THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA-

Continued

EDWARD CARY HAYES

Universityof Illinois

Attempting nowto applytheseprinciples it becomesnecessary

to ventureupon a classificationof our own. The proposed
classificationmust includea place for all social activities,for
the provincesinvestigated by all of the special social sciences;
not at all becausesociologyis to supplantor absorbthosemore
limitedinvestigations, but because the sociologist,if anyone,
must chart the whole territoryof social activities;and more
especiallybecause sociologyseeks those conclusionswhichissue
froma synthesis so wide as to involveall theprovincesof social
reality,aimingto trace thoseprinciplesof causationwhichare
equallyoperativethroughout the whole area.
Under the headingsin the followingclassification additional
subdivisionscan be insertedas minuteranalysismay require.
A. KINDS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

thatis, of specific,prevalent,consciousactivities,the problem-

phenomenaof sociology.
I. Social activitiesin whichfeeling,or the affective t
elertem
is predomninant.
Every kind of human experience-activity may contain a
value element,by virtueof whichthe experienceis, to the one
experiencing it, eithergood or bad. These value elementscould
no morebe describedto one wvho had not feltthem,thanparticu-
lar sensationsof sightor hearingcan be describedto one born
deaf or blind,yet being commonpossessionsof similarlyen-
vironedand normalmembersof our species,theyare as intel-
ligiblynamedas sensationsare, and "joy," "pain," "thepleasure
of meetingan old friend,"are as intelligible phrasesas "blue,"
"pungent,""the taste of pineapple"; and the experiencesin
whichthese value elementsare foundare describablein terms
i88
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA I89

of theiroccasions,as "meetingan old friend,"theirinanifesta-

tionsas "laughedand weptby turnsfor joy," and in termsof
commonexperience,as "joy." Now it is not the purposeto
classifyunderthepresentheadingthevalue elementsthatare to
be foundin human experience,but ratherthe concretesocial
activitiesin whichthoseelementsoccuras a predominant factor.
These include:
i. Specificlikesand dislikes.
a) Economic "usages," the wants exhibitedin economic
consumption.
b) The tastes which are ministeredto by the "finearts."
Artistictastes and economicwants shade into each other; a
singlearticlewhichis both usefuland beautiful,like a carved
table,or any otherproductof the art-crafts or Kunstgewerbe
ministers to bothat once.
c) Likes and dislikeswhich promptthe activitiesof play
and recreation.
d) Tastes which appear in the requirementsof etiquette
and in ceremony.
2. Standardsof success,thatis, of amrbition, or the success
of the individualas judged by himself,and of reputationand
fame,or the success of the individualas judged by his asso-
ciates.
Success is the attainmentor possessionof that which is
desired; the object desiredis the standardof success.
Tastes,moraljudgments,and ambitions,all three,are often
thoughtto be nativeto the humanbreastand commonto man-
kind; yettheyvary from- groupto group,fromera to era, and
fromplace to place. Nor is this merelybecause a tasteor ap-
provalor ambitionis latenttilltheproperobjectof it is invented
or discovered. On thecontrary introduction
to theobjectswhich
strangerslike is far fromcertainto evoke similaremotional
response,and even withinthe group old tastes and approvals
becomeobsolete. These threepredominantly emotionalclasses
of activityare typicalsocial phenomena,whichvaryfromsociety
to society,withinthewide limitsset by humannature,according
as theyare determined by a social conditioning.What theindi-
 9go THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

vidual desires, aside from physiological promptings, depends

mainly on what his group regards as success, suggests as de-
sirable, and pursues. Likewise the same set of categories which
serve for the classificationof the standards according to which
social approval and fame are accorded, serve also for classifying
the standardsupon which the individualbases his own self-
approval, for there is no class of ambitionsthat has not been
somewherean object of social approval.
The social factsto be tabulatedhere are complexactivities
includingthreeelements:first,conceptsdefiningobjectsof de-
sire; second, judgments as to their desirability; third,the corre-
spondingresponsesof feelingand impulsion. This group of
social phenomenaare not the activitieswhichare prizedas suc-
cessful but the activityof defining,approving, and prizing cer-
tain activitiesas successes. For example, the economic activities
by which wealth is amassed belong in quite another class, but the
prevalent social activityof making the possession or acquisition
of great flocksand herds, or of broad lands, or of wealth in gen-
eral, one of the popular conceptionsof success and bases of per-
sonal prestige and influence,falls here. Since wealth existed
there probably never was a time or place where wealth and the
power to get it were not regarded as a form of success. There
may still be peoples among whom wealth by itself is regarded as
a satisfactorysuccess and a worthyambition. Some of the other
standardsof successenumeratedappear later,and are less gen-
erally regardedand less firmlyestablishedin popular esteem.
Some are waxing,some have waned at times. And no part of
the descriptionof a people,not even the descriptionof their
moral code, is more significantthan that whichportraystheir
standardsof success,and the relativezeal withwhichtheyare
popularlyprized,and no reformis more fundamentalthan a
shiftingof emphasisin a people's standardsof success.
Standardsof success which are sociallydefined,approved,
of
and desiredinclude: (a) physicalprowess; (b) gratification
appetitesand tastes; (c) wealth; (d) powerover men,of which
a special formis (e) personalcharmand influence, whichhas
numerousaspectsbetweenwhichsocial judgmentdiscriminates,
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA I9I

