SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS PRE-MID CASE DIGESTS

Atty. Luardo | 8:00 - 10:00 PM Thurs | MC

HABEAS CORPUS
Rule 102

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 Ordoñez v. Vinarao, G.R. No. L-117376, December 8, 1994

DOCTRINES: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and
4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court).

FACTS: This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court on behalf of Oscar de Guzman y
Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the RTC for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972:

- alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.

RTC’s decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine
and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed

ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus extends to the continued detention of de Guzman. YES.

RULING: The requirements (refer to doctrine) have been met and finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.

OLD LAW NEW LAW

Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 R.A. 7659, as interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon:

If the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the
imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall
be within the range of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years).

Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law.

Since he has been serving sentence for more than ten (10) years now, his continued detention in the National
Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he should be released from prison without further
delay.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from
confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a
complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further
confinement. With costs de oficio.

Feria v. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000

DOCTRINES:
Purpose of Habeas Corpus: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is
held under lawful authority.

When Habeas Corpus cannot be availed of: the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding:
a. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
b. The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
c. an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render
the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The
proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.

FACTS: Feria has been under detention since May 21, 1981 up to the present by reason of his conviction of the crime of
robbery with homicide, for the jeepney hold - up and killing of the United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene
Carmona.

12 years later, Feria sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,
but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila that the transfer cannot be
effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information.

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It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response
to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of
Regional Trial Court of Manila, attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in
their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.

Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the
Manila City jail, the presiding judge of the RTC of Manila and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge
from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.

The RTC dismissed the the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution
of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Feria argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and that the evidence considered in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish
the contents of such judgments. Further, Feria contends that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy
of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process. Finally, he contends that the
Supreme Court held in the case of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons that it is not the fault of the prisoners that the records
cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those
records.

In its comment the SolGen contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is
legal basis to detain petitioner; that public respondents have more than sufficiently show the existence of legal ground
for Feria’s continued incarceration and that Feria’s remedy is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as the
legal basis for his detention
2. Whether or not a petition for Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy in this case

RULING:
1st Issue - Yes, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as the
legal basis for his detention.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, whether it sets forth a process which on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on the petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

In this case, Feria made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, in the urgent Motion for the issuance of Commitment Order, Feria stated that
he was found guilty by the trial court and was given a life sentence. The records also contain a certified true copy of the
monthly report attesting to the fact that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Therefore, Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, Feria’s release from confinement
is not warranted.

2nd Issue - No, the proper remedy in this case is for either Feria or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of
the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records or under
the inherent power of the courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their unfinished cases in accordance with
Section 5(h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of
justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.

The writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding:

a. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
b. The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
c. an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

In the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and executory. When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by

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habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.

Therefore, a petition for Habeas Corpus is not the proper remedy.

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 Ilusorio v. CA, G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

DOCTRINE: Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extraordinary
writ of habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.

FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos.They both contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of 30 years and begot 6 children, one of which is the respondent, Erlinda Bildner. Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from USA, he stayed with
Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The 2 children (Erlinda and Sylvia) alleged that during this time, their mother
gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant prescribed by Potenciano’s doctor
from USA which caused the deterioration of Potenciano’s health. The following year, Erlinda filed with the RTC, Antipolo
City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter's advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

CA ruled that Erlinda be allowed visitation rights to her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?

RULING: NO

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 yearsof age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. With his full mental capacity coupled with
the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. The Court of
Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never
even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity. The Court of Appeals missed
the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. Hence, there being no subject of restraint in the
case at bar, petitioner cannot secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her.

De Villa v. Director of New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004

DOCTRINES: Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus;
these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.

FACTS: This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent
Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be
granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of
the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza when she was
12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay

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the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the
putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered
him incapable of having an erection. On automatic review, the court found that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was
medically consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s
child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in
People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and it was denied with
finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges, for having been informed that DNA tests
required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo
de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample.
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator requested the
NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo
de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample
given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired
any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA test is a valid basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. (No)

RULING: No, the DNA test is not a valid basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto". Issuance of the writ
necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.

The individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having
duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.

Review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

Here, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a
legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, the petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right,
the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
The purpose of the application for the writ of habeas corpus is to seek review of findings of fact long passed upon with
finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings.

Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the defendant, are not correctable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; these errors must
be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law.

Petitioner alleged that he has been deprived of his constitutional right because his counsel was negligent. Jurisprudence
provides that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must examine whether counsel's conduct
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that the trial did not produce a fair and
just result

Hence, while the Court is sympathetic to the petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that
the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.

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 Adaza v. Caubay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005
DOCTRINES:
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the
petition. The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a
ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy.

The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and
took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood") located in Makati City. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.

The soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
issued a directive to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.

Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC of Makati City against the soldiers involved in
the Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving
custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding
Officers of ISAFP.

Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their
command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the
custody of ISAFP. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.

The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of
which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in reviewing and reversing a decision of the Supreme Court
2. Whether or not the remedy of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint.

RULING:
1st Issue -Yes, the CA erred in reviewing and reversing a decision of the Supreme Court.

A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire
into the cause of the junior officers’ detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees’ release, the Court would not have
referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had
the Court upheld petitioners’ cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the
petition. The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a
ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to the
Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the
propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and
release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is
inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from
claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

2nd Issue -No, the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint.

The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for
an appeal.

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a person’s
constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

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However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of
the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is
imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains
high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the
lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by
Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees – their clients –
any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees’ right to counsel and violates Republic Act
No. 7438 ("RA 7438").

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 Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

DOCTRINE: In habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

Thus, petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the
person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.

FACTS: Petitioners Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife. Bienvenida served as the laundry woman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante.

According to Bienvenida, in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-
month old son, Edgardo Tijing Jr. (Junior), under the care of Angelita, as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Junior were gone. Bienvenida thus proceeded to Angelita’s
house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. She returned to Angelita’s house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police,
to no avail. Petitioner-spouses looked for their missing son in other places, but saw no trace of his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida immediately
went to Hagonoy,where she allegedly saw her son Junior, for the first time after four years. She claimed that her son
was already named John Thomas Lopez and that Angelita refused to return the boy to her, despite her demand to do so.

Petitioners: Filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their
petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness,
Lourdes, was a midwife who testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. at her clinic in Sta. Ana,
Manila on April 27, 1989. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez, as the latter was
sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident which caused him the loss of his capacity to reproduce. Benjamin further
declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son, and that he and Angelita were
not blessed with children.

Respondent: For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she
gave birth to John Thomas Lopez also on April 27, 1989 at a midwife’s clinic in Singalong, Manila. She said the birth of
John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila in
August 1989, or four months after the alleged birth of the child.

RTC: Concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Junior and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child
of petitioners. The petition for Habeas Corpus was granted. Angelita was ordered to immediately release from her
personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioner-spouses.

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal. Nonetheless, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking
custody of the minor. Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and the sheriff turned over the custody of said child to
petitioners.

CA: Reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the
propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she
was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas are one
and the same person; and directed the custody of the minor to be returned to Angelita Diamante.

ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners; and
whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy

RULING: Yes, habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person
of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for
the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed as well, that in habeas corpus
proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including
those as to identity of the person.

In this case, the minor’s identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez,

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whom Angelita insists to be her offspring.

It must first be determined who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor’s biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are
indeed one and the same. Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application
for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of
custody over the said minor.

The general rule is that it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence
presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. However, since
the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, the Supreme Court may scrutinize the
evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish
that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing Jr.

1. There was evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. She admitted that after the birth of her second
child, she underwent ligation before she lived with Tomas Lopez. Assuming she had that ligation removed, as she
claimed, she offered no evidence that she gave birth to another child. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was
not presented in court. No clinical records, log book, or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

2. There was strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez was no longer capable of having a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted
to him that John Thomas was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez,
had no children after almost 15 together. Further, although Tomas Lopez had lived with respondent Angelita for 14, they
also bore no offspring.

3. There were irregularities in the registration and entries in the birth certificate of John Thomas. The Court
found unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas was filed by Tomas instead of the midwife, and only four
months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth
of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and respondent Angelita were legally married on in October 1974, in
Hagonoy, Bulacan; which is false because Angelita herself had admitted she is a “common-law wife”. This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

4. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given
high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

5. The midwife, Lourdes Vasquez, testified that she assisted in Bienvenida’s giving birth to Junior at her clinic. Unlike
Angelita, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order, and the signatures of
petitioner-spouses.

All these considered, the Court was constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of
habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

The petition for habeas corpus was GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED and
decision of the Regional Trial Court was reinstated.

