursuit of Mahan-style
sea power; or to overstress the unique nature of China’s maritime experi-
ences, while sparing no effort to avoid ‘power,’ declaring that ‘China’s ex-
perience as a maritime power is one of peaceful development and win-win
cooperation.’7 It appears from this second perspective that China’s mari-
time claims concern only issues of just deserved rights and national mari-
time security, and it seems as if China in fact harbors no interest whatsoever
in the expansion of power.
At its most fundamental, the question of maritime power concerns how
much power is wielded in the field of international maritime politics, that
is to say, maritime power has always been a relative concept, a point long
neglected by most Chinese scholars. When evaluating a maritime power,
not only is it essential to compare with oneself, it is of even greater necessity
to contrast with other countries, because there are no strong without the
weak. When discussing maritime powers, it is impossible to avoid the issue
of power distribution. This is because regardless of how China develops in
its own strength, one must also take into account power dynamics and re-
lationships with other maritime nations. Evidently, defining China’s mari-
time power objectives from a perspective of power has more rational and
pragmatic values. Power objectives are among the first severe problems to
be encountered in China’s path to becoming a maritime power and ought to
be cautiously prepared for. Moreover, we cannot only discuss ‘rights’ while
shunning the subject of ‘power.’8 When defining the concept of maritime
power, it is necessary to contemplate the impacts of the qualities of time
 Three major systematic objectives  3
and space, appreciating that maritime power encompasses not only military
might, political power, economic power, etc., but it is also necessary to con-
front the essence of ‘power,’ and not to use concepts like ‘rights,’ ‘interests’
and other concepts in international law to replace power politics itself.
As to the objectives, China should not only take into account its own
needs but also consider the rationality and feasibility of its targets, and
international maritime patterns. Based on the above considerations, and
comprehensively taking into account trends in Chinese interests, China’s
geographic characteristics, its own strengths and its overall development re-
quirements together with its international environment, China’s objectives
as a maritime power in my view should and could be categorized into three
aspects as following.

The No. 2 world sea power

Sea power and sea control had been criticized for a long time in China as
tools of imperialism and hegemonism, which makes it a little difficult for
Chinese elites to understand the basic points of sea power and sea control.
Even now, some Chinese officers and scholars still take this conception for
granted and deem that China should neither mention nor pursue sea power.
Besides, though the study of sea power has risen as a prominent discipline
in China over the past two decades, many of these studies are missing the
core points of sea power, while paying too much attention in the pursuit of
Chinese characteristics like the rights mode of sea power.9
However, the practice of sea power and sea control can be dated back to
the beginning of human civilization, which in fact has nothing to do with
Alfred Thayer Mahan and imperialism. The most basic function of interna-
tional politics is to influence or direct the distribution of land power through
the control of the seas. Of course, no one can occupy the seas, even a small
piece. In Mahan’s times and before, sea control mainly meant command
of critical sea access, while when we talk about sea power and sea control
in the current times, it just means relative influence and comparative ad-
vantage in some maritime areas, because today’s sea power is definitely an
inclusive system rather than exclusive one.10
Therefore, China needs to pursue sea control in some certain sea area
and needs to gain a strategic advantage in areas where core interests are at
stake. In this respect, there are no fundamental differences when compared
to other maritime powers in the world. The planning and practice of mili-
tary strategies still remain the foremost important issues to focus on when
building a maritime power.
From the perspective of sea control, the world’s sea powers can be broadly
divided into three categories: coastal navies, regional sea powers and global
maritime hegemonies. Coastal navies indicate that the scope of a military
force’s activities is mainly limited to the offshore. They lack large-scale
power projection platforms for the open seas and are unable to carry out
4  Three major systematic objectives
substantial oceangoing combat missions. The vast majority of the world’s
national navies belongs to this category. Regional sea powers signify those
whose effective control and activity zone far exceeds beyond the near seas,
to the extent of the distant seas and oceans. They possess a certain degree of
oceangoing combat capability, normally with a focused regional deployment
as its trademark, which are different from coastal naval varieties, as well as
worldwide naval varieties distributed globally. Classic examples of regional
sea powers include the British, French and Russian navies. Global maritime
hegemony indicates a military force’s global distribution and global reach,
with the goal of influencing all of the world’s key channel waters, as well as
directing the international maritime order. Until now, only the US Navy has
achieved this feat.
As to the Chinese sea power, China’s domestic experts ordinarily tend to
highlight China’s maritime military strategy of ‘coastal defense, open sea
protection.’ In contrast, foreign observers are more specific in their anal-
ysis. Many hold positions that China’s objective as a maritime power is to
establish some kind of hegemonic power, or at least regional advantage. In
particular, the eminent American bestseller Robert Kaplan foresees that
‘the South and East China Seas can unlock a vast naval footprint for China
in the navigable, southern Rimland of Eurasia – from the Horn of Africa to
the Sea of Japan.’11 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes contend that China
will not be able to develop a naval force comparable in might to that of the
United States. The use of onshore ‘Anti-Access’ technology requires the US
Navy to stay far away from China’s coastal waters. However, China will
nevertheless rely on an ever-strengthening comprehensive range of powers
to constantly seek to erode the US maritime advantage, first of all in the
First Island Chain and then the Second.12 From a US standpoint, some
strategy analysts who follow a realist zero-sum game doctrine believe that
China’s long-term goal of maritime power is to in fact challenge the United
States and seize the leading position in the Pacific region. Those who uphold
these viewpoints include Aaron L. Friedberg, Robert J. Art, and John J.
Mearsheimer, among other renowned scholars.
In fact, none of these arguments are novel. Realist theories in interna-
tional relations are often based on the fact that intentions are unreliable.
A country’s foreign strategic objectives are mainly determined by strength
and power structures. The so-called power determines interests. The greater
the power, the grander the objectives. I do not deny that this view has some
explanatory power. The problem is that in the current international system,
absolute power is almost nonexistent. Almost all exercise of power is lim-
ited, and a pure law of the jungle era has not existed for a long while. Even
for a superpower like the United States, its authority cannot be compared to
that of Genghis Khan and similar conquerors of the ancient world. In other
words, in the existing international system, the powers of every major na-
tion are insufficiently great, to completely divorce them from the constrain-
ing effects of the international system and to fully overcome geographic
 Three major systematic objectives  5
circumstances, natural endowments, the international environment, and
other conditions and limitations. Moreover, the role of technology in mil-
itary strategy is increasingly important, while any sophisticated weapons
technology would soon spread internationally. This would cause the suc-
cess of any major nation to be easily susceptible to duplication and hedging
by other powers. By contrast, the success of the Mongols depends on their
distinctive ethnic characteristics and advantages as horsemen. This type of
success was often difficult to mimic since the Mongols had maintained mil-
itary hegemonic power for a very long period of time.
Thus, when we plan China’s maritime military strategic objectives, we
ought to consider that there will be certain shifts in China’s interests along
with increases in its power. To a certain extent, it is rational that power de-
termines interests. At the same time, it is necessary to consider restrictions
on the expansion of power, because there always exist certain boundaries
on power expansion. Interests cannot grow unchecked. Successful strategies
are often always constrained strategies.
What type of sea power China ought to pursue largely depends on China’s
interests. What kind of sea power China can seek is determined accordingly
by geographical conditions, natural endowments, the international environ-
ment and other factors. According to spatial distances, from the near to the
remote, the duties of China’ sea power varied.

Offshore control
Sovereignty, security, political and economic interests mean that China must
gain a strategic advantage in the seas of East Asia, which can be regarded as
the strategic bottom line of China’s maritime power.
Regarding the definition of near-sea boundaries, China officially has
two popular explanations: Admiral Liu Huaqing once noted that the main
realms of China’s near seas consist of ‘the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the
South China Sea, waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and
Okinawa island chain, as well as waters of the northern Pacific’13; the 1997
edition of China People’s Liberation Army Military Terms says: ‘The People’s
Republic of China’s near seas include Bohai, the Yellow Sea, the East China
Sea, the South China Sea, and partial waters east of Taiwan.’14
According to these two interpretations, China’s near seas cover the four
major continental marginal seas in addition to some parts of the Northern
Pacific Ocean. It is not a legal concept such as an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), but instead a geographic theory. The range is larger: a region of 3
million square kilometers is claimed by China to be within its jurisdiction
based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and other international law.
All world powers are first and foremost regional powers, and their periph-
ery frequently does not easily allow others to meddle with the limits of their
strategic advantage. The role of the Americas to the United States, and the
6  Three major systematic objectives
Commonwealth of Independent States to Russia are examples of this. It is
not difficult to accept, by taking just a fleeting look at the map or by relying
on general knowledge, that the coastal strategic situation affects China’s
strategic safety and development security. Most of China’s core and major
maritime interests are concentrated in the offshore areas, and the impor-
tance of the East China Sea offshore to China is self-evident.
First, only through gaining a strategic advantage in coastal areas, can
China defend the reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China, sovereignty
over the Diaoyu Islands and Spratly Islands, and other core and crucial in-
terests. For China, the current situation of the Taiwan Strait, the Diaoyu
Islands dispute and the South China Sea issue are largely related to the loss
of control and voice over the East Asian coastal waters since modern times.
Taiwan’s role in China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is related to
China’s reunification and involves China’s major political interests. Unifica-
tion of Taiwan is a major factor in the development of China’s sea power, no
matter how highly advanced China’s sea power and how strong its maritime
power, but if China still cannot decide Taiwan’s future, then any sea power
ambitions eventually amount to foam. In the future, whether Taiwan can
reunify with Mainland China according to China’s own wishes is also an
indication of whether China can ultimately become a maritime power.
As for China, Taiwan forms a natural barrier to shield the mainland coast-
line and is an ideal focal point for the protection of maritime transportation
lanes. It represents a key for the Chinese Navy to breach the island chain
blockade and expand into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its strategic po-
sition is therefore extremely important. Once Taiwan falls under adversary
control, future prospects for China’s construction of a strong navy would
be ever bleaker. ‘In naval terms, the island’s location not only threatens to
prevent Chinese fleets based to its north and south from concentrating…
it is also the most conspicuous barrier to unified military action beyond
the first island chain.’15 Consequently, Taiwan is also concerned with issues
of security and development of China’s oceangoing navy. If China genu-
inely desires to break through the First Island Chain, it must take advantage
of momentum to search for a seaport and supply base on the First Island
Chain. Almost all islands and straits of the First Island Chain are controlled
by the United States, Japan and the United States’ allies and partners. In
times of war, by the advantage of deploying military forces along the island
chain, enemy forces can easily block China’s entry passage from coastal wa-
ters to the distant ocean. If China cannot obtain a focal point on the First
Island Chain, it will be unable to control any strategic passage and therefore
will be unable to awaken to threats originating from the open seas until it is
too late. Active defense measures would become all but meaningless chatter.
As Taiwan has been part of legitimate Chinese territory from ancient times,
it has also become the best opportunity for China to gain a strategic hub
and corridor in the First Island Chain.
 Three major systematic objectives  7
The Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of
Chinese territory. Historically, Chinese were the first to discover, give name
to, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. Besides, the Diaoyu Islands are not just
some rocks, but are related to China’s sovereignty, security and the demar-
cation of the East China Sea. I will explain it in further detail in Chapter 5.
The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the Western Pacific,
which covers a total area of about 3.5 million square kilometers, including
2 million square kilometers of sea area within the dotted line. Owing to its
extremely important geographical location and rich resources, the South
China Sea is the core or major interest of China’s politics, security, economy
and other fields. Regardless of whether it is officially identified as a core in-
terest, China’s interests in the South China Sea are critical, complex and di-
verse. So far, neither the Chinese government nor academia has elaborated
China’s main interests in the South China Sea from a comprehensive per-
spective. Although the Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic
of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests
in the South China Sea16 issued on 12 July 2016 clarifies China’s sovereignty
and sovereignty rights, it does not include all of China’s important inter-
ests in the South China Sea. On the other hand, most of the international
analyses focus more on the geopolitical aspects and are exaggerated; many
people even think that China will turn the South China Sea into its own
‘inner lake.’17
Taking into account the possible appeals of China on the security, devel-
opment and honor in the South China Sea for a period of time in the future,
and rationally considering the complex reality of the current geopolitical
pattern, I identified in 2017 China’s five main interests in the South China
Sea, in priority order, as sovereignty over islands and reefs, sea lane security,
strategic space, peace and stability, and marine resources.18
Second, offshore security and China’s continental security are intimately
connected. Access to offshore strategic advantages ensures key demands
of China’s national security. During confrontation between a land power
and a maritime power, land power would be at a strategically disadvanta-
geous position on both offensive and defensive fronts. Historical experi-
ence demonstrates that as long as China’s coastal waters are controlled by
hostile countries, China’s national security situation would become unac-
ceptably vulnerable. Hostile rivals could take advantage of this region and
threaten Mainland China’s security at any point on its coastline, stretching
for thousands of kilometers. This maritime region was once been controlled
for extended periods of time by both Japan, following the Sino-­Japanese
War, and the United States, following the Second World War, bringing
enormous threats to China’s national security. Consequently, China’s
coastal waters act as a buffer zone between China and the United States,
Japan and other maritime powers, and are a must-win strategic maritime
space for China.
8  Three major systematic objectives
In particular, China faces severe realistic security pressures on maritime
issues and potential security threats: the United States, Japan and other
countries control virtually all important isles in the Western Pacific. Fur-
thermore, they are using these islands as staging areas for the construction
of substantial land, naval and airborne leverage advantages to deter and
check China. Strategically, China is in a defensive position. On the eastern
coastal regions lie China’s economic, political and cultural heartlands, so
when faced with maritime threats, China lacks necessary strategic depth.
Moreover, security and stability are a type of psychological requirement,
whereas national security is a kind of sentiment. This is especially true for
China, which once suffered from long-term foreign aggression. If China is
unable to guarantee its offshore security and stability, it will lose ground
in the contest against its rivals. It is also highly likely that external forces
could exacerbate China’s sense of unease through superior maritime power,
thereby forcing China into compromise and harming the country’s political,
economic and other national interests.
Third, coastal marine resources are an essential pillar of China’s future
economic development and sorely need to be protected. Although China
has already become the world’s second largest economy, average income per
capita is still below the world standard. The task of economic development
remains very arduous. At present, China’s continental resources are insuf-
ficient to support China’s national economic development. Furthermore,
many crucial resources and energy production output levels are declining
sharply, while foreign dependency levels are rising with each passing day.
In future, marine resources will gradually replace continental resources as
the mainstay of China’s economic development. The exploitation of marine
resources pertains to China’s sustainable development, while international
law decrees that interests within Chinese sovereignty are concentrated ex-
clusively in East Asian coastal waters. Due to the existence of long-term
shortcomings in China’s maritime forces and administrative loopholes, cur-
rently almost half of all marine resources have been misappropriated by
surrounding countries.
As to the feasibility, China has some specific advantages, mainly man-
ifested through the complementary characteristics of its land power and
sea power, coupled with technical edge such as its Anti-Access (A2) and
Anti-Denial (AD) capabilities. Whether presiding in global geopolitical
‘core’ or located on its ‘periphery,’ it is a land power. Furthermore, territo-
rial cohesion is conducive for centralized administrative control.19 In this
way, strong land power can become an effective buttress for the develop-
ment of China’s sea power. In its coastal waters, China’s sea power has been
sheltered under the protection of its land power, and the geographic effect
of radiation means that China does not even need to counter the threat of
armed forces on oceanic fronts. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army can
take full advantage of the Chinese Mainland’s extensive strategic depth and
lie in wait, prepared for a fatigued opponent. It waits for the enemy to enter
 Three major systematic objectives  9
into the range of its weapons and then fights under conditions favorable to
China’s geopolitical and military situation.

Beijing can throw its resources, planning, and forces into achieving
objectives from the geographical and technical standpoints. The less
demanding requirements China has imposed on its military permit the
PLA to build up forces dedicated to a few core competencies. Special-
ization promises major qualitative leaps in capability and doctrine.20

Although in the overall balance of power, China is in a position of absolute

disadvantage. However, in specific maritime regions of East Asia and even
Asia Pacific, China may seize a certain degree of initiative. It is definitely
not true that China stands no chance at all.
In recent years, the relative balance of power in East Asia’s offshore wa-
ters is shifting in favor of China. This is the case with China’s accelerated
military modernization and improvements in the military’s combat effi-
ciency; even if the US Navy is able to maintain a fleet size of 355 vessels21 to
achieve the updated target of 60 percent of vessel deployments in the Pacific
Ocean, as well as successfully appeasing Japan, the Philippines and other
allied nations, the Chinese Navy is supported by strong onshore power
(land-based missiles and air force). This will cause any strategic advantage,
currently maintained by the United States in East Asian waters, to become
increasingly tenuous. The differing natures of key concerns of Sino-US in-
terests herein (China: territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights; the United
States: freedom of navigation, regional stability) and the diverse extents to
which resources are invested (China: it is possible to supply large amounts
of excellent military resources; United States: it is very difficult to even fully
and timely invest in the forces administrated by the Indo-Pacific Command)
contribute further to the power transition from the United States to China.
In the next 10–15 years, the United States will find it increasingly difficult
to protect Taiwan and honor defense commitments to Japan, the Philip-
pines and other allied nations in the Asia Pacific. Japan is the greatest exter-
nal challenge China will face in the foreseeable future, and Sino-Japanese
maritime conflicts will almost be impossible to mediate. In spite of this,
with deterrence from China’s steadily strengthening military force, the like-
lihood of preemptive Japanese provocation to Chinese military affairs is
very small. Most likely is that, with the passage of time, there will be a sub-
stantial shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. Japan will ultimately
be forced to acquiesce in China’s advantageous position. Although the
Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, would
tend to cause China political and diplomatic problems in the South China
Sea, it is unlikely that they would pose a military challenge to China. Of
course, the premise for the above-mentioned trends is that China is able to
maintain political stability and the impetus for continued rapid growth in
national power.
10  Three major systematic objectives
Regional presence
National security and sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) require China to
maintain an effective military presence in the Western Pacific and Northern In-
dian Oceans, as this forms the strategic foundation to build a maritime power.
The so-called effective presence indicates a level of existence that cannot
be overlooked and of power that cannot be defeated with ease. Whether it is
possible to shape and construct a favorable international environment is a
sign of whether a country can become a global power. The security of global
powers not only involves immediate domestic threats but also deals with
the preventative measures of having a certain buffer belt, thus being able
to eliminate threats beyond its borders. Furthermore, it requires a certain
deterrent capability, for when an enemy opposition threatens its security,
it will have the ability to carry out the required counterattack. Moreover,
it will mean that the international community acknowledges its status and
steadily increasing power.
On the one hand, the best way for a major nation with room for develop-
ment and border interests to maintain and defend these interests is not to
construct a ‘Maritime Great Wall,’ but rather to foray beyond these fron-
tiers. It should actively launch political, economic and military initiatives
outside the borders of its core interests in order to defuse, contain and de-
ter external hostile matters as well as to alleviate and eliminate potential
threats. Historical experience and geopolitical theory have proven time and
again that if China’s sea power is only localized within coastal waters of the
First Island Chain, it would stand at a highly disadvantaged position in its
contest with foreign rivals. China must endeavor to build a certain buffer
belt in the Western Pacific and the North Indian Ocean beyond the First
Island Chain, as the main maritime threats China faces will come chiefly
from these two major fronts.
On the other hand, the security of sea lanes has increasingly become an
issue of critical emphasis for China. Eighty five percent of China’s total
trade in goods is transported through sea. Nineteen percent of the world’s
shipping market’s bulk cargo is transported to China. Twenty-two percent
of export containers originate from China. China’s merchant shipping
fleet’s trajectories are spread across over 12,000 ports globally. China has
already become an export-oriented economic power reliant on sea lanes.
The Chinese economy has become completely export-oriented. To this day,
foreign trade remains one of the most important driving forces of China’s
economic development. This kind of economy is undoubtedly highly fragile
and extremely vulnerable to external influence. The obstruction of maritime
transportation would have an impact on domestic economic development.
Economic security has already exceeded the boundaries of state sovereignty.
Using the example of crude oil, the statistical data of 2005 have shown
that China always imports more than 90 percent of its oil needs through
sea, and 80 per cent of oil tankers must pass through the Strait of Malacca,
 Three major systematic objectives  11
accounting for one in six of the vessels traveling through the Strait of Malacca
each day.22 Until today, this kind of situation has not been changed much.
The Strait of Malacca’s transportation security issues have received
widespread attention. China’s maritime transportation security research
has already coined the term the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ or the ‘Malacca Pre-
dicament,’ although there are some scholars who believe these views are
somewhat exaggerated even alarmist.23 In fact, the transportation security
problem in the Strait of Malacca is only the tip of the iceberg for China’s
maritime transportation security. Various points along maritime transpor-
tation routes in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the South China
Sea could all suffer from the threats of potential opponents. The maritime
arteries connecting China’s economy with the outside world are almost con-
stantly under deterrence and intimidation by other maritime powers. The
United States could at any time impose a blockade on China, which would
cause China’s foreign trade and oil imports to come to a complete standstill.
Other regional powers such as India and Japan could also exploit China’s
fragilities in its maritime transportation routes in an attempt to gain com-
promises in other areas. India’s Ministry of Defense published naval combat
guidelines, highlighting that India is in

a position to exercise significant influence on maritime transportation

security in the Indian Ocean. The strategic focus of Indian naval control
is to play a role in bargaining between international rivalries. If neces-
sary, the use of military force is still an inevitable reality.24

Undoubtedly, in today’s age of high global economic interdependence, free-

dom of maritime navigation has already become a common interest of every
major power. The United States, India and other countries would not easily
use this kind of ace in the hole toward China, because unimpeded trade nor-
mally presents a win–win situation and is mutually reinforcing for all con-
cerned. But at the same time, we must see that the global economic war just
so happens to mobilize countries in sacrificing short-term trade interests in
order to achieve the strategic intention of transforming long-term patterns
of international balances of power. Other than the direct use of military
force, there are many other methods of trade-off to be considered, such as
blockades and intimidation, restrictions on China’s emerging resources im-
ports, hindrances to China’s economic growth, or limitations on China’s
trade corridors in certain directions, which are additions to the cost of eco-
nomic development. It should be noted, in open international waters, that
no opponent can wholly obstruct China’s maritime transportation routes.
However, even sporadic disruption is enough to upset China’s energy and
resource security. The Chinese ‘Galaxy’ Cargo Ship, gratuitously accused
of carrying chemical weapons, was intercepted and detained for three weeks
by US warships in the high seas of the Indian Ocean in 1993, which has
already sounded alarm bells for China’s maritime transportation security.
12  Three major systematic objectives
Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and piracy have also
made it imperative for China to maintain its power presence. China’s be-
leaguered SLOCs have also suffered from threats of and disruption from
piracy and armed criminal activities. The Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, East
Africa, Indian territorial waters, the Bay of Bengal and the vast region of
South East Asia are all among the world’s most active areas for rampant pi-
rate activities. According to the International Maritime Bureau’s 2016 data
on piracy and armed robberies of ships (not including incomplete statis-
tics from unreported cases), no fewer than 89 cases of piracy occurred in
the South China Sea and waters close to the Malacca Strait (including acts
already committed or unsuccessful attempts); in the Red Sea, waters sur-
rounding Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden, there were more than 62 cases; and
more than 35 cases occurred in the Indian Ocean. In these regions, the total
number of cases has surpassed 186, and it is estimated to account for 84 per
cent of the total global annual cases of 221 in 2016.25 These piracy activities
and armed robberies against ships just happen to be precisely concentrated
upon China’s most important SLOCs. Data show that although the interna-
tional community has taken strong measures, such as escorting ships, pa-
trolling and monitoring, piracy and armed criminal activities have not been
effectively contained in the Indian Ocean and its surrounding regions.
On the blue-sea navy’s own development, the Western Pacific and North-
ern regions of the Indian Ocean represent the basic boundaries of the
Chinese Navy’s external strategy. Navies have always engaged in combat
externally, choosing a fundamentally offensive strategy. Whether a junk
boat navy, steam ship navy or information-based navy, the key to victory
lies in defeating and annihilating the enemy’s maritime forces in the bound-
less ocean, while not relying on adhering stubbornly to specified positions
on the waters. During peacetime, blue-sea navies are important as a deter-
rent. As nuclear weapons are far too destructive, conventional deterrence
has risen to a position of prominence during nuclear deadlock situations.
Naval vessels that have special features of flexible mobility in wider oceans
are better suited for deterrent duties. A naval presence in wider oceans can
both act as a force to deter potential enemies, as well as be useful to gather
intelligence and provide remote warnings. This is crucial to prevailing in
conflict and wars. The purpose of a navy’s existence is not merely to do
combat with the enemy. Navies also are often used to execute other assign-
ments, for example power projection far from home, and onshore firepower
support.26 Evidently, no matter the circumstances, a wider ocean strategy is
essential for the navy of a maritime power. Moreover, it is also of immediate
and visible use.
China’s unfavorable geopolitical conditions in the Western Pacific mean
that if China’s navy is merely confined to activities in the coastal waters of
the First Island Chain, through the establishment of an offshore line of de-
fense to protect national security, it would nevertheless be a continuation of
the army’s strategy. The navy’s role and characteristics have far from been
 Three major systematic objectives  13
fulfilled. China still needs to pursue a defensive national security strategy,
but tactically it undoubtedly needs to be more aggressive. Today, the ori-
gins and forms of external threats have all undergone major transforma-
tion. Building a navy unquestionably cannot be a continuation of an army
mentality. Relying solely on coastal defenses and offshore patrols is already
inadequate for confronting the modern state of affairs. China must escape
the trap of onshore tactical mindsets, trigger the navy’s mobility advantage,
proactively prepare to eliminate sources of danger in the ocean’s depths and
in addition stun our opponents, in order to ultimately guarantee China’s
offshore and mainland coastal security.
At present, the geopolitics of the Western Pacific and Northern Indian
Oceans are complex, inappropriate for control, but suitable to mapping lay-
outs. All powers without exception, including the United States, are unable to
completely command these two great regions. There will be no fundamental
political or diplomatic obstacles for China’s attainment of power presence.
China must tirelessly strive to maintain an aircraft carrier combat group as
well as several reconnaissance support and early warning positions in each
of these two major regions, in order to realize effective power presence.
China is situated at the intersection of the Eurasian continent and Pacific
Ocean, adjacent to Central, Northeast and Southeast Asia, with land and
sea on either side. This is exactly Spykman’s so-called Inner or Marginal
Crescent,27 with distinctive characteristics of a continental–maritime com-
plex and is ‘an object of desire for both land powers and sea powers alike.’28
As far as geopolitical attributes are concerned, China enjoys dual status as
a major land power and an important sea power. It is the only major nation
to connect the ‘Heartland’ and the ‘Inner or Marginal Crescent,’29 and its
strategic location is vital. China is naturally situated in the middle of Asia,
benefiting from exceptionally favorable natural geographic, economic and
cultural ties with Northeast, Southeast and Central Asia. Unlike Japan,
India and other countries, it is very easy for China to play an important
role in Asia. This kind of influence will at the very least bring a highly pos-
itive significance to China’s expansion of sea power in the Western Pacific
and Indian Oceans: fortifying geoeconomic, political and military ties with
neighboring countries may indirectly play a role in maritime affairs. For
instance, if China proves able to utilize its cordial cooperation with South-
east Asian countries and South Asian countries to safeguard the security of
the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean–Malacca Strait maritime channel, and even
earn the support of some countries, it would be able to achieve a long-term
military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Global influence
In other global maritime regions, Chinese power still needs to exert more im-
portant influence. This is a necessary requirement in order to protect overseas
interests and fulfill the responsibilities of a global power.
14  Three major systematic objectives
The development of China’s interests and responsibilities requires China
to be able to project power in the world’s seas. This is first to safeguard
the country’s overseas interests. China’s foreign interests have already be-
come globalized. China’s overseas interests refer to those interests created
by the Chinese government, corporations, societal organizations and citi-
zens through global communications. These national interests exist outside
of China’s sovereign jurisdiction and mainly present themselves through
the form of international agreements. Through economic globalization,
the scope of overseas interests has become increasingly broad; they include
national overseas political interests, foreign economic interests, cultural in-
terests and citizens’ rights. It ought to be noted that national interests are
undoubtedly in a dynamic state of development. With ever-growing national
power, the depth and breadth of overseas interests will continue to expand.
In recent years, China has amassed increasing types of overseas national
interests, and their numbers are also rising. According to the Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China’s 2016 Statistical Bulletin of
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, as of the end of 2016, 24,400
domestic Chinese investors established 37,200 foreign direct investment en-
terprises abroad; these are distributed internationally in 190 countries and
regions; China’s net foreign direct investment (capital stock) reached USD
1357.39 billion.30
According to statistics from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Counselor
Affairs Department, the number of Chinese exiting across national borders
in 2014 has reached 100 million. It is predicted that in 2020, the number of
departures made by Chinese citizens will reach 0.15 billion. China’s foreign
interests generally include four major aspects: personnel safety, asset secu-
rity, resource provision and overseas market expansion. To conclude, there
are two major categories: first economic interests, and second the interests
of overseas citizens. As China pursues a principle of not exporting political
systems and values, China has therefore not many exclusive political or cul-
tural interests overseas.
In the course of China’s regular economic, societal and cultural inter-
actions with the world, numerous types of dilemmas and conflicts are in-
evitable. In some turbulent countries or unstable regions, China’s overseas
interests are often impacted by traditional security issues, such as regime
changes, conflicts, war, as well as nontraditional security threats such as ter-
rorism and organized crime. In these situations, China must employ strong
responses to urgently safeguard its overseas economic interests and citizens’
rights. The ocean acts as a central connector to link these interests with
the Chinese Mainland. As a result, the question of how to utilize sea power
to better protect the interests of Chinese companies and various organi-
zations, in addition to the safety of their employees, has become one that
Chinese policymakers must consider.
Furthermore, China needs to maintain international military influence,
as well as perform the responsibilities and duties required of a major nation.
Geoffrey Till held that the navies of China and the United States were a
 Three major systematic objectives  15
mixture of ‘modern navy’ and ‘post-modern navy.’ The former’s mission is
more traditional – the contention of the command of the seas is character-
ized with exclusiveness and competitiveness – while the latter’s priority is
not to compete with opponents for command of the seas, but to maintain
overall maritime security by ensuring a good maritime order.31 China’s in-
ternational responsibilities are becoming more globalized. Today’s mari-
time system is becoming more chaotic and urgently needs to be reorganized.
This would only be possible if major powers bear international responsibil-
ity and contribute global public goods. Maintenance of the world’s oceans’
universality, openness, and free navigation, deterrence and containment of
piracy, and safeguard of a good maritime order are all defined as maritime
public goods. The international community needs providers of maritime
public goods.32
The United States was previously the major provider of these maritime
public goods. However, due to its relative decline in economic might, in ad-
dition to the mounting diversification and growing complexity of modern
maritime security threats, it is increasingly difficult for the United States
to tolerate the costs of being a world leader. The provision of international
public goods such as freedom of navigation and maritime security is there-
fore becoming ever more problematic. It urgently falls on other maritime
powers to assume more responsibilities and obligations. With the rise in
China’s maritime power, the country will be progressively duty bound to do
so. ‘Only Chinese sea power can be the driving force that defines the world
order. The ultimate value of China’s sea power’s development will be deci-
sively established.’33

But it is not necessary for, nor is it highly probable that China will replace the
United States to become a ‘globally distributed, global defensive’ world mari-
time hegemon. From China’s perspective, becoming a global maritime hegemon
is not only unnecessary, but indeed China also lacks the basic requirements.

Experiences prior to the Second World War demonstrate that, due to the
oceans’ connectivity, during wartime it is essential to be the world’s greatest
power in order to have absolute naval supremacy. This is unless opponents
have similar levels of sea power, when problems cannot be resolved. His-
torically, France and the German Reich have both possessed ‘the world’s
second best’ navy, but as soon as they entered into battle with Great Britain,
the world’s preeminent sea power, they still could not escape defeat. From
the navy’s perspective of its strategic objective and mission, when matched
against the world’s ‘best’ naval force, the world’s ‘second best’ ultimately are
little different from the ‘twelfth best’ or ‘fiftieth best’ navies.34
However, developments in military technology in recent decades have
somewhat changed this situation. The application and impacts of navies
have undergone a great deal of change. With the development of land-based
weaponry such as missiles and long-range fighter jets, in addition to accel-
eration in the construction of space technology, a country with a weaker
16  Three major systematic objectives
navy, but with support from mighty land-based ‘Anti- Access’ (A2) or ‘Area
Denial’ (AD) forces, one can self-protect even when faced by a world-class
navy and even gain authority over near seas along its homeland.
China is a large country of ‘one land, one ocean,’ while the United States
is a sizeable country of ‘two oceans, one continent.’ The geographic impor-
tance of the Eurasian continent far exceeds that of the American continent.
With the rise of China, it is highly likely that Chinese political, economic
and military influence in Eurasia will overtake that of the United States,
while the United States’ strategic advantage in the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans is very difficult to exceed. Several years later, China, depending on
excellent continental advantage and relatively weak maritime power, and
the United States, relying on first-class maritime power and second-rate
land power, would strike a stable strategic balance. The Chinese Navy need
not overtake the US Navy to become the world’s number one to be able to
admirably safeguard its own interests as well as direct the perpetuation of
world peace and stability.
China’s path of peaceful development and the nature of its overseas in-
terests also render it unnecessary for China to mimic the United States’
maritime hegemony. Various factors, such as the expansion in overseas
interests and security of maritime transportation routes, stimulate the de-
velopment of China’s oceangoing navy and military presence around the
world. However, the Chinese Navy’s main objectives in waters beyond the
Pacific and Indian Oceans are as follows: first, the protection of economic
rights and responses to piracy and other non-traditional threats,35 and sec-
ond, to uphold the world’s freedom of navigation, disaster-relief and other
non-war military operations, so as to contribute Chinese responsibilities
for the peace and prosperity of the world’s oceans. The majority of China’s
overseas interests are originally from friendly economic cooperation, un-
like the United States’ hegemonic interests as well as the colonial interests
pursued during the rise of other maritime powers in history. Concerning
the preservation of ­China’s overseas interests, sea power is mostly leveraged
as diplomatic backup support or as a tool. The special features of China’s
overseas interests and the objective conditions faced imply that for China,
unlike the United States and certain other countries, it is neither necessary
nor possible for ‘warships to go wherever interests lie.’36
The Chinese Navy needs to demonstrate its strength at the right place
at the right time, present a psychological deterrence to potential adversar-
ies and effectively cooperate to promote diplomacy, but in fact, it need not
possess the capability to conduct large- and medium-scale warfare in global
maritime spaces like the United States. China has already many world ‘firsts’;
it is also highly probable that China’s comprehensive national strength will
step into the global forefront. But unless military technology undergoes a
revolutionary upheaval, it would be very difficult for China to become the
foremost sea power, based on Chinese geographic situation, natural endow-
ments, contemporary themes, military technology and other key factors.
 Three major systematic objectives  17
China is confronted by a complex geopolitical environment that other
global maritime powers do not face. It is situated in East Asia, where the
major world powers are concentrated. Furthermore, China faces enormous
challenges on both inland and offshore fronts, which makes it very diffi-
cult to strike a balance between land and sea. Since modern times, China
has frequently suffered significant double jeopardy from both land and sea.
Although China has nowadays eliminated the risk of a large-scale enemy
invasion into the heart of the Mainland, the inland security situation is far
from assured. The ‘Xinjiang Independence’ and ‘Free Tibet’ movements are
always ready to start wriggling, endangering the security of China’s western
frontier. Notwithstanding improvements in Sino-Indian relations, border
disputes are nonetheless bitter that both parties still tussle over practicali-
ties of control and negotiations. As today’s only remaining ‘relic’ of the Cold
War, the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula is ever more dynamic and
volatile with the emergence of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The com-
plexities of China’s surrounding security situation have determined that it
will never have the same geographic advantages as the United States, which
virtually never needs to consider land-based threats and can concentrate
its attention and resources on accumulating its naval force and expanding
maritime influence.
From the perspective of sea control, China’s coastal geographical condi-
tions present more drawbacks than advantages for Chinese naval combat
operations. China has a long coastline north to south, but short east to west,
which separates the Pacific Ocean from its links in surrounding seas by way
of islands, reefs and channels, forming features of semienclosed marine ar-
eas. During wartime, these areas are vulnerable to blockade and division
by enemy troops. US, Russian, Japanese, ASEAN and other strategic sea
powers encircle Chinese coastal areas, and as a result, the access of Chinese
naval forces to the oceans is easily dictated by others. The strategic depths
of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are relatively shallower, causing
the activities of Chinese naval forces to be severely restricted in this mari-
time sphere.37 Although China possesses an extensive coastline, but except
for Taiwan’s eastern coast, it lacks passages that directly lead to the oceans.
The ‘First Island Chain’ and the ‘Second Island Chain’ in the Western Pa-
cific Ocean have become obstacles to the Chinese military forces’ access
to the oceans from coastal waters. Furthermore, the United States, Japan
and other countries retain the control of almost all key islands on the is-
land chains and important waters in their vicinity with a wary stance on
China’s construction of a maritime power. In times of war, if the Chinese
Navy passes through channels in the island chains, it would be directly sub-
ject to their control.
On a spiritual level, China lacks vital maritime intellectual and cultural
reserves. Historically, China has over long periods possessed dominant
land-based power, but mighty rivals have also long existed on the continent.
The Huns, Xianbei, Rouran, Turks, Jurchen, Mongols and other political
18  Three major systematic objectives
powers of nomadic peoples posed a menace to northern China one after
another. Throughout confrontations with them, the Zhongyuan Dynasty
was by and large positioned at a disadvantage. In recent history, the expan-
sion of Tsarist Russia and the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union also
once posed huge pressures for China’s northern regions. In order to cope
with these threats, China had long adopted a tradition of ‘emphasizing the
land, neglecting the sea.’ What is more, the several millennia of agricultural
civilization that have conferred an inward-looking national temperament
and deep-rooted ‘petty peasant mentality’ are nonetheless a spiritual yoke
for China’s march toward the sea. These factors have contributed to China’s
lack of naval tradition, understanding and awareness of maritime power,
and awareness of the sea. There is a considerable gap compared to West-
ern maritime powers with regard to intellectual reserves and accumulation
related to the comprehension, exploitation and control of the sea. The dis-
crepancy in this type of maritime ‘soft power’ is very difficult to effectively
correct in the short run.
China’s maritime emergence also faces numerous extremely powerful
competitors, who treat China with suspicion. Other than the United States’
commanding presence and influence in the Western Pacific Ocean, the geo-
graphic positions and capabilities of Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam and
Indonesia, among other countries, are not to be underestimated. As for
China’s development as a maritime power, it is possible that these countries
would resort to various forms of checks and balances to drastically restrict
China’s maritime aspirations.38 The negative attitudes of these rivals in re-
sponse to China’s sea power and China’s unfavorable geographic situation
in the Western Pacific constitute the greatest external environment for the
development of China’s sea power.
Other than containment and isolation by the two great maritime nations,
the United States and Japan, other neighboring countries would not bear
significant goodwill when confronted with the development of China’s sea
power due to historical suspicion and practical considerations. India and
Australia are extremely cautious when faced with advancements in China’s
sea power and may possibly join US–Japanese lines of defense directed
against China. Several Southeast Asian countries are locked in maritime
disputes with China, so they naturally would not welcome increases in Chi-
nese sea power.
Consequently, it is improbable that the Chinese Navy will become the
world’s dominant maritime force. Nor is it likely to challenge the American
hegemonic power on the world’s oceans. In view of China’s continental–­
maritime geographic complex, in addition to its relatively unfavorable mar-
itime geographical situation, China is unlikely to develop as a sea power for
the purposes of global combat deployment. Technologically, the Chinese
Navy is short of tools for power projection and has comparatively weaker
capabilities for sustained large-scale oceangoing operations. In aspects
such as command systems (C4ISR), air defense and anti-submarine defense,
 Three major systematic objectives  19
China lags across-the-board and cannot compete with the US Navy in the
open seas. Even assuming that in future China is able to make up for the
technological gap, it is nevertheless difficult for it to enjoy the good times of
US maritime hegemony due to the two World Wars, geographical conveni-
ence (the United States’ own geographic advantage and ubiquitous military
bases worldwide) and international cohesion (an alliance system and inter-
national mobilization capabilities). The development of China’s sea power
has not only suffered limitations as a result of circumstances in the modern
era (increasing difficulties in using military force and its falling efficacy in
international politics) and geographic conditions (after breaking through
the First Island Chain, China’s sea power will be confronted with a short-
age of offshore bases and supply constraints; furthermore, it will enter into
serious competition with the United States, Japan, India and other powers).
In addition, the complexities of China’s developmental path, pressures for
economic growth, domestic security concerns and other issues all serve to
hamper China’s maritime ambitions.
Moreover, the United States’ maritime hegemony, already in a state of
continual decline, is destined to become a historical artifact. Since the end
of the Second World War, the extent of US control over the world’s seas has
followed a downward trend. Even if in future the United States is able to still
maintain its superpower status and dominant naval power, it is nevertheless
impossible to reverse this kind of decline. In other words, American-style
maritime hegemony shall become increasingly a thing of the past. The crux
of modern sea power is characterized by sea powers being unable to pursue
unipolar global hegemony and order. In contrast to steadily emerging space
and combination aerospace forces, the golden age of sea power is already
history. Even for countries with absolute naval advantages, it is not possible
to attain self-interest in international policy simply through leveraging na-
val advantages.39
This is not only due to developments in economic globalization and
complex interdependencies, leading to sharp escalations in costs of and
tumbles in effectiveness of naval arms. At the same time, technological
change has accelerated the decentralization of sea power. As land power
is also relying on anti-intervention technology and space forces to begin
extending toward the ocean, it is increasingly difficult to construct and
maintain traditional maritime hegemonies. However, contrary to the sit-
uation in development, international maritime issues happen to be ever
more numerous, and we also face ever more substantial security challenges
at sea. Any country that wishes to go it alone and promote peace under
hegemony would not be able to endure the burden. International coop-
eration, particularly maritime coordination among major nations, will be
the only way to maintain freedom and security at sea. Maritime hegemons
will eventually become a thing of the past. Whether the United States or
China, any country that continues to seek hegemony at sea will find itself
progressively weak and impractical.
20  Three major systematic objectives
On the whole, based on the prerequisite that China can continue its rise,
it is feasible for China to possess a world sea power just second to that of the
United States, which can control its offshore waters, deter its adjacent two
oceans and have an impact on the world. This ‘No. 2 sea power’ would still
be a regional sea power focusing on certain sea areas, compared with the US
version of globally distributed and global defensive sea power.

International political maritime power

A peaceful and agreeable regional environment provides the foundation
for China to become a maritime power. One of the essential goals pursued
for the development of China’s maritime power is to gain required interna-
tional political support and the international status it deserves. Whether
China can become a maritime power does not only hinge upon possessing
a strong navy, showing a certain deterrent ability, but also whether China,
as one of the region’s major nations, can persuade numerous neighboring
countries and the world’s major powers, through economic, diplomatic, and
other measures of gaining sufficient political influence or vocal power, to
recognize China’s successes, accept the development of China’s maritime
power’ objectives, and the consequences of its rise. Moreover, whether the
majority of the world’s maritime nations appreciates the role that China,
as a steadily internationalizing power, plays in and its contributions to the
international maritime order and recognizes China’s merited position in
international maritime politics is another key indicator of whether it can
succeed as a maritime power.
With the implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the international maritime order has ushered in a new chap-
ter in its development. Currently in its formative stages, the comprehensive
establishment of the new maritime order still faces arduous barriers and
a long road ahead. At the same time, UNCLOS itself has many problems:
first, UNCLOS is a product of compromise and concession. There exist
myriad imprecise and contradictory areas, inciting territorial disputes over
numerous islands and maritime delimitation worldwide; second, the work-
ing procedures of maritime management and arbitration institutions such
as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Inter-
national Seabed Authority (ISA) also must be clearly defined. Finally, many
countries are currently abusing the regulations of the UNCLOS, and the
connections between UNCLOS and other international laws and maritime
mechanisms ought to be further clarified.
China faces a complex and intricate maritime security situation. On is-
sues such as maritime delimitation and territorial disputes over islands, the
country encounters unprecedented conflicts and challenges. When China
tackles and resolves the problems it faces, it must take into account its in-
terests and positions as well as consider constraints of the existing mari-
time order and also the ‘negative feedback’ and influences on the maritime
 Three major systematic objectives  21
order due to China’s actions. Chinese methods of solving problems and the
Chinese paradigm of developing maritime power will inevitably have sig-
nificant impacts on the international maritime order. China’s resolution of
maritime disputes will be synchronized with the creation of the new inter-
national maritime order. The scale of China’s gains will ultimately depend
on the degree to which China can influence the direction of the international
maritime order’s development and the formation of regulations. As a result,
in the process of the international maritime order’s transformation, China
ought to insist on making its own voice heard. This would allow the new
maritime order to incorporate China’s interests, values and political ideol-
ogies. China should also embrace worldwide beliefs and sentiments, proac-
tively contributing its own strengths and rich maritime public goods for the
freedom, security and prosperity of the world’s seas, striving to become a
global political maritime power.
Since the 16th century, the world’s maritime order has been dominated
by Western powers. Over the past 500 years of rivalry, in the 16th century
Portugal, in the 17th century the Netherlands, from the 18th to 19th centu-
ries Great Britain, and in the 20th century United States have distinguished
themselves, become maritime hegemons one after the other, and dictated
the international maritime order. Such an international maritime order,
which pursues wealth and vies for maritime hegemony as its basis, carries
distinctive features of power politics. Once these maritime powers become
hegemons, they vigorously promote a set of international standards most
favorable to them. Like sea power, the international maritime order has thus
become one of the tools of hegemonic powers to maintain their hegemony
despite the opposition of other countries.
Large-scale military combat is already not the principal means of seeking
maritime interests in the present era. China cannot emulate the Great Brit-
ain and United States of the past, which chiefly rely on wars to rapidly rise
at sea. In modern times, China’s main demands have been all centered on
independence and survival. Before the question of survival was fundamen-
tally resolved, becoming a maritime power was but a dream. When China
finally has the will to face the sea, the times would have already undergone
momentous changes, which has long differed from that of Mahan’s period.
Acts of freelance gunboat diplomacy are increasingly restricted by interna-
tional mechanisms, global norms and worldwide public opinions. Although
peace and development, the topic of the times, are controversial, influence
of global norms, rapid expansion of international mechanisms, and the
world economy’s high degree of mutual dependency and other phenomena
are nevertheless today’s defining characteristics. As a result of economic
globalization and the development of interdependency, the use of military
force has not only declined in prevalence, but also in efficacy. Under such
circumstances, China is realizing a maritime rise and magnificent national
rejuvenation, naturally attracting more constraints than historical powers
on international laws, organizations and treaties, undermined by a globally
22  Three major systematic objectives
interdependent situation more unified than the then European international
system, and affected by unprecedented global crises. Consequently, China
is unable to ‘go it alone’ in diplomacy like certain European powers were
able to historically, nor can it imitate American-style isolationism, and it is
impossible to establish its own colonies and carve out spheres of influence.40
What is more, it is impossible to count on a certain number of expansionary
wars and China cannot expect effortlessly to profit from the outbreak of a
new World War.
Peaceful competition is the status quo for major nations, making a nonvio-
lent rise possible. Nuclear deterrence, economic globalization, development
of interdependence, and the reinforcement of global norms and peaceful
forces have made peaceful competition among major powers a reality. Al-
though there is still much conflict in the world, thanks to mutual restraint
and checks and balances between powers, peace is preserved overall. Since
its reform and opening up, China has adapted to the times and, on a path of
peaceful development, created the Chinese Miracle. In an era of market eco-
nomic integration, China can obtain the resources, raw materials and other
factors of production that it desires through overseas cooperation; simul-
taneously, it can also access overseas markets for its own products through
foreign economic cooperation. On the whole, all elements in China’s eco-
nomic development can be obtained through non-military means. Thus,
China neither has the pressure nor the motivation to follow the same ruin-
ous road as the Germany and Japan’s military ascendancies in the first half
of the 20th century. Furthermore, other powers, above all the hegemonic
United States, are also subject to constraints of present circumstances, in-
terdependency, and the international order. The chances of these countries
launching a preemptive strike to guarantee a position of authority toward
China will plummet. Overall, such a background and circumstances will
allow China the possibility of stepping out as a peaceful maritime power.
Following the Second World War, with the widespread political rise of
Third World Countries and through the incessant efforts of developing
countries in general, UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and finally gave legal
foundation to the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, sought by
developing countries. Overall, the international maritime order is heading in
a fairer and more just direction. For the first time, an international maritime
order was formed through negotiation and cooperation rather than through
battle at sea. Undoubtedly, peaceful competition is beginning to material-
ize. ‘In the future, the structure of international maritime politics will be
partly disjointed with the balance of military force. Diplomatic tussles and
legal struggles are becoming the main form of gaining power, interests and
discourse, and the main content of international maritime politics.’41 In this
contest, by virtue of China’s progressively growing overall national strength
and powerful political and economic influence, China can also become a
leader in the international maritime order through political, economic, dip-
lomatic and other non-military means. Many years later, even if China’s
 Three major systematic objectives  23
naval strength still trails the United States, it is nevertheless possible that
China political influence at sea could overtake that of the United States.

World marine economic power

Target setting for the world’s marine economic powers similarly depends
on a balanced assessment of necessity and feasibility. In terms of necessity,
pressures of development and natural marine endowments mean that China
must expand its horizons to the whole world. Crucial strategic resources re-
quired to support China’s economic development are in severe short supply,
and it is faced with the risk of exhaustion. Since 1993, China has been a net
importer of crude oil. With China’s rapid economic development, China
reliance on imported oil has escalated sharply. In 2014, China surpassed
the United States to become the world’s largest oil importer. With a rapid
growth of demand driven by China’s refinery capacity, in addition to ma-
turing technology in hydraulic fracturing and steadily decreasing US reli-
ance on foreign oil supplies, China will considerably widen the gap with the
United States on oil imports. In 45 of China’s major minerals, demand can
be guaranteed in only 24 cases by 2020. Supplies of iron, copper, aluminum,
etc. will be critically short.42
China is a highly populous country, but at the same time relatively scarce
in marine resources with a concentration of marine resources low per cap-
ita. Thus, in accordance with UNCLOS, proactive development and uti-
lization of resources in high seas and ‘the international seabed’ become
exceptionally important. On the basis of UNCLOS’s related regulations
and China’s persistent assertions, China possesses approximately 3 million
square kilometers of jurisdiction waters, including territorial waters, inland
waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelf.
Compared to China’s land area and population size, this appears miniscule.
As for resource sovereignty that China enjoys, per capita maritime area is
less than 3,000 square meters, only a tenth of the world average, 8 percent of
the Japanese per capita area, ranked 122nd in the world.43
Moreover, widespread delimitation disputes exist between China and its
maritime neighbors. In practice, maritime waters under Chinese effective
administration at present are only approximately 1.5 million square kilom-
eters in area.
The marine economy has already become one of the main means of com-
peting in maritime capability. Powerful capacity and influence to develop
and manage the seas and oceans are prerequisites or hallmarks of maritime
powers. On the one hand, due to economic development needs, every coun-
try would view its maritime realms and economic waters as strategic ar-
eas, even as its nation’s underlying foundation. This is why they relentlessly
formulate maritime development strategies, support competitive industries,
and accelerate exploration in and exploitation of marine resources. On the
other hand, for the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and maritime space
24  Three major systematic objectives
expansion needs, countries are continuously increasing economic activity in
disputed waters. They attempt to embolden themselves by increasing their
economic presence in diplomatic games. Political clashes on conflicts of
maritime rights gradually evolve into economic means of competition such
as prospecting surveys, exploitation and exploration.
At the same time, the development of economic globalization has estab-
lished ever more intimate links for global economic cooperative division of
labor. Optimization of the allocation of factors of production on an inter-
national scale has become a necessity. This is particularly the case for the
marine economy. The production, transportation and sale of marine prod-
ucts are for the world. All major nations’ maritime strategies have broad out-
looks, actively expanding toward the high seas, international seabed areas
and the North and South Poles. They try to seize international public areas
and resources, enthusiastically cooperating with other coastal states and
earning the right to develop and manage resources in foreign maritime areas.
China possesses certain maritime space and comparatively abundant ma-
rine resources, which form the basis for China’s ascent as a global maritime
power. China ought to endeavor purposefully to develop marine technol-
ogy, nurture marine talent and accumulate experience in marine explora-
tion; economic globalization’s background and the present maritime order’s
open characteristics thus have provided China the opportunity to expand
the world’s maritime space and augment ocean interests through peaceful
competition.
First, resources and maritime space within China’s jurisdiction form the
foundation to China’s ascendancy as a world maritime power. China has
excellent maritime conditions and rich resources. The country’s vast seas
span across tropical, subtropical and temperate belts, and have an exten-
sive coastline of 32,000 kilometers, of which 18,000 kilometers is mainland
coastline and 14,000 is island coastline. It owns 11,000 islands, with a total
surface area of 76,800 square kilometers.44 China has four offshore areas
of the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. In ad-
dition to the Pacific Ocean to the east of Taiwan, there are five maritime
regions. The Bohai Sea is China’s inland sea. A majority of the waters of
the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea belong to China’s
sovereign administrative waters. The surface area of these four seas is to-
tal of 472 square kilometers, of which approximately 300 square kilometers
within China’s jurisdiction. China possesses a multitude of varieties marine
resources, marine organisms, oil and gas reserves, solid minerals, renewa-
ble energy reserves, coastal tourism and other rich resources. The potential
for development is enormous. This includes over 20,000 species of marine
organisms, 3,000 species of marine fish, approximately 24 billion tons of off-
shore oil reserves, 1.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, 3.1 billion
tons of placer deposits, theoretical offshore renewable energy reserves of
630 million kilowatts, 1,500 coastal tourist attraction sites, over 400 kilom-
eters of deepwater coastline and 60 deepwater harbors, 3.8 million hectares
of mudflats, and 124,000 square kilometers of shallow sea areas with a water
 Three major systematic objectives  25
45
depth between 0 and 15 meters. China’s extensive east coast is the engine
of the Chinese economy. The eastern region’s political, economic and cul-
tural advantages are very easily disseminated through the sea. Furthermore,
­China’s sea areas are all situated in warm waters of tropical, subtropical and
temperate regions. Located in the center of the Asia Pacific, it has many
high-quality harbors. These are advantages that continental–maritime com-
plex countries such as France and Russia cannot compete with.
Second, globalization of the marine economy and present maritime
mechanisms pave the way for China’s exploration and exploitation of global
maritime areas and resources. Marine resources or marine assets are mostly
characterized by mobility and uniformity. It is impossible for any country to
wholly possess a maritime area, no matter how small in size, due to dynamic
features of maritime resources. Every coastal state shares a common inter-
est in the protection of marine ecosystems, the exploration and exploitation
of marine resources among other issues. The introduction of UNCLOS rec-
ognized from a legal and institutional perspective each nation’s flexibility on
marine assets. For instance, the scale of a country’s gains in its territorial
waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf in addition to the vast
high seas and international seabed areas, entirely depends on the country’s
capabilities to explore and exploit the ocean. Even greater opportunities ex-
ist in maritime space beyond spheres of sovereignty. High seas account for
approximately two-thirds of the world’s oceans and there are 251.7 million
square kilometers of international seabed areas in total, in which reserves of
renewable and nonrenewable resources are in abundance. The key to maxi-
mizing effectiveness and feasibility of maritime power under the framework
of international law is in actuality a country’s ability to achieve gains from
the sea.46
For mankind, the sea still holds too many unknowns. The risks of maritime
development, particularly deep-sea development, are huge, and it is extremely
demanding in terms of capital, technology, human resources, and other fac-
tors of production. The vast majority of countries worldwide are unable to in-
dependently conduct maritime development systematically. Even traditional
maritime powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan
are unable to be entirely self-reliant in this matter.
Therefore, cooperative development of marine resources is an unmistak-
able trend. The breadth and depth of each country’s participation in inter-
national maritime development is directly related to the size of their own
maritime space and is furthermore intimately connected to their compre-
hensive national strength, technological ability, and economic stature.
China’s marine economic activities have long expanded worldwide. As
described above, although China does not have the necessary conditions
to establish a global maritime empire, it has the chance to become a global
maritime economic power. Economic globalization and widespread intensi-
fication of international economic cooperation have created favorable con-
ditions for China’s export of surplus capital and human resources. The new
international maritime order has thus provided China with an opportunity
26  Three major systematic objectives
to expand its maritime space and augment its maritime interests through
peaceful competition. Through friendly cooperation with the world’s major
maritime states, China can integrate its use of global marine resources by
learning from the experiences of other countries; China can also advance
economic activities in international maritime areas.
Known as ‘the father of sea power,’ Mahan was the first to explicitly and
systematically suggest the theory of ‘sea power,’ at whose core is the combi-
nation of a strong naval force and merchant service. He developed a broad
system of sea power theories, providing a conceptual guide for the United
States to transition from focusing on governing in North America to march
toward global maritime hegemony. Considering China’s overall natural en-
dowments, geographical conditions, historical background, maritime inter-
ests and strategic needs, China as a maritime power in the new era is destined
to surpass the ‘sea power’ as described by Mahan. First, China’s intrinsic
natural endowments and geographic conditions mean that it cannot imitate
the United States’ maritime ascendency, not can it become a global maritime
hegemon; second, the substance of today’s competitive is increasingly di-
verse and intense, as naval power and the military are merely one aspect, for
diplomacy, the marine economy and other measures have ever greater poten-
tial. The world ranking of maritime power will certainly take into account
levels of marine economic development, diplomatic capability, in addition to
expertise in applying international law, and other nonmilitary factors.
In summary, we can condense China’s maritime power objectives into
three categories: first, effective management, control, and deterrence in cer-
tain sea areas and impact waters worldwide to become a dominant regional
power; second, vast maritime diplomatic power to be able to wield strong
political influence on the international maritime order as well as regional
and global maritime affairs; and third, reasonably and effectively to utilize
resources and waters within and beyond its jurisdiction to become an inter-
national economic marine power.

Notes
1 Originally published in Pacific Journal, No. 4, 2014, with edits.
2 Hu Jintao, “Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteris-
tics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in
all Respects,” http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094–19612151.html
3 Wang Shuguang, A Discussion on China’s Oceanic Management (Beijing: China
Ocean Press, 2004), p. 12.
4 Liu Zhongmin, “China’s Maritime Security Strategy under the Background of
the Changing International Maritime Situation,” Guoji Guacha, No. 3, 2011,
pp. 4–5.
5 As Liu Huaqing therefore once pointed out, the realms of China’s neighboring
seas mainly encompass “the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the South China Sea,
territorial waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and Okinawa island
chain, as well as waters of the northern Pacific.” Refer to Liu Huaqing, The
Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publishing
House, 2004), p. 434.
 Three major systematic objectives  27
6 Zhang Wenmu, “Economic Globalization and Chinese Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu
Guanli, No. 1, 2003.
7 For perspectives emphasizing China’s unique attributes as a maritime power,
refer to Zhang Haiwen, “Additional Discussions on China’s Experiences as a
Maritime Power,” Zhongguo Haiyang Bao, March 6, 2013; Wan Yiwei, “Chinese
Dreams of a Maritime Power Will Not Follow Past Western Roads,” People’s
Daily Overseas Edition, January 17, 2013.
8 For these types of definitions, it is possible to refer to Zhang Wenmu, “China’s
Sea Power, a Type of Subordination to China’s Sovereign Maritime Rights In-
stead of Ocean Power, Let Alone Maritime Hegemony.”; Zhang Wenmu, “On
China’s Sea Power,” World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jinji Yu Zhengzhi),
No. 10, 2002.
9 Ibid.
10 Hu Bo, “No One Lost the South China Sea (And No One Will Win)”, August
20, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-one-lost-south-china-sea-and-no-
one-will-win-29337
11 Robert D. Kaplan, “China’s Budding Ocean Empire,” http://nationalinterest.
org/feature/chinas-budding-ocean-empire-10603
12 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Zhong Feiteng et  al. as translators, Red
Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy
(Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), pp. 51, 132.
13 Liu Huaqing, The Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation
Army Publishing House, 2004), p. 434.
14 Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, China People’s Liberation Army Military
Terms (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1997), p. 440.
15 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the
21st ­Century: The Turn to Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 54.
16 Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Statement of the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and
Interests in the South China Sea,” www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/
t1379493.shtml
17 Robert S. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Sta-
ble Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014); James R. Holmes, “The South
China Sea, ‘Lake Beijing’”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/
the-south-china-sea-lake-beijing/
18 Hu Bo, “China’s Main Interests and the Order of Priorities in the South China
Sea”, in Su Ge, ed., China’s Initiatives: Responses to an Uncertain World (Beijing:
World Affairs Press, 2017), pp. 193–200.
19 Shen Weilie and Lu Junyuan. The Geography of China’s National Security
(­Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2001), p. 342.
20 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Cen-
tury: The Turn to Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 103.
21 This figure is a US Navy’s estimate of the fleet size required to maintain its global
maritime advantage. On 15 December 2016, the US Navy proposed a 355-vessel
fleet (US Navy, Executive Summary of 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment
(FSA), December 15, 2016, p. 3). Currently, the number of American naval ves-
sels on active duty is fewer than 290.
22 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, International Strate-
gic Resources Research (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2005), pp. 60–61.
23 Xue Li, “Analysis of the Connotations of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s
Response,” World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jinji Yu Zhengzhi), No. 10, 2011,
pp. 139–140.
24 Ministry of Defense (Navy), Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR, New Delhi: Inte-
grated Headquarters, April 25, 2004, p. 63.
28  Three major systematic objectives
25 International Maritime Organization, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships,” p.  2, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/
Documents/PiracyReports/245%20Annual%202016.pdf
26 Tim Benhow, “Maritime Power in the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia,” in Andrew Dorman, Mike Lawrence Smith, and Matthew
R. H. Uttley, eds., The Changing Face of Maritime Power (New York: St. ­Martin’s
Press, 1999), p. 107.
27 This refers to coastal regions far from the hinterlands of Eurasia, primarily en-
compassing coastal areas in Europe and East Asia. Controlling these “Inner
or Marginal Crescents” is key to controlling the world (Nicholas J. Spykman,
1944), because it is both possible to rapidly enter the “Heartland” and can easily
threaten maritime civilizations. After the war, the policy of limitation and isola-
tion employed by the United States in Western Europe and East Asia toward the
Soviet Union and China was heavily influenced by this theory.
28 Shen Weilie, Editor in Chief, An Introduction to Geopolitics (Beijing: National
Defense University Press, 2005), p. 468.
29 Ibid.
30 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “2016 Statistical Bul-
letin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/
article/tjsj/tjgb/201709/20170902653690.shtml
31 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge,
2009), pp. 6–19.
32 Joseph Nye, Zheng Zhiguo et al., translator, The Paradox of American Power:
Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Beijing: World Affairs
Press, 2002), p. 154.
33 Shi Xiaoqin, On Sea Power and Sino-US Relations (Beijing: Military Science
Press, 2013), p. 291.
34 Xu Qiyu, “Misunderstandings and Reflections on Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu
Guanli, No. 5, 2003.
35 Thomas J. Bickford, Heidi A. Holz, and Frederic Vellucci Jr, Uncertain Waters:
Thinking about China’s Emergence as a Maritime Power (Alexandria, VA: CNA
China Studies, September 15, 2011), p. 73.
36 This argument is quoted from Zhang Wenmu, “Economic Globalization and
China’s Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli, No. 1, 2003.
37 Shen Wenzhou, Editor in Chief, China’s Coastal Maritime Space (Beijing: China
Ocean Press, 2006), p. 178.
38 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US-China Security Relationship,” Survival,
Vol. 53, No. 2, 2011, p. 91.
39 Zhang Qian, “Sea Power and the Maritime Silk Road,” Jingji Guancha Bao,
No. 698, December 8, 2014.
40 Guo Shuyong, Logic in the Development of Great Powers: A Socio-Political
Analysis of the Rise of Western Powers (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006),
pp. 23–24.
41 Hu Bo, “Trends of International Maritime Politics and China’s Strategic
Choices”, China International Studies, Vol. 64, May/June 2017, p. 121.
42 Global Strategic Resources Review, p. 8.
43 He Chuantian, “The State of China’s Maritime Territories and Thoughts on
Tactical Defense of Maritime Rights,” Southeast Asian Studies (Dongnanya
Yanjiu), No. 2, 2001.
44 State Oceanic Administration, 2015 Survey Bulletin for Maritime Islands, www.
soa.gov.cn/zwgk/hygb/hdtjdc/201612/t20161227_54241.html
45 State Oceanic Administration, National Marine Economic Development Pro-
gram Outline, www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/hyjj/2007/03/16/1174008941719037.htm
46 Kong Zhiguo, Sea Power, Competitive Property Right and the Mode of Sea Ex-
ploitation (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2011), p. 40.
2 The connotation and
characteristics of Chinese
maritime power

The main goal of China’s path of peaceful maritime development is not to

seek global maritime hegemony, nor does it view power struggles at sea as
the main way of acquiring interests. It would be very difficult for China
to build US-style maritime dominance. However, China can nevertheless
carve a new path. For targets of effective ocean exploitation and exploration,
China will chiefly rely on diplomatic and economic measures to expand its
interests at sea. Deterrence by mighty military forces, brilliant diplomatic
strategy, excellent abilities to formulate international regulations, and a
strong marine economy and ocean management facility are the main ap-
proaches of expanding this type of maritime power. In China’s 5,000 years
of civilization, this represents a new course of development; in view of the
rise and fall of great world powers in history, this is also an entirely new
development in maritime power.

The ‘variable’ vs. ‘invariable’ rise1

The pursuit of any maritime power is the choice made in a certain era, under
specific conditions and based on their own natural endowments. In history,
there have never been two identical maritime powers; even the United States
and Britain are quite different in their paths to become maritime powers
and the composition of their powers.
It has already been recognized by Chinese decision makers and the vast
majority of serious scholars that ‘China’s dreams of maritime power will
not tread in the West’s footsteps.’ Indeed, compared to the rise of modern
Western maritime powers, China’s dreams of maritime power are situated
in entirely different time and space dynamics, geographic attributes and cul-
tural background. Naturally China must follow a different path from that of
traditional Western experiences.
Since the end of the Second World War, with the emergence of nuclear
weapons and nuclear deterrence, growth of economic globalization and in-
terdependence, powerful worldwide anti-war and peace movements, peace
and development have gradually become major themes of the times. The
nation-state system, consolidated continuously, leads to a world that is now
30  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
virtually without vacuum zones, or ungoverned spaces. The principles of
sovereignty are met with more and more challenges, but they continue to
garner public support. Space–time dynamics have changed fundamentally,
and it would be difficult for any country to become a dual maritime power
based on trade or expansion of its ‘sphere of influence’ and ‘command of the
seas’ as described by Mahan. This is not only a concern for a rising maritime
country like China, but will also be important tests for traditional maritime
powers such as the United States and Great Britain. China cannot be mili-
taristic in its expansion but simply pave a primarily peaceful maritime road.
Since China is a land–sea complex country, it must consider balanced
strategic focuses on land and sea and maintain coordinated development;
although China has relatively abundant marine resources, but compared to
world maritime powers is nevertheless insufficient; maritime space is nar-
row and obstructed by island chains. Its marine geography is furthermore at
a relative disadvantage. Under these geographic circumstances, China can-
not possibly achieve the kind of maritime hegemony attained by the United
States and Great Britain. China should rely on its own natural endowments,
objectively plan its own strategic objectives and approaches and not blindly
hope to emulate the historical experiences of the United States and Great
Britain and follow the road they once took to hegemony.
The ‘dog eat dog’ laws in the jungle of today’s international community are
not entirely outdated, the naval arms race still burns robustly and the role
of armaments as a supporting solution of disputes remains vital, although
peaceful settlement of disputes has indeed gradually become the main-
stream. Since the Second World War, there have rarely been cases of territory
successfully changing hands through military force. In particular, since the
establishment of the international maritime order based on the ­UNCLOS,
calls for maritime dispute resolution through peaceful negotiations have
been on the rise. More notably, today’s international maritime mechanisms
and order provide alternative modes of competition, in which, in addition
to sea power, economics, diplomacy, international law and other factors
play an increasingly important role. Brilliant diplomatic strategies and tac-
tics, competitive marine industries and skilled international legal expertise
may be able to circumvent the restrictions of traditional maritime spaces,
have great influence and acquire considerable interests beyond its sovereign
scope. While China builds strong sea power, it should also strengthen the
construction and application of diplomatic and economic measures.
However, China should also not overemphasize its distinctions so as to
not appear arrogant and imperious. The extensive course of humanity’s
maritime civilization does not lack in somewhat constant laws and experi-
ences; in practice, for each of today’s various global maritime nations, there
exist more or less universal values.
First, a maritime power must possess a certain degree of power status
at sea. Maritime authority forms the material foundation for China. No
maritime power can ignore the means to gaining and maintaining power,
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  31
because the rights and interests conferred by the international laws alone
are far from enough, not to mention the fact that the international law is also
dynamically developing. Major nations have powerful status, which China
should neither flinch from talking about nor have to sidestep. China is not
pursuing maritime hegemony, but it does need secure strategic space at sea,
international political status and effective sea power.
Second, maritime powers are naturally supported by marine civiliza-
tion. Civilizational transformation is a defense of society and culture on
China’s journey to becoming a maritime power. Western civilization as the
archetypal representation of mankind’s marine civilization, and the depth
and breadth of its maritime practices are by and large unparalleled. While
tainted by the vestiges of heinous colonial expansion and hegemonic war,
it has also amassed a great deal of human civilization’s essence. China has
deep-rooted genetic codes in continental civilization, and China’s geopoliti-
cal characteristics as a land–sea complex imply that it cannot fully complete
the transformation from a continental civilization to a maritime civiliza-
tion. It will ultimately retain its own cultural distinctions, but also inherit
and promote Western civilization’s understanding of the sea, ability and
awareness to utilize and control the sea, and study Western civilization’s
outstanding experiences in maritime law, diplomacy, applications of sea
power and other matters that are forever relevant for China.
Third, the spirit of contracts and system of conventions are the corner-
stone of the international maritime order and also ought to be the main
framework by which China participates in maritime politics. Along with
power transition in maritime hegemonies and evaluation of maritime means
of force, the spirit of contracts and system of convention in Western tradi-
tion have gradually evolved into the intrinsic basis of the maritime order and
have been universally accepted around the world. During China’s participa-
tion in maritime politics, it will of course have its own stances and proposals
and would inevitably lead to various sorts of tension with other countries.
However, this should not hinder China’s respect for the spirit of contracts
and adherence to the system of conventions. Like the majority of countries
in the world, China should engage in rivalry and cooperation under the
guidance of the spirit of contracts and within the system of conventions.
Consequently, on China’s road to becoming a maritime power, if it over-
emphasizes its own distinctiveness, hunting for ‘change’ and ‘originality,’
even reinventing the wheel, or, alternatively, if it overaccentuates modern
Western traditions, in particular blindly mimicking and mechanically cop-
ying Western practices and experiences, both approaches would be counter-
productive, futile and furthermore a threat to the rejuvenation of the nation
and magnificent rise of China. China’s road to maritime power combines
its natural endowments with circumstances of the times, renouncing ways
to the success of Western maritime traditions. Both heedlessly discrediting
and overstating the impact of Western experiences are unscientific, unreal-
istic and imprecise attitudes.
32  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
The path of peace and revolutionary uprising
In candid terms, the emergence of any significant maritime power would
certainly drastically alter maritime power structures as well as to some ex-
tent reshape the international maritime order. It is impossible that China
will not change the status quo in some way. The difference is that China’s
main path is a peaceful one.
The time when military might dictate all is already past. Sea control is
merely one means, rather than the ultimate goal of the majority of the coun-
tries in the world. Besides, maritime development and maritime governance
issues are emerging into two other themes of international politics. Since
the end of the Second World War, maritime development and maritime eco-
nomic interest has become a major topic of international politics. Due to the
rapid development of maritime science and technology in early decades of
the 21st century, mankind is entering a stage of comprehensive utilization
of the oceans, especially in exploration of the deep sea, which will soon wit-
ness substantial breakthroughs. The exploration and exploitation of mari-
time spaces will increasingly become the focus of every country’s maritime
strategy. With the focus of maritime activities shifting from offshore areas
to the deep sea and from waters under jurisdiction to the high seas, many
global challenges such as maritime environmental degradation and natural
or manmade disasters will further ferment and attract more attention, and
the humanistic emotions and solicitude of mankind for the ocean will also
become more stereoscopic and abundant. The governance of maritime com-
mons has placed the demands of shouldering necessary responsibilities and
obligations on maritime countries, especially major powers.
In this context, a country is not likely to survive without strong defense,
but it is more and more difficult to work only by force. If a country like
China were to follow these historical trends, it surely would launch, under
new conditions, a new path to maritime power.
Ever since the Chinese Communist Party 18th National Congress report
officially proposed its maritime power initiative, China’s maritime power
strategy has gradually become a hot topic, open to diverse interpretations
by numerous foreign and domestic media, scholars and officials. However,
the keynote speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping on 30 July 2013 at the
8th CCP Politburo collective study session is regarded as the most authorita-
tive and systematic elucidation to date. He stressed the need ‘for greater ma-
rine stewardship, awareness and governance of the seas, encouragement to
continuously achieve new accomplishments in the constructing a maritime
power,’ in addition to elaborating upon the role and purpose of maritime
strategy, the chosen route to becoming a maritime power, resource develop-
ment, environment protection, maritime rights and other concerns.2
Carefully analyzing the speeches of Xi Jinping, connecting the interna-
tional environment, contemporary situation and historical mission faced
by China as a maritime power, it is not difficult to identify two prominent
aspects of China’s experiences as a maritime power.
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  33
First, harmony. It means that China expands sea power and maritime
interests through the ways of ‘peace, development, cooperation, and mutual
gain.’ The core defining feature is the pursuit of ascendency at sea through
peaceful means. Historically, the rise of all maritime powers was accom-
panied without exception by large-scale war. As a rule, Great Britain, the
United States, Japan and other nations cemented their status as maritime
powers through naval battles. There exist varying degrees of maritime dis-
putes between China and virtually all of its maritime neighboring nations,
the majority of whom are far weaker than China. However, China is com-
mitted to settling maritime disputes through dialogues and negotiation. In
this regard, Chinese President Xi Jinping has in speeches on maritime power
repeatedly emphasized ‘adherence to peaceful, negotiation-based dispute
resolution and endeavors to maintain peace and stability’ and demonstrated
the Chinese leadership’s unwavering stance on peaceful dispute settlement.
The essence of ‘harmony’ is China’s restraint in the use of force at sea and its
quest of a peaceful environment. Why does Chinese maritime power have
these characteristics?
First and foremost, it is intimately connected with China’s grand strat-
egy for peaceful development. Maritime strategy is a key component of
China’s strategy for peaceful development, and the road to maritime power
naturally cannot contravene overall peaceful development. China’s path of
peaceful development is not to illustrate the distinctiveness particularities of
China; it is to show China’s intelligent decisions in line with current trends.
In other words, under current circumstances, even if China wished to rise
by virtue of military strength, it would lack such opportunities. Moreover,
the preference for peace has also benefited from the relatively open nature
of the present international maritime order. Due to developments in eco-
nomic globalization and interdependence, international public goods such
as worldwide SLOCs and freedom of navigation on high seas will increas-
ingly depend on joint global efforts, in particular those of major nations. No
country, not even the United States, can single-handedly maintain the inter-
national maritime order. It is possible for China to acquire certain stature
in maritime power through providing international public goods and under-
taking global obligations. In addition, the modern international maritime
order, based on the UNCLOS, has conferred upon coastal nations world-
wide a relatively equal opportunity to participate in international maritime
politics. This has created the necessary conditions for and expanded the in-
fluence of promoting dispute resolution by all countries through diplomacy
and international law.
China’s proposed Maritime Silk Road is irrefutably not a publicity stunt
to court global goodwill or for the purpose of colonial establishment or
hegemony, but is based on notions of impartial cooperation and collective
development, and a major venture for China’s peaceful maritime rise. On
23 June 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, while attending the China-­
Greece Maritime Cooperation Forum, gave a speech entitled ‘For Peace,
34  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
Cooperation and Harmony in the Ocean,’ clarifying China’s perspectives
on the sea and emphasizing features of ‘harmony’ on China’s journey as a
maritime power.

Engagements with the ocean leads to prosperity and that isolation from
the ocean leads to decline. Cooperation in developing the oceans brings
development to all countries while war fought over the ocean inflicts
disasters to mankind…China firmly safeguards its national sovereignty
and territorial integrity and commits itself to maintaining regional
peace and order.3

Second, ‘innovation.’ It applies beyond sea control, and further focusing on

the pursuit of exploration, exploitation and management of the seas. The
rise of any power always stems from the combination of material pursuit
and social motivations. China has unique geographical characteristics and
cultural qualities, facing unprecedented and demanding developmental re-
sponsibilities, additionally being in the midst of a new and evolving mari-
time order. Under both internal and external effects, it is highly probable
that China will create a new path. In reality, China is active in the process
of exploring practices and will highlight development and utilization of the
sea. Based on its jurisdictional maritime space, relying on the high seas, the
international seabed area and other public maritime spaces, China robustly
develops its marine economy. The Chinese Navy in fact does not have a
global presence, whereas China’s marine economic activities are by now lo-
cated all over the world’s major oceans and seas. When discussing maritime
powers, Xi Jingping also places greater emphasis on the theme of effective
exploitation and exploration of the seas. He proposes increasing the effi-
ciency and quality of the marine economy, transitioning the development
model and protecting the environment, striving to develop marine science
and technology and unequivocally reiterates China’s distinctive new path
as a maritime power. This new path will be based on objectives of effective
exploitation and exploration of the seas, mainly relying on diplomatic, tech-
nological and economic measures to expand maritime interests through fair
competition, international cooperation and negotiation.
‘Harmony’ is an organic component of ‘innovation’; ‘innovation’ is the
crucial foundation of ‘harmony.’ It is precisely because China’s decision
makers use China’s natural endowments, contemporary circumstances,
international environment and other objective conditions as a foundation,
and believe that while China cannot become a maritime hegemony like the
United States, it can nevertheless achieve success through economics, tech-
nology, diplomacy, military deterrence and other forms of comprehensive
power. Thus, only a development model of peace, cooperation and mutual
gain will be sustainable in the long run, whereas the peaceful approach itself
evidently is a key important reason for the innovation of China’s experience
as a maritime power.
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  35
Of course, whether this new path proves ultimately successful, and whether
China can secure the requisite maritime space peacefully and attain mari-
time power commensurate with its national strength, depends not only on
China’s own efforts but also on reactions from the international community.
In particular, this depends on whether the world’s hegemonic power – the
United States – recognizes and understands Chinese fundamental maritime
interests and the ‘harmony’ strategy. China undoubtedly needs to exercise re-
straint and control in its actions for global reassurance; meanwhile, the world
needs to afford the most basic respect for China’s security and core interests.