now in favorof one, now in favorof another;it may restupon

(i) themerefactof some otherformof success,(2) a sortof
hypnoticqualityin appearance,manner,or speech,whichcon-
centratesattentionupon its possessor,(3) intellectualvalue in
his utterances,(4) moral qualitieswhichinspireaffectionand
trust,or any combinationof these; (f) domesticefficiency;(g)
achievementin art, ceremony,or amusement; (h) literary
achievement;(i) scientificachievement;(j) militaryachieve-
ment; (k) achievementin politicsor other organization;the
word achievementmust be understoodto include "position"
whichis supposedto implyachievement, or thepowerof achieve-
ment; (1) sanctity,excellencein religiousobservance,and ex-
perience; (M) goodness and usefulness.
The standardsof ambitionand reputationof a sect within
a largersocietymay differfromthose of the largersocietyin
,eneralin the estimateplaced upon this or that object of de-
sire. Furthermorean individual,by reason of peculiarityof
hereditarydispositionor peculiarityof the social contactsor
otherconditionsof experienceto which he has been exposed,
may differin his standardsfromthe group of whichhe is a
member. In thatcase the standardsof ambitionand of reputa-
tion would not exactly coincide for him. Neverthelessmen
do prize theesteemof theirfellow-men, and feelthe desire for
it as a mnotive
influencingtheirconduct,even whenthatesteem
is based upon standardswhichtheythemselvesdo not exactly
share. Thus, forexample,a manwho caresmostforintellectual
achievement may enjoy and seek the admirationwhichhe can
win by athleticprowessfrompersonswho value it morehighly
than he himselfdoes. It may indeedbe questionedwhethera
man can desirereputationfor any qualityor success whichhe
does not in some degreevalue, that is, whetherhe can desire
such reputationfor its own sake and not merelyas a cause of
good treatment fromothersor a means of controlover others
forsomeulteriorend. However,thatwhicha groupregardsas
successforthatveryreasonbecomesdesirableto the individual
membersof thegroup (i) becauseit bringswithit social stand-
ing, power, and reward; (2) because when sought for these
192 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

reasons success in the pursuitbringsthe sense of power and self-

approbation,which is itself a reward and a motive of endeavor;
and (3) because the judgment of the group as to its intrinsic
desirabilitytends powerfully to be the judgment of any indi-
vidual born or even migrating into the group; and all this is
true even when the judgma-ent of the group is miostfoolish,so that
an achievementwhich is not in itself good or desirable becomes
really desirable for the individual simplybecause it is so regarded
by the group. Thus a group may be wholly on the wrong track
as to the true aims of life, but its erroneous judgments determine
the activities of its members. The group causes the ambitious
endeavors of its members to be turned in whatever direction
the group judgment marks out as the path of success, whether
the pursuit of head hunter's trophies,or of plethoric fortunes,
or of saner aims.
Though the standards by which the group judges its mem-
bers are, ipso facto, the standards by which individuals judge
theirneighbors,and though theytend to coincide with the stand-
ards by which the individual judges himself, still his standards
for judging himself and for judging others may not coincide
exactly. This is not only,as above indicated,because of peculiar-
ity of heredityor of social contacts,but also because there are
various formsof success and each has to select for himselfthose
to which he himself will chieflyaspire, but this does not prevent
him from admiring other formisof success achieved by others.
And it is also in part because self-interestmay make one a rebel
against the standards of his own group.
This latter fact mightlead us to separate goodness fromsuc-
cess and to say that goodness is that which God desires for man,
or societydesires for its members,and each desires for his neigh-
bor, but success is that which each desires for himself. Yet I
thinkwe must see that goodness is a fornm of success, since some
at least do desire it for themselves,and it is true of the other
formsof success that not every one of them is desired by every-
body, and since as just shown the attainmentof that which one s
neighborsappreciate and reward is itself a success, and since the
more men's desires are determined by reflectionrather than
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 193