10
 Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996

DOCTRINES:
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; PURPOSE. — In general, the purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
"The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."

PROPER LEGAL REMEDY. — Although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary,
we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the
right of custody over a child.

FACTS: Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig. Sometime in
November 1987, Arabella, then only 6 months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic for relief of coughing fits and for
treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300. Arabella could
not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner’s failure to pay the bill. Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the
effect that she allegedly paid the private respondents by installments in the amount of P1,700, knowing for a fact that the
sum payable was only P300. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic allegedly refused to turn over
Arabella to her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with Mr. Ty
(owner of clinic, married pajud ew this bitch fucker cheater), who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a
reason to be jealous of her, making it difficult for everyone all around.

On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic
only after 2 years. This time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. 3
years thereafter, petitioner again resurfaces to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.

Petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged therein that
Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,
with prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention have been perpetrated in Kalookan City.

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in
her counter affidavit, admitted that petitioner’s child, Arabella, had for some time been in her custody. Arabella was
discharged from the clinic and was in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly
identified to be the child’s guardian.

In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she had sought the help of barangay captains
and mayor and even congresswoman. Their efforts to help availed her nothing.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court.
The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child.

The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas
corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed
petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the
circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case
which involves child custody.

The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

RULING: Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”

11
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not
to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will.

It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is
not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for
the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.

The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the
minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned
to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.

1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of person.

The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met her lost daughter.
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from
each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical and analytical.

In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of
petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’ foster child, Cristina. According to one witness, there were
several babies left in the clinic and it wasn’t certain if Arabella was given to the petitioner.

2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of
mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody
over Cristina. Moreover, the way the respondents obtained custody isn’t material to the habeas corpus issue.

3. Private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina.
They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to
be placed in the custody of petitioner due top her lack of a stable job and her separation from a married man.

12
 Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985 (Also the dissent of J. Teehankee)

DOCTRINE: The petition for habeas corpus was already moot and academic since the detained lawyers were detained
by virtue of a warrant of arrest by Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to a criminal case of rebellion filed
against them before the said court. It argued that the function of a special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one’s detention.

FACTS: 3 lawyers, Atty. Ilagan, Arellano and Risonar, Jr were arrested and detained on the basis of a Mission Order
allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense for allegedly playing an active roles in organizing mass actions of
the communist Party of the Philippines and National Democratic Front and for using their profession as lawyers to cover
up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives.

On May 14 a petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the arrested lawyers on the ground that the
arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders.

Respondents contended that said lawyers were arrested on the basis of a Preventive Detention Actions (PDA) issued by
the President on Jan. 25, 1985. They further contend that pursuant to Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile, the Court lacks the
authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. The Writ of
Habeas Corpus is suspended by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.

Following the hearing on May 23, the Court, Due to lack of evidence linking the detained attys. With the alleged
subversive activities, resolved to Order the temporary release of the said attorneys on the RECOGNIZANCE of the
principal counsel of petitioners, retired Chief Justice Roberto Conception and Retired Associate Justice JBL Reyes.

However, despite the Court Order, detained attorneys had not yet been released. The camp commander at Camp
Bagong Diwa did not honor the Court's release order, saying that "it had to be verified from higher authorities,".

Respondents filed a Motion For Reconsideration reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the
effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.

On May 28, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27
against the detained attorneys before the RTC and a Warrant of arrest had been issued against them, and praying that
the petition be dismissed for having been rendered MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

Petitioners filed an Opposition contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary
investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process and the information against them is void.

Respondents further contend that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were
lawfully arrested without a warrant. And Pursuant to 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no information for an offense
cognizable by RTC shall be filed without a PI having been first conducted, except as provided for in Sec. 7 of Rule 112.
And the information filed by the Fiscal before the RTC fell within the exception.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for Habeas Corpus should be granted. - NO
2. Whether or not Information was void and RTC had no jurisdiction for lack of preliminary
investigation? - NO.

RULING:
1st Issue - No, the petition for Habeas Corpus should not be granted.

The petition for habeas corpus was already moot and academic since Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were detained by
virtue of a warrant of arrest by Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to a criminal case of rebellion filed against
them before the said court. It argued that the function of a special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one’s detention.

But since the detained lawyers’ incarceration was already by virtue of a judicial action in relation to a criminal case, no
matter if such case was filed more than two weeks after the arrests were made, the remedy of habeas corpus
supposedly no longer applies.

2nd Issue - No, the Information was valid and RTC has jurisdiction despite lack of preliminary investigation.

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that no Information be filed to offenses cognizable by RTC without first
conducting preliminary investigation except those in Sec. 7, Rule 112. However, the Verification filed by the
City Prosecutor stated that the Information was filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 and he found sufficient ground
to hold them for trial. Thus, preliminary investigation is not required prior to filing of such Information.

Further, Pursuant to the People vs. Casiano, absence of Preliminary Investigation did not impair the validity of
the Information or otherwise render it defective much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.

The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most

13
that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.

Hence, petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic

J. Teehankee dissenting opinion

J. Teehankee submit that on the basis of these established facts, the "sacred constitutional rights [and] also the right to
'due process' which is fundamental fairness" have been grossly denied the three lawyers detainees.

That the orders charging the 3 lawyers with instant rebellion should be declared null and void. They were patently void,
having been issued without jurisdiction under the well-settled rule that "a violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment [or order] is null and void and confers no rights."

That all proceedings in the instant rebellion case before the Davao trial court should be suspended and
enjoined until the petitioners-lawyers are granted their right to a preliminary investigation and the opportunity
to confront their accusers and disprove the charges. It is but part of due process that they be set free a ordered by
the Court and be enabled to prepare their defense. Without hearing and preliminary investigation deprived them their
right to due process and the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

The affidavits of surrendered NPA’s, which was made as basis by the respondents, has no probative value. It is
not based on the affiant's direct knowledge but offers hearsay, on his alleged interviews with surrendered
NPA's and "to the best of [his] knowledge and ability ."

No concrete evidence has been submitted against petitioners-lawyers, other than to recklessly red brush their legitimate
organization (BAYAN—Mindanao) as communist-led or -infiltrated front organizations — and to characterize the series
of welgas or strikes in Mindanao as implementation of the NDF program of activities to organize and mobilize the
"middle forces" of society.

STALE PDA
The PDA was issued on January 25, 1985. Under the implementing rules, it should have been served within forty-eight
(48) hour since it covered persons outside Metro Manila or 24 hours if within metro manila. The mere gap of almost 4
months between the issuance on Jan/ 25 and its actual service on May 10-12 shows that there was no necessity
for the peremptory issuance of the PDA. The four-month gap can give room for doubt as to its authenticity and
whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed 'any appreciable danger to national security and public order.

Further, the trial court was totally devoid and ousted of jurisdiction to issue a warrant of arrest because of the gross
denial to petitioners-lawyers of their constitutional right to due process.

It was an erroneous premise to hold that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the
exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, Sec. 5. The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of
January 25,
1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at
one's whim and caprice. The reliance on Rule 113, Sec. 5 was likewise erroneous, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest
nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law.

PROPER PROCEEDING according to J. TEEHANKEE

The majority decision should properly apply the case of Abejuela cited by it that the trial court is called upon "not to
dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to
hold reinvestigation."

I vote to grant the petition for habeas corpus and to set the petitioners immediately at liberty. Petitioners must be granted
their constitutional right to due process and the right to preliminary investigation, as granted by statute and expressly
assured to them by respondents in open court at the May 23rd hearing. The railroaded ex-parte proceedings and orders
in the instant rebellion case should be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction in having deprived petitioners of their
sacred constitutional right to due process.

14
 Moncupa v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-63345, January 30, 1986

DOCTRINE: A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to
be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the
writ.

FACTS: Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the
corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front
(NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.

After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force
Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained
that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution
of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential
Decree No. 33.

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. against the
other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was
excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant
that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. and yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were
denied by the lower court.

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of
the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of
National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated — "Since the petitioner is free and no
longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic as in similar cases."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's
temporary release.

RULING: NO. The present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic.

The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not
physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

In Villavicencio vs. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no
longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for
official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary
restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and oppressed the hope that its "decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic.

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention renders the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al. v.
Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al., G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The respondents
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released
and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be
considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:

"Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the
petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant
case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to
re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely
'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent
jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.
Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-
arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration."

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be

15
one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of
movement should not be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are
declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs.

