Regalian doctrine.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Incontrovertible evidence must be shown that the land is alienable or disposable in
order to overcome such presumption.

Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession,
or which is the foundation of ownership of property

TORRENS SYSTEM VS TORRENS TITLE

What is Torrens System?

It is a system for registration of land under which, upon the landowner’s application, the
court may, after appropriate proceedings, direct the register of deeds for the issuance of a
certificate of title.
The most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
Those systems of registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared object is,
under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible
title to realty, and to simplify its transfer.

Land registration under the Torrens system was never intended to be a means of acquiring ownership.
Neither does the existence of tax declarations or vest title. It is not a conclusive evidence of
ownership, but a proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Q: What is Torrens title?

A: It is a certificate of ownership issued under the Torrens system of registration by the government,
through the Register of Deeds (RD) naming and declaring the owner in fee simple of the real property
described therein, free from all liens & encumbrances, except as may be expressly noted there or
otherwise reserved by law.

Note: It is conclusive against the whole world (including the government and to a holder in good
faith), guaranteed to be indefeasible, unassailable & imprescriptible.

TORRENS TITLE is conclusive (It is a legal inference made so peremptorily that it cannot be overthrown
or contradicted.) against third parties, including the government. A holder of a Torrens title in good faith
is guaranteed that his/her title is indefeasible, unassailable and imprescriptible.

REGISTRATION VS JURISDICTION

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to establish evidence of
title over realty, a system of registration of titles to lands. The Torrens certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title in property.
Q: What are the modes of registering land titles?
A: There are two modes:
1. Original registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), and
2. Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
The purpose of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the title, except claims which were noted in the certificate at the time of registration, or which may
arise subsequent thereto; to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable; and to
relieve the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims.

Registration affords legal protection such that the claim of an innocent purchaser for value is
recognized as valid despite a defect in the title of the vendor.

Jurisdiction -
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands shall be in rem and based on generally accepted
principles underlying the Torrens system.

Jurisdiction in rem is acquired by the constructive seizure of the land through publication, service of
notice and posting. It is enforceable against the whole world.

Regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction over land registration cases and all petitions after
original registration. (Sec. 2, PD No. 1529)
However, first level courts may be assigned by the SC to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases:
(a) Where there is no opposition, or
(b) Over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000. (Republic v. Bantigue, supra)

Appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.

Sec. 2, PD 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the court‘s general jurisdiction and limited
jurisdiction.

Thus, a regional trial court has the authority to hear not only applications for original registration but
also on all petitions filed after original registration of title. The amendment aims to avoid multiplicity
of suits and simplify registration proceedings.

The court can now hear and decide not only non- controversial cases but even contentious issues
which before were beyond its competence. Initially, the land registration court has jurisdiction over the
land applied for at the time of the filing of the application.

At the trial, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determines whether the land applied for is
registerable, and the title thereto, confirmed.
If the land turns out to be inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order its registration and
the court must perforce dismiss the application.

A registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over land subject of registration cannot be
divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the
Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.
Reason: proceedings for land registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead
patents are not; thus, a homestead patent is not conclusive as far as courts acting on proceedings in
rem are concerned. (De los Angeles v. Santos, 12
SCRA 622)
IMPERFECT TITLE
Q: When is a person deemed to possess an imperfect title over property?
A: When the applicant for confirmation of imperfect title has shown possession and
occupation that is: (OCENI)
1. open,
2. continuous,
3. exclusive and
4. notorious
5. in the concept of an owner

Q: What is the effect of possession of animperfect title?

A: When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of the title being issued.

What must an confirmation prove applicant for judicial

A: 1. That the land is alienable and disposable land of public domain; and
2. That they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land for the length of time and in the manner and concept provided by law.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE VS TORRENS TITLE

Certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the Register of Deeds in the
registry. It accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
simple title which an owner possesses. (Agcaoili Reviewer, p. 245, 2008 ed)

A certificate of title is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself as the concept of
title is conceived under our Civil Law; “the certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree
of registration ’’

Q: What are the two types of certificates of title?

1. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) – the first title issued in the name of the registered owner by
the Register of Deeds covering a parcel of land which had been registered under the Torrens system by
virtue of a judicial or administrative proceeding.

It consists of one original copy filed in the Register of Deeds, and the owner’s duplicate certificate
delivered to the owner.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) – the title issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of a
transferee to whom the ownership of a registered land has been transferred by any legal mode of
conveyance (e.g. sale, donation).

TORRENS TITLE:
It is a certificate of ownership issued under the Torrens system of registration by the
government, through the Register of Deeds (RD) naming and declaring the owner in fee simple of the
real property described therein, free from all liens & encumbrances, except as may be expressly noted
there or otherwise reserved by law.
Note: It is conclusive against the whole world (including the government and to a holder in good
faith), guaranteed to be indefeasible, unassailable & imprescriptible.