The global vision of the maritime power dream

In a world of rapid economic globalization and rising interdependency,
‘China belongs to the world, the world also belongs to China.’ The Chinese
dream of a maritime power requires global participation. For China, it is
of critical importance to take advantage of global perspectives. In recent
years, China has demonstrably boosted management, development and ef-
forts to safeguard rights in its jurisdictional waters. But for maritime power
to become a reality, merely making the most of maritime space within
China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction is by far insufficient. China as a mari-
time power is global in scope. Only through global optimization of resources
distribution can the maritime power’s targets be achieved.
As mentioned before, China’s jurisdictional maritime space is quite in-
adequate. According to relevant regulations of the UNCLOS and China’s
consistent assertions, China possesses 3 million square kilometers of sea
areas under its jurisdiction and partial rights to the outer continental shelf.
Relative to other international maritime powers, China’s jurisdictional sea
areas are extremely limited and wholly insufficient to satisfy China’s mari-
time development needs.
As a relatively disadvantaged country in terms of maritime geography,
a major nation with onerous development tasks and a power with many in-
ternational responsibilities, if China were satisfied with only maintaining
and managing its own maritime space, it would be very difficult to become
a global maritime power as well as unbefitting the image of any responsi-
ble power. China ought to build itself into a maritime power with a global
outlook, using the world maritime space as a platform. While strengthen-
ing the development and utilization of the jurisdictional waters, it should
actively expand international public maritime space and cooperation with
other coastal countries, reinforcing the layout of sea areas beyond sovereign
jurisdiction.
Public maritime spaces include high seas and the international seabed
area. Of which, high seas, where nations enjoy freedoms of fishing, eco-
nomic development and scientific research, refer to all sea areas excluding
each nations’ exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, inland waters and
archipelagic waters for archipelago nations. The UNCLOS defines seabed
36  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
and subsoil, beyond the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf of
coastal nations, as the international seabed, which is jointly owned by all
of mankind and is rich in all kinds of resources. In depths of 4,000–6,000
meters below the sea level in every ocean worldwide, polymetallic oceanic
nodules of manganese full of copper, cobalt, nickel, iron and over 70 other
elements are widely distributed. Additionally, there are deposits such as
­cobalt-rich crusts, volcanogenic massive sulfide ore, natural gas hydrates, as
well as deep-sea biological resources, with excellent prospects for scientific
and commercial application.
The deep sea will become a strategic development base for various natural
resources in the 21st century. There would be many sectors such as deep sea
mining, biotechnology and technological equipment manufacturing in deep
sea industries. According to the UNCLOS, the international seabed area
is explored and developed by each nation under international mechanisms
established by the UNCLOS. The International Seabed Authority manages
the international seabed area and its resources on behalf of all of mankind.
For every country worldwide, this part of the space is entirely dynamic.
The size of the area a country may take advantage of international public
maritime space depends entirely on its own exploration and exploitation
capacities. To date, China has already achieved a certain degree of progress
in the development of the international seabed area: Chinese institutions
have won two block deep seabed minerals of polymetallic nodules deposit
respectively in 2001 and 2017. In 2011, the China Ocean Mineral Resources
R & D Association (COMRA) won exclusive exploration rights to a region
10,000 square kilometers in size of polymetal sulfide deposits in the South
West Indian Ocean international seabed area. In April 2014, COMRA also
earned the contract of ferromanganese crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.4
Maritime spaces of collaborative development, according to mutual
agreements and contracts, are mainly subject to cooperation spaces in the
jurisdictional waters of other coastal states, which are normally in other
countries’ exclusive economic zones or continental shelves. Due to im-
balances in maritime nations’ marine industrial development and large
discrepancies in their marine resources, international marine economic
cooperation is now extremely widespread. Not only third world countries
are attracting investment, foreign human capital and advanced technology.
Some developed countries with abundant maritime resources such as the
United States, Canada and Australia have also focused on appealing to for-
eign countries to develop their marine economies.
China has considerable economic strength, substantial human resources
and rapidly rising technological ability. In terms of marine economic co-
operation, there is enormous potential for cooperation for ocean fishing,
offshore oil and gas extraction, and marine tourism and other industries.
China’s ocean fishing industry has already spread all over jurisdictional wa-
ters of over 40 countries along the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Coast. In recent years, the three big enterprises of PetroChina, Sinopec and
China National Petroleum Corporation have won development rights and
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  37
interests in many offshore oil and gas fields in areas such as Africa, South
America and the Middle East through overseas cooperation and acquisi-
tions. The Chinese coastal tourism industry is also actively ‘stepping for-
ward,’ with the personnel turnover and capital investment growing rapidly.
While China’s maritime interests have inevitably expanded globally, its
responsibilities at sea also need to gravitate toward global development.
A country only has the vision of maritime power when it wields influence in
Antarctic scientific research, Arctic exploration, protection of Pacific fish-
ing resources, survival of small island nations, maritime counter-terrorism
and other matters seemingly ‘unrelated’ to its development of seapower; fur-
thermore, it needs to play important roles in maritime fair trade, responses
to financial crises, international peacekeeping and other such matters.5
In fact, China’s maritime activities are already found all over the world.
At the policy level, China should take greater initiatives to initiate planning,
in order to better guide, integrate and advance the depth and breadth of
China’s steps toward the world’s seas. If China’s maritime power strategy
were overly restricted to its jurisdictional maritime space, or treated sea ar-
eas simply as an extension of continental space, this would not at all help
to realize its dream of becoming a maritime power. While if the rest of the
world persists in observing China’s maritime pursuits with a prejudiced eye
or from a colonial perspective, this would hinder seizing the opportunities
provided by China’s maritime renaissance, and would make maintaining
good relations with China more difficult. Therefore both China and the
world should not concentrate their attentions on China’s 3 million square
kilometers of ‘private land,’ but should instead look to activities in the vast
expanses of global maritime space. Foreign countries also should not focus
only on the buildup of China’s sea power, but comprehensively weigh Chi-
nese maritime values and mentalities, marine technologies and economic
activities, maritime diplomatic capabilities and other improvements. Thus,
can China progress more assuredly toward a maritime power and the world
more fully recognize China as a rising star of the sea.

Potential maritime meaning of the belt and road initiative

In October 2013, during a visit to Indonesia, President Xi Jinping addressed
the Indonesian parliament, pointing out China’s commitment to strength-
ening interconnectivities with ASEAN countries and initiating the estab-
lishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. He promoted good
maritime cooperative partnerships with ASEAN countries to jointly con-
struct the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road.’ This was the first time that a
Chinese leader presented this initiative.

The key construction direction of the Maritime Silk Road will shift
south from Chinese coastal ports, past the South China Sea, through
the Malacca Strait, by the Lombok and Sunda Straits, along the north
Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and other
38  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
waters. It is attracting support by ASEAN and its member countries,
influencing the neighboring and South Asian region, even extending to
the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe.6

Furthermore, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is not isolated. It is in-
timately connected with the Silk Road Economic Belt, complementing and
enhancing one another. In Chinese governmental plans, the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt coupled with the Maritime Silk Road are abbreviated as ‘the
Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). China hopes to explore the special values
and doctrines of the Ancient Silk Road by adopting the BRI, additionally
inserting connotations from a new era, actively and enthusiastically forging
economic partnerships with nations along the routes.
The BRI promotes what can be described as the Chinese leadership’s
insights into the development trends of the times. Drawing lessons from
historical experiences and combining both foreign and domestic economic
environments, it is a great pioneering venture. Chinese and international
academic circles have conducted a considerable evaluation on the motiva-
tions and aims of the Chinese government’s initiation of the BRI. There is
a multitude of opinions, interpretations and viewpoints on the initiative. In
my opinion, no matter what argument is maintained, it is near impossible to
depart from the following three main analysis perspectives.
First, the BRI is intended to support China’s reform and opening up in
addition to the advanced objective requirements of an economic ‘stepping
out.’ It is necessary for China’s peaceful development. China is already the
world’s largest trading power; globally, it has now become the largest trad-
ing partner of over 120 countries and the principal export market for over
70 countries or regions. However, behind the rapid economic growth and
flourishing trade lies a severe crisis. The great engine of China’s economic
development – large-scale investment – has perilously come to a dead end.
Traditional industries such as Chinese steel, cement and automobiles al-
ready have serious production overcapacity. Another major driver – export
growth – has also suffered a bottleneck. In recent years, profit margins
from Chinese foreign trade have plummeted significantly. Myriad coastal
manufacturing commercial enterprises have closed down. In these circum-
stances, China’s accumulated capital and production capacity are in urgent
need of large markets and wide channels. China needs a new strategy to
support and promote economic ‘stepping out.’ In this respect, Xi Jinping
has clearly advocated the BRI as conducive to expanding and enhancing
China’s opening up to the outside world. In the course of over 40 years of
reform and opening up, China’s economy is currently undergoing a sig-
nificant revolution from ‘leading in’ to ‘going out.’ New highly integrated
foreign prospects of markets, energy resources and investments have al-
ready emerged. Only by insisting on opening up to the outside world and
by deeply embracing the global economy can China achieve sustainable
development.
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  39
Next, to cope with the new state of affairs in international economic
competition, China has to expand across an even wider strategic space.
Presently, economic globalization and free trade have suffered obstacles
unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. The WTO Doha round of
negotiations has yet to produce any headway; reform of the International
Monetary Fund has come to a complete standstill. At the same time, trends
against globalization, economic integration and collectivism have grown
more obvious, while negotiations in many types of bilateral and multilateral
free trade agreements are ever more popular, and the world has already been
shaped into the three main economic spheres of North America, Europe
and Asia Pacific. In response to this complex situation, the United States,
Europe and other Western countries, particularly the United States, were
the first to attempt to ‘make a fresh start’ while at the same time continuing
to urge the adjustment of the international economic order. For instance,
the United States launched negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Agreement (TTIP), which were attempting to take unilateral action, for-
mulate new trade rules together with its allies and partners, control the new
future economic world order and eventually force the majority of countries
in the world to ‘enter world trade system a second time.’ In an increasingly
competitive economic environment, China needs to consolidate the diverse
types of cooperation that is currently in progress so that they are intercon-
nected and mutually inspiring. This would result in systematic effects and
an indomitable position in possible future competition. However, a trend of
‘Rising East, Declining West’ has materialized in global economic patterns.
With China’s share of world economy rising, its extensive responsibilities
in driving international economic development are unprecedented. Many
countries in Asia, Europe and Africa hope to hitch an ‘express train ride’
on China’s development. They anxiously wait to strengthen economic coop-
eration with China, as trade in goods or services of an ordinary nature al-
ready do not adequately suffice. To this end, China also requires a complete
strategic or policy framework to better consolidate resources, in order to be
greater and stronger together.
Of course, the practice of the BRI would inevitably create to a certain
degree political and security spillover effects. Notwithstanding that China
is a large trading power and ‘the world’s factory,’ there is still a notable
discrepancy when compared to the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, other Western countries, and even Russia, with regard to political
influence over and understanding of its surroundings and the outside world.
The BRI is distinct from ordinary economic cooperation. Interconnectiv-
ity and intercommunications of infrastructure frequently necessitate high
mutual trust in politics. Cooperation in this respect would directly reduce
the psychological distance for both sides. If this initiative were successfully
implemented, it would surely tremendously benefit in elevating China’s in-
ternational status and influence. Besides, China’s relationship with the vast
40  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
majority of its neighboring countries has demonstrated a peculiar and con-
tradictory situation in economics and security. On the one hand, economic
connections continue to increase; on the other hand, mutual suspicion and
vigilance on security matters nevertheless also rapidly intensify. China ur-
gently needs a balanced and coordinated strategic framework to accom-
modate neighboring countries. In this sense, even if China does not wish
to confer too much strategic significance to the BRI, the implementation of
these two key initiatives help to increase China’s strategic space for maneu-
ver, change the passive situation facing the United States and hedge against
negative effects of ‘Asia Pacific Rebalancing’ to China.7 Furthermore, the
BRI will also improve the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
for China’s overseas trade and communications.
Lastly, the BRI is an important component of China’s neighboring diplo-
matic strategy and the foundation for China’s peripheral diplomatic strat-
egy on both the continental and maritime sides. From beginning to end, the
BRI has connections with China’s neighboring diplomacy. While visiting
Kazakhstan and Indonesia, Xi Jinping raised the topics of the Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road respectively. They
are extremely meaningful in their own right, because the Central Asia and
South East Asia regions are key pivot points for the BRI and are also its most
important partners. Launching the BRI as a part of the work of Chinese
peripheral diplomacy has already been included in a series of documents
on neighboring diplomatic policies. More importantly, the term ‘peripheral’
itself is a very imprecise concept. The peripheral areas of major nations
will continue to expand with boosts to national power. Additionally, with
greater conveniences in telecommunications and transportation, bounda-
ries of peripheral spaces will be more and more blurred. With increases in
China’s national strength and international influence, the connotations and
extensions of China’s peripheral diplomacy broaden relentlessly. The scope
of China’s surroundings will no longer be confined to contiguous nations
or those across local seas, but developing in the direction of regions further
afield. What is certain is that the BRI will very possibly become the chief
strategic framework that China promotes in its greater peripheral diplo-
macy in several future decades.
However, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt have differences after all. This is not merely due to disparities in
continental and maritime spaces. Moreover, China is traditionally a land-
based power; its practices and experiences of operating the continental An-
cient Silk Road are far richer than of that of the maritime Ancient Silk Road.
In ancient times, the continental Silk Road was conferred strategic signif-
icance from its very inception. Zhang Qian’s unprecedented exploration in
the Western Regions is a part of the national strategy, in order to connect
every Western realm to resist the Huns. From the Han dynasty onward, the
Silk Road has on numerous occasions been obstructed by the chaos of war,
and many times been re-opened through the support of national strength.
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  41
All along the route of the Ancient Silk Road there were many official out-
posts as a symbol of China’s national power and influence. By contrast,
the maritime Ancient Silk Road was characterized by distinctive natural
crossovers. This was the spontaneous economic action of coastal ancestors.
Except in China’s coastal regions, participation of the Chinese government
and for a majority of inland residents was virtually negligible and may be
disregarded. Although the Treasure Voyages of Zheng He through the West-
ern Ocean were momentous and prominent, its lack of support and motiva-
tion from maritime trade and the marine economy meant it was ultimately
short-lived.
However, the scope of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and flexibility
of its connotations will by far excel those of the Silk Road Economic Belt.
The development potential of the two projects and their overall global impact
as a whole cannot be compared in the same breath. The ocean worldwide is
entirely interconnected. The success of coastal experiences in Europe, Asia
and Africa could very easily be transplanted to waters in other parts of the
world, whereas continental routes will eventually terminate on the Eurasian
continent. If the Silk Road Economic Belt wants to extend its influence to
other areas of the world, it must rely on support from maritime routes. As
for interactivity, connections between various points along the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road inevitably become distribution networks, whereas no
matter how we may build a dense Eurasian land bridge, the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt still cannot free itself from the constraints of linear distribution.
At present, China is advancing toward the sea and building maritime
power on a wide and far-reaching scale for the first time in Chinese history.
Consequently, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’s practices will be des-
tined to bring to China more important values and more profound impacts.
In addition to augmenting and reinforcing China’s economic cooperation
with other coastal states, and enhancing China’s international political in-
fluence, it is a maritime power’s most important component and practice
initiative. It must also shape China’s oceanography outlook, as well as di-
rectly expedite the conception of Chinese versions of maritime assertions
and regulations.
By interpreting the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’s vision, combined
with China’s traditional ideals and the current international trends, we have
reason to believe that if the initiative is effectively implemented and mar-
keted, the principles that China advocates, such as interconnectivity, coop-
eration and mutual gain, openness and inclusivity will possibly develop into
the core values of the international maritime order and be recognized as
standard for the vast majority by the world’s coastal countries.

Interconnectivity
Interconnectivity is the inevitable outcome of economic globalization at a
certain stage of development. Maritime interconnectivity and freedom of
42  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
navigation achieve the same goals through different means. Whereas the
former not only far exceeds the latter in richness of its connotations, it is
also more in tune with current times. Xi Jinping pointed out, to build in-
terconnectivity, the three features of infrastructure, rules and regulations,
interpersonal exchange should be merged into one. The five central domains
of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial
integration and people-to-people bonds should also advance together.8
Freedom of navigation is a mandatory requirement for interconnectivity
at sea, or one of its major connotations. In reality, freedom of navigation at
sea forms the foundation of American maritime hegemony, its essence to
maintain the US Navy’s free entry and exit in the world’s oceans and seas.
Although theoretically all countries worldwide have the same rights univer-
sally as the United States, but due to inequities in the development of ca-
pability, legal equality often leads to de facto imbalances. The naval forces
of the vast majority of coastal nations are only active in contiguous waters.
Freedom of navigation in the world’s oceans is not of substantial relevance
to these countries. Freedom of navigation initiatives have a proactive side,
but are nevertheless the game of a hegemon or superpower. Under the pro-
motion world order of democracy, egalitarianism and freedom, its impact
and attraction are already greatly reduced.
On the contrary, interconnectivity has increasingly become a buzzword in
the international community. The United States, European Union, Russia,
ASEAN and other powers all have proposed various versions of intercon-
nectivity. These include the American ‘New Silk Road’ initiative, the EU’s
‘Connecting Europe Facility’ and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. At
many multilateral conferences, interconnectivity has also received a high
degree of priority. The 2013 APEC Leaders’ Declaration clearly set out hard-
ware, software and interpersonal communication as the three main pillars of
interconnectivity and a goal of all-round interconnectivity, and integration.
The APEC Connectivity Blueprint, published at the 2014 APEC Summit in
Beijing, is determined to achieve its mutually established initiatives and tar-
gets by 2025. It will reinforce interconnectivity between hardware, software
and personnel to realize a long-term target of seamless and comprehensive
connectivity and an integrated Asia Pacific. The theme of the 10th Asia-­
Europe Meeting was also interconnectivity held on 16–17 October 2014.
Interconnectivity represents a new round of economic globalization and
vital requirements for regional integration. Presently, every power’s focus
is concentrated on the construction of interconnectivity on Eurasian con-
tinent. From a long-term perspective, after Eurasia becomes a major inte-
grated market, it is inevitably necessary to bolster exchange of needed goods
and services with Africa, the Americas and other parts of the world, which
objectively demands the global improvement of maritime transportation.
Maritime interconnectivity brings in a new age for maritime navigation.
All coastal nations, regardless of their size or strength, can become key
hubs or play central roles. All countries will have the conditions to fully
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  43
demonstrate the comparative advantages of their natural endowments and
industries. They would also play an indispensable role and work hard on
bearing responsibilities on maritime issues such as SLOCs, maritime secu-
rity and marine development.
In the process of completing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, China
should strengthen its understanding and research into maritime interconnec-
tivity and its values and rules. Further to actively enhancing coastal nations’
infrastructure construction and maritime economic cooperation, China needs
to consider interconnectivity and its ties with the new international maritime
order from the perspective of the entire world and the whole of mankind.

Win–win cooperation
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road inherits the spirit and ideas of build-
ing a shared destiny and emphasizes the principle of achieving shared
growth through discussion and collaboration. The goal is to hope for joint
development and joint prosperity with all countries along the Road.
Concepts of mutually beneficial cooperation are rooted in China’s own
path of peaceful development. Over more than 40 years of reform and open-
ing up, China has not taken the old road of expansion and domination of
previous rising powers, while it has instead corresponded with the world
through equal economic and mutually beneficial economic cooperation
with great success. Therein lies the experience of the Chinese Miracle. The
aim of China’s proposed Maritime Silk Road is to attain even greater ac-
complishments, to proudly spread and celebrate these development expe-
riences and to promote the joint establishment of common interests and a
common destiny with various countries on the continents of Europe, Asia
and Africa, not limited to mutual economic cooperation. The construc-
tion of the BRI will exceed joint economic gains and more heavily focus on
achieving comprehensive mutual successes with partner nations in multiple
fields and all-round aspects, creating a community of shared development
prosperity. This marks quite a notable change from prominent past Chinese
foreign policy objectives of mutual economic benefit.9
‘Win–win cooperation’ is the best model by which mankind can explore,
utilize and develop the oceans. The oceans differ from land territory. Other
than for Antarctica, all land globally has already been carved and con-
sumed by various countries worldwide, whereas almost 70 percent of ocean
space belongs to all of mankind as a public asset and as ‘common land.’
Even if a small section of maritime space carries sovereign characteristics,
due to the ocean’s fluidity, coastal nations cannot exclusively occupy and
enjoy maritime areas, even its shoreline. Ever since the Age of Exploration,
the essence of maritime hegemony is in fact to strip or limit other nations
of their right to use the seas. Maritime hegemons such as Great Britain and
the United States have never controlled the entire ocean. Thus, although
military utilizations of the seas are restrictive, on a political, economic and
44  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
cultural level, the development and management of the ocean are based on
mutually beneficial cooperation from the very beginning of the world sys-
tem, which is starkly different from land-based empires that control almost
everything in their spheres of influence. Construction of every-day fibre-­
optic cables on the seabed, marine meteorological forecasts, marine search
and rescue, in addition to other maritime affairs all require a global con-
certed effort of coastal nations to cooperate. Even when nations were war-
ring with each other, these kinds of cooperation still develop regardless.
Mutually beneficial cooperation is also a natural requirement for the de-
velopment of global maritime politics. Viewed from a global context, the
center of mankind’s development has principally begun to shift from the
land to the sea. The 21st Century is the maritime century, when humanity
steps toward the sea on a grand scale. At the same time, numerous natural
disasters, environmental deterioration, global maritime security and other
issues have become increasingly apparent. In this global maritime environ-
ment, going it alone is fruitless and unproductive. The maritime space, rel-
ative to continental space, has yet far more unknowns. Mankind’s future
scientific and technological capabilities in the long run still cannot fully
overcome diverse obstacles in maritime space. When facing the ocean, any
person, institution or individual country is totally insignificant. Without co-
operation there is no prospect for success.
China’s leaders are keen to discuss win-win cooperation internationally,
and emphatically do not speak with deception or fraud, instead with pro-
found philosophical sources or traditions. Ancient Chinese philosophy de-
votes attention to the interactive synergy and progress between Yin (阴) and
Yang (阳) (bipolar opposition), so all things in the world are interconnected;
it does not only pay attention to objects’ differences and contradictions.
Instead, for more prominent are the likeness and interdependence of things.
Therefore, unlike the classical philosophy of Western international rela-
tions, Chinese politicians often do not regard international relations as a
‘zero-sum game’ and argue for common growth and shared prosperity.
Once China’s excellent cultural tradition connects organically with the
greater trend of global maritime collective cooperation, it will surely shine
at the center of international maritime politics.

Openness and inclusivity

Openness and inclusivity are the most important characteristics of maritime
civilization. Yet, due to human interference because of selfish interests and
desire for power, this type of openness and inclusivity has always been in-
complete, with distinctly narrow traits. The Age of Exploration’s practices
directly begot the formation of the global system. In recent eras, Western
countries relied on strong sea power for control over the world’s oceans,
while extensive regions in Asia, Africa and South America were reduced
to colonies thanks to the connectivity provided by the oceans. Since Ma-
han systematically created sea power theory, the pursuit of sea control has
 Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  45
always been a maritime power’s main mission. Even to this day, the United
States still professes control over 16 of the world’s maritime choke points
and important straits.
With today’s intensifying developments in economic globalization and
complex interdependence, sea power has become progressively decentral-
ized, and controlling the sea has gradually given way to sharing the sea.
Openness and inclusivity in international maritime politics is both an inher-
ent requirement for mankind’s progress, and also an objective reality that
all the world’s major powers must accept. Now is time for human maritime
behavior to return to the sea as ‘all rivers lead to the sea,’ the origin of open-
ness and inclusivity.
On the issue of openness, there have been repeated setbacks and difficul-
ties in the course of Chinese history, perhaps not skillfully dealt with; but
concerning inclusivity, China arguably is the power the best qualified to
speak in the world. In China’s history, there has never been a religious war,
moreover nor a dark ‘Middle Ages’ akin to that of Europe. Since ancient
times, the main part of Chinese civilization has always been tolerant toward
foreign ethnicities and cultures. The Chinese people are secular, unshackled
by religion, unbound by history and without exclusionist genes. The Chi-
nese nation itself is a huge melting pot, the development of the Chinese civ-
ilization constantly drawing upon the fruits of other civilizations. Looking
around at various powers worldwide, China is the only country yet not to be
dominated by monotheism, thus is also the most developed of ‘secular ra-
tional’ power in the world. The so-called secular rationality is not in fact to
abandon faith, nor does it renounce the importance of values and morality.
Instead, it does not render absolute the so-called dogma or value, and does
not treat their promotion or export as a realistic objective.10
In China’s process of ‘stepping out,’ it had neither the ambition of lectur-
ing nor the impulse of changing the world. Exactly as Vice Foreign Minister
Zhang Yesui stated, ‘the BRI is a collaborative initiative, about which China
does not have any particular strategic geopolitical intentions, and does not
intend to become the dominant authority in regional affairs, operate its
sphere of influence, or interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.’11
The Maritime Silk Road is not a self-confined group and would not hinder
existing regional cooperation mechanisms. The construction of the Mari-
time Silk Road is by no means China’s one-man show and would not exist
without the participation of various global powers. China not only needs
to cooperate with countries along the Silk Road, but also collaborate with
major world political powers such as the United States and Europe. The ul-
timate goal of the Maritime Silk Road is to drive the construction of global
interconnectivity and intercommunication, greater convenience in utilizing
the oceans, development and protection of the oceans. Neither South Asia,
the Middle East, East Africa nor other regions all will be the ‘terminus’
of the Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road truly adheres to a spirit of open-
ness and inclusivity. Any willing country, economic entity or enterprise, and
individual could partake equally, not limited to national borders, or types of
46  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power
actors, or ideology and culture. The Maritime Silk Road passes through ar-
eas of international strategic and political sensitivity, where geopolitical re-
lations are intricate and complicated. Every country differs greatly in terms
of national scale, level of development, historical traditions, ethnicities and
religions, language and culture, interests and pursuits. This objective situ-
ation requires the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to be built based upon
the aforementioned differences, inclusive of difference countries’ differing
needs. As every national policy has its own priorities, innovation and coop-
eration models need to identify where interests concur, reinforcing the foun-
dations of cooperation. The survival of the Maritime Silk Road depends
on attracting more and more coastal nations to participate. This is not only
China’s own conception, but also a common cause for all countries.
Ideas and awareness stem from practice. The 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road may be this century’s most magnificent cooperative practice at sea. Its
promotion and implementation will not only drive the world’s economic glo-
balization and greater integration, bringing prosperity to countries world-
wide and people at large. It will also develop new beliefs and rules, directly
changing the modern international maritime political landscape. The three
major proposals described above certainly do not tell the full story, but it
would be a good beginning.

Notes
1 Originally published with additions in the Huanqiu Globe Magazine, No. 6, 2013.
2 Xi Jing ping, “Continue to Make New Achievements in Further Understanding
the Ocean, Managing the Ocean, and Promoting the Construction of Maritime
Power”, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c64094-22402107.html
3 Li Keqiang, “For Peace, Cooperation and Harmony in the Ocean,” www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1171451.shtml
4 See at www.isa.org.jm/mineral-resources/55
5 Li Yaqiang, “The Significance of a Maritime Power,” Strategy and Management
(Zhanlue Yu Guanli), No. 3, 2014.
6 Liu Cigui, “Development of Marine Cooperative Partnerships: Several Reflec-
tions on the Development of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” Interna-
tional Studies, No.4, 2014, p. 2.
7 Xue Li, “China’s Diplomatic Risks Reflecting on The Belt and Road,” Financial
Times, December 30, 2014; Wang Yong, The Belt and Road and the Development
of China’s New Strategy for International Economics (Beijing: Peking University
School of International Studies WeChat Platform, December 19, 2014).
8 Xi Jinping, “Connectivity Leads to Development, Partners to Focus on Cooper-
ation,” http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1109/c64094-25997795.html
9 Sun Xuefeng, “The Belt and Road Guides China’s Foreign Strategic Transfor-
mation,” The Paper, January 2, 2015.
10 Zhang Shengjun, “Chinese Thought Helps International Politics Exit ‘the Mid-
dle Ages’,” Peipai News, January 13, 2015.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Speaks at a
Panel Session during a Top-Level Forum in China-- – Building the Continental
and Maritime Silk Road,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/
t1140481.shtml
3 China’s coastal geostrategy

China is a country of relatively unfavorable marine geography. Its marine

geographic environment is extremely complex and there exist, to varying
extents, maritime disputes with almost all its maritime neighbors with op-
posite or adjacent coasts (Table 3.1).
Since 2009, the situation in the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea
has deteriorated dramatically. Contradictions at sea between China and
­Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries have rapidly intensified;
with China’s progressive steps toward the sea, neighboring countries have
accelerated development of their maritime strategies. Despite the easing of

Table 3.1  Maritime Disputes between China and Its Neighboring Countries on
Sovereignty of Island and Reefs and Maritime Demarcation

Country Dispute details Current situation

North Korea Dispute over territorial Not yet demarcated.

(DPRK) waters of the north Yellow
Sea, Exclusive Economic
Zone and continental shelf
demarcation.
South Korea 1. Dispute over Exclusive
(ROK) Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the south Yellow Sea and
East China Sea.
2. Disputes over the Suyan
(Socotra) Rock and Rixiang
(Gageo) Reef.
Japan 1. Dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the East China Sea.
2. Territorial dispute over the
Diaoyu Islands.
The China–DPRK
Governmental Agreement
on the Joint Development
of Offshore Oil Resources
signed on 24 December2004.
Not yet demarcated.
The China–Korea Agreement
on Fisheries signed on 30
June 30 2001.
South Korea has constructed
artificial installations on
Suyan Rock.
Not yet demarcated.
The China–Japan Agreement
on Fisheries signed on 1
June 2000. China and Japan
‘co-administrate’ the Diaoyu
Islands.
(Continued)
48  China’s coastal geostrategy
Country Dispute details Current situation

Vietnam 1. Dispute over Exclusive The Beibu Gulf Agreement

Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the South China Sea.
2. Sovereignty dispute over the
Nansha Islands.
Philippines 1. Dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the South China Sea.
2. Dispute over the Nansha
Islands.
Malaysia 1. Dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the South China Sea.
2. Sovereignty dispute over a
section of the Nansha Islands.
Indonesia Dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the South China Sea.
Brunei Dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zone and
continental shelf demarcation
in the South China Sea.
on Fisheries, Agreement on
Exclusive Economic Zones
and Continental Shelves
signed in 2000.
Other waters not yet
demarcated.
Vietnam occupies 29 of the
Nansha Islands.
Not yet demarcated.
The Philippines occupies eight
of the Nansha Islands.
Not yet demarcated.
Malaysia occupies five of the
Nansha Islands.
Not yet demarcated.
There exist no territorial or
sovereignty disputes between
Indonesia and China.
Not yet demarcated. Brunei
demands sovereignty rights to
Nantong Jiao (Louisa Reef).

Source: State Oceanic Administration Strategic Development Research Institute, China’s

Maritime Development Report (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2007), p. 16. (Author has partial
supplements).

the situations in the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea since 2016,
Conflicts and skirmishes that China faces at sea are still complex and heated.
Under these circumstances, China urgently needs a comprehensive
coastal geo-strategy to coordinate and cope with all types of maritime dis-
putes and potential crises. This would better assist China’s progress to be
a maritime power. On the whole, China must pursue an overall strategy of
‘Stabilizing the North’ (Wei Bei 稳北), ‘Harmonizing the South’ (He Nan
和南), and ‘Contesting the East’ (Zheng Dong 争东). More specifically this
means to pursue ‘stability’ in the Yellow Sea, keep ‘harmony’ in the South
China Sea and strengthen ‘contest’ in the East China Sea.

‘Stabilizing the North’

Stabilizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding Yellow
Sea, while developing good relations with the two Koreas.
 China’s coastal geostrategy  49
The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is an
intrinsic requirement for China’s national security. Historically, the Korean
Peninsula has always been a critical strategic site for maritime and conti-
nental powers to hedge and compete. It is a strategic pivot point for China
to project its continental power to the sea, and also a ‘stepping stone’ for the
United States, Japan and other maritime nations to assault the Mainland.
Since the beginnings of the Sui and Tang dynasties, all incidents of turmoil
on the Peninsula have invariably brought disasters to the Chinese Main-
land. In fact, China has never been able to disconnect itself from the Pen-
insula. The late Qing government, although it was difficult to ensure even
its own survival, was determined to participate in the war against Japan in
1894 and attempted to maintain its traditional influence over the Korean
Peninsula. In reality, a cordial relationship with the two Koreas contributes
greatly to China’s influence and role in the Peninsula. It is also an impor-
tant foundation for the extension of Chinese sea power toward the Sea of
Japan and even toward the northern Pacific. Furthermore, the Yellow Sea
envelops and protects China’s capital and its environs and is an offshore
barrier for northern China. Once its situation deteriorates, it would severely
restrict China’s power projecting and expansion ability in other directions,
and limit Chinese sea power’s deserved accomplishments and aspirations.
Therefore, the stability of the Peninsula and its surrounding waters, and
good relations with the two Koreas would create a favorable flank and rear
environment for China’s maritime power.
Disputes over the demarcation of the northern Yellow Sea exist between
China and North Korea. Between China and South Korea there are de-
marcation disputes over the southern Yellow Sea and northern East China
Sea, in addition to disputes over Suyan Rock and Rixiang Reef. Thus far,
maritime demarcation disputes have mainly focused on conflict over fisher-
ies. In recent years, Chinese fishermen have engaged in clashes with the two
Koreas, in particular frequent confrontations with South Korea. This has
triggered diplomatic tension between China and South Korea as well as civil
antagonism, enhancing mutual security precautions.
Nevertheless, these contradictions between China and North Korea, and
China and South Korea are still manageable. They are in essence disputes
of marine economic rights and involve to a minor extent maritime secu-
rity concerns. Additionally, the two Koreas are willing to solve problems
peacefully with China through negotiation. With regard to strategic intent,
although there may be competition between China and North Korea, and
China and South Korea, but this is very far from rivalry. This situation is
quite different from that in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea.
North Korea ought to focus on containing threats from the south and the
east. Although it frequently carries out small actions, it has still not yet pre-
sented a major direct challenge to China in the Yellow Sea.
South Korea and China’s military competition in the Yellow Sea and
conflicts over fisheries intensifies with time, but there is no big intent for
50  China’s coastal geostrategy
confrontation. Moreover, there is no fundamental conflict between the mar-
itime strategies of China and South Korea in general. There are important
mutual interests at sea, particularly in the oceans and high sea areas. South
Korea’s main strategic directions at sea are southward and eastward. With
South Korea’s acceleration in implementing autonomous, oceanic and holis-
tic maritime security concepts,1 and increasingly forceful advances toward
the ocean, China and South Korea’s room for cooperation in areas such as the
protection of critical SLOCs in the Asia Pacific, safeguard of maritime secu-
rity and joint development of marine resources will correspondingly grow.
China is hopeful of resolving disputes and differences with the two Koreas
through negotiations within the framework of traditional friendly relations
between China and North Korea and strategic cooperative partnership
between China and South Korea. As matters stand, China and South Ko-
rea have already reached a consensus on the legal validities of Suyan Rock
and Rixiang Reef, specifically that the disputed reefs have no Exclusive
Economic Zone or continental shelf rights, and do not affect maritime de-
marcation. China and South Korea have already held multiple rounds of
negotiations on demarcation. In their many meetings, Chinese and South
Korean leaders have all agreed to continue negotiations on maritime de-
marcation, support both the collaboration and the mechanisms of fisheries,
reinforce communication and cooperation, and accordingly deal with issues
related to the domain of fisheries.
The possible ‘hard landing’ of the Korean Peninsula situation is another
major challenge that faces China. Chinese, American, Japanese, Russian
and other powers’ interests and forces are tangled and concentrated on the
Peninsula, as the last geographical relic of the Cold War. The North Ko-
rean nuclear issue continues to cause disquiet while escalating South Ko-
rean unification movements have enhanced the risk of regional upheavals
in the present state of affairs. After the Incheon Winter Olympics 2018,
DPRK–ROK (North–South Korea) relations and DPRK–US relations have
improved greatly. North Korea has shown willingness to abandon nuclear
weapons, while the ROK and the United States have agreed to solve the
conflict through negotiations. Up to now (March 2019), relevant parties still
maintain a positive momentum of interaction, but considering the long-term
mutual precautions characterizing DPRK–ROK and DPRK–US relations,
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of a peace
mechanism for the Korean Peninsula would be a long-term and arduous
task and also needs the great contribution of China.
Strategic rivalry and strategic ‘mutual suspicion’ between China and the
United States have meant that the North Korean nuclear and Korean Pen-
insula issues have no solution for the time being. However, at the same time,
this structure has also restricted the freedom of movement of the United
States, South Korea and Japan. It is difficult for these countries to take
measures to change the status quo; North Korea had even taken ‘embrace
nuclear’ as a national policy and constantly been on the ‘brink of war.’
 China’s coastal geostrategy  51
However, behind North Korea’s insanity lies a certain degree of rationality,
for its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles are simply to ensure
national security and gain more bargaining chips in negotiations with the
United States, South Korea and other parties. That is why we can see some
flexibility of DPRK’s policy toward nuclear issues recently. As long as the
political situation remains stable, external provocation using missiles and
nuclear weapons is entirely out of the question for North Korea and would
only backfire.
Due to northeast Asia’s geographic patterns, the United States is for the
time being discouraged and short of measures to remove North Korea’s nu-
clear arms by force; whereas even if North Korea does become a nuclear
country, it still cannot change its adverse security environment, external
sanctions and isolation. Ultimately, the United States, North Korea and
other parties have no choice but to return to the negotiating table as the
Korean Peninsula’s bizarre cycle of ‘tension – reconciliation – tension …’
continues. Considering that each of the parties has no desire or motivation
in general to ‘break the deadlock,’ large-scale hot wars can yet be avoided;
though the risks and challenges are extremely severe, but China, as a peace-
ful force, has growing strength and influence, and there still exists space for
skilled diplomatic and political maneuver.
China has for a long time been committed to peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula and has also made great contributions. In future,
it should continue to wield regional influence and fulfill the major power
responsibilities. In view of significant shifts in the situation in Northeast
Asia, China may wish to clarify its own policies. China should increase its
support as required and must have the courage to take responsibilities with
regard to North Korea’s reasonable demands for its people’s livelihoods and
national safety; as for North Korea’s opportunistic disturbances, it intends
to contrive China’s abduction, therefore strong resistance and opposition
measures against this should be taken. In short, what should be supported
should be strongly supported; what should be opposed should be resolutely
opposed. Specifically, China should be dead against DPRK’s nuclear issue,
actively cooperating with the United States and ROK on it, but should re-
spect and somehow support DPRK’s regime and sovereignty, not permitting
the United States and ROK to implement forced subversion.
There should be robust support for the ROK’s endeavors to promote
denuclearization and the reconciliation process on the Korean Peninsula.
As China continues to strengthen its strategic cooperation and partnership
with the ROK, at the appropriate moment, it may wish to unequivocally
express its support for the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula;
while the ROK’s misrepresentations of the DPRK’s concerns, encourage-
ment of American armed forces buildup, reinforcement of various mili-
tary exercises provoke security instability in the region, consequently these
activities must be curbed. In addition to improving communication with
stakeholders and coordinating correctly, it is necessary to take the initiative
52  China’s coastal geostrategy
to plan in order to take a leading role in the constructing regional secu-
rity mechanisms. This means that China should drive relevant parties to
conduct a round of dialogue or negotiations on the nuclear issue, Korean
Peninsula peace mechanisms, the US alliance system and other topics of
discussion, taking advantage of an ideal opportunity to build a regional
security mechanism on the basis of a system similar to the ‘Six Party Talks,’
so as to mitigate each party’s ‘security dilemma’ and security concerns and
spur the situation toward peace and stability.

‘Harmonizing the South’

Skillfully managing the South China Sea dispute and actively building a
framework for peace in South East Asia.
China has multiple strategic interests in the South China Sea and its
surrounding waters. First, this sea area, which connects to the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, is a vital center of international shipping, guarding China’s
most important maritime lifelines. Second, the Bashi Strait, Malacca Strait,
Sunda Strait and Longmu (Lombok) Strait are strategic channels for Chi-
na’s sea power to extend toward the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Particularly
in the case where eastern oceanward channels suffer from close American
and Japanese surveillance and armed deterrence, these channels around the
South China Sea are even more valuable. Third, fish, oil and gas, and other
resources are plentiful in the South China Sea, where strategic depth is com-
paratively greater than the East China Sea and Yellow Sea and is a mainstay
of the Chinese marine economy’s development.
Nevertheless, there are three reasons why China should not be overly ag-
gressive in this region. First, the South China Sea is the intersection point of
the influences and interests of major nations, which are all interrelated and
interdependent, so it would be very difficult for any country or group to gain
an absolute advantage here. If China’s actions in this region were too bold, it
would unquestionably lead to joint resistance by ASEAN and other powers.
Second, more and more of the world’s chief maritime transportation ar-
teries are situated in the South China Sea, which is significant for almost all
the major trading nations for the security of sea lanes, and any conflict or
disputes would be of serious concern for the international community and
lead to intervention by the forces of major powers.
Third, China’s overall maritime situation, whether in terms of forward
presence, or strength of alliances and political relationships, compared to
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia is a relative fault line for the United States,
Japan and other countries’ countermeasure against China. This is also the
main reason why South East Asia has been the first priority of the United
States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ and its ‘rebalancing’ strategy. Accordingly, for China
to henceforth ensure a relatively benign political atmosphere would be of
huge benefit to the overall expansion of China’s sea power. Of course, more
important is that China does not need to apply too much military force to
 China’s coastal geostrategy  53
realize its strategic objectives, for in reality, since 2012, China has already
been driving the situation in a direction advantageous to China’s develop-
ment through reinforcement of power presence, land reclamation, drilling
and other peaceful measures without intense conflict and war, which could
be called peaceful coercion. However, American observers label these tac-
tics ‘salami slicing,’ that is to say, slowly and incessantly taking small ac-
tions that on their own would be insufficient to trigger war, but this series of
small actions would through accumulation lead to major strategic changes
within a certain period of time.2 This is true to some degree, but actually,
it is normally a passive reaction to other parties’ provocations rather than
some active operations to change the status quo. In fact, China still main-
tains considerable restraint in its policy toward the South China Sea, despite
its power being much greater than it used to be.
Following the end of the Cold War, China has championed a principle
of ‘bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,’ improving
ties with every country in Southeast Asia though concessions in economic
interests, mutual trust in politics, restraint in using force and other meas-
ures. These policies have resulted in enormous success, as China has rapidly
developed its relations with various Southeast Asian countries as well as
ASEAN over the past 20 years, constantly rising to new heights. However,
the South China Sea issue and the outside power factor have now become
bottlenecks to further improvement in relations between China and ASEAN
countries and have brought growing disquiet. Vietnam, the Philippines and
other disputant parties in the South China Sea intensify maritime conflicts
with China, while Singapore and other non-dispute parties are also very
anxious that China will adopt an offensive strategy in this region following
its increases in strength. In the modern era, Southeast Asia has always been
an arena of rivalry for major powers, while manipulation of the ‘balance
of power’ has long been standard practice of self-preservation for South-
east Asian countries. Some ASEAN countries, which take advantage of the
United States, India and other nations to contain China’s rise, have their
own reasonable motivations.
Moreover, there is the United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ and pursuit of the
‘rebalancing’ strategy, which may be abandoned in name but in essence sur-
vives as the Indo-Pacific strategy during the Trump administration and its
successors. Japan’s advances southward and attempts to use the South China
Sea issue to restrain China, India’s advances to the east to seek economic
interests and strategically balance on China and other external factors over
the South China Sea have objectively created conditions for ASEAN coun-
tries to counter China with the support of powers from outside of the region.
In this regard, China ought to have strategic confidence, in particular
considering its unprecedented power development. First, there is the dispar-
ity in national strength between China and Vietnam, the Philippines and
other ASEAN nations. Vietnam and the Philippines are fully aware that
China has forever possessed measures and opportunities to retaliate, and
54  China’s coastal geostrategy
consequently in recent years have always avoided provoking China; second,
China is economically a development opportunity for Vietnam, the Philip-
pines and other countries in Southeast Asia, and to break connections with
China would not correspond with their overall interests; third, although the
South China Sea issue is increasingly internationalized, and ASEAN, the
United States, India and other non-dispute parties are ever more interven-
tionist, nevertheless the majority of ASEAN countries in addition to outside
powers such as the United States and India would not readily take undue
risks for countries like Vietnam and the Philippines.3
As a result, no matter how perilous the state of affairs in the South China
Sea, no matter how arrogant Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries
are in their reliance on American resistance against China, they would all
refrain from becoming China’s enemies, because they neither can funda-
mentally prevent China’s growth in maritime power, nor can they count on
excessive assistance from countries such as the United States and Japan in
times of conflict and war. At present, the South China Sea contest is pri-
marily concentrated in public opinion, diplomacy, economic development
and other aspects. Dispute stakeholders, including Vietnam and the Phil-
ippines, all hope to maintain a ‘fight without breaking’ situation; as for the
United States, Japan and powers outside the region, they are increasingly
intervening on all areas of the South China Sea issue, though have to keep
basic restraint on armed conflict, and focus more on public opinion warfare
and diplomatic perspective. Other than bringing China a certain degree of
international pressure, this in fact does not constitute any substantive con-
straints. Under these circumstances, China has ever more capabilities and
resources for conducting diplomacy based on good-neighborliness, in addi-
tion to endorsing a ‘soft landing’ for the South China Sea dispute.
Concerning the South China Sea issue, China should endeavor to resolve
the dispute through economics, diplomacy, international law and other
measures, under the premise of maintaining effective deterrence. China’s
strategic objectives on this subject should be to safeguard the security of
SLOCs and win rights to the utilization of marine resources, and unless
China is preemptively provoked and compelled by circumstantial pressure,
it would otherwise not easily make ‘seize islands and occupy reefs’ its prin-
cipal objective in the South China Sea. In economics, China should improve
its deep-sea exploration capacities, create appropriate legal systems and
steadily boost both its economic and social presence in the South China
Sea; in diplomacy, China should pursue the understanding and support of
the international community, contribute its own initiatives and views on
co-development issues, and work hard to promote joint development; in in-
ternational jurisprudence, China should provide a reasonable explanation
of the ‘Dashed Line,’ meanwhile resolutely refuting actions of countries
such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which misinterpret or violate provi-
sions of UNCLOS.
 China’s coastal geostrategy  55
In reality, none of the parties wishes to be directly in breach of The Dec-
laration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and bear
responsibility for ‘drawing first blood.’ The price of recovering occupied
islands and reefs in the South China Sea by force relative to their signifi-
cance are heavily disproportionate, while the actual control and effective
utilization of the South China Sea are also in fact not dictated by the ability
to resume more islands and reefs. Islands and reefs in the South China Sea
themselves are not of great actual importance, while the focus is on the mar-
itime areas surrounding them. As long as China’s military, economic and
social presence can freely access these waters, occupation of the islands and
reefs by Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants will become increas-
ingly unsustainable. With the ever-expanding presence of Chinese forces in
waters surrounding Ren’ai Jiao (Second Thomas Reef), it is already pro-
gressively impractical for the Philippines to base its position on ships run
aground. At the same time, on the peaceful development and management
of the South China Sea, China should appropriately respond to ASEAN
countries to construct orders and norms such as South China Sea code of
conduct (COC) as positive diplomatic gestures, additionally to emphasize
support for bilateral communication and coordination mechanisms, and
establish security and mutual trust through joint law enforcement, joint ex-
ercises and other activities.
As to the ASEAN countries’ balancing tactics of ‘befriending the far and
attacking the near,’ China can relax the tensions stemming from its rise and
ease the innate terror felt by weaker countries when facing stronger neigh-
bors, by promoting the creation of a certain form of security community
through institutional arrangements.
China has already joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South
East Asia (TAC) and has signed the DOC, in addition to actively participat-
ing in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS)
and other ASEAN mechanisms. In fact, it has already to some extent for-
saken the right to willingly initiate large-scale war in this region. China’s
commitment to security in the region is earnest and responsible. To con-
tinue to implement an ‘assurance’ policy, China should continue to enhance
cooperation with ASEAN countries on security, military affairs and other
high political issues. It should facilitate multilateral security collaboration
mechanisms in the region to convincingly progress toward binding regional
norms by establishing trust measures, with the ultimate ideal aim of form-
ing a regional security community with no mutual military threats.

‘Contesting the East’

To guarantee the unity of Taiwan and Mainland China, to defend the ter-
ritorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, to vie for sea control in the East
China Sea and to ensure a secure passage from the east to the Pacific Ocean.
56  China’s coastal geostrategy
Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea are situated on the
eastern front of China’s maritime geopolitics and are China’s three most
prominent coastal predicaments. China’s challenges facing in this direction
mainly originate from Japan and the United States. Unlike China’s conflicts
with North Korea, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, clashes at
sea between China and Japan and the United States are relatively more inci-
sive in structure: China pursues maritime power and defends its own lawful
maritime rights, whereas the United States does not acknowledge China’s
deserved rights and is unwilling to abandon its regional hegemony; there
also exists to a certain degree a zero sum game in the sea power relationship
between China and Japan, as Japan would not freely allow China to develop
from a land power to a maritime power, and confrontation between China
and Japan’s long-term maritime strategies is already inevitable. Regardless
of how future Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations develop on the whole,
Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and demarcation of the
East China Sea, and Sino-US struggles over Taiwan and strategic advan-
tages in the East Asia both would not readily subside. Both Japan and the
United States also would not willingly relinquish their power and influence
in offshore East Asia to China.
Maritime competitions with Japan and the United States are the princi-
pal problem facing China’s maritime development at present and also for a
considerable period of time in the future. It is furthermore a major obliga-
tory test for China as its sea power develops. US-Japanese military deploy-
ment in Okinawa and elsewhere along the First Island Chain can entirely
block Chinese naval access to maritime channels from the East China Sea
to the Pacific Ocean in wartime. Before Taiwan is reunified with the Chinese
Mainland, this situation severely restricts the Chinese Navy’s oceangoing
capabilities; China’s growing sea power will certainly also rattle Japan’s
maritime superiority in the East China Sea and will inevitably incur Jap-
anese precautions and pressure; on Taiwan and other issues, the United
States and China have long oscillated between intense games of ‘interven-
tion’ and ‘anti-intervention.’ If China wishes to become a maritime power,
it must directly confront these structural contradictions; when necessary, it
also has no choice but to engage in struggle and requires the determination
and courage to use various methods, including military operations, to op-
pose hostile actions (Figure 3.1).
China is also gradually acquiring the strength and foundation for game
playing. In the East China Sea, the gap in strength between China, the
United States and Japan is narrowing with continuous modernization ad-
vances in China’s military and improvements in military efficiency. Under
the projected influence of China’s mighty continental power, Sino-Japanese
and Sino-US power transitions in the East China Sea are already inevitable.
Japan will be compelled to recognize China’s favorable position, while the
United States faces pressure to acquiesce in China’s defense of its lawful
maritime rights and due position. In the case of Taiwan for instance, RAND
 China’s coastal geostrategy  57

Figure 3.1  T
 he First and Second Island Chains.

Corporation claims in its 2015 report on the evolving balance of power be-
tween China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait, that in 2017 and
beyond, the United States would be in a disadvantageous position coded
by most of the military scorecards. Confronted by China’s military force of
land-based air power, short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and
rising sea power, the United States would no longer be able to defend the
Taiwan region in most scenarios.4
Moreover, the sensitivities of these concerns to each of the three sides,
China, the United States and Japan, are somewhat different. For China,
these issues are no doubt core and substantial interests, and China’s main
aim is to recover its rightful status of power; Japan’s main goal is to occupy,
validate and expand illicitly acquired gains, and impede progress of China’s
sea power; whereas the United States’ main objective in the East China sea is
to maintain freedom of navigation and regional stability, and safeguard the
US-led maritime order. This kind of difference on interest types, in addition
to varying geographic distances from each other’s mainland, has led China
to gain more advantages in the motivation and determination to fight.
On the surface, Sino-Japanese confrontations over the Diaoyu Islands
and East China Sea have for the moment already eclipsed Sino-US mari-
time contradictions, forming a pattern of conflict to ‘pressure Japan first,
and compel the US second’; behind this, Sino-US maritime geopolitical
competition is more and more intense, toward the status quo of Taiwan
and Diaoyu Islands. The United States is more considering the strategic
58  China’s coastal geostrategy
consequences of the possible changes rather than the security commitments
to Taiwan and Japan.
Every Japanese provocation and US containment operation will act as an
opportunity for continued expansion of successful achievements and serve
as a ‘strategic whetstone’ for China’s rise, comprehensively developing the
capabilities of China’s international mobilization, public communications,
jurisprudent battles and military deterrence.
The fight should be for better negotiation and compromise. It is unlikely
that China will expel the US military existence from the Western Pacific
through armed force, and also overpowering Japan by military force may in
fact not be the best option for China. The optimal outcome is to ‘seek status
by virtue of strength’ instead of conquering adversaries and their armies
through war and force Japan and the United States to respect China’s core
interests and entitled maritime rights–based displays of strengths and estab-
lishment of capabilities. In order to avoid losing control of the situation dur-
ing strategic confrontation, when simultaneous to enhancement of military
deterrence, diplomatic negotiation, legal struggle, and other approaches, it
is necessary to make full preparations for the two eventualities.
On the one hand, preparations for a worst-case scenario should be made
to increase the ability to control conflicts and win wars. Currently, Japan’s
reinforcement of its so-called defense of the south west happens to coincide
with the American desire for its allies to bear greater responsibility. Japan
and the United States are intensifying their consolidation of power and mil-
itary drills, such as counter missile exercises, directed at China’s perceived
antagonistic island seizures, are increasingly frequent. With considerable
developments in China’s sea power, Japanese and American hostility will
continue to escalate. In the future, further exacerbation of conflict, relentless
friction and intense struggle will be present in the East China Sea situation.
To this end, China must improve its ability to control conflict and win wars,
and be constantly ready to respond to outbreaks of conflict or crisis in the
East China Sea. Only with improvements in China’s maritime deterrence
capabilities, is it possible to maintain a basic balance in dynamic trends and
have space for bargaining. Even the best negotiation techniques and diplo-
matic performances, if not supported by strength, cannot win opponents’
respect. If China possesses specific maritime deterrence capabilities in the
East China Sea, supported by land-based air and missile forces, these would
act as certain constraint on the US and Japan’s mighty sea and air power.
The United States and Japan, when implementing containment, armed in-
timidation and battle plans, would have no choice but to reconsider more
before proceeding. Besides capacity building, considering that ‘the likeli-
hood of limited war and instability is higher in a new U.S.-China bipolar
system in the twenty-first century even compared to the old U.S.-Soviet Un-
ion bipolar system of the twentieth century,’5 and the increasingly fierce war
rhetoric of the United States,6 China should more resolutely demonstrate
 China’s coastal geostrategy  59
and maintain its policy bottom lines on Taiwan and other issues, pursuing
a more active deterrent.
On the other hand, the establishment of an effective crisis management
mechanism should be promoted to circumvent possible conflicts and crisis.
Chinese, American and Japanese strengths have become more and more
comparable, leading as anticipated to an intensification of power struggles.
Their military departments’ preparations based on worst-case scenarios
raise the possibility of conflict erupting on its own accord. In particular,
the mounted certain offensive weaponry or platform are even more likely to
directly lead to conflict. It is highly probably that the Prompt Global Strike
(PGS) deployed by the United States, due to its speed and strike accuracy,
would in times of crisis exacerbate the pessimism of Chinese policymakers
and result in measures that further worsen the crisis. As maritime disputes
intensify in East Asia, the United States continues to emphasize and even
augment its security commitments to countries such as Japan and the Phil-
ippines, which increases the risk of strategic misjudgment between China
and the United States due to third party factors. With the degree of strate-
gic mutual suspicion and confrontation on the rise, American and Japanese
reconnaissance and Chinese anti-reconnaissance struggles in the waters of
East Asia are serious with confrontation incidents between warships and
aircrafts frequently occurring. Some of them have been in public and at-
tracted worldwide attention. For instance, on 5 December 2013, the Ameri-
can cruiser USS Cowpens trespassed into the training waters of the Chinese
aircraft carrier Liaoning. As the warnings were ineffective, a Chinese vessel
responsible for alerts in the formation of the Liaoning rushed to intercept
the route of the USS Cowpens, forcing the latter to implement emergency
evasion measures. On 19 August 2014, a US P-8A Poseidon surveillance
aircraft, flying 220 kilometers east of Hainan, was intercepted by a PLA
Naval Air Force J-11B (Shenyang J-11B) jet fighter for close-range investiga-
tion and verification. American media speculated that there was less than 30
feet of space between the two aircrafts’ wings, and the Chinese jet even per-
formed a ‘barrel roll’ aerial acrobatic stunt. In future, similar incidents will
be infinite in number. In the event of friction or on-site mismanagement,
misjudgments and communication barriers may lead to escalations in crises
or conflict. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to build an effective crisis
prevention and management mechanism and prevent unnecessary misjudg-
ments and unanticipated conflicts.
‘The north is the rear, the south is the foundation, the east is the core.’
Each direction has a different strategic role and faces different contradic-
tions, so response tactics must also vary. The significance of the strategy
‘Stabilizing the North, Harmonizing the South, Contesting the East’ is to
clarify the strategic focus and grand plan of response for China’s three main
maritime directions, creating a coordinated complete strategy. Of course,
in any direction, there exists the application of ‘stabilizing, harmonizing,
60  China’s coastal geostrategy
contesting’ tactics and measures, but it is only a matter of difference in the
extent of their importance, strategic focus and priority.

Notes
1 Feng Liang and Fang Xiuyu, “Korean Maritime Security Policy: History and
Reality,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi Luntan, No. 1, 2012, p. 113.
2 Robert-Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” https://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/
3 Hu Bo, China’s Sea Power Strategy: Diplomacy, the Marine Economy and Sea
Power (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2012), p. 163.
4 Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff
Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David
A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris,
The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Bal-
ance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html, Summary xxix.
5 Øystein Tunsjø, “Another Long Peace?” The National Interest, 17 October 2018,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/another-long-peace-33726
6 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, “China Will Control the
South China Sea If Short of War with the United States”, USN Expected Nomi-
nee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, p. 18, www.armed-services.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_APQs_04–17–18.pdf; Harry Harris, “Make No
Mistake, Our 27-year Holiday from History Is Over. Great Power Competition Is
Back,” https://news.usni.org/2018/05/30/adm-davidson-takes-over-newly-named-
indo-pacific-command-in-ceremony-marked-by-great-power-competition-talk
4 China’s exterior line strategy
at sea

The greatest differences between sea and land are the former’s fluidity and
openness. If China wishes to truly safeguard its national security and inter-
ests, it cannot confine its defenses to the coast; an important characteristic
of powerful countries, as opposed to weak countries, is globalization and
the consequent internationalization of their responsibility. In addition to
managing one’s own affairs and engaging in self-defense, it is also necessary
for major powers to provide public goods for international security, so as
to shape and maintain the international order. China’s military forces must
have their own exterior line strategy and be prepared to build and distribute
power on a global scale, whether in the interests of self-defense or to pro-
mote international justice.

The ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces

The so-called stepping out of military force refers to a country’s military
deployment operations and maneuvers outside its territory and coastal ar-
eas. This is inevitably required as major countries develop and is also a gen-
uine necessity as they safeguard overseas interests, wield political influence
and assume responsibilities of great powers. Traditional military powers
such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia have long ably
maintained military presences overseas, while frequently conducting over-
seas military operations; India, Japan and other emerging military pow-
ers are also actively planning to foray overseas. China does not yet have
any systematic preparations and designs for its military forces to ‘step out.’
Nevertheless, whether escorting vessels in Gulf of Aden, evacuating Chi-
nese nationals from Libya, or conducting search and rescue activities for
Malaysia Airlines MH370 and other overseas operations, the ‘stepping out’
of China’s military forces has in practice already far exceeded theory and
strategic planning.
In order to wholeheartedly safeguard national security and citizens’ in-
terests, more clearly communicate strategic intentions to the international
community, build a peaceful and structured international order, and better
62  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
direct the process of ‘stepping out’ by military forces, China ought to ex-
plore a realistic and effective general plan.

Necessity: why is it essential to ‘step out’?

National interests are the main driver behind a country’s overseas activities.
The ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces is first and foremost necessary
to safeguard and expand interests. For any country, as its economic power
advances worldwide, its military might will likewise ‘step out.’ China is no
exception, as the Chinese economy’s ‘stepping out’ has naturally led to the
Chinese military forces to ‘follow suit.’ China already has interests dispersed
across the world, and it is possible that any signs of disorder or turbulence
in whichever part of the world may be closely linked to the country itself.
Around the world, violence, terrorist attacks, armed conflict and regional
turmoil frequently threaten overseas Chinese interests and the property and
lives of Chinese citizens. However, China still lacks compelling methods of
protecting overseas interests. In most situations, not only is it not feasible
to rely on military ‘hard power’ when confronted by large-scale terrorist
groups or organized encroachment by hostile countries, it is also not pos-
sible to effectively respond to the aggressive actions of even individual or
small groups.
Without a stable surrounding security environment, the rise of any power
would be vulnerable. The safeguarding of national security and expansion
of strategic space also require military forces to ‘step out.’ As mentioned
before, a power must have designated space for development and border
interests. The best way to maintain and defend these interests is not to con-
struct a ‘maritime Great Wall,’ but to break out from the bounds of core
interests to actively launch political, economic and military operations, in
order to defuse, contain and deter adversarial external influences, alleviate
and eliminate potential threats, and maintain regional peace and stability.
Continental–maritime complex countries, such as China, have intrinsic
disadvantages in maritime defense. Historical experience and geopolitical
theory have also repeatedly proven that if Chinese military forces were to
remain confined to their own territory and coastal areas in the vicinity of
the First Island Chain, China would be situated in an extremely unfavorable
position in strategic contests with foreign forces. China must endeavor to
maintain an effective presence of forces in the Western Pacific and Northern
Indian Oceans beyond the First Island Chain, in order to safeguard the se-
curity of strategic SLOCs, and furthermore contain any potentially hostile
activities that strategic rivals may initiate. In addition, as wars become rarer
and the age of staking out turf and large-scale clashes between warships has
long passed. For a rising maritime star such as China, military exercises
and non-warfare military operations at sea will become the main means
of promoting combat effectiveness in the armed forces. In other words, the
Chinese army needs to ‘step out’ to train its troops.
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  63
Moreover, Chinese military forces’ ‘stepping out’ also provides regional
and global ‘public goods.’ Due to a decline in recent years in the United
States’ relative capability and a decrease in its will to assume global respon-
sibility, and as other Western powers have widely suffered from economic
crises and struggles in development, demand in international public goods
has far outstripped supply. The international order has approached a state
of ‘chaos,’ while problems with terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, smuggling of narcotics, piracy, the marine environment
and natural disasters have frequently arisen. Critical duties such as main-
taining worldwide peace and stability, guaranteeing maritime security, in
addition to freedom of navigation sorely need a power such as China to step
forward. China has consistently attached great importance to preserving
world peace, actively providing human, material and financial resources for
UN Peacekeeping Operations, as well as various forms of unconditional aid
for international disaster relief.
However, in comparison with the United States, Great Britain, France
and other countries, China has by far not offered sufficient ‘hard power,’
as its overseas military capabilities are severely incommensurate with its
national strength. Furthermore, military forces dispatched by China are for
the most part composed of medical, engineering, communications and other
noncombat divisions. As China’s national strength progressively grows,
such deficits in responsibility are increasingly criticized by the international
community, and it has even been described as a ‘free rider.’ As China’s mil-
itary force ‘steps out,’ it will compensate for this imbalance and fulfill inter-
national obligations and duties in proportion to its national strength.

Feasibility: is it possible to ‘step out’?

To a certain extent, China has already begun to possess overseas power
projection capacities. This forms the material basis of its military forces’
‘stepping out.’ In naval aspects, the large-scale active service of type 052D
destroyers, type 054A frigates, the ‘Weishanhu’ and other large oceangoing
supply vessels allows China certain capabilities for oceangoing operations
and power projection, and have been preliminarily formed into organized
formations consisting of one to two guided missile destroyers, one to two
frigates and one oceangoing supply vessel; in future, as China’s aircraft car-
rier formations become combat effective, the Chinese Navy’s power projec-
tion platforms will become stronger and more extensive. In the air force,
air-freighter formations, composed mainly of the domestically produced
Y-8 and Russian-made Ilyushin IL-76, are basically capable of rapid inter-
continental airborne delivery of troops on a regiment or brigade scale. Test
flights of the Y-20 large airfreighter indicate that the Chinese Air Force will
gradually gain strategic capabilities in air transportation.
The Chinese armed forces have accumulated essential knowledge and ex-
perience through joint military exercises, overseas disaster relief, antipiracy
64  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
and other operations, building an excellent intellectual foundation upon
which to ‘step out’ on a grand scale. From 2009, the Chinese Navy has suc-
cessively dispatched formations on close to 30 occasions (typically forma-
tions formed of one guided missile destroyer, one frigate and one supply
vessel) to carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. Over nine years
of escort operations have allowed the Chinese armed forces to accumulate
firsthand information, intelligence and experience in areas such as over-
seas deployment, international military communication and operational
command; from 2010 onward, China’s three major fleets have frequently
conducted oceangoing training exercises and joint navy–air force drills in
waters between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, greatly
enhancing the Chinese military’s joint combat capabilities and promoting
collaboration between various branches and divisions within the navy.
Moreover, over the past five years, the Chinese military has also cooperated
with successive foreign militaries to transport chemical weapons from Syria
and perform search and rescue duties for flight MH370. Furthermore, it
has on multiple occasions participated in Sino-Russian joint military drills,
‘Cobra Gold’ multinational warfare exercises, Exercise RIMPAC (the Rim
of the Pacific) and other operations, gradually possessing the requisite inter-
national vision and fundamental skills to ‘step out.’
China’s burgeoning comprehensive national strength and international
influence have provided a good strategic opportunity for Chinese military
forces to ‘step out.’ As contemporary global themes of peace and develop-
ment become ever more important, nontraditional security threats more
conspicuous and ‘adversaries’ or rivals more complex and multifarious in
countries’ national security strategies, the pertinence of overseas bases has
notably decreased. Although for all countries, the construction and exercise
of military forces will inevitably aggravate neighboring countries and other
powers, levels of sensitivity are much lower than those before the end of the
Cold War. Djibouti, for instance, intends to build a ‘multinational’ base com-
plex, by virtue of its unique geographic location. Troops and militia from
countries such as the United States, France and Japan are now stationed
in Djibouti, whose government also intends to provide docks and ports to
armed forces from Russia, China and other countries. From this it can be
seen that although there exist mutual suspicion and precaution between
various powers in overseas deployment and application of force, this is not
necessarily a ‘zero sum game,’ a situation in which by venturing out, China
would force others out of the picture. Moreover, the United States and other
Western powers are unable to adequately ensure maritime security in addi-
tion to world prosperity and stability. For the sake of sharing responsibility,
traditional military powers such as the United States, United Kingdom and
France have also strategic interests to endorse Chinese power to robustly
‘step out.’ China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council and has long pursued foreign policies of independence and self-­
determination. In addition to making enormous contributions to economic
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  65
growth and prosperity worldwide, China has played an increasingly vital
role in recent years, becoming even more indispensable as its global influ-
ence continues to expand. In such an international political environment,
Chinese military force has the possibility to gain access to observation sites
and communications relay stations abroad, in addition to supply points.
There exist no obvious political obstacles against China assuming a greater
role in peacekeeping, escort duties, disaster relief and other international
operations. On the morning of 1 August 2017, the ceremony in which the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stationed in Djibouti safeguarded
base troops stationed in the base camp was held. This marks the completion
and put into use of Chinese first overseas security base.

Strategy: how to ‘step out’

In reality, in recent years, the Chinese military forces have been rapid and
remarkable in their pace as they ‘step out.’ However, Chinese actions are
mostly responses to emergencies, such as piracy, natural disasters and other
unforeseen circumstances, lacking a system of strategic co-ordination and
advanced theoretical guidance. In the future what methods will China
chiefly employ to ‘step out,’ on what scale and how far-reaching in scope?
These are all questions that China must urgently consider, explore and find
clear answers to. They do not only need to outline in practice the strategic
requirements of ‘stepping out,’ but moreover must clarify to the world the
practical demands of ‘China’s future path,’ which are worthy of emphasis
and in-depth discussion by Chinese leaders, decision-making departments
and scholars.
I believe that ‘stepping out’ by military forces is an organic component of
China’s active national defense strategy and in general should serve China’s
greater strategy of peaceful development. Its main goal is neither territo-
rial expansion, nor the pursuit of global hegemony, but rather to maintain
China’s overseas interests, national security and the international order. It
should be noted that under China’s strategy of peaceful development, China
does not in fact have any exclusive overseas political and cultural interests.
Moreover, the majority of conflicts of interest can be resolved through pol-
itics, economics, diplomacy and with other approaches. As a result, China
simply does not need to ‘send warships to follow developments in its in-
terests.’ In comparison with the United States, ‘stepping out’ by China’s
military powers is both relatively limited in scale and scope. China needs
to clearly recognize this and adhere to this overall guiding principle in the
long term.
With regard to scope, China’s overall strategy ought to ‘emphasize distri-
bution in the Asia-Pacific, exert influence globally’: building a constant effec-
tive military presence in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans,
while retaining military influences in other areas of the world through
warship visits, peacekeeping missions, escort operations and joint  drills.
66  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
In terms of scale, China’s strategic delivery forces should be able to meet the
demands of wars of moderate intensity in areas adjacent to its ­territory – the
naval aviation power of one to two aircraft carrier formations, or the infan-
try strength of a division to an army group, would furthermore have the ca-
pacity to provide reinforcements at any moment; in regions outside of Asia,
the Western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, China should have the
ability to respond to low-intensity wars or nontraditional security threats,
which may require rapid arrival and timely deployments of land, sea and
air forces, and should at the very least include the following capabilities: an
oceangoing combat formation composed of approximately two warships,
army combat forces at the battalion or regiment levels, in addition to aerial
deterrence and reinforcement support at the squadron level.
As China’s military power ‘steps out,’ there also exist enormous differ-
ences in its methods and avenues in comparison to those of the United States,
Great Britain, France and other countries. China will ‘step out’ principally
using methods of amiable cooperation, diplomatic negotiation, equality and
mutual gain, as opposed to relying on warfare or the establishment of mil-
itary blocs. This is distinct from the experiences of other great powers, as
throughout history, ‘stepping out’ by military forces has often been the re-
sult of colonization and large-scale war, or depended upon connections with
colonial overlords or relations with allies. For instance, British and French
overseas bases are mostly remnants from the colonial period, whereas the
United States’ vast overseas military bases are profiting from post–Second
World War arrangements and hegemonic interference in the Third World.
In the process of ‘stepping out,’ it is necessary to pay particular attention
to the concepts of ‘reasonability,’ ‘legitimacy,’ and ‘synergy.’ ‘Reasonability’,
that is, to not to exert pressure, and to convince others with morality in
the spirit of principles of equality and negotiation; ‘legitimacy’ is namely to
conform to the UN system of legal standards and prevailing international
norms, as well as to acquire its general recognition and respect, reflecting
both changes in the international community’s mainstream values in a
timely manner; ‘synergy’ refers to taking advantage of opportunities as they
arise. The ‘stepping out’ strategy should adapt to international trends and
needs of the international community, combine the safeguarding of one’s
own interests with the provision of international public goods and connect
the pursuit of power with the fulfillment of international responsibility,
one classic example being escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. However,
‘stepping out’ by military forces is not synonymous with the ‘stepping out’
by the economy. The former has a relatively high degree of sensitivity, and
despite China’s endeavors, it is impossible to entirely eliminate some of the
entrenched suspicion, friction and even conflict that might result. When con-
tradictions and disagreements emerge, it is necessary to adopt a pragmatic,
confident and candid attitude in communications with the international
community, not seeking the outside world’s complete understanding and
support, but striving to encourage related countries to have an unobscured
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  67
understanding of China’s position and principles and form comparatively
stable strategic expectations with regard to Chinese foreign conduct.

Aircraft carriers and China’s two-ocean strategy

On 25 September 2012, China’s first aircraft carrier, ‘Liaoning,’ was offi-
cially commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and
on 24 November, J-15 fighters successfully completed test flights, taking-off
and landing onboard. On 26 November 2013, the ‘Liaoning’ set sail for the
South China Sea from a military port in Qingdao, escorted by two guided
missile destroyers and two missile frigates, to conduct oceangoing forma-
tion training exercises. The Chinese people’s dream of an aircraft carrier
was finally realized. This both demonstrated that China’s defense industry
had advanced in leaps and bounds and that China would persevere in its
progress toward blue oceans with the construction of an oceangoing navy.
Nonetheless, this is only the first step in a long journey, and in the future,
there remain arduous trials ahead.

Planning and construction of Chinese aircraft carriers

‘Liaoning’ is only the beginning, for its usefulness as a test case by far sur-
passes its actual combat abilities. The construction of aircraft carriers, in
addition to their incorporation into the military and formation of combat
capabilities, is an exceptionally difficult and complex process, requiring the
unremitting hard work of several generations. At present, China’s aircraft
carrier program is still simultaneously positioned in stages of practice, study
and exploration, with considerable distance remaining before ultimate de-
ployment and utilization in high-intensity combat. In the construction pro-
cess, China should draw extensively on experiences or lessons from countries
such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia. Considering that
China has a relatively brief history of engagement and use of aircraft carriers
and a shortage of experience, the need to conduct test demonstrations using
the ‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier as a platform was evidently imperative. Through
the ‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier, China has initiated assessments of its own plans
and programs, and is able to provide data and evidence on a firsthand basis
for final decision-making. The metamorphosis from the ‘Varyag’ to ‘­Liaoning’
has proven that this experiment has already attained initial results.
Aircraft carriers are a systemic project, an immense system of combat
platforms. There remains a long way to go from construction of the aircraft
carrier platform itself and the successful take-off and landing of carrier-­
borne aircraft to the aircraft carrier’s formal incorporation into the mili-
tary and combat readiness. A relatively long period of time is required to
test carrier-related software, conduct trials of weapons systems and trou-
bleshoot combat command systems. After the internal systems are properly
integrated, the carrier also needs to collaborate and conduct joint training
68  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
drills with destroyers, frigates, submarines and other members of future for-
mations, because the aircraft carrier never ‘fight alone.’ This stage involves
contact and coordination of communication, command, intelligence and
other systems between the different platforms, while the process will be even
more intricate and protracted.
For now, it seems that China’s aircraft carrier project is progressing ex-
traordinary smoothly. According to open resources, China is currently con-
structing two domestically made aircraft carriers in Dalian and Shanghai,
respectively. On the morning of 26 April 2017, the first Chinese domestically
made aircraft carrier was launched in Dalian. Almost simultaneously, PLA
Daily declared that ‘The construction of domestic aircraft carriers shows
that China has fully mastered technology and management experience in
relation with the carrier.’1
The situation is highly promising, but I believe that construction of world-
class aircraft carriers cannot rely on political resolve, economic investment
and sheer tenacity alone. China must yet remain calm, as a scientific atti-
tude, pragmatic outlook, enterprising spirit and systematic mindset are also
vital for success.
In future, China’s plans for and construction of aircraft carriers first
should adhere to a scientific attitude. The aircraft carrier program involves
myriad departments, and it is typically very difficult to consolidate knowl-
edge and opinions of various stakeholders. In the USSR, diverging views
within departments and leadership resulted in repeated indecision within
the aircraft carrier program and frequent repairs after it was launched in
haste; as a result, by the dissolution of the USSR, only the Kuznetsov-class
represented a success. It is furthermore necessary to mention that the po-
litical leadership ought to respect the recommendations of scientists and
experts in the policymaking process, rather than allow personal preferences
to impact decisions. In over 30 years, the USSR produced at least nine air-
craft carriers of four different classes but was ultimately unable to form
an effective combat force. To a large extent, this was related to its leaders’
‘impulsive’ decision-making. Therefore, extreme caution is essential when
formulating plans, selecting programs, demonstrating technology and mak-
ing decisions. It is necessary to comprehensively evaluate China’s national
strength, the domestic and international environments, operational needs
and technical capacities. Relatively scientific, long-term and enduring plans
for aircraft carrier construction were finally formed following repeated in-
vestigation and trials.
Second, a pragmatic outlook is required. With the introduction of the
‘Liaoning’ into active service and two other domestically made aircraft
carriers in sea trials and in the shipyard respectively, the Chinese people’s
self-esteem and sense of pride will unquestionably soar. Every functional de-
partment and decision-making bureau should seek a realistic and pragmatic
outlook, striving to avoid impractical goals and pursuits. With regard to
scale, it is necessary to comprehensively consider China’s maritime natural
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  69
endowments, geographical environment, national strength and other cir-
cumstances. China’s aircraft carrier program cannot realistically compare
to that of the United States, but should focus on consulting British, French
and other regional sea powers to devise a somewhat restrained aircraft car-
rier program. In terms of application, Chinese aircraft carriers will maintain
an effective presence in regions of the Western Pacific and Northern Indian
Oceans, effectively containing forces that seek to blockade China from ex-
terior lines, fully demonstrating the navy’s characteristics of mobility, and
strongly deterring adversarial forces, so as to ensure the relative security of
China’s coastal waters; at the same time, they will play a role in diplomacy,
maritime search and rescue, crisis management and other nonmilitary issues
on a global scale. China’s aircraft carriers simply cannot parallel those of the
United States in terms of scale, practical experience and levels of sophistica-
tion. Chinese, particularly policymakers, need to clearly understand that it
will also be very difficult for Chinese aircraft carrier formations to directly
contest those of American carriers in the foreseeable future. Unless this is
realized, any strategic designs may be very dangerous.
Finally, an enterprising spirit is essential. China should observe princi-
ples of gradual and steady progress but must also have a high starting point.
In comparison with the USSR, China benefits from a better international
political and economic environment, with more advanced and elaborate ba-
sic industrial systems, enormous economic strength and more opportunities
to share other countries’ experiences of success and failure. China can even
utilize computer simulation, reverse experimentation and other measures in
the place of many specific practical processes. Therefore, in its construction
of aircraft carriers, China ought to aim to be a global vanguard, boldly im-
agine and meticulously verify.
In addition, the construction and operation of China’s aircraft carrier
should focus particular attention on systematic concepts and the construc-
tion of weapons systems. The results of several wars following the Cold
War demonstrate that modern warfare is often a confrontation of coher-
ent weapons systems, intelligence systems and command systems between
countries. Detriments in any single weapons system would not significantly
impact the situation on the battlefield, while intimate coordination between
different branches of the armed forces and various weapons systems can
generate a huge advantage in battle. War is by now a confrontation of sys-
tems, in which the reasoned use of combinations can greatly improve over-
all combat effectiveness, whereas unreasonable combinations would likely
lead to an exponential decrease in performance. Active service of the ‘Li-
aoning’ and subsequent aircraft carriers will not rapidly overhaul the Chi-
nese ­Navy’s overall combat capacity and capabilities. If it is not possible to
swiftly improve relevant complementary equipment and systems, and accu-
mulate the necessary combat experiences and command capabilities, these
aircraft carriers will likely become a liability for the PLAN rather than a
tool for victory.
70  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
Principal duties of China’s aircraft carriers
The history of modern naval developments following the Second World
War demonstrates that aircraft carriers have become standard equipment
for oceangoing navies and are often at the core of the fleet. It is impossible
to build an oceangoing navy without developing aircraft carriers. This is
particularly true for countries, such as China, which lack substantial sup-
port in the distant oceans. As a result, oceangoing fleets must rely on their
own strength to win regional air control and defend air space, while air-
craft carriers are mobile airfields and an indispensable means of seizing air
supremacy at sea. Experiences of countries such as the United States and
Great Britain show that overseas operations are still heavily dependent on
carrier-based aircraft to enable air strikes, offer tactical cover and provide
support for control, even in situations where a multitude of overseas bases
and allied support are available. For instance, during ‘Operation Enduring
Freedom’ in December 2001, aircraft carriers were responsible for 75 per-
cent of the air assault mission.2
At the same time, aircraft carrier formations are integrated maritime
combat platforms, combining functions such as intelligence collection,
projection of military strength, firepower support, in addition to com-
mand and control operations. They are able to fully carry out air defense,
antisubmarine, onshore, and ant-iship strikes and combat missions. As the
most important component of the fleet, aircraft carriers are very effective
at thwarting enemy attacks both onshore or at sea, helping to safeguard
our sea power. Meanwhile, they play a key role while securing air suprem-
acy in addition to ensuring offensive power on the ground. In fact, if not
for its two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, the British
military would have certainly been unable to recover the Falklands Islands
(Islas Malvinas) in 1982. With increasingly sophisticated modern refueling
tankers and innovative combat weaponry, the operational radius of aircraft
carriers has expanded further. It is conventional belief that carrier-borne
attack aircraft in large aircraft carrier formations can reach surface and on-
shore targets within an attack radius of 1,000 nautical miles; in defense, air
defenses can reach up to 300 nautical miles in depth, while antisubmarine
defenses extend more than 200 nautical miles in depth.3 In the future, with
improvements in sensor technology and advancements in the operational
radius of weaponry, the effectiveness of aircraft carriers as an invaluable
platform will also be better reflected.
In addition to numerous military functions, modern aircraft carriers are
responsible for a growing variety of nonmilitary assignments and play an
increasingly important role in the fields of nontraditional security. Aircraft
carriers are a vital tool for disaster relief, medical assistance and other areas
of humanitarian aid. In the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, impressive vertical
air transportation capabilities of the aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lin-
coln, played a key role in disaster relief efforts. In times of crisis, aircraft
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  71
carriers are also a powerful means of personnel relocation. During the
­Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006, the United Kingdom dispatched multiple
ships, led by the HMS Illustrious, to engage in the evacuation of nationals.
It is only natural that a major power such as China ought to possess air-
craft carriers. China’s uses of aircraft carriers will not differ greatly from
those of the United Kingdom and the United States. Nevertheless, the emer-
gence of China’s aircraft carriers has astonished a number of countries,
attracting an onslaught of wide-ranging speculation, which includes two
highly representative arguments. The first claims that they will be used to
settle maritime disputes in the South China Sea and other waters in China’s
vicinity, while the second asserts that they are to challenge the United States
for maritime hegemony.
However, even those with the slightest trace of common sense should un-
derstand that China’s main motive for its development of aircraft carriers
is certainly not the settlement of maritime disputes with neighboring coun-
tries, as China pursues a policy of peaceful dispute resolution. Moreover,
even if Chinese policymakers were determined to utilize armed force or
forceful measures to resolve maritime disputes with Japan and some South-
east Asian countries, aircraft carriers would not act as the main combat
platform.
First, with comprehensive progress in China’s military modernization,
China has an ever growing number of alternative policy options from
which to select. At present, the Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force are
equipped mainly with combat aircraft consisting of Shenyang J-10, J-11,
Sukhoi Su-27, Su-30 and other third-generation combat fleets, all of which
have operational radiuses of approximately 1,500 kilometers or above. This
is no longer the era that was spearheaded by the limited J-6 and J-7; there-
fore, no matter whether the Diaoyu Islands or the Nansha Islands, both are
within the effective radius of China’s land-based fighter jets. In the future,
as China’s fourth-generation aircraft like J-20 enter active service in large
numbers, maintaining the advantages of air supremacy in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea will be a foregone conclusion. With regard to
missiles, China has formed an overwhelming advantage over its neighboring
countries. China’s land-launched cruise missiles and short-range ballistic
missiles can deter adversaries through saturation attacks in certain waters.
Whereas along China’s coast, hydro-acoustic conditions are complex and
marine geography unique, offering an ideal situation for the activities of
China’s silent running submarines, such as the Kilo-class, Yuan-class and
Song-class. China can use these submarines to effectively check and contain
opponents’ surface vessels. Furthermore, the combat capacity and versa-
tility of Chinese surface vessels are growing stronger. Domestically made
destroyers, such as the 052B and 052C models, and four modern destroyers
introduced from Russia have relatively strong overall operational capaci-
ties, including air defense, antisubmarine and anti-ship capabilities, and are
able to retaliate, blockade, provide firepower and carry out other combat
72  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
missions in coastal waters. As for 052D destroyers, which are beginning to
be mass produced, they harbor greater overall maritime combat capability,
in particular its regional air defense system has been lauded as the Chinese
version of ‘Aegis.’ As China has so many choices in its arsenal, what need is
there to bother with aircraft carriers?
Second, as aircraft carriers are unsuited for coastal operations, their value
in resolving maritime disputes is extremely low. Aircraft carriers are combat
platforms and instruments that operate principally on the high seas, whereas
due to space restrictions, it is difficult to fully demonstrate the combat effec-
tiveness of aircraft carriers in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and
other coastal areas. Moreover, in comparison to China’s and its opponents’
large fleets of land-based fighter jets, the dozens of carrier-borne aircrafts
play only a very minor role. On the other hand, aircraft carriers operating
in coastal waters face immense risks. Aircraft carriers are extremely vulner-
able to being monitored and tracked from shore-based radar surveillance,
electronic interception and reconnaissance aircraft in coastal waters, such as
the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They are also susceptible to at-
tacks from ground-based aircraft, cruise missiles, submarines and other Anti-­
Access/Area Denial weapons. In times of war, not only would aircraft carriers
not be of great assistance in coastal areas, they could easily be ‘taken hostage.’
It is likewise unthinkable that the mission of China’s aircraft carriers is
to compete with the United States for maritime hegemony. Disregarding
the fact that China has no such strategic intentions, even if China wished to
challenge the US Navy in the high seas, it is extremely foolish to assume that
it would use aircraft carriers and large-scale formations to engage in battle.
With regard to the construction and distribution of sea power, US strength
will continue to exceed that of China for a long time to come. If China at-
tempted to initiate a symmetrical contest with the United States in the high
seas, pitting aircraft carriers against aircraft carriers, it would be very dif-
ficult for China to gain the upper hand. In terms of aircraft carrier tech-
nology, there are generations of differences between China and the United
States. The Liaoning is less advanced that even the USS Enterprise-class
aircraft carrier, which was launched in the 1960s; from the perspective of
combat experience, China is starting virtually from scratch, whereas the
United States already has almost a century’s worth of abundant practice.
We can be optimistic that China will be able to rapidly compensate for this
gap in experience and technological skill by developing in leaps and bounds.
However, even if this is the case, the geographic characteristics of China’s
continental-maritime complex mean that in the long run, China cannot con-
tinue to invest a large proportion of its resources in the navy and in aircraft
carriers in a way similar to the United States. On this issue, the interpreta-
tion of Andrew Erickson, professor at US Naval War College, is in compar-
ison rational and objective. He believes that Chinese aircraft carriers will
mainly be responsible for four tasks: protection of SLOCs, naval diplomacy,
regional deterrence, in addition to humanitarian aid and disaster relief.4
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  73
Development of aircraft carriers is one part of China’s oceangoing strat-
egy and represents a cornerstone of China’s progress toward blue water,
international responsibility and a global power, while it is not a counter-
weight to be used for the escalation of contests with neighboring countries
or with the United States. Coastal waters should not be the theater of Chi-
na’s aircraft carriers, which in fact ought to make their mark in the Western
Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans, adjacent to China. In view of China’s
increasingly diverse range of combat platforms and options in the manage-
ment of maritime disputes, some countries, which are engaged in disputes
with China, unthinkingly criticize and condemn, while plainly grossly un-
derestimating China’s ambitions with regard to aircraft carriers. Of course,
China’s aircraft carrier program is unavoidably becoming the focus of spec-
ulation on ‘the China Threat theory.’