16
 Velasco v. CA, G.R. No. 118644, July 7, 1995

DOCTRINE: Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

FACTS: Lawrence Larkins was charged with violations of BP Blg 22 and a warrant of arrest was issued against him. He
was arrested by the NBI for the crime of rape which was filed by Alinea before the NBI, not yet before the Court. Larkins
was able to post bail for his violations of BP Blg. 22, not the rape. Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused
to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he could
be held for inquest. Subsequently, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. Larkins, through his first
counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Bail for the rape case. Subsequently, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty.
Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and
for Immediate Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This was denied by the trial
court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkin's common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus with certiorari. CA granted the writ.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was proper. (NO).

RULING: No, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was not proper.

Section 4 of Rule 102 provides that the issuance of the writ is not allowed in the following circumstances:
1. person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order
2. if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
3. A person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

The first and third circumstances are present in this case.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus,
for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

In this case, writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the restraint of liberty is by virtue of the complaint or
information. Further, by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and
voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of
its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. Jurisprudence defines judicial process is as a writ, warrant
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued
in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,
or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice

Hence, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was not proper.

In re Azucena Garcia, G.R. No. 141443, August 30, 2000

DOCTRINE: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, and if found illegal, to
order the release of the detainee. However, it is equally well settled that the writ will not issue where the person in whose
behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction.

NOT AVAILABLE TO PERSONS CONVICTED BY AVAILABLE TO PERSONS DEPRIVED OF A

FINAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
JUDGMENT OR TO PERSONS OUT ON BAIL

petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for
habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment
of the crime of falsification of public document and use
thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory.
Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was
made on April 8, 1999, or eight (8) months prior to the
filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out that
Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail,
the writ prayed for should not be granted. Indeed, we
have held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right
is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention.
Petitioner, however, has failed to persuade this Court that

17
 petitioner is still out on bail. the proceedings before the trial court were attended by
violations of her right to due process, or for that matter,
other constitutional rights.

SUMMARY: Garcia was charged with three counts of falsification of public documents in three separate criminal
informations, the first being for falsification of technical description of land and other two being for falsification of
Declarations of Real Property.

In its decision, the trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, CA and SC affirmed Garcia’s conviction and entry of
judgment was made.

In the instant petition, Garcia questions the validity of the judgment rendered in the criminal case. She contends that
where the proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused, the judgment of conviction
is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.

FACTS: On October 27, 1989, accused Azucena Locsin Garcia filed an application for land registration with the RT of
Quezon City (Branch 80) docketed as LRC Case No. 89-007 covering two parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 822-C-
1 and 822-C-2 with an area of 32,350 and 28,750 sq. m., respectively. Appended to said application were the following
documents, to wit: (1) Tax Declaration No. 2273 with PIN-21-11773-1 for Lot 822-C-1; (2) Tax Declaration No. 22732
with PIN-21-11773-2 for Lot 822-C-2; Subdivision Plan Psd-19954; (4) Technical Description of Lot 822-C-1; and
Technical Description of Lot 822-C-2.

Said application was abandoned because on May 8, 1991, accused, who is the applicant in the land registration case,
filed an application this time for administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 with the Land
Registration Authority. On June 20, 1991, TCT No. 308462 was ordered reconstituted, along with other TCTs in the
names of other applicants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. Q-283(91) signed by Benjamin M. Bustos,
Reconstituting Officer of the Land Registration Authority.

On September 10, 1991, complainant Antonio de Zuzuarregui wrote the Quezon City Assessor's Office requesting for
certification as to the authenticity of Declaration of Real Property No. 2273, and Declaration of Real Property No. 22732
both issued in the name of Domingo Locsin and purportedly signed by Jose C. Gonzales, then acting City Assessor of
Quezon City, because the lot embraced by the said declarations are allegedly within the boundary of said complainant's
property per his TCT No. 181095.

In reply to the above letter, Q.C. City Assessor Constantino P. Rosas wrote Zuzuarregui on September 11, 1991 stating
that no such records (Declarations of Real Property Nos. 2273 and 22732) exist in their office and the same appear to
be spurious.

On October 4, 1991, Zuzuarregui wrote another letter this time to Mrs. Brigida Llave, Technical Records Section of the
Bureau of Lands, NCR, Q.C. requesting for certification as to the authenticity of the following documents:

1) Annex "1". - Xerox copy of Plan Psd-19954 of Lot 822-C in the name of Domingo R. Locsin;

2) Annex "2" - xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-1, Psd-19954, also in the name of Domingo R.
Locsin; and

3) Annex "3" - xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, likewise in the name of Domingo R.
Locsin.

In Llave's reply of October 7, 1991, she stated that the alleged plan, Psd-19954, is non-existing in their files and called
attention to the fact that she has no signature over her stamped name "Brigida R. Llave" on said plan. Also, on August
14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a letter from herein complainant
Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT No. 308462 is not shown as among those filed
in their office.

Herein accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of public documents in three separate
criminal informations filed with the RT of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92, the first
being for falsification of technical description of land and the other two being for falsification of Declarations of
Real Property.

Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public documents filed by the herein complainant against
the herein accused were raffled to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and
subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a decision penned by the latter, dated May 17, 1994, the
herein accused was acquitted of all the above charges on reasonable doubt.

Moreover, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N. Coloyan, and introducing or
using said TCT in support of her application for reconstitution of title. Similarly, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-
53590 and Q-94-53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries in Declaration of Real Property Nos.
22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of Jose C. Gonzales, and introducing or using the

18
same in support of her application before the Land Registration Administration (LRA).

In its Decision dated April 20, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of falsification of public
documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, and subsequently this Court, affirmed
petitioner's conviction. Entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999.

Petitioner's Contentions:
● Petitioner only questions the validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589.
● She contends that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused, the
judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.
Hence, in her case, the fundamental unfairness of the judgment, when viewed in light of the record, renders the
same subject to attack for being violative of her right to due process of law.
● Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial judge was totally silent on the official findings and
determinations that Coloyan's signature on the owner's copy of the TCT No. 308462 was genuine. Instead, the
trial judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing on the photocopy of TCT No.
308462 is not his.

OSG's Contentions:
● The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.
● The ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter which falls within the
exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court.
● A writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a
writ of error. As such, the writ will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law committed by a court in the
exercise of its functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted

RULING: NO. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, and if found illegal, to
order the release of the detainee. However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue where the person in
whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, 9 or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order. 10 In the case at bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a
petition for habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document and
use thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory. Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was made on
April 8, 1999, or eight (8) months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out that petitioner is still out
on bail.

Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the writ prayed for should not be granted. Indeed, we have
held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention. Petitioner,
however, has failed to persuade this Court that the proceedings before the trial court were attended by
violations of her right to due process, or for that matter, other constitutional rights.

It is apparent from the arguments advanced by petitioner that the purpose of this petition is to cause this Court to once
again re-examine and pass judgment upon the trial court's appreciation of the evidence presented, especially the
credibility of Coloyan as a witness. The Decision dated April 20, 1995 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the disquisition
of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution dated October 27, 1998 of the Third Division of this Court, finding that no
reversible error was committed by the trial court, should have impressed upon petitioner that issues relating to the trial
court's appreciation of the evidence have already been settled and thus, can no longer be reviewed anew by this Court.
As early as the 1913 case of Trono Felipe v. Director of Prisons , we have laid down the rule that an application for
habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of error.

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 Alimpoos v. CA, G.R. No. L-27331, July 30, 1981

DOCTRINES: The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily it cannot properly be
used for any other purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to
determine whether a person has committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to punish
respondent or to afford the injured person redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or other money award.

It is the general rule that habeas corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available.

FACTS: Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police in Agusan by virtue of a warrant of arrest
in a criminal case which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries, the place which was
allegedly robbed belonged to spouses Alimpoos. The accused, then detained, contending that the warrant was issued
without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the
Trial Court. Mosquito named as defendants in this case the Provincial Fiscal and the spouses Alimpoos. He also filed a
claim for damages premised on Article 32 (4), (8), (15), (16), (17) and (19) of the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy for Mosquito. (NO)
2. Whether or not he may be awarded damages in a Habeas Corpus case. (NO)
3. Whether or not spouses Alimpoos can be a party to the case. (NO)

RULING:
1st Issue - Habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.

Section 3, Rule 102 enumerates what should be set forth in a petition for Habeas Corpus:

“SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the
party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;

(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain,
such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be
deemed the person intended;

(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency
of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.”

It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case.
That is error. If the Accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary examination, what
should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without
enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of
arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. This principle was enunciated in
Lee Ching v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 329 (1916) where it was said:

“Proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from the main case from which the proceedings spring. They
rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.”

When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its
prosecution, but to have the preliminary investigation conducted.

The Accused, therefore, should have limited his complaint against the Chief of Police of Bayugan, the person having him
in alleged illegal custody.

