20220623-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR A. Zimmerman & MR M. Begg-FEEDBACK - Re Constitutional Issues

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1
2
3 Mr A. Zimmermann & Mr M Begg (Australian date) 23-6-2022
4 Emails: enquiries@sheridan.edu.au mbegg@ipa@org.au
5
6 Re: 20220623-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr A. Zimme rman & Mr M. Begg-FEEDBACK -Re constitutional issues
7 Sirs,
8 I read the articles “The Real Debate Is Not Simply About Monarchy vs. Republic” by Mr
9 Augusto Zimmermann and also “The Indigenous Voice to Parliament Has the Potential to Be
10 Divisive” by Mr Morgan Begg upon I both desire to provide a limited feedback.
11 While both appears to me with the best intentions neither seem to have correctly reflected what
12 constitutionally is applicable, as I to some limited degree will refer to below, albeit the document
13 below might be a start to consider, which so far amounts to about 2,940 pages (including 73
14 Supplements) besides other publication as my Scribd blog “inspectorrikati”.
15
16 Scott Morrison requested the Australian Federal Police to investigate regarding
17 COVID issues, and well, let the AFP do its job and do a proper investigation as I now
18 have requested in this COMPLAINT.
19
20 This document can be downloaded from:
21 https://www.scribd.com/document/518990686/20210806-Mr-G-H-Schorel-Hlavka-O-W-B-to-Reece-
22 Kershaw-Chief-Commissioner-of-the-Australian-Federal-Police-COMPLAINT-2
23
24 I on 19 July 2006 (representing myself) in AEC vs Schorel-Hlavka (involving 9 Attorney-
25 Generals who were served a NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER) I completely
26 defeated the Commonwealth in both cases. (County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737
27 & Q10897630 exercising federal jurisdiction). My initial issue was that the “compulsory” part of
28 voting was unconstitutional. Thereafter I raised numerous other constitutional issues including
29 that the purported Australian Citizenship Act was unconstitutional. You both may understand
30 that when a party object to the legal validity of a certain act or part thereof then for all purposes
31 and intent the relevant legislation or part thereof under objection is ULTRA VIRES Ab Initio,
32 unless and until if ever at all a court of competent jurisdiction declares it to be INTRA VIRES.
33 On 4 December 2002 the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg (exercising federal
34 jurisdiction) by consent of the parties ordered that the matters of the NOTICE OF
35 CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS were to be heard and determined by the High Court of
36 Australia. The High Court of Australia is well aware of this outstanding NOTICE OF
37 CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS but has for about 20 years not bothered to hear and
38 determine the matters. Hence, in law the purported Australian Citizenship Act (now 2007) is and
39 remains ULTRA VIRES.
40 In the matter of Senator Heather Hills the High Court of Australia made a ruling that she was
41 disqualified within s44 of the constitution [Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
42 (UK)], in Sykes v Clearly the Court held that Mr Clearly by s44 was disqualified and in
43 Barnaby Jones the Court held that he also was disqualified within s44. In my view each
44 decision was based upon incorrect understanding about what S44 stands for. At my Scribd blog I
45 have canvassed these and numerous other issues extensively. And, none of the Attorney-
23-6-2022 Page 1 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

INSPECTOR-RIKATI® about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
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Page 2
1 Generals or the Commonwealth DPP sought to challenge any of the issues I raised in my 409
2 pages ADDRESS TO THE COURT (written submissions) at the successful appeals.
3 It may give you an indication that where I was able to successfully and so comprehensively
4 defeat the Commonwealth then obviously this may indicate I so to say done my homework.
5
6 I was very pleased indeed that Mr Augusto Zimmermann was at various times referring to the
7 Hansard records of the Constitutional Convention Debates. Regretfully he did not QUOTE –
8 END QUOTE statements as I in my writings do, as you will notice I generally always do as to
9 enable my readers to check back and quickly can ascertain that I indeed correctly quoted certain
10 parts. It also assist the reader to read more of the debate as to ascertain if the quoted part is not
11 taken out of context.
12
13 The Framers of the Constitution themselves at times also made critical errors such as in the
14 following:
15
16 Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
17 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
18 The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
19 allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
20 END QUOTE
21
23 QUOTE
24 Mr. GLYNN ( South Australia )[12.35]: I have not the Federal Council Bill before me;
25 but I believe that that bill contained the words "sailing between the ports of the colonies."
26 The bill was sent home with those words in it; but her Majesty's advisers at home
27 deliberately changed the wording of the measure so as to give the Council wider
28 jurisdiction. There was a limitation in the bill which does not appear in the act, and the
29 Imperial authorities must have made this alteration for some specific purpose. They
30 could not have accidentally inserted the words "port of clearance, or." There is no danger
31 of conflict between the laws of the commonwealth and the Imperial law. The moment
32 a new act is passed in England which conflicts with any legislation passed by the
33 commonwealth, that act will to the extent of the difference abrogate the legislation
34 under the constitution of Australia .
35 END QUOTE
36
37 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is a “Constitution Act” and as
38 such can only be amended by an “Amendment Constitution Act” and not by any ordinary British
39 legislation. Hence, the purported “Australian Act 1986 (UK) has absolutely no bearing upon the
40 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) and neither upon any Commonwealth
41 legislation that was validly enacted within the context of the constitution.
42 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is a British Act and as such
43 considering the decision of Aggregate Industries UK Ltd., R (on the application of) v English
44 Nature and & Anor [2002] EWHC 908 (Admin) (24th April, 2002) and Judgments - Mark
45 (Respondent) v. Mark (Appellant), OPINIONS, OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL for judgment
46 IN THE CAUSE, SESSION 2005-06 [2005] UKHL 42 on appeal from: [2003] EWCA Civ 168
47 It appears that the The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
48 Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) albeit not overriding constitutional law, is
49 complimentary to British (constitution) law, as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
50 Act 1900 (UK) is.

Page 3
1 This clearly underlines that the European Union laws were overriding British domestic
2 legislation but not any British constitutional legislation such as the Commonwealth of Australia
3 Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
4 While the U.K. left the EU nevertheless the EU laws that were at the time applicable still are
5 “complimentary” still applicable to the Commonwealth of Australia.
6 There has been an utter and total failure to understand both Subsection 51(xxxvii) & (xxxviii).
7 As French J (then as judge in WA – Later CJ of HCA)) made clear that Subsection 51(xxvii) did
8 no more but to grant the powers to the Commonwealth to accept a reference of legislative
9 powers but the powers for the State to refer legislative powers had to be found elsewhere.
10 Constitutionally, all and any reference of legislative powers purportedly to the Commonwealth
11 by any or all of the States were without constitutional validity unless they were in each instance
12 approved by the relevant state electors in a State referendum.
13
14 Hansard 21-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
15 Australasian Convention)
16 QUOTE
17 The Right Hon. C.C. KINGSTON (South Australia)[9.21]: I trust the Drafting Committee will not fail to
18 exercise a liberal discretion in striking out words which they do not understand, and that they will put
19 in words which can be understood by persons commonly acquainted with the English language.
20 END QUOTE
21
23 QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
24 I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its language. He says:
25 One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be either legally
26 immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority above and beyond the ordinary
27 legislative bodies, whether federal or state legislatures, existing under the constitution.
28 END QUOTE
29
30 ":.. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of
31 its makers" Gaudron J (Wakim, HCA27 \99)
32
33 "... But … in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its words should
34 remain constant. We are not to give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could have
35 borne in 1900. Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as language changes.
36 "
37 Windeyer J (Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association)
38
39 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA
40 27 (17 June 1999)
41 QUOTE
42 Constitutional interpretation
43 1. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the
44 intention of its makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs,
45 hopes or expectations. Constitutional interpretation is not a search for the mental states of
46 those who made, or for that matter approved or enacted, the Constitution. The intention
47 of its makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in the historical context
48 in which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
49 Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my
50 opinion[53]:
51 "We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence

52 available - the authors of the text in question intended to say. That is an
Page 4
1 exercise in what I have called constructive interpretation[54]. It does not