The two-ocean deployment of Chinese aircraft carriers

The narrow ribbons of water within the First Island Chain are similar to a
large pond. Therefore, this is not the site that Chinese aircraft carriers can
maneuver for prolonged periods of time. Chinese aircraft carriers are des-
tined to advance toward the high seas, as well as undertake combat duties in
the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans.
For China, the first purpose of aircraft carriers is to resolve issues of long-
range projection of military power and oceangoing operations. China’s cur-
rent oceangoing formations, composed of destroyers and frigates, are lacking
in essential logistical safeguards and intelligence support, with no offshore
air supremacy or requisite antisubmarine capabilities. They can only perform
a number of noncombat assignments on the high seas, such as antipiracy and
counterterrorism missions, while it is difficult to form effective combat capa-
bilities. Once an aircraft carrier is deployed on the high seas, its various types
of carrier-borne aircraft can provide a certain degree of reconnaissance, early
warning and air cover to the formation at sea. In addition, they can function
as a command platform to fully coordinate other forces in the formation.
Second, China’s aircraft carriers act as a deterrent to adversaries on the
exterior line. China’s unfavorable geopolitical conditions in the Western
Pacific imply that if the Chinese Navy were to remain confined to coastal
activities within the First Island Chain, safeguarding national security by
establishing a line of defense in coastal waters, this would simply be an ex-
tension of the army’s onshore strategy, while the navy’s purpose and unique
characteristics are far from being exploited. China must break the mold by
thinking beyond ground warfare, demonstrating the navy’s advantages of
mobility, eliminating sources of danger or containing and deterring oppo-
nents in the ocean’s depths, so as to ultimately ensure the security of China’s
coastal waters and even the coastal mainland.
In future, the main zones of activity for China’s oceangoing navy will first
be the waters of the Western Pacific Ocean beyond First Island Chain, and
74  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
second the waters of the Northern Indian Ocean from the Middle East and
the coast of East Africa to the Malacca Strait. In order to achieve an effec-
tive military presence in both oceans, China should consider deploying two
oceangoing fleets, centered around aircraft carriers – the Pacific fleet and
the Indian Ocean fleet.
Among them, the main purpose of the Pacific fleet is to achieve an effec-
tive presence for the Chinese Navy in the Western Pacific Ocean beyond
the First Island Chain, to reverse the inordinate imbalance of power in the
Western Pacific, and to enforce containment and deterrence against the na-
val and aviation forces of countries deployed in the Western Pacific, such as
the United States and Japan. In wartime, it will offer effective early warning
and a certain amount of armed support against the offensive operations of
enemy fleets and bases, while delaying or impeding adversaries’ offensive or
intervention measures targeted at China’s coastline. Only with such a force
would it be possible to realize the proactive defensive battle concepts of Ad-
miral Liu Huaqing: ‘while the enemy can attack our coastal area, we too are
capable of attacking its rear area.’5
The Indian Ocean fleet will be based on key islands in the South China
Sea or ports of any amicable countries, concentrating on the northern
Indian Ocean as its focal zone of activity. Its principal mission is to coop-
erate with the naval forces of India, the United States and other countries
to combat piracy, oppose maritime terrorism and protect SLOCs. At the
same time, by maintaining a certain military presence in the Indian Ocean,
it will prevent adversaries from paralyzing China’s operational resolve by
means of sabotage, blockade or restriction of China’s SLOCs. In addi-
tion, as an important force, it will also prevent adversaries from using the
Indian Ocean to intrude in or attack China’s inner heartlands using sea-
based cruise missiles and carrier-borne aircraft. Furthermore, it will be able
to considerably contain foreign maritime forces that intend on interfering
with Chinese affairs in the South China Sea.

Nonwarfare operations of China’s naval force

On 25 November 2013, Peace Ark, a PLAN hospital ship, set sail for disas-
ter areas in the Philippines, devastated by Typhoon Haiyan, to carry out
humanitarian relief and medical assistance duties. This was the first time
that China had dispatched a vessel to overseas disaster zones to perform
such tasks. In recent years, the Chinese Navy has repeatedly made advances
toward blue water and stepped toward the world, by participating in escort
groups, evacuation of personnel, search and rescue, port visits and joint
UN exercises. As the Chinese Navy’s combat capabilities at sea have rapidly
increased, nonwarfare military operations have simultaneously also grown
ever more prominent and remarkable.
Unlike the army, air force and other branches of the military, the navy
represents mobile homeland. Other than engaging in contests with foreign
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  75
armed forces, it also combines two other major functions of diplomacy and
law enforcement. During peacetime, the navy’s chief purpose is to protect
the global trade system, which is centered on ocean and sea, through both
direct and indirect means. In the same way, managing global maritime cri-
ses and responding to interstate conflict have already become major focal
points in countries’ maritime defense considerations. In the context of main-
taining peace between powers, at least on a superficial level, non-­warfare
military operations of navies far exceed their use in combat.
The navy will represent an important platform for China as it fulfills in-
ternational obligations, assumes international responsibility and promotes
military cooperation between states. As issues such as terrorism, prolifer-
ation of mass destruction weapons, drugs smuggling, piracy, deterioration
of the marine environment and natural disasters loom ever larger, military
forces must respond to a series of nontraditional security threats on a global
scale, in addition to dealing with traditional security threats. Non-warfare
applications of military power are increasingly becoming one of the princi-
pal functions of the armed forces in all countries. Among these, non-­warfare
military operations of the navy are particularly impressive. Geoffrey Till
has listed five major functions of modern navies: preventing conflict, main-
taining sea control and freedom of navigation, safeguarding the maritime
order, projecting armed forces overseas and engaging in necessary inter-
national cooperation. The undertaking of noncombat military operations
is the main method of fulfilling the abovementioned duties for each of the
world’s major navies.6
In specific terms, a strong naval force is a leading instrument in the man-
agement of nontraditional security threats and demonstration of leadership
by major powers. It is a vital platform or tool in defense diplomacy, interna-
tional cooperation and coercive diplomacy, while it also acts as robust sup-
port for civilian sea power and law enforcement at sea. The Chinese Navy
will naturally not be an exception, for as its strength grows, its applica-
tions and capacities in these non-combat fields will be enriched, with more
extensive scope, considerably greater depth and dramatically increased
frequency.

Responding to nontraditional security threats and safeguarding

freedom of navigation
It is undeniable that the joint efforts of coastal states worldwide, especially
the great powers, are genuinely required in order to respond to a range of
maritime crises and to maintain the international maritime order. China is
by now the world’s second largest economy and a global political power. The
Chinese Navy is an important platform, measure and tool for China as it
fulfills international obligations, assumes international responsibilities and
provides international public goods. In non-warfare military fields, it ought
to make an even greater difference.
76  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
First is to protect freedom of navigation. The Chinese Navy’s most im-
portant oceangoing duties in the future are to maintain the security of vital
strategic maritime channels and the high seas, as well as to prevent certain
countries, organizations or groups from blockading international water-
ways or plundering international public marine resources. From December
2008 to the present, the Chinese Navy has already established regular de-
ployments in in the Gulf of Aden, continuing to carry out escort missions.
In future, it is highly probable that these types of duties will extend and
expand to other waters.
Second is to participate international search and rescue. Representing
the nation, the navy force can be sent to the disaster areas of tsunamis,
earthquakes, typhoons, geological hazards and shipwrecks and the scenes
of other major maritime emergencies as soon as possible. From the perspec-
tive of victims and the international community, not only would this offer
strength and trust, but in practice, this would also play a role and create an
impact in rescue efforts, which cannot be substituted by financial aid and
material assistance. This is exactly the significance of operations such as
those of the Peace Ark.
Third is international peacekeeping. For a long time, restricted by inad-
equacies in its long-range power projection capacity, China’s contribution
to international peacekeeping activities have mainly been the provision of
manpower and supplies. Improvements in China’s naval capabilities and ex-
pansion in its sphere of activity have been conducive to transforming this
situation, so that China may wield a greater amount of influence. The Chi-
nese Navy, as a force dedicated to justice, will also be an important channel
for the international community as it responds to humanitarian crises, pro-
vides food and medical assistance and evacuates personnel in areas of war
or conflict.

Initiating military diplomacy and international cooperation

The navy is the most internationalized branch of the military and a critical
platform for military diplomacy. The navy’s mobility and flexibility make
it a unique and highly useful tool in foreign policy. The application of so-
called naval diplomacy, that is, a series of preplanned and targeted actions
implemented by the navy under the guidance of national foreign policy, in-
cluding naval aid, visits by naval vessels, military exercises at sea, mutual
visits by naval leaders and other exchanges by personnel in the navy.
Navy diplomacy encourages the promotion of communication, improve-
ments in mutual trust and support for cooperation. Close contact between
two naval forces is also an important symbol of intimate and mature bilat-
eral military and national relations. With substantial increases in the Chi-
nese Navy’s capacity to ‘step out’ and to ‘bring in,’ the navy’s opportunities
for mutual visits and exchanges with its counterparts continue to flourish.
Joint exercises with the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and
 China’s exterior line strategy at sea  77
other major sea powers are becoming increasingly commonplace, while
their subjects and scope also favor practical warfare. For instance, the
­Sino-Russian ‘Joint Sea 2013’ drills covered joint air defense, strikes against
maritime targets and other standard warfare maneuvers. Since 2007, the
Chinese Navy has participated in multilateral drills with the Western Pa-
cific Naval Symposium and furthermore was officially involved in the 2014
and 2016 RIMPAC joint exercises. However, in comparison with the world’s
leading maritime powers, the depth and breadth of China’s naval diplomacy
still need to be bolstered. Mature navy diplomacy represents an indispensa-
ble lesson for China as it advances toward blue water.
For sovereign states, the navy is also a key instrument in coercive diplo-
macy. The navy benefits from powerful strategic mobility, while the oceans’
connectivity allows any country with a naval force to disseminate its na-
tional influence and volition to every corner of the world using the navy.
Compared to other branches of the military, the navy appears to be more
flexible and more agile. Therefore, in the event of a regional or international
crisis, relevant powers would always lose no time in dispatching naval ves-
sels to waters close to the scene of the incident, in order to deter opponents
and defend their own interests. For instance, during the Syrian crisis, both
the United States and Russia deployed a number of warships to the Mediter-
ranean to act as pressure during diplomatic tensions or struggles.
At present, China’s overseas interests have appeared to reach a ‘blow-
out,’ in which turmoil or conflict in any part of the world may be intimately
connected to China’s interests. Following its rise, Chinese Navy will make
more frequent appearances in crisis waters, like the United States, Russia
and other countries, in coordination with China’s foreign policy and also to
protect various overseas interests.

Supporting the Chinese Coast Guard’s law enforcement activities

and building an integrated system of management and defense at sea
Maritime law enforcement is applied based on how a sovereign state’s rel-
evant national laws administer activities within its jurisdictional maritime
space. This includes customs inspections, anti-smuggling operations, pro-
tection of fisheries and declarations on sovereignty, which was originally
once one of the most important functions of the navy. Nowadays, the coast
guard and maritime police force play an increasingly vital role for various
countries, while distinctions between the functions of law enforcement, mil-
itary forces and paramilitary forces are now also clearer. The navy is in-
creasingly focused on sea control and maritime warfare, whereas the Coast
Guard (CCG), maritime police force and other civil or paramilitary forces
are beginning to shoulder more responsibility for law enforcement and
management of maritime spaces such as inland waters, territorial waters,
contiguous zones and Exclusive Economic Zones. Under normal circum-
stances, law enforcement forces are commanded by civil authorities, while
78  China’s exterior line strategy at sea
the national navy mainly provides them with intelligence support, profes-
sional training and coaching, and even on-site reinforcement assistance;
during wartime, these forces belong to the military, as the navy, by mobiliz-
ing relevant mechanisms, will integrate law enforcement forces into a series
of maritime combat operations, to utilize as a part of comprehensive plans.
In coastal control and in response to maritime disputes, such as the
Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, the CCG is often placed on the
front lines as the chief force for sovereignty claims and law enforcement.
To provide strong backup support for the CCG, the Chinese Navy ought to
possess the capability to offer intelligence, logistical guarantees and even
combat support to the CCG at all times. In waters where disputes are more
intense, it must also be capable of joint deployment with the CCG, in order
to deter opponents and ensure that they do not interfere in the CCG’s activ-
ities. Depending on the situation, they need to establish a joint emergency
center or combat center if necessary to unify and coordinate command.
In an era of very few naval battles worldwide, it will become increasingly
common for countries to use their naval forces for non-warfare purposes.
China’s emergent navy will not only be a formidable and awe-inspiring force
for war but should also be an important global power that assumes a pleth-
ora of noncombat duties and obligations. Its function can be found therein,
but it also has national responsibilities and a global calling. In observing
the growth and development of the Chinese Navy, we also require such a
perspective.

Notes
1 PlA Daily, “Move towards the Construction of the World’s First Class Navy,”
www.81.cn/dblj/2017-04/20/content_7569154_3.htm
2 Terry Kraft, trans. Han Peng, Wan Zhiqiang, and Sun Xueguan, “Naval Avi-
ation and Diversification in Flight Require Aircraft Carriers,” Haijun Yiwen,
No. 2, 2010, p. 21.
3 The Editorial Committee of the Encyclopedia of the Chinese Navy, Encyclope-
dia of the Chinese Navy (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1999), p. 824.
4 Andrew Erickson, “A Work in Progress: China’s Development of Carrier Strike,”
Jane’s Navy International, July/August 2014.
5 Liu Huaqing, The Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation
Army Publishing House, 2004), p. 437.
6 Geoffrey Till, “Making Waves – Naval Power Evolves for the 21st Century”,
Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009, www.janes.com/news/security/­
terrorism/jir/jir091117_1_n.shtml
5 Disputes over the Diaoyu
Islands and the Demarcation
of the East China Sea

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and demarcation of the East China Sea
have become focal points of Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation, as they
steadily overshadow historical issues. In fact, both the historical and the
legal principles of the Diaoyu Islands and East China Sea demarcation are
very clear, while Japan’s sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands and
‘Sino-Japanese Median Line,’ concocted in the East China Sea, have no
credibility at all. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and
Japan have been in dispute over these two key matters. A complex back-
ground and a myriad of reasons led to a sudden escalation of the dispute
in 2012. We ought to rationally regard the situation and explore plans of
response, having comprehensively understood China’s interests and com-
pletely identified Japan’s actions and motivations.

Why China cannot compromise over the Diaoyu Islands

The Diaoyu Islands are an archipelago, not in fact an individual island,
with a total of 71 islands that are named by the China Oceanic Adminis-
tration (COA). The eight comparatively larger islands and reefs are Diaoyu
Dao (Uotsuri-shima), Nanxiao Dao (Minami-kojima), Beixiao Dao (Kita-­
kojima), Chiwei Yu (Taisho-to), Huangwei Yu (Kuba-shima), Bei Yu (Oki-
no-Kita-iwa), Nan Yu (Oki-no-Minami-iwa) and Feilan Dao (Tobise), with
a total area of 6.374 square kilometers. Of these, Diaoyu Dao is the largest
island, with a surface area of 4.3 square kilometers.
Following the rapid downturn in Sino-Japanese relations due to Japan’s
‘island purchase’ incident in 2012, how much importance do the Diaoyu Is-
lands carry exactly in Sino-Japanese relations, and in particular what is their
value to China? Such questions have elicited reflection and interpretation
from distinguished individuals, both domestically and overseas. According
to The New York Times and other Western media, the Diaoyu Islands are
but a few rocks and reefs in the East China Sea. The US government also
believes that China is somewhat making a mountain out of a molehill, while
some Chinese domestic experts and independent social scholars point out
80  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
that the Diaoyu Islands represent merely a local issue, so a complete deteri-
oration in relations with Japan for the sake of the Diaoyu Islands is rather
unjustifiable.
Is this the truth? The answer palpably is no. China is not an ‘aggressive
fighting cock’ and is even less prone to act on impulse and emotion. The
reason the Chinese government is so resolute is because the Diaoyu Islands
are indeed connected to both China’s core and critical interests, and Japan
has already breached China’s ‘bottom line.’
The Diaoyu Islands issue is first and foremost a matter of sovereignty.
China has abundant legal grounds and irrefutable evidence, which is also
widely recognized in international public opinion, for its sovereign posses-
sion of the Diaoyu Islands. Even in the United States, which professes to
defend Japan’s administrative rights over the Diaoyu Islands, many schol-
ars and mainstream public opinion are inclined to recognize Chinese sov-
ereignty over these islands. The most socially influential among them, the
prominent American director Chris D. Nebe directed the documentary
Diaoyu Islands: The Truth. By tracing back through history and cataloging
significant illustrations, this work proves that ‘the Diaoyu Islands all be-
longed to China since several centuries ago.’1
In today’s world, sovereign states are still the most important actors and
the principle of sovereignty remains the central pillar of the international
order. As long as matters of sovereignty are concerned, they certainly would
not be minor issues. With the breakneck speed of economic globalization
and developments in the information technology, the formerly clandestine
world of diplomacy is gradually becoming more accessible. Diplomatic
decision-making is becoming democratized and socialized; as the gen-
eral public’s influence on diplomacy grows, select social elite will further
become one of the main actors in diplomatic activities. In this context,
traditional secret diplomacy and private compromise are increasingly im-
practical, especially in foreign affairs concerning sovereignty. The exercise
of sovereign rights is no longer the prerogative of professional diplomats,
kings, monarchs or leaders, and is no longer the business of the ruling party
itself. On issues such as the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, in addition to
widespread involvement from the social elite and the general public, China
has no alternative but to diametrically oppose Japan as it is very difficult
to make further concessions, since Japan has already abandoned mutual
acknowledgment or tacit agreement to suspend the Sino-Japanese dispute.
This is not nearly as simple as purely an interest calculation, as it is not
merely related to national interests, but is also linked to the national re-
gime’s authority and legitimacy.
Simultaneously, the strategic location of the Diaoyu Islands is also of
great importance. If reunified with China, they will be the easternmost
point of Chinese territory in the East Sea; if forever captured by Japan, they
would be the westernmost extremity of Japanese territory. Japan believes
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  81
that by occupying the Diaoyu Islands, the depth of its defense can be driven
forward by over 300 kilometers in the southwest, and that the Diaoyu Is-
lands can also be used as a base for close-range reconnaissance and sur-
veillance on military deployment and operations in Taiwanese and Chinese
coastal regions. They could even be used as an early warning position to
defend against missile threats from China. For China, the Diaoyu Islands
are an excellent forward base, as Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands represent
strategic support for China to make a substantial breakthrough in the First
Island Chain. The recovery of the Diaoyu Islands would greatly empower
China’s sea power to progress toward a blue-water navy.
Finally, the Diaoyu Islands issue also concerns notable marine economic
interests. Waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands enjoy a wealth of petro-
leum and fisheries resources: there are 3–7 billion tons in oil reserves as per
estimates, and the annual catch of fisheries reaches up to 150,000 tons of
stocks.

The importance of the Diaoyu Islands absolutely cannot be underesti-

mated, because they are not merely a stepping stone in Japan’s race for
oil and natural gas resources on the East China Sea continental shelf,
but also a key location in East Asia’s regional strategic security and
peace.2

To this day, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(­U NCLOS) has not clearly specified what types of island can support a
200-­nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), but it is highly likely
that the Diaoyu Islands possess the basic conditions to establish an EEZ.
If Japan occupies the Diaoyu Islands, the baseline of Japan’s territorial
waters in the East China Sea will lean sharply westward, which would
allow Japan to benefit from a favorable position in the EEZ delimita-
tion between China and Japan, obtaining at least an extra 60,000 square
kilometers of EEZ waters. Behind the dispute over island ownership lay
maritime delimitation and economic interests, which are also important
reasons why Japan has significantly tightened control over the Diaoyu
Islands, the Chongzhiniao Jiao (Okinotorishima) and other ‘outlying is-
lands’ over recent years.
Those who deem the Diaoyu Islands issue inconsequential belong to only
two factions. First, there is the ‘dishonest’ international faction. The US
government and some sections of the Western media undoubtedly cannot
empathize with China on this issue, because it does not concern their own
vital interests, so they make light of a matter of principle. Second, there is
the ‘naïve’ domestic faction, which believes that through its own tolerance
and restraint, China can in exchange acquire a thaw and improvement in
Sino-Japanese relations. They say that continuing to ‘lock horns’ over the
Diaoyu Islands issue is not beneficial to China’s national interests. On the
82  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
contrary, China’s firm display provides Japan’s right-wing sects an excuse
and helps the Japanese right wing to gain prominence and legitimacy. This
argument also represents the views of a considerable proportion of Japa-
nese, while in Sino-Japanese exchanges, Japan often applies such viewpoints
when making appeals to China.
In fact, the Diaoyu Islands issue is purely symbolic, for it is simply a mi-
crocosm of Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation. The dispute between the
two sides, China and Japan, is certainly not limited to the Diaoyu Islands
themselves. As long as there is no alleviation in Sino-Japanese strategic con-
frontation, there can be no de-escalation in the Diaoyu Islands issue. Even
if the Diaoyu Islands issue is forcibly shelved, new problems and contradic-
tions will arise.
Essential differences exist between Sino-Japanese maritime disputes and
Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine disagreements at sea. The latter focus
on competition for maritime space, whereas the former do not only center
on rivalry for maritime space but also represent a clash between national
strategies. This kind of collision is inevitable in the current Asia-Pacific sit-
uation and cannot be mitigated through China’s goodwill and unilateral
concessions alone.
On 11 September 2012, the Japanese Noda Yoshihiko government an-
nounced its ‘purchase of the islands.’ The original tacit agreement between
China and Japan to shelve the issue of the Diaoyu Islands dispute was
broken, and China immediately adopted a series of political, legal, diplo-
matic, military and other measures in opposition. Japan too did not show
any weakness, consistently not recognizing the presence of any dispute
over the Diaoyu Islands whatsoever. The Diaoyu Islands case had already
escalated from their previous deferred state into a full-blown dispute: the
Chinese Coast Guard and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) had created a
situation of coexistence and co-governance in waters surrounding the
Diaoyu Islands, but now the two countries’ military forces are actively
preparing for conflict and war against each other. Japan has incessantly
speculated on China’s radar illumination and the excessive proximity of
its military aircraft. On the Diaoyu Islands issue, even if China would
like to relent, Japan would provide it with neither the conditions nor the
opportunities to do so.
For Japan, a country sensitive only to strength, the balance of power is
key. Only through rapid augmentation of its own strength and intense long-
term competition can China compel Japan to clearly recognize the reality.
The game in process concerning the Diaoyu Islands conflict may be pro-
tracted with many twists and turns, and also may be somewhat dangerous.
In this regard, China needs to maintain strategic tenacity and fortify stra-
tegic patience. Strategically, China must not proceed rashly due to anxiety,
and moreover must not compromise and concede without reason due to ti-
midity and overcautiousness (Figure 5.1).
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  83

Figure 5.1  C
 ontested Lines in the East China Sea.

The truths and falsehoods of demarcation in the

East China Sea
The Sino-Japanese demarcation in the East China Sea covers two main is-
sues: first is the demarcation of EEZ, and second is the delimitation of the
continental shelf. There are indeed overlaps between the concepts of the
EEZ and the continental shelf, but the two concepts themselves and their
extended connotations are not one and the same. To clarify the principles
of Sino-Japanese demarcation in the East China Sea, it is necessary to first
understand these two concepts and their bilateral relationship.
The EEZ system as specified in UNCLOS is measured from the baseline
from which the breadth of territorial waters is calculated and should not
exceed 200 nautical miles. As the name suggests, the interests of coastal
states in EEZs are predominantly economic rights. As UNCLOS Article 56
stipulates, the core economic rights of the coastal state in its EEZ are:

Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving

and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil,
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and ex-
ploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds.
84  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
This also includes ‘The establishment and use of artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures; marine scientific research; the protection and preser-
vation of the marine environment.’3
The EEZ outer limit of 200 nautical miles is for ideal situations free of
dispute. In reality, the depth and breadth of waters between many of the
world’s opposite coasts and adjacent states are limited. As a consequence,
it is very difficult to fulfill the 200 nautical mile demarcation requirement.
Waters between China and Japan are indeed less than 400 nautical miles
wide, at only 360 nautical miles at their widest point. A Sino-Japanese dis-
pute is thus created. On this matter, China advocates a principle of fairness,
taking into account coastline directions on the same latitude and relative
length, demography and other factors. This is also the trend in international
maritime delimitation, whereas Japan does not contemplate at all the fair
and equitable development of the maritime order, stubbornly adhering to
the ‘Median Line’ principle.
It is important to note that UNCLOS does indeed have a ‘principle of
fairness’ and a ‘median line principle’ on issues of maritime demarcation
between opposite coasts or adjacent states. Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS,
respectively, indicate delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts: enacted in the International Court
of Justice (ICIJ), Article 38 indicates that demarcation agreements, based
on international law, may assist in reaching equitable resolutions. How-
ever, at the same time, it recommends that before each party in the dispute
reaches a settlement agreement, it first determines a provisional ‘Median
Line.’ Article 15 of UNCLOS concerns ‘Delimitation of the territorial sea
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts,’ that is,

neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to

the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States
is measured.4

Nevertheless, both parties must agree to the Median Line.

The continental shelf system was first established in the 1958 Convention
in the Continental Shelf and reaffirmed in the 1982 UNCLOS.

The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance… shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  85
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connect-
ing the depth of 2,500 metres.

Those within 200 nautical miles are termed the ‘inner continental shelf,’
whereas those beyond 200 nautical miles are named the ‘outer continental
shelf.’ The inner continental shelf is delimited independently by each state
under UNCLOS provisions (except where disputes exist). In contrast, the
outer continental shelf requires coastal states to apply to the UN Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and then delimit the
outer continental shelf based on the Commission’s recommendations. The
continental shelf system confers upon coastal states the right to explore
the continental shelf and exploit natural resources. This refers to

The natural resources … [that] consist of the mineral and other non-­
living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organ-
isms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at
the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or
the subsoil.5

Interests of the continental shelf within 200 nautical miles often coincide
with interests of the EEZ as the two share the same external boundary. Since
EEZs are at most only 200 nautical miles wide, whereas continental shelves
can extend to a maximum of 350 nautical miles, coastal states do not enjoy
overlying waters and above water airspace rights in the outer continental
shelf. It is evident that delimitation of the continental shelf should be based
principally upon the seabed geological structure, as both the continental
shelf and continental margin have clear geological definitions.
When discussing demarcation of the East China Sea continental shelf,
it is essential to discuss the Okinawa Trough. The Okinawa Trough is lo-
cated on the margins of the East China Sea continental shelf, in a long
and narrow curved depression between the outer edges of the East China
Sea continental shelf and the Ryukyu Arc. Situated on the margins of the
East China Sea continental shelf, between the Ryukyu Islands and China’s
Diaoyu Islands, the curved depression was formed due to Ryukyu Trench’s
expanding lithosphere. The majority of the Trench exceeds 1,000 meters in
depth, with a maximum depth of 2,716 meters. Most parts of the East China
Sea seabed have the structure of a classic continental shelf and is a natu-
ral maritime extension of the Chinese mainland, thus the Okinawa Trough
naturally becomes the demarcation frontier between the two countries’
continental shelves.
For this purpose, on 14 December 2012, the Chinese government has al-
ready tendered to the CLCS a partial submission on the boundaries of the
outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China Sea, for-
mally expressing its own intentions to the international community. However,
86  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
Japan believes that China and Japan share the joint Sino-Okinawan conti-
nental shelf, and that the Okinawa Trough is simply an incidental pitfall in
the two countries’ natural connection, and that the continuity of the East
China Sea continental shelf cannot be interrupted. In view of this, Japan
urges demarcation of East China Sea to ignore legal consequences of the
Okinawa Trough, while the specific demarcation method should determine
delimitation boundaries according to distance standards and the ‘Median
Line,’ rather than the natural extension of the continental shelf.
In this way, according to the EEZ and continental shelf systems’ differing
connotations and demarcation methods, in theory China and Japan have
two entirely different maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, at close
to 100 nautical miles apart at their furthest point. If China is to develop the
East China Sea’s outer continental shelf, it may be necessary to conduct op-
erations in Japan’s EEZ, which may lead to many difficulties. In practice, for
the convenience of delimitation, development and management, after the
EEZ system came into effect, the development trend of worldwide maritime
delimitation is to draw a common line for the boundaries of EEZs and Con-
tinental Shelves, provided that all parties in dispute can reach a consensus
on the boundaries of EEZs and continental shelves, and subsequently make
reciprocal and mutual adjustments on this basis. Unfortunately, Japan has
not allowed any space for negotiation.
Japan proposed numerous times to China, beginning as early as 1982,
its hope to formally define the Median Line as the demarcation boundary
between the two countries’ maritime EEZ. At that time, the Chinese side
adopted an evasive stance on this issue and did not give a clear response to
the Japanese side in order to protect overall Sino-Japanese relations, whereas
the Japanese government misunderstood that to mean that ‘China acqui-
esced in the Median Line principle.’ In June 1996, the Japanese Parliament
officially concocted the so-called ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ through the
‘Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law.’ This Median Line is
highly problematic, both from a technical and legal perspective: first, huge
problems exist in Japan’s delimitation method from the baseline of its ter-
ritorial waters. A large number of base points in Japan’s territorial waters
are located on outlying islands distant from its mainland, leading to a severe
deviation in Japan’s territorial waters baseline from normal coastal trends.
Japan is in fact not a typical archipelagic state, as its coastline neither cuts
deeply inland, nor is there a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity.
Therefore, it does not fulfill UNCLOS Article 7(1) on the two specific ge-
ographic characteristics required for the exploitation of straight baselines.
In spite of this, Japan still employs a large number of coastlines that do not
meet standard regulations, allowing its territorial waters baseline to shift
substantially toward the Chinese side. Second, the Median Line completely
disregards the extension of the East China Sea continental shelf and in fact
does not take into account the matter of continental shelf delimitation. Ac-
cording to Japan, there is only EEZ delimitation, and no continental shelf
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  87
demarcation in the East China Sea. This is clearly contrary to basic facts
and international justice.
Naturally it is difficult for China to agree with Japan’s unilateral con-
duct, and the Chinese government has never recognized the so-called
Sino-­Japanese Median Line. However, over a long period of time and in
consideration of the overall state of Sino-Japanese relations, China has ex-
ercised restraint on this issue, proposing to ‘shelve disputes, jointly develop’
in the disputed region. China has even opened the door to negotiations on
the question of resource development on the Chinese side of the so-called
Median Line. The objective is to transform the East China Sea into a sea
of ‘friendship and cooperation’ through Sino-Japanese collaboration to de-
velop the East China Sea continental shelf and the establishment of an excel-
lent atmosphere for cordial Sino-Japanese cooperation. All the same, Japan
is not yet satisfied and instead makes much ado about nothing, pursuing the
so-called drinking straw effect devised by Iraq against Kuwait in 1989.6
This is not just sensationalization by the Japanese media, for the Japanese
government is also complicit. At the ‘ASEAN 10+3’ Energy Ministers’ Con-
ference held in Manila on 9 June 2004, the former Japan’s Minister of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry at the time, Nakagawa Shoichi, drank fruit juice
using a straw to protest to Zhang Guobao, the then deputy director of the
Chinese National Reform and Development Commission, and proposed the
so-called drinking straw effect. Nakagawa stressed that if China were to be-
gin oil extraction in waters near the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line,’ resources
belonging to Japan would be inevitably ‘siphoned’ away as if through a
straw. Furthermore, he demanded that China provides relevant extraction
statistics to Japan. In technical terms, the absurdity of Japan’s position goes
beyond even Iraq’s claims in 1989, for the majority of Iraqi terrain is higher
elevated than that of Kuwait, whereas the topography of the East China Sea
continental shelf is higher in the west and lower in the east. If there is indeed
a ‘drinking straw effect’, it means resources would flow from the western
side of the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ toward the east. However, not only
does Japan verbally protest to China, it also dispatches naval vessels and
reconnaissance aircrafts for surveillance, disrupting China’s operations and
at its oil and gas fields around the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ such as the
Chunxiao gas field.
On the issue of demarcation of the East China Sea, China promotes
principles of fairness and natural extension of the continental shelf, which
correspond to the reality of the East China Sea, and therefore ought to be
respected. In future diplomatic and legal battles, China needs to widely re-
search what content the fairness principle encompasses and uphold the legal
status of the Okinawa Trough. China can also consider reasons to integrate
the delimitation boundaries of its EEZ and continental shelf, to draw one
unified frontier, but under the premise of fairness. If a common boundary is
drawn, China should adhere to principles of fairness on the basis of compre-
hensive consideration of the continental shelf’s natural extension, features
88  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
of seabed geological structures, coastline length and trends, in addition to
historical, cultural and other situations.

The effects of establishing the East China Sea Air Defense

Identification Zone
On 23 November 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Defense officially declared
the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), whose area covers the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding wa-
ters, traverses Japan’s contended ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ and extends
as far as the vicinity of the Okinawa Trench. Overlaps between China’s
East China Sea ADIZ and Japan’s ADIZ encompass virtually half of the
East China Sea’s airspace, and there is also a small area of overlap between
China’s ADIZ and South Korea’s ADIZ near the Suyan Reef. According
to the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s statement, any aircraft located in this
airspace must circulate its flight plans to the relevant Chinese authorities,
as well as promptly and accurately answer any Chinese inquiries. Some
countries such as the United States and Japan immediately responded in a
frenzy of indignation, with public opinion in an uproar, as their statesmen,
media, and experts all expressed strong opposition or censure. The United
States, Japan and South Korea initially also dispatched military aircrafts
purposely into to this ADIZ to demonstrate their resolve.
Taking stock of the United States, Japan, South Korea and other coun-
tries’ responses since the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China
Sea, it would appear that the losses have outweighed the gains for China.
By some observations, American and Japanese military aircraft continue to
break into China’s ADIZ, whereas China has not adopted ‘defensive emer-
gency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identi-
fication or refuse to follow the instructions’ as per its announcement, and
the ADIZ exists in name only; on the other hand, China has paid a heavy
diplomatic price. Even South Korea and Australia, which ordinarily main-
tain good relations and are averse to confrontation with China, have band-
wagoned vociferously with the United States on this issue against China.
It is obviously true that some aspects of China’s ADIZ in the East China
Sea, such as area scope, regulations, diplomatic skill and crisis anticipation
do have details that need to be refined and lessons to be learned. For in-
stance, since this initiative is primarily targeted at Japan, there is no need to
incite animosity from all directions. Prior to the release of the statement, it
would be wise to offer the United States, Australia, South Korea, and other
parties information and explanation, to at least partially assuage the dis-
content of these countries; as another illustration, ADIZ rules are to some
degree imprecise and distinctions could set based on ‘aircraft that approach
territorial airspace with intent’ or ‘aircraft that only pass by or through
the ADIZ as normal’; in addition, prior to its public announcement, it is
possible that the Chinese government underestimated the rest of the world’s
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  89
radical reaction, as diplomatic, military, media, public relations and other
kinds of precautionary measures were somewhat insufficient.
Nonetheless, we cannot deny the strategic significance of the establish-
ment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea due to tactical flaws. The legal
status of the ADIZ is very different from those of territorial airspace. These
are autonomous actions of the sovereign state, not protected by interna-
tional law, and perceived very differently by various countries worldwide.
States all have extremely diverse views and understandings on whether its
own aircraft should comply with foreign regulations when entering other
states’ ADIZs, as well as on how to supervise foreign aircraft entering their
own ADIZ. Consequently, there is great operational flexibility in regard to
what the ADIZ means. No countries would relinquish military freedom of
movement within foreign ADIZs, counting on other countries’ military air-
craft to unconditionally concede that its ADIZ was a wild dream all along
as far as they were concerned. Even the American ADIZ routinely suffers
from ‘brazen incursions’ by Russia’s and other countries’ military aircraft.
Of course, every country’s civil aircraft would typically comply with others’
ADIZs out of safety concerns.
China emphatically was not so naïve as to believe that reliance on its
ADIZ alone could pacify the United States, Japan and other countries and
lead to their abandonment of close-range reconnaissance and mid-air prov-
ocation targeting China, nor did it expect American and Japanese military
aircraft to abide by relevant rules. In fact, the reason China has set up an
‘ADIZ’, despite international pressure, is partly to combat Japan’s exploita-
tion of its own ADIZ to create tension, but moreover due to the inherent
requirements of its own power and capacity building.
On the one hand, the ADIZ can advance the construction of a strong
early warning air defense system, allowing the People’s Liberation Army
Air Force (PLAAF), People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF)
and other aerial forces have confidence in laws and regulations to follow
when confronted with foreign aircraft, achieving better division of labor
and integration of strength. For a long time, the construction of China’s
military forces has been piecemeal and intermittent. The coordination and
cooperation mentality between the various forces were relatively weak and
it was difficult to form a concerted effort. Defending the ADIZ became a
major mission and will be extremely favorable to the development and re-
finement of China’s early warning air defense system.
On the other hand, it may be born out of the need to train troops and
enhance military capabilities. In recent years, China’s military moderni-
zation has accelerated with a diverse range of advanced equipment and
weaponry entering active service in large quantities. However, it still lacks
in areas such as experience, software and cooperation. Since Chairman Xi
Jinping took over control of the military, he has vigorously stressed that the
armed forces should ‘be able to fight battles, to win battles’ and has elevated
military conflict preparations to a high degree of importance. Following
90  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, the games of
‘cat and mouse’ between Chinese military aircraft and American and Jap-
anese military aircraft within China’s ADIZ will certainly become more
frequent, which will greatly test China’s air force capabilities. It is clear that
the ADIZ makes higher demands of the Chinese army and serves as an ex-
cellent training platform. Although the Chinese army need not take action
on every foreign aircraft entering its ADIZ, it needs to thoroughly examine
the trajectories and whereabouts of every aircraft entering the ADIZ, with
the ability to take measures at any moment should that be necessary.
From a long-run perspective, the contest over the ADIZ is merely a mi-
crocosm of the Sino-Japanese and Sino-US strategic game. As Chinese mar-
itime and aerial force rapidly increase, the strategic balance in East Asia’s
coastal waters is currently advancing in a direction favorable to China. Un-
der the projection of China’s land power, if the PLAN, PLAAF and PLA
Rocket Force are able to form a joint force, and it would only be a matter
of time before China is able to gain a strategic advantage over the United
States and Japan in East Asia’s coastal waters. Perhaps the Chinese mili-
tary does not have the capability to win worldwide supremacy, but as long
as China can maintain the momentum of its rise, there is no doubting its
strength to build a strategic advantage in East Asia’s coastal waters within
and around the First Island Chain. In this region, China is able to concen-
trate practically all of its advantageous power, whereas mobilization and ac-
cumulation of resources and power here is ultimately limited for the United
States due to geographical constraints. The current American advantage in
East Asia’s coastal waters is abnormal, owing to long-term degradation of
China’s naval and air forces. This will change as the gap between China and
the United States’ overall military power closes. In future, China’s overall
military capability may still be unable to contend with that of the United
States. However, thanks to geographical and technological reasons, changes
will occur in the Sino-US strategic balance in East Asia. The United States
cannot win in this region for it is situated on China’s doorstep, just as it was
unable to form a military advantage in Eastern Europe against the Soviet
Union decades ago.
In future, it is foreseeable that Chinese military aircraft activities will
become livelier above the East China Sea. Japanese and American military
aircraft certainly will not disappear from China’s ADIZ, but their num-
ber, frequency and prominence will all be gradually surpassed by those of
China. This is a ‘battle of endurance’ and also a test of willpower, a circular
game and also an on-going contest, for a fleeting advantage may be of little
avail, with one-off gains and losses also unable to transform greater trends
in the shift of power.
How to seize these strategic opportunities for shifts in relative power? It is
key for China to do well in its own affairs, to persevere untiringly in efforts
to prepare for military conflict, to be cautious but not fearful of war and to
leverage the East China Sea military conflict to promote a ‘strong military
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  91
dream’ and ‘strong national dream.’ In this process, China should strive to
enhance its strategic planning ability, tactical operations and coordination
capacity.
In the face of momentary setbacks or impediments, it is necessary to
maintain strategic tenacity. In any case, blunders and flaws can hardly all
be avoided. Modesty and prudence are critical, earnestly learning lessons
from experience is the right answer, though not to be overly mindful of gains
and losses and so anxious as to move in the other extreme and come to a
standstill.

Commitment to the security of sea lanes in the

East China Sea7
When discussing the security of China’s sea lanes, people invariably refer
to the Malacca Strait or the ‘Malacca dilemma,’ scrutinizing routes in the
South China Sea and in the west. Rarely mentioned are the Gonggu Strait
(Miyako Kaikyo), Dayu Strait (Osumi Kaikyo) and other easterly SLOCs. It
is little known that this eastward maritime lifeline is even more fragile and
that its importance is increasing with each passing day.
There are four main maritime routes for China’s international trade, split
into the four directions of north, south, east and west. Of these, the eastward
route heads east in the direction of the Pacific Ocean east coast, passing
via Japan, and the East and West Coasts of the both American continents,
while the Gonggu Strait and Dayu Strait on the periphery of Japan happen
to be important channels for China’s eastward route.
The Gonggu Strait, also known as the Gonggu Waterway, is a route in
between Japan’s Okinawa and Gonggu Islands (Miyako Retto), measuring
approximately 300 kilometers in width, and is the main route through which
China crosses the Pacific Ocean to regions such as Central America and
South America. Furthermore, the Gonggu Strait is an important supple-
ment to southward routes as China hereby has a direct route to access ports
in northeastern Australia and various island nations in the south Pacific
Ocean. The Dayu Strait is situated between Dayu peninsula (Osumi Hanto)
on the southern tip of Japan’s Jiuzhou Island (Kyushu) and Dayu archipel-
ago (Osumi Shoto). Measuring 33 kilometers wide, it is an important chan-
nel from the East China Sea, Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan to access the
northwest Pacific Ocean. In accordance with UNCLOS and Japan’s relevant
rules on ‘specially designated waters’ for three nautical miles of territorial
sea, foreign vessels and aircrafts can all have free passage, without manda-
tory observance of the principle of ‘innocent passage.’
In addition, between various Japanese islands, there remain more than 20
straits or channels, connecting the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
Prior to Taiwan’s reunification with Mainland China, these straits or chan-
nels are the swiftest ways for China to access the open ocean. As the shale
gas revolution and international energy supply creates a situation of ‘rise in
92  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
the west, fall in the east,’ and with the expansion of trade between China and
the Americas, the importance of these lanes will grow substantially.
In accordance with UNCLOS’ principle of fairness and spirit of impar-
tiality, states with relatively favorable marine geography should show con-
sideration toward states with relatively unfavorable marine geography on
legitimate maritime rights such as resource development, navigation at sea
and other areas. Numerous Japanese islands surround the East China Sea,
creating a semi-enclosed sea. Japan is in fact duty bound to afford China
freedom of passage or passage transit convenience through these straits.
Moreover, most of the ships entering and exiting these channels are asso-
ciated with China’s trade and security. As an interested stakeholder, China
needs measures to safeguard the security of these lanes, in addition to voic-
ing a powerful message.
Yet, not only do Japan and other countries disregard China’s legitimate
rights and interests, they also view these international sea lanes as platforms
for containment and suppression of China’s strengths by deploying large
numbers of troops close to straits or waterways, closely monitoring each and
every Chinese naval vessel, merchant ship and aircraft that passes through
the straits, and at times even defying the principle of freedom of navigation
to overtly provoke and impede the normal navigation of Chinese vessels and
aircraft in international waterways. To oppose the ever more frequent en-
try and exit of Chinese naval vessels through the First Island Chain, Japan
has brazenly deployed anti-ship missiles in proximity of these waterways. In
2013 Japan initially deployed Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles on Gonggu
Island and additional new style surface-to-ship missiles in Xiongbenxian
(Kumamoto Prefecture) in 2016. Relative to the South China Sea or the Ma-
lacca Strait, it would be far simpler for the Japan and the United States to
block China’s maritime lifelines in waterways surrounding the East China
Sea during wartime.
Consequently, the security of sea lanes in the East China Sea, the Diaoyu
Islands dispute and the Taiwan issue have become the three most pressing
easterly concerns which must be resolved as China emerges as a maritime
power; at the same time, they are major interests that China must fight for.
In this aspect, China requires decisive and resolute political will.
In order to safeguard China’s legitimate interests in the Gonggu Strait
and other strategic channels of the East China Sea and maintain the secu-
rity of maritime lifelines, it is imperative that China builds more agile mil-
itary deterrence capabilities, applies more targeted diplomatic pressure on
Japan and fortifies its strategic foundation to progress eastward toward the
Pacific Ocean through long-term, resolute and forceful cold confrontation.
China’s strong strategic deterrence with regard to Japan is indisputable.
In theory, if Japan blocked SLOCs used by China, China could utilize a
range of land-based missiles to strike Japanese coastal bases. However,
whether this type of strategic deterrence can prove effective in practice
is highly questionable. First, the outbreak and escalation of friction and
 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  93
conflict is a gradual process. Before a total ‘rupture in the status quo,’ mis-
sile deterrence would not help resolve matters and does not carry a precise
focus; moreover, the political costs and sacrifices required for provocation,
containment and other measures are dwarfed by those required for missile
strikes. So long as Japan sustains a certain degree of moderation, it would
be difficult for China to make such a decision. This disconnect between
strategic deterrence and tactical deterrence has meant China, with no al-
ternative for decades other than to be subject to the mercy of Japan and
the United States in the Gonggu waterway and other international chan-
nels, has been unable put its strong national power and strategic deterrence
into practice. In recent years, with comprehensive development in China’s
aerial and sea power, Chinese aircraft and naval vessels are appearing with
increasing regularity in the relevant waters, their effective quantity and
quality markedly growing, China will progressively possess the capacity
to compete with Japan and the United States in these strategic channels.
Construction of power is a prerequisite for all strategies. As only China can
remain in an indomitable position at the site of friction and conflict, Japan
and other countries would not readily dare to threaten the security of Chi-
na’s maritime channels.
Over the years, Japan has already become accustomed to ‘covering up
its tracks by shifting blame to others’ on issues of freedom of navigation,
liberally discrediting China and confounding international perceptions. In
reality, Japan has damaged China’s lawful freedom of navigation, even as it
defiles normal Chinese navigation as ‘invasion’ or slanders China as a ‘dan-
ger to navigational security.’ In response, China should strengthen its battle
in diplomacy and international public opinion warfare. First, it needs to
focus on obtaining evidence and then, based on relevant international law,
methodically and cogently refute Japan’s ludicrous lies through iron facts,
and if necessary inviting the involvement of international judicial mecha-
nisms. Second, China can directly raise issues concerning transparency of
the jurisdiction over international channels such as the Gongu Waterway
to Japan. Justifiably, Japan has management rights over adjacent straits or
waterways, while, as the largest user of these channels, China also has the
right to demand that Japan comply with relevant international standards
and China’s legitimate rights. Third, China should formally broach the mat-
ter of Japan’s damage to Chinese freedom of navigation at the UN, the East
Asia Summit (EAS), and other relevant international and regional institu-
tions, proactively presenting to the international community principles of
truth and fiction.

Notes
1 Chris D. Nebe, Diaoyu Islands: The Truth, 2015, www.imdb.com/title/tt3231886/
2 Fu, Kuncheng, “Methods and Issues in Continental Shelf Delimitation in Chi-
na’s Periphery,” Periodical of Ocean University of China (Zhongguo Haiyang
Daxue Xuebao), No 3, 2014. p. 7.
94  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands
3 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www.
un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm
4 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm
5 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm
6 At the time when Iraqi tanks crossed the border to invade Kuwait, one of the
reasons Saddam Hussein gave the international community was that, by drilling
wells, Kuwait had “siphoned away” petroleum that belonged to Iraq.
7 Originally published in The Global Times, 27 December 2013, with edits.
6 A solution to tensions in the
South China Sea

South China Sea issues include two categories of affairs: disputed and
non-disputed. The South China Sea dispute incorporates two major subject
matters: first are island sovereignty disputes. The four countries of Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have partially occupied islands and
reefs belonging to China’s Nansha (Spratly) Islands. Among them, Viet-
nam occupies 29 islands and reefs and declares sovereignty over the entire
Nansha Islands; the Philippines holds eight islands and reefs, and proclaims
sovereignty over the so-called Kalayaan Islands in the Nansha Islands1;
Malaysia holds five isles and reefs, while Brunei has claimed sovereignty
over the Nantong Jiao (Louisa Reefs). In addition, Vietnam and the Phil-
ippines have, respectively, demanded sovereignty rights over China’s Xisha
(Paracel) Islands and Zhongsha Islands. Second are disputes over maritime
delimitation. After UNCLOS took effect, the countries just mentioned all
promptly established their own EEZ, even submitting applications to the
CLCS for the South China Sea outer continental shelf. The boundaries of
their claimed EEZ and continental shelf are substantially entrenched within
the South China Sea’s ‘Dash Line.’ Without first engaging China in amica-
ble consultations, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries have long
carried out large-scale resource exploitation activities in waters within Chi-
na’s Dash Line. Outside these issues are issues such as freedom of naviga-
tion, maritime security and geopolitical competition. In the past couple of
years, as the United States has stepped to the fore, assertively intervening in
South China Sea issues, the Sino-US geopolitical contest or power rivalry in
the South China Sea has become ever more prominent.

An accurate understanding of the situation in the

South China Sea
At present, the so-called South China Sea arbitration case has ended. The
US military is boosting its conspicuous firepower in the South China Sea,
where the situation remains tense, triggering intense domestic and inter-
national public concern. For China, the top priority is to objectively and
accurately understand the situation in the South China Sea, and then corre-
spondingly devise realistic strategies and response tactics.
96  Solution to South China Sea tensions
First, it is highly possible that tensions in the South China Sea will en-
dure for a long time to come. One, the South China Sea has already become
the United States’ major offensive and competitive arena to contain China’s
rise in the Asia-Pacific, replacing the Taiwan issue as the matter of great-
est geopolitical importance between China and the United States. Besides,
the South China Sea has already become a hyper politicized topic in the
United States, and no leader and military officer dare to show weakness.
The US military clearly views the South China Sea as a region of strategic
advantage and current geopolitical vulnerability for China. Now, the US
military would carry out hundreds of military exercises and thousands of
close reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea every year. Just from
May 2017 to September 2018, US warships have entered the 12 nautical miles
zones of islands and reefs occupied by China more than ten times already,
conducting a series of provocations like high-speed zigzag and electronic
jamming, which poses a huge threat to the sovereignty and security of China
and Chinese people on these islands and reefs. So long as the United States
does not alter China’s judgments on its greatest strategic rival, American
provocations in the South China Sea will only rise and not decline.
Second, the South China Sea dispute is complex and intricate, including
the sovereignty and legality of archipelagos in the open oceans, maritime
delimitation of semi-enclosed seas, historical interests and other thorny
subjects that cover almost all intentionally ambiguous aspects of previous
UNCLOS negotiations. Before the abovementioned ambiguous stipulations
are clearly defined, it would be very difficult to formulate a solution that
is recognized by all parties. Furthermore, exaggerated by battles of diplo-
macy, law and public opinion, these disputes spread broadly to the populace
and to public opinion, further reducing opportunities for negotiation and
compromise.
Third, there have been rapid changes in the balance of power in the South
China Sea, with all parties, particularly China and the United States, need-
ing time for strategic adjustment to reach a new equilibrium. In other words,
both China and the United States need to adapt to new roles: on the one
hand, the United States needs to acknowledge China’s sovereignty, sover-
eign rights and the reality of Chinese growing power in the South China
Sea, while granting China the necessary space and power; on the other
hand, throughout its maritime rise, China also needs to find a reasonable
and solicitous plan to accommodate the United States’ legitimate interests
in the South China Sea. During this process, frequent mutual strategic and
policy probing will become the norm, while a certain degree of conflict and
competition is also unavoidable.
How long exactly will such tension last? It is very difficult to give a pre-
cise estimate. Needless to say, the current direction of trends in the South
China Sea situation mainly hinges on China and the United States. In light
of the history of Sino-US interaction following the Taiwan Strait Crisis, it is
possible to attain an approximate estimate. The current state of affairs will
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  97
continue for at least around five years or so. There are two main factors in
deciding the length of time: on the one hand, tangible shifts in the balance
of power lay the foundation for stability, provided that China can build suf-
ficiently great power in the South China Sea which the United States is un-
able to ignore; on the other hand, the quality of interaction between the two
countries, the willpower and determination of decision makers, the wisdom
of policy departments and other nonmaterial factors also play an important
role, as they may either slash or elongate the time China and the United
States take to find a new equilibrium.
However, the likelihood of loss of control over the South China Sea situ-
ation or even an outbreak of war is not high. First, although various sides
take an unusually hard-line attitude and the dispute can seem very fierce,
above all there is no intention to provoke armed conflict or war. In a sit-
uation where the strengths of all South East Asian disputant parties are
far inferior to that of China, armed provocation would be equivalent to
self-­destruction. Despite the United States’ recent saber-rattling, its main
purpose is to increase the cost of China’s actions. Through military, diplo-
matic and international legal measures, the United States forces China to
withdraw in the face of opposition, rather than limit China’s operations in
the South China Sea through battles. Second, national decision makers and
policy departments are generally more rational than the media and public
opinion and will endeavor to quarantine confrontation and friction within
local confines. This is exactly the reason why South China Sea crisis man-
agement mechanisms are synchronized to receive support concurrently as
disputes intensify.
Overall, tension in the South China Sea cannot be uprooted, but it can be
managed as required. Irrefutably, tension in the South China will inevita-
bly have important impacts on the arrangement of China’s foreign strategy.
China is also sure to pay a certain price for its purposeful actions in the
South China Sea. In this regard, China must be patient and confident, and
be sure not to be excessively impulsive, eager to settle the dispute or keen to
alleviate the situation. China must persist in defending its sovereignty and
expanding the presence of its forces, proactively preparing for all possibil-
ities. China must fight, negotiate and cooperate with some of the disputant
parties, as well as with the United States, for these actions go hand in hand.
China must thoroughly understand the balance between conflict, negoti-
ation and cooperation to promote a gradual ease in the South China Sea
situation.

New opportunities and implications of China’s South China

Sea strategy
Since the end of the Cold War, China has long pursued a policy of ‘Chinese
sovereignty, shelving disputes, and seeking joint development’ (主权属我、搁置
争议、共同开发) on the South China Sea issue, in reality maintaining strategic
98  Solution to South China Sea tensions
patience and restraint. Although ‘Chinese sovereignty’ and ‘seeking joint
development’ have essentially been reduced to empty rhetoric, prior to 2009
‘shelving disputes’ was more or less accepted by Vietnam, the Philippines and
other countries. Since China and ASEAN countries signed the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, disputes
in the South China Sea had been under basic control. While confrontations
still regularly occurred, they usually would quickly subside. During this time,
China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the
Philippines, developed rapidly, and the South China Sea dispute was in fact
often not a pressing dominant challenge.
However, from 2009 onward, a series of intertwining factors has caused
countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines to take the lead in disrupting
the relatively calm status quo. First of all, China’s ever-growing strength
elicits Vietnamese and Philippine strategic anxiety. Believing that ‘there is
no time like the present,’ they try to seize more fait accompli and resources
while China’ strength is still insufficiently strong. Next, the worldwide prac-
tice of the EEZ and continental shelf systems inspire Vietnam, the Philip-
pines and other claimants to accelerate their legal offensive. For instance,
they set various islands as the basepoints of territorial waters, bolstered the
administrative jurisdiction of disputed islands and reefs, strengthened mar-
itime law enforcement and presented to the CLCS a submission on delimita-
tion of the outer continental shelf before its deadline (May 13, 2009). Finally,
the United States’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ and promotion of the ‘Asia-Pacific Rebal-
ancing’ strategy enthused and roused some countries, such as Vietnam and
the Philippines, which hoped to take advantage of the American ‘Pivot’ to
provoke China.
Coerced by the situation, China has no choice but to begin asserting its
rights. In its countermeasures, China has shown formidable strength and
unyielding determination, which exceeded the expectations of the relevant
countries. Following numerous contests, there has been a dramatic transfor-
mation in the situation. First, there has been a radical swing in the balance
of power. While there are still difficulties in China’s control of the South
China Sea, Chinese capability is no longer what it was before, hence it is al-
ready difficult for Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants to contend
with China. Furthermore, it will be more difficult for in situ provocation by
them to succeed. The cases of Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) (2012)
and the standoff over Zhongjian Nan (2014) symbolize the rapid expansion
in China’s control and development capacity in the South China Sea. As
China’s offensive and defensive power has grown, the US-Philippine version
of ‘shelving disputes’ has been introduced, whether the American proposal
to ‘freeze’2 or the Philippine ‘Triple Action Plan’,3 both essentially retreat
to advance, seeking through these diplomatic approaches to offset Chinese
advantages in strength and diminish China’s ever more influential actions to
safeguard its development rights in the South China Sea.
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  99
Second, debate over legal principles and rules has already become a focal
point in the game. Compelled by the balance of power situation, V ­ ietnam,
the Philippines and other claimants have started to change tactics in the
South China Sea conflict, demonstrating more caution and restraint in
‘armed conflict’, while greatly promoting its ‘non-violent attack.’ These
countries are ever more antipathetic to China in the realms of diplomacy
and international law, and furthermore work hard to encourage the mul-
tilateralization and internationalization of the South China Sea issue.
Although the Rodrigo Duterte administration has made a big change of
Philippine’s policy towards South China Sea, this kind of adjustment is just
on the tactics rather than general positions of the disputes. To advance its
‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy and strengthen the geopolitical compe-
tition with China, the United States has steadily abandoned the so-called
take no side and take no position approach, to comprehensively and promi-
nently intervene in the South China Sea issue. Japan, Britain, France, ­India,
Australia, the European Union and other major powers outside of the re-
gion have also all significantly concentrated their attentions on the South
China Sea issue.
Consequently, future diplomatic and legal warfare will gradually replace
military contests as the main form of the game in the South China Sea.
China’s ability to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea has
increased dramatically, and furthermore it is time to take the initiative and
realize its propositions and aspirations (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1  The South China Sea and the Nine Dash Line.
100  Solution to South China Sea tensions
Trends in the unfolding South China Sea situation once again prove that
strength is a condition and prerequisite in negotiations. Only when China’s
strength is sufficiently great, may the South China Sea situation develop as
per China’s vision. Regardless of how the United States, the Philippines and
other countries may use glib and artful words, China cannot forsake the
protection of its rights and development in the South China Sea. Strength
here includes the three major competences of military and law enforcement,
resource development, administration and social management. On the basis
of consolidating control over the Xisha Islands, China should expand its
power presence in the Nansha Islands and its surrounding waters, making
sure to react in a timely manner to crises that emerge in waters within its
jurisdiction, with the military power to respond at any time to conflict of
a moderate scale. On resource development, it is necessary to considera-
bly expand the presence of fisheries in the South China Sea, particularly in
disputed waters; achieve breakthroughs in the development of oil and gas
in the central and southern parts of the South China Sea as soon as possi-
ble; and launch the tourism industry as appropriate. On administration and
social management, China should accelerate the ‘solidification’ of Sansha
City, which should fulfill its role as an administrative pioneer and leader,
and elevate China’s status and duty in international cooperation, such as on
sea lane management and disaster relief in the South China Sea.
The questions that immediately follow are: what are China’s strategic
objectives and will China use these growing capabilities to seize islands
and capture reefs, in addition to controlling the entire South China Sea? In
truth, China’s actions are not to renounce ‘shelving disputes,’ but to pro-
mote peace through strength, to advance negotiations through strength.
On 30 July 2013, while presiding over a Politburo study session, Xi Jinping,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, once again emphasized adherence to the guiding principles of ‘Chi-
nese sovereignty, shelving disputes, and seeking joint development.’ If pre-
viously ‘shelving disputes’ was associated with myriad frustrated, passive
decisions, then in the future ‘shelving disputes’ must have richer connota-
tions of active choices.
In my observations, the 12 Chinese characters (主权属我、搁置争议、共同
开发) in the guiding principle above have offered conciliation in China, and
the overall reasoning is feasible. The South China Sea dispute is only one
part of China’s ever-closer relationship with South East Asian countries,
and the universal spirit of peaceful dispute settlement is perpetually appli-
cable. Policy design is not the problem for China’s current policy predica-
ment in the South China Sea; instead, it is caused by the gap in strength and
capability. At present, China certainly has no need to start from scratch,
while it should continue to enrich the principles in the 12 characters with
new content and new connotations, so that reputation and honor may follow
from true merit and real achievements.
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  101
Professed ‘Chinese sovereignty’ (主权属我) will be actual policy sup-
ported by formidable strength, pledging or enjoying specific political, mil-
itary, economic, and political actions, rather than merely a catchphrase;
so-called shelving disputes (搁置争议) is both a sincere commitment to the
international community, and a solemn warning against trespass upon this
principle. With the capability and determination to fight against acts of
provocation, China will not close its eyes as it did before. The so-called joint
development (共同开发) means that instead of remonstrating time and time
again, China will attract relevant countries to cooperate on resource devel-
opment through various economic initiatives and exceptional development
and operational capabilities. In short, actions speak louder than words, and
tangible achievements are far more important than extravagant proposals.
As for the South China Sea strategy under the new circumstances, a thor-
ough understanding of the 12 characters guiding principle is quite inade-
quate, but truly it is an important foundation for success.

Intelligently navigating complex relations in the

South China Sea4
In recent years, China’s capabilities of commanding situations in the South
China Sea have steadily increased. However, at the same time, Vietnam, the
Philippines and other related countries increasingly unite against China,
leveraging America, Japan and other outside powers to check China, while
attention on and unease over the South China Sea from other countries
in the region and major global powers swell. Diplomatically, China faces
heavy encirclement and enormous pressure.
Vietnam, the Philippines and other related countries are currently engi-
neering ‘He Zong’5 toward China. Vietnam has always gone to great lengths
to separate the South China Sea issue from the overall Sino-Vietnamese re-
lationship, concentrating on an unrelenting, long-term conflict, while high-
lighting tactics and flexibility. One side stresses a revolutionary friendship
of ‘comrades and brothers,’ developing robust relations with China’s party,
government and military; bolstering economic and trade cooperation; and
preventing a ‘rupture’ in Sino-Vietnamese relations from endangering the
greater environment of its reform and opening up. The other side does not
hesitate to prepare for political, diplomatic, legal and military struggles and
conflicts with China. During Benigno S. Aquino III’s presidency, the Phil-
ippines readily posed as the ‘vanguard’ in opposition to China in the South
China Sea, first stoking the case of Huangyan Dao, followed by the Renai
Jiao incident, and also taking legal action against China in the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Since Dutterte’s government came
into power, it has adopted the policy of shelving disputes in the South China
Sea but has not abandoned Philippine basic positions including the arbi-
tration ruling and the reef sovereignties on the South China Sea issue, and
102  Solution to South China Sea tensions
there are also frequent murmurs on harsh measures to be taken toward
China in the Philippines.
Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia have always advocated negotiations with
China to resolve differences and oppose intervention by the United States
and other external powers, although they all welcome the United States
playing a greater role in non-disputed issues. For them, the South China Sea
dispute has never been a major concern in their relations with China, but
they still harbor doubts over what kind of South China Sea policies China
will pursue after its rise. Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and other
non-claimant sides are both concerned over how aggravation in the South
China Sea dispute will cause ASEAN to ‘disintegrate’ but also do not wish
to ‘fall foul’ of China due to this issue. Therefore they encourage claimant
countries to engage in negotiations and willingly act as mediators.
ASEAN has no specific position on the South China Sea dispute. Put an-
other way, there is no sovereignty dispute whatsoever between China and
ASEAN, as ASEAN’s aim is to establish a certain consensus between claim-
ant states and non-claimant states, in addition to seeking a certain role in
implementation of DOC and the COC negotiations process. Because every
ASEAN member state has a different stance on the South China Sea is-
sue, it is very difficult for ASEAN to play a collectivizing role in specific
disputed issues. This fact was already clearly revealed at the 2012 ASEAN
foreign ministers meeting held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in which, for the
first time in its 45-year history, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a
joint communiqué following their annual meeting because of divergence on
South China Sea issues.6
In addition, with the Asia-Pacific region’s rising clout in global political
and economic framework, the strategic location of the South China Sea ap-
pears increasingly important, as all of the world’s major powers are actively
forging strategic fulcrums here. Besides the United States, Japan is also
strengthening its intervention in the South China Sea issue. It is no overstate-
ment to claim that on the nondisputant side, Japan would be most pleased to
see China ensnared in the South China Sea issue, as Japan views Vietnam,
the Philippines and other ASEAN countries as the most important potential
allies other than the United States to check and balance China. Under the
backdrop of a protracted, fierce dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Japan pro-
actively calls on all countries in South East Asia, sensationalizing ‘China’s
maritime threat,’ seeking linkages between the South China Sea and the
East China Sea, and hunting extensively for allies and partners to oppose
China. Japan has upped its military and economic assistance to Vietnam
and the Philippines to boost diplomatic interaction with these countries on
maritime issues, to best exploit any rifts or contradictions involving China
in order to build a maritime security mechanism or alliance against China.
India, Australia, Britain, the European Union, Russia and other countries
have notably fixated their attention on the South China Sea situation, ap-
pealing for peaceful dispute settlement and publishing policies linked to
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  103
the South China Sea. Out of consideration for the balance of power, these
countries are genuinely averse to seeing China’s prosperous development in
this region.
The pattern of mutual checks and balances between powers and eco-
nomic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region makes the cost of war
in the South China Sea excessively expensive, while China’s ever-growing
power presence leaves Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants with no
alternative but to reform policy and start afresh, turning to economic, legal,
diplomatic and other means of ‘non-violent attack.’ As all parties develop
military strength, strengthen law enforcement and prepare for all eventu-
alities, competition over resources development, international law and the
regional order will spread like wildfire. Here are some details:

• First, resource development is already a major source of friction and

conflict. Deterred by China’s growing military and law enforcement
forces, Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants gradually discon-
tinued the seizure of new islands and reefs, turning instead to inten-
sify competition for resources in the South China Sea. This tactic both
captures economic interests, and also results in fait accompli, which
create favorable conditions for sovereignty claims. At present there are
approximately 200 multinational oil companies that have petroleum
charter rights and engage in oil and gas exploration and exploitation
in the South China Sea, where more than 1,000 oil and gas wells are
being drilled. Their main partners are countries such as Vietnam, the
Philippines and Malaysia. In recent years, these countries have coop-
erated with foreign oil companies to a greater extent, brazen in laying
new wells and have become increasingly reckless in their actions. As
regards friction in fisheries, detainment and expulsion of Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese fisherman by Vietnam, the Philippines, and
other ASEAN countries have at times occurred. Dispute over fisheries,
colored by the various parties’ internal nationalist sentiments among all
parties, grows more passionate and vehement. On the whole, the scram-
ble for resources has now become a leading incentive for new conflict in
the South China Sea. However, one thing that must to be noted is that
China is no longer the main focal point of contradictions over fishery
disputes in the South China Sea, and that there is more and more fric-
tion occurring between Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam in wa-
ters adjacent to the Natuna Islands and southwestern fishing grounds.
In hot spot areas south of waters surrounding the Xisha Islands, China
maintains only a few hundred fishing boats while those of Indonesia,
Philippines and Vietnam all number at least in the thousands there.
• Second, contentions in international law explanation and public opin-
ion have steadily created a ‘second battlefield.’ Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, and other countries depend on UNCLOS with great fanfare,
focusing on surveys of geological structures and situation awareness
104  Solution to South China Sea tensions
in the South China Sea, aggressively collecting legal support for their
claims. In addition to campaigning for the ‘sympathy vote,’ they are at
all times prepared to ‘reason’ with China or to ‘settle in court,’ with the
Philippines speculating from January 2013 that arbitration on the South
China Sea issue has set a precedent. Some officials and scholars in the
United States and the West also actively provoke in fields of diplomacy
and public opinion, publicly accusing proposals and actions linked to
China as non-compatible with the provisions and spirit of UNCLOS.
These countries focus their attack on China’s position on the ‘Dash
Line,’ forcefully utilizing tools such as diplomacy and public opinion to
repeatedly call into question Chinese legality. Due to various reasons,
China has neither scrupulously prepared for legal battles in response,
nor has it formed a set of systematic strategies, so in this respect is com-
paratively passive.
• Third, great-power politics have made the issue even more complex and
challenging. The United States in particular intends to establish a new
front in the South China Sea in the strategic contest with China. The
power competition between China and the United States also consti-
tutes the greatest external dispute in the South China Sea environment,
which is becoming more and more a deciding factor to the situation of
South China Sea. The United States’ attraction of allies and partners by
exploiting the South China Sea dispute will naturally be perceived by
China as encirclement for containment by the United States, whereas
increasingly confident steps by China to protect its rights in the South
China Sea and its rising power will also be viewed by the United States
as ‘subversion’ of the US-led maritime order. With a rising degree of
American intervention, the development of Chinese sea power, and the
consequently narrowing gap between Chinese and American overall
strength, negative Sino-US general interaction will inevitably impact
the direction of the South China Sea issue. If the overall manner of
­Sino-US competition intensifies, South East Asian countries will have
no choice but to ‘pick a side.’ The South China Sea will become the focal
region of China’s and the United States’ strategic struggles, and never
will there be days of peace.

The situation in the South China Sea, the security environment in South
East Asia and even the entire Asia-Pacific power structure have undergone
vast changes. While China has been constructing a prominent military de-
terrence system, its legal contest, resources development and diplomatic
conflict approaches must be promptly coordinated and redressed. China
needs to show ‘muscle’ but moreover needs a comprehensive strategy.
It is vital to reinforce the interpretative power of international law, as well
as the ability to mold international maritime mechanisms, to solidify the
legal basis of China’s claim positions. It is irrefutable that UNCLOS’ ambi-
guities on maritime delimitation, legitimacy of islands and reefs, historical
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  105
entitlements and other issues have objectively elevated the fervor of global
maritime disputes, while the intensification of these global disputes will in-
exorably lead to retroactions in the further evolution and development of
international maritime institutions. Although UNCLOS’ appointed adjudi-
cation mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice, the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Court of Arbitration, do not
have any binding power on settling issues of sovereignty disputes, but they
could in theory reinterpret some of UNCLOS’ ambiguous articles accord-
ing to various countries’ new maritime practices and situations worldwide.
This both poses a challenge and presents an opportunity to China to safe-
guard its own interests in the South China Sea by enhancing its aptitude in
interpreting relevant international legal provisions, or re-molding maritime
mechanisms to demonstrate its own standpoint.
Key to breakthrough is the effective promotion of joint resource develop-
ment in the South China Sea to increase trust and reduce friction. Consid-
ering the sensitive and difficulty of joint development, for instance, disputed
countries have distinctly contrasting views on maritime disputes and delim-
itation, China should devote major efforts to studying all kinds of programs
for joint development, adopt an open attitude to all forms of economic part-
nership and achieve ultimate bilateral political solutions through concrete
economic and security cooperation. China must sustain sufficient patience,
take steps gradually and steadily and untiringly promote the joint devel-
opment of the South China Sea. In this process, China must strengthen its
capacity to raise good proposals, demonstrate adroit deterrence strength
and actions that embody strategic will. Through a comprehensive strategy
of ‘initiative + strength + action,’ the case of ‘shelving disputes and joint
development’ may exist in reality as well as on paper.
A prerequisite for success is both soft- and hard-handed management to
deal with the internationalization of the South China Sea dispute in order
to ‘cool’ and ‘extinguish’ the dispute. The majority of the non-­claimant par-
ties have their reasons for concern over the South China Sea issue; there-
fore, China should fully respect and understand each sides’ attention on
freedom of navigation, regional security and other factors in the South
China Sea; improve the transparency of relevant policies; and broaden
and deepen communication and cooperation. China can narrate its South
China Sea policy through diverse bilateral dialogue mechanisms, multilat-
eral platforms within the ASEAN framework and other international are-
nas. Among these, it is necessary to distinguish between the disputes over
islands and reefs in the South China Sea, maritime delimitation and other
issues concerning the South China Sea, such as freedom of navigation and
regional security. On these, China may hold consultations with any coun-
try or organization at any time and place, and engage in many kinds of
cooperation.
At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2014, Chinese For-
eign Minister Wang Yi echoed the ‘two-track’ approach proposed by Brunei,
106  Solution to South China Sea tensions
to handle the South China Sea issue, where disputant countries directly
seek, through amicable negotiations, a peaceful resolution to the relevant
disputes, while principles of peace and stability in the South China Sea are
jointly protected by China and ASEAN countries. This has been a highly
successful diplomatic venture. Since its introduction, this initiative has been
widely lauded, receiving the support and recognition of most ASEAN coun-
tries. Through such ‘softer’ hands, China has won understanding from a
majority of countries and organizations worldwide, as far as possible build-
ing an international public opinion and environment in favor of China. Up
to now, China and ASEAN countries have made great achievements under
the ‘two-track’ approach, of which, the fast advancing negotiation of COC
is a typical example.
As for a number of countries that intend to ‘profit from trouble’ by lever-
aging the South China Sea issue, and even engage in hostile actions, China
needs to convey to them the unequivocal point that security in the South
China Sea is connected to important interests of parties globally, but the
South China Sea dispute is irrevocably linked to China’s sovereign rights
and sovereign interests. To this end, China should not hesitate to tie these
countries’ conduct on issues in the South China Sea and their bilateral re-
lations with China and set a certain ‘red line’ for bilateral political, diplo-
matic and military retaliation may not be spared. Through a ‘harder’ hand,
it should obstruct and limit collusion between certain powers outside of the
region and a number of claimant parties.