primaryimpulse,the moremenmustdesirefor themselves that

goodnesswhichis simplythe dispositionand conductthat re-
sults in securingon the whole and in the long run the largest
attainment of human-ends. Thereforeprogressin social intelli-
genceif carriedfarenoughbringswithit an increaseddesirefor
goodnesson thepartof theindividualmemberof society,and a
decreasein the divergencebetweenwhat societydesiresfor its
membersand what its membersdesire for themselves.This is
in part because the dictatesof righteousnessare seen to be no
arbitrarydemandsbutthemethodof attainingthe rationalends
of individualand social life,and onlythoserequirements which
are so understoodare recognizedas demandsof righteousness.
And it is in partbecausea societythusenlightened has become
wise enoughto maketheway of its transgressors hard,to refuse
applause anldeven toleranceto evil formsof success,and ade-
quatelyto appreciateand rewardrightand difficult conduct,as
it long has appreciatedand rewardedthe courageof the soldier.
At firstthesesocial rewardsand punishments are externallyin-
flicted,and of coursemay therefore be desiredonly forpolicy's
sake. But evenso thegoodnessthusrewardedis a formof suc-
cess and thesocial rewardsand punishments are subtleand per-
vasive, extendingto the most intimatepersonal relationships
and causing life to blossomor to blight. And finallythe ac-
ceptedstandardsof themostintimategroupsin whichone grows
fromchildhoodand continuestill age make the standardsof
self-jutdgmenzt.
Two personsor two societiesmay equally desire goodness
yethave verydifferent conceptions as to what constitutes
good-
ness,just as theynmay equallydesirephysicalgratification
or per-
sonal charm,or achievement in art,whiletheirideas of physical
gratification differas widely as those of the blubber-stuffing
Eskimo fromthe Parisian, and theirideas of personalcharm
or artisticconventionality
as widelyas thoseof the paintedsav-
age fromthe Greek. It nmust be remembered thatwe are cata-
loguingcomplex,concreteactivitieswhichincludedefiningob-
jects of desire,rankingthemas to desirability, and the desires
themselves whichare evokedbytheobjectsof desiredefined.
I94 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

The activityof defining,prizing,and desiringgoodnessis

hereclassedamongthoseactivitiesin whichfeelingpredominates.
Its mostconspicuouselementis the feelingof abhorrence, or of
sympatheticaffection,respect,and reverencetoward certain
formsof dispositionand conduct,as witnessedin othersor as
recognizedin one's self. Yet these feelings,like others,are
basedupona perception or judgment,in thiscase eithera percep-
tion of acts themselvesdirectlyshockingor winsometo man's
naturalsensibilitiesdevelopedin theprocessof evolutionas par-
tial guides to conductin simpleuniversalage-old relationships,
or else a judgmentconcerningthe consequencesto be expected
fromhumantraitsand conduct,a judgmentwhichmay be dim
or clear,based upon experienceand common-sense, or upon the
or
insightof genius, upon the previsionof science. Judgment,
as comparedwithfeeling,is a largerelementin themoralactivi-
ties of thoseleaderswho stirup the abhorrencesand apprecia-
tions of their fellows,and bind moral requirements upon the
consciencesof men,thanit is in thoseof themass. Yet evenin
themass of such a sociallyenlightened peopleas may sometime
exist,theproportion of judgmentto feeling,and justiceto senti-
ment,and far-sighted guidanceto short-sighted sympathy, may
be far greaterthan it is amongany people today.
In sucha societytheidea of goodnesswouldtendto coincide
withthe idea of usefulness,and usefulnessto take the various
formsof achievement,accompaniedby sympathetic kindness,
and to carrywithit charmand influence.
The mostnotablesubdivisionwithinthemoralactivities(de-
fining, prizing,and desiringgoodness) are: (i) thosebased on
the instincts(particularlysympathyand sociability),as stimu-
lated by simpleperceptionof persons; (2) those based upon a
more farseeingperceptionof the conditionsof welfare,the re-
quirementsof rationalreliability, the conductwhich all must
requireof each as themethodof satisfactory social life.
II. Sciences and creeds.-Sciences and creeds are closely
related. Men early acquire bodies of doctrine,but it is only
slowlythattheybuild up sciencesand scientific arts,to replace
the mythologies that had answeredthe mind's hungerfor ex-
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA I95