2 mean peeking inside the skulls of people dead for centuries. It means
3 trying to make the best sense we can of an historical event - someone, or a
4 social group with particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a
5 particular way on a particular occasion."
6 END QUOTE
7
9 QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
10 The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for
11 the whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the
12 whole of these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal
13 constitution which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the
14 several colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the
15 royal prerogative exercised, in their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be
16 practically vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the
17 full power and dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies
18 that will be in existence concurrently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each
19 assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey
20 again says-a merely subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority
21 conferred upon it by the constitution, but invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of
22 such authority.
23 END QUOTE
24
25 HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
26 QUOTE
27 Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
28 sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
29 parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present
30 are not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the
31 power of amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary
32 sovereignty. No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the
33 power of changing its constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the
34 parliaments of a federation are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in
35 one body. More than all that, there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed
36 with, instead of there being a high court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary
37 which towers above all powers, legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter
38 of the constitution.
39 END QUOTE
40
41 Then consider this incorrect statement:
42
43 Chief Justice French in his speech “The Common Law and the Protection of Human Rights”
44 to the Anglo Australiasian Lawyers Society on 4th September 2009, said:-
45 “ We do so against the backdrop of the supremacy of Parliament"
46
47 While Parliaments in the colonies were supreme above their State Supreme Courts, this changed
48 by the federation, and “separation of powers” did mean that the Parliament no longer could
49 overrule the State Supreme Court and that it neither could interfere and/or diminish the State
50 Supreme Court judicial powers.
51
52 When a matter is referred to the Commonwealth then obviously this entails to reduce the original
53 judicial powers of the State Supreme Court. This can only be done if the “sovereigns” the
54 electors were to approve for the relevant State Parliament to transfer certain legislative powers to
55 the Commonwealth. After all the Commonwealth when accepting legislative powers referred to
56 it by one or more states will then have the judicial powers with it.
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1
2 Because the States within Section 106 were created “subject to this constitution” the states are
3 bound by the legal principles embedded in this constitution, unless otherwise stated within the
4 context of this constitution. Even Section2 compels the Governor-General to act in compliance
5 “subject to this constitution” and as such cannot exercise nor attain any powers outside the
6 provisions of the constitution.
7
8 As Mr Augusto Zimmermann correctly pointed out how the Head of State (the representative
9 thereof being the Governor-General) could be impartial when states like WA and QLLD
10 assigning him to be Chief Health Officer and/or Vaccine Commander. Actually, I am not aware
11 that the constitution provide any State to install certain powers to the Governor-General. Neither
12 that WA could legislate (as it did) to jab citizens with “POISON” as this violates the very legal
13 principle for “PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT”. It was and remains to be in my
14 view beyond the judicial powers of the High Court of Australia to determine that the wording
15 “PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT” are not having any meaning.
16
18 QUOTE
19 Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local
20 Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
21 of the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the
22 Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their
23 own territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except
24 that which is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
25 END QUOTE
26
28 QUOTE
29 The CHAIRMAN.-I do not think I can rule this proposed amendment out of order. Every clause, or
30 nearly every clause, in a Bill in some way qualifies the preceding clauses. They extend the operation of
31 those clauses, and, in some instances they limit the operation of the clauses. This is not a distinct
32 negative, and I think it would be unduly curtailing the power of the committee to arrive at such a conclusion
33 as they may think fit if I ruled this out of order.
34 END QUOTE
35 .
37 QUOTE Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-
38 When we consider how vast the importance is that every word of the Constitution should be correct,
39 that every clause should fit into every other clause; when we consider the great amount of time,
40 trouble, and expense it would take to make any alteration, and that, if we have not made our intentions
41 clear, we shall undoubtedly have laid the foundation of lawsuits of a most extensive nature, which will
42 harass the people of United Australia and create dissatisfaction with our work, it must be evident that
43 too much care has not been exercised.
44 END QUOTE
45 .
47 QUOTE
48 Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-The honorable and learned member (Mr. Isaacs) is I think correct
49 in the history of this clause that he has given, and this is [start page 672] one of those instances which should
50 make us very careful of following too slavishly the provisions of the United States Constitution, or any other
51 Constitution. No doubt in putting together the draft of this Bill, those who were responsible for doing so used
52 the material they found in every Constitution before it, and probably they felt that they would be incurring a
53 great deal of responsibility in leaving out provisions which might be in the least degree applicable. But it is
54 for us to consider, looking at the history and reasons for these provisions in the Constitution of the United
55 States, whether they are in any way applicable; and I quite agree with my honorable and learned friend (Mr.
56 Carruthers) that we should be very careful of every word that we put in this Constitution, and that we should

Page 6
1 have no word in it which we do not see some reason for. Because there can be no question that in time to
2 come, when this Constitution has to be interpreted, every word will be weighed and an interpretation given
3 to it; and by the use now of what I may describe as idle words which we have no use for, we may be giving a
4 direction to the Constitution which none of us now contemplate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to see that
5 there is some reason for every clause and every word that goes into this Constitution.
6 END QUOTE
7
8 Re Wakim [1999] HCA 27 (17 June 1999)
9 KIRBY J. : “ A legislature cannot, by preambular assertions, recite itself into constitution
10 power where none exists. ”
11
12 Chief Justice French in his speech “The Common Law and the Protection of Human Rights”
13 to the Anglo Australiasian Lawyers Society on 4th September 2009, said:-
14 “ We do so against the backdrop of the supremacy of Parliament"
15
16 Despite we seem to have numerous self-professed “constitutional lawyers” an oxymoron
17 because it is as conflicting as a person calling himself “firebug firefighter” this as lawyers are
18 looking how to twist and infringe upon constitutional text to suit their clients whereas a
19 constitutionalist pursues the organic meaning of constitutional text.
20
22 QUOTE
23 Mr. ISAACS.-We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
24 END QUOTE
25
27 QUOTE Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-
28 That this is not like an Act of Parliament which we are passing. It is not in the position which Mr. Barton has
29 described, of choosing or setting up a code of laws to interpret the common law of England. This
30 Constitution we are framing is not yet passed. It has to be handed over not to a Convention similar to
31 this, not to a small select body of legislators, but to the whole body of the people for their acceptance or
32 rejection. It is the whole body of the people whose understanding you have to bring to bear upon it, and
33 it is the whole body of the people, the more or less instructed body of the people, who have to
34 understand clearly everything in the Constitution, which affects them for weal or woe during the whole
35 time of the existence of this Commonwealth. We cannot have on the platform, when this Constitution is
36 commended to the people, lawyers on both sides, drawing subtle distinctions, which may or may not be
37 appreciated by the people.
38 END QUOTE
39
41 QUOTE
42 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
43 terms that are just to both.
44 Mr. DEAKIN.-It is made for the lawyers under this clause.
45 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-I do not think so. If you say "Trust the Parliament," no Constitution is
46 required at all; it can simply be provided that a certain number of gentlemen shall be elected, and meet
47 together, and, without limitation, do what they like. Victoria would not agree to that. But there is a desire to
48 draw the very life-blood of the Constitution, so far as the states are concerned, by this insidious amendment,
49 which would give the Houses authority from time to time to put different constructions on this most
50 important part of the Constitution. I hope we will do as we have done in many instances before, in matters
51 that have been much debated-adhere to the decision we have already arrived at.
52 END QUOTE
53
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1 QUOTE
2 Mr. ISAACS.-If you were to bring in a Bill to impose one tax, would it include a power to repeal
3 another on the same subject?
4 Mr. OCONNOR.-Undoubtedly.
5 Mr. ISAACS.-Mr. Barton has given an opinion that it would not.
6 Mr. MCMILLAN.-We have the ablest lawyers divided on this question, and what is the layman to
7 do?
8 END QUOTE
9
10 With this the problem is that many so called “constitutional lawyers” considering the context of
11 the constitution upon their legal studies and not as an (unbias) FAIR MINDED PERSON.
12
13 In my AEC vs Schorel-Hlavka cases I on 4 August 2005 drew the attention to the court about
14 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) HCA 24 (12 September 1996) and that there for
15 the Commonwealth could not rely upon the ‘AVERMENT” provisions in the CEA1918, as this
16 interfered with the State sole legislative powers and so the State courts judicial powers. The
17 court having heard both parties then made the ruling that the Commonwealth had to file and
18 serve all and any evidence it relied upon. This was a significant court decision that however ever
19 since was blatantly ignored by the Commonwealth. Since then it continued to rely upon
20 “AVERMENT” in thousands of other cases despite it being aware the Court made its ruling.
21 Indeed, the ATO (Australian Taxation Office) itself scandalously continued to do so also.
22
23 On the 5th September 2006, the High Court in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments
24 Commission [2006] HCA 44 5 September 2006 C7/2005 made a binding ruling that there is a
25 “Kable Principle”. It also means that the ATO cannot rely upon “evert”/”averment” even so it
26 nevertheless continues to do so and this in my view by perverting the course of justice and
27 deceiving the administration of justice.
28
29
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2
3
4 What had eventuated was that on 16 November 2005 the magistrate in the Magistrates Court of
5 Victoria at Heidelberg made known that if I succeeded in my cases then John Howard was not
6 validly elected in both 2001 and 2004, etc, however the following day on 17 November 2005
7 made clear he was not considering previous court orders and convicted me in both cases. This I
8 successfully appealed. As the County Court then noted that “No evidence led by the
9 Commonwealth D.P.P.” As such, enforcing the court orders of 4 August 2005 that the
10 Commonwealth couldn’t rely upon “AVERMENT”. Despite this the Commonwealth
11 nevertheless engages if perverting the course of justice each and every time it claims
12 “AVERMENT”/”AVERT” in state courts!
13
15 QUOTE
16 Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
17 Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
18 state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get £100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
19 the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
20 Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
21 provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may
22 be amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have
23 this provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the
24 Ministers of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask
25 permission to occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
26 END QUOTE
27
28 It must be clear that giving the Governor-General by the States to be Vaccine commander, where
29 this is beyond the scope of the Federal government to do so it a constitutional absurdity. The
30 same with being the Chief Health Officer of a State. While the Commonwealth itself can provide
31 legislation, as it does at time, to grand the Governor-General certain powers in addition to his
32 prerogative powers the states however cannot do so.
33
34 There is also the absurdity that states are using “concurrent” legislative powers. For sure, at the
35 time of federation there were no federal laws enacted because first a Federal Parliament needed
36 to be created and hence certain colonial (now State) laws continued to be applicable but once the
37 Commonwealth commenced to legislate this was the end of any State legislative powers.
38
40 QUOTE
41 Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
42 legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
43 END QUOTE
44
46 QUOTE
47 Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
48 nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
49 Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