In defense of legal principles in the South China Sea

As everyone knows, on 22 January 2013, the Philippines initiated the South
China Sea arbitration procedure, professing in accordance with provisions
Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS. The South China Sea
arbitration case filed by the Philippines marked the South China Sea dis-
pute’s game beginning to focus on softer contests in international law and
global public opinion following hard confrontations such as showdowns be-
tween ships, military deterrence, demonstrations of power and social pro-
test. Additionally, the Philippines is in fact not the sole disputant party in
the South China Sea dispute that wishes to file a lawsuit against China, as
Vietnam and other claimants are currently deliberating and actively prepar-
ing their involvement. In future, with further development of China’s law
enforcement and improvements in management and control of the South
China Sea’s waters, the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimants will suffer
greater losses with military means or paramilitary methods in a decisive ‘do
or die’ battle with China over strength and courage in the South China Sea,
so international legal battles will gradually become the main form of their
contests with China.
When filing for arbitration, the Philippines asserted that consultation and
negotiations with China had reached an impasse. In fact, the Philippine side
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  107
had consistently been refusing to engage in any serious dialogue with China
since the Huangyan Dao incident, much less negotiations. It is true disputes
indeed exist between China and the Philippines over the Nansha Islands
and parts of its waters; however, there has never been any Sino-­Philippine
communication in reference to the arbitration’s purported issues on the in-
terpretation and application of UNCLOS. The Philippines has never for-
mally raised the aforementioned issues with China. Put another way, the
Philippines was filing a lawsuit on the matter of A, when actually discussing
the subject of B. The Philippines disregarded the fact that it had never en-
tered any negotiations with China on arbitral affairs, concealing the truth,
inventing fictitious disputes and failing to execute Article 283 of UNCLOS
on the obligation to exchange views on dispute settlement approaches.
Of the 15 complaint submissions in the arbitration case filed by the Philip-
pines, the 3 main submissions were as follows: first, the arbitral tribunal was
required to clarify that China’s claim for maritime rights based on the ‘Dash
Line’ (or ‘9 Dash Line’) were contrary to UNCLOS. Second, the arbitral
tribunal must declare that China’s Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef), Ximen Jiao
(Mckennan Reef), Nanxun Jiao (Graven Reef) and Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef)
were merely ‘low tide elevations’ that could generate no maritime zones of
their own; Yongshu Jiao, Huayang Jiao, Chigua Jiao (Johnson South Reef)
and Huangyan Dao were ‘rocks’ and had no entitlement to 200-nautical-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone rights. Third, the arbitral tribunal was requested
to determine that China was ‘infringing’ upon the Philippines’ Exclusive
Economic Zone and continental shelf rights as asserted under UNCLOS
and furthermore adopt ‘temporary measures,’ pressing China to end such
acts. The purpose of these demands was to fundamentally diminish the le-
gal basis of China’s claims in the South China Sea, limiting China’s mari-
time interests in the South China Sea to a few scattered islands, reefs, and
their surrounding waters.
The Philippines of course understood the immunity China enjoys under
Article 298 of UNCLOS.7 As a result, content of its arbitration request was
clearly meticulously designed to as far as possible circumvent the sover-
eignty dispute underlying the South China Sea issue. On the surface, these
arbitration submissions were a legal debate and a request for the arbitral
tribunal to determine that China’s position and actions did not comply with
UNCLOS, in place of a demand by the Philippines for the tribunal to settle
its island sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes with China. This
attempted to circumvent China’s immunity, through a ‘technical’ and ‘law-
ful’ litigation request, which promoted the Philippine case and allowed it to
initiate the arbitration procedure.
In spite of this, the Philippines’ arbitration request cannot evade sus-
picions of edging around codes of conduct and concealing the truth. Ac-
cording to a Chinese official statement: ‘The core of the Philippine file for
arbitration is the matter of territorial sovereignty over particular islands
and reefs in the South China Sea. It does not concern the interpretation or
108  Solution to South China Sea tensions
application of UNCLOS.’8 Moreover, UNCLOS is purposely ambiguous on
historical rights, the legal status of islands and reefs, and other issues. To
some extent, the arbitral tribunal’s rulings and recommendations have an
inclination to possibly undermine UNCLOS’ legal foundation, which seeks
the highest common factor through ‘ambiguous compromise.’
However, on 12 July 2016, more unexpectedly, the arbitral tribunal issued
the award of this case and made a series of bold and impertinent decla-
rations: ‘the ‘Nine Dash Line’ is contrary to the Convention and without
lawful effect to the extent that it exceeds the geographic and substantive
limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention.’ ‘The Con-
vention superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdic-
tion, in excess of the limits imposed therein.’ As for the status of features in
the South China Sea, ‘none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands,
in their natural condition, are capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of their own within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Con-
vention.’ So, none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands generate
entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.9
Obviously, this award is too audacious and unprofessional, which is short
of the basic checks and balances required of an international case. If all the
declarations made by the tribunal were tenable, China would have nothing
but a group of insular features in the South China Sea. For this arbitration,
China has always adopted a policy of non-participation, non-acceptance
and non-recognition.
As to this case, over 70 countries and international and regional organ-
izations, and more than 230 political parties from 90 countries have made
statements showing their understanding of and support for China’s position
of settling disputes through negotiations10 and do not recognize the dispute
resolution approach of the Philippines and the arbitral tribunal. These sta-
tistics may be controversial in the Western world, but it is no doubt that the
arbitration procedure and its award have not won the general recognition
of the international community. Thus, regardless of the outcome, the case
itself does not constitute an overwhelming challenge to the China’s legal
claims in the South China Sea. The problem is that the case has set a bad
precedent, with the possibility of tearing apart the entire international com-
munity and swaying the maritime order based on UNCLOS. In the future,
conflict will intensify over concerns such as the international community’s
means of dispute resolution and the importance of UNCLOS. These con-
flicts will naturally impact the situation in the South China Sea, as the Phil-
ippines, the United States and other countries will inevitably demand China
to comply with arbitration rulings, relying on these outcomes to strengthen
their authority and moral high ground in the game against China in the
South China Sea. There also exist many variables that determine whether
Vietnam and other disputant parties will mimic the Philippine example.
It should be noted that the South China Sea dispute is a strategic and
comprehensive contest, in which legal warfare need to sufficiently consider
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  109
maritime strategy, policy enforcement, military deterrence, and other situa-
tions at a higher level, broader scope and wider frontier.
First, in order to respond to such legal disputes with self-confidence and
professionalism, it is necessary to boost research into international mari-
time law and interaction with relevant international mechanisms. Ideas in
the underlying principles of international law, in particular maritime law,
originate from customary law shaped in the process of interaction among
Western countries. In modern times, China has been learning constantly
to catch up. Today, China is still a distance away from world class in the
research field of international law, which includes international maritime
law. On specific issues, such as the South China Sea, China’s research also
appears to be relatively rudimentary, for the most part ending with the rep-
etition and interpretation of official positions. In jurisprudential, empirical
and other aspects, there is very little of value in diplomatic legal conten-
tions. In order to achieve true victory in legal battles, China must advance
this area of research and lay a solid foundation for its legal claims. On 7
December 2014, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the ‘Position
Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of
the Philippines,’11 incisively identifying inconsistencies and contradictions
in the Philippines’ arbitration case through incontrovertible evidence and
exhaustive logic. It fully demonstrates the Chinese position and reflects Chi-
na’s marked progress in areas such as its aptitude for legal research and skill
in diplomatic battle in recent years.
At the same time, China should strive to participate in the development
and operation of international mechanisms. Chinese citizens hold a number
of positions in mechanisms such as CLCS and ITLOS, which are based on
UNCLOS to exercise jurisdiction on the behalf of virtually all of mankind
and whose impartiality and authority are widely recognized by the interna-
tional community. China should appropriate steer domestic public opinion
to avoid speculation on various kinds of ‘conspiracy theories.’ As for the
Philippine arbitration case, China must approach it rationally, present its
position to the international community and illustrate its experiences of in-
justice. However, it is inadvisable to vent its fury and sentiment toward the
Philippines to ITLOS or the arbitral tribunal at will.
Second, it is necessary to comprehensively weigh interest gains against
interest losses in strategic international maritime legal battles. The legal
battle in the South China Sea is the result of various conflicting beliefs and
interests, creating huge pressure against the evolution and development of
UNCLOS as the ‘maritime charter’ as well as challenging China’s principles
of maritime law and maritime strategies. The signature and implementation
of UNCLOS is the result of compromise, which features tactful ambiguity or
evasion on myriad major issues such as the status of islands and reefs. These
less than explicit articles reflect differences in the legal views and interest
definitions of coastal states. The South China Sea issue has in particular
110  Solution to South China Sea tensions
highlighted the inadequacies of UNCLOS stipulations on maritime delim-
itation principles, status of features, historical rights and other issues. An
ultimate settlement in the South China Sea dispute has to accompany the
evolution of international maritime law, and the resolution process is certain
to impact upon developments in international maritime law. China needs to
comprehensively scrutinize gains and losses in its entire sovereign maritime
space, including the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, in accordance with
the underlying spirit of international maritime law, practical experience, de-
velopment trends, and other factors. In light of this consideration, China
next should form relevant regulation proposals.
Third, it is necessary to strengthen coordination between domestic de-
partments and institutions, so that diplomatic, economic, military and other
policy tools can act in concert together to support the legal warfare. There
is a certain degree of flexibility in international law as the arbitral court and
other international mechanisms do not award rulings in a vacuum entirely
free of international politics. The trial process, final result and even jurisdic-
tion of this case will be subject to the interference or influence of the inter-
national situation and public opinion. Consequently, this is unquestionably
not merely a simple legal battle, but an integrated and all-encompassing
contest of diplomacy, military affairs, international law and public opinion,
presenting a test for China’s comprehensive strategic strength at sea.
As for China, it is imperative to prevent the international community
from forming an unfavorable final verdict on the laws relevant to the South
China Sea. In addition to strengthening the construction and interpretation
of its own legal system, it is necessary to resolutely suppress any provoca-
tive behavior akin to the Philippine arbitration case. In diplomacy, China
should adjust its mentality as deliberate evasion in unnecessary, actively
voice its stance at international events and in so far as possible unveil the
‘sympathy vote’ of the Philippines and other countries in light of inevitable
of internationalization of the South China Sea issue; militarily, China still
needs to continue reinforcing its construction and application of force, el-
evate the effectiveness of deterrence and prevent the emergence of further
disadvantages to China; economically, China should proactively conduct
scientific investigation and maintain economic presence in the disputed ar-
eas, in addition to initiating appropriate oil and gas resource exploitation
measures to promote genuine ‘joint development’ by way of independent
development through advantages in technology, capital and other areas in
the southern and central South China Sea.

Debate over the South China Sea ‘Dash Line’12

Since 2009, China’s position over the South China Sea ‘Dash Line’ (also
sometimes known as ‘the Nine Dash Line’) has become a focal point of the
South China Sea legal conflict, as not only does the Philippine arbitration
farce point directly at the ‘Dash Line,’ but Vietnam, Malaysia and other
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  111
countries are in practice also opposed to the ‘Dash Line.’ Even more note-
worthy is that the United States has started to cheer its support openly for
the Philippines as US Assistant Secretary of State Russell demanded China
clarify the ‘Nine Dash Line’ at a US congressional committee hearing on
5 February 2014.13 Subsequently, more and more American senior officers
have made repeated accusations of Chinese violations of UNCLOS, insist-
ing that China explain its ‘Nine Dash Line’ request. There are also some
other countries within the region and beyond that more or less believe that
the ‘Dash Line’ is noncompliant with the UNCLOS essence, in which ‘land
dominates the sea.’ For a time, it seemed as if China’s ‘Dash Line’ position
was perpetually incompatible with UNCLOS and had become a target of
unrestricted censure. However, the truth is not as it appears.
First, China’s position on the ‘Dash Line’ does not contravene any
UNCLOS articles. China’s claims on the ‘Dash Line,’ which includes island
sovereignty and the historical interests of waters within the Line, are mainly
founded upon the enduring historical practices of Chinese ancestors in the
South China Sea. China began sailing and fishing activities in the South
China Sea as early as in the Han Dynasty, while accounts related to the
South China Sea appeared in Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters) in the
Eastern Han Dynasty. Since the Tang Dynasty, China has encompassed
the Nansha Islands into Chinese domain, while in the Song and Yuan Dy-
nasties, the many islands and waters of the South China Sea were named,
administered and controlled, tentatively establishing the beginnings of
maritime territory in the South China Sea. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties,
the scope and domain of China’s activities in the South China Sea were fur-
ther outlined as the four major archipelagos and their neighboring waters
progressively become traditional areas of operation for Chinese fishermen.
Based on the above, after over ten years of investigation and verification,
in 1947 the government of the Republic of China finally mapped China’s
traditional territory in the South China Sea through the form of the ‘Dash
Line.’ Following its founding, the People’s Republic of China inherited and
committed to the ‘Dash Line’ claims.
With the formation of the Exclusive Economic Zones and continental
shelf systems, original legal facts on the ‘Dash Line’ have evolved into three
broad categories: first is the sovereignty of islands and their territorial wa-
ters; second is the Exclusive Economic Zones of islands in light of UNCLOS
assertions; and third are the lawful rights of traditional waters, which are
yet to be determined, that is, historical rights or interests that are also a
focus of current disputes.
The ‘Dash Line’ is in fact not a territorial demarcation line, nor has the
Chinese government ever defined it as such. This is a legal fact that the
current maritime legal system is unable to interpret. Serving as basic in-
ternational maritime law, UNCLOS has not made any provisions on such
traditional territories or interests based on historical practice, nor has it
provided clarification on existing legal facts. Although UNCLOS refers to
112  Solution to South China Sea tensions
historic title and historic bay in Article 15 and Article 298, expressing that
UNCLOS acknowledges historic rights, but does not include articles spec-
ifying what constitutes historic rights. It is unavoidable that there exists a
degree of ambiguity in China’s ‘Dash Line’ claims because there is in fact no
consensus on the concept and connotations of historical rights in the field
of international jurisprudence. The legal system established by UNCLOS
in reality cannot explain or define historic rights. In the part of Preamble,
­UNCLOS is ‘Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention con-
tinue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international
law.’14 Without clear-cut standards and regulations, it is hard to understand
what ‘violation’ could mean.
Second, related countries clearly have hidden motives for exploiting
­UNCLOS to attack China’s ‘Dash Line’ position. Work on the general sur-
vey and design of the ‘Dash Line’ map began on 1933, completed in 1947
and was released to the public in 1948. In the following several decades until
the early 1970s, the ‘Dash Line’ position received the international com-
munity’s widespread approval and recognition. In this period, South East
Asian countries including Vietnam and the Philippines designed and pub-
lished maps, which labeled without exception the Nansha, Xisha, Dongsha,
Zhongsha Islands and other archipelagos within the ‘Dash Line’ as belong-
ing to China. Western countries such as France and Spain even published
maps that used ‘Dash Line’ to mark China’s maritime territorial boundary
in the South China Sea without the slightest objection from any of the par-
ties in the South China Sea dispute today. Some countries now discount
their former silence and acquiescence, accusing the ‘Dash Line’ position of
compromising UNCLOS, while in fact they violate the diplomatic principle
of equitable estoppel, if only for immediate interests.
Due to economic interests and strategic interests, the Philippines, Viet-
nam and other claimants wish to not only secure their occupied islands,
reefs, and other vested interests, but also continue to expand their gains; the
United States, Japan and other countries help to muddy the waters with ul-
terior motives at heart, principally to create inconvenience for China and to
contain China at sea. If international morality and international law are dis-
regarded due to these countries’ selfish interests, then surely this is a breach
in the underlying spirit of fairness and justice in international law?
Finally, the use of UNCLOS to forcibly adjudicate of the ‘Dash Line’
position contradicts inter-temporal law and other legal principles or conven-
tions. Inter-temporal law ‘resolves conflict between laws, and furthermore
determines a suitable legal time scale. That is, legal facts must be judged
based upon contemporary law, instead of according to law while the dispute
is in progress or as it is settled.’ In other words, we can judge neither the
conduct of our predecessors in accordance to modern laws, nor whether de-
scendants’ inheritance of ancestors’ legal facts is ‘lawful.’ UNCLOS was not
signed until 30 years after the establishment of the ‘Dash Line’ position, and
only officially enforced over ten years after that; even in comparison with
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  113
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, ‘Dash Line’ claims originated
more than ten years earlier.
Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf rights derive from the
modern maritime legal system centered upon UNCLOS, while China’s
‘Dash Line’ position originates from international legal conventions at and
before that time. The legal origins of the two matters are entirely differ-
ent. Condemning the ‘Dash Line’ position as noncompliant with UNCLOS
stipulations, surely is to allow UNCLOS to traverse retrospectively through
time and space? In addition, the blind expansion of any UNCLOS article’s
jurisdiction and the exaggeration of its interpretive power may raise the
problem of coherence for UNCLOS articles as the whole, as well as lead to
contradictions between UNCLOS and other principles in international law,
directly creating a ‘legitimacy’ crisis for UNCLOS in the general interna-
tional legal system.
Thus, according to jurisprudence and relevant historical support,
­UNCLOS articles and practices all cannot refute China’s ‘Dash Line’ posi-
tion. In accordance with prevailing international legal principles, as a new
legal system, UNCLOS and its practices, cannot conflict with existing in-
ternational law and existing legal facts. The Exclusive Economic Zone and
continental shelf systems established by UNCLOS also cannot challenge
China’s existing rights obtained on the basis of other legal systems.
UNCLOS is the foundation of modern maritime law and the maritime
order, and its spirit of fairness, justice and authority is generally recognized
by the international community. However, international maritime law is in
a state of constant dynamic development, while UNCLOS itself is far from
perfect. It is a product of concession and compromise, with numerous am-
biguous articles that need distilling and a wide range of marine practices
that need to be included. The apparently fierce contraction between China’s
‘Dash Line’ position and UNCLOS is actually due in large to UNCLOS’
areas of deficiency the jurisprudence of historic rights.
To be sure, in future China needs to make fresh efforts through its na-
tional practices. However, the international community, all coastal states
included, also should conscientiously promote the enhancements and refine-
ments in UNCLOS through sustained communication and negotiation, so
as to provide a more comprehensive, just, reasonable and clear legal refer-
ence or guide for the settlement of various major global maritime disputes,
such as the South China Sea dispute.

Thoughts on the land reclamation of the Spratly Islands15

At the end of 2013, China launched a construction project to garrison sec-
tions of the Nansha Islands. In April 2014, a photo of China reclaiming land
in the Chigua Jiao was widely shared in various major media. At the scene,
the photo merely showed a number of Chinese large tonnage vessels working
in the vicinity of the Chigua Jiao, having reclaimed 0.1 square kilometers of
114  Solution to South China Sea tensions
artificial island. The then Philippine President Aquino III declared, several
Chinese vessels equipped with land reclamation facilities were discovered in
waters of the Nanxun Jiao and Huayang Jiao. They could be used for land
reclamation and island building in the South China Sea.
In response, at a routine press conference on 15 May 2014, Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated, ‘China has
indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands including Chigua Reef and
the contiguous waters. Whatever construction China carries out in the Chi-
gua Reef is completely within China’s sovereignty.’16 On 9 June, with regard
to the news of airport construction on the Yongshu Jiao, Hua Chunying
again expressed a similar position. Based on past experience, this attitude
showed that China had already indirectly acknowledged rumors of land
reclamation.
At a press conference on 9 April 2015, Hua Chunying delivered a more
detailed explanation, noting that the Chinese government has been car-
rying out maintenance and construction work on some of the garrisoned
Nansha Islands and reefs with the main purposes of optimizing their func-
tions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed
there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and
interests, as well as better performing China’s international responsibility
and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mit-
igation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environ-
mental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other
matters.17 The relevant construction is well within China’s sovereignty, and
it neither impacts nor targets any country. According to conjecture from
satellite photo at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
in the United States, the accumulated surface area of expansions to islands
and reef is over 13 square kilometers. Three super long aircraft runways
(each approximately 3,000 meters in length) have been built on the Yongshu,
Zhubi and Meiji Jiao.18
China’s project to construct islands and reefs has enormously improved
livelihoods on the Nansha Islands, and has also markedly advanced China’s
power presence in the Nansha Islands. At the same time, this progress has
also prompted a high degree of concern from the international community
especially the United States,19 which exploits the opportunity to sensation-
alize, exert pressure upon China with language such as supposed ‘too much,
too quick’20 and alleged ‘militarization of islands and reefs’, and which in-
creases the extent of their intervention in the South China Sea issue, and
heightens Sino-US tension on the matter.
In reality, with the new situation in the South China Sea, China had truly
no choice except to reclaim land in the Nansha Islands, for the following
reasons.
First, this is to remedy historic gaps in infrastructure investment and to
bolster the power presence in the Nansha Islands. For long periods of time,
Vietnam and the Philippines have continued operations on occupied islands
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  115
and reefs, promoting some islands as military bases. Vietnam has stationed
from dozens to hundreds of troops on the medium and relatively larger
sized islands and reefs, such as Hongxiu (Namyit) Island, Nanwei (Spratly)
Island, Jingxiong (Sin Cowe) Island, Nanzi Island (Southwest Cay), Zhong
Jiao (Central Reef) and has more than 2,000 military personnel garrisoned
throughout the entire Nansha Islands in total. In particular, there are recon-
naissance positions, docks and an airfield built; cannons and other heavy
weaponry deployed; and approximately 550 troops stationed on the Nanwei
Island. On its occupied islands and reefs, the Philippines has constructed two
small-scale military airbases and on three of these islands and reefs created
army bases, including an airstrip on Zhongye (Pag-Asa) Island that can even
host large C-130 air freighters. In stark contrast, installations on islands and
reefs controlled by China in the Nansha Islands are the most rudimentary.
They were reinforced concrete huts on stilts built by soldiers, who were sta-
tioned on the reefs in the 1990s. Having suffered from the high-­temperature,
high-humidity and high-salinity environments of the South China Sea for
over 20 years, these facilities are now in urgent need of repair and develop-
ment. Since contending parties such as Vietnam and the Philippines have
seized all the islands with the best conditions, peaceful and prudent man-
agement of the few islands and reefs under China’s control has become the
foundation upon which to secure its presence in the Nansha Islands.
Second, it is to ‘teach Vietnam and the Philippines a lesson’ in order to
quell their hubris. In the past, to counter the seizure of islands and reefs by
countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as their actions that
incessantly disrupt the status quo, China chiefly pressurized or condemned
these sides through approaches in diplomacy or public opinion, appealing
to these countries to stop their provocative behavior and restart to bilateral
negotiations as soon as possible. However, diplomacy that is not supported
by strength and practical action will always come to nothing. Vietnam and
the Philippines not only turned a deaf ear to China’s objections, but stepped
up their aggravations, completely viewing relevant international norms and
the DOC signed in 2002, as irrelevant, and accelerated them to further their
military, social, political and economic presence on occupied islands and
reefs, speculated publicly on the ‘China threat’ and advocated the interna-
tionalization and multilateralization of the South China Sea dispute. Above
all, as their unease intensifies in the foreseeable future, Vietnam and the
Philippines are anxious lest the situation develop in an increasingly unfa-
vorable direction and count on the unprecedented tendency of countries
outside of the region to meddle in the South China Sea.
Under these circumstances, reciprocal action by China is fully within
reason. China needs to act so that the Philippines can discern the reality,
indirectly check and balance its expansion and safeguard the peaceful or-
der of the South China Sea. In view of China’s present comprehensive na-
tional strength, once there is an outbreak of action over the Nansha Islands,
whether it is an arms race or an infrastructural competition, China would
116  Solution to South China Sea tensions
tower over both Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s construction on the
Nansha Islands would deal Vietnam and the Philippines a head-on blow,
helping to compel Vietnam and the Philippines to refrain from unilateral
action and to return to the negotiating table.
Last, it is to cast a chess piece in the distant seas and the open oceans, to
develop islands and reefs under control in the South China Sea into bases
upon which to move forward. As China steps toward the distant seas and the
open oceans, China is in ever-greater need to acquire indispensable bases in
the central and southern parts of the South China Sea for reconnaissance
and early warning in addition to logistical support. The Nansha Islands
happen to be situated in a critical location and can project upon the entire
southern part of the South China Sea, compensating for any shortfalls or
deficits in China’s reconnaissance or early warning in this area, furthermore
acting as a multiplier in projecting power, and increasing the capability of
Chinese sea power to extend to the southern part of the South China Sea
and even to the Indian Ocean. For China’s deep-sea strategy, the impor-
tance of the Nansha Islands even exceeds that of the Xisha Islands.
However, the distance between the Nansha Islands and both the Xisha Is-
lands and the Chinese Mainland is considerable. The closest distance from
the Nansha Islands to the Xisha Islands is approximately 550 kilometers,
while the effects of projection from heavy forces present on Hainan Island
and the Xisha Island bases decline sharply by the time the Nansha Islands
are reached; moreover, islands and reefs presently under Chinese control
in the Nansha Islands had no airfields and no large-scale docks before. In
the event of catastrophe, even Chinese power would find it very difficult to
proceed with rapid relief and rescue. At the same time, China also lacks
necessary the self-defense capabilities herein. A number of the somewhat
larger islands and shoals have already been completely carved up and di-
vided between Vietnam, the Philippines and other parties, while the few
islands and reefs controlled by China are practically enclosed by islands and
reefs occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines.
Furthermore, in geomorphology, these islands and reefs were mostly at-
olls or platform reefs, with relatively poor natural conditions and unable to
deploy heavy equipment or garrison a large number of personnel. The gar-
rison capability of these islands and reefs was at most squads of light weap-
onry and small arms. Under the present circumstances, islands and reefs of
the Nansha Islands were not only unable to serve as a powerful springboard
for the extension of Chinese power but were likely to become a liability for
the Chinese government and military in times of armed conflict. To change
this situation, land reclamation in the Nansha Islands can be accepted as a
peaceful yet effective strategic measure.
To satisfactorily execute the abovementioned intentions, these islands and
reefs reclaimed by China should at the very least meet the two following
major functional requirements. First, as a vital power presence, the forces
garrisoned on these islands and reefs must be able to self-defend in times
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  117
of skirmishes, and not be ‘held hostage’ by Vietnam, the Philippines and
other countries, or be the object of those who ‘fish in muddy waters.’ This
requires China to increase its total armed forces in these areas to at least
the battalion level or even to the regiment scale, and furthermore boost its
anti-reconnaissance facilities, so as to strike a basic equilibrium in power in
the Nansha Islands with Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Sec-
ond, as forward bases, these islands and reefs must support a comparatively
larger airfield and larger docks, with strong logistical capacities.
This all requires a certain amount of space. Before Chinese reclama-
tion, islands with airfield runways greater than 1 kilometer in length in the
Nansha Islands were the two largest of the Nansha Islands, namely Taip-
ing Island and Zhongye Island, with surface areas of 0.432 and 0.37 square
kilometers, respectively, whereas Malaysia has built an artificial island on
Danwan Jiao (Swallow Reef), whose area reaches 0.35 square kilometers,
with a runway exceeding 1 kilometer long.
It is evident that a large-scale military presence and the functions of a
forward base all specify that the islands areas cannot be too small. Taking
into account livelihood issues and socialization activities, these islands and
reefs require even greater areas. The United States’ alleged ‘too quick, too
much’ is purely unsubstantiated as globally there have never been standards
for such measurements. In view of the Chinese government’s consistently
high efficiency in infrastructure construction, the scale of island and reef
expansion is all the more straightforward to comprehend.
It is essential to note that completely denying the military role and sig-
nificance of China’s island building in the Nansha Islands would appear
deceitful, however, to unduly examine China’s behavior from a military per-
spective alone would be rather too constricted. In fact, the potential role of
island and reef expansion in the Nansha Islands in stimulating socioeco-
nomic livelihoods, launching international cooperation and assuming the
responsibility of a great power should not be overlooked.
It is common knowledge that China historically once long assumed over-
whelming advantages in its socioeconomic presence in close proximity of
the Nansha Islands. However, following the end of the Second World War,
especially since the 1970s, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines
seized numerous islands and reefs one by one in China’s Nansha Islands.
Chinese fishing boats and merchant ships thus lost traditional supply de-
positories and transit centers, as the capacity and scope of their operations
diminished day by day, while China comprehensively fell behind Vietnam,
the Philippines and other disputant parties in the development of resources
in the Nansha Islands, such as that of fisheries, oil and gas, and tourism. Out
of considerations to accelerate economic development in the South China
Sea and improve livelihoods of Chinese citizens, under a backdrop of peace-
ful dispute resolution, China must best manage and exploit islands and reefs
currently under its control. As these islands and reefs have extremely small
surface areas and very poor basic conditions, China has no alterative other
118  Solution to South China Sea tensions
than land reclamation and island building. In the context of China acceler-
ating its support of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and cooperation
around the South China Sea, the need for island building is even more acute.
There is a severe imbalance in the supply of international public goods
in the South China Sea region. The Nansha Islands also remain a key plat-
form for China to expand global cooperation and undertake international
responsibility.
We only know that piracy is rampant in the Gulf of Aden, whereas it is
unobserved there are also areas severely affected by piracy on the margins
of the South China Sea, where incident outbreaks are next only to those
of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in frequency and at times even the high-
est in the world. The hydrology of the South China Sea is complex, with
myriad sunken reefs and shoals, hectic transportation routes and ships of-
ten running aground against reefs. For instance, on 11 July 2012, a PLAN
frigate became inadvertently stranded while carrying out routine patrol
duties in waters close surrounding the Banyue Jiao (Half Moon Shoal) in
the Nansha Islands; on 17 January 2013, the USS Guardian minesweeper
ran aground and stranded in the Philippine Tubbataha Reefs. Additionally,
the South China Sea and its peripheral regions are vulnerable to countless
typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis, while marine search and rescue mis-
sions are extremely arduous and hazardous. Impeded by maritime disputes
and restricted by their national strength, ASEAN countries are simply un-
able to assume the abovementioned responsibilities. Although China has
considerable strength, these issues were beyond its reach. China’s forces in
the Nansha Islands were limited to the defense of islands by troops, as it
was impossible to deploy large-scale military or civilian facilities on a per-
manent basis on the Yongshu Jiao and other islands and reefs given their
the intrinsic conditions; search and rescue forces must be dispatched from
the distant Xisha Islands or even Hainan Island, and were unable to arrive
in time at the scene in central and southern parts of the South China Sea.
Under these circumstances, there was an enormous gap in the supply of
international public goods in the South China Sea.
As the largest coastal state along the South China Sea, China naturally
has an unshirkable responsibility. Responsible great powers do not only in-
dulge in empty rhetoric; moreover, the assumption of international duties
should begin from the periphery. Specifically, to central and southern parts
of the South China Sea, China must have solid logistical support, hence the
need to expand islands and reefs under its control in the Nansha Islands.
Following their completion, the islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands
will become comprehensive bases to safeguard China’s participation in in-
ternational cooperation and contribution in maritime public goods. These
islands and reefs will not only allow China’s various forces to more agilely
reach the Nansha Islands, rapidly operate on the periphery of the South
China Sea, but also help all countries’ vessels and aircraft that navigate in
the vicinity of the Nansha Islands. The islands will become some powerful
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  119
points to support China’s drive for prosperous development and peaceful
stability in the South China Sea.

The debut display of ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ and its

future maneuvers
In early May 2014, the Chinese deep-water drilling rig, Haiyang Shiyou
(Ocean Petroleum) 981, was deployed in the waters of the Xisha Islands
to engage in drilling and exploration duties. The China Maritime Bureau
issued the navigational alert ‘Hainan Navigation Warning No. 0033,’ an-
nouncing that ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ drilling platform will conduct drilling
work between 2 May and 15 August in an area within one nautical mile
radius of 15-29.58N 111-12.06E, with other unauthorized vessels prohibited
from entry.
Nonetheless, Vietnam paid no heed to this navigation warning, instead
dispatching a large fleet of vessels to cause severe disruption to China’s drill-
ing operations. Vietnam sent combat divers and in addition released consid-
erable quantities of fishing nets and bulky obstacles in the water in acts of
blatant provocation, which ‘constitute a security threat to the facilities and
personnel of Chinese vessels, as well as posing a hazard to the security of
normal navigation.’ Chinese ships had no choice but to resort to measures
such as ramming ships and spraying water cannon to resist Vietnamese ves-
sels. Thereupon Chinese escort ships engaged Vietnamese ships seeking to
interfere in intense confrontation in the proximity of 17 nautical miles south
of Zhongjian (Triton) Island.
During the standoff, fierce conflicts unfolded between the two parties on
fronts such as military affairs, diplomacy and public opinion. At the peak
of the conflict, there were close to 200 vessels of various types at the scene
between the two sides. The confrontation south of Zhongjian Island also
attracted a high degree of global attention. As for responses to its actions,
China has received a mix of positive and negative reaction domestically and
internationally. Supporters argue that execution of the Zhongjiannan initi-
ative is an excellent demonstration of China’s determination in maintaining
its rights and constitutes a powerful deterrence of the states concerned; in
contrast, critics point out that the Zhongjiannan project is worthless as this
block’s value to yield oil and gas is not high, while worsening relations with
Vietnam and deepening a sense of vigilance in other countries surrounding
the South China Sea.
On the operational level, it is difficult to comprehend for some sections
of public opinion on the ‘Coming too hastily and leaving also in a hurry’
actions targeting ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981,’ equating critical political and mil-
itary affairs with child’s play. In particular, the early pull back carried
the suspicion of acquiescence to external pressure. On 15 July, China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Oilfield Services Lim-
ited (COSL) unexpectedly issued an announcement that ‘Haiyang Shiyou
120  Solution to South China Sea tensions
981’ rig platform had successfully completed drilling and exploration op-
erations in waters surrounding Zhongjian Island in the Xisha Islands and
would shift sites, as planned, to waters near Hainan Lingshui to continue
work, which was one month in advance of schedule. At the time the United
States frequently pressured China in respect to the Zhongjiannan project:
for instance, on 10 July the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations de-
manded in resolution 412 that China withdraw drilling rig 981. As a result,
this transition has inevitably led to all kinds of conjecture from observers
globally and media of whether what happened was a routine transference or
rather a strategic retreat for diplomatic ‘pacification’?
However, the story of pressure leading to such a compromise is not very
credible. For more than two months since the launch of the Zhongjiannan
project, Vietnam has persisted in disrupting China’s drilling and exploration
operations at the site, continuously pressurizing China and seeking interna-
tional support; at the same time, it was clear that the United States ‘sup-
ported Vietnam, suppressed China’ in aspects such as diplomacy and public
opinion, repeatedly criticizing China for the initiative. Yet, these attempts
have been in vain. Vietnam lacked forceful measures to coerce China to
withdraw, whereas the United States had no strong political will for coercive
intervention. At the scene, Vietnam was in an increasingly unfavorable posi-
tion since early May, while its open speculation on the Sino-­Vietnamese con-
frontation event was exactly to compensate for its deficiencies in strength; in
diplomacy, Vietnam has gained also only the verbal sympathy and support
of countries such as the United States and Japan, rather than gaining any-
thing of substance. Even the intercessions by the then US President Barack
Obama, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and other senior officials have
been unable to resolve the issue. How could a nonbinding resolution with
no legal effect in the slightest, passed by 20 odd members of the US Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, result in a positive turnaround?
From an objective perspective, an early withdrawal did indeed help to alle-
viate regional tensions and mitigate Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-US relations,
but it was certainly not a major consideration for the transfer of the rig. In
view of information from all sides overall, it is highly probable that the early
fulfillment of its targets is the reason at root for the drawback. Deep-sea oil
and gas development is an incredibly complex economic activity, as at least
it must pass through multiple steps such as on site surveying and explora-
tion, data analysis, test drilling, in addition to formal extraction. Previously,
only simple 3D seabed seismic measurements, which yet lacked the support
of precise and detailed data, were carried out in the Zhongjiannan block
to ascertain drilling location. This time in launching the initiative, the 981
drilling rig did not conduct detailed research or economic calculations, as its
main economic objective is to obtain submarine geological data, as a basis
for follow up decision making, with strong features of test drilling.
As relevant information and plans are short in detail, drilling and explo-
ration cycles cannot be devised so rigorously and accurately, with a large
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  121
degree of flexibility in the original three months period. Having established
two rigs and obtained essential information and statistics, before such data
are comprehensively analyzed and commercially assessed, for drilling rig
981 to remain at the site would be to make much ado about nothing. ‘The
relevant companies will research and formulate the next step in the scheme
of operation on the basis of analysis and assessment of geological mate-
rial.’21 Comments such as this by the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs are
not simply government rhetoric and clichés, as this is likely the truth, albeit
this stage in drilling rig 981’s operations has indeed concluded. Of course,
the Zhongjiannan initiative is also drilling a ‘political well,’ for political
motivations are also important reasons behind the launch of this project.
This conflict and game is an exceptional demonstration of China’s power-
ful strength and determination, as well as a declaration of the intention to
defend its sovereignty through actual action. At the same time, it has ap-
praised and tested the positions and bottom lines of neighboring countries
and those of countries outside of the region such as the United States.
Typhoon and other meteorological concerns are direct factors for the
transfer. The South China Sea began to enter the typhoon season in mid-
to late July 2014, No. 9 typhoon ‘Rammasun’ formed on the afternoon of
12 July on the ocean surface of the Northwest Pacific Ocean, ferocious
and merciless in its intensity, and was predicted to impact the Xisha and
Hainan Islands on around 18 July. Although drilling rig 981 can withstand
typhoons, the capacity of its surrounding escort, provisions, and services
vessels to endure typhoons is far less optimistic. As goals had been reached
and the weather was subject to sudden change, to begin to withdraw from
the site before the advent of typhoons was undoubtedly a wise move.
Following the Zhongjiannan incident, both China and Vietnam pro-
claimed momentous victories, while a range of interpretations and narratives
emerged in domestic Chinese public opinion. In reality, notwithstanding
any apparent irrespective gains and losses, the Zhongjiannan initiative un-
deniably marks a major breakthrough for China. Its economic and strategic
role and significance to China in the South China Sea will far outweigh the
project itself.
First, the most direct understanding possible has been conceived of geo-
logical structures in waters surrounding the Xisha Islands to the benefit of
follow-up research and development work. Unlike ordinary, indirect sur-
veying equipment, drilling rig 981 directly explored and laid wells, acquiring
firsthand seabed geological specimens from the Zhongjian Depression. Ac-
cording to information released by CNPC, drilling and exploration works
have on this occasion discovered signs of oil and gas in the targeted layers.
From results of preliminary analysis of data and geological materials gath-
ered, the Zhongjian Depression has the essential conditions required for oil
and gas deposits, and to some extent, potential for oil and gas exploration.
Second, China has accumulated a wealth of management and conflict
experience for operations in sensitive waters. The Zhongjiannan initiative
122  Solution to South China Sea tensions
is the first time China has engaged in operations in distant seas far from
the continent, in especially complicated and sensitive waters. During this
period, China has engaged in a sweeping head-to-head contest with Viet-
nam at the scene and beyond to ensure the normal operations of the rig,
fulfilling all tasks to satisfaction and gaining rich experience in fields such
as politics, diplomacy, law enforcement, military affairs and public opinion.
It goes without saying these experiences will provide valuable lessons and
references for China in its future exploration and development of other sen-
sitive waters of the South China Sea.
Third, China has dealt a stunning blow to the arrogance and audacity of
countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and moreover changed the
configuration of oil and gas development in the South China Sea. As for
other parties in the South China Sea dispute, the influence of the by drilling
rig ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ far outstrips that of an aircraft carrier, as China
has become the only South China Sea disputant to independently possess
deep-sea drilling equipment and technology. With increasing escalations in
the South China Sea dispute, oil companies from outside the region, which
prioritize economic benefits and are confronted with growing security risks
and cost uncertainties, have no choice but to be more cautious when collab-
orating with Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.
In contrast, China, relying on its own equipment and technology and
strongly supported by national determination, will gradually become the
leader in developing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. After
Drilling Rig 981 commenced drilling south of the Zhongjian Islands, Viet-
nam, the Philippines and other ASEAN countries grew ever more alarmed
and agitated, anxious that China will initiate drilling and in the even more
sensitive waters of the Nansha Islands. It can be expected that Vietnam, the
Philippines and others will have to show restraint on issues of oil and gas de-
velopment from now onward lest they provide additional leverage for China,
resulting in its use of drilling rig 981 for retaliatory development. Thus, this
platform can at least check the momentum of countries such as Vietnam and
the Philippines in oil and gas development, and play a role in cooling the
South China Sea dispute.
The Zhongjiannan initiative is only the initial appearance of drilling rig
981 and the first demonstration of its capabilities. The regions in which it can
truly prove its superior capabilities are the central and southern parts of the
South China Sea, south of the Xisha Islands. In fact, the region surrounding
the Xisha Islands is actually not rich in oil and gas deposits. Although the
depression area in the waters surrounding the Xisha Islands (that is, the
location of the Zhongjiannan initiative) possesses geological conditions for
the formation of oil and gas deposits, such as occurrence of oil, reservoir
strata, cap rocks, traps, migration and later stage storage, with certain pros-
pects for development, but cannot be compared with waters surrounding
the Nansha Islands. Judging from the development layouts of all disputant
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  123
parties in the South China Sea, the vast majority of wells are concentrated
on the coast of the South China Sea continental shelf and around the sedi-
mentary basins of the Nansha Islands.
Whether ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ will revisit the Xisha Islands predomi-
nantly depends on CNPC’s and other companies’ analysis and evaluation
results from data and material collected on this occasion. The key is to see
whether this region has any commercial development value, and on this
foundation to plan and arrange exact tasks for the next phase. But, in any
case, the Xisha Islands will not be at the heart of China’s oil and gas devel-
opment in future.
Gradual progress toward the Nansha Islands is the true import of ‘Hai-
yang Shiyou 981’, but this will be a protracted and onerous process. Difficul-
ties in supplying the Nansha Islands far exceed those of the Xisha Islands,
while the Nansha Islands’ geopolitical environment is also more complex.
Mainland China is currently placed at an absolute disadvantage, with highly
limited capacity for action in the vicinity of the Nansha Islands and subject
to many handicaps. The crucial bottleneck is China’s lack of a substantial
provisions and defense base around the Nansha Islands and is therefore un-
able to provide various basic guarantees to such a huge platform. All of the
islands and reefs under Chinese control are slender table reefs, the majority
of whose area is submerged during high tide, typically with areas above wa-
ter partitioned into multiple segments. Surface area available is extremely
limited and facilities on the islands and reefs are also very poorly equipped
houses on stilts constructed from reinforced concrete. Issues of self-defense
remain problematic for these islands and reefs, let alone the provision of
support for drilling rigs. To transform this situation, the only current fea-
sible solution is land reclamation. China has already started work on this
front, and once construction is complete on the forward base in the Nansha
Islands, ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981,’ next drill will have basic material conditions
there. Exploring and surveying the seabed in waters surrounding the Nan-
sha Islands are other relatively thorny but imperative tasks. Without abun-
dant geological data as groundwork and prior to commercial evaluation, it
would be impossible for China to mobilize the imposing drilling rig 981 to
the Nansha Islands. While ‘political wells’ should be drilled, they cannot be
drilled too often. Financial accounts should also be calculated, as to extract
deep-sea oil and gas as soon as possible, breakeven and to create a virtuous
cycle are the long-term core business operations of drilling rig 981.
With China’s steadily strengthening military deterrence, oil and gas devel-
opment in addition to land reclamation in the South China Sea will increas-
ingly become its two most practical strategic means of maintaining its rights
and expanding its maritime space in the South China Sea. ‘Haiyang Shiyou
981’ simultaneously harbors the dual qualities as a production platform and
strategic tool, while its activities and role destined to become major points
of observation in future contests and games in the South China Sea.
124  Solution to South China Sea tensions
Notes
1 The Kalayaan Islands is the name given by the Philippines for the part of the
Nansha Islands over which it claims sovereignty. The Kalayaan Islands is com-
prised of 54 islands, reefs and shoals, covering a maritime area of 64,000 square
miles. In addition to the eight islands and reefs occupied by the Philippines,
seven occupied by Mainland China, there are another six situated within the
scope of these islands. They are Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef), Huayang Jiao
(Cuarteron).
2 “Remarks at the East Asia Summit Ministerial Intervention,” John Kerry, Sec-
retary of State, Naypyitaw, Burma, August 10, 2014. www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2014/08/230471.htm
3 “DFA statement on the Philippine proposal ‘Triple Action Plan,’ ” Republic of
the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2014. http://www.
dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013–06–27-21–50-36/dfa-releases/3729-dfa-statement-
on-the-philippine-proposal-triple-action-plan.
4 Originally published in Phoenix Weekly, Issue 33, 2013, with edits.
5 “He Zong” (合纵) means that a group of weak countries unite to confront a
strong power in the system, and “Lian Hen” (连横) means that a big power aligns
with some weak countries to challenge another weaker country. The allusions of
“He Zong” and “Lian Hen” originate from the Warring States period of ancient
China.
6 Luke Hunt, ASEAN Summit Fallout Continues, 20 July 2012, https://­thediplomat.
com/2012/07/asean-summit-fallout-continues-on/
7 In accordance with special article 298 of UNCLOS, the ways in which treaty
signatory states can submit a declaration to the Secretary General of the UN to
exclude compulsory arbitration procedures. It is chiefly applicable to maritime
disputes such as territorial sovereignty, maritime delimitation, historical rights,
and military issues. As early as 25 August 2006, China delivered to the UN
Secretary General a statement in writing, which specifically noted that China
excluded disputes concerning, among others, sea boundary delimitations, his-
toric bays or entitlements, military and law enforcement activities from the dis-
pute settlement procedures provided in part XV of UNCLOS (Articles 297, 298
and 299).
8 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Position Paper of the Government of
the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China
Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, https://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm.
9 The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, pp. 473–474.
10 Yang Jiechi Gives Interview to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbi-
tral Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration, 15 July 2016, www.fmprc.gov.
cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1382712.htm; Xinhua Agency, More than 230 political
parties from more than 90 countries have expressed their support for China’s
South China Sea position, www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016–07/12/c_129139756.
htm
11 Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Mat-
ter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic
of the Philippines, www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm
12 Originally published in Oriental Morning Post, 1 April 1st, 2014.
13 Daniel R. Russel, Statement at the Hearing of “America’s Future in Asia: From
Rebalancing to Managing Sovereignty Disputes” before the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Repre-
sentatives, 113 Congress, February 5, 2014.
 Solution to South China Sea tensions  125
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/Depts/los/­
convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, p. 25.
15 Originally published in Phoenix Weekly, Issue 19, 2014.
16 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on
15 May 2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1156451.
shtml
17 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 9
April 2015, www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cefi/eng/fyrth/t1253488.htm
18 See details at https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/
19 Congressional Research Service, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China
Sea: Implications and Policy Options, 18 June 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R44072.pdf
20 US Calls for Land Reclamation ‘Halt’ in South China Sea, 30 May 2015, www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-32941829
21 Yi Xianliang, Deputy Director of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Af-
fairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Held a Briefing on the China-Jiannan
Project, 14 June 2014, www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/t1165600.
shtml
7 Promoting peaceful power
transition between China and
the United States

The United States is the most important country China must face in its quest
for maritime power. As the sole superpower, the global political, military
and economic presence of the United States, in particular its forward mili-
tary presence in the Western Pacific region, constitutes the most significant
external variable as China develops into a maritime power. It is an indis-
putable fact that there has been relative deterioration in American strength,
nonetheless, this will be a protracted process by virtue of the county’s con-
siderable capacity to restore and adjust. As a result, China has no alterna-
tive but to make long-term preparations to pursue maritime power under
the shadow of American maritime hegemony or superiority and carefully
scrutinize the strategic positions of both countries at sea. A path carrying
aspects of both competition and cooperation, as well as peaceful interac-
tion, appears to be necessary.

Sino-US maritime competitive posture in the next 30 years1

Needless to say, China and the United States have each marked the other
as its greatest strategic rival. Although China and the United States each
have their own weaknesses and challenges in national strength, the gap
between other global powers and China and the United States is grow-
ing ever larger, for the relationship between China and the United States
has already become that of the world’s two foremost leading powers. Mil-
itary and security confrontations between the two countries center on the
Western Pacific, as the strategic rivalry here between the two sides will
practically determine the overall evolution of the global Sino-US maritime
military contest.
The Sino-US relationship is the most important set of bilateral relations
influencing future global peace and development. As the difference in Chi-
nese and American strength steadily recedes, this relationship will approach
equilibrium, at least in the Western Pacific region. This is not to say that
China will ultimately supersede the United States as the global hegemon,
but China’s rise will nevertheless reform, to some extent, the power structure
between China and the United States, and the state of Sino-US relations.
 Power transition between China and the US  127
Following the end of the Cold War, a strategic situation formed between
China and the United States, broadly described by Robert S. Ross as ‘the
two countries each possess geopolitical advantages in Asia Pacific, for
China has substantial advantages in land power, while the US has signifi-
cant advantages in sea power, thus producing a bipolar structure or strate-
gic balance.’ This state of affairs allows both China and the United States
to have certain defensive advantages in their respective areas of dominance,
consequently causing the two sides to allow some leeway in confrontations
with one another.2
China and the United States vividly illustrated this balance during the
Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996), the Lingshui ‘collision incident’ (2001) and
other confrontations, in which both sides maintained crucial restraint. How-
ever, such a military equilibrium, formed along China’s territorial border or
coastline, is highly atypical, for it is predicated on inordinate shortcomings
in the Chinese armed forces’ capacity to project power overseas, especially
in maritime and aerial power.
This balance is also destined to be unstable, at least in the Western Pa-
cific region. With expansion in its comprehensive strength and accelerated
pace of military modernization, China is resolutely stepping toward the
oceans and beginning to project its power toward the open sea. China will
also become more determined to defend its national unity and territorial
integrity, and safeguard maritime interests. Shifts in the balance of power
will force the United States to reexamine its professed ‘responsibilities’ or
commitments on matters such as the Taiwan issue and the Diaoyu Islands,
in addition to military policies within China’s EEZ as well as in Chinese
adjacent waters.
The process of revising or reshaping this balance will be a time of turbu-
lence and uncertainty, full of crises. For China, the defense of territorial
sovereignty, maintenance of maritime rights and interests and resistance
against external interference are among its fundamental rights, while the
pursuit of power and position commensurate with its national strength in
coastal spaces is an essential part of building maritime power. As for the
United States, the long-time commander of the Western Pacific, it is ex-
tremely sensitive and insecure with regard to growing Chinese power. The
United States already identifies China as its greatest long-term future strate-
gic competitor, accordingly initiating anticipatory measures against the rise
of China, such as routinely accusing China of engaging in maritime ‘expan-
sion,’ beginning to change its ambiguous ‘no position’ policy of neutrality
on the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea issues, promoting its ‘Rebal-
ance to the Asia-Pacific’ strategy and the more recent Indo-Pacific concept.
China’s anti-intervention strategy and the United States’ offensive deter-
rence concepts, such as Air-Sea Battle (ASB) or the Joint Concept for Ac-
cess and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC),3 represent an ever
greater challenge. Overall, both countries’ military strategies require further
refinement and their contents also need to be enriched, but their directions
128  Power transition between China and the US
will not change. China is wary of American interposition in the Taiwan is-
sue and disputes in seas surrounding China; in contrast, the United States is
concerned that China’s growing confidence will go on to threaten the United
States’ military and security dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Such a strategic
divergence is the decisive factor restricting developments in strategic mutual
trust between the two countries. With further evolution in both Chinese and
American military strategies and deployment of various advanced weapons
systems, this strategic contest will enter a different stage and a new balance
will emerge as a result.
It is worth remaining vigilant for even as China and the United States are
trying to build a new type of great-power relationship for ‘no conflict, no
confrontation,’ risks of strategic military conflict between China and the
United States are escalating. To circumvent these risks, we should carry out
objective comparative analyses and hypothetical deductions on both mili-
taries’ ‘worst case scenario’ strategic and operational preparations, in order
to help relevant decision makers and departments of both sides to gage ra-
tional general expectations for future situations, thereby more sensibly and
peacefully engaging in strategic contests.

The shifting strategic balance between China and the United States
Based on current development trends, even with somewhat slower economic
growth rates, it will only be a matter of time before China’s aggregate eco-
nomic output overtakes that of the United States. A range of international
economic institutions and experts in strategic forecasting virtually all concur
that China’s aggregate output will surpass that of the United States in the
first half of the 21st century. China’s GDP is around 60 percent of that of the
United States in 2017, while both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank now rate China as the world’s largest economy based on pur-
chasing power parity (PPP).4 And it won’t be too long before China’s economy
surpasses the United States by other measures like GDP, too. The Centre for
Economics and Business Research (CEBR) predicts it will happen in 2029.5
In comparison, predictions regarding China’s comprehensive national
strength are more conservative. The US National Intelligence Council spec-
ulates that China will have worldwide power similar to that of the United
States in 2030, based on the four major indicators of GDP, population size,
military expenditure and technological innovation; if three further key
indicators of health, education and governance are added, China’s com-
prehensive national strength will be comparable to the United States by ap-
proximately 2045.6

It is possible for China’s economic strength to match that of the US, but
in contrast it would be very difficult for China’s military strength and
cultural strength to reach the levels of the US. The gap in Chinese and
American comprehensive strength can only be reduced to achieve par-
ity, but it is not possible for China to fully catch up to the US.7
 Power transition between China and the US  129
In terms of military capability, China will not yet be able to contend with
the United States on a global scale in the foreseeable future; nonetheless,
it has steadily gained the confidence to act independently and serve as the
United States’ equal in the Western Pacific region. The RAND Corporation
estimates that in 2025, the value of Chinese defense spending will be slightly
more than half of American defense expenditure. In the 2014 Military Bal-
ance, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London on 5 February 2014, China’s defense spending may catch up with
the United States in the 2030s.8
Even if China’s economic and defense spending growth rates were to stag-
nate, and even if the United States were to improve its fiscal situation and
curtail reductions in defense expenditure, considerable reductions of the gap
between Chinese and American defense spending are inevitable. Moreover,
practically all of China’s defense spending is concentrated in the Western
Pacific, whereas the United States is only able to focus part of its spending in
this region, despite its best efforts to ‘rebalance.’ Consequently, China will
soon possess more abundant financial resources than the United States here.
Nevertheless, military expenditure is only one of many important indi-
cators used to gauge the strength of military capability. The United States
continues to lead in aspects such as military theory, scientific research and
development, equipment standards, combat efficiency and overseas polit-
ical support. It is important to note that, relative to military expenditure,
equipment and other forms of hard power, it will still be a long time before
the Chinese military is able to match the US military in terms of experience
and traditions.
Comprehensive evaluation of factors such as economic strength; capacity
in military technology, equipment, and industry; military strategy and the-
ory; military expenditure, various strategic reports and assessments have
also widely concluded that there will be material changes in the ­Sino-US
strategic position in the Western Pacific in the next 10–20 years. A re-
port from the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observes
that gaps between China’s and the United States’ economic and military
strengths will narrow over the next 15–20 years, as China’s military advan-
tages in its surrounding waters pose an ever greater challenge to the US–
Japanese alliance. The United States’ position of dominance will also be
subject to pressure, resulting in a type of ‘balance erosion.’9

The most likely potential challenge to the alliance over the next 15 to
20 years does not involve full-scale military conflict between China and
Japan or the United State originating, for example, from Chinese efforts
to expel Washington from the region. Instead, Beijing is likely to grad-
ually erode Japan’s security interests through peaceful means instead of
resolving disputes through military offensives.

An assessment report from the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) esti-

mates that China and the United States will have more or less equal numbers
130  Power transition between China and the US
of major military vessels (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines,
etc.) in the Pacific Ocean by 2020, with each side retaining approximately
100 vessels.10
There is undeniably still a chasm in capability and quality between China
and the United States, but due to asymmetries within the sphere of Sino-US
operations, the Chinese Navy will undoubtedly benefit from quantity ad-
vantages in East Asian coastal areas, compensating, to some extent, for
qualitative differences. Coupled with China’s vast land-based aerial power
and the involvement of missile forces, the balance of power is sure to lean
in favor of China. There is widespread belief among US naval analysts that
both the United States’ active and passive defenses may be insufficient to
respond to the increasingly precarious operational environment within the
First Island Chain, especially within Mainland China’s coastal waters.11
In fact, there is already a disequilibrium in the balance of military power
across the Taiwan Strait. China will furthermore attain maritime and aerial
military supremacy over Japan in the East China Sea by approximately
2020, when the United States will lose space in the offshore balance and
have no choice but to directly face China in strategic confrontation.12 The
Carnegie report also notes that, ‘over time, China will be able to steadily re-
fine its established ‘anti-access/area denial’ (A2/AD) advantages, expanding
them to regions in Northeast Asia and eventually to Southeast Asia.’ The
RAND Corporation’s 2011 report also believes that in future decades, the
United States’ ability to protect its allies and friends in proximity of China
will slowly deteriorate.13
In light of this, the United States is attempting to take precautionary
measures by aggressively advancing its strategies of ‘Rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific’ and its Indo-Pacific concept, adjusting military disposition
in the Asia-Pacific, redesigning regional security structures, implementing
the AirSea Battle combat doctrine to counter an imminently more power-
ful China. In order to better respond to anti-access and other threats from
powers such as China and maintain American military superiority under
circumstances of fiscal austerity, the Pentagon launched in September 2014
its third ‘Offset Strategy’, which tries to focus defense investment on critical
fields of disruptive technology in the future so as to overcome any oppo-
nents’ increasingly numerous challenges.
The reality is that in recent years, growth in Chinese power has led to
certain consequences and is to some extent changing the ‘status quo’ and
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. China’s coast guard and powers of law
enforcement are beginning to exert effective control over China’s EEZ, in ad-
dition to maintaining a habitual presence in waters surrounding the Diaoyu
Islands, Nansha Islands and other disputed islands and reefs; the density of
Chinese naval and air force patrols on the coast has soared sharply, while
the establishment of the ADIZ in the East China Sea is a demonstration of
China’s mounting confidence in its own power, In sum, there has been rapid
development in China’s sea power, simultaneously strengthening its coastal
 Power transition between China and the US  131
presence while robustly stepping toward the open oceans. The Chinese
Navy has accelerated its ‘emergence’ from the First Island Chain to lay the
groundwork for an oceangoing navy and to routinely dispatch large-scale
flotillas to the Northwestern Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean to
conduct distant ocean training exercises.

Anti-access vs. AirSea Battle

Suffering from a severe lack of trust, the military-to-military relationship
has long been the most significant weak link in the overall Sino-US rela-
tions. Rivalry/enmity between the two parties is gradually intensifying, with
each side increasingly perceiving the other as its main (potential) competi-
tor. Moreover, from the perspective of realist interests and strategic needs,
it would appear that both Chinese and American military forces have no
alternative but to prepare for the worst. China does not only need to build
a credible deterrence against ‘Taiwanese interdependence,’ safeguard its
own sovereignty and interests in coastal areas, but also needs to develop an
oceangoing navy, maintain certain long-range power projection capabili-
ties in the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean, and uphold
an effective presence in order to maintain national security and access to
sea lanes. Whereas the United States views China’s relentlessly expanding
coastal ‘A2/AD’ capabilities as possibly undermining important American
interests, in particular the US military’s ‘freedom of navigation’ or ‘freedom
of entry and exit’ in these waters, endangering the viability of American
security commitments to its allies in the region, and thereby jeopardizing
US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese Navy’s rapid devel-
opment, albeit from a lower starting point, will likewise impact US military
influence in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the US military must invest
in capabilities to ensure effective operations in ‘A2/AD’ environments. ‘This
will include implementing the ‘Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, im-
proving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency
and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.’14
Both China and the United States have striven to uncover weaknesses in
the one another’s military forces, taking full advantage of important op-
portunities from technological revolutions in missiles, ships, aircraft, aero-
space, telecommunications and other areas. Both adapt to circumstances as
required and endeavor to exercise their individual strengths, while targeting
the other side’s weaknesses, so as to acquire an advantage in the strategic
contest and snatch victory in potential local conflicts.
In the early 1990s, Andrew F. Krepinevich et al. from the US Department
of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) authored a report on the Rev-
olution in Military Affairs, noting that as Third World Countries control a
certain number of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, high-performance air-
craft and other long-range weapons systems, US forward bases worldwide
132  Power transition between China and the US
will face rigorous challenges. In times of conflict or crisis, not only can these
bases no longer offer reassurance to their allies, on the contrary they will
become a source of unease or hardship for the United States. In the 2003
report ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge,’ Andrew F.
Krepinevich et al. formally introduced the concept of ‘A2/AD.’15
The so-called Anti-Access concept (A2) refers to anti-ship ballistic mis-
siles, anti-ship cruise missiles, high-performance fighter aircraft, state-
of-the-art naval mines, quiet submarines, anti-satellite weaponry, cyber
warfare and other means of coercing the US military to distance its activ-
ities from the Chinese Mainland or from beyond the effective projection
range of these weapons, and thereby to relinquish the ability to intervene in
China’s coastal crises. ‘Area Denial’ (AD) is the second-choice alternative,
for in the event that the US military cannot be obstructed from free entry in
wartime, the abovementioned forces should delay the US military’s access
or reduce the efficiency of their operations by inflicting damage. The con-
cept of A2/AD was subsequently frequently applied in American observers’
discussions and various US military reports. Although a principal threat
was not identified in early documents, in truth their greatest target has all
long been China.16
It should be noted that the Chinese government does not in fact use the
terminology ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial,’ as this is only an interpretation of
China’s military strategy and policy which is used in American strategic
and military circles. It is obvious that China has no intention of disrupt-
ing freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, nor does it plan to ex-
pel the US forces from the Western Pacific. The essence of China’s military
strategy, arms development and power disposition aimed at the US military
is ‘anti-interference and anti-aggression,’ that is to say, resistance against
powerful enemy interposition. Since the founding of the People’s Republic
of China, deterrence of powerful enemy interference in China’s sovereignty
has become the most important duty of the Chinese armed forces. It has
always been necessary to guard against the United States, whether in regard
to Taiwanese reunification, or to the protection of the Diaoyu Islands’ and
the Nansha Islands’ sovereign rights. US intervention is a decisive varia-
ble that China must take seriously. Following the establishment of Sino-US
diplomatic relations, the United States maintains military and political ties
with the Taiwanese authorities through the Taiwan Relations Act, continues
to peddle arms to Taiwan, opposes the Chinese government’s recapturing of
Taiwan by force and even threatens to resort to armed conflict if necessary.
During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, the United States dispatched
two aircraft carriers, with great pomp and circumstance, to waters neigh-
boring Taiwan as deterrence against China. The United States and Japan
have signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between them.
Following escalation in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Is-
lands, the United States has on multiple occasions declared that the Diaoyu
Islands is encapsulated within this treaty and that the United States op-
poses any unilateral changes to Japan’s ‘administrative jurisdiction’ over
 Power transition between China and the US  133
the Diaoyu Islands. The United States also signed the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the Philippines in 1951, and has in recent years been heavily
reinforcing military deployments in Southeast Asia and intervening promi-
nently in the South China Sea dispute, in the name of promoting the ‘Rebal-
ance to the Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Indo-Pacific.’ From a military perspective, the
United States’ extensive array of defensive commitments in the Asia-­Pacific
has caused the US military to become the greatest impediment to the safe-
guard of Chinese sovereignty, while any of China’s military operations
in this region may be subject to limitation or even interference from the
United States. Therefore, prevention of US military interposition in China’s
coastal military activities has steadily become an important test that the
Chinese armed forces must overcome. China’s military pays close atten-
tion to the highly integrated, information-based and modernized combat
capabilities of the US military, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, Kosovo
War and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while winning local wars under
conditions of ‘informationization’ has emerged as the chief mission of the
Chinese armed forces.
In December 2004, China published a new version of the national de-
fense white paper, which states that it will be necessary in future to ‘win lo-
cal wars in informationized conditions.’17 Throughout the past decade, the
Chinese military’s top priority has been to win ‘local wars under advanced
technological conditions.’ The 2013 version of the ‘National Defense White
Paper’ continued to expand upon this concept, stating that

China’s armed forces firmly base their military preparedness on win-

ning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make
overall and coordinated plans to promote military preparedness in all
strategic directions, intensify the joint employment of different services
and arms, and enhance warfighting capabilities based on information
systems.

China’s armed forces ‘intensify scenario-oriented exercises and drills, con-

duct well-organized border, coastal and territorial air patrols and duties for
combat readiness, and handle appropriately various crises and major emer-
gencies.’ The Chinese military views the safeguard of national sovereignty,
security and territorial integrity, in addition to the protection of peaceful
national development, as its principal duty. China’s armed forces

unswervingly implement the military strategy of active defense, guard

against and resist aggression, contain separatist forces, safeguard bor-
der, coastal and territorial air security, and protect national maritime
rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and
cyber space. “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will
surely counterattack if attacked.” Following this principle, China will
resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sover-
eignty and territorial integrity.18
134  Power transition between China and the US
In consideration of the wide range of US military and security commit-
ments in the Asia-Pacific region, China must make adequate preparations
to respond to American interference if it is to maintain its sovereign rights.
Over the past 20 years, the Chinese armed forces have accelerated drives
for military modernization, concentrating on building missiles, quiet sub-
marines, stealth fighters and other ‘trump card’ weaponry. Furthermore,
information technology is utilized to develop sensors and command net-
works, optimized navigational platforms and guided weapons, compre-
hensively elevating the target detection and strike power of missiles, fighter
aircraft, surface combat ships, submarines and cyber attacks. Among these,
the most eye-catching and emblematic of the ‘trump card’ arms is surely the
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, similarly the DF-26 missile. According to
a US Department of Defense report,

the DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range

ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack
large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The
DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuver-
able warhead.19

It is more difficult to intercept than ordinary ballistic missiles due to its ac-
tive homing and trajectory adjustment or correction capabilities following
reentry into the atmosphere, while some observers even believe that this is
a game changer that will transform the outlook or balance of the strategic
contest.20 To this day, the Chinese government has not yet publicized spe-
cific details on this missile, but it certainly exists. At the 9/3 parade in 2015,
DF-21D was first officially presented to the world.
The reason China has adopted a projectile-centric strategy for power pro-
jection, aggressively developing forces such as missiles and unmanned aerial
vehicles, is to a large extent due to a shortage of alternative options as China
responds to the formidable power projection capacities of the United States
and its allies. There remains a sizeable difference in the Chinese military’s
maritime and aerial platform technologies in comparison with those of the
US military.
At present, the core objective in US strategic doctrine aimed at China is
to impede its transformation, in particular preventing it from changing the
status quo of the Asia-Pacific by force. This includes hampering China’s re-
alization of cross-strait reunification and safeguard of sovereignty over the
Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, either by means of force or with
the threat of force.
US policymakers and analysts adhere faithfully to the principle of strength
to ensure peace, believing that the cornerstone or foundation for the peace-
ful coexistence of China and the United States in the Pacific is whether the
United States can sufficiently demonstrate its capability to China, build
sufficient deterrent capability and prevent China from using force or the
 Power transition between China and the US  135
threat of force as a means of settling maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific
region. Due to shifts in the balance of power in East Asia, the United States
may find itself forced to turn from defensive deterrence to retaliatory de-
terrence in order to preserve the status quo: the former is predicated on the
United States’ capacity to directly defend its interests and its allies, whereas
the latter is based on the effectiveness of counterattacks against China by
employing long-range weapons and platforms better suited for survival if
threatened by escalatory situations. Put another way, ‘both preparations for
battle and intensifications in conflict prevent war,’ while undue fear of war
or of intensification in the situation would severely damage American in-
terests, instead fostering Chinese ‘ambitions.’ Preparations for war and the
dogged buildup of deterrence are precisely the reasons for the introduction
of AirSea Battle doctrine as well as the focus of its efforts.21
AirSea Battle, as the name suggests, is the integration of coordinated
aerial and maritime operations. In July 2009, then US Defense Secretary,
Robert Gates, directed the navy and air force to introduce the new combat
concept of AirSea Battle. In September of the same year, General Norton
A. Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, and General Gary
Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, signed a classified memorandum to
jointly examine the concept of AirSea Battle. Joint development of the Air-
Sea Battle doctrine between the air force and the navy was first raised in
the 2010 edition of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), in order to over-
power adversaries in a series of military operations.22 In November 2011,
the US Department of Defense officially established a cross-service AirSea
Battle office to implement and assess this doctrine. In January 2012, the
US Department of Defense proposed the closely related Joint Operational
Access Concept (JOAC). Henceforth, AirSea Battle had started to enter the
stages of substantive demonstration and practical verification.
Since its appearance, the concept of AirSea Battle has received fervent
support from senior US military officials. In February 2012, Schwarz and
Jonathan W. Greenert, the then Chief of Naval Operations, co-authored the
article ‘Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,’ pre-
senting AirSea Battle’s three core characteristics of ‘Networked, Integrated,
Attack-in-Depth’.23 Subsequently Greenert issued multiple additional pub-
lications in support of the AirSea Battle concept. According to his argu-
ments, the operational duties of AirSea Battle are first to ‘blind,’ rapidly
paralyzing an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, which are the seven
most notable subsystems in the organization of modern military integra-
tion, namely the C4ISR system; second, to attack the opponent’s important
local ‘A2/AD’ resources, for instance by destroying airfields and missiles
launchers; and third is to launch attacks against adversaries’ in-flight air-
craft, missiles and networks.24
Strictly speaking, AirSea Battle can only be regarded as a combat doc-
trine, rather than a strategy. The United States’ proposal and enhancement
136  Power transition between China and the US
of AirSea Battle unmistakably derive from the dual pressures of technology
and reality, while its first aim is to precipitate US forces to surmount oper-
ational spaces and boundaries between military branches such as the army,
navy, air force and cyber warfare to optimize consolidation and better exe-
cute joint operational missions. This is exactly as highlighted by Schwartz,
who stressed that the true value of AirSea Battle is to provide a unified
means of coordination for the various military services to respond to oper-
ational challenges faced by joint forces. Its second aim is to counteract the
ever more formidable ‘A2/AD’ capacities of China and other countries, so
as to guarantee US military freedom to access the oceans, aerospace, outer
space, cyberspace, and other ‘global commons.’ The US military estimated
that in the next 10–20 years, the Chinese PLA will possess the capacity to re-
strict the US military’s access to waters and limit its freedom of operations
in the First Island Chain and even the Second Island Chain. The PLA will
be able to strike the US military’s forward bases and troops, undermine its
C4ISR information systems, attack its logistical support frameworks, delay
its entry into combat zones and ultimately cause the US military to surren-
der its strategic and operational initiative, as a result offering it little alter-
native other than to compromise with China.25
Confronted by China’s considerable ‘A2/AD’ capabilities, the reliability
of the US military’s forward bases and major air-sea combat platforms
will face severe tests in wartime. While the US Air Force and Navy, accus-
tomed to initiating attacks in combat zones close to densely distributed
bases and from invulnerable aircraft carriers, have had to make adjust-
ments. Incontrovertibly, the greatest target of AirSea Battle is China.
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept opens by high-
lighting AirSea Battle’s purposes, as the United States’ development and
implementation of this combat doctrine is predominantly to counter Chi-
na’s ever-strengthening ‘A2/AD’ capabilities, prevent China from destabi-
lizing US hegemony in the Western Pacific, and gain victory in possible
conflicts with China.26
For these reasons, the US military is actively adjusting its deployment
of armed forces in the Asia-Pacific: while withdrawing from other parts
of the world, it proceeds with reinforcements in this region; within the
Asia-Pacific, it ‘strengthens the north, fortifies the south,’ continues to ac-
celerate US-Japanese allied military cooperation, emphasizes building new
power presences around South East Asia and Australia and furthermore
disperses and retracts its troops, enhancing the strategic status of Guam
and other bases in the Second Island Chain. In equipment development,
it mainly concentrates on reconnaissance, early warning, missiles, satel-
lite communications and other support systems, focusing on constructing
a new generation of stealth bombers, unmanned air vehicles designed for
aircraft carrier-based operations, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV),
new types of submarines and other long-range, rapid, stealth reconnais-
sance and combat forces.
 Power transition between China and the US  137
However, the concept of AirSea Battle has led to various disputes, even
within the US military and also has its own share of critics. Some observers
question the strategic qualities and functions of AirSea Battle, arguing that
it cannot provide an effective path for the US military to respond to Chinese
armed forces. Seth Cropsey, a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute in
the United States, comments that AirSea Battle does not include essential
elements of military strategy, is extremely unfocused and is more akin to
a plan to boost cooperation between various arms and services of the US
military, rather than a military strategy aimed at China. It adds little sig-
nificance to US responses against China’s ‘A2/AD’ and would only serve
to amplify Chinese suspicion, wariness and antagonism.27 Dr. Thomas X.
Hammes, a researcher at the National Defense University in the United
States, claims that it is the very popularity of AirSea Battle that precisely
demonstrates the United States’ lack of a strong military strategy to support
its national strategy.28 Yet there is another view that criticizes AirSea Battle
for its excessively grand and unwieldy plans, for which the United States has
neither the resources nor the capacity to execute it while its defense budget
is under rising pressure. There are in fact also no detailed budgets in con-
nection to ‘AirSea Battle’. James Randy Forbes, Chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces subcommit-
tee, previously expressed such hesitations in a letter to then US Secretary of
Defense, Leon Panetta.29 The most common objections stem from concerns
and fear of a large-scale war. A section of the US military elite and some
analysts worry that the implementation of AirSea Battle could provoke
war, even a large-scale nuclear war, between China and the United States.
Professor Amitai Etzioni of George Washington University has made the
following famous comments on this subject: Air-Sea Battle is ‘inherently
escalatory, and could even precipitate a nuclear war.’30 In order to break the
‘kill chain’ of China’s ‘A2/AD’ forces, as described in the words of Greenert,
the optimal approach is to attack command and control centers, missile
launchers and airfields on the Chinese Mainland, but this will unquestion-
ably incur vehement Chinese retaliation, and may even cause China to take
‘preemptive strikes.’ There will be swift escalations in conflict, even leading
to the outbreak of nuclear war, results that the United States would truly be
unable to endure, as after all, China is not the same as Iraq, Libya or Iran.
In addition to AirSea Battle, US strategists and analysts are also con-
templating alternative options, such as the Offshore Control Strategy, as
proposed by Dr. Hammas. This strategy believes that ‘no operations would
penetrate Chinese airspace. Prohibiting penetration is intended to reduce
the possibility of nuclear escalation and to make war termination easier.’
The United States can coerce China into compromise by blockading distant
oceans outside the sphere of China’s ‘A2/AD’ influence, instead of directly
striking onshore targets, and ultimately waging ‘a war of economic attri-
tion to bring about a stalemate and cessation of conflict with a return to a
modified version of the status quo.’31 The greatest issue with this strategy is
138  Power transition between China and the US
whether it would work. A blockade of distant oceans or economic war does
not only intrinsically carry the risk of conflict expansion, but in this vibrant
business world, these practices are also extremely problematic and appear
practically impossible in the long-term. Even if the United States is able to
overcome fiscal difficulties and economic pressures to successfully realize
an ocean blockade, it cannot triumph over China on this basis alone. On
this matter, critical comments by the US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s
Elbridge Colby are the most typical. Colby notes that the conflict between
China and the United States is long-term and strategic in nature, with both
sides devoting sufficient patience and harboring great resolve. Evidently, a
distant blockade is inadequate to compel China to yield and accept Amer-
ican conditions. ‘It didn’t work in World War II, in World War I, or against
Napoleon. It was important to victory – but it wasn’t anywhere near suffi-
cient.’32 Perhaps distant blockades may be of use to the United States, but
as for the United States’ allies, but American support is equally ‘distant,’
with aid too remote to fulfil immediate needs. Without direct American as-
sistance, it will be increasingly impractical for the United States’ allies to
contend with China. What is even more difficult for US policymakers to
accept is the possibility that the United States may have to relinquish its
current military and security advantages or powers in Chinese coastal wa-
ters to China due to such ‘ostrich policies.’ The US government will find it
truly difficult to bear the risks and pressures associated with these actions,
regardless of their efficacy.
There is also an argument in favor of ‘responding in kind’ and the pur-
suit of Deterrence by Denial. A principal proponent of this strategy is the
US Naval War College’s Andrew S. Erickson, who claims that, as China’s
ultimate goal in the settlement of maritime disputes is the occupation and
long-term control of islands in question, the United States does not neces-
sarily need to defeat China, instead simply stopping it from achieving its
objectives. The United States needs to prevent China from occupying or
controlling the relevant islands by displaying its potent destructive force.
To this end, the United States should develop its own anti-access or area de-
nial capabilities, focusing on the deployment of submarines, anti-ship cruise
missiles, torpedoes and other military hardware.33 Stephen Biddle and Ivan
Oelrich raise a similar point, claiming ‘the A2/AD threat at the heart of this
debate is real, but limited with limitations on future reach about 400–600
kilometers from a friendly coast.’ Thus, if the West responds appropriately,
A2/AD-imposed Finlandization would not present a realistic danger, even
without ASB.34
This is a relatively passive defense strategy, which implies that the United
States must in part recognize China’s power and furthermore withstand
pressure from domestic sources and its allies. Before the United States ac-
cepts the end of its hegemony in the Western Pacific, it is unlikely that the
US military will adopt this policy recommendation.
 Power transition between China and the US  139
On the whole, AirSea Battle clearly better befits the current overall US
strategy, while Offshore Control, Deterrence by Denial or even ‘Proxy War’
all do not correspond with the United States’ strategic vision. Confronted
with China’s maritime rise and military modernization, maintaining a
strong forward presence in the Western Pacific remains a cornerstone of
US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific. US military strategy against China
is based on two major premises. First, the United States anticipates that
the balance of power in the Western Pacific region is presently being bro-
ken. Over the next ten years, as Japan and other US allies will no longer
be able to ‘resist’ China, the United States must prepare to ‘step up to the
challenge,’ lest China should ‘triumph’; second, the United States can nei-
ther accept withdrawal from the Western Pacific, nor does it wish to share
maritime power with China. The US military still aspires to retain maritime
hegemony in this region and maintain its superior strength over China. The
concept of AirSea Battle is formulated based on these precise reasons, while
programs such as Offshore Control and Area Denial are inconsistent with
US strategy on the whole and would be highly questionable selections for
American policymakers.
In general, the US military’s strategies in response to China’s growing A2/
AD capabilities tend to contradict one another. On the one hand, the United
States indeed recognizes that the Sino-US balance of power, from Chinese
coastal waters to the Western Pacific, is leaning increasingly in China’s fa-
vor, while the United States cannot for the time being identify good coun-
termeasures due to geographical constraints, technological limitations and
budgetary reductions. On the other hand, the United States is still unwilling
to renounce its power and influence in East Asia and is currently attempting
to adopt more offensive methods of deterrence to reconfigure its strategy
on China.
Therefore, although the concept of AirSea Battle has numerous flaws
and is yet to be perfected, its essence will be the fundamental future doc-
trine adopted by the US military against China’s so-called A2/AD strategy.
Unless there is overwhelming change in US policy toward China, with a
desire to thoroughly reform relations and share sea power in the Western
Pacific, the US military would otherwise further intensify implementation
of the AirSea Battle doctrine. On 8 January 2015, David L. Goldfein, the
then Director of the Joint Staff in the US Department of Defense, issued
a memorandum, officially changing the name of the AirSea Battle (ASB)
combat doctrine to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (JAM-GC), now incorporated into the marine corps
and army thinking, and moreover enriching connotations of AirSea Bat-
tle. While the concept may have been updated, the principal target remains
A2/AD.35 In order to meet the challenges of A2/AD and support JAM-GC,
the US Navy has also developed the concept of ‘Distributed Lethality’,
which is achieved by increasing the offensive and defensive capabilities of
140  Power transition between China and the US
individual warships, employing them in dispersed formations across wide
geographic expanses and generating distributed fires.36

Who will prevail? China or the United States?

The military contest between China and the United States is a sweeping
game between two types of platforms and two kinds of strategies. Although
various military branches of both countries’ armed forces are generally very
extensive and well-developed overall, when comparing their construction of
forces and characteristics, the two countries have many differences in the
Western Pacific, particularly in East Asian waters. The Chinese military is
a force that chiefly relies on the land, concentrating heavily on the develop-
ment of anti-naval technologies, while at the same time developing a distant
ocean navy; in contrast, the core strength of the US military is its maritime
platform, relying on the ocean to consolidate internal and allied resources
and strengthen power projection capabilities through air-sea platforms.
On the whole, the US and Chinese militaries each have their own strengths
and weaknesses. The two sides’ military games and competitions are ex-
ceptionally complex, but it is possible to broadly determine which side has
greater chances of success within different spaces by comprehensively ana-
lyzing the three competing assessments of the results of the interactions of
the key factors of technology, geography and reliability of the military sys-
tem. Of course, preconditions are that both parties will reasonably utilize
their own advantages and regularly demonstrate their capabilities.

