Lilia, Ma. Angelika C. - Scarborough Shoal - Source

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NAME: Ma. Angelika C.

Lilia
COUR & SECTION: BSN-1A

Look for the sources used by the Philippines and China in their respective claims of
sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal and identify which are primary sources. Also,
look for the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and explain the reason for its
decision.

The Philippine Claims

As for the Philippines, up until recently, its claims over Scarborough Shoal were mostly
supported by modern rules, particularly those arising from the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and as a result of State practice: The
Scarborough Shoal, also known as Bajo de Masinloc in the bill, has been placed under
the regime of islands as specified by Article 121 of UNCLOS, along with the Kalayaan
Island Group (part of the Spratlys), which is defined as the baselines of the Philippine
archipelago under UNCLOS.

It appears that the Philippines is now beginning to justify its defense of Scarborough
Shoal on historical justifications. The historical component of the claim has been more
obvious, in particular, since Manila began arbitral proceedings at the PCA in January
2013.

According to these investigations, Scarborough Shoal was depicted on a 1784 map of


the Pacific Ocean between the coasts of California and Mexico, Japan, the Philippines,
and the coast of China that has the watermark PVL (for Pieter van Ley).

According to some, the 1900 Protocol (Treaty of Washington) defined islands under
Philippine administration but outside the area of the Treaty of Paris as being effectively
transferred to the US, even though the Treaty of Paris of 1898 placed the shoal outside
the Philippines territory, as mentioned by China.

In the Philippines, it is widely believed that Scarborough Shoal's exclusion from the
1898 Paris Treaty or its 1900 Washington Treaty had no bearing on the country's
sovereignty.
The Philippine Islands and Her People, by Dean C. Worcester, 1898; Borneo, Iles de la
Sonde, Celebes, Moloques, and Philippines, 1860; Carta General el Archipelago
Filipino al Mando del Capitan de navio D. Claudio Montero y Gay, 1875; Derrotero del
Archipelago Filipino, 1879; and Carta General el Archipelago Filipino, 1879

The planting of a flagpole in 1965, the construction and operation of a small lighthouse
in 1965 that the Philippine Navy restored in 1992, and the use of Scarborough Shoal as
an impact range by US and Philippine forces stationed at Subic Bay are among the
historical evidence cited by the Philippines as supporting its claim to sovereignty.

Because of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the
potential for conflict emerging from differences between China and the Philippines over
overlapping claims in the South China Sea, the Philippine claims are of particular
importance to U.S. policymakers. The treaty does not compel Washington to support
one side or the other in the disputes over Scarborough Shoal's or the Spratly Islands'
sovereignty. In truth, U.S. policy has consistently stated that we do not take a side in
disputes over sovereignty, including those raised by the Philippines on territory in the
Spratly group following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines on
August 30, 1951.

The Chinese Claims

Academic historiography dates the conquest of Scarborough Shoal, also known as


Huangyan dao, by China to the Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century. Unfortunately, even
by Chinese standards, there is a significant period of time where the land is not
mentioned.

Chinese fishermen's sailing routes are purportedly fully documented in The Book on
Voyage Routes (Geng Lu Bu) and other annuals, according to Wu Shicun, who made
this claim in 2012. If true, this would place Chinese presence by the end of the Ming and
early Qing dynasties.

The claim of possession is tenuous before to the turn of the 20th century and even
during the interwar years. Scarborough Shoal, which is a portion of the Xisha Qundao,
was known as Changsha or Wanli Changsha by the late Qing. Second, Scarborough
Shoal was left out of Chinese Admiral Li Zhun's 1909 directive for a naval circle to the
Paracel Islands.

This shoal was not even claimed until 1933, when France, the colonial authority in
charge of Vietnam, sent soldiers there and declared the Spratlys to be a part of the
Indochina Federation, sparking a conflict between Japan and France over the so-called
Nine Isles Incident.

Fourth, based on the naming of various isles throughout the entire region, Scarborough
Shoal was not listed in the official list of South China Sea features until 1935, which may
have led some people to believe that the shoal was only known through Western
cartography.