TORRENS TITLE is conclusive (It is a legal inference made so peremptorily that it cannot be overthrown
or contradicted.) against third parties, including the government. A holder of a Torrens title in good faith
is guaranteed that his/her title is indefeasible, unassailable and imprescriptible.

Title is a juridical act or a deed which is not sufficient by itself to transfer ownership but provides only
for a juridical justification for the effectuation of a mode to acquire or transfer ownership.

Land title is the evidence of the owner’s right or extent of interest, by which he can maintain control,
and as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of property.

CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE

Under Section 11(4)(a) of Commonwealth Act No, 141, the judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, which the law describes as "judicial legalization," allows for agricultural
public lands to be disposed of by the State and acquired by Filipino citizens.

Also, the application do not comply with the requirements for original registration as provided for in Sec.
14 of PD 1529 which provides:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
 REPUBLIC vs SANTOS
GR No. 180027; July 18, 2012
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Generosa Asuncion, Teresita Sernal, and Spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona
purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite which
were surveyed and consolidated to a single lot identified as “Lot 3”. On 12 March 2002, the respondents
filed with the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Lot 3. The DENR submitted a report
stating that the lot was alienable and disposable based on a certification issued by the CENRO dated
March 15, 1982. The respondents also testified that their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation and possession since time immemorial and to substatiate
the said testimony, they presented various Tax Declarations covering certain areas of Lot 3—the earliest
of which dates back to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot previously belonging to Generosa
and Teresita. RTC granted the application. After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the
government, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed the lone opposition to the
respondents’ application on 13 May 2003. The government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public
domain and, hence, not subject to private acquisition and registration. The CA denied the appeal of the
OSG, and affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting original registration of Lot 3 in favor
of the respondents.

RULING:
Yes. The SC overturn the decisions of the RTC and the CA for not being supported by the
evidence at hand.
Applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine. Jura Regalia simply means that
the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus,
pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be
traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the
State. Lot 3 is an unregistered land and being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land
belonging to the State.
Also, the application do not comply with the requirements for original registration as provided for
in Sec. 14 of PD 1529 which provides:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
 (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Neither 1 nor 2 justified their claim because the evidence presented do not constitute a well-nigh
controvertible kind to prove title thru possession and occupation. The testimonies were patently deficient.
The tax declaration fall short of possession since June 12, 1945. According to Malabanan vs Republic, in
order for public land to be considered as patrimonial there must be an express declaration by the State
that the property is no longer intended for public service or for national development. Until then, period
of acquisitive prescription will not commence to run. In this case, no express declaration by the State was
presented, thus mere declaration of alienable
and disposable is not sufficient.

REPUBLIC vs HEIRS OF SIN

GR NO. 157485; March 26, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents are the lawful heirs of Maxima Sin, the owner of a cocal, nipal and swampy land in
Aklan, acquired by virtue of a deed of sale. Petitioners is the Republic of the Philippines represented by
ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF.
On 1991, the heirs of Sin filed a case to the RTC for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
declaration of ownership with damages against ANCF. Sin alleged that ANCF usurped the said land by
occupying it and converted it to fishpond. ANCF claimed that the land was a subject of Proclamation No.
2074 by President Marcos declaring such land as a civil reservation for educational purposes. It was
declared as a timberland not susceptible of private ownership.
The case was remanded to the MCTC. In the MCTC, Sin presented tax declaration dated 1945 as
proof of ownership. The court decided in favor of the Sin and stated that since the land was only classified
as timberland in 1960, it was Alienable and Disposable before it.
The RTC affirmed the MCTC decision. The CA dismissed the appeal. The petitioner did not show
evidence that before 1960, the land is likewise timberland. Sin has been in possession of the land privately
and has then ripened into ownership against the State. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of RTC upholding the respondents claim over the
property despite the classification as timberland.

RULING:
Yes. The petition was granted. The courts treated this case as an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
 The SC held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
Also, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act
or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that
the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to
the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-
interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be
considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. Thus, the SC reversed and set aside the rulings of
the RTC and MTC.

REPUBLIC vs REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.

GR NO. 199310; February 19, 2014
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over 2 parcels of
land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 to the
RTC. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), lone oppositor, asserted that Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 In support of Remman’s application, it presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans
of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated
December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of
the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be
denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. It pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna
de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part
of the bed of the said lake. It found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent claimed that the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an
elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to
14.80 m.
The RTC granted the registration based on the evidence presented by Remman. Upon appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.

RULING:
Yes. Petition of LLDA was granted. The subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. The said certifications presented by the
respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Testimonies are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation
of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's
application for registration was denied.