It is possible for China to attain strategic supremacy within the First

Island Chain and its surrounding waters
First, technological progress has started to greatly favor continental coun-
tries in their near seas. For China, this includes the waters within and sur-
rounding the First Island Chain.
In confrontations between land powers and sea powers, land powers have
long been positioned at a considerable disadvantage, whether offensively or
defensively. Maritime powers can fully utilize the flexibility of sea power,
swiftly assembling military strength, allowing land powers to deliver criti-
cal strikes at specific points. In contrast, it is difficult to rapidly amass land
power. Even if it were possible to form potent offensive force, the vast in-
sulating oceans will frustrate and significantly diminish strike efficiency.
For instance, in conflicts with the late Qing dynasty, though Great Brit-
ain, France and other imperialist powers may have had fewer numbers of
troops, but by leveraging their navies’ exceptional mobility, it was never-
theless possible to form local advantages in military strength and firepower
against the Chinese army by scouting far and wide for combat opportunities
along thousands of kilometers of coastline; in contrast, while the late Qing
government’s army was ostensibly immense, it was consistently incapable
 Power transition between China and the US  141
of assembling on time and was inactive in all respects. Such offensive and
defensive superiority was a key reason why the Netherlands, Spain, Great
Britain, the United States and other maritime powers were able to carve up
the world and claim global dominance, and also formed the technical basis
for Mahan’s theory that ‘Whoever rules the waves, rules the world.’
However, following the end of the Second World War, with rapid develop-
ments in missile, aerospace and information technologies, certain changes
have started to occur as land powers attain powerful means of locating and
striking targets at sea. With regard to pinpointing and tracking objects,
continental states can locate targets at sea by employing satellites, early
warning aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar
systems and other reconnaissance tools. Reconnaissance satellites can ac-
quire intelligence on the navigation of large surface vessels on a global scale;
short-wave direction finders and OTH radar systems can provide dynamic
information on relatively remote offshore targets, and while it may be un-
able to offer accurate target information, it can nevertheless play an early
warning role; early warning aircraft can pinpoint offshore targets hundreds
of kilometers at sea in real-time. For instance, the US’ E-2C Hawkeye early
warning aircraft can identify ships over 360 kilometers away. According to
analysis by Kanwa Defense Review and Jane’s Defence Weekly, China’s KJ-
2000 has similar specifications. However, due to impacts of the Earth’s cur-
vature, improvements in exploration capabilities of onshore and shipborne
radars have been stagnant for ultra-low altitude and surface targets, as ef-
fective detection distances have long stuttered at between tens of kilometers
to approximately 100 kilometers, and even within visual range.37 Some ex-
perts speculate that in future, China’s potential long-range intelligence, sur-
veillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will be primarily composed of
platforms such as space-based reconnaissance satellites, unmanned aerial
vehicles, and electronic reconnaissance ships.38
Land powers have achieved even greater technological progress in terms
of offensive measures and are able to rely on land-based fighter aircraft and
missiles to strike adversarial forces thousands of kilometers away at sea and
deep inland. With the Chinese military equipped with DF-21D missiles,
quiet submarines, in addition to the large-scale modernization of surface
vessels and fighter aircraft at sea, the US military increasingly faces a multi-
dimensional obstacle to power projection of the ‘final 1000 nautical miles’ in
the Western Pacific. In particular, in the balance between offensive missiles
and defensive missiles, the offensive side inherently has a technological ad-
vantage. Defense experts widely believe that, although the United States and
its allies have deployed interceptor installations (chiefly the ground-based
Patriot series and the ship-based Standard series of interceptor missiles) in
response to the offensive features of China’s sophisticated missile systems,
their chances of success are not high. Moreover, these devices are extremely
expensive, and so cannot be installed on a large scale, further limiting their
protective functions.39
142  Power transition between China and the US
In this situation, it is very easy to track and locate the movements of large
ships, especially flotillas of surface vessels. Under the threat of countless land-
based attack measures, the presence and effectiveness of sea power become
fragile, particularly in waters close to the continent. In this way, land pow-
ers have formed a certain natural strategic advantage relative to maritime
powers within specific regions. Some experts on sea power have termed such
maritime power of continental states as ‘land-based sea power.’ This theory
argues that weapons such as land-based fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles can permit coastal states
to subdue enemy forces without the need of a strong fleet at sea.40
From a geographic perspective, China likewise enjoys an advantage in
this region. China’s sea power is shielded by its land power along coastal
waters. James R. Holmes once noted that China’s potent land power and
effect of geographic radiation allow it to respond to foreign threats in dis-
tant oceans, even without resorting to armed force. For instance, during
outbreaks of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, China can
utilize geographic advantages to construct its land-based target tracking
and surveillance system, the world’s largest integrated air defense system
and advanced underground tunnel systems to allow missiles, unmanned
aerial vehicles and other projection devices to strike opponents in relatively
safety. Whereas in the Western Pacific, US military assets that may inter-
pose in Asia-Pacific affairs are heavily concentrated around the First Is-
land Chain, mainly in Japan’s Okinawa and Sasebo, with the majority of
bases and ancillary facilities distributed on several isolated islands, easily
vulnerable to pinpoint attacks or obliteration by opponents in wartime. In
recent years, the US military has adjusted its disposition and formed the
new concept of distributed lethality, intending to employ forces in dispersed
formations across wide geographic expanses, and distributing fire between
them.41 With this mentality, the United States is withdrawing its assets to
islands distant from Mainland China, such as Guam; doing so enhances
security but loses efficiency. During wartime, if the US military were to pro-
ject power toward China’s coast from Guam or from even more remote loca-
tions, to stage an exhaustive attack against China would be impossible. As
for aircraft carriers and other maritime forces, deterred by China’s ‘A2/AD’
threat, they can only play a role from beyond the radius of Chinese missiles.
There remain great differences between the two sides’ delivery distances
within the First Island Chain. The US military must transport necessary
materials over thousands of kilometers in order to support combat opera-
tions, whereas China is operating in its own ‘front yard.’ US military bases
in Guam and Hawaii are insufficient to guarantee the US Navy’s strategic
influence on East Asian coasts, so it must depend on considerable support
from regional allies and partners. The situation faced by the US military is
even more complex when accounting for the generally ambivalent and hes-
itant attitudes of US allies involved in wars with China, and unpredictable
factors in these countries such as possible domestic political barriers.
 Power transition between China and the US  143
In addition, in the event of conflict in this region, China’s operational sys-
tems have a higher degree of reliability. Modern warfare represents system-
atic conflict, as operational systems are composed of numerous command,
weaponry and network systems. As the level of complexity increases, there
will be inevitably more loopholes and substantially greater uncertainty.
These are challenges and difficulties that anti-enemy intervention strategies
and AirSea Battle will both encounter, but in coastal spaces in close prox-
imity to the mainland, the Chinese military’s operational systems are much
less complicated and more reliable than those of the US military. China
will primarily depend on ISR systems composed of shore-based radars,
early warning aircraft, reconnaissance satellites and other technology to
track and lock onto targets, subsequently supplying dynamic information
to the command system and transferring detailed relevant parameters to
the weapons system. The command system then needs to direct a range of
instructions to the ISR system and weapons system as required. The trans-
mission and interaction of the majority of data produced in this entire pro-
cess are completed through reliable wired networks or systems onshore. In
contrast, the US military has no alternative but to depend heavily on space-
based satellites and maritime platforms for reconnaissance and early warn-
ing, while predominantly relying on space-based communication satellites
to relay data. In its several recent local wars, 100 percent of the US military’s
navigation and positioning and over 90 percent of its communications were
accomplished by relying on satellites.42
However, the bandwidth resources of space-based satellites tend to be
highly limited. Once under strain in times of war, there will be an explosive
increase in the quantity of data, easily leading to congestion in channels of
communication and a collapse in the C4ISR system. To avoid such a situa-
tion, the US military has had to rent a large number of communication sat-
ellites from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) during the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US military intervenes in conflicts with
a major power like China, deficiencies in US military’s bandwidth resources
will undoubtedly exacerbate. Coupled with data injections or network in-
terference carried out by the opponent, consequences could be even more
catastrophic. The opposition does not even need to employ anti-­satellite
weapons (ASAT) to attack US communications satellites, resulting in pa-
ralysis of the US military’s C4ISR system.

The US military will perpetuate its maritime hegemony

in distant waters
Once outside of the First Island Chain and continuing to penetrate into dis-
tant oceans, there is a radical transformation in the situation. First, tech-
nology is increasingly favorable to the United States. In distant oceans,
technological advancements are ever more advantageous for mobile air-sea
platforms; on the contrary, there is a steep decline in the efficiency of one-off
144  Power transition between China and the US
delivery devices centered on continental platforms. With greater distances
from the mainland, precision positioning, tracking and attacks from land-
based platforms all become more difficult. The functions of ground-based
radars, unmanned aerial vehicles and other means of tracking and position-
ing are restricted at sea, where target information gathering mainly relies
on space-based remote sensing and digital reconnaissance satellites. Today,
world-class naval vessels have very large spheres of maritime activity and
unpredictable changes in trajectory. It is very difficult for fixed-orbit satel-
lites to continuously track mobile targets at sea. Although the use of mul-
tiple satellites can, in theory, significantly reduce tracking time intervals,
costs and efficiency would be completely insupportable. Even if it is possible
to capture signals of enemy ships and aircraft in real time, and obtain their
precise locations, strike accuracy will decline with substantial increases in
delivery radiuses. At the same time, due to prolonged early warning times,
efficiency in the interception of incoming missiles and attacking aircraft by
adversary maritime forces will improve accordingly. If the protection and
convenience offered by the continent are lost, China will face operating in
domains or with technologies where the US military is most adept and will
have to mainly rely on its own less-than-mature sea power to compete with
the most powerful naval force in the world – that of the United States.
The US Navy remains the world’s strongest, most disciplined and most
professional sea power. Regardless of what vessels and aircraft are used to
engage in direct battle, US surface combat formations can still gain an over-
whelming advantage over those of any adversaries. The US Navy is the only
global force, which is distributed worldwide and has undergone a complete
information revolution. With the support of unrivalled target tracking and
homing systems in addition to operational networks, US warships far out-
perform their opponents in terms of both strike range and durability, espe-
cially when remote from enemy heartlands and deep into the oceans.
China has obvious drawbacks in its marine geography. The amplification
effect of land power through technology is limited and does not, at its core,
change the unfavorable marine geographic environment that China faces.
While China may have an extensive coastline, it however lacks channels that
directly connect to the ocean, with the exception of Taiwan’s east coast. The
First and Second Island Chains in the Western Pacific Ocean have become
obstacles to the entry and exit of Chinese military forces from the coast to
the ocean, while strategic maritime channels eastward to the Pacific Ocean
are all controlled by the United States and its allies. In wartime, survival
conditions will dramatically deteriorate for the PLAN outside of the First
Island Chain, with the freedom and efficiency of its activities set to decline
sharply. In diametric contrast, the United States will be able to more easily
access operational support and logistical supplies from various bases in the
First and Second Island Chains, fully exploiting its geographical advantages.
More importantly, China is positioned at an absolute disadvantage rela-
tive to the United States in terms of its network of allies and overseas bases,
 Power transition between China and the US  145
with effective redress implausible for a long period of time yet. In the ab-
sence of overseas bases and military and political support from allies, it is
very difficult for Chinese power to make an impression far away from the
mainland. In the foreseeable future, unless China can form a long-term alli-
ance with the United States, Japan and other maritime powers, it would be
very difficult to fundamentally change unfavorable conditions in its marine
geography. Moreover, it would be near impossible to acquire strategic ad-
vantages in the entire Western Pacific, or even in waters worldwide.
Although the operational radiuses of China’s medium-range ballistic
missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range stealth fighter aircraft far
transcend the First Island Chain and have established combat capabilities,
but during the relatively long flight across the island chain they may suffer
interception from concentrated air defenses and anti-missile forces, greatly
reducing their combat effectiveness. In particular, due to their compara-
tively low flight speed, anti-ship cruise missiles are unlikely to cause any
substantial damage to opposition warships, other than consuming the other
side’s air defense resources; long-range stealth fighter aircraft and bombers
not only risk interception, but also face arduous challenges in tracking and
locating targets; only anti-ship ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic
missiles are able to constitute any consequential threat to enemy warships
and forward bases. However, due to high production costs, they are rela-
tively limited in number. Furthermore, with interception by missiles, such
as the ground-based Patriot series and ship-based Standard series, it is very
difficult to launch an uninterrupted attack on US military targets. It should
not be overlooked that although ISR systems are developing rapidly, the
speed of their progress is far outpaced by that of strike devices. As described
above, there exist various problems with ISR systems in the open oceans,
with the exception of satellites, which can provide information on discon-
tinuous targets on a large scale. Maritime targets are beyond the reach of
shore-based systems, while air-based and sea-based systems must advance
into the ocean to be effective. Without control of the air and seas, security
itself would become uncertain, let alone expectations of triumph. Inade-
quacies in ISR capabilities have become a major bottleneck in the Chinese
military’s execution of naval combat missions. In its AirSea Battle combat
doctrine, the US military construes the ‘China threat,’ based purely on the
theoretical operational radiuses and other physical perceptions of the DF-
21D, H-6 and Su-30MKK, completely disregarding the abovementioned
constraints in geography and limited reconnaissance and surveillance capa-
bilities, undeniably exaggerating China’s future potential capacity.
As for the stability and security of the two sides’ operational systems in
distant oceans, the United States also holds an overall advantage, as China
is unable to rival the United States entirely, both in experience and in re-
sources. As long as China maintains the momentum of its rapid rise, it will
only be a matter of time before China develops and acquires the funda-
mental hardware required for oceangoing operations. In spite of this, the
146  Power transition between China and the US
development and refinement of software such as data collection and recon-
ciliation, power consolidation and coordination, oceangoing deployment,
and operational experience are much more difficult. The more distant Chi-
nese military operations are from Chinese coasts, the lower their levels of
safety and efficiency, with the rate of efficiency decrease far outstripping
that of American counterparts.43
In resource matters, China has a shortage of essential support in distant
oceans. China’s oceangoing ISR systems lack information from reconnais-
sance measures other than reconnaissance satellites and are easily subject
to the US military’s disruption and deception. China’s C4ISR systems will
become ever more vulnerable with China’s growing dependence on offshore
platforms and space-based platforms in regions far from the continent. In
contrast, the US military relies on forward bases scattered worldwide, and
on allies’ onshore or offshore reconnaissance, communications and other
resources, effectively offsetting deficiencies in space-based reconnaissance
and communication capabilities, with much greater reliability in its entire
C4ISR system operations.

Reluctant compromise and desperate balance

In the Western Pacific, China is naturally a land power, while the United
States remains a maritime hegemon. As a result of the combined impacts of
geopolitical conditions, military technology and military systems, there in-
controvertibly exists a strategic equilibrium between China and the United
States. Some similarities are present between these circumstances and the
strategic confrontation in ancient China between the Zhongyuan dynasty
and nomadic tribes in the north along the Great Wall of China or annual
400-millimeter precipitation line. The Zhongyuan dynasty and nomadic re-
gimes had each maintained their own strategic advantages on the southern
and northern sides of the equilibrium line respectively. Of course, such a
balance is not indestructible with sufficient manpower, while disparities in
the efficiency of military systems would also bring about enormous changes.
As was the case in the time of the Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, armies
in the Zhongyuan dynasty pursued adversaries in the Gobi desert and fre-
quently prevailed, whereas the Mongol, Later Jin and other ethnic minority
regimes also established long-term rule in the south. Nonetheless, in a situ-
ation where both parties can utilize their own technological and geographi-
cal advantages as usual, it would be very difficult to shatter this equilibrium.
Similarly, there are certain effective radiuses and scopes of dominance in
China’s ‘from land to sea’ and the United States’ ‘from sea to land’ power
projection methods. In the next 10–20 years, as China concludes the first
stage of its military modernization, it will gradually achieve strategic su-
premacy within the First Island Chain and its neighboring waters. In view
of China’s geographic superiority in these areas, vast air defense systems,
and land-based reconnaissance and early warning measures, it is unlikely
 Power transition between China and the US  147
that some doctrine like AirSea Battle will succeed in its vision of attacking
deep into Mainland China. It will only trigger ill-advised conflict escalation
or Chinese retaliation. Moreover, there are huge divergences in Chinese and
American core interests in the East China Sea and the South China Sea
respectively. For China, the importance of its interests and the extent of its
concern over these issues cannot be compared to those of the United States.
The United States lacks credibility in this region when engaging in threaten-
ing measures to present an offensive deterrence against China. At the same
time, the general trend, from a strategic perspective, is for the United States
to ‘back off’ on Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea and other
issues, while any actions attempting to reverse this tendency would become
both futile and highly perilous.
Although the United States is unable to achieve victory over China in
coastal regions contiguous to China, it can nevertheless hold an absolute
advantage in open waters distant from the Chinese Mainland and effort-
lessly maintain denial capabilities within most waters. It is exactly as Hugh
White remarks, to dominate China, the United States needs to sustain sea
command; but to check and balance China, the United States simply needs
to uphold sea denial, which is certainly feasible.44 If China disregards flaws
in its natural endowments, deficiencies in its capabilities and relatively weak
overseas political influence, and pursues spheres of influence and superior
power in the entire Western Pacific region or even in maritime spaces world-
wide, it would still be unable to radically change the Sino-US strategic equi-
librium, regardless of how great its aspiration and investment.
The Sino-US strategic equilibrium is upheld broadly in waters surround-
ing the First Island Chain. Prior to a profound revolution in military technol-
ogy, this equilibrium is the boundary of where onshore technology extends
toward the ocean, and the limit of where offshore technology advances to-
ward the continent. In a situation where both the Chinese and US militaries
are fully utilizing thriving military technologies and exploiting their respec-
tive geographic advantages, it would be very difficult for the United States
to overcome China in Chinese coastal waters, whereas it would be unlikely
for China to emerge victorious in a confrontation with the United States in
the distant oceans.
This strategic equilibrium is not static, but dynamic, with a certain de-
gree of flexibility in its scope. First, technological advancement may not
be symmetrical. Land-based reconnaissance, delivery and combat technol-
ogies are in development, while corresponding technologies of maritime
platforms are also constantly improving. The importance of identical tech-
nologies is often not the same for the two parties, thus some technological
innovations may marginally adjust the strategic balance. Second, war or
strategic confrontation today is completely different from the infantry and
cavalry warfare that was waged on either side of the Great Wall and is a
systemic conflict comprising thousands of assembled constituents and sys-
tems. The actual combat capabilities of both China and the United States
148  Power transition between China and the US
are determined largely by the extent to which military power is integrated
and the efficiency of the two sides’ joint operations. This is relatively diffi-
cult to accurately assess and there exists a definite degree of uncertainty. In
addition, the level of support from foreign allies is another major variable
that must be computed. With the democratization of international relations
and the thriving development of civil society in various countries, military
operations of overseas garrisons will be met with opposition due to intensi-
fying political and public opinion, which will undoubtedly increase flexibil-
ity in the strategic equilibrium.
Finally, it must be stressed that there are conspicuous differences between
this demarcation line of strategic advantages and the ‘Great Wall Line’ of
ancient times, for it is intangible and porous, rather than palpably divided
by a physical barrier. Both Chinese and American military forces have free-
dom of navigation within one another’s sphere of dominance, even during
times of war. This is because no country can command even a small offshore
area in the same way control is exercised onshore, so neither China nor the
United States can entirely deny access to the other side within their respec-
tive scopes of dominance. Moreover, China does not in fact need to expel
the US military from East Asia or even from the Western Pacific to gain a
strategic advantage along China’s coast, while the United States likewise
does not need to deprive China of its rights to explore and exploit distant
ocean spaces in order to maintain its global maritime supremacy.

The possibility of maintaining peace at sea between China and

the United States
Undoubtedly, maritime geopolitical competition has already become one of
the major issues in Sino-US relations. To a great extent, whether China and
the United States will fall into the Thucydides trap depends on the maritime
interaction between them. In this regard, many experts and scholars believe
that Sino-US maritime conflicts cannot be reconciled. Some even equate
Sino-US maritime competition with pre–First World War German–British
relations and Cold War era Soviet–US relations. In this case, is it possible
for China and the United States to uphold peace at sea?

Sino-US power rivalries grow progressively fiercer but are

somewhat reconcilable
With China’s resolute strength in stepping ‘from land to sea,’ and the United
States’ maritime strategy of accelerating ‘from sea to land,’ reversing from
the wider oceans in the direction of the coast, antagonism between maritime
military strategies of both sides is already an indisputable reality. China
and the United States are engaging in political, economic, military and
other expansive contests near East Asian coastal waters. The United States
is concerned that the ultimate goal of China’s development of sea power is
 Power transition between China and the US  149
to expel the United States from East Asia and even to challenge the United
States’ global hegemony. While the countermeasures of the United States to
contain and suppress China, in addition to acts to enhance military deploy-
ment in the Asia-Pacific, it also causes China to become more insecure. The
Sino-US security dilemma thus arises.45
China’s efforts to develop sea power and safeguard its maritime interests
happen to be in intense strategic conflict with the United States’ promotion
of the ‘Rebalance to the Asia Pacific’ and Indo-Pacific strategy or similar
actions to augment various forms of its regional presence. The essence of
this rivalry and conflict is the contradiction between China, a regional mar-
itime power, in pursuit of its own legitimate rights and a commensurate po-
sition of power, and the United States, which seeks to maintain its maritime
hegemony and consolidate its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific.
In addition to divergences in strategy, there still exist numerous practical
conflicts between China and the United States. Differences exist between
the two sides on the Taiwan issue, which are difficult to reconcile for the
time being, fundamentally restricting the two countries’ maritime strategies
and mutual trust in policies. Differences of awareness exist between the two
countries’ recognition of maritime norms and rules, such as the military
jurisdiction of EEZs and of Innocent Passage, affecting the effectiveness
and efficiency of communication. On issues, such as the East China Sea and
South China Sea, Chinese actions to safeguard its sovereignty are increas-
ingly incomprehensible for the United States. The United States believes
that China is transforming the ‘status quo’ of the Asia-Pacific region by vir-
tue of its steadily rising strength and fears that this would eventually subvert
the US-led Asia-Pacific security system. It therefore attempts to conduct
preventative diplomacy vis-à-vis China. All kinds of resounding censure
and criticism grow day by day, with intentions to use the Diaoyu Islands,
South China Sea and other issues to check China ever more apparent. While
the United States piles pressure on China with more and more of its forces
deployed in the Asia-Pacific, it takes an unfair position on the Diaoyu Is-
lands and South China Sea issues, while it is one-sided in its suppression of
China and support for the actions of Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and
other claimants, all which also leaves China somewhat indignant, with no
choice but to make a range of preparations for American intervention in
maritime disputes involving China.
However, this rivalry between China and the United States is in truth
not entirely irreconcilable, for the nature of the Sino-US maritime game
is completely different from the German-British competition for sea power
and ­Soviet-US contest for hegemony. The present military technology is un-
able yet to entirely transform the impacts of geographic distance, and so
there is a huge buffer space between China and the United States. Regard-
less of how China’s sea power develops, the Sino-US contest still carries
the distinctive features of a classic match between a land power and a sea
power. China is a regional maritime power, and its most important maritime
150  Power transition between China and the US
interests are concentrated in East Asian waters, whereas the United States is
a global maritime hegemon, and East Asian waters are merely one key part.
As a consequence, the focal interests of China and the United States in
these waters are quite different. Adjustments in power and influence in East
Asian waters would not produce an underlying impact on China’s and the
United States’ global positions of power. China has the means to win dig-
nity, while the United States certainly also has ways to maintain respect.
This is far from comparable to the competition for sea power between Ger-
many and Great Britain during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.46 In
this regard, Chairman Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that ‘the Pa-
cific is sufficiently large to accommodate both the US and China.’47
Specifically, although there is fierce conflict between the two parties’ pur-
suit of interests, there is nevertheless room for compromise and concession:
the United States’ two most important interests in these waters are to ensure
freedom of navigation and to maintain regional peace and stability. There
exists no fundamental contradiction between China and the United States on
these two subjects, even though the United States uses freedom of navigation
to carry out close-range coastal surveillance and maritime deterrence, which
poses a certain security threat to China, and the United States’ widespread
opposition to the use of military force to change the status quo has also con-
stituted a certain restriction on China’s use of force to uphold its rights.
In essence, China also concurs in principle with the values and concepts
of freedom of navigation and regional peace and stability. Furthermore,
with expansion in the sphere of activity of China’s sea power and steady
increases in its regional interests, Sino-US common interests on these two
major issues will continue to magnify. The Taiwan issue and maritime dis-
putes involving China concern core and vital Chinese interests and are an
extension of Chinese sovereignty or sovereign rights, so it is very difficult for
China to make concessions; whereas the United States’ major consideration
on these issues is how to fulfill its commitments to its allies and contain
China’s maritime rise. These are also very important, but for freedom of
navigation, regional security and global strategic plans, these two interests
are in fact not wholly indispensable. In reality, in terms of the strategic situ-
ation, existing international circumstances ought to permit both China and
the United States to safeguard their core interests, without one presenting
a major threat to the other. The strategic width and depth of the Pacific
Ocean cannot be compared to the North Sea. It is sufficiently large to ac-
commodate both China and the United States, and it is possible that these
geographic differences would allow Sino-US competition to extricate itself
from the tragedy of historic German-British conflict.

Overall interdependence will restrict the fomentation of conflict

However, mere strategic balance is far from sufficient. While it helps to con-
tain large-scale wars, it cannot prevent small-scale battles, and all large-scale
 Power transition between China and the US  151
wars originate from small-scale battles or even skirmishes. Peace between
China and the United States still must benefit from the ‘you are among us,
we are among you’ composite interdependence that has formed between the
two countries.
Mutually assured destruction (MAD) regarding the eradication of nu-
clear deterrents, restrictions on a high degree of economic interdependence,
in addition to Sino-US interdependence in global governance and maritime
security, are three key positive elements for peace.
The first step is to ensure a joint purge of powerful deterrents in nuclear
era circumstances. Against a backdrop of nuclear terror, direct conflict or
war between major powers is becoming inconceivable, for any escalation in
conflict could be catastrophic. Although it is difficult to compare China’s
nuclear arsenal with that of the Soviet Union or Russia, its minimum nu-
clear deterrence measures are nevertheless sufficient to dissuade the United
States from potential hostile actions. With the ever-increasing sophistica-
tion, perfection and innovation in China’s nuclear arms and their means of
delivery, credibility of MAD between China and the United States is also
greatly enhanced and an overall state of peace can be expected.
The second step is economic interdependence. As China steadily inte-
grates into the international system, its reliance on US-led international
mechanisms is increasing and common interests with the United States are
also expanding. China will gradually discover the value of complying with
regulations, thus renouncing armed challenges. In reality, the accomplish-
ments of China’s reform and opening up are in a process of synchroniz-
ing with and integrating into the international system. Sino-US trade war
and economic decoupling initiated by the Trump administration may cast
a great shadow on this interdependent relationship, but in longer term, is
doomed to be unsuccessful since they are against the trend of economic
development. The United States will come to discover that a policy of con-
frontation and containment both proves ineffective and is ever more diffi-
cult to manage.
Besides deep trade complementarity, there is also intense division of la-
bor between China and the United States in traditional manufacturing, in-
formation technology and other industries. Although economic friction is
growing, economic interdependence is also increasing. To some degree, inti-
mate economic ties in fact already act as deterrence, because both countries
have measures to paralyze and even destroy one another’s economy. An all-
out trade war between the two countries purports both sides’ simultaneous
ruin and means that even the relatively stronger United States would be
unable to afford the cost of large-scale economic retaliation from China.
The third is the pressure of global governance. The two sides’ common
interests in nonproliferation, development promotion, regional security
and other issues are steadily growing. Any significant problem in the world
would be very difficult to resolve without Sino-US cooperation. For instance,
the US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, issued by the two
152  Power transition between China and the US
countries on 12 November 2014, has been hailed as an underlying transfor-
mation in the global politics of climate change. The urgency of global gov-
ernance will also precipitate genuine Sino-US strategic partnership.
Maritime competitions are very important to both sides, but it is only
one piece of the complex relationship between China and the United States.
With China’s rise, the United States’ relative decline, and the rapid growth
in common interests, both sides would, as far as possible, avoid a ‘deadlock’
in the overall Sino-US relationship due to maritime frictions. As blows are
traded over maritime issues as mentioned above, at the same time, the sta-
bility and development of Sino-US relations are also actively boosted.
China’s leaders have proposed an initiative to build a new type of power
relations in addition to a new type of military relations. The maintenance
of stable relations with the United States remains connected to the overall
state of Chinese foreign affairs. Although the United States is inclined to
take a hard line on maritime disputes involving China in the near future and
increasingly echoed great power competition, it in fact does not wish for this
issue to affect overall Sino-US relations, and proactively advocates for high-
level exchange and strategic dialogue between China and the United States.
As neither China nor the United States could afford a complete breakdown
in their relationship, universal restraint is favored by both countries as a
moderating handbrake in this intense game concerning maritime issues.
The United States of course wishes to contain China, but it is increas-
ingly difficult to do so. The United States is already aware that the challenge
China poses to the United States is quite unlike that of the Soviet Union, so
with regard to China, the United States cannot adopt a comprehensive con-
tainment policy of politics, economics, military, culture and other aspects,
as it did with the Soviet Union. Under rapidly developing interdependence,
the United States can only adopt a partial containment policy against
China. Expressly, on the one hand, it bides for opportunities to suppress
and check China in some measure on maritime and other issues, and on
the other hand also endeavors to maintain a stable relationship with China
on the whole. The United States’ implementation of such a policy would
inevitably aggravate mutual conflicts and reciprocal hedging in the compe-
tition and cooperation of Sino-US relations. This would further deepen the
relationship of ‘neither friend nor foe’ between China and the United States.

Maritime functional cooperation will advance the stability of

Sino-US relations
Competition between China and the United States in East Asia or the West-
ern Pacific Ocean is only one part of comprehensive Sino-US maritime rela-
tions. In global waters there is extensive space and potential for cooperation
between China and the United States. The seas, in particular the distant
oceans, still encompass most unknowns in the world whose exploration and
exploitation is very difficult and invariably represent a feat no single country
 Power transition between China and the US  153
can accomplish alone. At the same time, due to characteristics of maritime
connectivity and mobility, the marine economy and social activities have
naturally open features. Whether safeguarding maritime security, shaping
the maritime order or proceeding with maritime development, all is insepa-
rable from the unswerving cooperation of littoral states. Both China and the
United States are global powers with interests circulating worldwide, and in
a time of globalization and economic interdependence, the two countries
both rely on an open world and economic systems for fulfilling and pro-
tecting overseas interests. For both sides, this produces an enormous need
and potential for collaboration on areas such as maritime security, maritime
politics and the marine economy.
In the field of maritime security, in the present world, there is neither one
country nor one maritime power that alone can secure its own interests,
let alone protect worldwide common interests. As powerful as the United
States may be, it is no exception to this. Since the end of the Cold War,
confronted by the diversification of maritime threats and naval duties, the
US Navy has actively supported cooperation on maritime security and pro-
posed the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 1,000 Ship Navy Plan and
the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative and other international collab-
oration schemes in succession, in addition to prominently emphasizing the
necessity of international cooperation in National Strategy for Maritime
Security (2005) and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
(2007), among other publications.
In the 2015 edition of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,
while the United States stresses the challenges and risks of China’s A2/AD,
it also candidly recognizes that the Chinese Navy is making ever greater
contributions in maritime affairs such as cracking down on piracy, provid-
ing humanitarian assistance and participating in large-scale multilateral
exercises.48 Compared with the United States, China somewhat lacks the
capability and resources to uphold SLOCs and its overseas interests through
military measures on a global scale, thus cooperation would be its foremost
choice. Lyle J. Goldstein of US Naval War College believes China and the
United States can engage in cooperation on at least six main areas of ac-
tion: the establishment of maritime trust and crisis management mecha-
nisms, maritime search and rescue, disaster relief, marine environmental
surveillance, the safeguard of regional maritime security and on assuring
the security of SLOCs.49 Global maritime issues and sudden crises often
compel China and the United States to work more closely. For instance,
the joint escort in the Gulf of Aden, the Malaysia Airlines MH370 search
and rescue operation and other united operations have highlighted the need
for China and the United States, as global maritime powers, to cooperate
hand-in-hand.
With regard to the maritime order, common interests between China and
the United States are increasing significantly. As I have mentioned before,
the current maritime order based on UNCLOS is far from fully formed.
154  Power transition between China and the US
To  form a cogent maritime mechanism, the participation and support of
major powers are crucial. Moreover, policy coordination between China
and the United States is a vital prerequisite. China and the United States are
maritime powers, both with extensive continental coastlines, and share an
intrinsic common language and joint historic responsibility in shaping the
maritime order. With the narrowing of the gap in strength between China
and the United States, Chinese and American perceptions on issues such
as safeguarding freedom of navigation and shaping the maritime order are
rapidly converging and the influence of ideological differences and other
irrational factors on this issue will gradually decline.
As for marine development and management, China and the United
States will become deeply interdependent in scientific research, exploita-
tion of marine resources, environmental protection and other areas. De-
velopment of the seas, with their considerable openness and shareability, is
very different from management of land, for even marine resources within
territorial waters are dynamic. Both China and the United States possess
their own unique advantages. The United States has rich experience in ma-
rine development and management and an advanced technological level,
whereas China has relatively abundant human resources and plentiful cap-
ital. In the exploration and exploitation of the global maritime spaces, the
high seas and international seabed areas, development and management of
resources and space require intensive capital and advanced technology. The
two countries would both benefit from cooperation, whereas both equally
stand to lose from conflict. In the vast expanses of the Arctic, mid-Pacific
and south Atlantic Oceans, mankind is severely underinvesting in capital,
human resources and other factors. Maritime awareness and investigation
of these waters require China and the United States to collaborate hand-in-
hand; the two countries are also increasingly inseparable on issues such as
worldwide maritime meteorological forecasts, awareness of maritime do-
mains and disaster early warnings.
At present, Sino-US contests in the maritime sphere are becoming ever
more eye-catching. China and the United States would often erupt into skir-
mishes and conflict, neither side appreciating the other, and both countries’
defense departments even reinforcing ‘worst-case scenario’ preparations
aimed at the other side. However, from an objective perspective, China and the
United States, as rivals who ‘detest’ one another, also increasingly cooperate,
coordinate and unite on numerous fields. Strategic maritime rivalry between
China and the United States is inevitable, but to undermine the other party
completely would be even worse. While the two countries may not like each
other, the functional cooperation offered by the other side is indispensable.

Constructing a new type of Sino-US maritime power relations

There are major issues in the construction of a new type of Sino-US maritime
relations, covering substantial subject matter. However, how to manage and
 Power transition between China and the US  155
alleviate the maritime rivalry between the two countries is without doubt one
of the most important issues and is also an area that both parties recognize
and are willing to cooperate on. In light of China’s proposal to construct
a new type of power relationship, the US government has responded selec-
tively. On the whole, the United States has accepted the two principles of ‘no
conflict, no confrontation,’ while expressing reservations on the two main
principles of ‘mutual respect’ and ‘win-win cooperation.’ The construction of
a new type of maritime power relationship is key for the two sides, China and
the United States, to break the historical curse of ‘inevitable conflict between
a rising nation and dominant nation’ or to step out of the ‘Thucydides’ Trap.’
The fact China and the United States should cooperate does not, however,
means that the two sides will definitely cooperate. The very low probability
of large war between China and the United States also does not mean that
peace is guaranteed. Sino-US relations are currently advancing toward a
fork in the road, where future prospects depend on both parties’ choices
and endeavors. Since the Sino-US contest of interests in East Asian waters
is not a matter of ‘life and death,’ and both sides cannot afford the costs of
direct conflict, jointly improving interaction processes, taking advantage
of peaceful opportunities, and preventing ‘tragedy’ from occurring appear
particularly important.

Strengthening strategic dialogue and communication to improve

interaction process
There are already over 90 pairs of bilateral dialogue and communication
mechanisms or channels between China and the United States. Under
Trump’s administration, the two sides have also established four new inde-
pendent mechanisms, namely, the Diplomatic Security Dialogue, Compre-
hensive Economic Dialogue, Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue
and Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue. These channels range from the
top to the executive levels, covering communication and interaction in poli-
tics, military, economics, culture in addition to many other aspects. Never-
theless, the efficiency and efficacy of Sino-US communication are far from
satisfactory, as in many cases the purpose and expectations of contact are
unable to be fulfilled. In other words, there is inadequate depth of commu-
nication. At present, many interactions end at wining and dining stage, with
each party expressing superficial viewpoints.
Both China and the United States are keen to emphasize their own indi-
viduality, or ‘exceptionalism’: China often highlights the distinctiveness of
its culture and traditions, and unwillingness to follow the West’s old path;
in contrast, Americans take pride in statements like ‘the US is a City Upon
a Hill’ and ‘Americans are voters of God.’ As Kissinger said, China and the
United States are two powers with entirely different traditions and strategic
cultures. Each side accurately perceives the other to face numerous practi-
cal difficulties and cultural obstacles.50 In addition, in the two countries,
156  Power transition between China and the US
there are growing numbers of individuals and departments involved in
decision-making, invariably increasing the difficulty of effective commu-
nication. A large degree of the so-called strategic distrust is due to the mis-
understandings arising in communication. The relationship between the
two countries is extremely complex to begin with; at the same time, the two
sides have completely different political cultures and bureaucratic systems.
As a result, even the most brilliant leaders and politicians may not always be
able to steady the ship. Even an excellent policy decision may be destroyed
by the two countries’ cumbersome policy implementation systems. An ac-
cord agreed in principle by the United States and China may be disman-
tled based on disagreements in the details; at times even when consensus is
reached on perspective and interests, divergences on implementation may
lead to failure in cooperation.51
In this situation, it is very important to use language and logic, which the
other party can understand in order to express one’s views and objectives.
This implies that acting unilaterally and flaunting oneself is simply a diplo-
matic show, serving only limited purpose in the development of Sino-US re-
lations. Only if both sides are prepared to renounce their individuality and
exceptionalism, earnestly listen to each other, and moreover understand
one another, can strategic dialogue and communication prove successful.
In addition, both sides should have the courage to face the genuine issues of
power competition rather than the false ones of freedom of navigation; need
to maintain strategic consciousness, arrange dialogue on issues of West
Pacific region as soon as possible, conduct substantial negotiation with re-
spect to strategic conception of each other, launch arms control dialogue
or mutual restriction on maritime armament development, reach necessary
consensus on power distribution and power balance in the region and form
an inclusive security framework for coexistence on this basis in the process
of the competition. With this foundation, China and the United States also
need to accomplish the endeavors discussed below.
On the one hand, the United States ought to maintain considerable confi-
dence in response to China’s growing maritime power. First, China’s coastal
advantages will be limited, whereas the United States will have plenty of
space throughout. Currently with powerful rivalries emerging in East Asian
waters, China experiences not only US containment, but also encounters
strong competition from Japan, South Korea, and even Vietnam, Indone-
sia and other countries. China may benefit from certain advantages, but
it is unlikely to control these waters exclusively. Second, China is unable
to gain advantages in the open seas, as through offshore balancing the
United States can continue to maintain its maritime hegemony. China and
the United States’ offensive and defensive balance in coastal waters and the
open seas demonstrates that if China’s growing strength maintains its mo-
mentum, while it may attain coastal advantages, it is unlikely to scale new
heights and become a strong challenger to the United States in the open
seas, as the United States can still form powerful restraints against China’s
 Power transition between China and the US  157
capabilities and intentions by virtue of its advantages in the open seas. On
the other hand, the United States ought still to maintain essential ration-
ality. If a relatively declining United States insists on conducting compre-
hensive checks and balances against a rising China in East Asian waters,
pursuing impractical goals in its own areas of disadvantage, this would be
unquestionably imprudent. Not only would this be futile, but may acceler-
ate the decline of American hegemony.
Consequently, the United States should consider accepting objective real-
ities in China and the United States’ relative changes in strength, in addition
to grasping the strategic importance of compromise and concessions.

If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying the contain
China, the potential for future tension – or worse – in Sino-­A merican
relations can only increase. By pulling back from its hegemonic role
in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United
States could better preserve its relative power and strategic influence.52

At the same time, without undermining its position of global leadership, the
United States should clearly demonstrate to what extent it is able to respect
China’s legitimate interests.53
As its strategic focus turns toward the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region,
the United States should carefully consider its responsibilities and obliga-
tions to certain allies, accommodate China on issues that concern Chinese
core and major interests and refrain from offering allies commitments that
are too difficult to honor; even if it wants to unite with allies to check and
balance China, the United States also should to be cautious against actions
that trigger a military race with China. Regarding the ‘Rebalance’ and
­Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States still needs to take concrete steps to
gain trust. Apart from repeatedly expressing that these strategies are in fact
not directed at China, it also needs to be more cautious, more transparent
in its actual conduct. In order to build mutual trust, the United States must
pursue a regional security mechanism that includes China, in place of con-
structing a ‘united front’ against China through bilateral military alliances
and multilateral political security alliances.
With respect to its adjustment of objectives, China should pay greater
attention to the tactical issue of communication.
First, considering that the United States’ strength still far exceeds that of
China, China should adopt a clearer strategy. On the one hand, it is essential
to clarify the issues on which China and the United States are competitors,
and on which they are cooperative partners, so as to aid both sides in com-
prehending each other’s bottom lines in policy and avoid actions that may
transgress into each other. As the relatively weaker party, it is inadvisable
for China to dictate extensive national core interests; it must strictly define
the scope of its core interests, clarify on which interests it is possible to com-
promise vis-à-vis on which it is vital to persevere. On the other hand, it is
158  Power transition between China and the US
necessary to insist on established bottom lines, not to compromise too eas-
ily. As the weaker party, China needs to clearly demonstrate its intentions to
the United States. China will take utmost care not to challenge the United
States’ core interests; however if China’s core interests are encroached upon,
it would resist the United States with greatest determination and the belief
that ‘it is better to die in glory than live in dishonor, better to die a hero than
live a coward.’ Only by adhering to its own bottom lines, strengthening its
strategic resolve, being firm where it must be firm, can China better safe-
guard its maritime interests.
Second, China should better enlighten the United States on Chinese mil-
itary power’s development plan and strategy. Under certain conditions, it
is necessary to pay attention to improving the transparency of policy and
effectiveness of information transmission. Although China has made re-
markable achievements on improving transparency, but due to institutional
coordination, mass media sensationalism and other problems in the trans-
mission process, contradictory information still often occurs in external
transmission, leading to incoherent situations.
Finally, China also needs a high degree of strategic awareness regarding
the importance of exchange and communication mechanisms on both sides
equally. It must not be China’s habit to use dialogue mechanisms themselves
as a tool or weapon in diplomatic disputes. Interruptions in communication
can of course exert pressure on other parties but would also harm one’s own
interests. Moreover, the cost and efficiency of this style of diplomacy is even
more unacceptable when other more substantive political, economic and
military means of retaliation available.

Establishing an effective crisis prevention management mechanism

As friction, conflict and crisis between China and the United States cannot,
for the instant, always be avoided, risks of Sino-US conflict induced by third
parties are rising. In order to avert unintentional direct confrontation or
even conflict, reinforce crisis management and reduce crisis incidents, con-
flict prevention has become an urgent priority. It is essential that both China
and the United States enhance the style and substance of existing maritime
military security dialogue mechanisms, promote discussion on maritime
crisis management, build trust and form effective norms or transition of
order, both as precaution and as control.
China and the United States should at the very least include the following
emergency and crisis prevention management mechanisms: First, the two
sides should reach a basic consensus on maritime military security issues,
such as mutual means of notification, navigation and flight regulations and
emergency procedures. After more than a decade of dialogue and consul-
tation on maritime security, this initiative has already achieved some suc-
cess like Code of Conduct for Maritime and Air Safety in the High Seas
and Mutual Notification Mechanisms on Major Military Operations (2014).
 Power transition between China and the US  159
In future, while continuing to uphold original matters of discussion and im-
plementing specific codes of conduct, it is also possible to attempt to devise,
on the basis of existing mechanisms, dialogue and consultation platforms
on US-Asia-Pacific strategy, US-Asia-Pacific alliance systems, maritime se-
curity and any other regional security issues, so as to encourage consensus
on conduct and third parties.
Second, there should be effective emergency channels of communication.
‘Established channels are prone to remain open when relations between two
countries are amicable, but reliability is often compromised in the event of
an emergency. Motivation is important, but institutional arrangement is
also required for assurance.’54 Therefore, it is necessary to agree to stand-
ard procedures concerning the Sino-US military affairs hotline and other
communication mechanisms, clarifying their duties, and systematically en-
suring that they remain effective in times of crisis.
Third, there are relevant regulations on crisis alerts and controls. Pres-
ently, the two parties need to shape crisis management procedures into a
set of mature and workable norms, to prevent misjudgment or misconduct
in decision-making departments in the midst of crisis, which would lead to
further unnecessary suspicion or conflict.
For contradictions in Sino-US policy and intensifying ‘strategic distrust,’
pragmatic and professional crisis management mechanisms can act as a
vital safety valve. In addition, they also have strong spillover effects, can
enhance mutual trust and encourage cooperation in other fields. If the two
powers could recognize that both sides share a considerable common inter-
est base, the two countries may establish crisis prevention measures, expand
channels of contact and strengthen communication and coordination, to
avoid catastrophic events and bolster desire for cooperation between the
two sides, so that their relationship progresses in a positive direction.55 This
type of professional or technological cooperation will ultimately lay the
foundation for improvements in overall military and security relations be-
tween China and the United States.

Adapting to essential compromises in pursuit of ‘maritime

co-governance’
On solutions for Sino-US maritime strategic competition, James Holmes
and Toshi Yoshihara have once proposed the theory of Sino-US ‘maritime
co-governance,’ believing that the United States is willing to entrust East
Asia to China, provided that China is able to fulfill a series of requirements
and conditions.56 In truth, Sino-US ‘maritime co-governance’ is far from
limited to the Western Pacific. As the Chinese Navy becomes the world’s
second largest sea power, the two countries’ naval cooperation in global
waters will likewise become ever more extensive and pervasive.
While strengthening maritime crisis management, China and the United
States should simultaneously endeavor to promote maritime cooperation to
160  Power transition between China and the US
safeguard joint interests and build mutual trust. China has already accepted
the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative that was proposed by the United
States. On 29 July 2003, China also formally joined the US Container Safety
Initiative (CSI), playing an important role in the latter. In future, cooper-
ation between the two sides to maintain security in fields of public global
maritime commons will become increasingly common. I believe that China
and the United States can focus on strengthening practical cooperation on
issues such as maintaining of freedom of navigation; cracking down on pi-
racy, anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, and disaster relief; and controlling
narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities, so as to promote awareness
of joint interests and form key strategic mutual trust.
Next, the two sides should promote the integration of ideas and beliefs to
boost cooperation in the construction of an international maritime order.
Sino-US agreement and divergences on maritime ideology and regulation
are of crucial importance to the evolution of the international maritime
order and have a significant impact on the progressing transition of sea
power. It is necessary for both sides to advance dialogue and cooperation
to improve aspects such as maritime law and international maritime mech-
anisms, promote convergence on maritime perspectives, and while seeking
not to fully bridge differences, but to better understand one another’s dis-
course and actions.
The third major implication of strategic cooperation is that China and
the United States must mutually make accommodating concessions, adjust
competition strategy, as well as control the ‘intensity’ of conflict in the West-
ern Pacific. Sino-US maritime contradictions or conflicts are mainly con-
centrated in epicontinental seas or coastal areas of East Asia, where the two
sides have long been regarded as strategic rivals. Due to constant changes
in the balance of power, all kinds of strategic probes and conflicts have be-
come commonplace. This has brought both risks and challenges: with Chi-
na’s rapidly growing strength, its actions to safeguard maritime interests are
growing more confident and resolute, while as the United States grows ever
more alarmed at China’s rise, its containment efforts progressively increase.
At the same time, this has also brought opportunity: as Sino-US conflict
gradually intensifies, the imminent outbreak of warfare conflict may inspire
convergence in interests or positions, compelling both sides to recognize
the value of communication and cooperation. Without China’s support and
tolerance, the United States would never be able to ensure freedom of navi-
gation and stability in this region; without the United States’ reluctant rec-
ognition, it would be near impossible for China to successfully reunify and
very difficult to satisfactorily uphold its maritime territorial sovereignty and
relevant rights.
Objectively speaking, both Chinese and American goals have somewhat
unrealistic aspects. In order to secure one another’s core or more impor-
tant interests, both sides ought to prepare to renounce or compromise on
some secondary objectives, in order to better adapt to and accommodate
 Power transition between China and the US  161
the other party. China must establish powerful military deterrence, but take
care to afford the United States appropriate diplomatic space, better ex-
press demands over its legitimate interests to the United States, carefully
reconsider its employment of war in maritime disputes, avoid coercing the
United States into a dead-end and encourage ‘concession with dignity’ from
the United States. When pursuing coastal advantages, it is also necessary
to fully examine American concerns over freedom of navigation. While
containing China and upholding its maritime hegemony, the United States
must at the same time fully recognize the significance and sensitivity of the
Taiwan issue and maritime disputes involving China, thus in time adjust-
ing its regional policy regarding Taiwan, cautiously approaching disputes in
the East China Sea and South China Sea to avoid aggravating the Chinese
people’s nationalist sentiments, easing Chinese hostility toward American
strategy in the Asia-Pacific by providing China’s coastal maritime power
sufficient space to develop, and encouraging China to make further contri-
butions to maintaining freedom of navigation and regional stability.
Within the existing system, China and the United States should accom-
plish ‘two types of sharing’; the United States ought to ‘share power’ with
China, and China needs to ‘share responsibility’ with the United States.57
China needs to improve its approach and technique in the pursuit of inter-
ests to better adapt to the current US-led international system, whereas the
United States needs to adjust the aims of its Asia-Pacific strategy accord-
ingly to better accommodate China. The central connotations of Sino-US
‘maritime co-governance’ are China’s acceptance of the United States’
global maritime advantage and its strategic partnership with the United
States to safeguard global maritime security and accessibility. In contrast,
the United States must respect China’s core and vital interests in the West-
ern Pacific region and make certain compromises in its policies.

Notes
1 Originally published in World Economics and Politics, No. 5, 2014, with edits to
the title and contents.
2 Robert Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Yan Xuetong, ed.,
Security Cooperation in East Asia (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004),
pp. 51–54.
3 Document: Air Sea Battle Name Change Memo. https://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/
document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memo
4 The World’s Top Economy: The US vs. China in Five Charts, www.weforum.
org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/;
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking-ppp-based
5 World Economic League Table 2016 Highlights, https://cebr.com/reports/
welt-2016/
6 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, p. 17.
7 Yan Xuetong, Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years
(­Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2013), p. 5.
8 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, 5 Febru-
ary 2014.
162  Power transition between China and the US
9 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China’s Military & The U.S.-­
Japan Alliance In 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, May 3, 2013, p. 308.
10 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
­Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress, September 2013, p. 42, www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
11 China’s Military & The U.S.-Japan Alliance In 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment,
pp. 186–187.
12 Yuan Peng, “A New Era of Strategic Thinking on China’s Greater Periphery,”
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 10, 2013, p. 31.
13 James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell,
Conflict with China Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,
pp. 5, 9.
14 Department of U.S. Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
21st Century Defense, January 2012, pp. 4-–5, http://www.defense.gov/news/­
Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.
15 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-­
Access and Area-Denial Challenge, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-
ments, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2003).
16 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why Air Sea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Stra-
tegic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 24.
17 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Na-
tional Defense in 2004 (White Paper), http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/
content_4249947_2.Htm
18 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, The Diver-
sified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (White Paper), www.mod.gov.cn/
affair/2013-04/16/content_4442839.Htm
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Secu-
rity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, www.defense.gov/
pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf
20 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
­Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress, p. 10.
21 Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle,” July 31, 2013, http://­nationalinterest.
org/commentary/Dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=6
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1,
2010, p. 33, www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf
23 Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting
Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012,
http://www.The-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212.
24 Jonathan W. Greenert, “Breaking the Kill Chain,” May 16, 2013, www.­foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle?Page=0,1
25 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-­
Departure Operational Concept, May 2010, pp.  17–30, www.csbaonline.org/
publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept
26 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-­
Departure Operational Concept, p. xi.
27 Seth Cropsey, “Statement of Seth Cropsey Subcommittee on Seapower and Pro-
jection Forces U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to P.L.A. Na-
val Forces modernization,” December 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-CropseyS-20131211.Pdf
28 Thomas X. Hammes, “A Military Strategy to Deter China,” December 1, 2013,
www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/01/a_military_strategy_to_deter_
china_106987.Html
 Power transition between China and the US  163
29 U.S. House of Representatives, “From Representative J. Randy Forbes to
the Honorable Leon Panetta,” November 7, 2011, http://forbes.house.gov/­
UploadedFiles/Panetta_ASB.pdf
30 Amitai Etzioni, “Preparing to Go to War with China,” July 2013, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/amitaietzioni/preparing-to-go-to-war-wi_b_3533398.Html.
31 Thomas X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely
Conflict,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, June 2012, pp. 5–6.
32 Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle,” http://nationalinterest.org/­
commentary/dont.sweat.airsea.battle.8804?page=3.
33 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recom-
mendations,” p.  11, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/
HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-EricksonA-20131211.pdf
34 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chi-
nese Anti access/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Com-
mons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer 2016, pp. 13,
41, 48.
35 See more information about the relations between ASB and JAM-GC, Terry
S. Morris, Martha VanDriel, Bill Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Richard H. Schulz,
and Kristin E. Jacobsen, “Securing Operational Access: Evolving the Air-
Sea Battle Concept,” February11, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/
securing-operational-access-evolving-the-air-sea-battle-12219
36 Naval Surface Forces Commander, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Con-
trol, January 2017, p. 9.
37 Liu Zhuoming and Jiang Zhijung, eds., Naval Equipment (Beijing: Encyclopedia
of China Publishing House), pp. 523–537.
38 Ian Easton, “China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities: Implica-
tions for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” The Project 2049 Institute, February 2014,
pp. 9–16.
39 Ian Easton, “China’s Military Strategy in the Asia Pacific: Implications of Re-
gional Stability,” The Project 2049 Institute, 2013, p. 16. www.project2049.net/
documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf
40 James R. Holmes, “An Age of Land-Based Sea Power?” March 2012, http://
thediplomat.com/2013/03/An-age-of-land-based-sea-power
41 Naval Surface Forces Commander, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Con-
trol, January 2017, p. 9.
42 Strategy Research Department of Chinese Military Science Acdemic, eds.,
Strategy (Beijing: Chinese Military Science Press, 2013), p. 96.
43 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recom-
mendations,” p. 5.
44 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne:
Black Inc., 2012), p. 75.
45 Hu Bo, China’s Sea Power Strategy: Diplomacy, the Marine Economy and Sea
Power (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2012), p. 153.
46 At the time, Germany hoped that its high seas fleet could exert a certain amount
of pressure on the British in the North Sea or in waters near the English Channel
to deter the British from participating in the war. These waters were central to
Britain’s core interests, tied to British national security and the security of most
important sea lane between Great Britain and Continental Europe. There was
a very limited strategic buffer space between the two sides, so Germany’s con-
struction of a mighty fleet was insupportable for the British.
47 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping Holds Talks Wwith US President Obama, Emphasizes
Constructing New Types of Sino-US Relations from Six Key Directions,” http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebr/chn/zgyw/t1209988.htm
164  Power transition between China and the US
48 U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Co-
operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015.
49 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival,
Vo1. 53, No. 2, 2011, p. 92.
50 Henry Kissinger, On China, Reprint edition (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
51 Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Sega, “The G-2 Mirage,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 88, No. 3, 2009, pp. 14–23.
52 Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony,” Current History,
Vo1. 107, No. 705, 2008, pp. 13–18.
53 Zhu Feng, “U.S. Rebalance in the Asia – Pacific: China’s Response and the Fu-
ture Regional Order,” CSS Discussion Paper, No. 12, New Zealand: Victoria
University of Wellington, 2012, p. 14.
54 Zhang Tuosheng, “A Case Analysis of Sino-US Security Crisis Management,
”in Zhang Tuosheng and Michael D. Swaine eds., Sino-American Security Crisis
Management Classic Cases, World Affairs Press (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe), 2007,
pp. 302–303.
55 Zhao Quansheng, Great Power Politics & Diplomacy, World Affairs Press (Shijie
Zhishi Chubanshe), 2009, pp. 16–20.
56 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Cen-
tury: The Turn to Mahan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 112.
57 Jin Canrong and Duan Haowen, “Dilemmas and Solutions in Current Sino-US
Relations,” International Review (Guoji Guancha), Vol. 1, 2014.
8 Maritime relations with Japan,
ASEAN, India, Australia and
Russia

The Asia-Pacific region is an area where leading global sea powers are con-
centrated and has become a strategic focal point of contention for those
maritime powers. With the exception of European countries, which partic-
ipate relatively less in this realm, virtually all other major maritime powers
are clustered here. Besides the United States, Japan and other traditional
maritime powers are also redoubling their efforts to consolidate vested in-
terests and establish their place in the international order; China, India and
other newly rising forces are emerging as a group; while South Korea, Aus-
tralia, Indonesia and other middle powers are also full of ambition. The
naval race is already ongoing in this region and is affecting every country in
the area. The Pacific and Indian Oceans have officially replaced the Atlantic
as the strategic center of international maritime politics. The differentia-
tion and combination of China, the United States, Japan, Russia, India and
the ASEAN countries, among other powers, will determine, to a great ex-
tent, the future of the world’s maritime order. For China to become a world
leader in this group of maritime heavyweights, it would be very difficult
to maintain an unassailable position in the maritime conquest without the
systematic planning of great power strategy.

Rationally facing frosty and tense Sino-Japanese relations

Japan is a neighboring country with immediate stakes in Chinese maritime
power. Historically, Japan has repeatedly impeded progress in China’s mar-
itime rise and is presently the most complex and keen-edged country with
which China has disputes at sea. In recent years, Japan has frequently sen-
sationalized concerns over China’s ‘maritime expansion.’ Chinese ventures
to build maritime power have not only been construed by Japan as a ‘corro-
sion’ of its rights and interests, they have at the same time become Japan’s
best excuse in its pursuit of political and military normalization. Japan is a
traditional maritime country, with sophisticated comprehensive strength at
sea that ought not be underestimated. In-depth analysis of Japan’s China
strategy, domestic political characteristics and policies designed for appro-
priate response is a matter of vital urgency.
166  Maritime relations
The long continuity in Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation
On 11 September 2012, following Japan’s ‘island purchase’ incident, Sino-­
Japanese relations plummeted and were further aggravated as the Abe gov-
ernment assumed power, inheriting the Noda cabinet’s hardline stance on
the Diaoyu Islands issue, while zealously striving to amend the constitution
and strengthen the military in opposition to China. It is unlikely that the
Japanese government, constrained by Japan’s national interests and the do-
mestic political environment, will be able to make sweeping policy reforms
in the short term, while strategic confrontation and military rivalries be-
tween China and Japan will endure in the long term.1
At present, in the case of China and Japan, there exist virtually all ele-
ments required for confrontation, as frictions exist between the two sides
in diverse fields, such as geopolitics, territorial sovereignty, ideology and
popular sentiment. In the next decade or so, it will be very difficult to estab-
lish a decisive détente in Sino-Japanese relations, which may even further
deteriorate, as a result of regional structural conflict, China’s and Japan’s
respective policy demands, and US intervention.
First, there are strong structural conflicts between China and Japan in
the East Asia. China and Japan are the two most powerful countries in East
Asia. Historically, the two countries have alternately enjoyed leadership or
dominance in this area. Before 1894, China was the leader in the East Asian
system; the power transition between China and Japan and Japan’s dissat-
isfaction with its role in the regional system prompted the outbreak of the
1894–1895 Sino-Japanese war. Between 1895 and 1945, Japan gradually con-
trolled large parts of East Asia by virtue of its military strength. For long
periods after the end of the Second World War, both countries experienced
unbalanced development in strength and had strategic deficiencies: China
was strong politically and militarily, but comparatively weak economically;
Japan was economically formidable, but was weaker politically and mili-
tarily. From the beginning of the 21st century, as Chinese comprehensive
national strength soared, Japan accelerated its march toward political and
military normalization, and a ‘parallel power’ structure emerged for the
first time in the history of East Asia. In a period of rapid change in the
power structure, both parties will place greater emphasis on relative gains,
hinging on ‘one man’s loss is another man’s gain.’ As a zero-sum win–lose
game emerges, fierce opposition might become inevitable between the two
countries.
It is no exaggeration to claim that the Japan issue may present the great-
est peripheral challenge to China’s rise over the next decade or even further
into the future. The intensity and complexity of Sino-Japanese conflicts far
outweigh those of Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine skirmishes and dis-
agreements. The ferocity and risks involved in Sino-Japanese confrontation
also even exceed those of Sino-US structural discrepancies. If friction and
various strategic paradoxes between China and the United States are said
 Maritime relations  167
to be anticipated, eventual or conjectural, escalation in conflicts between
China and Japan have, in contrast, already become a reality. Japan, alarmed
by China’s growing influence in political, economic, military, cultural and
other areas, fully focuses its efforts on opposing China on a global level. In
addition to engaging in far-reaching contests of power with China in North-
east Asia, Japan also frustrates Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, sparks
political and economic rivalries with China in Africa and Latin America,
seeks support in Europe, and persuades European countries not to lift the
ban on arms sale to China.
Second, both China and Japan have policy demands with regard to con-
frontation. At present, the two countries are in a similar stage of domestic
and international strategic adjustment and need to consolidate resources
both internally and externally, amassing power. For China, the Sino-­
Japanese conflict is intricate and complex, merging a range of negative is-
sues, including international power struggles, historical memories, national
sentiment, realist interests and geographical competition; in recent years,
it is increasingly apparent that the two countries’ maritime strategies are
in the conflict mode. Japan controls channels that are strategic to China’s
eastward access to the Pacific Ocean and furthermore has irreconcilable
disputes with China, over issues, such as sovereignty over the Diaoyu Is-
lands and maritime delimitation in the East China Sea. Japan’s strategy to
protect ‘outlying islands’ and expand maritime frontiers clashes directly
with China’s path to a maritime power. Growth in Chinese sea power will
undoubtedly cause Japanese maritime supremacy in the East China Sea
to falter, triggering Japan’s vehement backlash. As a power rises, it must
establish prestige, and as China aims to become a maritime power and a
global power, whether through peaceful or nonpeaceful means, it must first
overcome the hurdle that is Japan. China has no intention of initiating con-
flict with Japan, but from an objective perspective, the external threat from
Japan also provide opportunities for China to refine various strategic meas-
ures in the process of building its maritime power. China can thereby test its
overall capabilities in international and domestic mobilization, dissemina-
tion of public opinion, legal disputes and military deterrence.
As for Japan, China is viewed as its greatest external threat and competing
adversary. China’s military modernization, especially the modernization of
sea power, leaves Japan ill at ease2; burgeoning Chinese influence in politics,
economics and other fields also unsettles Japan, as it cannot accept large
shifts in the Sino-Japanese balance of power, fearing a strong China. Admit-
tedly, some Japanese admirals, like Yoji Koda, have argued that the capa-
bility of Chinese Navy should not be overestimated.3 But ‘the China threat’
has become the best cover for Japan’s right-wing leaders to amend the con-
stitution and strengthen the ‘military.’ Sensationalism of this issue has al-
ready become a critical strategic tool as the Japanese government attempts
to sustain approval ratings and to implement independent security policies.
In the process of Japan’s drive toward political and military normalization,
168  Maritime relations
issues with China have provided excellent leverage as it intends to remove
major domestic and international obstacles under the pretext of the ‘China
threat,’ and seek a position of greater equality and autonomy within the
US–Japan alliance.
Third, the United States’ ‘appeal for Japan to contain China’ has in-
creased its strategic reliance on Japan. Confronted by a rising China and
a distinct trend of relative decline in American strength, the United States’
power appears to be far outweighed by its ambitions, in a situation where the
US-led Asia-Pacific security order is currently experiencing the most severe
challenge since the end of the Second World War. Meanwhile, the United
States is trapped between domestic headaches and foreign turmoil. As tur-
bulent episodes frequently surface in the Middle East and Eastern Europe,
a shift in US strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific is easier
said than done. In the future, military might and hard currency, which the
United States is able to relocate from other regions to the Asia-­Pacific, will
be extremely limited. The United States repeatedly proclaims that 60 per-
cent of its naval and air force has been transferred to the Asia-Pacific, but in
reality, this is more fiction than fact. Approximately 60 percent of US Navy
vessels have in fact already been deployed to the Asia-Pacific region and in
the future, even based on the plan for 355 vessels additions may be insuffi-
cient, which is not at all comparable with China’s rapid rates of shipbuild-
ing. Yet, on the other hand, there is no sign that the United States has the
slightest willingness to abandon its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.
As its own resources and capacity progressively diminish, the United States
has no alternative but to depend greatly on the power of its allies, anchoring
its hopes in the integrated alliance system. In the ‘gang war’ against China,
Japan is the United States’ most important ally in the Asia-Pacific and nat-
urally the focus of its attention and reliance. As the United States promotes
the ‘Rebalance to the Asia Pacific’ and its Indo-Pacific strategies, its de-
pendence upon Japan will deepen considerably in the future since it shares
responsibilities with Japan. Maintaining strategic supremacy against China
in the Indo-Pacific region reinforces the US–Japanese alliance in political,
economic, military and other fields.
The United States supports the lifting of limitations on Japan’s collec-
tive self-defense rights, acquiesces in appropriate revisions to the Japanese
constitution, and frequently reaffirms its defense obligations in Article 5
of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and
Japan with respect to the Diaoyu Islands issue. After the Japanese cabi-
net enacted Abe’s doctrine of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ and passed
the decision on collective self-defense, Japan would become more active
and seek more military cooperation in international security issues. These
actions are all designed to win Japan’s unreserved support for its strate-
gic adjustments in the Asia-Pacific. With the United States vocally fanning
the flames, it will be even more difficult for Sino-Japanese relations to ap-
proach normalization.
 Maritime relations  169
Fortunately, despite the media in the two countries being filled with ag-
gressive saber rattling, it is unlikely that China and Japan will advance from
cold confrontations or paramilitary conflicts to a hot war for the following
reasons.
First, without a doubt, war would not be either side’s first choice of policy.
Disregarding the high degree of economic interdependence between China
and Japan, it cannot be ignored that the two countries’ economic growth de-
pends on a peaceful environment in East Asia. In the absence of a peaceful
environment, the post-war ‘Japanese miracle’ and the China dream of the
past 40 years would both be edifices of fantasy. With sufficient will, it is yet
not too late, and decision makers on both sides should not be inclined to re-
solve differences through war. Sensationalizing the ‘China threat’ helps the
Japanese government pander to popular opinion and earn approval ratings,
but this in fact cannot solve the underlying problems that plague Japan’s fu-
ture. The economy should be the Japanese government’s first priority. While
the right-wing may discuss initiating war with China, it would be unrealistic
to do it in practice, considering the current balance in Sino-Japanese com-
prehensive strength. As strength balance shift is favors to China, China has
all the more reason not to take the initiative to launch a war when time is
on its side.
Second, the United States functions as Japan’s ‘cork’; US influence acts
as a double-edged sword in Sino-Japanese relations, for under the presence
of US influence, Japan will certainly be unable to connect with China in
earnest. However, the United States is also objectively the cause for ‘tension
but no outbreak’ in the status quo of Japan’s military confrontation with
China. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has simul-
taneously implemented two major policies with regard to Japan. On the one
hand, it views Japan as its strategic anchor in the Asia-Pacific, with a high
probability of leveraging Japan to check Eurasian continental powers, such
as China and Russia, and attain strategic and economic power.
On the other hand, in multiple senses, the US military presence in the
Asia-Pacific acts as the lid to ‘Pandora’s box,’ forestalling a resurgence in
Japanese militarism and objectively curbing a genuine upsurge in the Japa-
nese military. Although the United States endeavors to profit from tumult
in East Asia, sowing discord between Japan and China, thereby reaping
effortless gains, the United States would be trapped in a difficult dilemma
if Sino-Japanese ‘cold confrontation’ were to transform into a ‘hot war.’ For
the United States, a declaration of war against China in order to fulfill ob-
ligations in the treaty with Japan against its will would be equivalent to a
strategic catastrophe; failure to meet treaty obligations however would indi-
cate that American security commitments are no longer effective, resulting
in a great blow to the United States’ international reputation and prestige.
If the United States does not defend a key ally such as Japan, how could it
defend other allies and partners? It would be highly likely that other Ameri-
can allies in the Asia-Pacific would scatter and dissipate. The Sino-Japanese
170  Maritime relations
position of ‘no war, no cooperation’ best corresponds with overall US inter-
ests. Thus, while reaffirming Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between the US and Japan, the United States has also high-
lighted the importance of peaceful dispute settlement and has cautioned Ja-
pan against provoking China on multiple occasions, urging Sino-Japanese
negotiations. Under US restrictions, even if the right-wing forces of Japan
had ambitions to launch a war, it would not possess the conditions necessary
for strategic execution.
Third, there have been improvements in the military situation and en-
hancement in management experience. China and Japan maintain a state
of coexistence and joint-administration in waters surrounding the Diaoyu
Islands. Games frequently arise, in which the China Coast Guard and Japan
Coast Guard monitor and track each other’s ships. The two countries’ air
forces each implement relevant regulations in their respective ADIZs above
the East China Sea, often coming into close contact. In this regard, ‘acci-
dental exchange of fire’ has always been a source of concern for all parties.
However, from a technical standpoint, the possibility of such events, while
conceivable, are slim to the point of inconsequential.
Historically, US–Soviet confrontation and Soviet–Japanese friction have
been commonplace, but never has large-scale conflict occurred as a result.4
In addition to historical experience, advancements in China’s and Japan’s
weaponry, equipment, and military systems have further averted such a pos-
sibility. State-of-the-art weapons and equipment, live communication and
integration of multiple channels of intelligence prevent relatively infrequent
accidents and erroneous judgments from arising. The main driving force
of Sino-Japanese aerial confrontation in future will be third-­generation
and even fourth-generation jet fighters. At present, the two sides’ dominant
forces are aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the J-10, J-11 and
F-15, whose maneuverability features are particularly outstanding, with ex-
cellent capabilities to mitigate risk. At the same time, channels of commu-
nication between fighter aircrafts, airbase stations, early warning platforms
and command centers are increasingly comprehensive and it is possible to
achieve close to real-time image transmission and integration of commands.
In this case, risks of unintentional collision or accidental exchange of fire
are much lower relative to those of second-generation jet fighters and tra-
ditional air command mode. Warships travel at comparatively slow speed;
therefore unless subjects purposefully open fire, such types of chance events
are highly improbable.

Decision-making characteristics of Japan

Diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics. To understand Japan’s for-
eign policy, it is imperative to first gain an intimate knowledge of Japan’s
unique domestic political ecology and operational logic.
 Maritime relations  171
It is often said that the greatest damage in Sino-Japanese relations is
largely caused by a handful of right-wing activists and politicians. The as-
sessment of ‘a handful’ is correct; whether of pre–Second World War mil-
itarists or post–Second World War right-wing activists, they account for a
negligible proportion of total Japanese nationals and are in the absolute
minority. Nonetheless, it is this minority that has once and once again im-
pelled Japan toward indelible perdition. We cannot help but question, how
is it that this minority is so self-righteous, so competent and so powerful, as
to take the vast majority of the Japanese people hostage? For a long time,
it was as though we were in fact unaware of the political and social origins
from which this handful of individuals was able to incite unrest.
In her influential work The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, the Ameri-
can anthropologist Ruth Benedict illustrates the extremism of Japanese cul-
ture that upholds shame as a virtue.5 The cultural origin of Japan’s popular
phenomenon of suicide and exporting war is an excessive esteem for honor
and dignity. Many of those who engage with Japan feel, to varying extents,
bewildered. One the one hand, Japanese individuals often appear polite,
cultivated and civilized; on the other hand, as a country, Japan’s history and
present reality are both full of violence and intolerance. How can it be that
differences are so immense between individuals and communities? In order
to answer this question, it is necessary to begin by discussing the social or-
ganizational culture and political ecology in Japan.
Historically, from a young age, the Japanese are indoctrinated with team
and national loyalty, as well as respect for seniors, predecessors and lead-
ers. The thinking and mentality of team leaders or national leaders often
determine the group’s or entire country’s general direction. The majority of
the Japanese people are merely followers, even if they do not approve of the
leaders’ selected path, they would not protest compellingly and even openly
challenge the leadership’s authority. They are unconcerned with politics for
the most part, but as soon as the government makes a decision, they would
usually choose to obey, drawn passively into a political vortex and assuming
potential risks. As Rong Jian observes, ‘During several of Japan’s key junc-
tures in the past century, Japan’s elite, particularly the intellectual elite, have
not exercised their requisite critical spirit, and have not truly fulfilled their
historical responsibility to independently surmount national interests.’6
Politically, Japan has always remained exceedingly exclusive, as powerful
family heritages and legacies passed from teachers to students have proved
the main paths to bringing forth new generations of politicians. Most im-
portant politicians originate from specific households and are beyond the
reach of the general populace. As a result of fierce struggles between polit-
ical factions, frequent political interference from military figures, and po-
tent civil extremists, Japan has rarely had strong cabinets and has lacked
promising politicians since the Meiji Restoration. Political decision-making
in Japan has often been heavily influenced and even dictated by military
172  Maritime relations
hardliners, right-wing groups and parties and other extremist forces. Faced
by the military’s or the right-wing’s certain radical claims and actions, the
Japanese government at times exploits opportunities to effortlessly profit,
while at other times feigns objection, but very rarely does it directly oppose
and restrain.
Although members of Japan’s right-wing forces and conservative extrem-
ists are few in number, they ‘dare to lead’ and are vigorously active, enthu-
siastically participate in the administration and discussion of state affairs
and farcically exaggerate their behavior, in stark contrast to the silence of a
majority of Japanese and the weakness of Japan’s cabinet.
For over a century, Japan’s basic national policy principle formed through
interaction between the three actors of extremist forces, the government
cabinet, and the populace, repeatedly taking extreme measures. In Japanese
history, many notable movements had often been spearheaded by a small
number of militarists or members of right-wing forces, who then forced the
Japanese government to adopt measures and formulate extreme policies,
finally followed by the frenzied participation of the Japanese people. From
the end of the 19th century to the year 1945, this had been the process and
policy logic behind Japan’s initiation of foreign aggression in all cases with-
out exception.
It is irrefutable that domestic right-wing forces and militarists in Japan
are always in the minority. Nevertheless, due to the Japanese government’s
weakness in addition to the public’s group mentality and sense of obedi-
ence, the fate of most individuals is to be ultimately dragged onto Japan’s
militarist chariot. For instance, following the end of the First World War,
Japan’s cabinet and military had constantly strived for absolute supremacy
in northeast China, and was even willing to engage in intense conflict with
the United States to achieve it. In spite of this, prior to the incident of 18
September 1931, the domestic civil service system still retained a certain
degree of control over the military in Japan, though of course the only dif-
ference between the two sides is in their use of measures. However, following
the successful ventures of the Kwantung Army, which had fewer than 20,000
troops, the domestic political situation in Japan began to incline toward
predominantly military solutions. The appetites of the Japanese govern-
ment and the general public were abruptly awakened, as mass participa-
tion erupted beyond control, outright war was declared against China and
a surprise attack was launched on Pearl Harbor, gradually leading toward
a deadly conclusion.
Following the end of the Second World War, Japan underwent democratic
reform under US military occupation. Nevertheless, democratic reform has
not been comprehensive and inertia in Japanese politics and society ren-
ders Japan’s democracy incapable of escaping extreme ‘conventions.’ Poli-
tics remains dominated by the same families and the same factions, for any
changes are slight and superficial. These circles remain as tightly closed as
before, and for a majority of Japanese, an awareness of and motivation for
 Maritime relations  173
political participation have never in fact been triggered. For instance, of
Japan’s 34 post-war cabinet prime ministers, the overwhelming majority of
them are either dignitaries from the former dynasty and veteran soldiers, or
were those hailing from prominent political families. Murayama Tomiichi
and Kan Naoto may be the two sole exceptions. With regard to members
of Japan’s right-wing, while their numbers may have indeed markedly de-
creased, they continue to stand at the forefront and remain exceptionally
active, routinely attacking neighboring countries on territorial and histori-
cal issues. In recent years, the impact of Japan’s far right forces has swelled,
while their levels of public recognition have also soared rapidly. The growing
influence of right-wing politicians such as Ishihara would drive the Japanese
government to a stronger position concerning the East China Sea disputes.7
The travesty of Japan’s ‘island purchase’ has once again confirmed that it
is en route to extremism. As a matter of fact, although the Japanese Noda
cabinet hoped to boost its approval ratings using the Diaoyu Islands, to
directly stoke trouble would be problematic, in consideration of widespread
common interests between China and Japan. Furthermore, Sino-Japanese
economic interdependence means that a majority of the Japanese populace
is also not in favor of conflict between China and Japan. At that time, Shin-
taro Ishihara, a figure infamous for advocating a resurgence in Japanese
militarism, began to speculate on this matter. Subsequently, the Japanese
government proceeded with ‘nationalization’ of the Diaoyu Islands, under
the guise of preventing Ishihara’s ‘island purchase’ and purportedly for the
protection of Sino-Japanese relations. Amidst provocation and incitement
by right-wing forces, and as a result of the Japanese government’s one-sided
propaganda and analysis, a majority of nonpartisan Japanese danced to the
tune of the Japanese government, supporting the fallacy that ‘there is no dis-
pute over the Diaoyu Islands,’ while its opponents were few and far between.
Japan’s political and social spheres also reflected on the subject when
China adopted hardline countermeasures. However, the focus of this intro-
spection was not the question of ‘nationalization’ and other matters of right
and wrong, rather it was to examine the opportunity’s selection, diplomatic
communication and other technical issues.8 Even numerous heavyweights
in the Japanese business sphere, whose own interests are closely tied to those
of China, could not play any constructive role whatsoever, regardless of
whether before or after the incident, and merely expressed superficial con-
cern over damage to interests in China.
If it can be said that Japanese society’s collective silence on the involve-
ment of territorial issues, sovereignty and nationalist sentiments may be
somewhat understandable, then Japan’s glamorization of invasion and de-
nial of aggressive acts truly leave the world astounded. It would appear that
underneath a veneer of democracy, Japan’s extremist traits persist.
Japan regularly complains that China, South Korea and other coun-
tries persistently pursue historical issues, but the truth is that Japan con-
stantly engages in outrageous rhetoric on historical issues and the Japanese
174  Maritime relations
government incessantly sows discord on this matter, so that China and
South Korea have no choice but to enter into altercations with Japan. Even
more frightening is that we are unable to detect discipline and restraint from
the Japanese government on this issue, while rational voices among the Jap-
anese people are also gradually fading. In recent years, disingenuous claims
such as ‘Everyone was taking action. At the time Japan was simply doing
what the US, Great Britain, France, and other countries all had done’ and
‘Japan was merely unfortunate, for it would be a different scenario if it had
been victorious’ have become increasingly prevalent in Japan. If this trend
were to continue, Japan would come close to eschewing its history of aggres-
sion completely.

Be patient and rational

The past century of Sino-Japanese historical interaction provides for ex-
tremely profound and negative educational material. It is true for both Li
Hongzhang and Zhang Xueliang that the greater the fear of war, the more
inevitable war becomes. To truly avoid war, it is first necessary to have deter-
mination and capital dedicated to combat. That is to say, to prepare for war
is to avoid war. Only through meticulous preparation is it possible to form a
strong deterrent to other parties so that they dare not act rashly. This ought
to be especially applicable for China in its contacts with Japan. As men-
tioned previously, Japan has a tradition of extremism, and once it embarks
on a path to radicalism, it would resolutely persevere unless compelled to re-
gress by an external force. Historically, China has learned profound lessons,
and both the Nationalist Government and the People’s Republic of China
have committed similar errors.
With regard to Japan, they have repeatedly been overly reliant on diplo-
matic approaches, in the hope that Japan will transform domestically, while
overlooking the need to create deterrence through more heavy-handed
measures. To preserve peace between China and Japan, in truth it is neces-
sary to prepare for all eventualities. The September 18th Incident occurred
precisely because the Kwantung Army believed that the Northeastern Army
was defenseless against an offensive and was inadequately prepared. This
was indeed the case. In 1928, during the Sino-Soviet conflict that resulted
from the Chinese Eastern Railway incident, the Northeastern Army’s de-
crepit combat capacity was altogether exposed, greatly boosting Japan’s
confidence. At the time of the September 18th Incident, Zhang Xueliang
personally commanded its main forces to encircle and suppress Shi Yousan
in Tianjin. Preparations were insufficient, from both aspects of military de-
ployment and political resolve, for battle against Japan. In Japan’s ‘island
purchase’ incident, although China had applied diplomatic pressure and
engaged in communication, concrete measures were not taken to deliver a
firm and tenacious message to Japan, and to some extent this precipitated
Japan’s misjudgment of the situation. If China’s surveillance ships had
 Maritime relations  175
suddenly entered into 12 nautical miles of the Diaoyu Islands for normal
navigation in advance, demonstrating China’s resolution to counter such
moves, it is highly likely that the ‘island purchase’ would have been aborted.