planationand therain-making, divination,

conjuring,propitiatory
ceremonies and observanceof luckyformsof conduct,whichhad
answeredthe need to "do something about it" in life's practical
affairs. Scienceas distinguishedfromcreedis a relativeterm.
Teachingsare scientificin proportionas theyare the resultof
a thorotugh and convincingapplicationof the scientific methods
of observation,inference,and experimentor criticalcomparison,
and so in proportion
to thecompleteness withwhichtheypresent
particularphenomenain theiressentialrelationsto otherphe-
nomena;and a teachingthattodayis themostscientific thatwe
have on a given subject,tomorrowmay be replacedby newer
scienceif morethoroughinvestigation yieldsresultsincongruous
withit.; The scientificmind is one whichprogresseswith the
extensionof the frontiersof comprehensiontoward corre-
spondencewithobjectivereality,a correspondence whichis ap-
proachedby the continualtestingof our notionsby the realities
themselves. Science advancesmost rapidlyin fieldsmostopen
to observationand experiment,namely,the fieldsof sensible
phenomena,but the practicalneed is perhapsquite as urgentin
the fieldsof psychicreality.
Activitiesincludedunderthe headingcreedand sciencemay
be dividedinto threeparts:
i. Those relatingto materialphenomenainorganicand or-
ganic.
2. Those relatingto psychicphenomenaincludingthe social
realities. In discussingthe ethicalvaluationsor standardsof
success,culminating in ideas of goodnessand usefulness,I re-
markedthatwhilethe elementof feelingpredominates in these
valuationsas theyprevailamongthemass of men,yettheycon-
tain an elementof judgmentand even of science. Justwhere
the divisionshould lie betweenthe activitiesfallingunderthe
head of feelingand those relatingto cognitionis a matterof
factto be determined by observation.
3. Those relatingto matterswhichare beyondthe sphereof
observation.
III. The arts of life, the applicationsof the sciencesand
creeds.
I96 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

In the acquisitionand manipulationof materialthings:

i.
(a) extraction;(b) transformation;(c) transportation;(d)
communication; from
(e) personalservice,includingself-service,
bathingand barbering up to and includingthehygienic,medical,
and surgical arts; (f) personal aggression; (g) theft; (h)
giving.
2. Practical arts in the acquisitionand manipulationof
psychicpossessions.
a) Methodsof thoughtand proof. The chiefprinciplesfor
the guidanceof thoughtwhichhave widelyprevailedare four:
(i) Animism,or the beliefthatwhateveris was made and
whateveroccurs is the deed of a doer, "maker" and "doer"
beingconceivedin termsborrowedfromknowledgeof animals
and men.
(2) Authority, the notionthat thoughtis to be guided by
previousthoughtratherthan by freshrevelationsor freshob-
and thatideas can be provedby showing
servationand in-ference,
thattheyharmonizewith,or can be deducedfrom,the authori-
tative body of thoughtalready possessed. The authoritative
body may conisistof "supernaturalrevelations"or not. When
eithera past revelationor the sayingsof the Talmud,or of the
Koran, or of the Fathers and of Aristotle,or of dead man-
darins, or of any other teacherswhose veneratedutterances
have become"classic" are acceptedas major premisesof the
thoughtof a people,thenthissecondprincipleof thought-guid-
ance prevailsamongmen. This is by no meansthe same thing
as acceptingthe guidanceof contemporary experts,thoughthe
lattermay degenerateand become slavish. The difference is
twofold: first,contemporaryauthorityis not crystallized,rigid,
and unprogressive; second,the individualthinkerselects,it may
be on thoroughlyrationalgrounds,betweencontemporary au-
and in so doingindirectly
thorities, selectshis own beliefs,while
in a societythat is in bondageto dead thinkersthe particul-ar
thinkerswhosedicta are to be regardedas finalare selectedfor
the individualby society.
(3) System. The principlethat thoughtsare to be testeid
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 197