When a warrant of arrest is being assailed for improper preliminary investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the
warrant of arrest or a petition to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. It is the general rule that habeas corpus
should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available.

2nd Issue - Damages cannot be awarded.

In Habeas Corpus cases, the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a provision for damages. It has to be
confined to what is provided for in Section 15, Rule 102, which reads:

“SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the court or Judge has examined into the cause of caption
and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his
discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the
officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the
prisoner shall be forthwith released.”

The sole function fo the writ is to relieve the unlawful imprisonment and ordinarily it cannot be properly issued for

20
another purpose.

Thus it has been held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to determine whether a person
has committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to punish respondent or to afford the injured
person redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or other money award.

3rd Issue - As to the issue whether or not the spouses Alimpoos may take part in the case, the Court ruled that which
the issuance connotes the commencement of a civil action, the proceeding for habeas corpus is technically not yet a suit
between private parties.

Section 19 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC 19. Who may appeal in habeas corpus cases. — The appeal in habeas corpus cases may be taken in the name of
the person detained or of the officer or person detaining him. But if the detention is by reason of civil proceedings the
party in interest or the person who caused the detention shall be entitled to control the appeal; and if, by virtue of
criminal proceedings, the provincial fiscal or the city fiscal as the case may be, is entitled to control the appeal on behalf
of the government, subject to the right of the Solicitor General to intervene.”

A habeas corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and purposes
the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the proceedings by habeas corpus is in no sense a suit
between private parties. The person restrained is the central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely
for his benefit. As it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be entered against
anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the technical sense.

In this case, although the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal,” he had
nevertheless abandoned the same. Neither did he take steps for the reconsideration of respondent Trial Judge’s Order
dismissing the appeal. The inaction of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been an admission on his part of the
unmeritoriousness of an appeal. As in criminal proceedings, his sound discretion on the matter should be deemed
controlling, and it has to be held that the Offended Parties were bereft of personality to prosecute the appeal.

The proper party is the Chief of Police or the person having the accused in the detention and not the private offended
party. It is also only the fiscal who may appeal the order granting the writ as mandated by Section 19 of Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

21
 Suarez v. CA, G.R. No. 83251, January 23, 1991

DOCTRINES: REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. — There are four well known requisites to
the principle of res judicata: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action (Filipinas
Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 66059-60, December 4, 1989). However, the foregoing requisites
should be subservient to the most significant requirement that the former judgment must be a valid one.

RES JUDICATA; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE WHERE JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST CASE WAS NOT A VALID
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; CASE AT BAR. — The purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a
writ of habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of her child but on the
contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which
respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as to who shall have the custody of
the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court without the necessity of filing a separate action under Rule 99 of the said rules for that purpose. Nevertheless, it is
error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating the reasons
or basis thereof This should not prevent the filing of the second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was
granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas corpus case.
Hence, We believe that the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a
valid adjudication on the merits which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to annul and set aside the orders of the trial court and to enjoin the latter from
proceeding with the petition for custody of and support of minor Rafael Carlos Suarez filed by respondent Manese.

Respondent Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner Suarez, his mother
Paz and his sister Milagros. On Feb. 23, 1987, before she could finish the presentation of her evidence, Manese filed a
motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file another action for custody of minor under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court, contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and legal custody of the minor child could
be fully adjudicated in another action not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.

The trial court issued a resolution granting the motion with prejudice. Thereafter, Manese filed another action for custody
of minor and support against petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of bar by prior judgment
dismissing the same with prejudice. The motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied by the trial court. Petitioner,
however, moved for the reconsideration of the denial which was also denied. Manese filed a motion for visitorial rights
and a motion for custody of the minor during the Christmas season. Trial court issued an order denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and granting Manese’s 2 motions. The trial court issued another order setting aside its order
which granted the petitioner’s motion for visitorial rights over the minor, and setting the pre-trial of the case on a
scheduled date.

Not satisfied, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining
order/preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the orders of the trial court. CA rendered judgment dismissing the
special civil action.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus is res judicata to
the present action for custody of minor and support.
2. Whether or not the respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion in granting custody to private
respondent during the Christmas season as stated in the questioned order.

RULING:
1st Issue - No, the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus is not res judicata in the
present action for custody or minor and support.

There are four well known requisites to the principle of res judicata: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the
court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties; (3) the former judgment is a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.

However, the foregoing requisites should be subservient to the most significant requirement that the former judgment
must be a valid one. The Court of Appeals is correct that the former order issued by the trial court, dismissing the
habeas corpus case is null and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Further, the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the case show that the order of the trial court was issued
whimsically and capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to the nullity of the order.

Records show that the motion to dismiss of respondent Manese, who was the plaintiff in the trial court was filed during
the trial and hearing stage of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The general rule governing dismissal of actions by
the plaintiff after the answer has been served is laid down in Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, which rule is
summarized as follows — an action shall not be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff after the service of the answer
except by order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. Hence, the trial court has

22
the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss at the instance of the plaintiff, but this discretion should be
exercised within reasonable limits. In such case, the trial court has to decide whether the dismissal of the case should be
allowed, and if so on what terms and conditions.

In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was without prejudice to the filing of an action
for the custody of minor on the ground that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a
second action to be filed under Rule 99 of the Revised Rules of Court. Clearly, the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing
the first action for a writ of habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody of
her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the
ground upon which respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as to who shall
have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102,
Revised Rules of Court without the necessity of filing a separate action under Rule 99 of the said rules for that purpose.
Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action without
stating the reasons or basis thereof This should not prevent the filing of the second action for custody of minor, since no
opportunity was granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas
corpus case.

Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal with prejudice was validly rendered within the lawful
discretion of the court and could be considered as an adjudication on the merits, nonetheless, the principle of res
judicata should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. The application of the
said principle, under the particular facts obtaining, would amount to denial of justice and/or bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance.

Hence, the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication
on the merits which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.

2nd Issue - The other issue raised by petitioner concerning grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in granting the
custody of the child to respondent Manese during the Christmas season from December 18, 1987 to January 2, 1988 is
already moot and academic.

23
 Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

DOCTRINE: While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to
appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ.
While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who
is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for
the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition.

FACTS: Unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters (Respondents) filed a petition for
habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana
was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the
body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of a registered religious
sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder. Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy and as her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.

The court issued 2 orders directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its
autopsy. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature
of the action. He argued that a special proceeding for habeas corpus is not applicable to a dead person but extends only
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Respondents amended their petition and alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related to
Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. In the absence of a restraining order from the
SC, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly
authorized government pathologist. The court denied the Petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

The court then ruled that the amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the
same, hence, the court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the
dead body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the
exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. Satisfied with its
jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of
burial thereof). Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another
woman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead
body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the
original petition for habeas corpus

RULING: YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over the case. Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule
of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein
determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so
warrant.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge
to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition
complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who
is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for
the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition.

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or
alive. After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings,
amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to
pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case
may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent
circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking
of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. As correctly alleged by

24
respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code. However, the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her, in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded
to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

Therefore, the Respondents did not need to file a separate civil action and the court did not need to dismiss the original
petition for habeas corpus. The amendment of the petition gave the court ample jurisdiction over the case.

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 Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990

DOCTRINE: The SC also points out that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail.
The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have
exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus.

FACTS: In February 27, 1990 when Juan Ponce Enrile was the Senate Minority Floor Leader, he was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBO on the strength of the warrant issued by Hon, Salazar of the
RTC od Quezon City.

The warrant had been issued on information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senor State Prosecutor Trampe, State Prosecutor Abesamis, and Asst. City Prosecutor Manquil Jr., charging Enrile,
Sps. Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI HQ on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The next morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in QC where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date, February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which
was followed by a supplemental petition), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being or having
been:
(a) Held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) Charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary
investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) Denied his right to bail; and
(d) Arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause

In other words, Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily, a charge of rebellion
would entitle one for bail.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to bail

RULING: Yes, he was deprived of his constitutional right to bail.

While the crimes against him were complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders (the intention of the
prosecution became clear that it was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the
maximum)

The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can
be charged would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the
commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitled for bail.

The SC also points out that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper
step that sould have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all
other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus.

Gutierrez CONCURRING:
A petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special
circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us. The trial court was
certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest
which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us
so he would not be arrested without bail for a non-existent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of
the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.

Melencio-Herrera SEPARATE OPINION:

I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy. Had the Information filed below
charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that Information charged
Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The
charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon
the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the Information nor
was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court. Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to

26
have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful
restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy, which is
less effective, may be availed of (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).

Bidin DISSENTING: Habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged
with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of
petitioner’s constitutional right to bail.