LOZADA vs BRACEWELL
GR NO. 179155; April 2, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
On December 10, 1976, petitoner Lozada filed an application for registration and confirmation of
titile over a parcel of land in RTC Makati. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No.
N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.
On 1998, Bracewell filed a petition for review of the decree in RTC Las Pinas claiming absolute
ownership and possession of a portion of Plan PSU-129514 identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598
(subject lot). Bracewell alleged that the OCT of Lozada was fraudulently included in Decree No. N-
217036. He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of
the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the lots
covered by Plan PSU-129514. On the other hand, Lozada alleged that Bracewell was an interloper with
respect to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan
PSU-129514.
RTC Las Pinas decided in favor of Bracewell. Lozada filed an appeal to the CA alleging that RTC
Las Pinas has no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of registration, which must be filed in
the same branch that rendered the decision. RTC decision was affirmed and is the proper venue because
the property is located in Las Pinas. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree
No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134.
RULING:
Yes. Petition is denied. Under Act No. 496 or the "Land Registration Act," as amended, which
was the law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated.
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on
January 23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is
still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this case
was only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December
1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure and, hence, should
succumb to the greater interests of the orderly administration of justice
There is no forum shopping because the petition for review of the decree of registration and the
application for land registration involved different parties and issues. No need for conciliation proceeding
because the LRA, an instrumentality of government had been impleaded.

VALIAO vs REPUBLIC
GR No. 170757; November 28, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On August 11, 1987, Petitioners Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao,
and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to
Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable
and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application
has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez who purchased the land pursuant to a
Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 and submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562 dated September
29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC,granted petitioners' application for registration of the subject property,
 Upon appeal to the CA, RTC decision was reversed. The CA stated that the subject property is
part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Further, the prior cadastral case which ruled that the land belongs
to the State renders res judicata. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable?
2. Whether or not there is res judicata?

RULING:
This is an exception the rule that “Court is not a trier of facts”. Hence, the court has reviewed facts
and evidence.

1. No. The requisites for judicial confirmation of title provided in Sec. 14 RA 7659 must be
presented by no less clear, positive and convincing evidence. The Regalian Doctrine provides that there
must be a positive act by the government reclassifying the lands as Alienable and Disposable. No such
evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Property of public domain is beyond the commerce of men.
Occupation in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
title. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, it must be considered the same as still inalienable public domain.
2. Judicial declaration that a land is public does not preclude application seeking judicial
confirmation of title to the same land provided thereafter it is Alienable and Disposable and there is an
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Valiao failed to
prove the same through incontrovertible evidence. No tax declaration covering the subject property,
during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in
evidence. Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in
1976 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of
the applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration
of the subject property under PD 1529 was denied.

HERMOSO vs COURT OF APPEALS

 GR No. 166748; April 24, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos.
3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof. They filed with DAR a petition for coverage of the said lots under PD
No. 27. DAR granted the petition and directed to process the issuance of emancipation patents in favor of
them. Upon motion for reconsideration, DAR modified their decision and directed to hold in abeyance
the processing of the emancipation patent of Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship is finally
resolved and disposed.
In a separate proceeding, a petition to determine whether or not Hermoso and Banag are tenants
was filed to the DARAB where tenancy relationship was upheld.
The appeals to the CA and Supreme Court were denied. Banag filed an ex-parte motion for
issuance of Emancipation Patent, which the DAR has granted. Appeal to the office of the President was
denied. Respondents filed a petition to the CA alleging that the land is not covered by PD No. 27 pursuant
to the order of DAR Secretary in 1973 declaring that those lands are suited for residential, commercial,
industrial and urban purposes. The CA granted the petition dismissing the Petition for Coverage under
P.D. No. 27 filed by respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.

RULING:
No. Petition was denied. The lots are not covered by PD No. 27 or the Emancipation Patent Law.
PD No. 27 provides for the issuance of emancipation patent to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands
devoted to corn and rice production. To be subject of PD No. 27, the land must be an agricultural land
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, industrial lands. The subject parcels of land
cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were
reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes
way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.

PALANCA vs REPUBLIC
GR No. 151312; August 30, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1973, Petitoners, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, filed an application to bring the
pieces of land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act. hey acquired said
realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly
and continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the filing of said application.
The evidence showed include the plan, survey certificate, tax declaration and testimonies of witnesses.The
CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15, 1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in fee simple
of the two parcels of land in question. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295 was
issued in the name of petitioners. Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10418, and T-10884 were issued.
On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years, respondent Republic of the Philippines
filed with the CA a petition or annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration and title,
and reversion. It alleged that the CFI decision is null and void having no jurisdiction because the lands are
unclassified lands. In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the proceedings committed
perfidious acts amounting to extrinsic fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment of a judgment.
Respondent maintained that a culture of collusion existed between and among the petitioners. The CA
granted the petition and declared null and void the decison of CFI of Palawan dated December 15, 1977.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in granting the respondent’s petition to annul the land registration?