Page 9
1 Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
2 remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
3 all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
4 END QUOTE
5
7 QUOTE
8 The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: The moment the commonwealth exercises the
9 power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
10 END QUOTE
11 .
13 QUOTE Mr. REID:
14 We must make it clear that the moment the Federal Parliament legislates on one of those points
15 enumerated in clause 52, that instant the whole State law on the subject is dead. There cannot be two
16 laws, one Federal and one State, on the same subject. But that I merely mention as almost a verbal
17 criticism, because there is no doubt, whatever that the intention of the framers was not to propose any
18 complication of the kind.
19 END QUOTE
20 .
22 QUOTE
23 The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: We ought to be careful not to load the
24 commonwealth with any more duties than are absolutely necessary. Although it is quite true that this
25 power is permissive, you will always find that if once power is given to the commonwealth to legislate
26 on a particular question, there will be continual pressure brought to bear on the commonwealth to
27 exercise that power. The moment the commonwealth exercises the power, the states must retire from
28 that field of legislation.
29 END QUOTE
30 .
32 QUOTE
33 Mr. OCONNOR.-Directly it is exercised it becomes an exclusive power, and there is no doubt that it
34 will be exercised.
35 END QUOTE
36
38 QUOTE
39 My only desire is to give power to the Federal Parliament to achieve a scheme for old-age
40 pensions if it be practicable, and if the people require it. No power would be taken away
41 from the states. The sub-section would not interfere with the right of any state to act in
42 the meantime until the Federal Parliament took the matter in hand.
43 END QUOTE
44
45 As the Framers of the Constitution made very clear that the States could legislate UNTIL the
46 Commonwealth commenced to do so but once it did that was the end of state legislative powers.
47 In fact, since the federation came into force the States no longer could amend their colonial
48 legislation.
49
50 Mr Morgan Begg correctly points out you cannot have a treaty with yourself.
51
52 QUOTE
53 At its best, the issue of treaty is just incoherent. Indigenous Australians are Australians,
54 and the Australian government can’t sign a treaty with itself.
55 END QUOTE
56
57 However I view he erred in the following statement if this were to relate to both ss51(xxvi) and
58 s127:
Page 10
1
2 QUOTE
3 It also explains why the nation overwhelmingly supported a constitutional change in 1967.
4 The removal of references to race in the Constitution was consistent with a view that
5 Australians formal and legal status should not be delineated along racial lines.
6 END QUOTE
7
8 Albeit in my view he correctly states, if this related to s127 and not ss51(xxvi):
9
10 QUOTE
11 The movement for the Voice is not the continuation of 1967 but a repudiation of the claim
12 for racial equality it represented.
13 END QUOTE
14
15 Firstly, as I indicated one has to read the constitution and the Hansard debates without legal bias.
16 If you fail in this then forget about what the constitution is about.
17
18 Section 127 was at the time where Western Australia really hesitated t5o become part of the
19 federation because of the high number of Aboriginals in WA and the taxation was deemed
20 unaffordable unless Aboriginals were not included. It also would prevent others to so to say start
21 killing Aboriginals to reduce taxation, etc.
22
23 I recall and incident with the Electoral Officer in the then Heidelberg Commonwealth electoral
24 office where he claimed Aboriginals never voted until the 1967 referendum. I pointed to a poster
25 he had near the entrance showing that Aboriginals did vote in the very first federal election. So,
26 he clearly lacked that knowledge.
27 For sure, there were not many Aboriginals who voted in the first federal election but that was not
28 because of any federal legislation then or since. No federal legislation existed prior to the first
29 sitting of the federal parliament and certain Aboriginals who already were granted franchise in
30 their colonies by the federation automatically within s41 of the constitution retained franchise in
31 the federation. Likewise so for females. There was however one critical exemption to Section 41
32 and that was that where the Commonwealth had legislated within s51(xxvi) against a particular
33 race then all and every person of that race was automatically denied their franchise. Despite the
34 High Court of Australia’s incorrect decision in “KOOWARTA V. BJELKE-PETERSEN
35 (1982) 153 CLR 168 High Court of Australia” the Racial Discrimination Act in my view is
36 and remains unconstitutional. I also refer to the Ss51(xxvi) referendum being a “con job”
37 referendum.
38
39 Let me explain:
40
41 S127 had absolutely nothing to do with the eligibility of Aboriginals having franchise or not. It
42 was purely for taxation issues.
43
44 Ss51(xxvi) however specifically excluded Aboriginals because the Framers of the Constitution
45 held they were EQUAL as any other Australian, and while certain races could be subject to
46 legislation to curtail their rights the Framers of the constitution however held that Aboriginals
47 were equal.
48
50 QUOTE
51 Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-That is an alteration of substance which I will explain. I agree with the
52 object of the clause as proposed to be limited by the amendment which I am now proposing. That is to say, I
53 quite agree that any elector who, at the establishment of the Commonwealth or afterwards, has, under the
Page 11
1 law in force in any state at the establishment of the Commonwealth, the right to vote at elections should not
2 be prevented by any law of the Commonwealth from exercising that right.
3 END QUOTE
4
6 QUOTE
7 Clause 120-In reckoning the numbers of the people of a State or other part of the Commonwealth aboriginal
8 natives shall not be counted.
9 Dr. COCKBURN: As a general principle I think this is quite right. But in this colony, and I suppose
10 in some of the other colonies, there are a number of natives who are on the rolls, and they ought not to
11 be debarred from voting.
12 Mr. DEAKIN: This only determines the number of your representatives, and the aboriginal
13 population is too small to affect that in the least degree.
14 Mr. BARTON: It is only for the purpose of determining the quota.
15 Dr. COCKBURN: Is that perfectly clear? Even then, as a matter of principle, they ought not to be
16 deducted.
17 Mr. O'CONNOR: The amendment you have carried already preserves their votes.
18 Dr. COCKBURN: I think these natives ought to be preserved as component parts in reckoning up
19 the people. I can point out one place where 100 or 200 of these aboriginals vote.
20 Mr. DEAKIN: Well, it will take 26,000 to affect one vote.
21 Mr. WALKER: I would point out to Dr. Cockburn that one point in connection with this matter is, that
22 when we come to divide the expenses of the Federal Government per capita, if he leaves out these
23 aboriginals South Australia will have so much the less to pay, whilst if they are counted South
24 Australia will have so much the more to pay.
25 Clause, as read, agreed to.