27
 Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994

DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may
arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the
absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in
advance of a determination of his case in court. In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.

FACTS: Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were
charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to
death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. The Both
accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released from detention. Before petitioners
could be arraigned, Respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the original informations which was
granted by Judge Villajuan and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court.

On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms and was raffled to the sala of the 2nd judge, Judge Pornillos. No
bail having been recommended for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners.

Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by the petitioners before Judge
Pornillos. At the court session set for the arraignment, the motion was denied. In the meantime, prior to the arraignment
of petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the
reinstatement of the original informations be granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.

On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18,
1994, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present petition for certiorari
and mandamus?

RULING: NO. The petition for habeas corpus was wrongly filed. The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be
ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not
the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However,
habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to
perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the
proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter.

Neither can the court grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the
functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance
of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus
to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court
will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in court.

In the case under consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance
which would warrant the grant of the writ, hence their petition therefor has to be denied. In addition, a petition for
habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial . It was held in
case of Enrile v Salazar that:

"The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there."

Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus was dismissed.

Ngaya-an v. Balweg, G.R. No. 80591 August 5, 1991

DOCTRINE: In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must determine whether: (1) the person in whose
behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the name of the person detaining another; (3)
the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (4) the cause of his detention (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised
Rules of Court). Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty that the petition for
habeas corpus will be granted and the person detained will be released from confinement. If the respondents are not
detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed the petition
should be dismissed.

FACTS: This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Daniel Ngaya-an,
Petitioners Carmencita Ngaya-an, Clemente Wingnga and Felisa Ngaya-an Tacalig (Petitioners for brevity) are the wife,

28
brother and sister, respectively, of Daniel Ngaya-an. Named as respondents are Conrado Balweg alias "Ka Ambo" the
Head of Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA for short), Sagmayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong" the Head of the
CPLA Moro Company and the CPLA.

In their petition dated November 17, 1987, petitioners alleged, among others, that Daniel Ngaya-an is the Chairman of
the Cordillera Bodong Association; that sometime on October 5, 1987, at a check point manned by elements of the
CPLA situated at Cagaluan Gate, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao on direct order of Sagmayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong" Daniel
was forcibly taken and brought to their headquarters at Cagaluan Pasil, Kalinga Apayao; that Daniel has been detained
and deprived of his liberty by respondents; that respondents have no legal basis nor authority to detain him; that Daniel
has not committed a crime nor charged with an offense for which he can be legally detained; that petitioners together
with their relatives and friends went several times to the CPLA detachment at Cagaluan but respondents refused to
release Daniel and reveal the place where he is detained; that respondent Balweg in a radio interview admitted that the
CPLA is responsible for the disappearance of Daniel and even hinted that he will be or had been killed by the CPLA. As
a relief petitioners prayed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued directing respondents to produce the body of Daniel
and show cause for his detention. They also prayed that after hearing Daniel be restored of his liberty and discharged
from confinement.

The writ of habeas corpus was issued and a copy of the resolution was duly served through registered speed air mail to
respondents Conrado Balweg and the CPLA. In addition respondents were advised of said resolution by telegrams sent
by Second Division Clerk of Court Salvador de Guzman. The copy of the resolution sent to respondent Appag was
returned unserved with the notation from the post office that the addressee is unknown in Cagaluan, Pasil, Kalinga-
Apayao, the address indicated in the petition.

In his return of the writ of habeas corpus dated November 3, 1989, respondent Balweg alleged inter alia that Daniel
Ngaya-an is not in his custody; that he has not ordered the apprehension of Daniel; that he has nothing to do with the
disappearance of Daniel; that he learned of Daniel's disappearance in the radio and newspaper reports; that the petition
does not specifically state his participation in the disappearance of Daniel so that the petition states no cause of action
against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Daniel Ngaya-an is unlawfully detained or restrained of his liberty by respondent Balweg and the
CPLA.

RULING: NO. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
(Section 1, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court). The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy intended to determine
whether the person under detention is held under lawful authority.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must determine whether: (1) the person in whose behalf the
application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the name of the person detaining another; (3) the place
where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (4) the cause of his detention (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court). Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty that the petition for habeas corpus
will be granted and the person detained will be released from confinement. If the respondents are not detaining nor
restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed the petition should be
dismissed.

In the case at bar, petitioners miserably failed to substantiate by clear and convincing evidence that Daniel Ngaya-an in
whose behalf the petition has been filed is under the custody or is unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty by the
respondent Balweg. The only evidence linking respondent Balweg to the disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an is the
declaration of Ramon Edduba, the lone eyewitness for the petitioners that on October 5, 1987, at about 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, Sagmayao Appag together with "Ka Ambo" and three other men carrying long firearms accosted Daniel
Ngaya-an at the Cagaluan Gate and thereafter with a rope tied on Daniel's hands and feet he was carried to the
detachment. Witness Edduba apparently committed an error in naming "Ka Ambo" as one of the companions of
Sagmayao Appag as he declared that "Ka Ambo" is the assistant of Sagmayao Appag. On cross-examination he even
admitted that he does not know the full name of "Ka Ambo". In the affidavit he executed on November 19, 1987, which
petitioners offered as Exhibit "B", Ramon Edduba declared that before Daniel Ngaya-an could step down from the jeep
he was approached by Sagmayao Appag accompanied by men armed with long firearms one of whom he identified as
"Ka Elias". He has not declared nor even insinuated that respondent Conrado Balweg popularly known as "Ka Ambo"
the Head of the CPLA was with the group of Sagmayao Appag when Daniel Ngaya-an was accosted at the Cagaluan
Gate on October 5, 1987.

Ostensibly, the disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an was established by Ramon Edduba's testimony corroborated by
Carmencita Ngaya-an the wife of Daniel Ngaya-an. However, the granting of the relief is not predicated on the
disappearance of a person. The petitioners must establish by competent and convincing evidence that the missing
person in whose behalf the petition is filed is under the custody of the respondents.

Here there is no evidence that respondent Balweg the Head of the CPLA, is responsible for the disappearance of Daniel.
Neither is there any evidence that the missing person is presently detained by respondent Balweg. On his part
respondent Balweg has not only categorically denied that Daniel Ngaya-an is under his custody but also that he is not
responsible for his disappearance.

29
It is possible that based on the testimony of Ramon Edduba the person responsible for the disappearance of Daniel is
respondent Sagmayao Appag. However, we could not grant the relief and order respondent Sagmayao Appag to release
Daniel because up to now this Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Appag. As borne by the
records of this case, the writ issued on November 23, 1987, as well as the subsequent resolutions of this Court, were
returned unserved because respondent Appag is unknown at Cagaluan, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, the address indicated in
the petition.

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 Martin v. Guerrero, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1499, October 22, 1999

DOCTRINES: Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be
enforced within their respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them are limited to and operative only
within such areas.

Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible.

FACTS: Gil Ramon O. Martin charged RTC Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero with "ignorance of the law" and "violation of the
Philippine Constitution." Respondent allegedly issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus against herein complainant who was a
resident of Parañaque City, although the RTC was in Tagaytay City. Worse, the former incurred considerable delay in
resolving the latter’s Omnibus Motion.

On December 27, 1995, a Petition for Habeas Corpus dated December 26, 1995 was filed before the RTC of Tagaytay
City by Petitioner Maria Victoria S. Ordiales against Gil Martin for the custody of their begotten minor child born out of
wedlock during their union.

On December 28, 1995, the Sheriff submitted his Sheriff's return certifying therein that on that same day he served a
copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The Sheriff did not mention in his return that he effected service of the courts processes at the business address
indicated in the complaint because both the Summons and the Writ of Habeas Corpus directed him to effect such
service at 24 Madrid St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila.

Due to Martin’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing, so the respondent Judge issued an order in open court on the
said date directing the undersigned(martin) to appear before the said court at 8:30am on Jan. 05, 1996 to show cause
why no punitive action will be taken for his refusal to acknowledge receipt of the Writ and for failure to appear.

On Jan. 04, 1995, Deputy Sheriff certified on his sheriff’s return that on the same day he served a copy of the order and
alias Writ upon the undersigned at his residence thru his maid, Susan Nadal. However, Martin still did not appear on the
rescheduled hearing. So the Judge issued a Warrant for the arrest of the undersigned. The NBI agents besieged his
residence at BF Homes but they failed to arrest Martin.

Martin filed an Omnibus Motion before the subject court of the respondent Judge praying for the dismissal of the case on
the basis of the legal grounds enumerated therein.