Difficulties in promoting ‘new perspectives’ on Japan

China and Japan are neighbors which are separated by only a ribbon of
water, and have no alternative but to interact with one another and cannot
survive isolated. In recognition of this, it is necessary to acknowledge that
even when the two countries were in diametric opposition, there were plenty
of views and actions in both China and Japan that facilitated goodwill be-
tween the two countries. Domestically, China has long advocated for ‘new
perspectives’ on Japan with regard to the continued exacerbation of Sino-­
Japanese relations at the turn of the 21st century due to historical issues.9
The main arguments in favor of new perspectives toward Japan are that
post-war Japan has experienced tremendous change and that since it is now
a democratic state, where the majority of the populace is not interested in
war, China cannot regard Japan with the same old prejudices. From a hu-
manist point of view, this judgment is undoubtedly correct, but a political
standpoint, a democratic state and peaceful population cannot in fact mod-
ify the trajectory of Japanese political workings and development. As I have
previously discussed, post-war Japan merely has the ostensible outlines of a
democracy, and not its true essence. It also matters little whether a majority
of the population is in favor of war, for its channels of participation and
roles within Japanese politics are severely limited. It must be noted that Ja-
pan’s right-wing activists and militarists have always remained in the small
minority. This view was tenable even during the Second World War, when a
majority of Japanese people were simply victims of incitement and momen-
tum. Therefore, while we recognize that substantial changes have occurred
in Japan and in the Japanese populace, this transformation cannot satisfac-
torily explain ‘why new perspectives on Japan would be feasible.’
In addition, all relationships are bilateral or multilateral interactions,
and stability cannot be maintained through compromise, concession and
restraint from one party alone, thus new perspectives based solely upon
wishful thinking on China’s part are highly unrealistic. Compromise and
conciliation always require a suitable environment. New perspectives en-
courage China to ease pressure on Japan regarding historical issues in ex-
change for improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. However, the crux of
the matter is not whether China refuses to relinquish historical issues, but
that Japan is increasingly interested in amending the historical narrative,
hoping to progress toward political normalization through the embellish-
ment and revision of history. This is also the case with the Diaoyu Islands
dispute. For Japan, disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and maritime delim-
itation in the East China Sea are strong starting points for its push toward
political and military normalization. Through unceasing sensationalism of
176  Maritime relations
maritime disputes with China, the Japanese government mobilizes its do-
mestic strategies and policies. Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and mar-
itime delimitation in the East China Sea are tied to sovereignty, and it is
impossible for Japan’s typically weak government to have the audacity to
make any major concessions. Moreover, the Diaoyu Islands and the East
China Sea are increasingly used as key tools by Japan to stymie China’s rise
and contain China at sea. If China were to have ‘new perspectives’ on Japan,
they would only prove effective under the precondition that Japan simulta-
neously harbors new beliefs about China.
Unlike the somewhat naïve logic of Ma Licheng et  al., another type of
‘new perspective’ on Japan is rooted mainly in realist positions. They believe
that for China, principal areas of contradiction are Sino-US paradoxes,
while it is possible for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement to ‘alleviate certain
key aspects of passivity in the face of the US and significantly bolster dip-
lomatic leverage over the US.’ Since strategic competition between China
and the United States is becoming ever more intense, with structural con-
tradictions already having formed between the ‘World No. 2’ and the ‘World
No. 1,’ China ought to also engage Japan from a strategic balance of power
perspective.
However, as Professor Shi Yinhong, a forerunner and emblematic figure
in this school of thought, himself indicated,

It is necessary to recognize that Japan is the US’ principal ally in East

Asia, and furthermore it lacks a tradition of diplomatic independence;
it is inconceivable that potential conflicts between the US and Japan
would develop to the extent of palpable upheaval in the US-Japanese
military/political alliance.10

Together with mutual distrust, which the transition of power between China
and Japan has generated, and Japan’s long tradition of alliances with the
strongest powers (with Great Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, and with the United States post–Second World War), a Sino-Japanese
rapprochement, even if credible, would be extremely difficult to achieve and
operate.

Strategic confrontation and compellence

Contradictions and differences between China and Japan are a manifes-
tation of strategic paradoxes. Before Japan accepts the reality of China’s
rise, it would be unrealistic to expect that the tension between China and
Japan could decrease significantly. Therefore, it is time for China to forgo
any illusions and be combat-ready for challenges ahead. The Sino-­Japanese
strategic conflict represents a critical test for China’s peaceful rise and in
particular, the rise of its maritime power. More importantly, no matter
whether China wishes to embrace or confront Japan, it must attach great
importance to the position and role of Japanese influences in the process of
 Maritime relations  177
China’s development of sea power and national rejuvenation. Meanwhile,
China must remain calm in the face of tense Sino-Japanese relations, while
maintaining a sense of vigilance in response to Japanese policies targeted at
China and trends in Sino-Japanese relations, taking a long-term view, while
not taking action to appease a few persons. At present, Japan’s policies in-
deed heavily feature ‘Abe’ characteristics. Although domestically there is
some dissent in Japan with regard to this, divergences mainly center on the
mode, methods and extent, while there remains widespread recognition
of Abe’s general trajectory of political and military normalization. China
must fully comprehend that before there are any material changes in the
overall environment of Sino-Japanese relations and in the balance of power
between the two sides, it is unlikely that any Japanese government would
have motivation for or success in promoting Sino-Japanese thorough recon-
ciliation. Furthermore, whether during or after the ‘Abe’ era, China should
not harbor inordinately high expectations with regard to Japanese policy.
In accordance with current developing trends, China ought to make suf-
ficient preparations for long-term competition with Japan. Of course, China
must also welcome various opportunities and prepare for a potential olive
branch from Japan, but should not repeat mistakes similar to those that had
occurred during the establishment of formal Sino-Japanese diplomatic re-
lations. It was too generous for China to neglect the past aggression and the
significant value of Diaoyu Islands during the negotiations. China still must
seek to develop Sino-Japanese relations in a positive direction, but cannot
surrender its own principles and core interests in doing so. In the current sit-
uation, the Japanese government must demonstrate sincerity on historical
issues and the Diaoyu Islands dispute. This will act as the new foundation
for normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and China ought to adhere to
a strict position on both of these major matters. Japan has the characteristic
of fastidiousness, and this would be of benefit to both parties.
In order to discourage Japan from possible further serious provocation,
China must reinforce its strategic preparation and deterrence. On his-
torical issues and maritime disputes, it is necessary to establish a certain
bottom-line with regard to the Japanese government, prevent continued re-
version in the Japanese government’s position and deter its endorsement of
right-wing forces for its own illicit gains. At the same time, it is essential to
clearly convey an unequivocal message to the Japanese government, so that
military deterrence can achieve its effect, curbing the Japanese government’s
indulgence and ambiguity, thwarting Japan’s progress toward extremism. If
Japan’s right-wing forces were to rise in rebellion or cause a disturbance, it is
necessary to adopt retaliatory measures and press ahead undaunted despite
any adversity. Imagine if in 1931, Zhang Xueliang and the hundreds of thou-
sands of soldiers under his command in the Northeastern Army, had been
able to decisively and forcefully attack the invaded Kwantung Army, which
numbered close to 20,000 troops, it would be doubtful whether Japanese
militarist forces could have risen and whether Japan would have staged a
full-scale offensive on China. Of course, today is no longer the era of ‘close
178  Maritime relations
combat.’ Therefore, deterrence measures against Japan are not limited to
military approaches, but also include economic, diplomatic, legal and var-
ious other means.
As stated before, the balance of power between China and Japan is in-
creasingly disadvantageous for Japan, and over time, China will grow fur-
ther emboldened. Thus, the motivation for China to use force in territory
disputes will continue to decrease in the future. Therefore, as long as Japan
is willing to preserve peace and does not militarily provoke China, China’s
best policy is to reach a peaceful solution of historical issues and Diaoyu
Islands disputes through political and diplomatic measures.
Japan is the United States’ principal ally in the Asia-Pacific. The direc-
tion of Sino-Japanese relations is inevitably affected by developments in the
US–Japanese alliance; therefore, it is imperative not to disregard Ameri-
can influence in the process of pressurizing Japan. In the context of China’s
rapid rise and the relative decline of US strength, both the United States
and Japan have a strong incentive to strengthen relations with one another
in an attempt to construct a modern global alliance. In spite of this, behind
the United States’ and Japan’s alliance, there exist fierce differences over
the recognition of Chinese influence, respective interests and demands, as
well as response mechanisms and other key issues: first, the United States
and Japan differ on their understandings of the ‘China threat’ and the two
countries’ strategic aims regarding China are difficult to reconcile. For the
United States, China is a rising strategic competitor but still a ‘distant con-
cern’ and caution is currently emphasized, especially in the East China Sea;
as for Japan, China is perceived as an ‘impending peril’ and it struggles
to understand American judgments on ‘balance.’ Second, the two parties
differ in international status and deviate structurally in their definitions of
national interests. The United States hopes that Japan will lend further sup-
port for its hegemony on a global scale and wishes that Japan would not
incite a furor in East Asia, whereas Japan concentrates for the most part on
its vicinity, as East Asia encompasses virtually all of its traditional security
interests, and exigently expects US ‘patronage’ in this region. Third, they
have different conceptions of cooperation, for the United States appears to
trade in futures, whereas Japan invests in stocks. The United States seeks
a long-term foundation and is spurred to perfect cooperative mechanisms,
promoting the US–Japanese alliance as the most important touchstone for
the US-led security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and focusing on elic-
iting greater contributions from Japan; in contrast, Japan attaches more
importance to immediate ‘arbitrage’ measures, for instance joint exercises
targeted at China to seize islands and military deployments, in an attempt
to gain an unassailable position in strategic contests with China, in addition
to elevating its own clout in the Asia-Pacific strategic framework with the
assistance of US strength.
As a result, China is generally comparatively passive under the secu-
rity structure of the US–Japanese alliance against China, but it is also not
 Maritime relations  179
entirely devoid of space in which to make capital. In contests with Japan
and with strict counter-US precautions, it must at the same time engage
in cooperation. For instance, with support from the United States, China
could appropriately contain Japan in response to provocative actions from
the Japanese political right-wing and military. Of course, a ‘degree’ of con-
trol is necessary in the process of ‘playing off one power against another’;
therefore, China must remain cool-headed and not expect too much from
the United States. ‘The US has its own interests, sometimes exploiting, and
at other times suppressing, conflicts between China and Japan. Its role cou-
ples the dual aspects of intensification of conflict and temporary stabiliza-
tion in the situation. For China and Japan, notions of beseeching the US to
thereby force the other side into capitulation are unrealistic,’ particularly as
the United States and Japan are allied states.11
China must also uphold a mature mentality to embrace peace and op-
portunities for cooperation. Nowadays, global strategic conflict is reflected
more in diplomacy and politics, while military approaches are often em-
ployed as a means of last resort or deterrence, rather than for direct combat.
As complexities arise in the foreign relations of major powers, a certain de-
gree of disorder will occur in relationships between friends and adversaries.
Although China and Japan are competing rivals in politics, military affairs
and diplomacy, in the economic field, they remain key cooperative partners.
The relationship between China and Japan is indeed very poor, but they nev-
ertheless sustain basic diplomatic relations and vast individual exchanges,
while bonds of peace continue to be strengthened. Chinese personnel and
departments working with Japan ought to clearly understand the intricacies
of Sino-Japanese relations. In the spirit of dialectical thinking that there
are two sides to a story, contention is required where conflict is necessary.
Meanwhile, China also needs to seek cooperation where collaboration is
necessary, in order to expand its strategic options beyond a ‘reductive Cold
War-esque calculus.’12

Reinforcing the provision of security to Southeast Asia

As a whole, Southeast Asian countries use ASEAN as a platform to com-
mand ever greater clout and influence at the regional and international lev-
els; moreover, these countries are situated at vital strategic points, while
some countries have sizeable populations, vast territories and enormous
development potential. Therefore, in China’s maritime strategy, they are
‘important powers’ that cannot be disregarded.

The dichotomy between economics and security

China has a well-established and rich history of contact with Southeast
Asia. In over 2,000 years of historical interaction, periods of neighborly
and amicable relations were overwhelmingly dominant, while war and
180  Maritime relations
conflict were far from commonplace. Although various Southeast Asian
countries were of nominally unequal status as China’s tributary states or
dependencies under the ancient East Asian system, relations between most
of these countries and China in effect were devoid of substance. Further-
more, to a large extent, these ostensibly unequal relations resulted from
exaggerated interpretations of Chinese official history. Ancient Chinese
rulers welcomed arrivals from all nations, and certainly did not wish for
every country to surrender to Chinese rule.13 Historical descriptions of
the tributary system phenomenon were little more than wishful thinking
and fallacious fantasy on the part of ancient Chinese rulers and scholars.
The essence of such unequal relations was in fact reciprocity and mutual
gain. Ancient Chinese rulers were thereby satisfied with vanity and pres-
tige, whereas Southeast Asian countries took advantage of the tributary
system to not only reinforce trade with the Zhongyuan dynasty, but to also
procure huge economic interests.14 This is also the reason why Annam, the
Sultanate of Sulu (modern-day Philippines), and other countries requested,
on multiple occasions, to increase the frequency of tributes to China on
their own accord.
This type of relationship collapsed in the wake of the arrival of Dutch,
Spanish, British, French and other Western colonists. Various Southeast
Asian countries successively entered an era of colonization under Western
imperialist powers. Subsequently the newly burgeoning powers of Japan
and the United States also proceeded to engage in contests over this region.
The involvement of external forces had disrupted East Asia’s original politi-
cal ecology, and ever since then, China’s relations with these countries have,
without exception, been subject to the containment by and influence of the
United States and other outside powers.
Impacted by the Cold War and China’s revolutionary diplomacy, political
relationships between China and various Southeast Asian countries were,
by and large, frosty for a long time, with economic ties little better and both
sides taking precautionary measures in security matters following the end
of the Second World War, to the extent that one major purpose of the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, was to
forestall a possible ‘incursion’ from China.15
Post–Cold War relations between China and Southeast Asian countries
have improved rapidly, as China’s relationship with ASEAN advancing
from one of dialogue partner to that of a strategic partnership. In over
20 recent years of exemplary diplomacy between China and South East
Asia, Sino-ASEAN relations can be rated as a shining example of China’s
neighborly and amicable diplomacy. Since first contact between China and
ASEAN in 1991, there has been enormous progress in the development of
bilateral relations. In particular, the period between 2003, when China es-
tablished a strategic partnership with ASEAN countries, and 2013 has been
labeled ‘the golden decade’ of development in Sino-ASEAN relations. The
value of bilateral trade increased at an annual rate of 23.6 percent over this
 Maritime relations  181
decade, and it has reached USD 514.8 billion in 2017. Until 2017, the ag-
gregate mutual investment surpassed USD 200 billon.16 Presently, China
is the largest trading partner of ASEAN and the vast majority of ASEAN
countries, while ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner. Politically,
China actively participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN
Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS) and other diverse
regional mechanisms led and constructed by ASEAN. In 2003, China also
acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, be-
coming the first major power to sign this treaty; China, which signed the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with
related parties in 2002, maintains relevant restraint on the South China Sea
issue and currently seeks to establish a South China Sea code of conduct
with greater binding force with the other claimants. Guided by a policy of
‘bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,’ China has swiftly
attracted ASEAN countries through economic cooperation, political sup-
port and security restraint, while relations between China and Southeast
Asian countries in areas such as politics, economics, security and culture
have developed across the board.
However, there is a wide variation in the pace of improvement and devel-
opment across different types of relations. Development in economic rela-
tions has been highly notable, whereas progress in security relations has
been unduly sluggish and extremely delicate. In particular, fragilities in se-
curity relations between China and Southeast Asian countries have been
thoroughly exposed following the United States’ promotion of its ‘pivot’ and
‘rebalance’ in this region beginning in 2010. In comparison, China’s devel-
opment of security relations with these countries is not only inferior to that
of the United States but is even weaker than that of Japan and India. In the
context of China’s rise, most Southeast Asian countries regard the United
States as the guardian of regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and maintain
close military relations with the United States. Indeed, the South China Sea
dispute is a major obstacle to security and military cooperation between
China and Southeast Asian countries, but we should not overstate its role
and impact. It is very easy to understand why the Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia and other South China Sea disputant parties would appeal to the
United States and take precautionary measures against China. As Singa-
pore, Indonesia and other nondisputant parties are also troubled by China,
the pursuit of US goodwill cannot be entirely explained through the South
China Sea issue.
Predicaments caused by geographic proximity have also prevented
Southeast Asian countries from drawing closer to China on security mat-
ters. ‘Befriending the far and attacking the near’ has always been a classic
geographical survival principle of the weak. What is more, all Southeast
Asian countries had once existed for a prolonged period of time under the
formidable shadow of ancient China. With acceleration in China’s rise,
Southeast Asian countries grow ever more anxious with respect to China.
182  Maritime relations
In this regard, the ideas of Lee Kuan Yew are able to accurately capture
these countries’ mindsets.

The countries of the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and Australasia have
established and maintain good relations with China, and though China
says it will never seek hegemony over them, it is in their best interest to
have a strong US presence in the region.

‘The world hopes the U.S. will remain a counterweight to China. No other
single country or group of countries, such as the EU, can fill this role.’17
Most countries in Southeast Asia do not only hope that the United States
will check China, but also wish to draw in Japan, India, Australia and other
extra-regional powers to neutralize China’s steadily growing influence in
this region.18
On the one hand, ASEAN countries are delighted to develop various
forms of economic cooperation with China, and share the dividends of
­China’s rise; on the other hand, in security matters they are also vigorously
strengthening countermeasures to guard against China and actively imped-
ing Chinese dominance in this region.19

Good neighbors and close friends in a crucial period

Moreover, it is worth remaining vigilant, for it is possible that this divergent
situation, in which developments of security relations and economic ties are
unbalanced, will continue to intensify. Escalations in the South China Sea
dispute and aggravations in security precautions are increasingly irrecon-
cilable with more intimate economic connections. To remedy this situation,
China must calmly regard future issues, risks and challenges, which will be
encountered in diplomacy with the Southeast Asian countries, and ought to
reflect on experiences and lessons from China’s interaction with them.
In retrospect, diplomatic achievements, which China has secured in
Southeast Asia over the past two decades, have all been somewhat passive
and providential elements, because while China has taken advantage of op-
portunities presented, its active pursuit and creation of opportunities have
in fact been rare. As the United States has long maintained an indifferent at-
titude to ASEAN-led regional mechanisms, political, economic, diplomatic
and military investment has been relatively thin in this region, providing
China with greater strategic space. At the same time, the vast market size
of China and Southeast Asia has also provided both sides with strong in-
centives for economic cooperation. In this case, China has enthusiastically
responded to ASEAN proposals and arrangements, indisputably greatly en-
hancing space for strategic cooperation between the two parties.
Looking forward, there have already been significant changes in the sit-
uation, and if China and Southeast Asia wish to accomplish further suc-
cess in their relationship, levels of difficulty and complexity will multiply
 Maritime relations  183
accordingly. First, the entire world’s attention on Southeast Asia has surged
markedly, as political contests between major powers steadily intensify, and
the political ‘window period,’ which China may utilize, has already ended.
This region is considered by the United States to be an area of foremost im-
portance in its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and is also viewed by the EU,
India, Russia and others as a crucial hinge in order to partake in contests
in the Asia-Pacific and even Indo-Pacific geopolitical frameworks. Second,
the marginal effect of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN
countries is dwindling as competition intensifies with economic homogeni-
zation, while the difficulties and pressures of promoting economic ties soar.
Meanwhile, differences and issues in politics, security and other fields are
becoming more pronounced, restricting the scope and quality of coopera-
tion between the two sides. If security pressures and tension resulting from
China’s rise cannot be adequately alleviated and diverted, mutual distrust
and precaution in security matters will also corrupt cooperation in politi-
cal and economic areas. Third, comparing today’s starting point with that
of over 20 years ago, there are already enormous discrepancies. To make
further progress based on the current starting-point would require exponen-
tially more effort and investment. Without active initiative and systematic
preparation, it would be as though to sail against the current, for not to
advance is to regress.

How to reassure one’s neighbors?

China’s relations with all countries in Southeast Asia and even ASEAN have
entered a critical stage. If security ties can be substantially improved, re-
lations between the two sides will be transformed; on the other hand, the
reverse is certain to lead to deterioration. In view of this, China’s Southeast
Asia strategy needs the determination and courage of storming a fortress,
and action should also be more readily taken, with focus on facilitating the
coordinated and synchronous development of security and economic rela-
tions, so that countries in the region might feel more secure.
Powers are often the largest providers of regional security, with their means
of delivery limited to no more than two types: first, there is self-restraint and
self-discipline, where their greatest contribution to regional security is to
not sow discord themselves; second, there is the supply of financial capital,
manpower and expertise to enthusiastically respond to regional concerns
and crises, while maintaining regional peace and stability. In both meas-
ures of contribution, there are currently certain issues in which China has
space for improvement. Although China upholds a high degree of strategic
restraint in Southeast Asia, playing an important role in regional peace and
stability, the delivery and announcement of its strategies are inadequate,
while methods of expression are somewhat awkward, which have impacted
upon actual outcomes. In the provision of public goods, China has been
neither proactive nor sufficiently bold, not yet satisfactorily fulfilling the
184  Maritime relations
potential of the three factors of ‘financial capital,’ ‘manpower’ and ‘exper-
tise.’ To change this situation, the following measures and tactics ought to
be adopted.
First, China ought to have meticulous strategic designs and policy plans,
clearly communicating its regional aspirations to all Southeast Asian coun-
tries. In the past, China has proposed guidelines for neighborly diplomacy,
consisting of camaraderie and partnership with neighboring countries,
bringing harmony, security and prosperity to its neighbors, in addition to
the maxim of ‘amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusivity’ for peripheral
diplomacy. It also once proposed a new security concept of ‘equality, mu-
tual gain, coordination, and cooperation’ and a holistic perspective of secu-
rity in Asia, to better expound to the outside world its guiding principles in
peripheral diplomacy and security ideology. Nevertheless, this still cannot
act as a substitute for specific strategies and policies, and ASEAN countries
still hope to receive the assurance from China that it will not pursue hegem-
onic status in the region.20 The core questions are as follows: exactly what
kind of position should Southeast Asia occupy in China’s peripheral and
foreign strategies? What types of strategic objectives should China pursue
in the fields of politics, economics, diplomacy and security in this region?
Furthermore, how should these relationships with diverse characteristics be
coordinated? I believe that Southeast Asia is the crux and focal point of Chi-
na’s neighborly diplomacy and is the ideal partner with which to create an
East Asian security community; China should endeavor to mold Southeast
Asia into its own economic and political ally on the foundation of equality,
mutual gain and cordial negotiations, enabling it to become a strategic sup-
port in China’s peaceful rise.
There is a widespread belief that the United States is the most important
factor in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia, while, in reality,
this is not the case, as China is in fact the greatest contributor to security
in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, peace in Southeast Asia
has been irrevocably connected with China’s strategic restraint and active
participation. On the South China Sea issue, China maintains restraint,
does not resort to the threat of armed force or war, encourages countries in
Southeast Asia to unite for self-reliance and supports ASEAN’s important
role in regional economics, politics and security. In the future, what China
needs to do, other than to uphold established practices, is to focus more on
external expression, so as to clarify its own positions and to publicize its
contributions.
The real question is how to solve the disequilibrium in development be-
tween economic ties and political and security relations. China’s relationship
with Southeast Asian countries has already reached a bottleneck, namely
the question of how to build political and security connections from eco-
nomic cooperation and development, and even affinity or identification re-
garding values. More pressing is China’s rise, in particular the development
of its military power, which has applied pressure on some countries that are
 Maritime relations  185
confounded by China’s power position and the direction of its future devel-
opment. From the perspective of security concepts and values, China still
lacks a set of mature and practical regional strategies with which to defuse
this tension, which has formed as a result of changes in its own power and
status. How to direct spillovers from economic cooperation, as well as pro-
mote synchronized and coordinated developments in political, security and
economic relations have already become matters of urgency. The Maritime
Silk Road initiative provides an excellent platform for cooperation between
China and ASEAN countries.21 When implementing this initiative, China
should strongly encourage participation from Southeast Asian countries,
not only to bolster cooperation between China and Southeast Asia, but fur-
thermore to augment the expansion and connotations of the Maritime Silk
Road through the ‘China + ASEAN + X’ model. In other words, it is best
for China to engage ASEAN countries and together promote the Maritime
Silk Road, rather than view them merely as tools in the expansion of its own
strategic space. Such joint decision-making, joint turn westward and joint
development will be very different from mutual economic cooperation, will
produce enormous spillover effects and can markedly elevate the degree of
political cohesion and mutual trust in security.
Second, appropriate handling of the South China Sea issue. In practice,
disputes over the ownership of islands and reefs and maritime delimitation
in the South China Sea represent the largest obstacle to China’s pursuit of
neighborly and amicable diplomacy in this region. Effective management of
the South China Sea dispute is one of the major tasks for promoting contin-
uous improvement in relations. As the quality and intensity of relations be-
tween China and ASEAN countries advance, the prominence of the South
China Sea issue in bilateral relations will inevitably decline in the long run.
In reality, even now the South China Sea does not occupy an important po-
sition in relations between China and disputant parties, with the exception
of Vietnam, which retains a harsh stance on this issue. Moreover, China’s
ability to manage the South China Sea dispute is rapidly improving, and
accordingly its confidence is also buoyant. In the future, China can continue
to advocate for the settlement of issues through dialogue and negotiation,
and promote the establishment of binding codes of conduct in the region,
in order to both apply a certain amount of institutional pressure on coun-
tries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and also extend a gesture of self-­
discipline to facilitate mutual trust politically with ASEAN countries.
Finally, diplomacy in Southeast Asia should be organically linked to for-
mation of the regional order. As a developing world power, China still ought
to consider how to dedicate its own power and wisdom to the political, se-
curity, social and cultural integration of East Asia. At present, economic in-
terdependence in East Asia is steadily increasing and economic cooperation
is rapidly flourishing, whereas pace in the construction of political mutual
trust and security cooperation lags severely behind. China has made im-
portant contributions in stimulating the regional economy and promoting
186  Maritime relations
regional economic integration. While China’s economic impact has already
been acknowledged, its actions in the field of regional political, security and
cultural integration are evidently still inadequate. If Chinese security con-
cepts and international political values cannot be accepted in the region,
difficulties will multiply for China in its peaceful rise. If the regional order,
which China hopes to build or shape, is not recognized by Southeast Asia,
it would be impossible to completely assuage estrangement and mutual pre-
caution between China and ASEAN countries.
Specifically, China should have an overarching plan and layout for the
regional order, in particular for the security order. For instance, what type
of regional order does China seek, and what reasonable measures does it
have in order to achieve the order it pursues? What are the positions and
functions of ASEAN countries in this regional order? Of course, more im-
portant than theoretical interpretations are concrete actions and practices.
As a major power, China still needs to provide security assurances and se-
curity solutions for the region on both material and psychological levels.
China must have its own rational plans for settling diverse burning issues
within the region (regardless of their relevance to China’s own interests),
and actively endeavor to contribute public goods to the regional security
order, mechanisms and norms in East Asia.

Efforts to accommodate India on maritime issues

Outside of the East Asian geographical framework, India is the country
that China’s maritime strategy can least afford to overlook. ‘A rising China
and an emerging India are turning to the sea in ways that they did not be-
fore. This fact alone has the potential to radically alter the world’s maritime
pattern.’22 As China exits the Malacca Strait and enters the Indian Ocean,
India is a presence that truly cannot be circumvented. Peace and stabil-
ity in the Indian Ocean region will be critical as China’s economy, politics,
military and other influences ‘step out.’ As the largest coastal state in the
Indian Ocean, India’s attitudes and roles with respect to China are by no
means trivial. Good Sino-Indian relations are by and large indispensable to
achieving China’s goals as a maritime power.

Discussions on Sino-Indian maritime conflicts

While there are in fact no direct conflicts of maritime interest between China
and India, mutual suspicion and containment in the two sides’ maritime
strategies are both substantial and omnipresent. China and India, both ris-
ing stars in the global maritime system, are emerging simultaneously at sea.
The two countries’ maritime activities have inevitably attracted the world’s
focus, while a ‘Dragon-Elephant Contention’ is all the more striking. As the
two countries’ strengths begin to impact the structure of sea power in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, overlaps have appeared in their naval domains.
 Maritime relations  187
China’s advancement into the Indian Ocean and India’s progression into
the Western Pacific Ocean have led to a resurgence in mutual encirclement
theory, which has long revolved around Sino-Indian rivalry.23
The Indian media is awash with reports and analysis that the intention of
China’s elevated levels of activity in the Indian Ocean is to encircle India,
while there is also widespread coverage in China on India’s potential threats
to Chinese SLOCs and opportunistic interference in the South China Sea
issue. Robert Kaplan even predicts that ‘As the competition between India
and China suggests, the Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out
in the twenty-first century.’24
With the Chinese Navy going to the distant seas, and especially as Chi-
nese warships navigate the Indian Ocean with ever increasing frequency,
India has expressed extreme caution and suspicion toward China’s growing
naval power and its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.25 India and some
Western countries perceive port expansion projects contracted by Chinese
companies in coastal states along the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka Paki-
stan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, as a part of the ‘String of Pearls Strategy,’
which China is currently utilizing to encircle India and control the Indian
Ocean. Since its emergence in 2004, this concept has received strong support
in Indian media and has become another leading synonym for the ‘China
threat.’ Although Indian officials have publicly refrained from commenting
on this issue, in practice they indeed demonstrate suspicion and anxiety in
their policies. India expresses unambiguous disapproval of Chinese naval
activities in the Indian Ocean, aggressively excluding China from both the
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and various institutions’ multilat-
eral exercises.
India is expediting the implementation of its ‘Eastward’ policy, vigor-
ously boosting its military and economic presence around the South China
Sea, while likewise inflaming China psychologically. In July 2001, India
formally established the Andaman and Nicobar Command (abbreviated
as the Eastern Naval Command) on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
followed by a substantial increase in military deployments on these islands.
The ­Andaman-Nicobar Islands are Indian territories that are situated to the
southeast of the Bay of Bengal. They are composed of 572 islands of vary-
ing sizes, have a total area of approximately 8,325 square kilometers, span
more than 1,000 kilometers from north to south, and are India’s gateway to
the East. At their nearest, this group of islands is only a distance of 90 and
50 kilometers away from Indonesia and Myanmar, respectively, guarding
the ‘NL10 Degree Channel’ and ‘Great Channel,’ from which the Malacca
Strait enters the Indian Ocean.
India also regularly dispatches fleets to the South China Sea to carry out
joint patrols with the US military in the Malacca Strait, to conduct joint
naval exercises with ASEAN countries and to furthermore offer military
aid to countries such as Vietnam. India has been cooperating with Vietnam
and other countries on oil and gas development in the South China Sea since
188  Maritime relations
1988. In 2011, in spite of Chinese protests, India and Vietnam signed agree-
ments for cooperation on blocks 127 and 128 in the vicinity of the Nansha
Islands. In addition, certain statements from the Indian government and
media have associated China with the abovementioned actions. On 3 De-
cember 2012, the then Indian Navy’s Chief of Naval Staff, Devendra Ku-
mar Joshi, professed to media that India has its own ‘economic assets’ in
the South China Sea and that the Indian Navy must intervene in the South
China Sea dispute, even dispatching troops when necessary. At the same
time, he claims that the formidable strength of the Chinese Navy is the
‘greatest concern’ for tension in the South China Sea.26 A general view is
that China dominates the South China Sea and is also beginning to repeat-
edly foray into the Indian Ocean. Therefore, India must collaborate with
the United States, Japan, Australia and others in the Indo-Pacific region to
counterbalance China.27 Such hawkish rhetoric from India naturally infu-
riates China, where some media and experts have also expressed misgivings
about India’s maritime threat. Cautionary remarks with regard to India’s
involvement in South China Sea and blockade of the Strait of Malacca have
resounded persistently.
In reality, there already exists extensive and intense Sino-Indian compe-
tition at sea. Its scope encompasses not only all island states in the Indian
Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, but also includes the Ma-
lacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. While the two
parties’ politics, economic activities and disposition of troops in these re-
gions are certainly not aimed exclusively at one another, acts of mutual infil-
tration and mutual hedging in the two sides’ rea;-world prisoner’s dilemma
clearly substantiate the abovementioned ‘war of words.’

India’s ambitions and grievances

Controlling the Indian Ocean has been India’s strategic dream ever since
its independence. This compulsion is mainly determined by the strategic
status of the Indian Ocean and India’s own position. Mahan once predicted:
‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key
to the seven seas in the 21st century. The destiny of the world will be decided
in these waters.’28
Historically, India’s and the Indian Ocean’s fates have been irrevocably
interconnected, ascending and declining in unison. Ancient India’s seafar-
ing industry was highly advanced, as the Pandya, the Chola and several
other mighty naval powers emerged at different points in time in the south
of India and established close commercial and cultural ties with the Ro-
man Empire and the Arabian region through the Indian Ocean. Whereas
in modern history, India’s colonial destiny derived from with the loss of
India’s maritime supremacy. In addition, Mahan’s theories in relation to sea
control have been extolled as a touchstone by Indian leaders and strategists,
in effect guiding India’s strategic planning and practice. In 1958, then prime
 Maritime relations  189
minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted that ‘whatever power controls
the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s sea-borne trade at her
mercy and, in the second, India’s very independence itself.’29 The celebrated
Indian historian and strategist, K. M. Panikkar, believes that ‘the future
of India is not determined by land borders, but by the open seas that sur-
round India on three sides.’ He claims that ‘whoever commands the Indian
Ocean, has control over India’ and furthermore declares that ‘To become a
sea power, it is sufficient for India to independently defend national interests
in seas important to security and become a leader in the Indian Ocean.’ Ar-
guments and convictions such as ‘The Indian Ocean is India’s ocean, India’s
backyard, and India’s lake’ are rather common in New Delhi, although very
few high-ranking figures in India would openly acknowledge this.30
Evidently, the ultimate goal of India’s maritime strategy is to eliminate
the presence of all extra-regional powers from the Indian Ocean. India
wishes to obtain absolute authority and dominance in the region, so that the
Indian Ocean might become India’s lake. Rajiv Gandhi, the former prime
minister of India, once publicly declared that India ought to ‘control the
situation in between the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean’ based on
exerting control over the five majors straits.31 Views similar to the opinion
that ‘India’s strategic boundaries cover the entire Indian Ocean region, from
western Asia in the west, including coastal areas of the Persian Gulf and the
Red Sea, to the Pacific’s South China Sea region in the east’ are extremely
popular among India’s elite.
However, while the ideal is splendid, the reality is highly tenuous. Cur-
rently India cannot hope to realize its lofty ambitions and aspirations for
control over the Indian Ocean. While it is very difficult to attain dominance
in the Indian Ocean, its strategic layout is relatively simple, as power dis-
tribution in these waters is the most intricate and complex in the world.
The United States, which firmly controls important sea lanes on the east-
ern and western coasts of the Indian Ocean and additionally maintains a
vast military base in Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean, is in fact
the most powerful force in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, countries such
as the United Kingdom, France, Russia and Australia all view the Indian
Ocean as a region important to their strategic interests and have long re-
tained an effective power presence here. France has constructed a sophisti-
cated naval base on the island of Réunion, close to Madagascar. In recent
years, Japan, Russia and other countries have also commenced patrols in
the Indian Ocean, under the pretext of fighting piracy. A situation has arisen
in which powerful rivalries crowd the Indian Ocean, no single country can
achieve exclusive domination or total control, and even the United States
enjoys only a relative advantage. There are few strategic maritime fulcrums
in the Indian Ocean, making it difficult to attain omnidirectional control
of these waters. Judging from the current situation, it would be difficult for
any power to fully control a majority of strategic points, let alone gain con-
trol of the Indian Ocean in all directions. However, most of its waters are
190  Maritime relations
unrestricted and so suitable for military maneuvers at sea, and therefore of
strategic significance.32 Under these circumstances, India’s so-called con-
trol over the Indian Ocean is merely a romanticized longing and a dream.
It is clear that India is also very much aware of the disparities between ide-
als and realities, for its maritime strategy is far more conservative in prac-
tice. India divides the Indian Ocean into three areas according to their levels
of importance with respect to itself: the Zone of Positive Control – ­waters
within 500 kilometers of the coast; the Zone of Medium Control – waters
within the range of 500–1000 kilometers; and the Zone of Soft Control, en-
compassing all remaining areas of the Indian Ocean. Freedom to Use the
Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategies has pointed out in 2007 that since
India’s naval missions cover vast areas, India must distinguish between ar-
eas of primary interest areas and those of secondary interest areas, so as to
focus on the former.33 Following these points, India also classifies its mar-
itime interests into two main categories according to their levels of impor-
tance: India’s so-called Primary Interests Areas, which cover the Arabian
Sea and the Bay of Bengal, mainly include India’s EEZ, islands and island
expansion; access to the Indian Ocean’s key strategic points, principally
the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Mandeb Strait and the Cape
of Good Hope; island states in the Indian Ocean; the Persian Gulf; and
major international shipping corridors that traverse the Indian Ocean. In
contrast, India’s so-called Secondary Interest Areas include the southern
Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the South China Sea and the eastern Pacific
Ocean. The areas of interest have been extended in Indian Navy, Ensuring
Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015).34 Among them, the
South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions
are in the category of Secondary Interest Areas. The South China Sea has a
certain place in India’s maritime strategy, but it is certainly neither of fore-
most concern, nor a core interest.
The main motive for China’s advancing military forces in the Indian
Ocean is to safeguard the security of sea lanes and overseas economic inter-
ests. Presently, 80 percent of China’s oil imports originates from the Middle
East and Africa and is shipped to China via the Indian Ocean, Malacca
Strait, and other channels. Although China is actively seeking to diversify
sources of its oil imports, the Indian Ocean region, which accounts for 60
percent of global crude oil reserves and 35 percent of natural gas reserves,
remains China’s most reliable source of crude oil imports. By 2020, over
85 percent of imported oil volumes will pass through routes in the India
Ocean. The security of the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait regions
will impact this ‘maritime lifeline,’ which concerns the heart blood of Chi-
na’s economy. With gradual depletion in China’s domestic resources, China
now needs or hereafter will need various mineral resources from around
the Indian Ocean, such as copper, lithium, beryllium, nickel, cobalt and
phosphate, hence China must cooperate with these countries to ensure
the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China has
 Maritime relations  191
growing investment interests along the Indian Ocean’s coastlines. The best
way to secure these interests is to cooperate with India and other countries
to uphold peace, stability and freedom of navigation in this region, whereas
the most foolish path would be to simply confront India outright over the
Indian Ocean.
In the foreseeable future, China will also be incapable of challenging India
in the Indian Ocean. In the era of peaceful development, opportunities for
large naval battle and enlarging the enclosure have by now vanished from
existence. It is also very difficult for China to modify its intrinsic maritime
geographic disadvantages through armed force; furthermore, China is inca-
pable of possessing numerous overseas military bases as the United States.
The focus of China’s maritime strategy remains on East Asian waters and
their surrounding areas. China must create a strong oceangoing force, but
in truth its mission is not to overthrow the United States and India in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans; its objective is to acquire an effective power
presence and maintain basic operational depth along exterior lines. In the
case of strategic competition, the Indian Ocean represents interior lines for
India, as opposed to exterior lines for China, and hereby India possesses
natural advantages. The comprehensive strength of the Chinese Navy far
outweighs that of India, however, in consideration of current and possible
future military technologies, China’s overall strength, relative to that of
India, cannot yet compensate for its geographical disadvantages in the Indian
Ocean. India benefits from exceptionally favorable geographic conditions in
the Indian Ocean, whereas China has yet to gain a foothold in the Indian
Ocean. Although China may establish a few military bases in coastal coun-
tries bordering the Indian Ocean through fair, mutually beneficial and cor-
dial cooperation, but there are no countries, with the exception of Pakistan,
that are willing to risk antagonizing India, and these military bases’ war-
time significance and operational efficacy will be severely curtailed if used
to target India. Moreover, bases acquired through peaceful means are natu-
rally subject to the restrictions of various treaties and are far less convenient
than India’s use of its own territory. Therefore, unless India were to weaken
considerably, it will otherwise be impossible for China to reform its strategic
disadvantages and passivity when confronted by India in the Indian Ocean.
If one were to take into account the United States, then a Sino-Indian
clash would become even more absurd. It goes without saying that in the
future the main naval forces in the Indian Ocean, will be the United States,
India and China, while as the United States’ strength progressively dimin-
ishes, China and India are presently filling the void left by American power.
However, neither China nor India will be able compete with the United
States in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future. In the tripartite pol-
itics of the Indian Ocean, China is clearly not India’s greatest rival, for the
United States is in fact the most significant obstacle to Indian hegemony in
the Indian Ocean. ‘The five main strategic waterways,’ which India professes
to administer, are all currently under US control in practice. Sino-Indian
192  Maritime relations
maritime strategic confrontation is of secondary importance and a façade,
whereas in contrast a potential strategic maritime conflict between the
United States and India is of genuine importance.

The implementation of India’s maritime strategy does not chiefly con-

cern Chinese interests, but rather American interests. India wishes to
possess real and effective sea control in the entire Indian Ocean. The
pressure it faces from the US will certainly not be less than that which
China faces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea region.35

Indian sensationalism of ‘China’s maritime threat’ derives more from

historical resentment, regional security predicaments and the diverse
needs of strategic planning as a major power. Its extreme sensitivity to
Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean is due chiefly to its overall outlook
on Sino-­I ndian relations. India has long regarded China as its rival and
opponent in Asia, while Chinese growth has created new anxieties for
India, namely the question of what type of global position will India be
placed in as a result of China’s extensive and rapid development? India
is even concerned that China’s growing military power will threaten its
security, with China’s military modernization intensifying this percep-
tion. To a large extent, it is India’s overall perception of China that has
determined its views and attitudes toward China’s entry into the Indian
Ocean. India’s unbridled propagation of ‘the China threat,’ conspicuous
‘advance eastward,’ the expansion of its naval influence and operations to
the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific, are in part also to avoid a conflict
of strategic interests with the United States. For Sino-Indian relations,
the most critical differences between the two sides are territorial dis-
putes, mutual trust in military affairs, trade imbalances and the Pakistan
issue, and do not in fact include the South China Sea issue. For India,
its core interests do not relate to the South China Sea issue, which is of
significance to India in only the two aspects of its eastward advancement
policy and to balance China, although freedom of navigation is used as
a slogan.36
From the perspective of power competition, Indian resistance against
Chinese expansion of power in the Indian Ocean is due to considerations
on how to guarantee its relative supremacy. India harbors hostility and
prejudice against China’s limited military operations in the Indian Ocean
and has concocted the ‘China threat,’ a necessity in its power contest with
China. ‘A stronger Indian naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean can in-
crease China’s maritime vulnerabilities and thereby to some extent offset
China’s superiority over India on land, in air, and in space.’37 This implies
that in case a large-scale conflict breaks out on the northern Sino-Indian
land border, India may then take measures to target SLOCs in the Indian
Ocean, which China depends upon for its survival, so as to compensate
for its unfavorable position in the face of China’s formidable land power.
 Maritime relations  193
Developments in Chinese sea power and its ‘stepping out’ will of course mit-
igate these vulnerabilities to some extent, but this is a situation that India is
unwilling to witness.

Maintaining Sino-Indian strategic stability at sea

In reality, China and India both have their distinct strategic strengths and
weaknesses. China’s comprehensive strength and geographical conditions
on land are more favorable compared to those of India, and it is able to
form an enormous advantage over India in its overall strategy and on land
whereas in the Indian Ocean, India possesses a strategic advantage over
China. Thus, there is a clear strategic equilibrium between China and India,
and a true maritime security dilemma does not exist, for the two sides’ stra-
tegic maritime rivalry ought to remain within manageable bounds.38
Would India leverage the vulnerability of China’s sea lanes to launch
an attack on China? India possesses such conditions and capabilities, as
it guards China’s westward channels and may, at any moment, pose major
threats to China’s SLOCs. Indian sea power cannot be ignored, but if I­ ndia
wishes to utilize these strategic maritime advantages to provoke China, it
would face numerous difficulties and risks. First of all, there is a great dis-
parity in national strength between China and India, with India at a dis-
advantage in the overall strategic contest between the two countries. India
faces considerable strategic pressure from China on land and on the direc-
tion of Pakistan. While India is able to strike Chinese vessels sailing the
Indian Ocean, China can nevertheless utilize missiles and fighter aircrafts
to directly attack central regions of the Indian subcontinent. Consequently,
it would be very difficult for India to turn a blind eye to risks on land so as
to take necessary measures at sea. Second, with the rapid ascent of China’s
sea power, China is, by no means, without any capacity for resistance at
sea, which means that blockading and harassing oceangoing Chinese ships
will not be readily attainable; furthermore, the scale of India’s economic
exchange with Southeast Asia, China, Japan and other East Asian countries
is steadily expanding, and such obstructive actions will undoubtedly under-
mine freedom of navigation throughout the entire region, causing India to
become a target of public censure, and ultimately harming the security of
its own overseas trade. Finally, Sino-Indian common interests in politics,
economics, security and other areas are progressively increasing, allowing
India’s determination to wane.
Is India going to join the United States’ and Japan’s anti-China camp? In
recent years, the United States and Japan have spared no efforts to charm
and cajole India, in the hope of coordinating and collaborating together in
efforts to contain and suppress China. For the greatest possible integration
of resources, the United States has even proposed a geostrategic concept
wider than the old ‘Asia-Pacific’ – the Indo-Pacific, building a quadrilat-
eral security system and elevating India to a very high strategic status.39
194  Maritime relations
Leveraging Indian power, the United States attempts to increase its number
of bargaining chips in its contest with China in the Asia-Pacific. As India’s
political, economic and security ties with East Asia rapidly burgeon, India’s
focus with regard to China and East Asia is likewise intensifying sharply,
as India also desires to take advantage of US power to expand its influence
in the Asia-Pacific; in certain regional hotspots and on matters such as se-
curity, India indeed shares much common ground with the United States
and Japan, and cooperates in operations. India also hopes to use US power
to check and balance China, but this does not mean that India will join the
United States’ and Japan’s camp to contain and suppress China. India is
among a select few countries worldwide that have long retained ambitions
as a great power, pursuing an independent foreign policy and is a founding
member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although India happens
to concur with the United States and Japan on precautions against China’s
sea power, India nevertheless still has reservations on cooperating in se-
curity matters with those two countries. Moreover, Indians remain acutely
conscious that the US Navy rules the waves in Asia, especially in the Indian
Ocean.40 Uday Bhaskar, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and
Analyses (IDSA), clearly explains this: ‘India’s DNA does not allow it to
become a Japan or a Britain in terms of adopting a subordinate status to
the U.S. and relying on America to guarantee the nation’s security. India’s
strategic culture would not allow it.’41 More importantly, the degree of con-
flict and disagreement between India and China is in fact not so high as to
demand comprehensive strategic confrontation.
India is certainly not China’s adversary or enemy in maritime affairs. On
the contrary, it is a collaborator in China’s distant ocean strategy and part-
ner in solidarity. On the whole, there exists a certain strategic equilibrium
between China and India, and moreover there are no fierce or irremediable
conflicts in their maritime strategies. Cooperation between the two coun-
tries will be of major benefit to the implementation of both countries’ mari-
time strategies, whereas conflict at sea will cause their respective dreams of
maritime rejuvenation to become remote and elusive. All decision-makers
and serious scholars in both China and India need to have a clear under-
standing of this reality and should not dance to the tune of media and public
opinion in the two countries, let alone blindly adhere to the United States’
and other forces’ preposterous arguments and absurd theories, unthink-
ingly adopting the ideas of others and reducing Sino-Indian relations to the
strategic asset of a third-party state.
As for China, if it wishes to carry out its Indian Ocean strategy and safe-
guard the security of its SLOCs, it must embrace India and assuage mutual
suspicion and precautions as far as possible.
First, it is necessary to strengthen strategic communication with India as
military forces progress toward the Indian Ocean. With the proliferation
of overseas Chinese interests and enhancements in the Chinese military
forces, the large-scale ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces has become
 Maritime relations  195
a relentless movement, with Indian Ocean as an area of top priority. In
the near future, China is expected to sustain normalized sea power in the
­Indian Ocean, and even maintain a number of support bases. These actions
and operations will inevitably stoke Indian anxieties, suspicion and precau-
tions.42 While India may not be capable of halting China’s ‘stepping out’
operations, China also need not meaninglessly provoke India. Therefore,
China’s Indian Ocean strategy ought in general to respect India, accom-
modate India and strengthen clarification and communication with India
on the Maritime Silk Road, China’s Indian Ocean strategy and other ma-
jor sensitive issues, in order to eliminate gratuitous misunderstandings and
establish an essential foundation for mutual trust. Since China has neither
the capacity nor the desire to challenge India’s strategic supremacy in the
Indian Ocean, there is no harm in emphasizing its arguments in due course
and expressing to India that ‘China respects India’s dominance in the In-
dian Ocean and has no intentions to contend with India for hegemony in
this region.’ At the operational level, China must also promote the launch
of substantive and open dialogue with Indian security mechanisms on mar-
itime and naval affairs, so as to establish maritime security mechanisms
that are reconcilable with the interests and positions of both countries. Sim-
ilarly, it will be beneficial for India to accept the fact that China has legiti-
mate interests in the Indian Ocean and should seek to engage with the rise
of China’s sea power.43
Second, China should enhance military communication and cooperation
with India to improve the military relationship. Military cooperation be-
tween China and India is severely disproportionate to overall development
in Sino-Indian relations and has impacted strategic mutual trust. For the
two militaries, there exists only a defense and security consultation mecha-
nism for the Chinese and Indian ministries of defense, while the three mili-
tary branches of the army, navy and air force lack permanent mechanisms
for contact and communication, and nor is there a hotline at the top level.
Not only are there too few joint exercises between the two countries, but
they are also too superficial. Even such exercises are often interrupted due to
various political reasons and lack institutionalized training arrangements
similar to those between China and Russia. In the field of military com-
munication, China needs to elevate the strategic importance of India, in-
creasing its attention on India and the strength of its appeal. China should
expedite establishing a routine exchange and communications mechanism
between the armies, air forces and in particular the navies, encouraging the
creation of mutual trust through the promotion of a military hotline, port
visits and other measures. China ought to institutionalize ‘hand-in-hand’
army exercises, in addition to attempting large-scale and more extensive
collaborative exercises; it should seek to reinforce bilateral and multilateral
interaction with the Indian Navy, strengthen cooperation with the Indian
Navy on anti-piracy measures, naval convoys and other areas, in anticipa-
tion of progressively joining an array of Indian Ocean naval mechanisms
196  Maritime relations
that are dominated by India. In return, China can also invite the Indian
Navy to engage in joint exercises and patrols in the South China Sea.
Finally, it is furthermore necessary to bolster media control or guidance
to prevent unfounded and unjustifiable criticism. Public opinion in both
countries has been distorted to a certain extent by hostile sentiments, while
reciprocal attacks in the media and speculation in public opinion have con-
stantly cast a shadow over developments in Sino-Indian relations. As men-
tioned earlier, whether India’s claims of an alleged ‘onshore China threat’
or the so-called String of Pearls Strategy or the Chinese media’s exagger-
ated renderings of the Malacca dilemma and of possible armed intervention
by India in the South China Sea, the majority of views represent ground-
less conjecture and embellishment. Nonetheless, we cannot underestimate
the impact of such public opinion. China and India are big powers as well
as neighbors, which in addition harbor territorial disputes and an intrin-
sically compelling security dilemma. Coupled with a history of troubling
experiences between China and India, the populace in the two countries
are exceptionally vulnerable to the beguilement and influence of extreme
speech, an undercurrent that hampers the development of bilateral relations
between the two countries and their peoples. There is no shortage of me-
dia, experts and even officials, who trumpet theories of the ‘India threat’
or ‘China threat’ domestically in either China or India. The two countries
ought to build an environment of mutual respect and win–win cooperation,
rationally view one another’s diplomatic actions and military deployments,
and not blindly censure without substantiation. More importantly, it is nec-
essary to pay attention to the sources of information. Currently, the vast
majority of international reports speculating on confrontation and conflict
between China and India stem from the Western world while extremely
lacking in original information from both sides, especially China.

Winning over Australia’s relative neutrality

Australia is the largest country in the Southern Pacific. It borders the Pacific
Ocean’s coral seas and the Tasman Sea in the east, and faces the Indian
Ocean and its marginal seas on three sides – west, north and south. Its loca-
tion as a transoceanic, intercontinental hub and its geographic situation is
highly favorable. As the two prominent plates of geopolitics and economics
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans continue to merge, and with the formation
and dissemination of the geographical concept of ‘Indo-Pacific,’ Australia’s
strategic location will be of ever greater importance. Geographically, Aus-
tralia is another noteworthy country, which may have a huge impact on the
strategic implementation of China’s maritime power, and especially on the
development of its distant ocean strategies.
As a non-Asian country, Australia nevertheless is just across the sea from
Southeast Asia, and so has geographic freedom to interpose in East Asian
affairs; at the same time, it guards strategic routes for Eurasian continental
 Maritime relations  197
powers to venture southward, while its left and right flanks also have a con-
siderable impact on SLOCs in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Australia
plays a critical role for China, regardless of whether it is to exit eastward to
the Pacific Ocean or southward to the Indian Ocean.

The robust vitality of US–Australian alliance

We must clearly recognize that the US–Australian alliance is virtually un-
assailable. Australia is a crucial ally for the United States in the Asia-Pacific
region, while the US–Australian alliance forms the bedrock of Australia’s
security strategy. Friendship between the two countries in security matters
stems from the their experience of fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in the Pa-
cific War. It is also due to the United States’ presence that Australia was able
to avoid large-scale invasion by Japan on its own territory. In view of this
knowledge and recollection, the foundation of Australian security strategy
post Second World War has been to strengthen the US–Australian alliance.
As the United States’ ‘southern anchor’ in the strategic Asia-Pacific region,
Australia aspires to continue acting as the United States’ ‘deputy sheriff’ in
the Southern Pacific, broadening its influence by relentlessly reinforcing al-
liance relations with the United States. Consequently, Australia has actively
participated in the Korean War, the Vietnam War and various other US-led
wars. Since the end of the Cold War, it is widely believed in Australia that
myriad hot topics in the Asia-Pacific, such as issues of the Korean Penin-
sula, Taiwan the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, in addition
to increasingly intense and diverse regional security dilemmas and arms
races have a substantial risk of spiraling out of control with very high costs
associated. Moreover, only the United States and its alliance system are able
to safeguard peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific by continuing to main-
tain a powerful presence in the region.
With this awareness, Australia has long devoted considerable effort to
supporting and cooperating with the US–Asia-Pacific strategy. Australia
furthermore responds enthusiastically to US expectations in matters of mil-
itary and security cooperation. In order to assume duties and obligations
required of the US ‘security bandwagon,’ Australia participates in wars in-
itiated by the United States and assists it in resolving regional and interna-
tional affairs as important ways of preserving the US–Australian alliance.
Cooperation between the two sides is not confined to Asia-Pacific affairs
exclusively, as the fervor of Australia’s participation in the Gulf War, and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is matched by only that of Great Britain.
In terms of intimacy and integration, the US–Australian alliance may even
surpass the US–Japanese alliance, as joint naval and air force exercises be-
tween them are extremely frequent, while many deputy command posts in
the headquarters of US Pacific Command are held by Australians.
Australia’s strategic significance to the United States is self-evident. For
the United States, Australia is not only able to strategically support the First
198  Maritime relations
Island Chain, but is also a crucial mainstay of the Second Island Chain, and
can furthermore bolster the Third Island Chain. It is an exceptionally im-
portant ally in the Asia-Pacific in addition to Japan. As the United States
promotes its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategies, the
United States has substantially boosted its military presence in Australia,
with the deployment of 2,500 marines to Darwin, increased the distribution
of naval and air forces in northern Australia, and increased the frequency of
naval activities near Australia’s coasts as well as number of air force sorties
in and out of Australia.44 Australia both welcomes and firmly supports such
American actions to strengthen military deployments. In reality, policies
to reinforce the US–Australian alliance are not only highly coherent, but
enjoy widespread consensus of opinion domestically in Australia. Whether
in state or civil circles, the importance of the US–Australian alliance is in-
controvertible, as all domestic sectors within Australia share a very high
degree of awareness on the issue. During a speech at The Lowy Institute
for International Policy on 9 August 2012, the then Australian Minister for
Defense, Stephen Smith, remarked,

The US has underwritten stability in the Asia-Pacific for more than the
past half century… A continued, indeed enhanced, US presence in the
Asia Pacific is essential to peace and stability in our region. Australia
welcomes the US enhanced engagement.45

On 23 February 2013, in an interview with a mainstream domestic newspa-

per, The Australian, Kevin Rudd commented that ‘A long-term, sustained
strategic American influence in this region would enhance Australia’s inter-
ests in security, diplomacy, and other areas in the long run.’46 These state-
ments certainly do not represent government rhetoric, but instead heartfelt
support. There is also an abundance of praise for the US–Australian alliance
from the Australian people. In a 2012 survey of public opinion and foreign
policy organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute for International Policy, 87
percent of respondents believed that allied relations with the United States
were very important or quite important to Australia’s security.

Australia’s entanglements with regard to China

We must note that for all issues concerning China, Australian policy is
hardly consistent and explicit for significant domestic discrepancies exist.
Not only is the intimacy of Sino-Australian relations dwarfed by that of US–­
Australian relations, but it also pales in comparison to that of Japanese–­
Australian relations. When faced with China, Australia increasingly exhibits
conflicting parallel psychologies of both ‘reliance’ and ‘restriction.’ On the
one hand, it welcomes economic connections with China, recognizes China
as a leading global economic power and regards China’s rise as an oppor-
tunity for Australia; on the other hand, it is also anxious that development
 Maritime relations  199
in Chinese military power will affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region,
expressing disquiet against China’s regional impact, hoping that China will
not alter the status quo in the Asia-Pacific, and fearing that China will at-
tain strategic supremacy in this region. Between the two conflicting paral-
lels, some scholars, like Euan Graham, has argued that Australia should
learn from Vietnam to develop its own naval capabilities and avert depend-
ence on a single ally, managing ‘a broad-spectrum relationship with Beijing
that includes both cooperation and competition.’47
In regard of realist interests, Australia in fact does not wish to enter into
conflict with China, as after all China’s rise is associated with economic
opportunities. At present, China is Australia’s largest trading partner. The
latest data published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade show that Sino-Australian trade achieved many milestones, with the
total two-way trading increasing from AUD 149.8 billion in 2015 to 174.7
billion in 2016, an increase of up to 16.6 percent. China is also Australia’s
largest source of imports, with the total value of Australian imports from
China amounting to AUD 64.3 billion in 2016, accounting for 17.7 per cent
of Australia’s total imports. Moreover, China has become a key export mar-
ket for the Australian services sector, especially its tourism industry, with
international visitors’ expenditure from China has surpassed the sum of
visitors from the No. 2 and No. 3 (the United States and the United King-
dom). In 2016, the value of exports from Australia’s services sector to China
totaled AUD 14.7 billion, a dramatic year-on-year increase of 50 percent.48
However, in security matters with regard to China, Australia adopts a dis-
cordant attitude, involving mostly vigilance and containment. For example,
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) reaffirms that its strong and
deep alliance is at the core of Australia’s security and defense planning, and
Australia will continue to broaden and deepen its alliance with the United
States, including by supporting the rebalance of US military forces.49 From
an objective perspective, this position predominantly derives from Austral-
ia’s own security requirements. Australia lacks necessary awareness of Chi-
na’s strategic security intentions, believing that China’s ascent in security
affairs portends an escalation of security risks in the Asia-Pacific, while
agonizing that China will become hawkish and intrusive in its military and
political expansion as it grows in strength. On 2 May 2009, Australia une-
quivocally expressed such concerns in a defense white paper titled ‘Defend-
ing Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030’: ‘The pace, scope,
and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give
its neighbours cause for concern.’ ‘In future, China will be a potential crisis
flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region.’50 On 12 February 2014, the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) issued a report titled ‘China’s New Dream,’
which claimed that

The re-emergence of China as a great power will be Australia’s greatest

foreign policy challenge during the 21st century. Canberra will have to
200  Maritime relations
carefully balance Australia’s growing economic relationship with China
and its traditional alliance with the US. The major threat to this bal-
ancing act would be if America’s fiscal problems force it to slash defense
spending and withdraw from the East Asian region.

Such a scenario would render Australia more vulnerable to ‘foreign inva-

sion’ than at any period since 1942.51
In terms of its alliance relationship with the United States, Australia
also has anxiety between the fear of ‘abandonment’ by the United States
in the event of a conflict, versus the fear of ‘entrapment’ in the potential
Sino-American conflict that is contrary to Australia’s own interests.52 Un-
deniably, the reason behind Australia’s full cooperation with the United
States’ Asia-Pacific strategies is chiefly to alleviate its sense of insecurity
in the Asia-Pacific’s complex security environment, while supporting the
United States is equivalent to purchasing American ‘security insurance’ as
a precaution against threats and harm that a rising China may inflict upon
Australia. In 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia clearly expressed
deep concern about China’s rise: ‘Navigating the decade ahead will be hard
because, as China’s power grows, our region is changing in ways without
precedent in Australia’s modern history.’ And the paper further pointed out,
the alliance with the United States is central to Australia’s approach to the
Indo-Pacific and to counter this kind of power shift.53
Furthermore, pressure to fulfill alliance commitments has also cast a
shadow over Sino-Australian relations. Due to the United States’ heavy
involvement in East Asian affairs that are associated China, such as the
Diaoyu Islands dispute and issues with respect to Taiwan and the South
China Sea, and steady contractions in the two countries’ power gap, the
United States has increased its expectations of ‘enhanced input’ from Japan,
Australia, and other allies. In consideration of China’s continuous develop-
ment of ‘Anti-Access’ and ‘Area Denial’ forces, the United States has been
adjusting its deployment of military forces in recent years, focusing greater
attention on Guam, Australia and other second line bases in the Western
Pacific. During peacetime, the United States needs to charm Australia into
applying political and strategic pressure on China. If an incident breaks out
in East Asia, it is highly likely that Australia will become a strong pillar of
support for US military action. Although it is not in Australian interests to
become embroiled in Sino-US conflict, and Australia would be exceedingly
unwilling to make a binary choice, it would in reality be very difficult for
Australia to refuse the demands of the United States, its greatest ally. For-
mer Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser claimed that ‘Australia is
so locked into the US system that it would have no option but to join any
American war with China.’
Collaborating with the United States to implement its ‘Rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific’ and develop the US–Australia–Japan plus multilateral security
cooperation scheme, Australia has also significantly strengthened relations
 Maritime relations  201
with Japan on political ties as well as military and security cooperation. In
the Joint Statement of Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century,
signed between Japan and Australia in July 2014, Australia conveyed its
support and appreciation for Japan’s security policy and ‘Proactive Contri-
bution to Peace’ that is founded upon international cooperation.54 It also
endorsed Japan’s exercise of collective rights to self-defense in accordance
to UN Charter principles. Immediately following the removal of Japan’s
‘Three Principles on Arms Exports,’ Australia extended an olive branch. In
June 2014, at the 5th ‘2+2’ talks, attended by both Japan’s and Australia’s
Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defense, an agreement was
reached on cooperation in areas of equipment and technology. In July, the
two sides signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the
Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology. On the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan,
the Australian government stands patently on Japan’s side in diplomacy.
On this subject, even some of Australian academic circles believe that the
Australian government maintains ‘double standards’ on the Diaoyu Islands
issue, as it does not take any action on Japan’s unilateral ‘nationalization’ of
the disputed islands and denial of historical aggression, while unjustifiably
accusing China of disrupting the status quo.

Reasonable expectations and the law of gradual progress

A framework of ‘economic reliance on China, security dependence on the
US’ has emerged in Australia’s foreign strategy, which intends to preserve
this arrangement in the long run. In Sino-US–Australian trilateral rela-
tions, China is at a relative disadvantage as it is very difficult to convert
China’s economic superiority and ties with Australia into actual power.
With regard to Australia’s diplomatic traditions and domestic opinions,
the United States is its natural ally with shared values, whereas a strong
China is an instinctive target against which to take countermeasures. As a
British colony, Australia was located a great distance away from its home
country in the complex geographical environment of the Asia-Pacific. Early
settlers, uncomfortable with Australia’s neighbors in Asia, were concerned
that the neighbors would threaten their own existence and livelihoods. A
way of mitigating such unease was to form alliances with the world’s most
powerful countries. Thus when Great Britain could no longer ensure its se-
curity, Australia quickly turned to the United States. Although this sense
of insecurity has subsided substantially with enhancements in political and
economic connections between Australia and Asian countries, it has not
disappeared entirely. In the context of a rising China, there will be no fun-
damental changes in Australia’s general mindset of ‘appeals to the US, pre-
cautions against China.’
In Australia’s foreign strategy, considering Australia’s quest for secu-
rity and the strong economic power of the United States, the prominent
202  Maritime relations
US–Australian alliance is near unshakable. Unless American strength
suffers a severe setback, causing the United States to withdraw from the
Asia-Pacific, it would be very difficult for China to supersede the US posi-
tion in Australian strategy for a long period of time to come, and compelling
Australia to make choices between China and the United States is by all
means ill-advised. However, ‘although the relationship between Australia
and the US will always be closer than that of Australia and China, it is
possible to bridge this gap by a large margin.’55 China can indeed narrow
the distance between Sino-Australian relations and US–Australian rela-
tions, or, in other words, reduce the level of attention and pressure targeted
at China from developments in the US–Australian alliance. If conflict or
confrontation ensues between China and the United States, while China
cannot expect Australia to take its side, it may urge Australia to exercise
greater caution and restraint in its support to the United States, prevent-
ing Australia from becoming a direct bridgehead in American efforts to
contain China.
Unlike Japan and other countries, Australia has no major conflicts of inter-
est with China. In security, Australian policy toward China focuses on pre-
caution, rather than containment. During peacetime, Australia purposefully
endeavors to avoid provoking China as the strengthening US–Australian al-
liance, and there exist many opportunities to develop relations between Aus-
tralia and China. If China and the United States were to become ensnared
in confrontation or conflict, it is a foregone conclusion that Australia would
side with the United States and undoubtedly endorse American politics, di-
plomacy and morality. Nonetheless, there is a large degree of uncertainty as
to how much Australia would support the US military and as for what role it
would play, while it may even potentially maintain a relatively neutral posi-
tion in its actions. In summary, how far would Australia go to guard against
China? To what extent would it follow the US to contain China? These an-
swers are as yet unknown, but may be nonetheless striven for.
China requires a profound understanding of Australia’s intrinsic sense
of insecurity, prioritizing the other side’s level of comfort in the process of
communicating with Australia. In operations to safeguard maritime rights
and as its military power ‘steps out,’ China must increase the transparency
of its policies as appropriate and inform Australia of anticipated circum-
stances prior to major operations. In order to mitigate Australia’s sense of
insecurity, it is first of all necessary to not make unjustified criticisms; sec-
ond, to not react in an excessively radical manner; and third, to not assume
the air of a chauvinistic power. In interactions with Australia, it is neces-
sary, as far as possible, to avoid coercing Australia into making the singular
choice of ‘approaching China by opposing the US.’ Not only would this be
unnecessary, it also may prove counterproductive.
China also needs to progressively bridge the gap with Australia through
pragmatic cooperation and expansion in military exchange and coopera-
tion. Unlike India, Australia is relatively open to China’s participation in
 Maritime relations  203
affairs in the Indian Ocean and is willing to maintain communication and
cooperation with China to safeguard freedom of navigation and regional
peace and stability. China and Australia both attach great importance to
the Malacca Strait and to Southeast Asia, while the two countries share
vast common interests in the eastern Indian Ocean. In recent years, they
have engaged in outstanding cooperation on antipiracy matters, in search
and rescue operations for the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, in addi-
tion to other nontraditional security fields. In view of Australia’s imprecise
understanding of China’s security strategy and profound misconceptions
regarding the Chinese PLA’s strategic intentions, boosting communication
between the two sides’ militaries, supporting joint military exercises and
training, and other operations are of even greater significance.

Expanding maritime connotations in the Sino-Russian

strategic cooperative partnership
Russia has all the features of a global power and is an important force, upon
which China may leverage in the process of building maritime power. Al-
though Russia has frequently suffered serious setbacks in its economic re-
structuring since its declaration of independence from Soviet Union, and to
this day has not yet found a suitable path for its development, it nevertheless
remains a leading global power in terms of its military, political, diplomatic
and cultural strength and a renaissance should only be a matter of time. As
the crisis in Ukraine clearly demonstrates, the United States and Europe’s
preventative strategies toward Russia are deeply engrained for they are con-
stantly concerned about Russia’s resurgence and expansion, while Russia’s
political system, heritage of great power, and cultural characteristics mean
that it cannot be wholly accepted into the Western world. The probability of
an outbreak of war or a ‘new Cold War’ between Russia and the West is very
slim, but fierce strategic games will endure for a long time to come. With
the release of the new national security strategy by the United States, it is
likely that China and Russia will be viewed by the United States as its great-
est and second greatest global strategic rivals for a long time in the future.
Appeals to allies and partners from both east and west to encircle China
and Russia respectively and prevent the two countries’ ‘ascent’ will con-
tinue to be a core pillar of US global strategy. Relentless eastward expan-
sion by NATO and the EU, Indo-Pacific quadrilateral alliance promoted
by the United States, in addition to the intrinsic demands of Chinese and
Russian national rejuvenation, will all encourage closer contact between the
two countries. The two parties’ strategic cooperation on issues such as Syria
and Iran, global economic regulation and other areas highlight the rich
connotations of ­Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. The seas are currently
becoming a new domain for strategic cooperation between them. There is
enormous scope and potential for Sino-Russian cooperation, particularly in
Arctic and Asia-Pacific maritime affairs. Nonetheless, the two countries are
204  Maritime relations
‘partners rather than allies,’ for it is necessary to clearly acknowledge chal-
lenges and limits in their maritime cooperation as the scope of cooperation
actively expands and collaborate intensifies.

Russia’s maritime tradition

Russia originated from inland Eastern Europe and has traditionally been
a continental power; however, it has always harbored somewhat extrava-
gant and obsessive maritime dreams. Peter I of Bulgaria once said, ‘A great
leader who has an army has one hand, but he who has a navy has two.’56
Similarly, Tsar Alexander III and Russian President Vladimir Putin have
asserted, ‘Russia has just two allies, the army and the navy.’57
Under long-standing imperialist practices, such aspirations and emphasis
upon the seas are indeed truly indispensable. The reason Russia was able
to develop from a small duchy into an empire, which spanned the Eurasian
continents and directly connected three major oceans, is because Russian
rulers have historically yearned fiercely for the seas.58 During the country’s
long-term continental expansion in Eurasia, the Russians have gradually
recognized the importance of the seas. In order to rapidly encircle and in-
vade vast areas of land, they exploited unique geographical conditions and
coordinated transit systems of land and water, using waterways to link the
Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the White Sea in Russia’s Arc-
tic region, through Europe’s rich river systems and lakes, into a giant land-­
water transit system; in the Far East, the Cossacks in the Tsardom of Russia
invaded eastward, along east–west tributaries of the Siberian Ob River, the
Yenisei River, and Lena River, subsequently advancing southward along the
Heilongjiang to reach the Pacific Ocean. In comparison with the Mongols,
whose conquests depended upon cavalry, the Russians indeed had greater
imagination in their utilization of water channels and power. Without the
support of waterways, the rather frail Tsarist Russia would at any rate find
itself unable to traverse these immense deserts, forests, quagmires and other
geographical barriers with existing technological conditions at the time.
The perfection of such a land–water transit system invariably required
reliable access to the sea, while winning control over the ocean would fur-
thermore have achieved greater transportation freedom and strategic depth
in defense. Marx once noted, ‘For a system of regional empire, land was
sufficient; for a system of universal aggression, water had become indispen-
sable.’59 Consequently, ever since the reign of Peter the Great, the pursuit
and protection of gateways to warmer seas has become a traditional geo-
graphic complex passing from the Tsardom of Russia, to the Soviet Un-
ion, to the Russian Federation. Over several centuries of expansion in the
past, although Russia’s maritime military force was inferior to that of its
European counterparts in most situations, when confronted with nearby
Sweden, Turkey and other secondary powers, as well as the decrepit Qing
dynasty, it nevertheless earned abundant dividends.
 Maritime relations  205
The ascent of the Soviet Union drove Russia’s sentiments toward mar-
itime power to their zenith. Through decades of painstaking accumula-
tion following the Second World War, the Soviet Union had, in one leap,
become a naval superpower capable of competing with the United States,
even surpassing its rival in the ballistic missile submarines. The Red Navy
had distributed strategic hubs across all major oceans worldwide and was a
powerful tool as the Soviet Union implemented hegemonic foreign policies
and entered into global contests with the United States. A strong navy was
also an important emblem of Soviet superpower, while in a similar fashion,
historical glory is a vital source of inspiration for the elite of modern Russia
as they contemplate the present and reflect on the past, while channeling
energy and effort to seek rejuvenation.
The history of the Russian people’s pursuit of sea power demonstrates
that the development of Russia’s navy has been overly tied to geopolitical
interests from the outset, with maritime trade and overseas economic inter-
ests usually not the focal point of policy; this differs enormously from Great
Britain, the United States and other maritime countries. As such, Russian
maritime programs have long held a tradition of ‘military first, trade sec-
ond.’ As a stark contrast to its swift progress in military power, develop-
ments in maritime trade and the marine economy have disproportionately
lagged behind. Even at the height of the Soviet Union’s power, there had not
been any noteworthy amelioration in this situation.
Russia has frequently suffered from economic hardship following the end
of the Cold War, with both its comprehensive strength and sea power plung-
ing. However, Russia’s primary intention to restore its traditional maritime
power has never changed. Judging from a series of documents on maritime
strategy published by the Yeltsin and Putin governments, Russia has never
forsaken global maritime power, a strategic goal that the outside world may
find inconceivable. The 2008 financial crisis had a severe impact on the
Russian economy, while American and European sanctions, in addition to
falling global oil prices, have created new challenges for Russia’s military
modernization and maritime affairs. Nevertheless, the situation should not
be more adverse than that of the 1990s, as the Russia’s state of affairs is far
from desperate. Moreover, deterioration in the external security environ-
ment would all the more cement Russia’s political determination to acceler-
ate the construction of a global maritime power.

Arctic ambitions and Pacific dreams

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s geographic situation and
strength in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean steadily declined, as it was by
then unable to stage a full confrontation with NATO at sea and in an ever
more defensive position; in contrast, Russia enjoys certain geographical and
military advantages in the Arctic, while strategic pressure from the direction
of the Pacific is also not as great as that from the west. In consideration of
206  Maritime relations
this, the directions of the Arctic and Pacific have naturally become strategic
focal points for Russia’s maritime military affairs. In the 2012 presidential
election period, Putin reasserted, ‘Our mission is to thoroughly revitalize
the ‘ocean-going’ navy, beginning with the North and the Far East.’ The
Arctic Ocean is of priority because this region is of crucial interest to Rus-
sia, which has important needs in resource development, shipping, military
security, delimitation and other issues; the Pacific Ocean is stressed not only
due to abundant resources contained in Russia’s far eastern EEZ and con-
tinental shelf, but more importantly in view of development in Russia’s far
east and its response to the shift eastward in US strategic focus.60
It is common knowledge that there is an immense wealth of resources
in the Arctic, hence Russia increasingly views the Arctic as the strategic
resource base for its future development. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian
Federation 2020, enacted in 2001, stipulates that Russia’s top two long-term
objectives in Arctic waters are to: research and development of the Arc-
tic to the development of export-oriented economic sectors, priority social
problems; protecting the interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.61
On 18 September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the
Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Until
2020 and Future Perspectives, expressly proposing the ‘the use of the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian
Federation that provides for the solution of tasks for the social and eco-
nomic development of the country’ and ensuring the realization of ‘compet-
itive advantages for Russia in the extraction and transportation of energy
resources.’62 In its Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was
released in 2015, Russia has claimed that it would ‘reinforce the standing of
the Russian Federation among the leading maritime powers.’63 To this end,
Russia is at the moment reinforcing diverse far-reaching measures in the
military, diplomacy, the economy and international law, in an attempt to
boost its strategic supremacy in the Arctic and seize the first mover’s advan-
tage in the scramble for Arctic resources.
Russia also has high expectations for the ‘Northern Sea Route’ (also
known as the Arctic Northeast Passage). This sea lane follows the coastlines
of the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and Chukchi
Sea, among others, and is an important channel connecting Russia’s Euro-
pean and Asian regions. From St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, this sea lane
spans 14,000 kilometers, whereas taking the Suez Canal measures 23,000
kilometers. At present, these routes are only navigable for a few weeks in
the summer, but their commercial prospects grow progressively brighter
with the relentless melting of glaciers, bringing huge transportation benefits
and enormous economic gains for Russia. Moreover, after this route is con-
nected, Russia’s seas can be linked from east to west into a single stretch,
fundamentally transforming the geopolitical strategy in which its sea power
disposition has heretofore been partitioned and obstructed by glaciers, and
considerably improving Russia’s strategic environment.64
 Maritime relations  207
Russia’s territory extends across the Eurasian continent, while its foreign
strategy cherishes the tradition of the ‘double-headed eagle.’ With the rise
of the Asia-Pacific region in the global domain, this double-headed eagle
strategy will become better balanced. Russia declared its ‘turn to the East’
virtually at the same time as the United States initiated its Pivot to the
Asia-Pacific. This move is certainly not a pretentious pursuit of vogue on
Russia’s part, but derives from political and economic considerations. On
this point, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave very clear explana-
tions in February 2013 when it released a new edition of ‘The Concept of the
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.’ This document claims that

Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is be-

coming increasingly important since Russia is an integral part of this
fastest-developing geopolitical zone, toward which the center of world
economy and politics is gradually shifting. Russia is interested in partic-
ipating actively in the APR integration processes, using the possibilities
offered by the APR to implement programs meant to boost the Siberian
and Far Eastern economy, creating a transparent and equitable security
architecture in the APR and cooperation on a collective basis.65

In addition, security and strategic factors are also very important. Russia
cannot help but direct its attention to escalations in the Asia-Pacific’s ge-
ographic rivalries, especially the constant intensification of conflicts over
maritime power and of maritime disputes. At a time when all powers are
competing to become Pacific countries, promoting the 21st century as the
Pacific century, Russia, which defines itself as a global power, of course
would not wish to miss out on the drama of the century.
The Kuril Islands dispute provides an excellent foothold for Russia to
participate in strategic contests in the Asia-Pacific. Each time Russia is on
the verge of fading from the Pacific Ocean, it would invariably and promptly
demonstrate resolve to territorial defense or brandish its military might.
As disputes over the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Liancourt
Rocks have escalated, Russia has also often demonstrated an extraordinary
hardline on the Kuril Islands issue. Senior Russian officials, including Pu-
tin, have frequently made tough statements and actions on the issue. Rus-
sia’s Eastern military district has also bolstered construction of airfields,
deployment of missiles and other military facilities on the Ostrov Iturup
(Etorofu-to) Islands, frequently conducting island defense exercises around
this archipelago. Such actions by Russia are naturally responses to Japa-
nese provocation, but for the most part, Russia hopes to attain its goal of
strengthening its military presence in the Pacific by leveraging the Kuril
Islands issue, with the aim of capturing a favorable position in Northeast
Asia’s future strategic structure.66
In light of territorial disputes between Russia and Japan, the complex
situation on the Korean Peninsula, mounting US military presence in the
208  Maritime relations
Asia-Pacific, and rapid growth in Chinese sea power, Russia attaches ever
greater importance to bolstering military strength in the Asia-Pacific. The
Pacific Fleet is considered a major tool in protecting Russia’s maritime in-
terests and security in the Asia-Pacific. It is Russia’s second largest, and also
has been maintained comparatively intact following the collapse of the So-
viet Union. In particular, with a collection of over 20 nuclear submarines, its
undersea power is extremely impressive. Russia has already started to im-
plement a more balanced strategy, in which east and west have equal impor-
tance, with particular emphasis on the eastward shift of military resources
to compensate for inadequacies, thereby greatly augmenting the strength
of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Russia is at present steadily deploying a fleet
of newly constructed large and medium-sized assault ships like Borei class
strategic nuclear submarines.
Russia remains actively engaged in political contests in the Asia-­Pacific,
taking the initiative to participate in regional mechanisms such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and Asia-­
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and regularly conducts a wide range
of joint military exercises at sea with countries within the region, such as
China, India, Vietnam and even Japan. Russia’s maritime forces and bomb-
ers also often frequent the East China Sea and the South China Sea to carry
out deployment and drills, highlighting its power presence.