RULING:
No. It must be emphasized that an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property
registered in favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never
prescribes. Verily, non-disposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be
recovered by the State at any time and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no
jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the public domain.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (CA 141) clearly requires the concurrence of two things: (1)
that the land sought to be registered is public agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking
registration must have possessed and occupied the same for at least thirty years prior to the filing of the
application. The land classification map shows that the land were unclassified public lands as of 1929.
Executive Proclamation No. 219 dated 1967 classified these lands as national reserves. It becomes evident
that the subject properties have never been released for public disposition. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. The possession of public forests on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot
convert the same into private property. Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries,
could never ripen into ownership. It bears stressing that unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

SEC. OF DENR vs YAP

GR No. 167707; October 8, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
FACTS:
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve.
 Boracay Mayor Jose Yap, et. al. filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap
et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by
a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.Again, the
OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants
in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

RULING:
No. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for
the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that
the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption
that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap, et.al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say
their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented
and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a
judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession
and considerable investment in the island.

CRUZ vs SEC. OF DENR

GR NO. 135385; December 6, 2000

FACTS:
The Petitioners Cruz et. al. assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). They complained, among others, that the provisions amounted to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, and that they granted ownership over these natural resources to indigenous peoples n
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus, it is
unconstitutional. The provisions provided, inter alia, that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains were private but
community property of the indigenous peoples and gave the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which were found to
be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation. The petitioners also contended that, by providing for an all encompassing definition
of “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, the provisions
violated the rights of private landowners. In addition, the petitioners questioned the provisions of the
IPRA making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution.

RULING:
No. The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. The SC deliberated upon the
matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result
transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow against the Regalian
doctrine
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
After deliberating on the petition, seven judges of the Supreme Court voted to dismiss the
petition, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions or a part of them. Seven other members of
the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Therefore, the petition was dismissed. In a separate opinion, judge Puno analyzed the development
of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System, and argued that the provisions of the IPRA did
not contravene the constitution, as ancestral domains and ancestral lands were the private property of
indigenous peoples and did not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
 REPUBLIC vs NAGUIAT
GR NO. 134209; January 24, 2006
GARCIA, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of
land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales on December 29, 1989 with the RTC Zambales, Branch 69.
She alleged that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the
LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto
Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30)
years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever
kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitoner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application on the ground that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the
parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of
land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable
lands of the public domain?

RULING:
No. The said parcels of land are still classified as Public forest lannd. Public forest lands or forest
reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. As to
these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Naguiat never presented the
required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land
applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.
The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For unclassified
land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

LIGON vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 107751; June 1, 1995
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of
Sale dated 20 April 1989, the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) sold to it 2 parcels of land
located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The
parties stipulated in the Deed of Sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal
occupants in the property within 45 days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply
with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INC.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of
the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
The trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's
copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the registration of the Absolute
Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the
new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK. The trial court rendered a decision ordering
petitioner to surrender the certificate of title for the registration of the sale and the annotation of the
mortgage to the new TCT to be issued in favor of INC. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the Deed of Sale prejudicial to the rights of the mortgage?

RULING:
No. The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the
certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of
the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered,
cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots.
 Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or
carried over to the new TCT. This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to
Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It
is inseperable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem- a lien on the property whoever its
owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership. Thus all subsequent purchasers must
respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for
such mortgage until discharged follows the property. It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner
of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any
substantial injustice.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO

vs COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 103727; December 1, 1996
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
This case is a consolidated case involving the Petitioners’ claim of the subject property, the total
land area of which is approximately 173,000 hectares, on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled “Titulo de
Propriedad Numer 4136” against third persons and the Government itself. The claim covers lands of
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna, Quezon and Metro Manila cities.

GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for
recovery of real property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against
private defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of
the subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation. RTC of QC dismissed the
complaint saying that the defendants are already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title -
which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the
estate shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff
Intestate to pay each defendant the amount of 5,000 and atty fees. Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Petitioner filed an appeal, CA dismissed.

GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of administration over the
intestate to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San Pedro as
administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor upon posting a bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming that the
Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is invalid. Republic
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republic‘s opposition to the petition for letter of
administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon. The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad
as null and void and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro. Petitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, GR Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not
recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro
of the lands covered thereby?

RULING:
No. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as
null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate.
Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land Registration Act within 6 months from
date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976. In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. There was no
certificate of title shown.
Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of
private ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered under Land
Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela
Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. Petitioner-heirs failed to
present neither the original Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only an alleged illegible copy was
presented). Even the secondary evidence presented was also not admissible. The Titulo de Propriedad is
null and void and no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are excluded from
inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of administration closed and terminated. The heirs are
disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.