The petitioner claimed that The court of respondent Judge did not have jurisdiction over the case nor over the
person of your undersigned complainant. And notwithstanding the failure to file comment by the Petitioner as
required by the court up to Jan. 22, 1996, such failure amounted to an abandonment of Petitioners right to do so, which
in any manner did not operate to exculpate respondent Judge from issuing a ruling on the motion to dismiss in culpable
and palpable violation of the three months period within which to decide as mandated by paragraph I, Sec. 15, Article
VIII of the Philippine Constitution, considering that the last matter to be resolved was the Omnibus Motion, ANNEX I
which was filed on Jan. 08, 1996. Hence, to date more than seven (7) months has already lapsed.

Respondent Judge explained that Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, like any other regional trial court in the
country, is vested with concurrent original jurisdiction not only with the Court of Appeals but also with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines pursuant to the explicit provisions of Section 21 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act (JRA) or EO 33 and the ruling enunciated in the case of Almine vs. CA, 177 SCRA 796.

OCA: A writ of habeas corpus that may be issued by a Court of First Instance or a judge thereof is enforceable
only within his judicial district and not outside it. Clearly, Tagaytay City (4th Judicial Region), the site of the court
where Judge Guerrero presides, and Paranaque (National Capital Judicial Region) where the complainant resides do
not belong to the same region. Therefore the respondent Judge may be considered to have exceeded his authority in
issuing the contested writ.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Guerrero erred in issuing the writ of habeas corpus.

RULING: YES. BP 129 provides that RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction (1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions x x x.

SEC. 2. Rule 102 ROC

Who may grant the writ. -- The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by x x x a Regional Trial Court, or a judge thereof,
on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Hence RTCs have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be enforced within their
respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them are limited to and operative only within such
areas. Clearly then, respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against herein complainant, who
was a resident of Paranaque, an area outside his judicial jurisdiction.

31
Although respondent erred in issuing the Writ, his error did not constitute gross ignorance of law. Well-settled is the
rule that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible. In the present case, complainant failed to show bad faith or
malice on the part of the respondent. Indeed, any allegation of bad faith is negated by the fact that respondent,
upon the motion of complainant, dissolved the Writ of Habeas Corpus and recalled the Warrant of Arrest.

Nonetheless, as the OCA emphasized, judges have a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. It is imperative, therefore, that they remain conversant with basic legal principles. For committing
an error on a basic legal point, the respondent should be sanctioned.
***
Delay
Respondent judge should also be held liable for his failure to rule promptly on complainant’s Omnibus Motion. His
explanation that he opted to inhibit himself from further proceeding with the case did not justify the delay. It was his duty
to resolve matters pending before him expeditiously.

We reiterate that "delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the 90-day period fixed by the
Constitution amounts not only to gross inefficiency but also constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a magistrate shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods."

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 Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004

DOCTRINE: There is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked CA its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.

FACTS: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to their daughter, Sequiera. After three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to
return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home
with her daughter without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit,...
Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter.

However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

The petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that
since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).

ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner
without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.

Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is
being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case
will be left without legal remedy.

In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to
protect the rights and promote the welfare of children"

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of
RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are... absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of
RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts... have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with
family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. PETITION GRANTED.

In Re Raymundo Reyes and Vincent B. Evangelista, G.R. No. 251954, June 10, 2020
DOCTRINE: The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed.
(A) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this Court or any of its
members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any
of its presiding judges. In the absence of all the RTC judges in a province or city, any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
in the province or city where the absent RTC judges sit.
Hence, this Court has concurrent jurisdiction, along with the CA and the trial courts, to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
However, mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the
petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts "serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."
FACTS: Petitioner, Atty. Rubee Ruth C. Cagasca-Evangelista (petitioner), the wife of Evangelista, filed the instant
petition as counsel for her husband and Reyes. She alleges that Reyes and Evangelista were convicted by Branch
103, RTC of Quezon City for violation of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. (RA) 6425, as amended, for the
illegal sale of 974.12 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, acting in conspiracy with one

33
another, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amount of Php500,000.00
each.
The penalty was made in accordance with the amendment introduced by RA 7659, which increased the penalty of
imprisonment for illegal sale of drugs from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, to reclusion perpetua to
death for 200 grams or more of shabu. The said conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Decision dated 27
September 2007.
More than a decade after the affirmation of Reyes and Evangelista's conviction by the Supreme Court, petitioner now
claims that with the abolition of the death penalty, and the repeal of the death penalty in RA 7659 as a
consequence, the penalty for illegal sale of drugs should be reverted to that originally imposed in RA 6425, or from
reclusion perpetua in RA 7659 to six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in RA 6425. According to her,
"if the convicts will serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA[,] it is as the same as punishing them to (sic) a
crime that is not existing anymore. And said [penalty] will [be] tantamount to deprivation of their life and liberty and will
not be fair and just in the eyes of man and law."
Further, petitioner insists that both Reyes and Evangelista have already served 19 years and 2 months, or more than
18 years if the benefit of Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) under RA 10592 was to be considered. And, with
the benefit of the GCTA, which may be applied retroactively, both Reyes and Evangelista have already served more
than the required sentence imposed by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is proper.
RULING: NO. First, petitioner disregarded the basic rules of procedure. There is no verified declaration of electronic
submission of the soft copy of the petition and the required written explanation of service or filing under Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is also patently lacking.
Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION; HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The Rules of Court provide that "except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint that will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record , the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
----------------------------------- x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x ---------------------------------------
Section 2, Rule IV of the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592, "An Act
Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code ,"
(2019 IRR), issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), provides:
Section 2. GCTA during Service of Sentence. — The good conduct of a PDL convicted by
final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall
entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the period of his
sentence, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10592.
The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during service of sentence:
a. Recidivists;
b. Habitual Delinquents;
c. Escapees; and
d. PDL convicted of Heinous Crimes.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this Court or any of its
members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law , or the RTC or any of its
presiding judges. In the absence of all the RTC judges in a province or city, any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the province or city
where the absent RTC judges sit.
Hence, this Court has concurrent jurisdiction, along with the CA and the trial courts, to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

34
However, mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the
petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts "serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."
DIRECT RECOURSE TO COURT IS PROPER WHEN QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE INVOLVED
In the landmark case of Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, the Supreme Court ruled that direct recourse to this Court is
proper only to seek resolution of questions of law, and not issues that depend on the determination of questions of
facts:
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in
the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus
(extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of
law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII,
cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought
directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by
structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary
functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court
to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule
which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
dimension of the issue or cause raised. (Emphasis supplied)
At first blush, petitioner seeks to raise a question of law — whether or not the abolition of the death penalty in RA 9346
reverted the penalty for illegal sale of shabu from RA 7659 to RA 6425 prior to its amendment, thus placing the
question within the jurisdiction of this Court. The real question, however, is the release of Reyes and Evangelista
from detention based on the alleged service of their sentences pursuant to RA 10592, which requires a
determination of facts, i.e., if said PDLs are entitled to the benefit of GCTA. On this ground alone, the petition
must be dismissed.
NO EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT DIRECT RESORT TO THE SC; STILL
FOLLOW HIERARCHY OF COURTS
At any rate, it must be stressed that as a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be entertained unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as in cases involving national interest and those of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Not one of these exceptional and
compelling circumstances, however, were even alleged or shown in order for the Court to disregard the sanctity of the
hierarchy of courts.
Procedural considerations aside, the Court still finds the petition wanting in merit.
In this case, the confinement of Reyes and Evangelista at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City is valid pursuant
to a lawful judgment. They were convicted for violation of Section 15, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and the
affirmation of their conviction was decreed by no less than this very Court.
We are aware that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. Here,
petitioner invokes the third circumstance.
When the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. As a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy, the
writ of habeas corpus may be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. Mere invocation that an extraordinary
circumstance exists is not enough, as in this case.
As claimed by petitioner, there is no dispute that death penalty has been abolished. This does not mean, however,
that the penalties imposed under RA 7956, apart from death, have likewise been repealed. Section 1 of RA 9346, An
Act Prohibiting the Death Penalty in the Philippines, provides:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,
Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known
as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed, Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and
all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
RE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA & LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Upon a reading of the law, only the imposition of the death penalty has been removed, and RA 7659, as well as other
laws, are repealed or amended insofar as they impose the death penalty. Section 2 of RA 9346 provides the
appropriate penalty in lieu of death: reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
Revised Penal Code; or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the said nomenclature.
Evidently, RA 9346 did not repeal the amendment introduced in RA 7659 imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
against Reyes and Evangelista is valid.
On the issue of the applicability of RA 10592, it is clear from the aforequoted provision that PDLs convicted of

35
heinous crimes shall not be entitled to GCTA. Section 1 of 0o, amending Article 29 of the RPC, supports this:
x x x Provided, finally, that recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
Reyes and Evangelista, who were found guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs exceeding 200 grams, have
committed a heinous crime. This is in consonance with RA 7659, which includes the distribution or sale of
dangerous drugs as heinous for being a grievous, odious and hateful offense and which, by reason of its
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity is repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
Rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, such as the 2019 IRR issued by the DOJ and the DILG, have the force of law, and are entitled to great
respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of
legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity
was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the
same.
Accordingly, the writ cannot be issued and the discharge of Reyes and Evangelista from imprisonment
should not be authorized.