26 END QUOTE
27
28 The following refers to Section 41:
29
30 “ Mr. O'CONNOR: The amendment you have carried already preserves their votes.”
31
32 HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
33 QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
34 The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
35 END QUOTE
36
38 QUOTE
39 Mr. BARTON.- Of course it will be argued that this Constitution will have been made by the Parliament of
40 the United Kingdom. That will be true in one sense, but not true in effect, because the provisions of this
41 Constitution, the principles which it embodies, and the details of enactment by which those principles
42 are enforced, will all have been the work of Australians.
43 END QUOTE
44
46 QUOTE
47 Mr. OCONNOR.-I think that the reason of the proposal is obvious. So long as each state has to do only
48 with its own citizens it may make what laws it thinks fit, but we are creating now a new and a larger
49 citizenship. We are giving new rights of citizenship to the whole of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and
50 we should take care that no man is deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.
Page 12
1 Mr. GORDON.-Might you not as well say that the states should not legalize murder?
2 Mr. OCONNOR-That is one of those suppositions that are against the first instincts of humanity.
3 Mr. GORDON.-So is this.
4 Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it is not. We need not go far back in history to find cases in which the
5 community, seized with a sort of madness with regard to particular offences, have set aside all
6 principles of justice. If a state did behave itself in that way, why should not the citizens of the
7 Commonwealth who did not belong to that state be protected? Dr. Cockburn suggested in so
8 contemptuous a way that there could be no reason for this amendment, that I got up to state again
9 what had been stated before.
10 Dr. COCKBURN.-Not contemptuous.
11 Mr. OCONNOR.-I know the honorable member meant nothing personal, but I thought it necessary to state
12 the reasons of what, had it not been for the honorable member's statement, would have seemed to be a
13 perfectly obvious proposition. Mr. Clark, of Tasmania, thought the amendment of importance, and pointed
14 out that it had been put in the United States Constitution. It should also be put in this Constitution, not
15 necessarily as an imputation on any state or any body of states, but as a guarantee for all time for the citizens
16 of the Commonwealth that they shall be treated according to what we recognise to be the principles of justice
17 and of equality.
18 END QUOTE
19
20 One therefore has to question why the amendment of Ss51(xxvi) if Aboriginals had already
21 citizenship since federation but may or may not have been provided with franchise pending their
22 own state legislative provisions?
23 What the 1967 referendum to amend Ss51(xxvi) actually did achieve was to re-classify
24 Aboriginals to be equal as to any “inferior” “coloured” “foreign” “aliens”
25
27 QUOTE
28 That the words "The affairs of," first line sub-section (1),be omitted.
29 [start page 253]
30 Mr. BARTON.-I have no objection to taking it that way.
31 Mr. DEAKIN.-I think it must now be perfectly clear that what we desire is, not to deprive, the Federal
32 Parliament of its paramount power in every respect in regard to any dealings with the races referred
33 to, but to leave to the several states, until the Federal Parliament legislates upon the alien question, the
34 operation of all legislation already passed, and the the right to legislate in the future until the Federal
35 Parliament thinks fit to supersede it by specific legislation. For instance, the Federal Parliament might well
36 pass a general law applying to these races without making any reference to their employment as miners or
37 hawkers, and any state legislation in regard to those occupations which might be in existence would continue,
38 or now legislation regarding them might be introduced. When the Federal Parliament chooses to make
39 regulations in regard to the employment of aliens as hawkers and miners, the state legislation will cease to
40 have effect. The honorable and learned member (Mr. Symon) said-Hand to the Federal Parliament all powers
41 connected with aliens, and allow them to give back certain powers to the state." We say-Instead of taking
42 these powers from the states and giving them back again, let us leave them with the states until the Federal
43 Parliament chooses to assume them."
44 Sir JOHN DOWNER (South Australia).-I do not think it makes any substantial difference whether you put
45 this provision in clause 52, or leave it where it is. The Federal Parliament has first to say what races it is:
46 necessary to make regulations about.
47 Mr. ISAACS.-That is giving a rather limited meaning to the words "deemed necessary."
48 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-There must be some body which deems it necessary, and the only body to which
49 the words can refer is the Commonwealth Parliament. What very substantial difference does it make whether
50 we leave the provision as it stands or put it into clause 52? True, if the provision is left where it stands, the
51 Federal Parliament will have exclusive power in connexion with this matter; but that body will only have
52 exclusive power when it chooses to exercise it. It is only when the Federal Parliament has passed
53 legislation dealing with the people about whom regulations are to be made that this exclusive power
54 will have arisen. The only matter for the committee to consider is as to the expediency of leaving the
55 provision here or of putting; it into clause 52. Wherever it is, it will, upon the passing of the Constitution,

Page 13
1 operate as an intimation to the Federal Parliament that this is a matter of national import, upon which they are
2 expected to legislate. Once within the Commonwealth citizens should be able to go freely from one state to
3 another; there should be no lines of differentiation between states. If races are admitted into one state, and are
4 not free to go into another, the inconveniences of administration, especially on the borders, will be very great.
5 It has been thought well that there should be a uniform law throughout Australia in respect to the
6 citizens of Australia, and it was considered that this provision should be put into a separate clause
7 giving exclusive powers, in order to emphasize the fact that the Federal Parliament should legislate
8 upon this matter. In my opinion, whether you put the provision into clause 52, or leave it where it is, its
9 substantial legislative effect will be the same. As to the meaning of the words, "the affairs of the people of
10 any race with respect to whom it is deemed necessary," in my opinion it is the Federal Parliament who must
11 deem it necessary.
12 Mr. ISAACS.-What is the meaning of the statement that the state cannot legislate for the whole
13 general community?
14 Mr. BARTON.-That is by way of description. A law made by the state does not apply to the general
15 community.
16 [start page 254]
17 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-My argument is that deemed necessary means deemed necessary by the Parliament
18 of the Commonwealth. Assuming that I am right, I ask to whom does this clause extend? The persons named
19 by an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament. When the Commonwealth Parliament deals with this subject, its
20 legislation will over-ride any local legislation, no matter whether you put the provision in clause 52 or leave it
21 in clause 53. What the representatives from Victoria want is exactly what is provided here, but the provision
22 is put where it is for the purposes of extra emphasis, and to indicate to the Federal Parliament that they are
23 expected to make over-riding and general legislation in regard to this vital question. I think honorable
24 members are, almost without exception, strongly of opinion that there should be federal legislation upon this
25 matter, and I therefore believe that it will meet the wishes of honorable members if we leave the provision
26 exactly where it is, as a means of hurrying up the Federal Parliament and causing it to legislate in this matter
27 as soon as possible.
28 END QUOTE
29 .
31 QUOTE Dr. QUICK (Victoria).-
32 There can be no doubt as to the desirability of conferring unlimited powers on the Federal Parliament to
33 prevent the introduction of foreign coloured races.
34 END QUOTE
35
37 QUOTE
38 Mr. BARTON.-No, but the definition of "citizen" as a natural-born or naturalized subject of the Queen is
39 co-extensive with the ordinary definition of a subject or citizen in America. The moment be is under any
40 disability imposed by the Parliament be loses his rights.
41 Dr. QUICK.-That refers to special races.
42 END QUOTE
43
44 What this means is that as Ss51(xxvi) was at the time of federation then any Commonwealth
45 legislation against a particular race would wipe out the race franchise. This obviously so that the
46 people of that race could not vote to overturn that legislation.
47
48 When the 1967 referendum regarding ss51(xxvi) was held (albeit I had by then not migrated to
49 Australia) I understand that the principle of amending this section was to give Aboriginals
50 citizenship. Yet, they all along had citizenship within their own state/territory since federation.
51 While a State within section 25 could prevent any race to obtain franchise and so be prevented to
52 vote in federal elections because Section 41 only provided for those entitled to vote in State
53 elections, the “con job” referendum regarding ss51(xxvi) as such couldn’t provide Aboriginals
54 with anything. However, they were by the amendment re-delegated to be equal to “foreign”
55 “inferior” “coloured” (aliens), as if they no longer had any Australian rights. And as any
56 legislation regarding any race within the amended ss51(xxvi) could not be used against the
57 “general community” it means that the alleged powers of the purported Racial Discrimination
58 Act was utter and sheer nonsense and no constitutional validity.
Page 14
1 Moreover, the referendum, as I understand it, was not about changing the original purpose of
2 Ss51(xxvi) but merely to include Aboriginals. And in law a law cannot be used both negative
3 and positive. As such, where the referendum was not at all as to “inferior” “foreign” coloured”
4 “races” to have the same rights as others then no matter what the ss51(xxvi) referendum was to
5 mean it could no more but equalize Aboriginals with the same rights as those that existed for
6 those against “inferior” “foreign” coloured” “races” (aliens)!
7
8 It means that the moment the Commonwealth commenced to legislate as to any race all and any
9 person of that race lost their franchise! It means also that not a single person of the Aboriginal
10 race in constitutional terms was then validly elected since 1967. The nevertheless maintained to
11 have their citizenship of the state/.territory they resided in just without franchise.
12
14 QUOTE
15 Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the
16 operation of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a
17 citizen of the state? There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a
18 state to remain outside the pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual
19 citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may
20 be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a
21 citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual
22 citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen
23 of the Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all.
24 But if we introduce this clause, it is open to the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those
25 who say that it is putting on the face of the Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not
26 expect will be exercised adversely or improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in
27 dealing with this question, be as careful as we possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this
28 Commonwealth in any way or exclude anybody [start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision
29 and clearness. As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want
30 to place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it,
31 the right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this only as an argument, because no one would anticipate
32 such a thing, but the Commonwealth Parliament might say that nobody possessed of less than £1,000 a year
33 should be a citizen of the Federation. You are putting that power in the hands of Parliament.
34 Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