Priorities and limitations in Sino-Russian maritime cooperation

There has gradually been a revival in the Sino-Russian partnership of stra-
tegic cooperation, with interdependence and cooperation between the two
parties in global strategy, regional affairs and economic development con-
stantly increasing in incidence and scale. Specifically regarding the maritime
domain, there are no fundamental conflicts or disputes between China and
Russia at sea. In contrast there exist numerous shared interests in sea lanes,
maritime security, geopolitics, the marine economy and other fields. Since
2012, China and Russia have held a series of large-scale naval exercises.67
As China’s and Russia’s maritime conflicts with the United States, Japan,
Europe and other forces escalate, the tendency for China and Russia to
unite together for greater strength in maritime affairs to alleviate strategic
pressure will become even more palpable. In this context, economic collab-
oration in the Arctic and maritime strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
are likely to become the two most noteworthy sources of optimism.
Though Russia may be self-satisfied with its achievements in the Arctic,
in recent years it has been subject to capital and technological bottlenecks,
with progress stagnant in the development of various resources. In particu-
lar, while its energy development is concentrated predominantly in onshore
oil and gas fields, petroleum and natural gas resources in Russia’s Arctic ter-
ritory are distributed chiefly in the region of the Arctic continental shelf. In
the foreseeable future, it would be difficult for Russia to carry out large-scale
 Maritime relations  209
exploitation without substantial foreign assistance or cooperative partners.
China’s advantages in these respects, such as financial resources, human
capital and technology, in addition to enormous resource shortages, exactly
happen to form excellent complements to those of Russia.
On the basis of its colossal economic size and total volume in foreign
trade, China remains the Northern Sea Route’s largest potential customer.
Despite accelerated melting of the Arctic glaciers, and even the possibility
of meteorological conditions for year-round navigation prior to 2040, in the
absence of huge economic investment, sophisticated societal management
and professional teams for maritime safety, the lack of infrastructure and
harsh natural environment in the Arctic will continue to limit possibilities
for the large-scale commercialization of the Arctic Northeast Passage. From
a global perspective, China has both the greatest need and strongest support
for Russia to expand and strengthen this sea lane.
Although Russia is actively developing in the direction of the Asia-Pacific,
its power is insufficient and it is unable to mimic past aggressive expansion
undertaken by Soviet Union in this region; in addition to relatively unfa-
vorable geographical conditions, it is very difficult for Russia to directly
exert any commanding influence over most Asia-Pacific affairs. The United
States and Russia are geographical competitors across all areas, while Ja-
pan and Russia are in dispute over the Kuril Islands, and neither the United
States nor Japan can freely permit Russian power to develop and burgeon in
the Pacific. In this region, China has emerged as the most important player
other than the United States. However, with myriad opponents at sea, China
is positioned in a circle of warring adversaries, is in sore need of partners for
strategic maritime cooperation.
It may be remarked that Sino-Russian maritime cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific is a natural product of circumstances. Not only are the two
countries able to redress one another’s deficiencies in issues with regard to
maritime disputes, engaging to some degree in strategic coordination and
policy cooperation; they unite in matters on the regional maritime order,
jointly resisting attempts by the United States and Japan to preserve mar-
itime supremacy; they are also interdependent and mutually supportive in
the expansion of strategic space in the Indian Ocean.
However, as China accelerates the advancement of its maritime cooper-
ation with Russia in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific and strives to enrich all as-
pects of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, China must also rationally
prepare for obstacles and bottlenecks in Sino-Russian cooperation.
On the one hand, it is difficult for the two sides to achieve major break-
throughs in key military and security matters, as strategic maritime co-
operation between China and Russia is underpinned by the ‘partnership
without alliance’ nature of overall Sino-Russian relations. In the context
of realist interests, due to enormous developmental pressures and needs of
economic transformation, China and Russia are committed to integration
into the Western-led international system in the realms of both politics and
210  Maritime relations
economics. For the time being, there is yet no substitute available for re-
liance upon the capital, technology, management experience and institu-
tional power of the United States and European countries.
Although China and Russia are both subject to US hegemonic contain-
ment and suppression, while simultaneously often reserving thinly veiled
criticism for the current international order, in general they do not wish
to sever ties with the West completely. In terms of geopolitical law, unions
between continental powers commonly tend to be unstable and lack the
success required to transform global maritime patterns. For instance, dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon, acting with a fully unified continen-
tal Europe, was still unable to force Great Britain into surrender. China
and Russia are naturally the Eurasian continent’s two major powers. Geo-
graphic complementarity between them is poor, while similarities and com-
petitiveness are strong. An alliance between the two countries cannot truly
transform the geographical disadvantages that each side must face to be-
come a global maritime power. Therefore, the absence of a military alliance
between China and Russia is not in fact due to issues of political mutual
trust or conservative diplomatic doctrine, but chiefly because the costs of
an alliance between the two countries would exceed the benefits. Only if
the United States were to force both China and Russia into a dead end at
the same time, would a Sino-Russia alliance be raised on the agenda, but it
increasingly appears that the United States possesses neither the capability
nor the desire to do so.
Differences in China’s and Russia’s main strategic directions have meant
that while the two countries often stand ‘back-to-back,’ they are unlikely to
stand ‘shoulder-to-shoulder.’ Each side can only primarily rely on itself to
manage strategic pressure from the east and the west respectively, while the
greatest value of strategic cooperation is mutual political encouragement
and reciprocal diplomatic support, rather than combined hostility toward
shared adversaries. Russia has its own specific strategic interests in waters
of the Asia-Pacific and certainly would not provoke the United States, Ja-
pan and other countries carelessly as a result of China’s issues in the East
China Sea and the South China Sea. Military coordination and cooperation
will increase, but cannot possibly develop into a genuine alliance. Expecting
Russia to unite with China in retaliation against the US–Japan alliance on
issues such as the Diaoyu Islands dispute is without doubt an excessively
naïve fantasy.
On the other hand, although there are no underlying divergences or con-
flicts of interest between China and Russia in the Arctic and in Asia-Pacific
maritime affairs on the whole, there nevertheless exist some fierce contra-
dictions in certain specific areas.
First, Russia is extremely zealous and aggressive in its Arctic policy, and
much still remains to be done for cooperation between the two sides. The
Arctic region is a center of Russian maritime strategy. At present, Arctic
 Maritime relations  211
countries, which are in the intense conflict to seize the Arctic, demonstrate
ever more xenophobic inclinations, this being especially true for Russia.68
Russia has once actively hindered and resisted China’s accession to the
Arctic Council, engagement in Arctic scientific research, resource devel-
opment activities, and other matters. There is great potential for cooper-
ation between them in the Arctic, but it will also be difficult for China to
change Russia’s geographic distrust as well as gain its understanding and
support.
Second, Russia is enthusiastically involved in the South China Sea issue,
and China cannot help but be alarmed by its proclivities. Since 2000, Rus-
sia has enhanced its participation in South China Sea and Southeast Asian
affairs, actively initiating trade in military technology, political dialogue
and economic cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, and other countries.
In particular, the Russian–Vietnamese ‘comprehensive strategic partner-
ship’ deserves China’s heightened attention, as Russia has long supported
Vietnam’s weapons modernization program that is targeted conspicuously
at China.69 For example, Russia has provided Vietnam with Sukhoi Su-27
and Sukhoi Su-30MKK fighter aircraft, conventionally-powered Kilo-class
submarines and other advanced weapons; and aids Vietnam in the forma-
tion of its submarine force, with which it jointly produces missiles. Russia
is also Vietnam’s most important collaborator in the exploitation of oil and
gas in the South China Sea. In recent years, while many petroleum compa-
nies in the West have become increasingly cautious regarding cooperation
with Vietnam due to concerns over agitating China, momentum in joint-­
development between Russian oil companies and Vietnam in disputed areas
of the South China Sea has nevertheless increased.
Third, it is possible that the steady rise of China’s sea power will aggra-
vate Russia’s strategic anxiety. Russia views itself as a key player in strategic
contests in the Asia-Pacific and, at heart, does not wish any country, China
included, to grow strong. As China’s sea power develops and ‘steps out,’ the
probability of confrontations between Chinese and Russian military forces
in sensitive waters will rise considerably. It is difficult for China to exonerate
Russian movements close to the South China Sea, while Russia is also irref-
utably apprehensive about possible future Chinese presence and activities in
the Sea of Japan and the Northwestern Pacific Ocean.
In short, there are so many reasons for China and Russia to cooperate at
sea, as the general trend in the two countries’ maritime relationship shows
that cooperation far outweighs competition. However, there will not be a
royal road to cooperation, as competition and precaution will follow closely
like a shadow, moreover contradictions and friction will oftentimes occur.
On this matter, China ought to remain sufficiently rational and mature,
strive to attain the best outcomes through utmost effort, and neither erro-
neously exaggerate Russia’s precautions and vigilance against China, nor
entertain any unrealistic expectations and fantasies with Russia.
212  Maritime relations
Notes
1 Stephen R. Nagy, “Can China-Japan Relations Return to ‘Normal’?”, 22 Octo-
ber, 2018, www.policyforum.net/can-china-japan-relations-return-normal/
2 Alexander Neill, “Japan’s Growing Concern over China’s Naval Might”, 28 May
2017. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39918647
3 Yoji Koda, “A Japanese Perspective on China’s Evolving Surface Fleet”, in Peter
A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Evolving Surface Fleet (U.S.
Naval War College CMSI Red Books, 2017), pp. 31–42.
4 Ian Bowers, “Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 46, 61.
5 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).
6 Rong Jian, “Three Questions in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Ling Dao Zhe, No. 58,
June 2014. http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_20140721109768_4.
html.
7 Alessio Patalano, “Seapower and Sino-Japanese Relations in the East China
Sea, “Asian Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2014, p. 47.
8 International Crisis Group. “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the
Rocks,” Asia Report, Vol. 245, 2013, pp. 5–29.
9 Ma Licheng, “New Perspective on Relations with Japan – Popular Sino-­Japanese
Concerns,” Strategy and Management (Zhanlue Yu Guanli), No. 6, 2002.
10 Shi Yinhong, “The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and Diplomatic Revolution,”
Zhanglue Yu Guanli, No. 2, 2003.
11 Gui Yongtao and Huang Chuyun, “The Historical Background and Crux of
Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China International Strategy Review
2014 (Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Pinglun, 2014), Peking University Institute of
International and Strategic Studies (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2014), p. 48.
12 Lin Kun-Chin and Andrés Villar Gertmer, Maritime Security in the Asia-­Pacific:
China and the Emerging Order in the East and South China Seas (­London:
Chatham House, 2015).
13 Mi Cui, “Reasons of Ancient Southeast Asian Countries Paying Tribute to An-
cient China,” Southeast Asian Studies, No. 1, 2014.
14 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), pp. 25–27.
15 Ibid., 51–59.
16 The Data Is from China’s Ministry of Commerce, www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/
jshz/new/201801/20180102706664.shtml
17 Lee Kuan Yew, “China’s Growing Might and the Consequences.”
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0328/billionaires-11-current-events-lee-
kuan-yew-china-consequences.html
18 Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang, Chen
Wenxin, and Zhang Fan, “Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast
Asia,” 25 October, 2016, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/
2016/10/25/225690/recalibrating-u-s-china-relations-in-southeast-asia/
19 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Southeast Asia in the US Debate,” Southeast Asian per-
spectives on US–China Competition, Aaron L Connelly, ed., (Lowy Institute, 2017).
20 Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang,
Chen Wenxin, and Zhang Fan, “Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in South-
east Asia”, 25 October 2016, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/
2016/10/25/225690/recalibrating-u-s-china-relations-in-southeast-asia/
21 Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Challenging
Test for ASEAN,” 2018, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/co18030-chinas-
maritime-silk-road-challenging-test-for-asean/#.W_Xg1_n7SUk
 Maritime relations  213
22 C. Raja Mohan, translated by Zhu Xianchao and Zhang Yumei, Samudra Man-
than: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Beijing: China Democracy and
Law Press,. 2014), p. 1.
23 Ibid., p. 161.
24 Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian
Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, No. 2, 2009.
25 Darshana M. Baruah, “China’s MSR: A Strategic View from India,” www.­
orfonline.org/research/30058/
26 Devendra Kumar Joshi, “Rapidly Modernizing Chinese Navy Concerns India,”
www.indtvusa.com/rapidly-modernising-chinese-navy-concerns-india-­n avy-
chief/
27 Vivek Mishra, “India and the Rise of the Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 30 Septem-
ber 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/india-and-the-rise-of-the-indo-pacific/
28 This passage is very much in vogue, but there is great doubt over its source.
There is in fact no such content in Mahan’s works, and it is likely the fabri-
cation and fiction of subsequent generations of strategists. However, there is a
certain truth in this argument, for the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean
is incontrovertible.
29 K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea
Power on Indian History (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1965), p. 89.
30 David Scott, “India’s Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,”
Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 97–129.
31 Dick Sherwood, Maritime Power in the China Seas: Capabilities and Rationale
(Canberra, Australia: The Australian Defense Studies Center, 1994).
32 Wu Qirong, “Military and Geographic Conditions in the Indian Ocean Region
and Their Impact on Maritime Military Operations,” Junshi Xueshu, No. 8,
2010, pp. 76–77.
33 Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defense (Navy), Freedom to Use the Seas:
India’s Maritime Military Strategies (New Delhi, 2007), p. 59.
34 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Indian
Navy, October 2015, p.  32. www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_
Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
35 Zhang Wenmu, “Great Power Politics in the Center of the World Geopolitical
System – on the Strategic Complementary Significance of Sino-Indian Security
Cooperation,” Taipingyang Xuebao, No. 3, 2010, p. 50.
36 Hu Xiaowen, “From Tactical Involvement to Strategic Deployment – New I­ ndian
Trends in the South China Sea,” Guoji Zhanwang, No. 2, 2014, pp. 107–108.
37 Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and sStrategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, (New
Delhi: SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2009), p. 288.
38 David Brewster, “Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is There Really a Sino-Indian
Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region,
Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, p. 1.
39 Donald J. Trump. National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
2017.
40 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the
Indian Ocean: An emerging strategic triangle”, Naval War College Review,
No. 3, 2008, pp. 40–60.
41 Baldev R. Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major
Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 230.
42 David Brewster, “India and China: Playing ‘Go’ in the Indian Ocean,” www.
lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-and-china-playing-go-indian-ocean
43 Rory Medcalf, “The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of
­Engagement,” Asia Policy, Vol. 22, No.1, 2016, pp. 61–67.
214  Maritime relations
44 The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, August 2014, www.austlii.edu.au/au/
other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2015/1.html
45 Paper presented by Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, to the Lowy In-
stitute on the 2013 Defence White Paper, https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/
publications/paper-presented-stephen-smith-mp-minister-defence-lowy-­
institute-2013-defence-white
46 The Australian, February 23, 2013.
47 Euan Graham. “What the Philippines and Australia Can Learn from Vietnam
about Living with China”, 5 October 2016. www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/
what-philippines-and-australia-can-learn-vietnam-about-living-china
48 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Trade and Investment at a Glance,
2017. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/trade-at-a-glance/
trade-investment-at-a-glance-2017/Documents/trade-investment-at-a-glance-
2017.pdf
49 Department of Defense. 2016 Defence White Paper, www.defence.gov.au/­
WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf
50 Department of Defence (Australia), “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific
Century: Force 2030”, http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/defence _white_
paper_2009.pdf.
51 David D Hale, “China’s New Dream: How Will Australia and the World
Cope with the Re-emergence of China as a Great Power.” www.aspi.org.au/­
publications/chinas-new-dream-how-will-australia-and-the-world-cope-with-
the-re-emergence-of-china-as-a-great-power
52 Cameron Hill, “Australia and the South China Sea: debates and dilemmas,” www.
aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_
Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/SouthChinaSea
53 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p.  4, www.fpwhite
paper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Min-
ister Abe Joint Statement, “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century”,
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044640.pdf
55 Mark Beeson, “Australia’s Response to a Rising China,” Foreign Affairs Review
(Waijiao Pinglun), No. 1, 2014, p. 69.
56 Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi, “Ukraine cCrisis: wWhy Russia sSees Crimea
as iIts nNaval sStronghold,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/
ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer.
57 See “Putin aAgrees with eEmperor that Russia’s only aAllies aAre Army and
Navy,” http://tass.com/russia/789866.
58 Jing Zhongjie, “Characteristics and Inspirations in the Development of Russian
Sea power,” Jinglüe, No. 16.
59 Karl Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century (Beijing: ­People’s
Press, 1979), p. 80.
60 Zuo Fengrong, “Primary Investigations in Russian Maritime Strategy,” Waijiao
Pinglun, No. 5, 2012, p. 136.
61 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020, http://arctichorizons.org/
sites/default/files/policy%20literature/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020.pdf
62 Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020, https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/­
uploads/f iles/content/upload/29%20Russian%20Arctic%20Strategy%20
Until%202020%20BW.pdf
63 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.
net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/
Maritime%20Doctrine%20TransENGrus_FINAL.pdf ?sr=b&si=DNNFile
ManagerPolicy&sig=fqZgUUVRVRrKmSFNMOj%2FNaRNawUoRdhdvp
FJj7%2FpAkM%3D.
 Maritime relations  215
64 Historically, the Russian Navy has repeatedly suffered defeats on the battle-
field due to its inability to swiftly assemble forces from east and west due to
obstruction by Arctic glaciers. For instance, during the Russo-Japanese War,
the Baltic Sea Fleet and other forces in Russia’s European regions could only
take a circuitous route via the Cape of Good Hope, across the Indian Ocean, and
then northward through the Malacca Strait to free the Pacific Fleet, which was
trapped by Japan in the Far East. In the absence of overseas supply bases, the
outcome of victory or defeat had in reality long been determined as it had taken
them over six months to traverse virtually half the globe. Thus, when the major-
ity of Russian reinforcement fleets arrived in Namibia’s Lüderitz, the Russian
Pacific Fleet had already been annihilated in Lüshungang. When they finally
approached Vladivostok, Japan was already well prepared for conflict and a trap
awaited.
65 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. www.mid.ru/en/
foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/
id/122186
66 Zuo Fengrong and Zhang Xinyu, “Maritime Strategy in the Process of Russian
Modernization”, Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Bao, No. 6, 2011, p. 73.
67 David Scott, “Russia-China Naval Cooperation in an Era of Great Power
Competition,” http://cimsec.org/russia-china-naval-cooperation-in-an-era-of-
great-power-competition/36773
68 Ibid.
69 Alexander Korolev,“The Two Levels of Russia’s South China Sea policies,” www.
eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb376.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36045
9 Deterrence is preferable
to fighting

The military is a political tool, and war is an extension of politics. Military

affairs and war are both means to an end, and not politics itself. As Sun
Tzu says, ‘supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance
without fighting.’1 Armed coercion in peacetime is akin to victory in battle
during times of war and has always been a key function of military forces.
Deterrence is, put simply, ‘a show of strength’ and a means of offensive
defense. In today’s society, ‘laws of the jungle’ are not yet to disappear en-
tirely, but at the same time, the influence of international mechanisms and
moral standards are also on the rise. The costs and effectiveness of war or
brazen coercive approaches are increasingly disproportionate. In particu-
lar, due to restraints from nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence
and other factors, large-scale wars between powers have now become ex-
tremely rare, while peaceful development has progressively become the con-
temporary theme. In this situation, armed force often forms the material
basis for coercive diplomacy, rather than being used to seize territory and
conquer adversaries.

The purpose and importance of deterrence

Deterrence, in particular reciprocal nuclear deterrence, was once an impor-
tant pillar of maintaining peace and security during the Cold War. Deter-
rence theory was formed alongside nuclear terrorism, and a central topic in
early research on deterrence theory was nuclear deterrence. But deterrence
as a practice has long existed in the extensive history of human society. De-
terrence refers to a defensive strategy to prevent a situation (such as war or
invasion) from occurring, rather than a strategy to compel others to sub-
mit to one’s will through intimidation. Means of deterrence are not only
applicable in the field of security, but are also widely used in economics,
diplomacy and other areas. It is simply that there is often more uncertainty
and greater difficulty in managing deterrence in other domains. At appro-
priate moments in international interaction, displays of one’s strength and
determination may be conducive to the fulfillment of one’s interests, in addi-
tion to the maintenance of regional stability and the promotion of peaceful
 Deterrence is preferable to fighting  217
development worldwide. In relation to the matter of China’s national inter-
ests, demonstrating one’s will and resolve to opponents may induce fear and
restraint, achieving the purpose of deterrence.
There are three features of successful deterrence: a retaliatory force, a
genuinely effective threat and reliable ways to disseminate the concept of
this threat. A retaliatory force mainly indicates the ability or strength to
engage in retaliation, whereas a genuinely effective threat refers more to
the desire or motivation to retaliate. Diplomacy is the principal method of
transmitting information about deterrence, frequently including discourses
of leaders, statements from diplomatic representatives, diplomatic notes,
secret meetings and other measures. If a country has only considerable po-
litical, economic and military strength, and were to lack prowess in the art
of diplomacy, it cannot necessarily precipitate the opposition’s surrender.
Furthermore, diplomacy itself is a type of retaliatory force, for instance in-
terruptions in bilateral military communications, expulsion of diplomatic
representatives and diplomatic protests. Consequently, deterrence tactics
are commonly used in diplomacy, in order to prevent other countries from
taking actions that are disadvantageous to oneself.
The development of China’s sea power will inevitably lead to containment
by the United States, Japan and other countries, while these containment
approaches will be a combination of both heavy-handed and light-handed
measures. That is to say, they will try their best to maintain an absolute
military advantage over China, creating enormous pressure for China’s
sea power, and if necessary, even launching preemptive, localized strikes
against China’s sea power; in diplomacy, they will continue to emphasize
the China threat theory, exploit opportunities to intervene in maritime dis-
putes between China and its neighboring countries, and appeal to small-
and medium-sized countries in the vicinity to unite and resist China; they
will continue to obstruct access to cutting-edge technologies, control vital
strategic hubs, and impede the rapid expansion of Chinese sea power. In
fact, such efforts at containment will not be deterred as per China’s wishes
for some time to come, but for as long as Chinese sea power continues to
develop and grow, this containment will forever remain and strengthen.
Declarations of peace and displays of diplomatic goodwill alone are insuf-
ficient to undo such containment; use of powerful measures in response to
antagonistic intentions when necessary is also vital.
Enhancements in deterrence are also required to safeguard realist mari-
time interests, as China’s sea power has also been widely impacted by chal-
lenges from surrounding countries. In the case of the South China Sea issue,
despite persistent incursions upon Chinese sovereignty and economic in-
terests by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries, neigh-
borly relations nevertheless remain China’s priority, as it still advocates
the ‘shelving of disputes and joint development.’ In 2002, China signed the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with
ASEAN countries, the core content of which prohibits the various parties
218  Deterrence is preferable to fighting
from taking actions to disrupt the status quo before a settlement agreement
is reached. This is a position consistent also with China’s management of
territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. However,
some countries have failed to comply with the DOC and continue to adopt
various measures to intensify their seizure of islands and reefs in addition to
plunder of resources. China must strengthen deterrence against these hos-
tile maneuvers, demonstrating to the relevant countries its will and determi-
nation to protect its maritime interests through practical action. Only then
will it be possible to curb continuous deterioration in the South China Sea
situation. For instance, China’s ostensibly ‘heavy-handed’ countermeasures
since 2012 have not only reversed the difficult situation in the South China
Sea but have also landed a heavy blow against the aggressive actions of
countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, directly leaving them little
alternative but to maintain restraint in their conduct on-site.

Accustomed to deterrence as a ‘new normal’

The world is, as a whole, an amalgamation of conflicts. In comparison with
agrarian civilizations, the greatest characteristic of maritime civilizations
is its direct confrontation of differences, willingness to engage in conflict
and not intentionally manufactured unity and harmony. At present, neither
resources for and channels of deterrence are problems. What China needs
is to reinforce its will and determination to resolutely safeguard its own
interests. The Chinese people yearn for peace and long for harmony, but
as China develops its sea power, there are certain to be obstacles at every
step of its path which abounds with competition and resistance everywhere.
Unless China wishes to retreat entirely back onshore, its national interests
mean this has to be faced. Here, it is furthermore necessary to refute popu-
lar anxieties about conflict and war as they would derail China’s monumen-
tal plans for a peaceful rise; with regard to some disputes and conflicts, if it
is possible to endure, China should endure; if it is possible to defer, China
should defer.
Strategic windows of opportunity for peaceful development can by no
means be gained by relying on compromise and tolerance alone. In fact,
appropriate levels of deterrence would not only not aggravate conflicts,
but also prevent exacerbation of and escalations in conflicts. The process
of evolution in the international system is shaped by interactions between
countries. All countries would as far as possible try to seize opportunities to
maximize their own advantages, thus disagreements and contradictions are
inevitable regardless of a single country’s goodwill and restraint.
This cycle is particularly clear in the development of Chinese sea power.
China’s naval modernization has been a topic of only the past decade or so,
in part to make up for previous deficits and to close the distance between
China and developed Western countries. This has resulted in absurd conjec-
tures and precautionary measures. The obsessive exercise of restraint and
 Deterrence is preferable to fighting  219
patience in international intercourse would not only allow opposition forces
to make insatiable demands, to yearn for more and more, but also amplify
other countries’ suspicions about China’s strategic intentions. Others would
all the more doubt China’s motives if it were to insist on appearing modest
and genial, while all other countries in the entire international system strive
to protect their national interests as much as possible. Moreover, to blindly
compromise, tolerate and evade problems could present a trap of one’s own
making, because once the outside world grows accustomed to such behavior
from China, there would be an enormous fallout if China were then to show
the slightest impression of strength. This, on the contrary, would be unfa-
vorable for the normal development of China’s foreign relations.
Deterrence is a type of preventative measure in diplomacy to maintain the
status quo and to forestall conflict. If left at the mercy of practical realities
caused by other countries, China would become ensnared in an even more
passive position, such that confrontation and hostility between the two sides
would only intensify. On many issues, China had no alternative but to adopt
drastic measures in order to coerce other parties into reforming their poli-
cies following the actual outbreak of events, largely because the impressions
conveyed to them previously were misleading. It is naturally difficult to
convince opposing foreign leaders to acquiesce and compromise in today’s
era of open diplomacy, with public participation levels on the rise, hysteri-
cal misrepresentations in the media and a high degree of attention from the
other side’s general population. Meanwhile, the domestic populace’s emo-
tions in China, as the victim, are more intense and domestic political risks
of compromise even greater, thus, China is more unlikely to back down, and
can only increase retaliatory measures and boost their strength.
This often would result in a stalemate in the style of a ‘prisoner’s di-
lemma,’ where there are ultimately no winners regardless of the conclusion.
Even if it were possible to break the deadlock, it would still be very difficult
to attain a win–win outcome, as each party would believe that it has made
more concessions than other sides. The bilateral relations would not only
be undermined on the inter-governmental level, but civil hostilities will also
be aggravated. For instance, during the Diaoyu Islands boat collision cri-
sis in September 2010, although in the end China made Japan release the
captain through various countermeasures (temporarily interrupting bilat-
eral communication at the provincial and ministerial levels and above, sus-
pending increases in the number of flights between the two sides, expanding
Sino-Japanese engagement on matters of navigational rights, delaying the
China–Japan General Forum on Coal, limiting tours to Japan by Chinese
citizens and so on), thereby gaining a superficial victory, there was a signifi-
cant increase in the Japanese people’s hostility toward China. The Japanese
populace were extremely displeased with the compromise of the Japanese
government, which was showered with condemnation for its weakness to-
ward China. In the long run, this environment is in fact not beneficial to
China’s development of diplomatic relations with Japan.
220  Deterrence is preferable to fighting
Therefore, it is imperative to anticipate or predict actions that may be
taken by other countries before matters deteriorate or in the early stages
of the unfolding process. Next it is necessary to express one’s own discon-
tents and possible retaliatory measures to the other side through diplomatic
channels or other special channels, so as to control the situation to a specific
extent or to practically eradicate it. We must take precautions against risk
and adversity and cannot wait to protest only when it is too late. In this
sense, deterrence supports crisis prevention and control. The effective use of
deterrence at appropriate moments can contain or eliminate the emergence
or development of trends that may potentially cause grievous damage to
China’s national interests.
Likewise, it is necessary to avert another extreme movement from emerg-
ing, namely, disproportionate responses to conflict and mindless displays
of uncompromising strength. Deterrence, especially deterrence in security
affairs, does have some negative impacts and is in reality not a tool that
may be often utilized. Deterrence here mainly refers to anticipating harm
to one’s interests, while being compelled to take action when cordial nego-
tiations prove unfruitful. In fact, this is not to say that China must confront
and combat other countries on all matters. In the majority of cases, China
will adopt soft deterrence, utilizing diplomatic, economic and other means
of retaliation, rather than readily threatening other countries with armed
force. Specifically as to what kind of deterrence should be adopted and un-
der what conditions must be determined based on the nature of the interests
and the extent to which the status quo is disrupted. There does not exist a
protocol that can be applied across the board, for this is a very intricate art
in diplomacy.
In a similar vein, when confronted by other countries’ deterrence meas-
ures against China, it is necessary to respond calmly both by maintaining
a high degree of vigilance against others’ unscrupulous intentions and
by sensibly managing matters. China cannot blindly link economic is-
sues with politics, associate political issues with security and magnify
matters of low politics into those of high politics, while overanalyzing
all subjects. In the current phase of China’s development, the intensity
and intimacy of China’s interactions with the rest of the world are un-
precedented, therefore the diversity and complexity of conflicts between
China and the world are also unparalleled. As other countries manage
their differences and conflicts with China, they will naturally adopt some
deterrence approaches and countermeasures. In future, China will in-
evitably frequently encounter deterrence from other countries. Most of
these deterrence measures are a natural phenomenon and a procedural
matter, and something, that China must experience in its rise. As long as
it responds with confidence, China will certainly be able to resolve these
issues one by one.
At present, harmony is an ideal and an objective for the international
community, whereas in reality, dispute and conflict are the normal state of
 Deterrence is preferable to fighting  221
affairs. China must adapt to this world filled with conflict, grow accustomed
to deterring other countries in order to protect its interests, and also become
acclimated to deterrence from other countries. It should neither carelessly
conceal its capabilities to bide its time, nor should it ostentatiously display
its strength and make everywhere enemies. China cannot allow a number
of conflicts and contradictions with other countries to affect its judgment
of the overall situation, nor can China retain a mentality of victimization
in the long run, interpreting all deterrence attempts by other countries as
‘undying imperialist ambitions to subjugate us’ and similar acts.

Creating a smart deterrence system

It should be recognized that factors such as nuclear terrorism resulting from
nuclear weapons, global opposition to war and expansion in peaceful forces,
globalization and developments in interdependence have rendered large-
scale wars between major powers largely preventable. For a power such as
China, strategic deterrence is strong and unassailable. The outstanding his-
torical achievements of Chinese People’s Liberation Army in wars against
foreign forces and the three-in-one integrated strategic nuclear strike capa-
bilities of land, sea and air are sufficient to deter any potential large-scale
wars targeting China.
‘Those who do not dare to fire the first shot against China, may yet dare to
violate China’s national interests.’ Even under existing conditions of strong
strategic deterrence, Chinese interests are nevertheless subject to frequent
infringement by neighboring countries. Reasons for boldness on the part
of these countries are mainly rooted in the following three components:
first, there is substantial middle ground between ‘war’ and ‘peace,’ while,
in most situations, there is no place for armed force in strategic deterrence.
If other parties use political, social, diplomatic, economic, legal and other
non-­m ilitary means to oppose China, or apply military measures to conduct
low-­intensity, cold confrontation, China would be unlikely to retaliate on a
large scale. Second, major powers often do not have comprehensive capabil-
ities, and they may even be positioned at a disadvantage in local areas and
certain domains. For instance, although China’s overall military strength is
formidable, it does not have a marked advantage relative to its surrounding
countries in small-scale maritime conflicts and low-intensity confrontations
at sea, for it suffers from problems such as a low rate of informationization
and poor projection capacity. Third, the effectiveness of strategic deterrence
has begun to decline with fewer large-scale wars. International mechanisms,
international norms and international public opinion play an ever-greater
role, while the diplomatic risks of armed force grow higher and higher; the
costs of modern warfare are huge, as economic and political costs soar con-
tinuously. In this case, it is very difficult to translate the threat of a large-
scale war into practice. Opponents are undoubtedly aware of this, and
consequently pay little heed to the risks.
222  Deterrence is preferable to fighting
In order to carry out surgically precise strikes, China needs ‘more dex-
terous’ deterrence tactics and measures. While continuing to accelerate
construction of a powerful system of strategic deterrence, China also ur-
gently needs to strengthen its creation of a tactical deterrence system. The
quality of strategic deterrence used directly reflects a country’s strategic
decision-making and policy implementation abilities. Good deterrence of-
ten results from the integrated and coordinated application of multiple ap-
proaches. It requires not only correct judgment of the other side’s intentions,
insights into the adversary and awareness of both parties’ weaknesses, but
also needs unified internal understanding, coordinated positions and inte-
grated resources so as to form a joint effort and create a ‘fist.’ In order to
boost the efficiency and effectiveness of deterrence, China should concen-
trate on the following improvements.
First, it is necessary to pursue an active deterrence policy, to ‘preempt’
rather than to ‘react.’ Deterrence is a preventive strategy to maintain the
status quo, to avert outbreaks of conflict or escalations in crises. Its pur-
pose is to avoid any future passivity; therefore, ‘preemption’ has always been
one of the essential components of deterrence. In addition, the reason why
‘preemption’ is advocated is because ‘reaction’ strategies are often difficult
to satisfactorily implement in practice. In the event that conflicts or crises
occur, space for bilateral maneuver will shrink and compromise will be-
come very difficult in today’s age of open diplomacy, with extensive public
participation, media sensationalism and intense popular scrutiny from all
parties concerned. China’s triumph in resisting the Philippines at Huangyan
Island is in fact neither representative, nor consistently replicable. If this
were instead Vietnam, whose national strength is relatively greater, such a
model may prove ineffective. Moreover, the international community favors
the principle of fait accompli, in which actions that instigate escalations
in conflict are easily isolated. Often when ‘punishing innocent and guilty
alike,’ regardless of right and wrong, emphasis is placed on preventing be-
havior that expand disputes, provoke crises and escalate conflicts. Those
who disrupt the status quo, especially those who use armed force to under-
mine the status quo, always suffer from even greater external pressure, as
‘Those who react are commonly at the mercy of others.’ Therefore, China
establish a foothold, make the first move and not continue to passively wait
until it is too late.
Second, it is necessary to improve the relevance of deterrence, that is, to
adopt measures that can send a message directly to other parties. Although
the momentum of a combination blow may be great, it may be insufficient to
strike the heart of the issue, while at the same time leading to unnecessary
collateral damage, which is detrimental to safeguarding one’s own inter-
ests as far as possible. Using the 2010 Diaoyu Islands boat collision incident
again as an example, the objective of the series of deterrence approaches and
measures, adopted by China during the crisis, was to press Japan to apol-
ogize and release the Chinese nationals taken prisoner. First, Spokesman
 Deterrence is preferable to fighting  223
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Councilor and the Premier of
the State Council issued a series of protests and warnings to Japan, and en-
gaged in significant negotiations with Japanese diplomatic representatives.
As deterrence, they delivered a message that if the captain were not released,
there would be further action taken.
Second, China adopted a series of measures, such as deferring negoti-
ations on issues on the East China Sea, postponing the National People’s
Congress delegation’s visit to Japan, suspending contact over arrangements
to increase flights between the two parties and expand Sino-Japanese traffic
rights, postponing the China–Japan General Forum on Coal and suspend-
ing Sino-Japanese exchanges above provincial and ministerial levels, all of
which were described as a combination blow to secure the release of Chinese
nationals. It should be noted that these protests, negotiations, warnings and
countermeasures amply conveyed China’s resolve and tenacity to Japan and
applied sufficient pressure on Japan.
However, there still remains room for discussion or improvement. First
of all, the Chinese evaluation of the Japanese government’s intentions and
understanding of Japan’s domestic political model were in fact inaccurate.
As a result, China was unable to rapidly achieve its goals, continuing to
promote deterrence measures and expand their scope. Lasting 17 days, the
crisis stretched for too long, attracting long-term speculation from domestic
and foreign media and triggering a long period of passionate antagonism be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese people, which was not conducive to future
improvement of relations between the two countries. Furthermore, it is clear
that certain measures adopted by China did not have a significant impact
on Japan’s decision-making, but did lead to resentment from the Japanese
people, for instance, the suspension of or delay in normal civil communica-
tions. These non-targeted measures expand the scope of attack but arouse
the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people. Finally, credibility of deterrence
does not depend on the quality or quantity of retaliatory measures, nor does
it depend on fervent public diplomatic displays by the defending state. It
relies primarily on the challenger’s perceptions of retaliatory measures and
the assessment of its own intentions and motives. Communication of intent
between the two sides is critical in deterrence, and poor communication will
lead to failure. Therefore, in order to ensure that one’s deterrent is credible
and effective, it is crucial to maintain essential channels of communication.
With regard to sensitive events, special channels of communication can of-
ten play an unexpectedly important role.
Third, China needs the reinforcement of political, economic, diplomatic,
military and other measures, translating ‘strength’ into ‘ability.’ Neither
China, nor any other major country is an omnipotent champion. For in-
stance, China is relatively fallible in its maritime operational capabilities.
While China prepares to win localized wars with advanced technolog-
ical conditions, it must also bolster the power of paramilitary forces law
224  Deterrence is preferable to fighting
enforcement, in order to respond to emergency events, civil disputes and
maritime crises. Historically, coastguard ships are usually the first to arrive
on the scene during maritime crises and conflicts. Their response speeds,
operational capacities, command capabilities often play a decisive role in
controlling incidents. Very often, military measures are in fact not the best
tools for deterrence. Economic, diplomatic and other means of retaliation
have greater precision and practicality at times. Therefore, in addition to
the construction of military and law enforcement forces, it is vital to en-
hance economic influence and diplomatic capabilities. In economic matters,
it is necessary to support technological innovation and the establishment of
international mechanisms. While expanding the size of the economy, China
should focus on structural adjustments, pursue international discourse
and optimize international economic power; in diplomacy, China ought to
concentrate on strengthening diplomatic resources or translating proven
strength into diplomatic ability. There remains a considerable imbalance be-
tween China’s capacities in diplomacy relative to its rapidly rising national
strength, manifested for instance in the consciousness of strategic thinking,
the professionalism of diplomats and the efficiency of decision-making and
executive agencies.
Fourth, China should optimize decision-making mechanisms, and seam-
lessly integrate resources, strengths and approaches. In order to prescribe
the right solutions, it is essential to first identify where counterparty weak-
nesses are found and what kinds of offensive measures can be used to com-
pel opponents to withdraw. In view of this, the most important task is to
strengthen the overall command, comprehensive research and institutional
coordination, clearly understanding measures and capabilities that one
can put into action, rationally planning goals to be achieved and response
measures.
It is imperative to build strong mechanisms to coordinate foreign and se-
curity affairs. Today, issues in diplomacy or foreign affairs frequently in-
volve numerous departments or multiple work units. In present-day China,
the number of departments and mechanisms that participate in such matters
grows ever larger, limited not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of Commerce and other traditional foreign affairs departments.
Various major ministries and commissions in the State Council system, all
echelons of the National People’s Congress, all levels of government and the
military have their own areas of interests and foreign channels, and each
has its own articulation capabilities as well as means of response. If these
units were able to join forces and form a concerted effort, they would be
able to convincingly display their power and resolve to the outside world; if
they fight individually, they would impede one another and be incapable of
conveying clear and cogent information to the rest of the world. Deterrence
would fail, and undesirable outcomes may even appear. With regard to mar-
itime security issues, China already has a Central Office of Foreign Affairs,
a Central Office of Maritime Rights, National Security Commission of the
 Deterrence is preferable to fighting  225
Communist Party of China and other primary central coordination bodies.
The definition of the functions of these mechanisms themselves and the di-
vision of tasks between them still need further clarification. On the policy
implementation level, there exists in a similar fashion the problem of blurred
lines between rights and responsibilities, as well as of ambiguities in relevant
rules and norms.
In addition, it is necessary to furthermore boost the effectiveness of de-
terrence and to follow words with action. Although heated verbal exchanges
are highly enticing, they are largely ineffective if unaccompanied by sub-
stantive action. The purpose of diplomacy is to communicate one’s inten-
tions and messages of deterrence to adversaries. It must be supported by
political, economic, military and other measures working together to prove
successful. Without the support of powerful strength, even the most out-
standing diplomatic accomplishments would do little to improve matters.
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, although the speech of Mr. Welling-
ton Koo, China’s representative, captivated and electrified the audience, it
changed nothing as British, French and American powers agreed neverthe-
less to Japan’s annexation of the Jiaodong Peninsula. It is exactly as Wel-
lington Koo said to Zhang Xueliang and the government of the Republic of
China following the Mukden Incident on 18 September 1931, ‘it is unrealistic
to hope to gain through diplomacy what cannot be obtained on the battle-
field.’2 Even if strength exists, deterrence cannot succeed without the deter-
mination to apply strength. Views on deterrence expressed on diplomatic
occasions must be supported by appropriate measures. Before these views
are openly declared, it is also necessary to fully consider if one has the nec-
essary resources to put them into practice; if not, the careless use of hardline
rhetoric would be inadvisable. In the use of deterrence, once statements are
issued, actions must follow. It is imperative that deterrence does not become
a mere formality, nor a war of words. Under normal circumstances, if deter-
rence operations are not carried out according to diplomatic declarations,
no further attention would be paid to future efforts at deterrence, whose
credibility and effectiveness will be greatly reduced.

Notes
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Mou Gong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
2 Wellington Koo, Wellington Koo Memoirs, Volume Vol. 2, Chinese Vision
(­Beijing: China Publishing House, 1985), p. 189.
10 Tridents beyond armed force1

In comparison with continental governance, human control over the seas

is relatively limited. As ‘it is very difficult for any country to administer
even a small area of ocean in the same way that it governs land,’ sharing
of power is a unique feature of maritime power. Even the British Empire,
upon which the sun once never set, and the current maritime hegemon, the
United States, must be well versed in the limitations of sea power and the
restrictions of expansion. Armed force is often merely one trident used to
achieve one’s objectives, as the adoption of nonmilitary measures, for in-
stance in diplomacy, economics and politics, are also of vital importance.
Especially in the present era of rapidly developing economic globalization
and strong global interdependence, the effectiveness of armed force has
significantly decreased. While Thomas Hobbes’ ‘survival of the fittest’
competitive doctrine of states remains valid, norms and mechanisms, ad-
vocated by John Locke and other liberals, have progressively won over
hearts and minds, while the status and role of non-military approaches
are increasingly prominent. In order for China to achieve its maritime
rise, it must skillfully forge tridents of nonmilitary measures, requiring
comprehensive efforts in diplomacy, economics, law, public opinion and
other areas.

The diplomatic transition from an Agrarian civilization to

a maritime civilization
Historical experience shows that the geographic environment and condi-
tions for subsistence are the most important factors in shaping attributes
of human civilization. Mighty inland rivers often nurture agrarian civiliza-
tions and societies, whereas communities engaged in fishing and commer-
cial trade tend to congregate in regions close to seas and oceans, while lush
grassland areas, such as the Mongolian Plateau, are the birthplace of vari-
ous nomadic tribes. Beginning from wild and primitive times, human soci-
ety has formed three general major types of agrarian civilizations, maritime
civilizations and grassland civilizations. The four leading ancient civiliza-
tions of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and Indus all relied on rivers
 Tridents beyond armed force  227
to develop and can be categorized as agrarian civilizations, also known as
river valley civilizations and continental civilizations.
Among these, China has the clearest imprint of an agrarian civilization.
The Chinese people have long lived within a relatively confined geographic
region of East Asia, with plateaus to the west, the Gobi Desert to the north,
and seas in the south and in the east. As domestic produce was sufficiently
plentiful, the agricultural industry highly advanced and the political system
exceptionally precocious, there was a dearth of motivation for commercial
exchange and maritime exploration. Although early peoples had for gen-
erations long been aware of the seas’ presence, onshore interests far out-
weighed those offshore for these people. Together with the vast immensity of
the Pacific Ocean, the cost of maritime conquest truly was insufferable. The
oceans were often characterized as profound mysteries in the discussions of
literati, very few of whom had actual practical experience. Over time, a ma-
jority of the Chinese people gradually formed an inexplicable dread of the
oceans. It is furthermore worth noting that over the long course of history,
China had long adhered to a principle of prioritizing agriculture and subdu-
ing trade, hailing rule by past dynasties as ancestral guidance, and viewing
agriculture as the nation’s cornerstone, and on which emphasis has been
placed. Such a continental civilization or tradition has never been broken
and has endured for several millennia. One should certainly underestimate
neither its deep-rootedness nor its lasting influence.
The Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans have been known as ‘the Sea Peo-
ples’ since ancient times. They used the ease of transportation offered by
the Mediterranean Sea to travel the length and width of southern Europe,
western Asia and north Africa, once building a large number of commercial
bases and colonial fortresses along the Mediterranean coast. In the work
Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel passionately praised the seas,
upon which the survival of Western civilization rests. In addition, using
China as an example, he remarks that various Asian countries do not share
in these activities, which transcend territorial boundaries and span across
oceans, even if they have more magnificent political buildings and even if
they themselves are flanked by the sea. For these countries, the sea simply
represents an interruption in the continent, a discontinuation in the land:
they do not have any constructive relationship with the seas.2
Ancient Greece is a classic maritime civilization. Ancient Greece was sit-
uated in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, centered around the Greek penin-
sula and encompassing a considerable number of the Aegean Islands, the
Ionian Islands to the west of Asia Minor, as well as southern Italy and the
island of Sicily. In terms of natural geographic conditions, it was mountain-
ous, encircled by seas, with rugged terrain and only a number of modest
plains, most of which are shielded by mountains and cliffs. These particular
geographic features have had a decisive impact on ancient Greek economics,
politics and culture. These small plains, concealed by mountains and cliffs,
have created classic ‘small city-states (poleis)’ and implied that the ancient
228  Tridents beyond armed force
Greeks could only survive and develop through trade and commerce. More-
over, such trade can only be in the form of overseas trade, thereby deter-
mining the ancient Greeks’ national characteristics, which are dominated
by business, industry and seafaring. Over the past 700 years of history,
the ancient Greeks had achieved profound accomplishments in numerous
fields such as philosophy, history, architecture, natural sciences, literature,
drama, sculpture, while their genetic stamp as a maritime civilization was
also firmly established.
Following the collapse of Ancient Greece, the ancient Romans continued
to perpetuate this gene with constructive effect. Thus, the spirit of Western
civilization as a whole can be traced back to the ancient Greek civilization.
Standing on the shoulders of the ancient Greeks, modern Europeans ini-
tiated the Renaissance, a cultural movement that unlocked early modern
European history, by organizing and researching classic works in the hu-
manities from the Ancient Greek and Roman periods. The advent of the
Age of Sail in the 15th century emboldened Europeans to journey the world.
Of course, the purposes of these early European maritime activities, which
were motivated mainly by the ‘exploration of global navigation routes, dis-
covery of new worlds, plunder of foreign riches, and establishment of colo-
nies’ were far from glorious.3
However, it is undeniable that such expansion indeed stimulated the de-
velopment of maritime civilizations. Profiting from the experience of the
Greeks and the Romans, Europeans have cultivated modern systems of
maritime civilization from rich maritime practices, eventually diffusing
these systems worldwide. With regard to the development of maritime civ-
ilization practices, the American naval historian E. B. Potter remarks that
Westerners first mastered and began utilizing the vast seas in the Mediter-
ranean, subsequently expanding their experience in the Mediterranean Sea
on a global scale. In his view, ‘waterways worldwide have not only enhanced
mankind’s mobility, providing large-scale markets for the fruits of hard
work and technological innovation, and all the while offering new fields for
the development of human thought.’4 In the end, the rise and fall of the pow-
ers that dominated Europe and even the Western world, such as Portugal,
Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany and the United
States, were all intimately linked to efficiency in utilization and control of
the seas. While the modern Western world is indisputably built upon the
concept of maritime civilization, and the current international system and
the international order are based on the customs and experiences of West-
erners, there seems little reason not to call the current international system
one based on marine civilization.
Agricultural lifestyles tend to follow the course of nature: they cherish
nature, rebuke the ways of man and are not fond of change; while merchants
in maritime nations are entirely different: they have greater opportunities
for exposure to foreign peoples of other languages and different cultures,
are predisposed to change, not afraid of the novelty and have the courage
to innovate.5
 Tridents beyond armed force  229
In 1792, when Great Britain appointed George Macartney as envoy to
China, Eastern and Western civilizations officially collided for the first
time, resulting in undesirable consequences due to the two sides being en-
tirely unable to understand one another’s conduct and actions. There was
great failure in communication, as differences over the ceremonial etiquette
of ‘kneeling and kowtow’ demonstrated that the continental world, repre-
sented by China, was at odds with the maritime world, dominated by Great
Britain. The isolation and hubris of the former, in addition to the boldness
and avarice of the latter, left indelible impressions upon one another. The
history of China’s passive acceptance of Western civilization commenced
with the Opium War in 1840. In particular, following defeat in the Second
Opium War in 1860, the self-esteem of the Chinese civilization suffered set-
backs ‘un-encountered for millennia,’ as the Chinese people not only were
conquered by foreigners’ invulnerable ships and sophisticated firepower, but
also were progressively convinced by foreign scientific and cultural beliefs,
and even political systems. Confronted by Western civilization, Chinese civ-
ilization had suffered a crushing defeat on the material and spiritual levels
as well. Thus learning from the West became both necessary and fashion-
able, which undoubtedly set a historical precedent. It should be known that
since its conception, the Chinese civilization had never experienced such hu-
miliation and never suffered such adversity. Historically, in the Zhongyuan
dynasties, defeat against foreign forces was commonplace, as China was
often also positioned at a disadvantage in battle against nomadic tribes.
In fact, elite individuals in the Empire of China also did not always believe
their military forces to be unassailable; on the level of morale, confidence
had nevertheless always prevailed. Even when facing formidable challenges
from the Hunnic Empire and the Mongol Empire, China never doubted the
superiority of its own civilization. In truth, while nomadic tribes were able
to conquer the Zhongyuan dynasties, they could not win over the hearts
and minds of the Chinese people, showing contempt for Chinese military
power but often filled with spiritual admiration for Chinese civilization. If
these nomadic emperors wished to maintain long-term peace and security,
to ensure stable governance, they had no choice but to learn from the Han
Chinese, to fuse customs and practices with those of the Han, because most
of those involved in state administration and national management were
Han Chinese. Degeneration and decline in the late Qing dynasty caused the
Chinese people to question themselves for the first time in all areas, from the
material to the psychological, objectively compelling China to start recon-
structing itself, using Western civilization as a model.
Following the Xinhai Revolution (the Chinese Revolution of 1911), the late
Qing government collapsed, but this learning process did not conclude. The
Republic of China greatly resembled Great Britain and the United States in
both style and substance and used the United States as its benchmark; the
new democratic revolution, led by the Chinese Communist party, adhered
to and studied from the Soviet model. After the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, the entire Chinese nation was at the time learning from
230  Tridents beyond armed force
the Soviet Union. From the 1960s to the late 1970s, China had, for a brief
moment, ‘turned over a new leaf,’ attempting to embark on a new trail, but
with little success; since reform and opening up, China once again turned to
the Western world, represented by the United States, by learning from the
West and integrating into the Western-led international system. It should
be noted that as China has maintained full contact and interaction with
the Western world for over 100 years, it has been studying Western systems,
culture and regulations virtually throughout this entire time. While China’s
identity as an agrarian civilization may not appear as apparent as in the
past, we must recognize that ancient Chinese experiences or culture still
have a significant impact upon China’s present-day development. Cultural
fluctuations have their own rhythm, while developments in material culture
are not necessarily able to drive advancements in nonmaterial culture.6
Although China’s material culture is already essentially in line with that
of the Western world, the evolution of its nonmaterial culture still lags be-
hind by comparison. By and large, China remains a country governed by the
mentality of agrarian civilizations. Especially when compared with mari-
time civilizations, this characteristic becomes even clearer.
The most important features of agrarian civilizations are their conserva-
tive and defensive natures. In contrast, maritime civilizations are open and
offensive. Agricultural peoples are sedentary beings, with the family being
the most basic unit of society. To establish homes around fertile farmland
far and wide, ‘to settle in peace and contentment’ and to live prosperously
with family have forever been the ultimate pursuit for the vast majority of
Chinese, who work diligently and tirelessly. If not for the inimical forces of
foreign powers, there would have been few changes in this perpetual cycle
of  agricultural life. There would even have been little difference between
rural life during the Chinese Qin dynasty and during the late Qing dynasty,
separated by over 2,000 years. Self-sufficient mode of production also en-
sured that trade was not imperative, and that there was a severe lack of mo-
tivation for foreign interaction. In the long term, China naturally moved
toward isolation and conservatism. In his outstanding work, ReOrient:
Global Economy in the Asian Age, the eminent scholar Andre Gunder Frank
exposes an important phenomenon. For almost 300 years since 1500, China
and Asia were at the heart of the global economy. China needed silver,
whereas Europe demanded Chinese goods. China had long had a trade sur-
plus, in which silver flowed toward China. However, China’s foreign trade
was entirely passive, in the interest of accumulating silver and other precious
metals rather than exchanging everyday necessities. Conservatism and pas-
sivity extended to national military and diplomacy, naturally creating undue
emphasis on defense, with the Great Wall being a classic example. Agrarian
civilizations have insufficient impetus to subjectively initiate war and engage
in expansion due to their self-sufficiency and conservatism. The ancient Chi-
nese people’s views on war and peace can be largely summarized by three
beliefs, those being: ‘prize peace,’ ‘cautions on war’ (慎战) and ‘war with
 Tridents beyond armed force  231
courtesy’ (礼战). In the words of modern international politics, this is to say
that ideas of peace take precedence and war must be waged with caution.7
Beginning with Sun Tzu, Chinese strategists have stressed the importance
of active defense. There have also of course been wars of conquest and ex-
pansion in Chinese history, but in the majority of cases they have been in
response to foreign aggression. In Antiquity, they have been forms of coun-
terattack against incessant harassment and constant invasion by nomadic
tribes, whereas in modern times, they have been a form of self-defense and
retaliation against the imperialism and hegemony of Western powers, in or-
der to pursue independence and sovereignty.

Chinese history indicates that the Han people have never been exces-
sively belligerent. In times when China showed signs of aggression, it
was often when it had been conquered by external powers and had suf-
fered rule or humiliation at the hands of foreigners.8

Sea people are often unable to achieve self-sufficiency and must trade and
communicate with the outside world. The key to their livelihoods rests nei-
ther with land nor with property but with formidable naval forces and buoy-
ant trade. For the British Empire, the crux of sustaining its hegemony was
a question of whether the Royal Navy was able to control crucial global sea
lanes, defeat opponents overseas and empower Great Britain to become the
worldwide center of trade and commerce, rather than the development and
prosperity of the British Isles themselves. Unlike the development trajecto-
ries of agrarian civilizations, the rise of modern maritime civilizations has
inevitably always involved chaos and bloodshed. During the Age of Sail,
heroes such as Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Magellan were in fact
the pioneering trailblazers of colonialism. Initially in various maritime na-
tions, most naval recruits hailed from piracy. This fully brings to light the
unscrupulous history of certain Western countries. However, there is always
another side to the story, as trade and conflict at sea have in the long run in-
culcated these countries’ national characteristics of openness and audacity.
The greatest foreign pursuit of agrarian civilizations is stability and
dignity, whereas the foremost concern of maritime civilizations are realist
­benefits – power and interests.
With regard to attitudes toward war and peace, the Chinese people prefer
peace and order. A prominent feature of Chinese culture is the pursuit of
stability and order. Chinese tend to be staunchly ‘risk averse,’ fearing situ-
ations of chaos and turbulence.9 This is very easy to understand, as during
the era of agrarian civilizations, war was the arch enemy of civilization’s
progress and society’s development; at the same time, the economy in China
was far more affluent and advanced than that of peripheral regions. Thus,
in ancient times, the Zhongyuan dynasties were not generally inclined to
expand externally through the use of armed force. Development and con-
tinuation of the Chinese civilization depended on social stability, economic
232  Tridents beyond armed force
prosperity and cultural progress. It is certainly no coincidence that Con-
fucianism, which emphasizes etiquette and hierarchical order, was highly
praised by rulers throughout history, while this is also closely connected to
Chinese people’s living environments and ways of life. ‘Eschew chaos’ and
‘stability above all else’ remain among Chinese people’s most important val-
ues. Chinese people also attach great importance to dignity and reputation
or, put more bluntly, like to save face. In the ancient East Asian system,
so long as neighboring countries symbolically expressed obedience to the
Chinese emperors, who would be reveling in the fantasy of ruling the whole
world. Then, these neighboring countries may also have benefitted from
abundant presents and rich rewards from the Zhongyuan dynasties.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China en-
tered a bitter war of words with the Soviet Union and passionately sup-
ported revolutions in Third World Countries, with little consideration of
its actual strength; to some extent at least, these activities were related to
face-saving. It was not until the end of the 20th century that China finally
began to accept the principle that national interest was the main objective
of diplomacy.
As for maritime nations, represented by Great Britain and the United
States, struggles of power form the main substance of international relations,
and the concept of interest is inborn with their founding. The 19th-century
British prime minister, Henry John Temple, the Third Viscount Palmerston,
once famously said, ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our
duty to follow.’10 Closely related to this is power. The international system
in modern Europe is a series of historical contests for hegemony and dom-
inance. With regard to Western theories of international relations, they are
undoubtedly also built on a foundation of ‘power and interests.’ National in-
terests are above all a Western tradition, and, in a sense, a tradition of mari-
time civilizations. Unlike agrarian civilizations that promote agriculture and
curtail trade, maritime civilizations all originate from commerce, invariably
leading to natural scrutiny of interests. While Westerners may of course also
value dignity and face, the Chinese treat it with far greater significance.
For agrarian civilizations, the principal method of upholding the interna-
tional order is political negotiation and concession, whereas maritime civili-
zations primarily rely on contests of power and treaty systems.
Needless to say, strength is most important cornerstone in the existence of
any international order, whether the regional order led by China in ancient
East Asia, or the modern world order led by the West. However, there are
vast differences in the main approaches to revising international relations
in the various types of international order. In ancient East Asia, members
of the international system mainly adhered to ethical principles, morals and
related Confucian norms, coordinating relations with one another through
unwritten political consultations. Based on their power, leading countries
in the system ensured its operation through methods such as conferment of
 Tridents beyond armed force  233
political titles and economic concessions. The problem was that different
leaders had different perspectives on the world, while there was a consid-
erable divergence in the definition of their countries’ responsibilities and
obligations vis-à-vis that of other countries. In Chinese history for instance,
there was both restraint in the use of force under the rule of Emperor Zhu
Yuanzhang, who declared 15 countries ‘forbidden to be conquered’ and cav-
alier dominance during the era of the Qianlong Emperor, who pursued ‘Ten
Great Campaigns.’ Similarly, during the Zhongyuan dynasties, neighboring
countries’ attitudes toward China varied greatly according to regime suc-
cession and changes in leadership. Any set of bilateral relations required
specific consultations, which may vary with time, actors and location. There
is little uniformity, but much discretion, in such relationships.
Maritime civilizations successfully integrate commercial contracts and
credibility into international relations. Both permitted and proscribed ac-
tions, respective responsibilities and obligations are recorded in black and
white in treaties. In modern times, many situations that do not comply with
treaties or demand changes in treaties, have been mediated through war or
diplomatic games, based of course on fundamentals of strength. The current
international system is in fact a system of treaties under a power framework,
with the profound signature of maritime civilizations. Such prominent and
palpable differences in conduct remain even to this day. Although China,
which is influenced by the traits and conduct of agrarian civilizations, has
experienced over a century of study and integration, it is at present not en-
tirely accustomed to the treaty system. Since the founding of the PRC, it has
formed alliances with the Soviet Union, certain Third World Countries, and
the United States in succession, and then quickly parted ways with them all.
There were many reasons for this, but definitely included China’s unfamili-
arity with cultivating bilateral relations according to treaty systems. China
did not wish to be subject to unnecessary treaty constraints for the sake of
alliances. Even if treaties were to apply, China does not want excessively
specific regulations, preferring ambiguous and imprecise ones, while hop-
ing to maintain requisite flexibility and leeway for maneuver. According to
treaty terms, China and North Korea are allies, while the United States and
South Korea are also allies. However, the former situation is undoubtedly
not as clear as the latter. On the issue of its nuclear tests, North Korea pays
little heed to China, whereas South Korea requires US approval even to
extend its missile firing range from 300 to 800 kilometers. Although in 1961
China and North Korea signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and
Cooperation Friendship Treaty, which is comparable to a military alliance
as ‘this treaty guarantees that when a signatory is in a state of war, the other
signatory must do all within its power to provide military aid and other
forms of assistance,’ the exact interpretation, comprehension, implementa-
tion and other issues depend entirely on how different leaders on both sides
perceive China’s relations with North Korea, which at times may be insepa-
rable but at other times irreconcilable (Table 10.1).
234  Tridents beyond armed force
Table 10.1  M
 ajor differences in the ways agrarian civilizations and maritime
civilizations approach foreign relations

Diplomatic mode of agrarian Diplomatic mode of Maritime

civilizations (China) civilizations (the United States
and Great Britain)

Main features Conservative and Defensive Open and Offensive

Value orientation Order and dignity Power and interests
Customary path Political negotiation and Power contests and treaty
concessions rules

Comparative analysis along these distinct lines may indeed seem exces-
sively abstract and oversimplified. It also cannot explain all historical nar-
ratives and experiences. Chinese maritime trade thrived during the Song
and Yuan dynasties, while the story of Zheng He’s seafaring voyages in the
southwest to as far as Africa also strongly highlighted China’s maritime
heritage; for a considerable period of time after its founding, the United
States pursued the ‘Monroe doctrine,’ illustrating classic characteristics of
continental culture as it was content to enjoy sovereignty over the Ameri-
cas. This model was also overly idealistic and idiosyncratic. Agrarian and
maritime are relative terms. As modern China has accepted many Western
views, matters at present are obviously not entirely conducted according to
concepts of agrarian civilizations; nor are the majority of Western countries
necessarily textbook maritime nations. With the exception of Great Britain,
which may be described as a purely maritime nation, even the United States
has very strong continental cultural connections. However, these compar-
isons still have key practical significance. To this day, even as China ob-
serves, understands and transforms the world, its conceptions of agrarian
civilizations or the perspectives and influences of continental culture still by
far outweigh those of maritime civilizations. The opposite is true for Brit-
ain, the United States and other Western countries. Overall, China remains
a country where mentalities of continental culture and agrarian civilizations
reigns supreme, whereas Britain, the United States and the remainder of the
Western world, remain for the most part countries dominated by a maritime
civilizational outlook.
The purpose of such a comparison is not in fact to determine whether
agrarian or maritime civilizations are superior, but to better understand
oneself, comprehend others and more effectively integrate into the world.
The Chinese civilization is the epitome of an agrarian civilization. Its di-
alectical understanding of concepts such as disputes and pursuits of peace
and harmony will be inherited and promoted if well organized, strongly
contrasting with shortcomings in the West’s path and current international
system.11
However, reviving the Chinese civilization certainly does not imply suf-
fering delusions of grandeur or resting on one’s laurels. Regardless of the
 Tridents beyond armed force  235
criteria in question, whether the accumulation of maritime tradition and
culture, or awareness and experience at sea, there remains an enormous gap
between China and Western countries like Britain and the United States. In
practical maritime affairs, especially in diplomacy, China trails maritime
civilizations by a vast distance. China has always persevered with integra-
tion into the current international system, in hopes of reform rather than to
start from scratch and to overthrow the entire international order. Further-
more, as China has already decided to build its maritime power, it not only
need to make strides toward the seas from the continent in terms of action,
but also it must progress from an agrarian civilization to a maritime civili-
zation in terms of its mindset and beliefs. In this process, diplomacy policy
will be the first to undergo a series of transitions. China must learn from
Britain, the United States and other Western countries to be open, confident
and enterprising; learn how to rationally confront and manage conflicts by
standing firm on national interests; become familiar with the spirit of the
contract, skillfully use treaty systems and rules; and clearly define and de-
velop relations with countries around the world.

Efforts for international ‘legitimacy’ and maritime

discourse power
Humans are gregarious creatures. An individual’s or a group’s political ac-
tions must all be acknowledged or recognized by others. The construction
of a maritime power is no exception. Not only does it require considerable
strength, but it also demands a certain degree of international legitimacy
and recognition from the international community.
‘Legitimacy’ is a very important concept in political science and politics
in practice. In the political sense, legitimacy is defined as the extent to which
the wider public accepts a certain regime or power. Legitimacy does not in
fact simply refer to the principle of legality in law, for it also has underlying
implications regarding the public’s recognition of and respect for authority,
regardless of whether the behavior of this authority complies with existing
legal rulings.
The international community is in a state of anarchy and disorder, lack-
ing a central authority. A country may obey or recognize other countries
due to power, interests, or ideology. Countries with superior strength can
rely completely on hard power to build a cut-throat imperial order. For in-
stance, countries either capitulated against or were decimated when facing
the Mongol Empire, founded by Genghis Khan. Other hegemonic countries
with weaker military strength must temper justice with mercy in order to
win the support and docility of other countries, on the one hand practic-
ing deterrence, while on the other hand presenting them with interests and
benefits; a country with relatively power strength depends more on trans-
fer of interests and ideological inducement. After the end of the Cold War,
large-scale applications of military power are greatly restricted and a trend
236  Tridents beyond armed force
of decentralization is emerging in developments of power. Not only is the
pattern of international power becoming multipolarized, but the power of
sovereign states is being eroded by non-sovereign actors. In this situation,
the construction of imperial orders and hegemonic orders becomes increas-
ingly unfeasible. It is even difficult for the United States, a superpower, to
act independently with no regard for others. For any country, the majority
of its actions must receive the international community’s recognition. Thus,
the matter of international legitimacy has become a recent subject of vital
importance.
Legitimacy is not the same as justice. It is not awarded by the UN or
the International Court of Justice. It is dynamic and must be striven for
individually. ‘Whosoever can amass greater legitimacy, will receive com-
paratively more support from the international community.’ Whoever has
power over codes of conduct, principles and the right to express and explain
international trends has greater legitimacy. Strength is the foundation of le-
gitimacy, upon which major powers intervene in international affairs, but is
undoubtedly not the only condition required. Aside from armed deterrence
and allocation of benefits, guidance of ideas is also of critical importance.
Guiding ideas, also known as mastering the rules of the game, is in reality
the issue of international discourse power. One’s ideas, proposals and rhet-
oric should be able to attract and win over other parties.
It is inevitably necessary to mention international discourse power when
discussing international legitimacy. At present, various actors, including
sovereign states, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organ-
izations, seek discourse power as the main objective of contention in inter-
national public opinion. In addition, they actively demand that their specific
involvement in that international discourse be consolidated as part of the
rules of the game, and commonly accepted by the international community.
To some extent, international politics has progressively become ‘the politics
of discourse.’12 Discourse is power, as power is ingrained in language. Dis-
course power does not refer to whether one has the right to speak, but the
application and expression of power through language.
World history was entering the great divergence around the year 1500,
as Europe and the United States rapidly overtook the rest of the world,
including China and other civilizations, by virtue of large-scale maritime
exploration and the Industrial Revolution. As European and American
countries competed over the seas, they gradually promoted the formation
of the international order and world system, inaugurated with the Peace of
Westphalia (1648). In almost 400 years of history, Europe and the United
States have virtually monopolized the discourse of maritime power. They
relentlessly mass produce political and economic jargon and statements on
sea power, oceanic activities, maritime law and maritime policy, which are
then carried to all countries worldwide. They coerced all countries to ac-
cept such discourse, and in doing so devised rules of the game that favored
maritime activities of Europe and the United States. Almost all civilizations
 Tridents beyond armed force  237
worldwide have been yoked into Europe’s and the United States’ track and
have no choice but to accept rules of the game that they formulated. All non-­
Western countries were in a passive and mute state. China, as a non-Western
country, was naturally placed in an acquiescent and voiceless position in the
system of maritime discourse.13
Modern China has remained near silent on the process of constructing
a maritime order and has even suffered greatly as a result. China had long
been afflicted by poverty and fragility, with simply no strength to spare to
advance toward the sea. In an era when warships dominated above all else,
China had no power to interfere in any major maritime issues.
After the end of the Second World War, economic globalization and in-
terdependence flourished, as the world entered an environment of overall
peace and stability. Although regional wars continued to occur, no large-
scale wars between maritime powers ensued. With the rising tide of global
decolonization and resurgence of developing countries, the dominance of
hegemons and superpowers in maritime affairs was somewhat diluted. The
international maritime order gradually progressed in the direction of justice
and fairness, while a series of maritime norms and mechanisms were even-
tually formed on the basis of negotiations and consultations. Among these,
the negotiations and signature of UNCLOS represent a crucial triumph
for a large number of developing countries in the construction of a new in-
ternational maritime order. Although military strength at sea remains the
bedrock and support upon which sovereign countries engage in maritime
affairs, diplomatic capabilities and experience in international law are also
becoming increasingly important. In the process of building a new interna-
tional maritime order, a number of small coastal states have played a major
role and wielded influence incommensurate with their national strength.
Unfortunately, due to a lack of strategic foresight and inadequacies in ex-
perience, China has not sufficiently seized this critical juncture to adjust the
maritime order, forfeiting an opportunity to peacefully pursue more power
in maritime discourser. Although China has actively participated in negotia-
tions, it was only as a bystander. China more commonly echoed views of devel-
oping countries, demarcating lines according to ideology, without significant
considerations on the impacts of UNCLOS system for China and the world.
The celebrated diplomat Ling Qing, who participated in the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, remarks in his memoirs that

support of the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone is linked to

the resistance against hegemony. At that time, as China was establish-
ing diplomatic relations with countries in Latin America, all committed
to a clear position on the issue. I myself also believe that support should
be an immutable matter of principle.14

In reality, the advantages of the 200-mile EEZ system far outweigh the dis-
advantages for a country such as China, with its semi-unfavorable maritime
238  Tridents beyond armed force
geographic conditions. The rapid intensification of disputes over delimita-
tions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is also due to none
other than the signature and implementation of UNCLOS.
Even today, as China advances toward the sea in earnest and on a grand
scale, it finds itself positioned in a multifaceted embarrassing situation of
insufficient strength, unfavorable geography, and scant international dis-
course power. Due to combined disruption in the distribution of power, late-
comers’ disadvantages, the geopolitical environment, maritime disputes and
various other factors, the building of China’s maritime power is currently
encountering an enormous ‘legitimacy’ crisis. The United States attempts
to contain China as it turns itself into a maritime power, while countries
such as Japan, India and Russia remain vigilant and even seek checks and
balances against it, and small- and medium-sized countries in the vicinity
are in a state of collective anxiety and fear. Very few countries will be happy
to witness China’s successes. While China has not yet achieved its potential
strength at sea, the China threat theory has already spread far and wide. As
for China’s ‘failure to comply with international law,’ ‘use of armed force to
change the regional status quo,’ ‘intent to become the maritime hegemon’
such negative news reports have engulfed major global media outlets. On
the part of China’s sea power, the international community is clearly not
yet prepared to accept a strong Chinese navy, nor is it ready to acknowledge
the scope of China’s core maritime interests and indispensable security bor-
ders. It does not even show the respect for China’s basic maritime economic
rights and interests as required. China’s military modernization and actions
to safeguard maritime interests have often served as an excuse for certain
countries to attack China on the international stage. The international ‘le-
gitimacy’ crisis is a hurdle that China’s maritime power has no choice but to
overcome in its development.
To resolve this predicament, strategic clarification is perhaps imperative.
It first requires clarification of China’s claims and strategic goals. What are
China’s specific objectives as a maritime power and how will China ful-
fill them? What kind of maritime order does China endorse, and how will
China wield its international influence? How to improve communication
with other international actors, demonstrate China’s objectives of devel-
oping military strength and express its intentions in applying of military
power is the other major issue in the accumulation of international legiti-
macy. It is important to understand ‘what will China do and in what man-
ner’ rather than ‘what does China have.’ There are extremely complicated
reasons as to why there is no international consensus on China’s construc-
tion of a maritime power. For some countries, this includes needs in power
struggles, factors stemming from suppression of China in moral and public
opinion and also indeed misunderstandings due to barriers in communica-
tion. There also indeed exist misunderstandings as a result of obstacles in
communication. With regard to the former, China must fight with determi-
nation and resolve, whereas for the latter, it unquestionably needs to reflect
 Tridents beyond armed force  239
upon and improve its diplomatic thinking, as well as approaches to public
opinion and propaganda.
For instance, China has always adhered to international law and has
never impeded freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Nevertheless,
there is widespread concern from the international community regarding
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This is related both to the
deception, prevarications and deliberately tarnishing the image of China
from countries such as the United States, Vietnam and the Philippines, and
is influenced by the nebulous nature of China’s strategy and position on the
South China Sea. In view of this, Chinese policy ought to be clearer, more
open, and more nuanced.
Greater clarity means that China needs clear and viable design at the
highest level in order to promote correct understanding and expectations
domestically and overseas. The negative effects of maintaining ambiguous
policies were not yet evident when China’s military strength and capacity
for economic development were relatively limited. Today, as China’s diverse
strengths continue to rapidly flourish, there is ever greater urgency for a
clearer strategy, so as to domestically consolidate policy comprehension
and integrate measures and resources, while internationally stabilizing
other parties’ behavior expectations on China, and reducing external mis-
conceptions and erroneous judgments. What are the objectives of China’s
maritime strategy and policies? How will it apply its power pursue these
goals? What are China’s positions on and justifications for disputes? A pleth-
ora of other such issues need to be systematically elaborated upon and clar-
ified. For instance, a policy white paper or strategic document on the South
China Sea could be published to codify and perpetuate one’s claims through
various mechanisms for bilateral dialogue, multilateral platforms within the
ASEAN framework, in addition to other international arenas.
More openness indicates that China ought to behave as a major power and
open its doors to examine issues and discuss cooperation with various par-
ties. Take the South China Sea for example, first and foremost, it is necessary
to distinguish island sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes from
non-dispute matters, such as freedom of navigation and regional security.
The two types of affairs can then be treated separately from one another: on
non-dispute matters, China can conduct consultations with any country or
organization at any time and place and be more proactive in the establish-
ment of relevant international mechanisms. China can also engage more ex-
tensively in various military exercises, taking the initiative to cooperate with
relevant parties in law enforcement, convoy efforts, disaster relief and other
fields, as well as making greater contributions. On disputed issues, China
should welcome all rational dialogue and communication while resolutely
opposing multilateralism and internationalization. Whether it is regarding
codes of conduct in the South China Sea, or various proposals to ‘freeze’ is-
sues as suggested by countries such as the United States and the Philippines,
China can initiate negotiations or communications with relevant parties.
240  Tridents beyond armed force
Greater nuance and sensitivity means that China still needs to enhance
its communication skills on the operational level of diplomacy, so that the
international community may feel more comfortable about China. China’s
rapid ascent will inevitably increase pressure upon neighboring countries,
whose fear of China and unwarranted interpretations of Chinese ‘strength’
reflect routine patterns in international relations. Furthermore, it is nor-
mal for some countries to express concern about China’s safeguarding of
its rights. It is imperative that China’s policymaking individuals and de-
partments understand and attach great importance to the psychology of the
weak, who should not be perceived purely as unreasonable and vexatious.
Even on matters that engender conflicting views and irreconcilable posi-
tions, it is necessary to maintain calm and rationality. One must suppress
thunderous outbursts of wrath and not casually label others as ‘friend or
foe.’ China not only needs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
its external communication, clearly articulating its positions and opinions
to the outside world, but also listen diligently and patiently to the views
and demands of all sides involved, truly comprehending the meanings and
subtleties behind the rhetoric of other parties. There ought to be more in-
depth communication and interaction, and less senseless criticism and fewer
accusations.
Clarity furthermore requires that China promotes the world maritime
order toward the direction of lesser ambiguity and lesser equivocality by
influencing and reshaping international norms. With regard to the accusa-
tion of outsiders, if China were to adopt a policy of blind circumvention and
accommodation, this will objectively reinforce other countries’ emphasis
on their own core interests and select international norms. In the long run,
this may incite greater resistance against China’s rise. China cannot become
ensnared in the externally manufactured logic of constantly explaining to
the outside world that ‘we do not possess this’ and ‘we are peace-loving.’
Instead, China needs to strengthen its rhetoric against the outside world,
emphasizing the logic of ‘why China should be able to possess this.’ China
needs most to consider how to persuade foreign countries to accept its goals
by applying norms and rules that are generally accepted by their domes-
tic political forces. At the same time, no matter whether a country’s core
security interests, or the norms and rules it advocates, they all have a cer-
tain degree of stability and are simultaneously positioned in a process of
dynamic development. Legitimization strategies therefore encompass both
reinforcement of interaction and communication, reorienting countries’ in-
terests toward cooperation rather than conflict with those of China and the
creation of new norms or refinement of existing norms, dovetailing them
with Chinese interests.
In addition, while promoting clarity, it is necessary to enhance how in-
ternational legitimacy is presented. First, China needs to properly uphold
and publicize its overall national strategy of peaceful development. Devel-
oping or rising peacefully does not in fact imply that China renounces the
 Tridents beyond armed force  241
use of force, but rather that it will practice restraint and refrain from using
armed force as the primary method of its development and rise. China’s
emergence is for the most part a peaceful process. China must apply tradi-
tional force with caution and prudence, and furthermore actively contribute
public goods to the international community. It should continue to pursue
a policy of good neighborliness, without resorting to threats of armed force
and without relying on military measures as the main means of resolving
territorial sovereignty issues and maritime delimitation disputes between
China and its neighboring countries. Even in times of crisis, when there is
little choice except to enforce military measures, restrictions must be im-
posed. China ought to boost its contributions of global public goods for
international security, making this one of the most important fields in the
way its military power is applied.
As described above, all countries are paying increasing attention to
non-warfare applications of military power. Owing to constraints from
­China’s development environment and chosen developmental path, it is dif-
ficult to imagine the large-scale application of military power in traditional
security issues, including the capture of islands and reefs, control of waters
and the annihilation of foreign forces. However, there remain bright pros-
pects for China’s maritime forces in nontraditional security domains, such
as combating piracy at sea, opposing international terrorism, promoting
nonproliferation, maintaining security on the high seas, and contributing
to maritime disaster relief. China’s demonstration of restraint in traditional
security fields and active participation in matters concerning international
public security will be of benefit in rectifying the international community’s
negative perceptions of the Chinese military forces.
With regard to publicizing its grand strategy of peaceful development, in
future China ought to pay greater attention to its own developmental path
and the domestic situation. China has focused on making highly methodi-
cal and extremely detailed explanations of times condition, China’s peace-­
loving traditional culture, and other factors while propagating the path
to peaceful development. In 2011, the Chinese government issued a white
paper titled ‘China’s Peaceful Development,’ which demonstrated China’s
perspective and its determination to take the peaceful road to development.
This white paper specified that ‘Taking the peaceful road to development
has rich historical roots and cultural foundations in China, embodying a
sincere desire and unremitting quest of the Chinese people.’15
This declaration is an excellent demonstration to the outside world of
China’s commitment to peaceful development, but undoubtedly such a
statement would not be enough to convince the international community.
Peaceful development is not so much an international strategy as a domestic
strategy, which is often a reflection of a country’s domestic politics. There-
fore the outside world often pays greater attention to China’s economic tran-
sitions, political reform and other domestic development issues. The simple
truth is that if a country’s domestic political and economic development
242  Tridents beyond armed force
model is sustainable and its developmental path remains peaceful and har-
monious overall, it will not have any substantial incentive or desire for over-
seas expansion. Since its reform and opening up, China has accomplished
spectacular feats in its development. How is it possible that China has per-
formed such miracles under the existing international system? Analyzing
such issues from the perspective of China’s own developmental path would
provide more compelling answers.
Actively formulating a tactic of ‘honoring the king, expelling barbarians’
in the modern era has been the preferred international legitimacy strategy
for countries seeking hegemony or dominance since ancient times. ‘King’
herein indicates universally acknowledged and generally accepted forms
of international conduct, which function as norms and standards, whereas
‘barbarians’ broadly refer to major threats to the international community.
For the purpose of upholding international integrity and justice, China
ought to assume greater responsibility and play a more prominent role
wherever possible in response to regional security threats and global issues.
At the same time, international action should center less on core interests
and concentrate more on common interests, fixate less on self-interest and
focus more on international justice. It is important to understand that inter-
national political culture has clearly advanced and that no single country
can unabashedly pursue its national interests in today’s society, with the
United States being no exception. All diplomatic actions, especially military
operations, must take into account international public opinion, or that is to
say, international popular views.
Of course, practical action and endeavors alone are far from sufficient,
as corresponding presentation is also of utmost importance. A successful
propaganda strategy is one that intrinsically fuses the national interests
it strives toward with the concerns of international audiences, amply re-
flecting new trends and movements. One example of how legitimacy was
successfully presented was when the United States skillfully combined the
fight against global terrorism with its military strategy of advancing into
Central Asia during the war in Afghanistan, winning the support of almost
all actors worldwide. A less successful instance of how legitimacy was pre-
sented was when the United States, once again, linked defense against mass
destruction weapons with its desire to occupy and dominate Iraq. Although
the United States was able to gather support and corral troops from certain
countries, most countries, including France, Germany, China and Russia,
all decided to oppose its actions. This is due to the international commu-
nity’s lack of conviction that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed mass de-
struction weapons and in the belief that the United States was waging war
in pursuit of hegemony. The crisis of US legitimacy during the war in Iraq
war even had impacts on the world’s general perception of US hegemony,
seriously affecting the soft power that the United States prides itself upon.
China is in the shadow of US containment measures, beset by numer-
ous regional security difficulties and politically alienated from the Western
 Tridents beyond armed force  243
countries that dominate the international order. China’s pursuit of legiti-
macy in its military operations thus involves arduous tasks and faces an up-
hill journey. As a consequence, China must attach greater importance to the
presentation of international legitimacy in its military activities. It is neces-
sary to garner, accumulate and create new resources for legitimacy during
peacetime, while not only paying close attention to each country’s foreign
policy and military strategy, but also augmenting the understanding of and
research into these countries’ domestic socio-political circumstances and
ideological inclinations, in addition to religious affairs and other situations.
In order to swiftly integrate a range of resources, as well as optimize and
improve methods used in propaganda and communication, China needs not
only to bolster military diplomacy and improve means of communication in
the course of action, but also to robustly advance newly emerging channels
of communication and modes of expression, such as social media. In terms
of style and substance, China must pay greater heed to the international
community’s mindset and sentiment, communicating with others, while vol-
unteering more information and details in expressing views and positions.