36
 Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000

DOCTRINE: When an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary
Deportation Order had already been issued by the BID, Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien
on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.

FACTS: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in coordination with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) conducted simultaneous raids at the Royal Flame Club, Space World and Narcissus
Club which are all located in Ermita, Manila as a result of which 20 female Chinese nationals were caught "in the act of
entertaining customers and guests.

No Alien Employment Permits or Alien Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals,
they were turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their alien status. They were thereupon confined at the BI
Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.

Chinese National Ma Jing, one of the 20 apprehended Chinese, filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional
Trial Court (RTC).

The Court finds no cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so that Ma Jing's immediate release is
hereby ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.

Ma Jing, not having been released from detention, filed a "Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt" naming BI
Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, BI Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and BI employees Mar
Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.

In the meantime, the other Chinese nationals' petitions for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by
the BI.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for Habeas Corpus may lie despite the pending of a deportation case

RULING: No, a petition for Habeas Corpus may not lie despite the pending of a deportation case.

It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give
due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case. Where the BID had not yet
completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly
delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.

Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no
showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.

When an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation
Order had already been issued by the BID, Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.

Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed. 47 Section 4, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The
writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. 49
The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, April 2, 2001

DOCTRINE: Provisions that were not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed repealed. Hence,
having been omitted from the 1997 Rules, Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which had previously
provided for a 48-hour reglementary period within which to appeal habeas corpus cases, is now deemed repealed.
Accordingly, the period for perfecting appeals in said cases and ordinary civil actions is now uniform, which is 15 days
from notice of the judgment or order.

FACTS: On November 5, 1998, Tung Chin Hui, a Taiwanese citizen, arrived in the Philippines. 10 days later, he was
arrested by policemen for allegedly tampering with his passport, and was subsequently turned over to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau found him guilty of possessing a tampered

37
passport, which was earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, and ordered his summary deportation.

Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal.
Respondents Commissioner of Immigration and the Board of Commissioners filed a Return of Writ controverting his
claim. However, the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release from custody. Hence, respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated January 29, 1999.

A copy of the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999; and,
according to the respondents, was received by their counsel on February 15, 1999. Respondents then filed a Notice of
Appeal from the said Order. The Notice of Appeal was dated February 15, 1999 and was received by the RTC on
February 16, 1999.

Petitioner then filed an Opposition. He contended that although respondents alleged that they had received the said
Order on February 15, 1999, they had in fact received it on February 11, 1999, as evidenced by the receipt of the
service thereof, and by the Sheriff’s Return. Thus, Petitioner claimed that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour
reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases, as prescribed by Sec. 18, Rule 41 of the pre-1997
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed

RULING:Yes, the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed.

Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. – An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by
filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of such
judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.”

On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

“SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.”

The well-settled rule of statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the
revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded. The omission shows the intention
of the rule-making body (the Supreme Court in this case), “to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not
reproduced in the revised statute or code.”

In this case, petitioner argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section 18
of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court.

However, Sec. 18 of Rule 41 was omitted from, and thereby repealed by, the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
completely replaced Rules 1 to 71.

Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil
actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court – which provides that appeals shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

Here, respondents received the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on February 11, 1999; and filed the
Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999, or five days after they had received the said Order.

Therefore, Petitioner’s argument is devoid of merit. The appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. The Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED.

38
 Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, November 23, 2003

DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. The term "court"
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

FACTS: In 1997, Raymond M. Jackson (petitioner), an American citizen was charged for violation of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code (Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification).

He was found to be in possession of US passports under the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard
Bator after a search conducted in his residence in Angeles City.

The Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) ordered the summary
deportation of Jackson.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CID regarding the BOC deportation order but this was denied.
However, petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the
CID, which had not yet been resolved.

The US Embassy in Manila issued a certification that the US Passports had been cancelled because the same were
tampered with.

CID ordered his arrest for being an undesirable alien based on the hold departure order of the Makati RTC and the
certification of the US Embassy. Petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID.

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court against the Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and
Jane Doe. In their return filed with the RTC, the respondents alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested and
detained at the CID on the basis of the summary deportation order issued by the BOC on and of the hold departure
order of the Makati RTC in a criminal case; the petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was a
pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by him.

The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest. (YES)

RULING: The petition is dismissed.

The Court held that under Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, except as otherwise provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 102, the term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such
supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. If it appears
that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered
prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint (Sec. 13, Rule 102).

In this case, the return of the writ by the respondents shows that the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID
detention center based on the BOC order which had become final and executory. The Court also held that such
documents from a foreign embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports held by their national on the ground that
the said passports were tampered with; hence, canceled were sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens
from the Philippines.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of
inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971

DOCTRINES:
Hernandez Doctrine - complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping was not warranted under
Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense.

"The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas
corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the
person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void" (summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte
Siebold, 1880).

"The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose,
such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of
authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are

39
separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has
served out so much of the sentence as was valid" (Cruz v. Director of Prisons, 1910).

FACTS: Mario Gumabon pleaded guilty for complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping on May 1953; he was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua along with Paterno Palmares, Epifanio Padua,
and Blas Bagolbol wherein the first two were convicted on March 1954 and and the third on December 1955
respectively. All of them have served more than 13 years.

Subsequently after their sentence, the Court decided in People v. Hernandez (1956), also known as the Hernandez
Doctrine, that complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping was not warranted under Art. 134
of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. Afterwards this doctrine was applied in People v. Lava (1969) wherein
the petitioner has served more than the maximum penalty imposed upon him was freed and his continued detention
illegal. Out of fear of experiencing the same negative judgment as Pomeroy v Director of Prison (1960), the petitioners
filed this case on the basis of denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question
and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art
22 of the RPC.

[This is not found in the main decision but in the Separate Opinion by J. Teehankee: In Pomeroy vs. Director of
Prisons, "(W)ith reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of habeas corpus
can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error." At the time of the
Pomeroy decision in 1960, as noted therein, "the existence of the 'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld by a sizable
number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court."]

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners be given a retroactive effect with habeas corpus as appropriate remedy. (YES)

RULING: The petition must be granted. Attorney Jose W. Diokno, the counsel of the petitioners, pressed vigorously the
existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question and the
retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of
the RPC.

The writ is the most important human rights provision (Chafee). In an opinion, Justice Malcolm said, “The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient.”

If the detention finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained then the availability of habeas corpus is
narrowed, because the only ground which the court allows habeas corpus is when another court wants
jurisdiction over the person or cause or some other matter rendering its proceedings void. However, the
fundamental exception: Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered
that judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention as decided in the Hernandez case.

The petitioners in this case was asserting their constitutional right. The petitioners were convicted by the CFI for which
was similar to Hernandez et. al and were punished under the same law and too were convicted. The court finds this in
violation of equal protection since our constitution guarantees uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under
same circumstance should be given the same privileges confirmed and liabilities imposed and then Article 22 on
retroactivity shall apply. The Court stated in Director v. Director of Prisons that the only means of giving retroactive effect
to a penal provision favorable to the accused is the writ of habeas corpus.

While the decision in Director v. Director of Prisons speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the
remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the
burden of justifying their release.

40
 Calvan v. CA, G.R. No. 140823, October 3, 2000

DOCTRINES: SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; SCOPE OF INQUIRY. — The inquiry on a writ of
habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the
proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed
to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order
that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. Keeping in mind the limitation that in habeas corpus the
concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether
such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process, an inquiry into the validity of the proceedings or
process can be crucial in safeguarding the constitutional right of a potential accused against an obvious and clear
misjudgment.

AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY FOR WRONGFUL PROSECUTION AND UNWARRANTED DETENTION; CASE AT

BAR. — Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ, which furnishes an extraordinary remedy and may not thus be
invoked under normal circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained, the illegal order and warrant of
arrest issued by petitioner Judge subsists and private respondent is offered no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in
the ordinary course of law. The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly administration of
justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. Such a
special circumstance is here present considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to quash, the
case no longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for a reinvestigation because the preliminary
investigation for purposes of filing the information has already been taken over by the Provincial Prosecutor. The latter,
upon the other hand, does not have the authority to lift the warrant of arrest issued by the disqualified judge. Meantime,
respondent is being held and detained under an illegal order and warrant of arrest which has no legal standing.