35 Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this
36 Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a
37 citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or
38 restrict those rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to
39 disabilities, as aliens, and so on.
40 END QUOTE
41
43 QUOTE
44 Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the
45 operation of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a
46 citizen of the state? There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a
47 state to remain outside the pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual
48 citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may
49 be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a
50 citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual
51 citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen
52 of the Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all.
53 But if we introduce this clause, it is open to the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those
54 who say that it is putting on the face of the Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not
55 expect will be exercised adversely or improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in
56 dealing with this question, be as careful as we possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this
57 Commonwealth in any way or exclude anybody [start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision
Page 15
1 and clearness. As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want
2 to place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it,
3 the right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this only as an argument, because no one would anticipate
4 such a thing, but the Commonwealth Parliament might say that nobody possessed of less than £1,000 a year
5 should be a citizen of the Federation. You are putting that power in the hands of Parliament.
6 Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

7 Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this
8 Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a
9 citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or
10 restrict those rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to
11 disabilities, as aliens, and so on.
12 END QUOTE
13
15 QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-
16 No one is more in favour of that than I am. But, at the same time, it is said-"Let the Houses of
17 Parliament act capriciously and variously from day to day-allow this 'tacking' to go on if the Houses
18 choose to agree to it-let the Houses do one thing one day and another the next, and do not bother about
19 altering the Constitution, but trust the Parliament." Of course; but Parliament must only be trusted when
20 it is within the Constitution. The Senate of to-day and the House of Representatives must not be put in a
21 position superior to the Constitution.
22 END QUOTE
23
25 QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
26 I do not see the necessity for considering the hon. member's proposal at the present time. I am proud of
27 being a citizen of the great British empire, and shall never fail to be proud of that position. I have no
28 desire to weaken a single link binding us to that empire, whether as regards the appointment of a
29 governor-general or anything else.
30 END QUOTE
31
33 QUOTE
34 Mr. BARTON.-Yes; and here we have a totally different position, because the actual right which a
35 person has as a British subject-the right of personal liberty and protection under the laws-is secured
36 by being a citizen of the States. It must be recollected that the ordinary rights of liberty and protection by
37 the laws are not among the subjects confided to the Commonwealth.
38 END QUOTE
39
41 QUOTE Mr. BARTON.
42 If we are going to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with regard to
43 Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the Parliament to pass
44 legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact,
45 to play ducks and drakes with it. That is not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal
46 Parliament."
47 END QUOTE
48
50 QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
51 I do not see the necessity for considering the hon. member's proposal at the present time. I am proud of
52 being a citizen of the great British empire, and shall never fail to be proud of that position. I have no
53 desire to weaken a single link binding us to that empire, whether as regards the appointment of a
54 governor-general or anything else.
55 END QUOTE
56
58 QUOTE
Page 16
1 Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we are all alike
2 subjects of the British Crown.
3 END QUOTE
4
5 Constitutionally “citizenship” is not at all related to nationality but merely to where a person
6 resides regardless of nationality. That is what my legal challenge in the NOTICE OF
7 CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS also did set out.
8
10 QUOTE Mr. OCONNOR.-
11 We must remember that in any legislation of the Commonwealth we are dealing with the Constitution. Our
12 own Parliaments do as they think fit almost within any limits. In this case the Constitution will be above
13 Parliament, and Parliament will have to conform to it.
14 END QUOTE
15 .
16 Ss51(xxviii) can only allow laws of the British Parliament that are within part 9 of the
17 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) and nothing to do with the first 8 parts
18 of the Act!
19
20 As such, the purported Australia Act 1986 (UK) and/or (Cth) has no constitutional validity.
21 Neither the Westminster Act, etc.
22
23 Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates
24 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
25 In the first instance, the power of the Crown itself is nowhere defined, and cannot be defined under this
26 constitution.
27 END QUOTE
28
29 Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates
30 QUOTE
31 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am trying to get at the ideas which are underlying the argument of hon.
32 gentlemen. I confess I have not got at them yet. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, talks about the powers
33 exercised by the ministers of the Crown in Great Britain. They do not differ in any respect from the
34 powers exercised by ministers of the Crown in any other country.
35 Dr. COCKBURN: They are much superior to the powers of ministers here!
36 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH': Not in the east.
37 Mr. DEAKIN: The powers of our ministers are limited, and theirs are unlimited!
38 END QUOTE
39
40 Australian members of Parliament desire to get rid of the constitution as this limits their powers
41 and by becoming a republic they anticipate they no longer are then restrained by the term “peace,
42 order and good government”.
43 The can then seek to implement the NEW WORLD ORDER without any constitutional
44 limitations whereas now it violated s44, etc. of the constitution.
45
46 While Mr Augusto Zimmermann referred to the issue of Governor-General reality is at least in
47 constitutional terms that the Governor-General represents the British Crown.
48
50 QUOTE Mr. LYNE:
51 First of all, he raised the question of the appointment of the Governor-General for the Federal
52 Executive. Now, I think there is no desire on the part of any large section of this community to take
53 what I may term the first step towards a severance from the mother-country, but the first step would
54 be in the election of the Governor-General instead of allowing his appointment to be made by the
Page 17
1 Home Government. It is but a small connecting link between the Australasian colonies-between a
2 Federated Australia and the mother-country-to allow the appointment to be made by the Home
3 Government; and I should like to know what power that Government would have over any Governor-
4 General elected in the manner desired.
5 END QUOTE
6 .
7 ANSARD 26-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
8 QUOTE
9 Mr. HOLDER: We want something which shall have two parts, which shall be democratic in the fact that
10 it is based on the people's will, and that in it every personal unit of the population shall be recognised and his
11 individuality preserved, and that, on the other hand, shall be a true Federation, in that each State unit shall
12 also have its individuality preserved and its independence assured. I do not think we can afford to
13 dispense with either of these two things. We cannot afford to dispense with the guarantee of the personal
14 individual rights of every citizen of the Commonwealth, nor, on the other hand, can we afford to dispense
15 with the individual or separate rights or interests of each of the separate States-if my hon. friend Mr.
16 O'Connor prefers that term. We cannot neglect to provide for their due recognition. The next principle I shall
17 lay down is this: That in dealing with this federal authority we should confer on it no powers which it
18 cannot exercise more wisely and well and effectively than the States can exercise those powers. I would
19 even go a step further, and lay down as the principle which should govern our conduct: To the States all that
20 is local and relating to one State, to the Federal authority all that is national and inter-State. I wonder
21 whether I can secure the absolute adherence, no matter where it may lead us, of a majority of this Convention
22 to that principle: To the State everything that is local and relating to one State, to the Federal power
23 everything that is national and of inter-State importance. I pass from these two general principles to a
24 discussion of the only other preliminary I shall have to touch, and that is the question of the appointment of
25 the representative of the British Crown in the person of the Governor-General. I do not take it that the words
26 of the Enabling Act requiring us to frame a Constitution for a Federation "under the Crown" bind us in the
27 matter of whether or not we shall elect our own Governor-General, because I take it that the legal bonds
28 which bind us to the mother-country, to the great British Empire, are chiefly, first the right of veto which
29 the Imperial authorities have over any Acts our local Legislature may pass, and which the Federal Legislature
30 may pass, and next the right of the Imperial Legislature at any time to pass legislation which may affect us, or
31 which may revoke any legislation affecting us. These are the great legal bonds which bind us to the British
32 Empire. But above all this, the greater and wider, and, to my mind, much more important [start page 145]
33 bonds than the legal bonds are those of kinship, of language, and of sympathy that must always bind us to the
34 motherland. The mere appointment by the Crown of the Governor-General is not a real bond. That this is so
35 is recognised to-day in that we have presiding, now and again, in the position of Acting-Governor of one or
36 other of these colonies, gentlemen who so preside by virtue of their position upon the legal bench. In the
37 appointment of the Governor we have only one link, and that link is again and again missing when
38 gentlemen, owing to their legal position, temporarily occupy the office.
39 Mr. SYMON: By vice-regal appointment.