The essence of peacefully winning the maritime contest

As the probability of large-scale battles at sea between major powers be-
comes extremely remote, the main functions of armed force and military
power have focused on deterrence. As an era of overall peace at sea dawns,
this trident, which embodies development and management of the oceans,
will play an ever more important role in the process of constructing a mari-
time power. The oceans contain close to 70 percent of the Earth’s space and
natural resources and represent humanity’s last beacon of wonder and hope.
The 21st century is hailed as the ‘ocean-century,’ as the marine economy is
currently fully entering the age of marine industrialization from its state of
natural economy, the comprehensive and three-dimensional development of
marine space is the trend of the times. Whosoever has the strongest develop-
ment and management capabilities has the greatest likelihood of emerging
victorious in this new maritime race.
At present, China’s marine economy accounts for approximately 10 per-
cent of its total GDP, which is far lower than respective figures in traditional
maritime powers such as the United States and Japan16; science and tech-
nology, contribute merely 35 percent to China’s marine economy, whereas
this figure reaches more than 50 percent in the United States and Japan.
It can be stated that regardless of whether in terms of quantity or quality,
there remains a considerable gap between China and the world’s marine
economic powers. If we take growth rates into consideration, the outlook
is even less optimistic. From ‘General Operations of the Marine Economy,’
issued annually by the State Oceanic Administration, growth rates in the
Chinese marine economy are not in fact high, not even exceeding the rate of
GDP growth in some years.
244  Tridents beyond armed force
With regard to measuring indicators of development and management, in
addition to potential for peaceful competition at sea, one may say to each
his own personal opinions and preferences. However, management exper-
tise, technological and scientific capability, and actual maritime space oc-
cupied are indisputably the three most crucial core aspects of competition.
If China wishes to triumph in this peaceful contest, it must be willing to go
the extra mile on these three areas.
First of all is management expertise. Development and management of
the oceans are increasingly becoming an extremely complex and profes-
sional enterprise, involving the humanities, social sciences, agricultural
studies, engineering, medicine and almost all fields of science, in addition to
the participation of a significant number of individuals, corporations, offi-
cial institutions and other actors. As of 2016, in China, 36.24 million people
were employed in ocean-related industries nationwide and the value of the
total marine output reached RMB 7050.7 billion, accounting for 9.5 percent
of total gross national product.17 The enormity of this scale and high de-
gree of professionalism prominently highlight the importance of integrated
management. Therefore, in peaceful maritime contests, all countries must
compete first and foremost on the basis of management capability.
As mankind turns increasingly toward the seas, and with the extensive
application of UNCLOS, all coastal states will face management predic-
aments of differing severities. Beginning in the mid-1990s, major coastal
states such as Canada, the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Russia, India
and South Korea all introduced laws of the sea and comprehensive mari-
time strategies, in order to further improve policy and regulations, enhance
overall maritime management and maximize efficiency. The Canadian gov-
ernment published and implemented its Law of the Sea in as early as 1997,
thus making Canada the first country in the world to establish legislation
on comprehensive maritime management. In July 2000, The US Congress
enacted the Oceans Act of 2000 (known in full as An Act to Establish a
Commission on Ocean Policy and for Other Purposes), which offered legal
safeguards for the US adoption of maritime policy in the new century. Un-
der this act, the US Commission on Ocean Policy officially submitted a pol-
icy report, titled ‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century,’ to the President
and to Congress on the 20 September 2004. The report, which specifically
recommends strengthening ‘coastal and watershed management activities,
and growing efforts to link these two approaches’ and introducing the new
concept of ‘ecosystem-based management,’ vastly enriches connotations of
integrated maritime management. Furthermore, on 17 December, President
George W. Bush presented the US Ocean Action Plan to Congress, propos-
ing concrete measures to execute ‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century.’
In 2007, the Japanese parliament passed The Basic Act on Ocean Policy
and promulgated its ‘Oceanic State’ strategy. Shortly thereafter, Japan an-
nounced a series of legislation, regulations and plans in support of The Ba-
sic Act on Ocean Policy, fully implementing maritime strategies and policies
 Tridents beyond armed force  245
while bolstering its competitiveness at sea. In that same year, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam also published its ‘Mari-
time Strategy towards the Year 2020,’ which clearly introduced the strategic
goal of building maritime power. In May 2012, Vietnam issued its Law of the
Sea, expediting its previously established maritime strategy.
China has clearly lagged behind on this front. Presently, it is of utmost im-
portance to formulate a cohesive and coordinated national maritime devel-
opment strategy, a comprehensive system of maritime laws and regulations,
and a complete system of strategic planning, zoning, policies and guidelines
for development at sea. The current priority ought to be the enactment of a
Chinese Ocean Basic Law and the refinement of maritime legal systems. The
Ocean Basic Law should reflect the national position on maritime issues in
addition to its guiding principles and fundamental strategies with regard to
operations at sea. The Ocean Basic Law occupies a dominant position and
takes precedence above lex specialis in the maritime legal system. This is the
legal basis upon which China administers maritime affairs domestically and
safeguards its rights and interests internationally.
Along with the establishment of regulations, various coastal states have
simultaneously stepped up institutional restructuring of ocean-related de-
partments and additionally established mechanisms for integrated mari-
time management.
In December 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order
13366, establishing the Committee on Ocean Policy as a part of the Council
on Environmental Quality to coordinate ocean-related activities of various
US departments and agencies, as well as assume overall responsibility for
the execution of US maritime policy. In 2010, President Obama signed an
Executive Order on ‘Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great
Lakes,’ dissolving the Committee on Ocean Policy founded in 2004, while
creating the cabinet-level National Ocean Council. Directly subordinate to
the Executive Office of the President, the National Ocean Council is respon-
sible for directing and coordinating all ocean-related tasks of federal de-
partments, in order to implement national maritime policy in a pragmatic
and sensible manner.
In January 2001, the government of Japan initiated large-scale reforms
to downsize its executive branch. Following restructuring and reorganiza-
tion of ocean-related departments and offices, responsibility for the man-
agement of maritime affairs lies mainly with eight administrative agencies,
namely, the Cabinet Office; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Tech-
nology; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Ministry of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry; Ministry of the Environment; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; and the Ministry of Defense. The Department for Comprehensive
Ocean Policy, established in accordance with The Basic Act on Ocean Pol-
icy, is the leading agency in Japan’s ‘state maritime governance,’ overseen
by Prime Minister and his Cabinet Office. The Minister of State for Ocean
246  Tridents beyond armed force
Policy is responsible for this department, who is also the Minister of Land,
Transport and Communications, while remaining members concurrently
are appointed by relevant state ministers.
Russia also places considerable emphasis on comprehensive management
of the oceans. The integrated maritime model it pioneered was the first of
its kind worldwide, established almost 10 years prior to that of the United
States. The Marine Board under the Government of the Russian Federation,
established on 1 September 2001 with the approval of the Russian govern-
ment, is the most powerful institution for integrated maritime management
in Russia. As a permanent governing body, its main responsibilities are to
coordinate all maritime affairs of federal administrative bodies and sci-
entific organizations, including all research and development activities in
oceans worldwide and in the polar regions.
From reforms to maritime management mechanisms in the United States,
Japan, Russia and other maritime powers, it is clear to see that every coastal
state follows an essentially similar track in integrating their institutions
and improving their efficiency, achieving the same results through different
methods. First there is the establishment of a comprehensive maritime gov-
ernance institution at the national level, responsible for drafting policy and
overall planning, in addition to integrating the activities of ocean-related de-
partments and enhancing overall coordination; second is the consolidation
of existing ocean-related departments, curtailment of institutions, clarifi-
cation of responsibilities and improvement of efficiency in implementation.
Since 2012, China has established the Central Leading Group for Safe-
guarding Maritime Rights and Interests in addition to its Office (abbrevi-
ated as the ‘Central Maritime Rights Office’),18 founded the National Ocean
Council, reformed and strengthened the Coast Guard, split and reorganized
the relevant functions of the State Oceanic Administration.19 Among these
organizations, the Central Maritime Rights Office belonging to Central
Foreign Affairs Committee is an executive coordination mechanism for the
safeguard of maritime rights and interests, specifically responsible for coordi-
nating Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Ecological Environment,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Agri-
culture, Chinese military and other ocean-related departments to integrate
the management of maritime rights, interests and other issues. Ministry of
Natural Resources and Ministry of Ecological Environment represent SOA
to supervise the use of seas, manage the protection of marine environments,
safeguard maritime rights and interests in accordance with the law and or-
ganize maritime scientific and technological research. At present, it would
appear that the Central Maritime Rights Office specializes in coordinating
operations to uphold rights and devising maritime strategy, while the Na-
tional Ocean Council and Ministry of Natural Resources focus on develop-
ment and management of the seas as a whole. It should be pointed out that
China’s reform of maritime related institutions is still in exploratory and far
from completed, and there would be some major adjustments in the future.
 Tridents beyond armed force  247
Second, maritime powers compete on the basis of marine scientific re-
search capabilities. Science and technology are the primary driving forces
of productivity, while for all countries, advancements in marine science and
technology are crucial and play a decisive role in the maritime contest. Ma-
rine science and technology, already at the forefront of global technological
rivalries, are becoming an increasingly important part of national mari-
time development, as, one after another, countries draft scientific marine
strategies and substantially boost investment in research, so as to seize a
commanding position in science and technology. In view of China’s sizea-
ble population, comparatively limited maritime space, and onerous devel-
opmental pressures, any rapid and healthy development in China’s marine
economy must rely on substantial advancements in maritime technological
capability, increasing efficiency in the use of resources and space through
technological progress. In fact, marine technological strategy is both the
forerunner and the cornerstone of maritime strategy for various global mar-
itime powers. The United States, Great Britain, Japan and other maritime
powers began work on researching and planning national marine techno-
logical policy in as early as the 1960s, issuing multiple strategy and policy
documents on marine science and technology. In contrast, it was not until
2006 that China drafted its first national level planning document, namely
‘An Outline of Plans for the Development of Marine Science and Technol-
ogy as part of the National 11th Five-Year Plan.’ In terms of investment in
marine research and exploration, although there have been numerous spe-
cial initiatives in recent years to promote the development of marine science
and technology, overall investment nonetheless still lags far behind that of
the world’s maritime powers.
Furthermore, as efficiency in scientific research remains relatively low
in China on the whole, there remains an enormous difference in the over-
all sophistication of China’s marine technologies and that of the United
States, Japan and other major maritime powers, with China lagging behind
by 10–15 years. Due precisely to its underdevelopment of marine science
and technology, China is vulnerable in areas such as marine research, sur-
veillance and protection of the marine environment, marine economic in-
dustrialization, while it is not compatible with the reality of safeguarding
maritime rights and developing the marine economy. During international
joint search and rescue operations for MH370 in 2014, although China made
huge contributions, equivalent to almost half of total international invest-
ment, its input was mediocre on a technological level. All major discoveries
were made by the United States, Great Britain and other countries, while
key processes depended entirely on Western technology. Moreover, do-
mestically produced Chinese equipment was humbled by advanced foreign
equipment, once again exposing shortcomings in the development of Chi-
na’s marine economy.
For breakthroughs in the realm of maritime technology, increases in in-
vestment are essential, but even more important are improvements in the
248  Tridents beyond armed force
efficiency of scientific research. On the one hand, the government ought to
increase its financial investment, so that investment in maritime scientific
research and technological development may occupy an appropriate pro-
portion of investment in the overall marine economy and accommodate the
needs of marine economic development. Government investment mainly
centers on more sophisticated, higher risk, basic theoretical research and
exploration projects conducted over long periods of time. On the other
hand, the state ought to boost social investment in maritime technology,
devoting social capital to relatively more practical scientific developments
and technological innovations, using policies as guidance, financial leverage
as encouragement and other measures to promote greater investment of so-
cial capital in maritime science and technology. While financial investment
at the state and all governmental levels is of course important, research
endeavors of private enterprises, at whose core is economic efficiency, are
more critical. When boosting investment, the state moreover must at the
same time focus on fostering a supportive environment for enterprises to
conduct scientific research in terms of policy and management.
Maritime powers depend on the support of competitive industries. China
should concentrate its efforts on becoming a world leader in numerous
marine economic industries. It should focus on the integrated and three-­
dimensional utilization of coastal areas, endeavoring to establish industries
like pharmaceuticals based on marine organisms, equipment manufactur-
ing, coastal tourism and offshore aquaculture, striving to advance technol-
ogy in various major traditional industries, using scientific and technological
innovations to improve the efficiency of space utilization. In deep-sea areas
and the open oceans, China should particularly boost research investment
spending on deep sea exploration, study of marine biology, maritime sur-
veillance, remote sensing at sea and other fields; improve technology and
equipment used in deep-sea exploration, including deep water submersible
technologies, comprehensive technologies used in the search for offshore
natural gas hydrates and those of offshore oil and gas platforms, taking the
initiative to explore new domains in both familiar and unfamiliar maritime
spaces. Furthermore, as large quantities of manganese nodules, sulfide ore
and resources are present on seabed ‘areas,’ China must also aim at ad-
vancing its technologies in deep-sea exploration, mineral extraction, among
other fields of scientific research.
World-class maritime equipment forms the basis upon which humans are
able to command the seas. This is particularly true for deep-sea drilling
and extraction, in addition to exploration in the open oceans and polar re-
gions. China is known across the world for its manufacturing and has an
extensive oceangoing shipbuilding industry with excess production capac-
ity. However, from onshore laboratories to scientific trials at sea, 90 percent
of important equipment components need to be imported. In considera-
tion of this, China needs to accelerate the creation of advanced products
in a number of industries, including deep-submergence vehicles, deep-sea
 Tridents beyond armed force  249
drilling vessels, offshore drilling systems, dynamic positioning systems,
deep-sea mooring systems, high-performance power generators on offshore
platforms, large offshore cranes, jack-up rigs and underwater production
systems; have the capability to provide deep-sea pipeline and standpipe sys-
tems, as well as independently design and manufacture maritime surveil-
lance facilities, integrated offshore platforms for observation, underwater
apparatus, submersible operational equipment and transferable basic com-
ponents for deep-sea use.
Finally, space is essential for any form of human activity. As a maritime
power rises, it will naturally flourish over vast maritime expanses. Although
China does not seek to rise by means of war, this does not imply that China
will not actively expand its maritime space. In this regard, it is necessary
to integrate national strategic planning with comprehensive political, dip-
lomatic, economic, military and other measures to safeguard and expand
available maritime spaces. This includes both profiting from existing assets
and seeking new additions, by increasing the efficiency of maritime spaces,
pursuing expansion, in addition to searching for new and attainable spaces.
First, China must fully and rationally make use of its jurisdictional sea.
UNCLOS confers 300 square kilometers of waters to China, upon which
rests the foundation of China’s maritime power. Only with correct main-
tenance, management and administration of this comparatively meager
maritime space will it be possible for China to realize its potential as a
maritime power. As China’s marine economy has, as a whole, long devel-
oped in a laissez-fare and predatory environment, it has a low capacity for
sustainable development and was a later-starter. Moreover it was small in
scale, had little exposure to market forces and the majority of its indus-
tries are still at the early stages of development. In addition, there is little
regulation, coordination and supervision of China’s maritime development
activities. Backward conceptions of management and a laissez-faire devel-
opment model have resulted in an ever more severe environmental burden.
There is extensive pollution in coastal waters of the Bohai Sea, the Yellow
Sea, and the East China Sea, while algal blooms are frequent occurrences
and degradation of the marine ecological environment has progressively
become one of the major factors restricting sustainable marine economic
development. The situation in the prevention and alleviation of maritime
disasters is likewise rather grim. In consideration of severe environmen-
tal deterioration in coastal areas, China needs to redouble its environ-
mental protection efforts, steadfastly fortify management and control of
­environmental pollution, and furthermore phase out unsustainable indus-
tries. Only in doing so may China take advantage of current assets, making
full sustainable use of maritime spaces within the bounds of our sovereign
rights and interests.
Second, China ought to actively participate in development and exploita-
tion of the high seas, seabed ‘areas’ and other public maritime spaces. Over
60 percent of the world’s seas and oceans is categorized as public maritime
250  Tridents beyond armed force
space and belongs to all of humanity. In comparison, China’s own maritime
spaces are comparatively limited and its per capita area extremely small.
It is therefore urgent that China moves from geographically unfavorable
coastal waters and regional seas toward extensive deep seas and boundless
open oceans. As the world’s most populous country, China should author-
itatively and effectively voice its own positions on rules surrounding the
management, utilization and development of oceans worldwide, gaining
its rightful place in the future of global maritime management with com-
mensurate power. At the same time, China must continue to support sci-
entific investigation in the polar regions and encourage maritime scientific
research using a multitude of measures to conduct investigation into and
exploration of strategic resources on international seabed areas, expedite
applications for resources in international seabed ‘areas’ and accelerate in-
ternational cooperation. China needs to gain priority development rights of
strategic resources in these ‘areas’ through diverse measures and occupy a
favorable position in the scramble for deep sea resources and in the interna-
tional maritime contest.
Third, China needs to engage in international cooperation with all coun-
tries, so as to expand access to other countries’ maritime spaces. There is
already considerable internationalization in production, marketing, con-
sumption and other aspects of the marine economy. In the case of marine
fisheries, the market for different fish species and seafood products has
steadily globalized. More than 75 percent of the world’s total seafood har-
vest is not sold or consumed in countries in which these fish are caught. An-
other example of an ambitious undertaking demanding numerous factors of
production intensive in human capital, financial resources and technology
is the exploitation of seabed resources, particularly in deep-sea areas. All
coastal states have their advantages and disadvantages and must count on
international networks to optimize the allocation of factors of production
worldwide. China commands unique comparative advantages in aspects
such as labor, capital and diplomacy, while nevertheless falters in marine
science, technology and expertise, among other areas. In comparison with
the world’s most advanced countries, China trails significantly in areas such
as the research, development and manufacturing of deep-water drilling
equipment and reserves of talent and expertise. However, China has begun
to rapidly catch up to its competitors, believing that it will also become a
dominant forerunner in certain technological fields and that furthermore it
is only a question of time before technology and industries are exported on
a large scale. China should actively pursue cooperation with various coastal
states worldwide, so as to cultivate expansive spaces for development by tak-
ing advantage of labor, capital, technology and other factors of production.
The Chinese people have always been an outstanding contender in
peaceful competition. With less than 7 percent of global arable land, An-
cient China once supported over a third of the world population and ac-
cumulated enormous wealth, while nurturing and advancing the unbroken
 Tridents beyond armed force  251
Chinese civilization. Since reform and opening up, the Chinese people are
once again demonstrating their wisdom to the outside world with regard to
peaceful development and peaceful competition, as China has neither colo-
nized nor invaded foreign countries. In the short span of just over 40 years,
China has become the world’s second largest economic power through
large-scale production and trade, and furthermore will soon become the
world’s leading economy. Learning from history and looking to the future,
we have reason to hope that China will surely fulfill yet another miracle at
sea. On the basis of its people’s wisdom and diligence, so long as China fa-
miliarizes itself with the rules of the maritime order and establishes sound
market mechanisms in addition to pertinent scientific research institutions,
it will emerge as a tour de force in this peaceful maritime race.

Notes
1 In Greek mythology, a “trident” was originally the weapon of Poseidon, god of
the sea. It is similar in shape to a long-handled fishing fork, with a long middle
blade and shorter blades on either side; in literature on maritime strategy, it is
used as a metaphor as a tool or important means to capture sea power.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, translated by Wang Zoushi, Lectures on the Philosophy of History
(Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2001), p. 93.
3 Yang Jinsen, A Brief History in the Rise and Fall of Maritime Powers (Beijing:
China Ocean Press, 2007), pp. 9–10.
4 Elmer Belmont Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History (Beijing: Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Press, 1992), p. 1.
5 Feng Youlan, A Brief History of Chinese Philosophy (Tianjin: Tianjin Academy
of Social Sciences Press, 2007), p. 25.
6 Liang Shuming, The Fate of Chinese Culture (Beijing: Citic Press, 2013), p. 108.
7 Guo Shuyong, “The Cultural Tradition and Diplomatic Philosophy of Chinese
Strategy,” in Guo Shuyong, ed., Strategic Speeches (Beijing: Peking University
Press, 2006), p. 209.
8 For dialogue between Scowcroft and Brzezinski, refer to Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World: Conversations on the Future of
American Foreign Policy (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2009), p. 96
9 Zhou Fangyin, “China’s World Order and International Responsibilities,” Inter-
national Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011, p. 36.
10 Henry John Temple, Speech to the House of Commons, 1 March 1848,
ht t p s://ap i.p a rl i a m e nt .u k / h i s t or i c - h a n s a r d /c o m mo n s /18 4 8/ m a r/01/
treaty-of-adrianople-charges-against
11 For more on the essence of Chinese civilization or Huaxia civilization, refer to
Ye Zicheng and Long Quanlin, Huaxia Doctrine: 500 Years of Wisdom of the
Huaxia System (Beijing: People’s Press, 2013).
12 Sun Xuefeng, ed., Strategic Legitimization and the Rise of Great Powers (Beijing:
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), p. 141.
13 Zhang Ersheng et al., “The Weakness of Maritime Discourse and Strategy of
China’s Maritime Power,” World Economic and Political Forum, No. 2, 2014,
p. 137.
14 Ling Qing, From Yan’an to the United Nations: The Diplomatic Memoirs of Ling
Qing (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2008).
15 Information Office of the State Council (PRC), China Issues White Paper on
Peaceful Development, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/zt/peace/t895028.htm
252  Tridents beyond armed force
16 It should be noted that there are at least two types of statistical method for ma-
rine economy. If using Chinese relatively broad statistical criterion on marine
economy in US and Japan, the proportion would be approaching 50 percent.
17 The State Oceanic Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 2017 Sta-
tistics Bulletin on the Chinese Marine Economy, www.soa.gov.cn/xw/hyyw_90/
201712/t20171226_59745.html
18 According to 2018 plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions,
the related functions of the Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime
Rights and Interests has been combined into Central Foreign Affairs Committee.
19 CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions, www.
scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1625741/1625741.htm
11 Conclusion and expectation
China’s maritime power in the
year 2049

A complete strategic design must have not only an objective and a roadmap,
but also an approximate schedule. The year 2049 represents the centennial
of the People’s Republic of China, 37 years since the Chinese government
officially proposed the construction of a maritime power, and 30 years from
this book’s publication.
The interval between the present day and the year 2049 represents an un-
known world and a protracted period of time. However, in terms of con-
structing a maritime power, this span of time is not enormous. In modern
times, the navy has steadily become a technologically sophisticated branch
of the military. In comparison with the army and air force, it has historically
taken longer to form a formidable navy force, hence the saying ‘decades
for an army, centuries for a navy.’ It will take a very long time for a power,
whose national strength is on the rise, to build a formidable naval force from
a low starting point, for the higher the technological demands and the more
complex the fleet structure, the longer the process will be to create a strong
combat force. The US Navy began large-scale military expansion at the end
of 19th century, and it was not until the 1920s that the United States joined
the select club of maritime powers, benefiting from the First World War,
which had ravaged Great Britain and Germany. The German Reich was
slightly quicker to adopt to militarism and aggression. Nevertheless, it was
still close to 20 years from when Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Sec-
retary of State for the German Imperial Navy, presented the ‘Fleet Laws’
(Flottengesetze) for naval expansion to when Germany became the world’s
second largest naval force in 1914. Following the end of the Second World
War II, it took nearly 40 years for the Soviet Red Navy to emerge from a
little-known underdog to ultimately become a modern global power, second
only to the US Navy in the 1980s. At present, there have been major innova-
tions in naval technology. In the information and intelligent age, informa-
tionization and systemization are flourishing, as naval fleet formations also
become notably more complex, and joint operations between the navy and
other military services reach unprecedented levels in breadth and depth.
Together this forms a stark contrast to the situation in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies. Therefore, it is highly likely that China will require more time than
254 Conclusion
its German, American and Soviet counterparts of yesteryear. China’s na-
val modernization began in around the mid-1990s, approximately 55 years
away from 2049. On the basis of the abovementioned historical experiences,
we can cautiously anticipate that, by that time, China will begin to build a
world-class, all-encompassing and balanced navy.
Progress in other indicators of maritime power, such as politics, diplo-
macy, economics and culture, tends to be even more sluggish and unpre-
dictable. Although both the USSR and the German Reich had succeeded
in building strong naval forces, they did not reap commensurate power in
maritime politics and lagged behind in marine economic and cultural devel-
opment, while their progress toward the sea suffered a severe lack of coor-
dination. In accordance with China’s three-pronged strategy for economic
development, by the mid-21st century, people’s lives will be more affluent
and prosperous, models of economic growth healthier and more balanced,
while the economy will have been modernized as a whole and per capita
GNP will have reached the levels of middle-income countries. Only under
these conditions of balanced and high quality-growth is it possible to be-
come a maritime power. Over the previous 30 years or so, China has com-
pleted its preparations to advance from the continent to the seas, enlarging
the scale of its overall economy, although not boosting its quality.
Over the next 30 years or so, economic transition, including that of the
marine economy, will be of utmost importance. It commonly takes between
10 and 20 years for countries like Japan and South Korea to transition from
an economy based on scale to one based on quality. In consideration of the
Chinese economy’s size, it seems more plausible that it would take close to
40 years for the country’s marine economy to expand and strengthen. Since
the reforms and opening up of the economy, China has fully integrated into
the international system, has by and large familiarized itself with the let-
ter and spirit of international rules and norms and is currently making the
leap from ‘mastering the rules’ to ‘creating the rules.’ In areas such as inter-
national trade and regional integration, China is already catching up with
Western countries in its institutions’ operational capacities. China has just
entered the stage of maritime development on a grand scale. With approxi-
mately 30 more years of learning and practice and a further two generations
worth of tireless endeavor, China’s ability, from a political and diplomatic
perspective, to participate in maritime politics will no longer lag far behind
that of the world’s other maritime powers. In terms of maritime conscious-
ness and culture, with long-term education at the national societal level and
large-scale practical experience at sea, there will still exist a disparity be-
tween China and countries like Great Britain and the United States; how-
ever, this will no longer represent a substantial difference.
To summarize the abovementioned predictions, come what may, China
as a maritime power in 2049 promises exceptionally auspicious prospects.
The greatest value of all sciences lies in forecasting. However, when it
comes to predicting future international events, 2049 remains far too distant
 Conclusion  255
a future. In other words, this is beyond the time frame of accurate predic-
tion. It is generally acknowledged that the current research methods in in-
ternational studies are unable to accurately predict the international state
of affairs beyond the next 20 years. Therefore, research into and forecasts
of the international strategic situation focus heavily on periods between 10
and 20 years. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC), for instance,
regularly publishes Global Trends, a series of reports that aim to predict
future worldwide trends in development over the next 15–20 years. The time
point in even the latest edition, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is
only 2030. To forecast developments in China’s maritime power more than
30 years into the future is tantamount to fortune telling.
When forming slightly bolder conjectures, it is nevertheless possible to
identify a number of long-term trends. For instance, congestion and resource
depletion in land spaces are becoming ever more pronounced. Humanity’s
accelerated march toward the seas and impetus to explore the oceans will
endure, as by the mid-21st century the Earth will undoubtedly represent an
entirely new maritime world. Mankind has achieved cutting edge advance-
ments in science and technology. However, innovative and sophisticated
technologies, including 3D printing, artificial intelligence and biomedical
developments, concentrate on changing the way people work and live. In
the field of macrophysics, mankind will find it very difficult for key inven-
tions and innovations to overturn existing basic frameworks in the natural
sciences for a considerable period of time to come, instead reiterating the
indispensable contributions of Newton and Einstein. Scientific and techno-
logical progress will not yet completely transcend barriers of distance and
space imposed by geography. A vast war on a global scale is even more diffi-
cult to initiate, while features of peaceful competition and peaceful contest
become ever more conspicuous in the global maritime order, as matters of
development overtake issues of warfare as the focal point of maritime poli-
tics. China will indisputably have the maritime qualities of a global power.
Unless there would be severe errors in its strategies and policies, China is
certain to become a genuine maritime power, while enjoying great flexibility
in its connotations and methods of development.
If subsequent Chinese policymakers and mainstream society are able to
thoroughly appreciate the abovementioned trends, consciously adapting to
new demands in development of the marine economy and maritime politics,
adopting on the roughly rational and practical strategies and policies, then
it is highly likely that my projections and vision with regard to maritime
power as outlined below will become a reality around the year 2049.
China will have formidable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capacities;
furthermore there will be significant improvements in China’s peripheral en-
vironment. After more than 30 years worth of hard work and collaboration,
the Chinese armed forces will have made comprehensive informationization
a reality, while there will have been a qualitative leap in the coordinated
combat capacities of the army, navy, air force, cyberwarfare defenses and
256 Conclusion
other forces. Under the leadership of a newly reformed military system, the
Chinese armed forces will have realized thorough, root and branch reforms.
The difference between China’s strength and that of surrounding countries,
including Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, will be so pronounced that
these countries would no longer have the ability or audacity to provoke
China. As relations between the two Koreas thaw and approach détente,
it may be possible that the Korean Peninsula will reunify and the situation
stabilize. Taiwan and Mainland China will likely continue to maintain the
status quo, but political, economic, security and cultural ties between the
two will become ever closer. Cross-strait reunification will no longer be a
topic of sensitivity in Taiwan, and moreover the issue of ­Taiwanese inde-
pendence no longer popular. In truth, the two sides of the strait will con-
verge as one united entity.
Maritime disputes involving China will no longer be the focal points or
hotspots of China’s relations with its neighboring countries at sea. Questions
of delimitation in the Yellow Sea may be settled, and although the Diaoyu
Islands, East China Sea and South China Sea issues may continue to linger,
the sovereign rights of islands themselves will no longer be as important as
they are at present. China will have unparalleled capacities in developing,
managing and controlling the East China Sea and the South China Sea,
while its legal claims regarding the Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea
the South China Sea, and other disputed issues will be well-founded and
widely recognized by the international community. Under the powerful de-
terrence of combined forces, the proposal of ‘shelving disputes and seeking
joint development’ will be met with keen responses from countries including
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, as these countries actively initiate ne-
gotiations with China over disputed issues. Geographic barriers due to is-
land chains in the Western Pacific will have also, to a significant extent, been
lifted. Deterred by China’s powerful capabilities in anti-access/area denial,
also known as ‘A2/AD,’ the United States will no longer enjoy supremacy in
the Western Pacific’s First Island Chain. The importance of maritime dis-
putes involving China and the United States will plummet, while the arena
for Sino-US contests will shift to the waters of the Pacific Ocean between
the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, together with the vast
expanses of the Indian Ocean.
By implementing a coordinated strategy of ‘mastering seas through land,
balancing land and sea,’ China’s geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific
region and even worldwide will change markedly over the long run. Projects
such as China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh–China–Myanmar
international Corridor and Zhongnan (Indochina) Peninsula railway will be
fully completed. A multidimensional land, sea and air transportation net-
work will have been created in the Southwest region, passing through the
Zhongnan Peninsula and entering the Indian Ocean. This will comprehen-
sively boost China’s relations with all countries in Southeast Asia and even
with countries along the Indian Ocean’s northern coastline, considerably
 Conclusion  257
improving the security situation of China’s westward sea lanes and the ge-
ographic situation along the eastern coast of the Indian Ocean. China’s
northwestern regions will no longer be distant from ports. There will be
a land bridge, which will ultimately connect Eurasia, traveling westward
from Xinjiang to Central Asia, linking Iran with Afghanistan, and termi-
nating at the Gulf of Oman. The railway, which begins in Kashi (Kashgar)
in Xinjiang, crosses the Hongpuqila (Khunjerab) Pass on the Sino-Pakistani
border, runs the entire length of the Pakistani border, and directly reaches
Gwadar Port, Pakistan, on the western coast of the Indian Ocean, will also
be entirely connected.
In the northeastern region of China, the Changjitu strategy will be metic-
ulously executed.1 Northeast Asia will make great strides toward regional
economic integration. In cooperation with Russia and North Korea, China
will acquire stable seaports in the Sea of Japan. As large areas of Arctic gla-
ciers melt, Arctic maritime routes will grow ever more mature and increas-
ingly hectic. China will benefit from these two additional routes to Europe
and North America, which are more rapid and more reliable.
In addition to these developments, China will also have four Eurasian
land bridges.2 The development of these entirely connective, high-speed
railways in the continental hinterlands will once again highlight the sta-
tus of land power on the Eurasian continent. The renowned English geog-
rapher and political scientist, Sir Halford Mackinder’s ‘heartland theory’
will experience a revival following centuries of suppression in favor of ‘sea
power theory.’ ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who
rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-­
Island commands the world.’ As, the world’s island, the Eurasian continent
will demonstrate its geographic superiority. China’s political and economic
impact over the whole of Eurasia will reach a new pinnacle, as China real-
izes the strategic vision of its Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk
Road. With China’s active support, the degree to which Eurasia is econom-
ically and politically integrated will reach unprecedented heights, forming
a new zone of economic cooperation that stretches from the Western Pacific
coastline in the east to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas in the west, span-
ning across the Eurasian continent. China, where the seas meet the land,
will be at the center of Eurasian economics and politics. Not only would
China be a bridge between the hinterlands of Eurasia and the seas, it will
also be a hub of interaction between East and West. In geopolitical and
geo-­economic terms, China will become the ‘intermediate country’ that
links east to west, and south to north. It will be Eurasia’s, and possibly the
world’s, ‘central country.’3
It is almost certain that China’s oceangoing fleet will have already been
formed and China’s navy will proceed, in all respects, toward the deep
oceans. The Chinese Navy will possess approximately five domestically
manufactured, first-generation and second-generation aircraft carri-
ers, some of which are conventionally powered, others nuclear powered.
258 Conclusion
They will be equipped with second generation Chinese carrier-borne fighter
jets and early warning aircraft. Among them, two aircraft carrier formations
will be assigned combat duties in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans,
respectively. Another aircraft formation will maintain combat readiness.
Other aircraft carriers will remain near the Chinese mainland, taking turns
to rest at dock. There will be significant changes in both the quantity and
quality of China’s destroyers and frigates. As the Chinese Navy plans to
shift from a purely defensive strategy to more diversified tasks, there will
be a sharp increase in the number of its destroyers, which are expected to
double to approximately 50 to meet the needs of its military’s ‘stepping out’
strategy. The Lüda class, Lühai class and Lüzhou class, all of which are se-
ries 051 destroyers, in addition to series 052B/C destroyers such as the Lühu
and Lüyang, and practically all other vessels in current service, will be
phased out. After between 10 and 20 years of mass production and service,
the new 052D-type and 055-type destroyers will form the next generation
of China’s regional air defense systems. The rumored 052E and 059 models
will have been outfitted one after another and will eventually represent the
fleet’s core.
Compared with numbers at present, there will be a slight increase in the
number of frigates to around 70 ships, while the 054B, 056 and subsequent
models will enter service in large numbers. Not only will they provide strong
backup support for China’s oceangoing fleet but will also be the vanguard
in coastal operations. The size of China’s submersible fleet will remain at
approximately 70 vessels, but its overall combat effectiveness will increase
in leaps and bounds, especially as the number of nuclear submarines surges
to around 30 and their combat capabilities become comparable to those of
the Russian submarine fleet. Furthermore, large numbers of surveillance
vessels, support vessels, supply ships and other auxiliary ships will frequent
China’s coastal waters, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Whether
judging based on indicators of overall scale, fleet structure or combat ef-
fectiveness, the Chinese Navy is already second only to that of the United
States in the world.
China’s political prohibition against and military principle of ‘not station-
ing a single solider overseas’ are surely destined to be abandoned in the fu-
ture. In line with its military forces’ ‘stepping out’ strategy, China will have
built dozens of overseas supply points, communication relay centers and
comprehensive support bases around the world through means of political
negotiation and diplomatic consultation with amicable countries and in the
spirit of the UN Charter. These overseas bases, mainly launched along the
coasts of the Eurasian and African continents, will be designed to provide
necessary geographical support for China’s overseas military activities. In
considering strategic needs, geographic access and developments in foreign
relations, China may establish overseas support points in the some countries
below with different areas of focus: a Northern Indian Ocean supply line,
centered around Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar; a Western
 Conclusion  259
Indian Ocean supply line, with Yemen, Amman, Kenya, Tanzania and Mo-
zambique at its core; and a supply line concentrated around the Seychelles
and Madagascar in the Central and Southern Indian Ocean.4
With supply and communications bases in South Pacific island countries,
including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, and logis-
tical support centers in South American and West African countries, such
as Chile, Argentina and Namibia, China’s communications and maritime
reconnaissance satellites will be able to offer comprehensive communica-
tions and intelligence support for Chinese military operations in the vast
majority of waters globally. The Chinese Navy will have the capability to
operate on a global scale in terms of both hardware and software. However,
even under these circumstances, the Chinese Navy will nevertheless remain
a regional naval force, which ‘emphasizes regional distribution and wields
global influence’ and cannot compare with the US Navy in scale and com-
plexity of tasks.
The Chinese Navy will also be beginning to possess the capabilities re-
quired to achieve China’s strategic maritime intentions in global waters.
The Chinese Navy will conduct a diverse range of tasks in waters around
the entire world at three different levels – exerting control, balance and in-
fluence. In coastal areas near the First Island Chain, China will maintain a
comparative advantage with power to command the seas; therefore, it will
be ready to respond to challenges initiated by any country or group. China
will maintain an effective presence in the Western Pacific and the Northern
Indian Ocean and be able to somewhat check and balance the US, Japa-
nese, Indian and other powers within this region, while also cooperating
with countries, including the United States, Japan, Russia and India, on is-
sues such as safeguarding freedom of navigation. In waters elsewhere in the
world, China can swiftly exert influence through small-scale, temporary de-
ployments, non-warfare military operations, military diplomacy and other
various means. As to China’s seapower, there would be a posture of offshore
control, regional presence and global Influences.
In the year 2049, the world’s maritime political establishment will be a
multipolar structure, composed principally of the United States, China,
Russia, Europe, India and groups of Third World Countries, with China
playing a pivotal and decisive role as one polar force. China will play a vital
role in international maritime mechanisms, such as the UN Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), International Seabed Author-
ity (ISA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
China will participate fully in various types of cooperation mechanisms in
the Pacific and coastal regions of the Indian Ocean. It will jointly maintain
regional peace and stability in the Western Pacific with the United States,
Russia, Japan, South Korea and other maritime powers, while at the same
time emerging as an important partner in cooperation with the US, Indian,
European and other powers in the Indian Ocean. In matters regarding
the Arctic, East Pacific, the Atlantic and other waters worldwide, Chinese
260 Conclusion
participation will be indispensable as well, as it is becoming a country of
crucial importance that all states endeavor to cooperate with.
Chinese diplomacy will be no different from that of Europe and the
United States in terms of its personnel quality, conflict experience or famil-
iarity with international norms. China will not only have appreciated the
essence of the international system that is dominated by the West, but also
have enriched the relevant institutions and rules with its extensive practical
maritime experience. It will have also brought China’s traditional culture of
‘harmony’ and ‘unity’ into international maritime politics, winning a strong
voice in the world maritime order. China’s position as a maritime power
will have been widely recognized worldwide. As the China threat theory
subsides, China’s participation and its role will be imperative in areas such
as the settlement of maritime disputes, international development and co-
operation, and the conservation of public spaces and resources. It is likely
that China will have firmly established its strength by the year 2049, while
also beginning to systematically declare its plans and visions for the world’s
maritime order. Chinese diplomacy will have completed the initial steps re-
quired in its transformation from a continental civilization to a maritime
civilization, while the country is a whole will have concluded its metamor-
phosis from a continental state to a coastal state. The year 2049 for China is
akin to the year 1919 for the United States; it is a starting point from which
China, as a maritime power, may advance toward the world and deeply en-
gage the world.
It is popular international belief that China’s aggregate economic output
will soon surpass that of the United States as it becomes the world’s larg-
est economy. By conservative estimates, as long as China’s planning, man-
agement and technology are able to conscientiously keep pace, according
to the marine economy’s current growth rate patterns, which are between
two and three percent faster than national economic growth over corre-
sponding periods of time, China’s marine economy will account for over
30 percent of GDP by the year 2049, making it the world’s largest maritime
economic power.
China’s fishing fleet, which ranks second to none both in terms of its size
and range of activities, will soon become the world’s largest. Likewise, Chi-
na’s merchant fleet will maintain a presence in all of world’s major oceans
and coastal ports, as the number of Chinese-flagged merchant ships will
exceed those of any other country worldwide. In addition, China’s mari-
time construction teams will be active on coastal and offshore construction
sites in various countries around the world. China’s drilling platforms will
be present in the world’s leading offshore oil and gas fields, while Chinese
oceangoing vessels for exploration and mining will operate deep in every
ocean. A large number of unmanned underwater vehicles and robots will
navigate in the depths of the oceans, unraveling deep-sea secrets. In China,
marine science and technology will make enormous contributions to the
marine economy, as China transforms itself from a country that is deficient
 Conclusion  261
in marine maritime science and technology to one that benefits from a su-
perabundance. China will become a leading power in deep-sea drilling, off-
shore engineering and other industries.
The entire Chinese nation is already passionately conscious of marine
issues. As maritime legislation and management systems improve, and op-
erations of institutions in comprehensive maritime management mature,
China’s marine economy will maintain high-quality, sustainable develop-
ment on a large scale.
China will benefit from an agreeable coastal environment and set the
benchmark for the comprehensive management and three-dimensional de-
velopment of marine environments worldwide. China will be organized and
efficient in the development and use of marine resources, and its marine
ecological environment splendid and wholesome, achieving a balance be-
tween land and sea, as well as harmony between mankind and the oceans.
The Maritime Silk Road will prosper and flourish as China further deepens
cooperation with various coastal states around the world. Marine economic
cooperation between China and virtually all coastal states will fully tran-
sition from maritime trade to cooperation in marine industries. Coopera-
tion between China and certain countries on various levels is unavoidable
in fields including the construction and operation of ports, exploration and
exploitation of marine resources and development of diverse maritime in-
dustries. China will participate both extensively and intensively in produc-
tion, trade, consumption and various market segments of marine economies
in all coastal states. As interdependence intensifies in the marine economy,
China will rank among the world’s leaders in the competitiveness and at-
tractiveness of its marine economy.
While it is possible that China may not have fully become a global mari-
time power in 2049, the outline of its maritime power will have already been
decided by that year. The foundations of economic, political, diplomatic,
military and various other aspects will nevertheless have been cemented.
All indicators will display a ‘powerful spirit’ and crucially, most of the key
steps on the road to success will by then be completed.

Notes
1 The Changjitu strategy is an abbreviation for the “Outline of plans for cooper-
ation in and development of the Tumen River region in China – Changjitu as
a pilot development zone,” officially approved by the State Council in August
2009. The Changjitu region encompasses the city of Changchun in Jilin prov-
ince, certain select areas of Jilin city, and Hunchun city, located in the Tumen
river basin.
2 The First Eurasian Land Bridge is a trans-Siberian land bridge, which begins in
China, spanning Vladivostok in Russia window city of Hunchun in Changjitu
pilot development zone, crossing Siberia and various European countries, and
terminating ultimately in the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The Sec-
ond Eurasian Land Bridge is a new Eurasian land bridge that connects Longhai
and Lanzhou-Xinjiang railways in China with railways in Kazakhstan. It starts
262 Conclusion
in the east at Liangyungang, reaching Alashankou (the Dzungarian Gate) at
the Chinese-Kazakh border in the west through the Longhai rand the North-
ern Xinjiang railways. The Second Eurasian Land Bridge enters Kazakhstan
and terminates at the Dutch port of Rotterdam, traversing Russia, Belarus,
Poland and Germany. Kunming rests as the hub of the Third Eurasian Land
Bridge, which spans across Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran, enter-
ing Europe from Turkey, and finally arrives at the Dutch port of Rotterdam. By
contrast, the Fourth Eurasian Land Bridge is a branch that diverges from Man-
churia, forming a distributary arm of the Binzhou railway and Binsui railway. It
links the Liangyi railway with the Baia railway, joining the Pingqi railway, and
connecting Xinganmeng (Hingan League), Tongliao city, Chifeng, and Beijing
on one route. Additionally, with the construction of multiple tracks, the Chang-
bai railway is able to link with the Changtu railway, connecting to the North
Korean railway network. This is currently in process of being approved. The
above-mentioned four rail routes are merely common examples. In addition to
these, there are already numerous branches and connections planned.
3 Refer to Wang Jisi for more on the terms “middle country” and “central coun-
try,” “Thoughts on China’s geo-strategy,” Strategic Briefing, No. 83, Peking Uni-
versity Institute of International and Strategic Studies.
4 Hai Tao, “China Should Build ‘Third Front Bases’ in the Indian Ocean.” http://
news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2011-12/23/c_131321310.htm
Index
Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and
page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes.
Abe, Shinzô 166, 177
An Act to Establish a Commission on
Ocean Policy and for Other Purposes
see Oceans Act of 2000
Afghanistan War 133, 143, 197, 242
Africa 37, 39, 41–4, 167, 190, 234
Age of Exploration 43, 44
Age of Sail 228, 231
agrarian civilizations 227; China as 227,
230, 233–5; diplomatic transition to
maritime civilization 226–35; features
of 230; foreign relations, approaching
234; greatest foreign pursuit of 231
agricultural peoples 230
aircraft carriers: and China’s two-ocean
strategy 67–74; coastal operations and
72; first-generation 257; modern 70–1;
planning and construction of Chinese
67–9; principal duties of China’s 70–3;
second-generation 257; as systemic
project 67–8; two-ocean deployment
of Chinese 73–4
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
88–91
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) 127, 131–40, 143,
145, 147
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure
Operational Concept 136
‘Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an
Era of Uncertainty’ 135
American defense spending 129
American maritime hegemony 42, 126
American ‘New Silk Road’ initiative 42
American-style isolationism 22
Amman 259
Ancient Chinese philosophy 44
Ancient Greece 227–8
ancient Greek economics 227
Ancient Silk Road 38, 40–1
Andaman and Nicobar Command 187;
see also Eastern Naval Command
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 187
Annam, the Sultanate of Sulu 180
Anti-Access (A2) capabilities 4, 8, 16, 132
Anti-Denial (AD) capabilities 8
anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) 143
anti-smuggling operations 77
The APEC Connectivity Blueprint 42
APEC Leaders’ Declaration 42
Aquino, Benigno S., III 101, 114
Arctic Council 211
Arctic exploration 37
Arctic Northeast Passage 206, 209; see
also Northern Sea Route
‘Area Denial’ (AD) forces 16, 132
Art, Robert J. 4
Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security 168, 170
artificial intelligence 255
‘ASEAN 10+3’ Energy Ministers’
Conference, Manila 87
ASEAN Plus One 181
ASEAN Plus Three 181
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 55,
181, 208
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 37
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) 208
‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy 40,
98, 99
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN): balancing tactics of
264 Index
‘befriending the far and attacking
near’ 55; established in 180; maritime
relations with 165–211; purpose of
180; South China Sea dispute and
102–6, 118, 122
Australia 18, 36, 88, 102; as British
colony 201; Defence White Paper
(DWP), 2016 199; entanglements with
regard to China 198–201; Foreign
Policy White Paper, 2017 200; foreign
strategy 201; Korean War and 197;
as a non-Asian country 196–7;
reasonable expectations and the law of
gradual progress 201–3; robust vitality
of US–Australian alliance 197–8;
Vietnam War and 197; winning over
relative neutrality of 196–203
The Australian 198
Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade 199
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
(ASPI) 199
Bangladesh 187, 258, 262n2
Bangladesh–China–Myanmar
international Corridor 256
The Basic Act on Ocean Policy 244–5
Bay of Bengal 12, 187–8, 190
Beixiao Dao (Kita-kojima) 79
Bei Yu (Okino-Kita-iwa) 79
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 38;
interconnectivity 41–3; openness
and inclusivity 44–6; potential
maritime meaning of 37–46; win–win
cooperation 43–4
Benedict, Ruth 171
Bhaskar, Uday 194
Biddle, Stephen 138
biotechnology 36
Bohai Sea 24, 249
Boxing Day tsunami 70
British Empire 226, 231
Bush, George W. 244–5
C4ISR system 18, 135–6, 143, 146
Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), United States 114
‘Central Maritime Rights Office,’
China 246
Centre for Economics and Business
Research (CEBR) 128
China: attaining strategic supremacy
within First Island Chain and
surrounding waters 140–3; Australia’s
entanglements with regard to 198–201;
coastal geostrategy 47–60; exterior line
strategy at sea 61–78; global vision of
maritime power dream 35–7; maritime
power in year 2049 253–62; maritime
renaissance 38; material culture
230; not compromising over Diaoyu
Islands 79–83; over-arching strategy
2; path of peace and revolutionary
uprising 32–5; promoting peaceful
power transition between US and
126–61; shifting strategic balance
between US and 128–31; Sino-US
maritime competitive posture in
next 30 years 126–48; South China
Sea strategy 97–101; US–Australian
alliance and 198, 202
‘China + ASEAN + X’ model 185
China Coast Guard (CCG) 77–8, 170
China-Greece Maritime Cooperation
Forum 33
China–Japan General Forum on Coal
219, 223
China Maritime Bureau 119
China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) 36, 119, 121, 123
China Oceanic Administration (COA) 79
China Ocean Mineral Resources R & D
Association (COMRA) 36
China Oilfield Services Limited
(COSL) 119
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 256
China People’s Liberation Army Military
Terms 5
‘China’s New Dream’ report 199
‘China’s Peaceful Development’ 241
Chinese aircraft carriers: planning and
construction of 67–9; principal duties
of 70–3; two-ocean deployment of
73–4
Chinese Air Force 63, 71
Chinese civilization 45, 229, 231, 234, 251
Chinese coastal tourism industry 37
Chinese Coast Guard: Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) and 82; supporting law
enforcement activities of 77–8
Chinese Communist Party 229; 18th
National Congress of 1, 32; new
democratic revolution, led by 229
Chinese defense spending 129
Chinese Eastern Railway incident 174
Chinese elites 1, 3
Chinese maritime power: connotation
and characteristics of 29–46; global

influence 13–20; global vision
of maritime power dream 35–7;
international political maritime
power 20–3; No. 2 world sea power
3–20; offshore control 5–9; path of
peace and revolutionary uprising
32–5; potential maritime meaning
of belt and road initiative 37–46;
regional presence 10–13; three
major systematic objectives of 1–26;
‘variable’ vs. ‘invariable’ rise 29–31;
world marine economic power 23–6
Chinese Miracle 22, 43
Chinese National Reform and
Development Commission 87
Chinese Navy 6, 16; C4ISR system
18–19; external strategy of 12; India
and 191; nonwarfare operations of
74–8; objectives in waters beyond
Pacific and Indian Oceans 16;
oceangoing capabilities of 56, 76;
oceangoing fleet of 257–8; RIMPAC
joint exercises and 77; as second
largest sea power 159, 258; US
Navy and 16; Western Pacific Naval
Symposium, multilateral drills with 77
Chinese Ocean Basic Law 245
Chinese PLA Navy 2
‘Chinese sovereignty’ 97–8, 101
Chiwei Yu (Taisho-to) 79
Chongzhiniao Jiao (Okinotorishima) 81
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword
(Benedict) 171
Chunxiao gas field 87
civilizations: agrarian 226–35, 234;
ancient Greek 228; Chinese 45, 229,
231, 234, 251; continental 31, 227,
260; Eastern 229; grassland 226;
maritime 30–1, 226–35, 234; river
valley 227; Western 31, 227–9
coastal geostrategy 47–60; ‘contesting
the East’ 55–60; ‘harmonizing
the South’ 52–5; overview 47–8;
‘stabilizing the North’ 48–52
coastal navies 3–4
‘Cobra Gold’ multinational warfare
exercises 64
Code of Conduct for Maritime and Air
Safety in the High Seas 158
Colby, Elbridge 138
Cold War 17, 39, 50, 53, 64, 69, 97, 127,
148, 153, 180, 184, 197, 205, 216, 235
colonialism 231
Columbus, Christopher 231
Index  265
Committee on Ocean Policy, US 245
Commonwealth of Independent States 6
Communist Party of Vietnam 245
Comprehensive Economic Dialogue 155
‘The Concept of the Foreign Policy of
the Russian Federation’ 207
Confucianism 232
continental civilizations 31, 227, 260
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower 153
Council on Environmental Quality,
US 245
counterterrorism missions 73
crisis prevention management
mechanism: establishing 158–9
Cropsey, Seth 137
customs inspections 77
‘Dashed Line’ 54
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (DOC) 55, 98,
181, 217–18
deep sea mining 36
demarcation, in East China Sea 79–93;
truths and falsehoods of 83–8
deterrence: accustomed to deterrence as
‘new normal’ 218–21; creating smart
deterrence system 221–5; purpose and
importance of 216–18
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile 134,
141, 145
DF-26 missile 134
Diaoyu Dao (Uotsuri-shima) 79
Diaoyu Islands 6; China not
compromising over 79–83; disputes
over 79–93
Diaoyu Islands: The Truth 80
Diplomatic Security Dialogue 155
‘Distributed Lethality’ 139
Djibouti 64–5
‘dog eat dog’ laws 30
DPRK 50–1; see also North Korea
‘drinking straw effect’ 87
Duterte, Rodrigo 99, 101
East Asia Summit (EAS) 55, 93,
181, 208
East China Sea 5; commitment to
the security of sea lanes in 91–3;
continental shelf 85–7; demarcation
of 79–93; truths and falsehoods of
demarcation in 83–8
Eastern civilization 229
Eastern Europe 90, 168, 204
266 Index
Eastern Han Dynasty 111
Eastern Naval Command 187; see also
Andaman and Nicobar Command
economic globalization 14, 19, 21–2,
24–5, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41–2, 45–6, 80,
226, 237
economics: ancient Greek 227;
dichotomy between security and
179–82; international maritime
mechanisms and 30; Sino-Indian
common interests in 193; South China
Sea dispute and 54
18th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party 1, 32
Einstein, Albert 255
Emperor Wu 146
Erickson, Andrew S. 72, 138
‘Eschew chaos’ values 232
Etzioni, Amitai 137
Eurasian Economic Union 42
European Union (EU) 99, 102, 203;
‘Connecting Europe Facility’ 42;
eastward expansion by 203
‘Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf Law’ 86
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 5,
22, 77, 81
Executive Order 13366 245
Exercise RIMPAC (the Rim of the
Pacific) 64
exterior line strategy at sea 61–78;
aircraft carriers and China’s two-
ocean strategy 67–74; nonwarfare
operations of China’s naval force
74–8; ‘stepping out’ of China’s
military forces 61–7
Feilan Dao (Tobise) 79
First Island Chain 4, 6, 10, 12, 17, 19,
56, 62, 64, 73–4, 81, 90, 92, 130–1,
136, 140–7, 256, 259
First World War 138, 172, 253
‘Fleet Laws’ (Flottengesetze) 253
Forbes, James Randy 137
France 15, 25, 39, 61, 63–7, 76, 99, 112,
140, 174, 189, 228, 242
Frank, Andre Gunder 230
Fraser, Malcolm 200
freedom of navigation: American
maritime hegemony and 42; as
function of modern navies 75; India
and 191; in Indian Ocean 191;
interconnectivity at sea and 42; as
international public good 15, 33;
safeguarding 75–6; US military’s 131;
in the Western Pacific 132
Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s
Maritime Military Strategies 190
freelance gunboat diplomacy 21
‘Free Tibet’ movements 17
free trade 39
Friedberg, Aaron L. 4
‘Galaxy’ Cargo Ship 11
Gandhi, Rajiv 189
Gates, Robert 135
George Washington University 137
German-British conflict 150
German Imperial Navy 253
German Reich 15, 253–4
globalization: economic 14, 19, 21–2,
24–5, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41–2, 45–6, 80,
226, 237; of marine economy 25;
trends against 39
global maritime hegemonies 3–4, 26,
29, 150
Global Maritime Partnership Initiative
153, 160
Global Trends 2030: Alternative
Worlds 255
global vision, of maritime power
dream 35–7
Gobi Desert 146, 227
Goldfein, David L. 139
Goldstein, Lyle J. 153
Gonggu Strait 91–2; see also Gonggu
Waterway
Gonggu Waterway 91, 93; see also
Gonggu Strait
Graham, Euan 199
grassland civilization 226
Great Britain 15; Afghanistan War
and 197; First World War and 253;
as imperialist power 140; Iraq War
and 197; as maritime hegemons
30, 33, 43; Napoleonic Wars and
210; participation in the Gulf War
197; as traditional maritime power
30, 68, 247; world’s maritime order
dominated by 21
‘Great Channel’ 187
‘Great Wall Line’ 148
Great Wall of China 146, 147, 230
Greeks 227–8
Greenert, Jonathan W. 135, 137
Gulf of Aden 12, 61, 64, 153
Gulf of Oman 257
Gulf War 133, 197

Hagel, Chuck 120
‘Hainan Navigation Warning
No. 0033’ 119
Haiyang Shiyou (Ocean Petroleum) 981
119, 122; debut display of 119–23; and
its future maneuvers 119–23
Hammes, Thomas X. 137
Han Chinese 229
Han Dynasty 40, 111, 146
‘harmony’: China’s traditional culture of
260; Chinese people and 218; essence
of 33; international community and
220–1; between mankind and the
oceans 261; as organic component of
‘innovation’ 34
‘heartland theory’ 257
Hegel, G. W. F. 227, 251n2
hegemonism 3
HMS Hermes 70
HMS Illustrious 71
HMS Invincible 70
Hobbes, Thomas 226
Holmes, James R. 4, 142, 159
Hua Chunying 114
Huangwei Yu (Kuba-shima) 79
Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal)
incident 98, 101, 107
Hudson Institute 137
Hunnic Empire 229
Huns 17, 40
Hussein, Saddam 94n6, 242
Ilyushin IL-76 63
imperialism 3, 231
Incheon Winter Olympics 2018 50
India 18, 102; ambitions and grievances
of 188–93; Andaman and Nicobar
Command 187; discussions on Sino-
Indian maritime conflicts 186–8;
‘Eastward’ policy 187; efforts to
accommodate on maritime issues
186–96; as emerging military power
61; maintaining Sino-Indian strategic
stability at sea 193–6; Ministry of
Defense 11; Primary Interests Areas
190; Secondary Interest Areas 190;
sensationalism of ‘China’s maritime
threat’ 192; South China Sea situation
and 102, 187–8
Indian Navy 188, 190, 195–6
Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas:
Indian Maritime Security Strategy 190
Indian Ocean 11, 12; India’s ambitions
and grievances 188–93; Zone of
Index  267
Medium Control 190; Zone of
Positive Control 190; Zone of Soft
Control 190
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
(IONS) 187
Indonesia 18, 37, 40, 48, 102–3, 156, 165,
181, 187
‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy 198
Industrial Revolution 236
Inner or Marginal Crescent 13, 28n27
innovation: harmony as organic
component of 34; in naval technology
253; technological 128, 147, 224,
228, 248
Institute for Defense Studies and
Analyses (IDSA) 194
intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems 141, 143
interconnectivity 41–3; economic
globalization and 41–2; freedom of
navigation and 42; global 45; maritime
42–3
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 84,
105, 236
International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) 129
international ‘legitimacy’: efforts for
235–43
International Maritime Bureau 12
international maritime politics 2, 20, 22,
33, 44–6, 165, 260
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
39, 128
international political maritime power
20–3
International Seabed Authority (ISA)
20, 36, 259
International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) 143
International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS) 20, 101, 109, 259
International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea and the Court of Arbitration 105
Iraq War 133, 143, 197, 242
isolationism, American-style 22
Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006 71
J-15 fighters 67
Jane’s Defence Weekly 141
Japan 18; ADIZ 88; be patient and
rational 174–9; decision-making
characteristics of 170–9; difficulties
in promoting ‘new perspectives’
on 175–6; long continuation in
268 Index
Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation Mahan-style sea power 2
166–70; strategic confrontation and Mainland China 6–7, 55, 91, 123, 124n1,
compellence 176–9 130, 142, 147, 256; see also China
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) 82, 170 ‘Malacca Dilemma’ 11; see also
Japanese culture 171 ‘Malacca Predicament’
Japanese Parliament 86 ‘Malacca Predicament’ 11; see also
Jiawu Sino-Japanese War 7 ‘Malacca Dilemma’
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver Malacca Strait 12, 52, 74, 91–2, 186–8,
in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) 190, 203, 215n64
127, 139 Malaysia Airlines MH370 Flight 61, 64,
Joint Operational Access Concept 153, 203
(JOAC) 131, 135 Ma Licheng 176
Joshi, Devendra Kumar 188 marine geography 30, 47, 71, 92, 144–5
Jurchen 17 maritime civilizations 227, 233;
diplomatic transition from agrarian
Kan Naoto 173 civilization to 226–35
Kanwa Defense Review 141 ‘maritime co-governance’: adapting to
Kaplan, Robert 4, 187 essential compromises in pursuit of
Kenya 259 159–61
Khan, Genghis 4, 235 maritime contest: advancements in
Kissinger, Henry 155 marine science and technology and
Korean Peninsula 17, 48–52, 197, 207, 256 247; essence of peacefully winning
Korean War 197 243–51; international 250
Kosovo War 133 maritime discourse power, efforts for
Krepinevich, Andrew F. 131, 132 235–43
Kuril Islands dispute 207, 209 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian
Kwantung Army 172, 174, 177 Federation 206
‘Maritime Great Wall’ 10, 62
Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity maritime interconnectivity 41–3
Dialogue 155 maritime power dream, global vision of
Law of the Sea (Canada) 244 35–7
Lectures on the Philosophy of History maritime public goods 15, 21, 118
(Hegel) 227 maritime relations: with ASEAN
Lee Kuan Yew 182 165–211; with Australia 165–211; with
legitimacy 235–43; crisis for UNCLOS India 165–211; with Japan 165–211;
113; defined 235; international 235–43; with Russia 165–211
justice and 236 Maritime Silk Road 33, 38, 43, 45–6,
Liaoning (Chinese aircraft carrier) 59, 185, 257, 261
67–9, 72 maritime terrorism 74
Li Hongzhang 174 Marx, Karl 204
Li Keqiang 33 Mearsheimer, John J. 4
Ling Qing 237 Median Line 84, 86–7; see also ‘Sino-
Lingshui ‘collision incident’ 127 Japanese Median Line’
Liu Huaqing 2, 5, 26n5, 74 Medvedev, Dmitry 206
Liu Zhongmin 1 ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-
Locke, John 226 Denial Challenge,’ report 132
Lowy Institute for International Meiji Restoration 171
Policy 198 ‘Middle Ages’ 45
Middle East 37–8, 45, 74, 168, 190
Macartney, George 229 military diplomacy: China and 243, 259;
Mackinder, Sir Halford 257 and international cooperation 76–7;
Magellan, Ferdinand 231 Russia and 206
Mahan, Alfred Thayer 3, 21, 26, 30, 44, military modernization 9, 71, 89, 127,
141, 188, 213n28 134, 139, 146, 167, 192, 205, 238

Ming Dynasty 111
Mongol Empire 229, 235
Mongolian Plateau 226
Mongols 5, 17, 204
monotheism 45
‘Monroe doctrine’ 234
Mozambique 259
Mukden Incident 225
Murayama Tomiichi 173
Mutual Defense Treaty 133
mutually assured destruction
(MAD) 151
Mutual Notification Mechanisms on
Major Military Operations 158
Myanmar 187, 256, 258, 262n2
Nakagawa Shoichi 87
Nansha Islands 2, 71, 95, 100, 107, 111,
113–18, 122–3, 124n1, 130, 132, 188
Nanxiao Dao (Minami-kojima) 79
Nan Yu (Oki-no-Minami-iwa) 79
Napoleon 138, 210
Napoleonic Wars 210
National Defense University, United
States 137
‘National Defense White Paper’ 133
National Ocean Council, China 246
National Ocean Council, US 245
National People’s Congress 224
National Strategy for Maritime
Security 153
NATO 203, 205
Nebe, Chris D. 80
Nehru, Jawaharlal 189
Netherlands: First Eurasian Land
Bridge 261n2; rise and fall of 228;
world’s maritime order dominated
by 21
Newton, Sir Isaac 255
The New York Times 79
‘Nine Dash Line’ 108, 111
‘NL10 Degree Channel’ 187
No. 2 world sea power, China as 3–20
Noda Yoshihiko 82
nomadic tribes 229
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 194
nontraditional security threats 12, 75–6
nonwarfare operations of China’s naval
force 74–8; building integrated system
of management and defense at sea
77–8; initiating military diplomacy
and international cooperation 76–7;
responding to nontraditional security
threats 75–6; safeguarding freedom of
Index  269
navigation 75–6; supporting Chinese
Coast Guard’s law enforcement
activities 77–8
Northeastern Army 174, 177
Northern Pacific Ocean 5
Northern Sea Route 206, 209; see also
Arctic Northeast Passage
North Korea (DPRK) 47, 49–51, 56,
233, 257
North Korean nuclear crisis 17, 50
Northwestern Pacific Ocean 131, 211
Northwest Pacific Ocean 91, 121
nuclear deterrence 22, 29, 151, 216
nuclear terrorism 216, 221
Obama, Barack 120, 245
‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century’ report 244
‘Oceanic State’ strategy 244
Oceans Act of 2000 244
Oelrich, Ivan 138
‘Offset Strategy’ 130
Offshore Control Strategy 137
Okinawa island chain 5, 26n5
Okinawa Trough 85–7
1,000 Ship Navy Plan 153
openness: China and 239; and inclusivity
44–6; maintenance of the world’s
oceans’ 15; South China Sea dispute
and 239
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ 70
Opium War 229
‘An Outline of Plans for the
Development of Marine Science and
Technology as part of the National
11th Five-Year Plan’ 247
over-the-horizon (OTH) radar
systems 141
Pacific War 197
Pakistan 187, 191–3, 256–8, 262n2
Panetta, Leon 137
Panikkar, K. M. 189
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 225
‘Peace Ark’ (PLAN hospital ship) 74, 76
Peace of Westphalia 236
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 8,
65, 221
People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) 89–90
People’s Liberation Army Naval Air
Force (PLANAF) 89
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
67, 69, 90, 118, 144
270 Index
Persian Gulf 11–13, 189–90
Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean–Malacca
Strait maritime channel 13
Peter I of Bulgaria 204
Peter the Great 204
PetroChina 36
‘petty peasant mentality’ 18
Philippines 9, 47, 48, 53–5, 59, 74, 95,
98–112, 114–17, 122, 124n1, 133,
149, 181, 185, 217–18, 222, 239, 256;
Exclusive Economic Zone 107; ‘Triple
Action Plan’ 98
Philippine Tubbataha Reefs 118
Phoenicians 227
piracy 12, 15–16, 63, 65, 74–5, 118, 153,
160, 189, 231, 241
PLA Daily 68
PLA Rocket Force 90
Portugal 21, 228
Potter, E. B. 228
Proliferation Security Initiative 153
Putin, Vladimir 204–5
Qianlong, Emperor 233
Qin dynasty 230
Qing Dynasty 111, 140, 204, 229, 230
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 135
RAND Corporation 56–7, 129, 130
‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ strategy
127, 130, 133, 183, 198, 200–1
reconnaissance satellites 141, 143–4, 146
Red Navy 205, 253; see also Soviet
Red Navy
Red Sea 12, 189–90
regional sea powers 3–4, 20, 69
Renai Jiao incident 101
Renaissance 228
ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian
Age (Frank) 230
Revolution in Military Affairs report 131
RIMPAC joint exercises 77
‘Rising East, Declining West’ 39
river valley civilizations 227
Roman Empire 188
Romans 227, 228
Rong Jian 171
Ross, Robert S. 127
Roughead, Gary 135
Rouran 17
Royal Navy 231
Rudd, Kevin 198
Russell, Daniel 111
Russia 6; Arctic ambitions and Pacific
dreams 205–8; Eurasian Economic
Union 42; expanding maritime
connotations in Sino-Russian strategic
cooperative partnership 203–11;
limitations in Sino-Russian maritime
cooperation 208–11; maritime
tradition of 204–5; priorities in Sino-
Russian maritime cooperation 208–11;
see also Russian Federation
Russian Federation 204, 206–7, 215n65,
246; see also Russia
Ryukyu Arc 85
safeguarding, freedom of navigation 75–6
‘salami slicing’ 53
Schwartz, Norton A. 135
sea: building an integrated system of
management and defense at 77–8;
maintaining Sino-Indian strategic
stability at 193–6
sea lane security 7, 10
sea lanes of communications (SLOCs)
10, 12, 33, 40, 43, 50, 54, 62, 72, 74,
91–2, 153, 187, 192–4, 197
Second Island Chain 17, 57, 64, 136,
144, 198, 256
Second Opium War 229
Second World War 7, 15, 19, 22, 29, 30,
32, 70, 117, 138, 141, 166, 168, 172,
180, 197, 237, 253
secular rationality 45
security: dichotomy between economics
and 179–82; sea lane 7, 10
September 18th Incident 174
Shi Yinhong 176
Silk Road Economic Belt 38, 40, 257
Sino-Indian maritime conflicts:
discussions on 186–8
Sino-Japanese maritime conflicts 9
‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ 79, 86, 87;
see also Median Line
Sino-Japanese relations: long
continuation in Sino-Japanese
strategic confrontation 166–70;
rationally facing frosty and tense
165–70
Sino-Japanese war 166
Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and
Cooperation Friendship Treaty 233
Sino-Okinawan continental shelf 86
Sinopec 36
Sino-Russian joint military drills 64
Sino-Russian ‘Joint Sea 2013’ drills 77
Sino-Russian maritime cooperation:
limitations in 208–11; priorities in
208–11

Sino-Russian strategic cooperative
partnership: expanding maritime
connotations in 203–11
Sino-US–Australian trilateral
relations 201
Sino-US maritime competitive posture,
in next 30 years 126–48
Sino-US maritime power relations:
constructing new type of 154–61;
establishing crisis prevention
management mechanism 158–9;
‘maritime co-governance’ 159–61;
power rivalries grow progressively
fiercer reconcilable 148–50;
strengthening strategic dialogue and
communication to improve interaction
process 155–8
Sino-US relations: Anti-access vs. AirSea
Battle 131–40; maritime functional
cooperation advancing stability of
152–4; prevailing China or United
States 140–6; reluctant compromise
and desperate balance 146–8
Sino-US trade war 151
smart deterrence system, creating 221–5
Smith, Stephen 198
Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue 155
Somalia 12, 118
Song Dynasty 111
South America 37, 44, 91
South China Sea code of conduct
(COC) 55
South China Sea ‘Dash Line’: debate
over 110–13
South China Sea dispute 5, 105;
accurate understanding of situation
in 95–7; debate over South China Sea
‘Dash Line’ 110–13; debut display
of ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ and future
maneuvers 119–23; in defense of legal
principles in 106–10; intelligently
navigating complex relations in 101–6;
new opportunities and implications
of South China Sea strategy 97–101;
openness and 239; solution to
tensions in 95–125; thoughts on land
reclamation of Spratly Islands 113–19
South China Sea strategy (China): 12
Chinese characters guiding principle
and 100–1; new opportunities and
implications of 97–101
Southeast Asia: dichotomy between
economics and security 179–82;
good neighbors and close friends in
crucial period 182–3; reassuring one’s
Index  271
neighbors 183–6; reinforcing provision
of security to 179–86
South Korea (ROK) 47, 49, 50–1, 56, 88,
156, 165, 173–4, 233, 244, 254, 259;
ADIZ 88
Soviet Red Navy 253; see also
Red Navy
Soviet Union 18, 90, 151–2, 203–5,
208–9, 230, 232–3
Spain 112, 141, 228
Spratly Islands 5, 6; thoughts on the
land reclamation of 113–19
Sri Lanka 187, 258
State Council’s National Maritime
Economic Development Program 1
Statement of the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on China’s
Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime
Rights and Interests in the South
China Sea 7
State Oceanic Administration, of the
People’s Republic of China 1, 243,
246, 252n17
‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces
61–7; how to 65–7; necessity to ‘step
out’ 62–3; possible to ‘step out’ 63–5;
strategy to 65–7
Strait of Malacca 10–11, 188
String of Pearls Strategy 187, 196
Suez Canal 206
Sui dynasty 49
Sun Tzu 216, 231
Suyan Rock and Rixiang Reef 49–50
Taiwan 2, 5–6, 9, 24, 26n5, 55–9, 81, 92,
96, 127–8, 130, 132, 142, 147, 149–50,
161, 197, 200, 256
Taiwan Relations Act 132
Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996) 96,
127, 132
Tang Dynasty 49, 111
Tanzania 259
technological equipment
manufacturing 36
technological innovation 128, 147, 224,
228, 248
Temple, Henry John, Third Viscount
Palmerston 232
10th Asia-Europe Meeting 42
terrorism: counterterrorism missions
and 73; global/international 241–2;
maritime 74; as nontraditional
security threat 12, 14; nuclear 216, 221
Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea 237
272 Index
Third World Countries 22, 66, 131, 232,
233, 259
3D printing 255
Till, Geoffrey 14, 75
Tirpitz, Alfred von 253
Toshi Yoshihara 4, 159
Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership Agreement (TTIP) 39
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP) 39
Treasure Voyages of Zheng He 41
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
South East Asia (TAC) 55, 181
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security 132, 168
tridents beyond armed force 226–52
Trump, Donald 53, 151
‘trump card’ weaponry 134
Tsar Alexander III 204
Tsardom of Russia 204
Tsarist Russia 18, 204
Turks 17
‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’
37–43, 46, 118, 187
two-ocean strategy, of China: aircraft
carriers and 67–74
2014 Military Balance 129
2016 Statistical Bulletin of China’s
Outward Foreign Direct Investment 14
Typhoon Haiyan 74
UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) 85, 95, 98,
109, 259
United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5, 20, 81;
Article 7(1) 86; Article 15 84; Article
38 84; Article 56 83; Article 283 of
107; Article 287 106; Article 298 of
107; Articles 74 84; Articles 83 84;
principle of fairness and spirit of
impartiality 92; signed in 22
United States: constructing new
type of Sino-US maritime power
relations 154–61; maritime functional
cooperation advancing stability
of Sino-US relations 152–4;
military perpetuating its maritime
hegemony in distant waters 143–6;
overall interdependence restricting
fomentation of conflict 150–2;
possibility of maintaining peace
at sea between China and 148–54;
promoting peaceful power transition
between China and 126–61; Prompt
Global Strike (PGS) deployed by
59; robust vitality of US–Australian
alliance 197–8; shifting strategic
balance between China and 128–31;
Sino-US maritime competitive posture
in next 30 years 126–48; Sino-US
power rivalries growing fiercer but
reconcilable 148–50; world’s maritime
order dominated by 21
unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUV) 136
UN Peacekeeping Operations 63
UN Security Council 64
US Air Force 135–6
US-Asia-Pacific strategy 159, 197
US–Australian alliance: Australian
people praising 198; China and 198,
202; robust vitality of 197–8; Second
World War and 197; Stephen Smith
on 198
US Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 129
US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 138
US-China Joint Announcement on
Climate Change 151
US Commission on Ocean Policy 244
US Congress 244
US Container Safety Initiative (CSI) 160
US Department of Defense 134; Office
of Net Assessment (ONA) 131
US National Intelligence Council (NIC)
128, 255
US Naval War College 72, 138, 153
US Navy 4, 9, 16, 253
US Ocean Action Plan 244
US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 129
US P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft 59
USS Abraham Lincoln 70
USS Cowpens 59
US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations 120
USS Enterprise 72
USS Guardian minesweeper 118
USSR 68–9, 254
‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier 67
Vietnam 9, 18, 54; Law of the Sea 245;
‘Maritime Strategy towards the Year
2020’ 245
Vietnam War 197
Wang Shuguang 1
Wang Yi 105
Wellington Koo 225
Western civilization 31, 227–9
 Index  273
Western maritime traditions 31 Yeltsin, Boris 205
Western Pacific Naval Symposium 77 Yemen 259
Western Pacific Ocean 17, 36, 187 Yin and Yang 44
White, Hugh 147 Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign
World Bank 128 Matters) 111
world marine economic power 23–6 Yoji Koda 167
World War I see First World War Yuan Dynasty 111
World War II see Second World War
WTO Doha round of negotiations 39 Zhang Guobao 87
Zhang Qian 40
Xianbei 17 Zhang Wenmu 2
Xi Jingping 34 Zhang Xueliang 174, 177, 225
Xi Jinping 32–3, 37, 42, 89, 100, 150 Zhang Yesui 45
Xinhai Revolution (the Chinese Zheng He 41, 234
Revolution of 1911) 229 Zhongjian Depression 121
‘Xinjiang Independence’ 17 Zhongjiannan incident 121
Xisha Islands 100, 103, 116, 118–23 Zhongjiannan initiative 119, 121–2
Zhongnan (Indochina) Peninsula
Y-20 large airfreighter 63 railway 256
Yellow Sea 5, 17, 24, 26n5, 48–9, 52, 91, Zhongyuan dynasties 18, 146, 180, 229
110, 249, 256 Zhu Yuanzhang, Hongwu Emperor 233
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