by theirsystematic coherencemay prevailwherethereis active

and fertileintellectuallifebut limitedknowledge. Animismhas
beenoutgrown, earlybonds,of authority have beenburst,and no
newauthority has as yetbeenclampeduponthemind;butmental
activityis speculative,and the slow-growingfruitsof pains-
takingmethodicalobservationhave not been gathered,so that
hypothesesdo not result fromwide acquaintancewith facts,
and are not testedby factand experiment, but by theirconsist-
encywitheach other. If desireforthepracticalreactionof be-
liefuponthemind,in comfortor stimulus,promptsthe formula-
tion of speculations, and especiallyif eitherfor this reason,or
becauseof the nativepredisposition of the thinker,imagination
is moreactivethanlogic,mysticism is the naturalresult;but if
curiosity, the zeal to comprehend, be the motiveof speculation,
and logic strongeror more stronglypromptedthan fancy,the
naturalresultis exemplified by Greekphilosophy.
(4) The scientific method,sometimescalled positivism,re-
liance on observation,and inference,testedby observation. A
populationcannotdependuponithisprincipleof thought-guidance
until it has become rich in the stored fruitsof extensiveob-
servation.
b) Arts of communicationand dissemination,including:
(i) language; (2) literaryand rhetorical arts; (3) thenegative
arts of secrecyand the arts of deception;(4) pedagogy; (5)
artsof self-culture.
c) The finearts and play: (I) music; (2) painting; (3)
sculpture;(4) architecture, as distinguished frombuildingand
structuralengineering,which are economic activitiesfalling
undera previoushead; (5) art craftsand decoration;(6) eti-
quette,ceremony, and ritual; (7) activitiesof thosewho by at-
tendance,performance,or managementmaintain the social
practicesof the theater,the circus,the race course,professional
athletics,and otherentertainments and exhibitions;(8) ama-
teurathletics,includingconitests and competitions dependingon
physicalstrength and skill,and all artificial
bodilyexercises;(9)
games of mindand chance,as chess and whistand dice; (io)
outdoorlocomotionwithoutathleticcompetition as a formof
 I98 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

play,includingthecustomsof riding,driving,sailing,automobil-
ing,bicycling, swimming, walking; (ii) returnto primitivein-
dustriesas play, includinghunting,fishing,gardening,stock
breeding. The advancedindustries mayalso be pursuedas play.
The distinction betweenworkand play is not foundin theovert
activitybut lies in the purposeand subjectiveattitudeof the
personworkingor playing. Workand playare different enough
whetherindividually or sociallyconsidered,yettheycan mingle
and overlapuntilthe onlyseparationbetweenthemis in many
cases one betweendistinguishable elementsin the same experi-
ence; and individualand social progressimplythat more and
more of our work shall becomeplay and of our play become
work; (i2) gambling;(I3) drinking, and otherdrugpractices
intendedto stimulatethe nervoussystemintothe simulationof
naturallypleasurableexperience;(I4) feasting;(I5) dancing;
(I6) social reulnions;(17) sex indulgence.
3. Arts of organizationand administration.These employ
psychicrealities(human activities)as means to ends,or treat
themas imperiling ends and so requiringto be prevented, sup-
pressed,or escaped. Organizationas an art is the technique
of correlatingthe differentiated activitiesof a pluralityof per-
sons intoa workingsystem,adaptedto servethepurposeseither
of the whole numberengaged in the different activitiesor of
sonme part of them;activitiesare correlatedin this sense when
each activityin the systemeitheris directedby the intention to
elicitor prevent or directother activity, or derivesheightened
practicaleffectfromits designedrelationto otheractivityin
the system. There are fiveprincipalfieldsof organization, each
of whichhas developedspecialarts,namely:
a) Political organization:originallythe exerciseof sover-
eignty-in foreignrelations,primarilywar; and in preserva-
tionof domesticorder,primarily maintenance of the slaveryof
the conquered,and settlement of feudsbetweenmembersof the
group,mainlyby inflicting uponthepartyadjudgedin thewrong
vengeanceless likelyto provokeretaliation thanthatwhichwould
otherwisebe inflicted by the aggrieved,and vengeanceuponvio-
latorsof groupcustomor sentiment; lateralso theadaptationof
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA I99