40 Mr. HOLDER: Yes, of course; the Commission from Her Majesty lies dormant until it is actually called
41 into existence by the absence of the Governor; but we can at this moment, if the necessity arises, appoint a
42 new occupant to the Supreme Court Bench, and that would qualify him to fill the office of Acting-Governor
43 if need required it. Therefore I think it is clear that to that extent it lessens the argument that the main link that
44 binds us to the mother-country is the appointment of the Governor, and shows that it is an argument which
45 has not half so much weight as some of the speakers would have us believe. But I take a very strong position
46 against the election of the Governor-General by the Federation, not because I believe it would mean losing a
47 link which binds us to England, but that we should have a man of such power and authority, derived directly
48 from the people, that he would certainly clash with the other powers and authorities we propose to set
49 up under this Constitution.
50 END QUOTE
51
53 QUOTE
54 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: At all events, I would ask hon. members to pause before they determine upon
55 asking the Queen to surrender all her prerogatives in Australia. For my part, I believe that all the
56 prerogatives of the Crown exist in the governor-general as far as they relate to Australia. I never
57 entertained any doubt upon the subject at all-that is so far as they can be exercised in the commonwealth.
58 END QUOTE
59
Page 18

2 QUOTE
3 people of the colonies?
4 Sir GEORGE GREY: I am afraid I shall lose my chance of moving an amendment to this clause if I do
5 not do it at this stage. I move:
6 That the words "The Queen may, from time to time, appoint," lines 1 and 2, be omitted with a view to the
7 insertion of the words "There shall be."
8 The intention is that the governor may be elected. I feel that in bringing this subject under the notice of the
9 Convention I am entering upon very delicate and very debatable grounds But I feel that, in point of fact, the
10 future of vast multitudes of persons will depend upon the manner in which this question is dealt with. This is
11 a question of the interests of nearly 4,000,000 persons at the present moment who look to us; and it appears
12 to me extremely inexpedient that the power of appointing the governor-general to rule so vast a confederacy
13 should be left in the hands of any minister of the day in Great Britain. The terms used are "the Queen shall
14 appoint"; but we all know perfectly well that that means that the minister for the time-being shall
15 appoint such person as he pleases, whilst such appointment might be absolutely obnoxious to her
16 Majesty herself. The meaning of the thing is that a friend or any other person chosen by the minister
17 may be appointed without the people of this great confederacy being in any way cons ulted. I
18 understand that the reason usually alleged for that by persons who support the appointment being
19 made by the Queen is that a social appointment is to be made. That is the term usually applied-it is a
20 social question, and not a political question. I contend that the question is twofold, and those two things
21 cannot be separated. The governor has political functions to exercise and he has social functions to
22 exercise, and in either case I hold that a person so appointed is much less fitted to exercise those
23 functions than a governor-general chosen by the people of the country would be. I do not understand
24 how it can be said that any social ends whatever, or, at all events, of [start page 562] any magnitude,
25 are attained by the appointment of the governor-general by the Crown; but I do hold that social ties
26 and social questions of the strongest possible kind require that the governor-general should be elected
27 by the people of the confederacy. Take the case of a widowed mother, herself well educated, perhaps
28 brought up as a teacher in one of your public schools, and possessing great ability; imagine her with
29 her orphaned children, deprived of a father, night after night teaching those children, with a hope that
30 the highest offices of the state of every kind may be open to them all. Is not that a social question-a
31 social gathering of the highest and noblest kind? And hundreds, I may say thousands, of such social
32 gatherings would be witnessed every night in this great commonwealth, if all the highest offices of state
33 were filled by election by the people. If you follow it out, you will find that in all social relations of the
34 family-fathers, mothers, children, brothers, sisters-this question is intimately concerned as being
35 something which binds the whole family together for common objects, and opens paths of distinction to
36 every one of them, if they prove themselves great and deserving men. Why should you say to all these
37 4,000,000 of people, "No one of you, nor any one of the other millions who are to occupy this country,
38 shall have the slightest chance of ever attaining to an honor of that kind"-that it shall always be open,
39 as it certainly, or almost certainly would be, to distant persons with no claim whatever upon the
40 inhabitants of this country, all of whom would be shut out from so great an opening as that of which I
41 speak? It is more materially necessary that we should consider this point now, and that we should come to a
42 just decision upon it, because I will show hereafter, as the discussion on the bill proceeds, that in every
43 instance all hope is shut out from the great masses of the colony to succeed to any one of the important posts
44 which under this bill will be open to the people of Australia. I say that, looking to our duty to our
45 Sovereign, we owe it to her to select the worthiest man we know to represent her here-to be certain that
46 the man so chosen is worthy to represent her; and in no other way than by his being chosen by
47 ourselves from people whom we know can we be certain that the worthiest man will be chosen to
48 represent the Queen within the limits of the great confederacy which we are about to constitute.
49 Considering the openings that would be given to every inhabitant of Australasia under such a system
50 as I propose, with so many families, as will necessarily do it, directing their every exertion and effort to
51 raise up children worthy of the great opportunities laid open to them, I ask whether this is not to us a
52 greater social question than a few balls and dinners given at Government House, at which none but
53 those in the immediate vicinity can be present? I ask what comparison is there between these two
54 things-one great and far-reaching, extending to millions, the other a mere sham, as it were,
55 representing what passes in another place, as if one were looking through the wrong end of a telescope
56 at some procession that was going on? All matters connected with Government House are diminished
57 here as compared with Great Britain and the influence exercised there. There it is the influence of an
58 hereditary monarch descended from a long line of ancestors. There it is the influence belonging to
Page 19
1 certain professions-the army and navy-who look to receiving honor from the hands of such a
2 sovereign. Here there are no ties whatever of that kind; and yet for a mere imaginary show, or what is
3 called the performance of social duties-entertaining strangers and also citizens immediately
4 surrounding the vice-regal court, which are the only benefits that are abso- [start page 563] lutely
5 gained-all those benefits that I speak of are lost. Let us look at it in another way, which is also worthy
6 of our consideration. What is the necessary consequence of having a governor-general of this kind,
7 with an enormous salary, and vast expenditure upon various subjects-a salary more than adequate to
8 the duties to be performed? You will find set down in this bill a salary of £10,000 a year.
9 END QUOTE
10
12 QUOTE
13 Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-I do not propose to detain the Convention with any reply, except to point out that
14 the contention of Mr. Barton in no respect applies to the matter submitted to the Convention. I agree with him
15 entirely in his constitutional construction of the prerogative, and, indeed, went so far out of my way as to
16 quote Todd to put it beyond all doubt. But what are the facts? It took ten years' fight in Victoria to get the
17 question settled, and we have it on the testimony of Mr. Brunker that a struggle has been waged in New
18 South Wales. Todd furnishes an instance in which a Ministry lost its life in South Africa in this struggle, after
19 a prolonged political conflict. Under the circumstances, it seems desirable there should be no ambiguity. We
20 are not dealing with common law, but with a statutory power, and desire to place these powers beyond all
21 dispute. What I would prefer is not the introduction of the words suggested, but such a definition of the term
22 "Governor-General" as would remove the ambiguity which it appears to me exists. The leader of the
23 Convention has told us that the words "Governor-General" or "Governor-General in Council" have
24 been used by the Drafting Committee according as the prerogative has, or has not, been practically
25 surrendered to Parliament. That is not to be found on the face of the measure, and it is always in these
26 cases open to question whether in any particular instance the prerogative has or has not been
27 abandoned. These doubts might be set at rest if there were a definition clause setting forth the sense in
28 which the term "Governor-General" is used in the Constitution.
29 Mr. BARTON.-The term "Governor-General in Council " when used means the Governor-General
30 in Council with the advice of the Executive.
31 Mr. DEAKIN.-And what does "Governor-General" mean?
32 Mr. BARTON.-That means the ordinary powers intrusted to the Governor-General by the Queen.
33 Mr. DEAKIN.-And these are to be exercised by him only on the advice of his Ministers?
34 Mr. OCONNOR.-When you only find the term "Governor-General," that means the prerogative.
35 Mr. DEAKIN.-On that prerogative Governors have made claims, which have received some recognition,
36 to exercise more power than they claim when the term "Governor-General in Council" is used. Under clause
37 70, any distinction which exists between different exercises of prerogative powers by our Governors are to be
38 preserved in the Commonwealth, and govern the relations of the Governor-General to each particular [start
39 page 2258] state according to the differing practices which may have existed. The difficulty I have mentioned
40 might be settled by some general provision or definition. On account of the strong feeling which exists in
41 some of the colonies, I propose to press this matter. I do not at all insist on the form of the amendment, but
42 call the attention of the Drafting Committee to the necessity of putting beyond all question the sense in which
43 the term "Governor-General" must be accepted. This prerogative power should be exercised, as practically all
44 other powers now are, on the advice of the Executive, or of one of its members.
45 Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-It appears to me, with all respect, that Mr. Deakin has not quite
46 appreciated the meaning of the section. We do not wish to put the Governor-General here in the
47 position of being any less the Queen's representative than the Governors of the various colonies are at
48 the present time. What is the position of the Governor of each of the colonies at present? By virtue of
49 his office the Governor of each of the colonies is Commander-in Chief of the Forces. The letters patent
50 appointing the Governor constitute him Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, and in England it is
51 pointed out the Queen is Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. The only meaning of that is that the
52 prerogative power of commanding the army is vested in the Queen, or in the representative of the
53 Queen.