Fifth, unlike in the case of the Spraltys, there are no traditional Geng Lu Bu fishermen
navigation maps given by China for Scarborough Shoal.

Scarborough Shoal was classified as a part of what China now refers to as Zhongsha
Islands when China's Map Verification Committee asserted sovereignty over 132
islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea in 1935, according to China. Chinese
writers contend that when China declared sovereignty over Zhongsha in 1951, it
implicitly encompassed Scarborough Shoal since they believe it to be a part of
Zhongsha.

Which are primary sources?

The primary source is the one written by Mark Rosen. According to the website, he is
the Executive Legal Advisor to CNA and has written numerous studies on international
and national security legislation for customers in the public and business sectors of the
United States. Mr. Rosen has specific knowledge in the maritime sector, which includes
maritime law enforcement, piracy, boundary and maritime disputes, and maritime
confidence-building initiatives. Rosen, a retired Navy Captain (JAGC), worked as a
political military planner for the Joint Staff as well as the Ocean Policy Analyst and Legal
Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operation (J-5).
The laws are unambiguous, well known, consistent, fair, and uniformly enforced.
Legislation, administration, and enforcement all rely on transparent, open, and efficient
systems. Justice is delivered promptly by representatives and neutrals who are
members of the communities they serve and who are also accessible, ethical, and
independent.

Ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

The South China Sea arbitration panel found in favor of the Philippines by a large
margin, finding that China's nine-dash line, recent land reclamation efforts, and other
activities in Philippine waters were all illegal.

China, as expected, responded negatively, calling the verdict "null and invalid." To
protect its interests, China may resort to aggressive and inflamatory measures.

The effectiveness of international law as a weapon to promote the peaceful, stable, and
legitimate use of the seas in the future will depend on how strictly China follows the
ruling and how actively the international community strives to enforce it.

The Philippines filed a complaint against China's claims and operations in the South
China Sea in 2013, and on July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal formed under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS*) issued its judgement in the case.
Essentially 90% of the South China Sea falls inside China's nine-dash line, a nebulous
representation of China's claim. China has been making concerted efforts to strengthen
its position in the South China Sea since around 2009. These efforts have taken many
forms, including the harassment of foreign ships by Chinese military, coast guard, and
maritime militia; the exploration and extraction of resources in contested areas; and,
beginning in 2013, the construction of artificial islands on which Chinese military and
civilian assets are based.

The Philippines, feeling economically, politically, and militarily outmatched by China,


sought resolution through international arbitration. Thousands of pages of arguments
and supporting documents were submitted by the Philippines in an effort to have the
court determine whether or not (1) China's claims based on the nine-dash line are
invalid under UNCLOS, (2) whether or not certain land features in the South China Sea
are rocks, islands, or low-tide elevations, * and (3) whether or not China has interfered
with the Philippines' right to exploit resources within the Philippines' claimed waters.
China has spent the better part of three years trying to undermine the Philippines' case
and the credibility of the proceedings, all the while insisting that it would "neither accept
nor participate in the arbitration."
Beijing launched a diplomatic offensive in the months preceding up to the verdict in an
effort to rally international support for its position. By mid-June, Beijing claimed that 60
nations had expressed support for China's position, although in reality only 10 countries
had done so in public. Supporting Beijing's position on the arbitration, the Chinese
government and government-affiliated companies also placed ads and editorials in
foreign media sources like the Washington Post, the San Francisco Chronicle, the
Telegraph, and Australia's The Age. About a week before the verdict, I went to a think
tank event in Washington, DC.

References
Caitlin Campbell, N. S. (2016). South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What’s Next?
Retrieved from U.S. - CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION:
https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-happened-and-whats-
next

Duong, H. (2012). CO12102 | The Scarborough Shoal dispute: Legal issues and implications. Retrieved
from RSIS: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1764-the-scarborough-shoal-dispute/
#.YrXzsnZBzrc

Rosen, M. E. (2014). A CNA Occasional Paper. Retrieved from


https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/iop-2014-u-008435.pdf

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