organization,developedfor such exerciseof sovereignty, to di-

verseadditionalaims,moreor less dependentupon the backing
of sovereignty, especiallyas exhibitedin the taxingpower.
b) Domesticorganization.In patriarchialsocietiesthe fam-
ily maybe identified withpoliticalorganization. The conscious
adjustmentof the activitiesof lovers and possible lovers,
and of spouses to each other,and of parentsto children,of
childrento parents,of childrento each other,and of all the
othersto grandparents, is one of themostimportant, and by no
means the easiest fieldfor the exerciseof organizingability.
Perhaps no other applicationof the art of organizationgoes
fartherto determine theentiresocial life of a population. And
thoughthe arts of familyorganizationmay oftenbe but simple
arts,yet thereis hardlyanywhere,if indeedthereis anywhere
at all, a people among whomtheyhave not been the objectof
muchcare,and theycontinuein themosthighlydevelopedsoci-
etiesto be theobjectof deep solicitude,of rationalidealism,of
cherishedcustomsand institutions, and to rewardthe finestin-
dividualskill.
c) Religious organization. Religious organizationis espe-
ciallypeculiarand interesting.It is remarkablefortheimmense
varietyof the activitieswhichit correlates. It is not without
significance that the word "hierarchy"comes to us fromthis
source. The main subdivisionsof organizedreligiousactivity
are (a) cr-eedand teaching,(b) ritual and observance,(c)
polity.
d) Economic organization. The uninitiatedby no means
realizehow farsuccessin a big businessconsistsin organization,
still less perhaps how thoroughlycorrelatedare all business
activitieslittleand big, even those of the lonelycobblerin his
basementand the tillerof the isolatedfarmbeingknitby many
strandsinto a web of interlacing activitiesthatcoversthe con-
tinentand spreadsover the seas.
Especiallyit is to be observedthatexchangeis a branchof
the art of economicorganization. Exchangeis theart of corre-
latingthevaluations,acceptances, and relinquishments of owners.
With referenceto its natureas an art,it cannotbe classedwith
 200 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

extraction,transformation, and transportation among the arts

forthemanipulation of materialthings;exchangeis as trulyan
adjustmentof humanactivitiesas any of the arts of organiza-
tion. The salesmanaims to modifyand adjust psychicrealities
as trulyas the politician. In the factthathe endeavorsto in-
fluencepsychicstateshe is like a lawyeror a teacher,far more
than he is like a farmeror a carpenterin handlingmaterial
things. It is true the salesman manipulatespsychicrealities
franklyas a means of gettingpossessionof materialthings;
but so, oftendo the statesmanand politician,and the definition
of organizationis correlation of activitiesas a meansto an end,
and it is no less an art of organizationwhethertheend sought
is of one sort or another.
e) Organizationof public opinion and public sentiment.
Public opinion is concernedwith political,economic,and re-
ligious interests,etc. For that reasonit may be objectedthat
it should not be enumeratedby itselfbut should be regarded
as one phase,now of political,now of economic,organization,
etc. It is truethatpublicopinionis a meansto all social ends,
butso also is economicactivity,and thisdoes not preventeither
frombeingabstractedfromthetangledsocialwholeto be studied
by itself. The organizationof publicopinionemploysthe arts
of the teacher,writer,and publicspeaker,and all the activities
of dissemination, as economicorganizationemploysthe technic
arts; as thelatterorganizesthe factoryand thestore,the former
organizestheschool,thepress,the library,the museum,and the
lyceum.
These are agenciesof the formationof publicopinioneven
when managed for gain. When theirpublic functionis sacri-
ficedto money-making theyare prostituted.
The isolatedwriterand publicspeaker,liketheisolatedcobbler
and farmer,are taken up into an organizationwhich is quite
beyondtheirown planning.There wouldbe publicopinion,and
it would be determined by a correlatedmass of activities,the
agenciesof social suggestion,2' eventhoughtherewereno art in
theorganizationof publicopinionbutonlyan undirected process
2I of"socialsuggestion"givenundera laterheading.
Cf.thedefinition
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 20I

of naturalcausation. But the factof humanexperienceis that

societiesearlydevelopa techniqueforthe formulation of public
opinionand publicsentiment.In partit is in thehandsof rulers,
priests,mandarins,and variousauthorities. In part it is prac-
ticedby the mass of the people,who in the variousrelationsof
life (but especiallyas parents) suppresscertainsuggestionsand
incitationsand emphasizeothers,partlyin obedienceto the lead-
ershipof theauthorities, and in partundertheguidanceof a com-
mon sense of what will promoteand what will endangerthose
ideas and sentiments whichare the foundation of thesocial order.
This subject largely occupies Professor Ross's book on
Social Control,and Professor Cooley's book entitledSocial
Organization, a Studyof theLargerMind,twoof themnost illu-
minatingcontributions to sociologythus far produced.
Here mightfollowa classification of the socio-physicalphe-
nomena,or thematerialworksof menin whichprevalentsocial
activitiesare bodied forth. In the ethnologicalmuseum,where
theutensils, weapons,artproducts, records,ceremonial appliances,
and modelsof the buildingsof different peoples are displayed
side by side,is a collectionof socio-physicalphenomena. A spe-
cial classification
of suchphenomenamightnot be withoutvalue,
but the materialworksof men have theirsignificance for soci-
ology eitheras manifestations of the prevalentpsychicactivi-
ties,or as technicconditions affectingthoseactivities. As technic
conditionstheyhave alreadyhad mention. And as manifesta-
tionsof the social activitiestheirclassification may be allowed
to correspondto the classification of thoseactivitieswhichhas
alreadybeengiven.