Page 20
1 Dr. COCKBURN.-Has the Queen of England ever claimed the right to settle a question of discipline as a
2 Governor has done here?
3 Mr. OCONNOR.-I will deal with that question later on. The Governor is Commander-in-Chief of the
4 Forces by virtue of his position. But the Governor cannot move a step he cannot obtain possession of a
5 rifle or a cartridge without the consent of his Executive. It is a merely nominal appointment, and the
6 power which he gets nominally he cannot exercise without the means which are supplied by his
7 Executive-by the Governor with the advice of his Executive. That is recognised, not only in the
8 Governor's instructions, but in all the Acts dealing with the regulation of the volunteer forces. For
9 instance, in the very Act in New South Wales which Mr. Brunker referred to, and under which a
10 dispute occurred, the Governor is described as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces as the Queen's
11 representative.
12 Dr. COCKBURN.-Just as he is here.
13 Mr. OCONNOR.-The dispute occurred, not because of any difficulty in recognising that position, but
14 because, in carrying out some executive acts, a question arose in the construction of the Act as to whether the
15 Governor meant the Governor with the advice of his Executive Council. It did not turn on this point at all. I
16 hope I have therefore made it clear that there is a recognition from beginning to end of the fact that the
17 Governors are nominally Commanders of the Forces. I would point out where I think Mr. Deakin has made
18 an error. The power of the Commander-in-Chief under this Constitution cannot be exercised until an Act has
19 been passed by the Commonwealth, because until that is done the Commonwealth cannot engage a soldier,
20 acquire a rifle, or a cartridge, or a uniform, or anything whatever. The Governor is simply Commander-in-
21 Chief, without an army, without weapons. How are they to be obtained? By passing an Act of Parliament,
22 and, in passing that Act, no doubt the Parliament will take very good care that the measure makes it perfectly
23 clear that all the executive acts which are to be carried out with regard to the forces are to be carried out by
24 the Governor with the advice of his Executive Council. So that Parliament will have the matter in its own
25 hands. I think Mr. Deakin has jumped before be came to the stile. It appears to me that no amendment which
26 you can put in this Constitution which simply recognises the position of [start page 2259] the Governor as
27 Commander-in-Chief, as the Queen's representative, will have any effect. If Mr. Deakin wants to move an
28 amendment, let him make it in the Act of Parliament which will authorize the Commonwealth to raise an
29 army, to arm it, and to give it all the material forces of the Commonwealth without which it cannot act. In
30 that Act the Commonwealth would take care to provide that the Governor could not take a step without the
31 advice of the Executive Council.
32 Mr. ISAACS.-If it were contrary to the Constitution that provision would not be of much avail.
33 Mr. OCONNOR.-I quite agree, with the honorable member, but it would not be contrary to this
34 Constitution.
35 Mr. ISAACS.-That is the whole question.
36 Mr. OCONNOR.-I think it is perfectly plain that it would not be contrary to the Constitution, because in
37 the Constitution the Governor-General is described, as all the Governors in the different colonies are
38 described, simply as Commander-in-Chief; and taking power to raise, clothe, and equip an army by the act of
39 the Governor with the advice of the Executive Council, could not interfere with the position of a Governor as
40 Commander-in-Chief. As Mr. Douglas reminds me, in all the colonies the position of Governor carries with it
41 ex officio the position of Commander-in-Chief. Now, I am anxious that this matter should remain as it is in
42 the Bill, because I think it would be a reflection on this Convention if the words of the amendment were
43 inserted in this clause, because it would mean that we did not really appreciate the distinction between the
44 position of Commander-in-Chief and the position of head of the Executive who had afterwards to deal with
45 the material matters in regard to which the Commander-in-Chief could not take a single step.
46 Mr. SYMON.-Why the Executive Council would have to ride out with the Governor-General as his staff.
47 Mr. OCONNOR.-Of course, they would have to take all the risks of the position. If the Governor-
48 General is Commander-in-Chief, and he has to go out as actual head of the army, I should hope that
49 every member of the Executive would take the position of danger when the hour of danger arrived. I
50 ask honorable members who support this amendment what danger they anticipate?
51 Dr. COCKBURN.-The danger that the Governor might seek to decide all questions of discipline.
52 Mr. SYMON.-Refer them to the men.