FACTS: The petitioner, an incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte fatally shot the former Mayor Rafael Benemerito
in a shootout at a sitio in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte. Salas surrendered his handgun and placed himself under the custody
of the Municipal Police and asked to be brought to the Provincial PNP headquarters in Laoag City.

The next day, Police Chief Inspector Crispin Aguno and Thelma Benemerito, wife of the victim, lodged a criminal
complaint for murder against Mayor Reynolan Sales at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Adams-Baagui-
Dumalueg-Pagudpud, Branch 127.

Judge Melvyn U. Calvan conducted a "preliminary examination" of the witnesses and issued the assailed order and
warrant of arrest against the accused "with NO BAIL.

Mayor Sales was transferred, on 04 August 1999, from the Provincial PNP headquarters to the Provincial Jail where he
had since been detained under the custody of the Provincial Warden of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Jail

After conducting a preliminary examination, Judge Calvan issued a resolution forwarding the records of the case to the
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. Salas was notified and made to submit his counter-affidavit and defense
evidence.

Contending that his right to due process was violated by the cavalier and perfunctory manner by which Judge
Calvan suddenly terminated and concluded the preliminary investigation, without even allowing him to submit
counter affidavit and present his witnesses, Mayor Sales filed a Petition For Habeas Corpus and Certiorari
before the CA. He argued that the Order and Warrant of Arrest was improvidently and illegally issued by Judge Calvan
because he is a relative of the complainant Thelma Benemerito (Ah okay!) withing third civil degree of affinity and
therefore disqualified from conducting the preliminary investigation.

CA: dismissed the petition.

Mayor Sales withdrew his petition for certiorari while his MFR was still pending. Only the habeas corpus petition
remained.

CA granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of Mayor Sales. The Office of the Solicitor General
filed a petition for review on the decision of the CA. CA denied the petition.

In it’s MFR the OSG would insist that CA resolved the issues beyond the basic precepts of procedure on the theory that
the determination on the legality of the order and warrant of arrest could not be resolved in a petition for habeas corpus,
the issue being appropriate only for consideration in a petition for certiorari.

CA rationated that: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity . This disqualification is mandatory,
unlike an inhibition which is discretionary. It extends to all proceedings, not just to trial as erroneously contended by
respondent Judge. Even Canon 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall take no part in a
proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, as when he is ‘related by consanguinity or
affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree.’ Due process likewise requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, so that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. (Gutierrez v. Santos, 2 SCRA 249, 254 [1961].)

"In Geotina v. Gonzales, (41 SCRA 66 [1971]) the judge who was admittedly related within the sixth civil degree of

41
affinity to the private complainant ordered the arrest of the petitioner. The Supreme Court held:

"We therefore hold that the respondent judge is without authority to preside over the criminal case in question. Section 1,
in commanding him to withdraw from the case herein involved, necessarily divests him of all authority to act in any
judicial capacity in connection therewith. We further hold that where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to
the case make no waiver of such disqualification as in the case at bar, sec. 1 forthwith completely strips the judge of
authority to proceed. All his acts in the premises are without authority of law.

‘The High Court also stated that where the judge decides in favor of his own competency, proceeds to try a case and
renders a verdict from which there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, resort
to the extraordinary remedies, of which habeas corpus can be cited as one, constitutes the only means available for
review by a superior court.

"In the case at bench, the order and warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge by virtue of which the petitioner is
detained offers no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of law. Habeas corpus is the only remedy
to release him from the effects of the illegal order or one issued without any legal authority, to use the language of
Geotina v. Gonzales."

Solicitor General contends that the writ of habeas corpus is simply a writ of inquiry, tasking the person who keeps a
detainee in custody to explain or justify the detention, conformably with Sections 1, 3 and 6, Rule 102, of the Rules of
Court.

"SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

"SECTION 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either
by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

"(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;

"(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain,
such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be
deemed the person intended;

"(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

"(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency
of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.

"SECTION 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. — In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ
shall be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court
or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person
not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person
restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to
summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of
the imprisonment or restraint."

The Sol Gen. submits that the writ should then be addressed not to the judge or person who issued the warrant
of arrest, but to the officer or anyone who actually detains the person in whose behalf the application is made.
Since the petition for habeas corpus concedes that Mayor Sales is in the custody of the Provincial Warden of Laoag
City, the latter, not petitioner Judge, should be the proper party Respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued in the CA is valid?

RULING:
T: YES, the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the CA is valid contrary to the arguments of the OSG.

R: A: The proceedings before the CA being confined to the habeas corpus case, the petition should ordinarily be
addressed to the person under whom Mayor Sales is in detention or in alleged illegal custody who would thereby be in a
position to produce at the hearing the body of the person in whose behalf the petition is made, consistently with the
import of Section 6, Rule 102, of the Rules. Judge Calvan however, has constructive custody over respondent for
having issued the order and warrant for his arrest.

The petition filed before the CA was originally one for habeas corpus and certiorari. The writ of certiorari was intended
to assail the Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Melvyn Calvan while the writ of habeas corpus was sought to
relieve Mayor Sales from detention predicating the application on the alleged illegal Order and Warrant of Arrest issued
by Judge Calvan by reason of his disqualification. Indeed, a writ of habeas corpus could be so employed as a remedy
ancillary to a proceeding in certiorari for purposes of review. Later, however, respondent Mayor withdrew the petition for
certiorari but not the petition for habeas corpus leaving the latter to sail alone. The withdrawal must not be deemed to

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affect adversely the jurisdiction of the appellate court, already acquired, to resolve all the issues theretofore
brought before it. Procedural precepts, it must again be stressed, are aids, not obstacles, in the achievement of
substantial justice.

Judge Calvan concededly is related to the complainant, Thelma Benemerito, within the third civil degree of
affinity (his wife Susan Benemerito-Calvan being the niece of the deceased).

Rule 137, Section 1 provides:

"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degre e, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above."

The proscription against the judge from proceeding with the case is predicated on the principle that no judge should
preside in a case in which he may not be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent In Geotina v. Gonzales,
this Court has said that where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such
disqualification, the Rules forthwith strips the judge of any authority to proceed.

The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the
question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The
probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the
judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. Keeping in mind the limitation that
in habeas corpus the concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or holding the
petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process, an
inquiry into the validity of the proceedings or process can be crucial in safeguarding the constitutional right of
a potential accused against an obvious and clear misjudgment. The intrinsic right of the State to prosecute and
detain perceived transgressors of the law must be balanced with its duty to protect the innate value of individual liberty.

Quite evidently, the circumspection and objectivity required of the judge could not be assured in the case at bar.
Stringent standard should be applied in order to avoid hasty and improvident issuance of a warrant for the arrest of an
accused. The deprivation of liberty, regardless of its duration, is too invaluable a price even just to stake for any wrongful
prosecution and unwarranted detention.

In Allado v. Diokno, the Court has cautioned:

"Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has
good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional
protection would be demeaned and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects’ only in the
fallible discretion of the Judge. (Beck v. Ohio.) On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order
that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably
discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. (Terry v. Ohio)
In this regard, the Court of Appeals has observed that —

"The preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge does not accord with the prevailing rules. He did
it under the old rules, where the preliminary investigation by a municipal Judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary
examination stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and
the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the
accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is
allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, RA 5180, as
amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it
into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist of only one stage. (Sangguniang Bayan v.
Albano)

"Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant The
Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and answers . (Roberts,
Jr. v. CA, supra; Sec. 6 (b), Rule 112.) The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provincial
Prosecutor. The purported transcript of the stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer.

"Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary investigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses
for the complainant. He Issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor without
giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. (Sec. 3
(b), Rule 112.)

"While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary
investigation or a reinvestigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arrest
which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecutor has no power to recall the warrant of arrest."

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Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ, which furnishes an extraordinary remedy and may not thus be invoked
under normal circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained, the illegal order and warrant of
arrest issued by petitioner Judge subsists and private respondent is offered no speedy, adequate remedy or
appeal in the ordinary course of law. The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly
administration of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special circumstance that requires
immediate action.

Such a special circumstance is here present considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to
quash, the case no longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for a reinvestigation because
the preliminary investigation for purposes of filing the information has already been taken over by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The latter, upon the other hand, does not have the authority to lift the warrant of arrest issued
by the disqualified judge. Meantime, respondent is being held and detained under an illegal order and warrant of arrest
which has no legal standing.

C: Therefore, the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued by the CA is valid due to the special circumstances in the case
at bar.

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