B. MODES OR TYPES OF CHANGE IN SOCIAL ACTIVITY

I. Social activityof a given kindmay vary in strength.

a) A creed,doctrine,or rule of practicemay be held with
tremorlessfaith in its validityand adequacy or may barely
excludea rivaland conflicting notion. An individualor a popu-
lationmay be strongor weak because equippedwithfirmcon-
victionsor onlywithfaintlyadoptedhypotheses.
b) A sentimentmay be hot and compellingor lukewarm.
202 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Tastes, approvals,and disapprovals,standardsof success and

prestigemaybut moderately preferthisto that,or theymay be
zestfuland urgent.
2. A given social activitymay vary in extent. Starting
froman isolatedinnovation it maybecomecosmopolitan, or hav-
ing been"all the rage" it may declineto an occasionalsurvival,
and disappear. The extensionof social activitiesis mainlyby
imitation, suggestion, or social radiation,but it may also be due
in part to multipleindependent origination,so that the radia-
tionis frommorethanone center.
3. As species of animals and plantsshow some degree of
organicvariation,no two specimensin an herbarium beingquite
alike,so also social activitiesof a givenkind are repeatedwith
variation,the Methodismof no two Methodistsbeingprecisely
identical,northeRepublicanism of two Republicans,northecar-
pentryof two carpenters;and a prevalentactivitychangesin the
degree of uniformitywithwhichit is, repeated;by assimilation
relatedactivitiesacquirea highdegreeof uniformity, and highly
integrated activitiesmayundergoa processof disintegration and
diversification.
4. Prevalentsocial activitiesvaryin anotherimportant way
thatis clearlydistinguishable fromvariationin strength, extent,
or degreeof uniformity, and whichis due to an alterationin the
psychicovertonesby whichtheyare accompanied. Throughout
the changethe activitycontinuesto be of the same kind,but
thereare added to it,or subtracted, minoraccompanying activi-
ties, which may be of various kinds,such as approvals,condem-
nations,or organizationof the participationsin the activity.
Owing to these changesin its accompaniments or its included
minorelements,an activity, thoughremainingof the same kind,
may appear in variousphases of whichthe chiefare:
a) Innovation,which is not a "prevalent"activityand is
a social activityonlyby virtueof beingsociallycaused or con-
ditionedand at leastpotentially a sourceof social influence.
b) Fashion.
c) Custom.
d) Institution.
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 203

e) Rationaleclecticism.
f) Organization.
Withouttarryinghere forcompletedefinition, it miaysuffice
to say thatwhenevera triumphant fashionhas forthemostpart
outlivedits competitors,if theyexisted,so thatit furnishesthe
pervasivesuggestiondefining whatis to be doneundergivencir-
cumstances, whenit has acquiredthepatrioticor groupsanction
of "our way," and more especiallythe emotionalsanctionof
familiaruse and wont whichtendsto make deviationfromit
appeargrotesqueand repugnant, thenwe have no longera mere
fashionbut a custom.
A custombecomesan institution whenits prevalencedepends
not alone on suggestionand emotion,but upon a practicaljudg-
mentwhichhas grownup aboutit and enteredintoit, stamping
it as the adoptedmethodof attaininga desiredend,as such,to
be defendedand supported. In orderthat activitiesmay truly
be regardedas institutional this judgmentas to theirpeculiar
fitnessand theimportance of the endstheyservemustbe shared
by a grouplarge and powerfulenoughto dominatean entire
population. Institutionalactivitiesare, therefore, likelyto se-
curepoliticalsanction,butI wouldnot,like ProfessorGiddings,
make politicalsanctionthe origin and essence of all institu-
tions.22 This may be the popular illusion about institutions,
but I thinkit is opposed to the facts. A tyrannyestablished
by conquest is not an institutionof the people upon whom
it is forced,and the sanctionof such a governmentcannot
makethe institutions of the people. On the contrary, thejudg-
mentof thepeoplecan maintain their in
institutions spiteof the
indifferenceand in somedegreeeven in spiteof thepersecutions
of government; on theotherhand,the popularjudgmentcan at
lengthadoptthe existinggovernment and cause it to becomean
institution.A group judgmentapprovingsome practicalend
whichis attainedbya customary activity, combinedwithanother
groupjudgmentadoptingthatcustomaryactivityas the method
of attainingthatend,togetherconstitute a social factof the ut-
most significance.A custominto whichsuch judgmentshave
enteredis a widelydifferent realityfroma customwhichlacks
22 Giddings, Sociology,
Inductive I84. ContrastSumner,
Folkways,
53-54.
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themand the difference is the essentialdistinctionbetweena