Page 21
1 Mr. OCONNOR.-You must have some one Commander-in-Chief, and, according to all notions of military
2 discipline that we are aware of, the Commander-in-Chief must have control of questions of discipline, or
3 remit them to properly-constituted military courts. Dr. Cockburn has referred to the trial of breaches of
4 military discipline. Well, I should think that one of the most material parts of any Act constituting the forces
5 of the Commonwealth would be to provide for the mode in which these court-martial would be conducted
6 and the Parliament would have abundant power to decide how these matters were to be conducted, and what
7 the particular form of the court was to be. It comes back to the same position as before. The Commander-in-
8 Chief can take any actual step, whether in regard to carrying on the business of war, or deciding
9 questions of discipline. But he has no machinery to act on until Parliament brings all this machinery
10 into force, and the Commonwealth Parliament can do what they like in deciding what powers are to be
11 exercised by the Governor-General with the advice of the Executive Council, and what powers are to
12 be exercised by the Governor-General himself. I hope that Mr. Deakin will recognise that the
13 movements of the army must be controlled by the Executive. This is not a matter of that kind, but simply
14 a provision that the Governor-General of the Commonwealth shall have, ex officio, the [start page 2260]
15 same rights, and nothing more than the rights, that the Governors of all the colonies have in this regard. I
16 hope the clause will be allowed to remain as it is.
17 END QUOTE
18
20 QUOTE Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH:
21 There must be some method, and we suggest that as a reasonable one. With respect to amendments of
22 the constitution, it is proposed that a law to amend the constitution must be passed by an absolute
23 majority of both the senate and the house of representatives; that, if that is done, the proposed
24 amendment must be submitted for the opinion of the people of the states to be expressed in conventions
25 elected for the purpose, and that then if the amendment is approved by a majority of the conventions
26 in the states it shall become law, subject of course to the Queen's power of disallowance. Otherwise the
27 constitution might be amended, and by a few words the commonwealth turned into a republic, which is
28 no part of the scheme proposed by this bill.
29 END QUOTE
30
32 QUOTE
33 Mr. SYMON ( South Australia ).-
34 In the preamble honorable members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one indissoluble Federal
35 Commonwealth -that is the political Union-"under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
36 and Ireland , and under the Constitution hereby established." Honorable members will therefore see that the
37 application of the word Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to be established. It is not
38 intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country or nation which we are going to
39 create under that Union . The second part of the preamble goes on to say that it is expedient to make
40 provision for the admission of other colonies into the Commonwealth. That is, for admission into this
41 political Union, which is not a republic, which is not to be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is
42 to be a Union by the name of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the
43 slightest degree.
44 END QUOTE
45 .
47 QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-
48 I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond
49 the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say
50 that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the
51 Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as
52 any private person would be.
53 END QUOTE
54
55 It should be understood that any Minister seeking to subject the Commonwealth of Australia
56 under some foreign power, being it the U.N. (United Nations), W.H.O. (World Health
57 Organisation), etc, would be a TREATOR.
58
59 Hansard 9-9-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
60 Australasian Convention)
Page 22
1 QUOTE
2 The Right Hon. G.H. REID: I strongly support the amendment for the reasons which my hon. and learned
3 friend has hinted at. This is an expression which would be more in place in the United States Constitution,
4 where treaties are dealt with by the President and the senate, than in the constitution of a colony within the
5 empire. The treaties made by her Majesty are not binding as laws on the people of the United Kingdom,
6 and there is no penalty for disobeying them. Legislation is sometimes passed to give effect to treaties,
7 but the treaties themselves are not laws, and indeed nations sometimes find them inconvenient, as they
8 neglect them very seriously without involving any important legal consequences. The expression, I think,
9 ought to be omitted. I will deal with the other suggested amendments when the time comes.
10 END QUOTE
11
12 It should be understood therefore that the Commonwealth cannot enter in some treaty with some
13 foreign legal entity and then obtain legislative powers it never had. While the High Court of
14 Australia purported that the Commonwealth gained legislative powers by a treaty this obviously
15 is sheer and utter nonsense.
16
17 Ss51(xxvi) was clearly designed to not allow it to be used against the “general community” and
18 the Commonwealth cannot therefore circumvent this restriction through some other mechanism.
19
20 Likewise, the nonsense of treaties about environment, the Framers of the Constitution made it
21 very clear that those powers remained with the States.
22
24 QUOTE
25 Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
26 END QUOTE
27
28 Neither can the Commonwealth parliament create its own constitution as this is/would be in
29 violation to the legal principles embedded in the constitution.
30
32 QUOTE Mr. BARTON.-
33 Providing, as this Constitution does, for a free people to elect a free Parliament-giving that people
34 through their Parliament the power of the purse-laying at their mercy from day to day the existence of
35 any Ministry which dares by corruption, or drifts through ignorance into, the commission of any act
36 which is unfavorable to the people having this security, it must in its very essence be a free
37 Constitution. Whatever any one may say to the contrary that is secured in the very way in which the
38 freedom of the British Constitution is secured. It is secured by vesting in the people, through their
39 representatives, the power of the purse, and I venture [start page 2477] to say there is no other way of
40 securing absolute freedom to a people than that, unless you make a different kind of Executive than
41 that which we contemplate, and then overload your Constitution with legislative provisions to protect
42 the citizen from interference. Under this Constitution he is saved from every kind of interference.
43 Under this Constitution he has his voice not only in the, daily government of the country, but in the
44 daily determination of the question of whom is the Government to consist. There is the guarantee of
45 freedom in this Constitution. There is the guarantee which none of us have sought to remove, but every
46 one has sought to strengthen. How we or our work can be accused of not providing for the popular
47 liberty is something which I hope the critics will now venture to explain, and I think I have made their
48 work difficult for them. Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
49 Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
50 therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people. We have provided for a Judiciary, which will
51 determine questions arising under this Constitution, and with all other questions which should be dealt
52 with by a Federal Judiciary and it will also be a High Court of Appeal for all courts in the states that
53 choose to resort to it. In doing these things, have we not provided, first, that our Constitution shall be free:
54 next, that its government shall be by the will of the people, which is the just result of their freedom: thirdly,
55 that the Constitution shall not, nor shall any of its provisions, be twisted or perverted, inasmuch as a
56 court appointed by their own Executive, but acting independently, is to decide what is a perversion of its
57 provisions? We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
58 Constitution. It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but
Page 23
1 it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
2 Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
3 Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
4 this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
5 degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
6 guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense,
7 the court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a
8 tribunal as will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
9 constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the
10 sphere of the Commonwealth. Having provided for all these things, I think this Convention has done
11 well.
12 END QUOTE
13
14 In my view judges who pretend otherwise seeking to twist and infringe upon the true meaning
15 and application of the constitution are TRAITORS.
16
17 This PLANDEMIC covid issue has borne out how politicians were violating the legal principles
18 embedded in the constitution big time.
19
20 The States have absolutely no legislative, executives and/or administrative powers regarding
21 “man-kind” infectious diseases. It has no quarantine powers to pursue any compulsory mask
22 wearing, social distancing, lockdowns, curfews, QR code relating to any infectious disease. My
23 articles published at my Scribd blog “inspectorrikati” sets out matters in great details. Likewise
24 as to the repeated fraud committed by the federal government in supporting the Ukraine NAZI
25 government with weapons, monies, etc.
26
27 We need to return to the organics and legal principles embed in of our federal
28 constitution!
29
30 This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
31 Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
32 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

33 (Our name is our motto!)


20220623-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR A. Zimmerman & MR M. Begg-FEEDBACK - Re Constitutional Issues

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20220623-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To MR A. Zimmerman & MR M. Begg-FEEDBACK - Re Constitutional Issues

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23-6-2022 Page 1 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

23-6-2022 Page 2 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

51 "We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence

1 exercise in what I have called constructive interpretation[54]. It does not

23-6-2022 Page 5 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

44 Mr. DEAKIN.-It is made for the lawyers under this clause.

5 Mr. ISAACS.-Mr. Barton has given an opinion that it would not.

49 Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

23-6-2022 Page 8 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

14 Mr. BARTON: It is only for the purpose of determining the quota.

20 Mr. DEAKIN: Well, it will take 26,000 to affect one vote.

25 Clause, as read, agreed to.

3 Mr. GORDON.-So is this.

10 Dr. COCKBURN.-Not contemptuous.

23-6-2022 Page 12 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

34 Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

6 Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

36 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH': Not in the east.

39 Mr. SYMON: By vice-regal appointment.

1 HANSARD 1-4-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

31 Mr. DEAKIN.-And what does "Governor-General" mean?

23-6-2022 Page 19 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

12 Dr. COCKBURN.-Just as he is here.

35 Mr. ISAACS.-That is the whole question.

52 Mr. SYMON.-Refer them to the men.

32 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

23-6-2022 Page 23 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

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