merecustomand an institution.
It is not necessarythat a social activitybe eitheran inno-
vation,a fashion,or an institution.It may prevail,not by the
charmof fashionablenovelty,or of familiarcustom,butbecause
thoughrejectedby manyit is by manyothersselectedand prac-
ticed; and thatnot becausethosewho adopt it belongto a sect
or sectionof societywhosegroupjudgmentapprovesit, but be-
cause as individualstheyhave adoptedit each for himselfas a
resultof his own deliberationand criticism. Such a social ac-
tivityhas reachedthephase of rationaleclecticism.
Whetheror no an institution is always organized,certainly
an organizationis not always an institution,but organizationis
by itselfan additionalphase of social activity. The natureof
organizationhas alreadybeendiscussedundertheheading"prac-
ticalarts."
Adequatesocial description musttakeaccountnot onlyof the
kinds of social activitybut also of the variationsin strength,
extent,degreeof uniformity, and phase of the activitiesof any
givenkind.
C. CONDITIONS OV SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

I. Geographic.-The naturalphysicalenvironment including

such itemsas (i) aspect; (2) climate; (3) soil; (4) minerals;
(5) flora; (6) fauna; (7) topography, includingthedetermina-
tionof directionand degreeof facilityin traveland transporta-
tion; (8) distances,internaland external.
II. Technicconditions,or the materialproductsof human
activity.
I. Wealth (otherthanpurelynatural): (a) its forms,with
reference to thepurposesforwhichit is adapted,and theexcel-
lence or imperfection of the adaptation;buildings,means of
transportation, etc.; (b) its amount;(c) its distribution
or own-
ershipand rightof use, includingpublic ownershipand that
partnership betweenindividualshavinga special claim and the
generalpublicwhichis represented by taxation,the government
controlof privatelyownedcommoncarriers,etc.
 CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA 205

2. Population: (a) numbers;(b) distribution in space, for

example,sparseruralalternating withdenseurbanin givenpro-
portions,etc.
III. Physiologicqualities of the individualscomposingthe
population. These are of two classes:
i. Hereditary,that is eitherpresentor predetermined at
birth; including(a) age; (b) sex; (c) race; (d) congenital
diseasesand defects;(e) psychicpredispositions, thatis tenden-
cies of the organismtowardvarietiesof activitywhichappear
in consciousness, and whichare commonlyreferredto as mat-
tersof "temperament" or "naturalendowment."
2. Acquired,including(a) many formsof disease or de-
fect,as well as (b) specialstrength and skill,and (c) thoseor-
ganic modifications which for
prepare the readyperformance of
certainconsciousactivities,and make othersdifficult, and which
are referredto as "second nature,""disposition,"and "habit."
Examples of acquiredphysiologicconditionsappear in the
contrastsbetweenthe physicalconditionof an agriculturaland
manufacturing populationof the same stock,or in the effects
producedupon a peopleby a prevalentdrughabit. Any preva-
lenthabit,if it be a truehabit,is itselfan acquiredphysiological
modification of the peopleaffected, and may be quite as signifi-
cant as a hereditary traitor predisposition.Habit and custom
are totallydistinctorders of phenomena. The existenceof a
customin a societymay or maynot resultin a habitcommonto
manyof itsmembers, butthepresenceof sucha habit,wherever
it exists,will helpto perpetuate-thecustom. The distinction be-
tweenhereditary and acquiredtraits,in so faras it can be made,
is of greatimportance bothscientificallyand practically.
Physiologicalvariationsmarkthevarietiesof mankind, and so
cause specificvariationsin the social activities;but the physio-
logical traitswhich are commonto man as man underlieand
determinewhateveris universallyinstinctive or normalamong
mankind,includingsomedegreeof sympathy and sociability,
and
thelogicalprocesses.
IV. Psychicconditions.
[To be concluded]