Democratic Management of Common Property in Goa: From 'Gaonkarias' and

'Communidades' to Gram Sabhas

Author(s): Sharon D'Cruz and Avinash V. Raikar
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Feb. 4-10, 2006, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Feb. 4-10, 2006),
pp. 439-445
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4417767

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Economic and Political Weekly

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Democratic Management of
Common Property in Goa
From 'Gaonkarias' and 'Communidades' to Gram Sabhas
Common property was controlled and regulated by a highly endemic, localised,
semi-autonomous institution called the 'gaonkaria' in Goa. In the colonial period, this
institution was considerably overhauled by the Portuguese who rechristened it as
'communidade'. Communidades were internally modified to direct the agrarian surplus to the
Portuguese but after liberation both national and state governments neglected and
superseded these rural institutions by moder ones, resulting in their degeneration. An attempt
is made here to propose some alternatives by which the communidades can be
revived and if possible be replaced with gram sabhas.

SHARON D'CRUZ, AVINASH V RAIKAR

ince time immemorial, common property resources (CPR) possession is de facto by use rather than by right. A CPR is defined
have contributed to the growth of village economies. as A "a resource that is accessible to the whole village, to which
scan of the history of Goa indicates that powerful tribes no individual has an exclusive right" [Jodha 1986; McKean
and sections of society settled down in places where land was 1992]. According to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), it refers to
easily available and tried to control this precious resource for a 'facility' that is distinguished by individual use rather than
their exclusive use. This 'exclusiveness' resulted in a conflict,individual possession, a number of users who constitute a collec-
and subsequent marginalisation of certain sections of society. tivity and have an independent right to use a resource and to
In this article, an attempt is made to understand the natureexclude
of others who are not members of that collectivity. CPRs are:
common property in Goa and the geographical zone in which - Resource units that are bound by well defined physical, bio-
it was concentrated. The common property was controlled and logical and social parameters.
regulated by a highly endemic, localised, semi-autonomous - A well-delineated group of users who are distinct from the
institution called the 'gaonkaria'. The gaonkaria had a specificpersons excluded from the use of a resource.
nature that was considerably overhauled by the Portuguese who - Multiple users who are involved in the extraction of a resource.
systematically introduced periodic changes into its functioning - Explicit and implicit, well understood rules that existamong the
and rechristened it as 'communidade'. The latter was internally users regarding their rights and duties about resource extraction.
modified so as to direct the agrarian surplus to the Portuguese.- Users who are jointly entitled to the site or fugitive resources
After liberation, the national and later the state government prior to its capture or use.
neglected and superseded this rural institution by modern ones. - Users who compete for the resource and thereby impose
This resulted in the degeneration of the communidades. Here, negative externalities on one another.
an attempt is made to propose some alternatives by which these - A well-delineated group of right holders who may not coincide
institutions can be revived and if possible be replaced by gram with the group of users. .
When one deals with CPRs, it is essential to note that here
sabhas. The past is reflected in the present and it is essential to
understand the continuum between the two. The research findings the use of land is regulated by rules and access is restricted to
are based on archival sources, contemporary works, reports and the members' community, unlike open access where there is an
other secondary works. absence of any regulations that govern the use of resources.
Nobody is accountable for their overuse and there is an absence
Concept of CPRs: Accessibility versus Ownership of obligations on users for their long-term maintenance. Here,
the CPR relates mainly to land that had a series of indivisible
CPRs have attracted academic interest particularly after the and enforceable claims were sanctified by rituals. The bene-
publication of the proceedings of the conference of CPRs in 1986ficiaries were privy to the system and had no access to alternate
and the formation of the international association for the studyor remunerative income earning opportunities [Bromley 1992].
of CPRs. The thrust of their argument was that the local com-The community management of CPRs existed in large parts
munity could manage resources effectively as they undertook of the country. D D Kosambi (1956) argues that during ancient
collective action [Wade 1987; Demsetz 1967; NRC 1986]. Property times, land was held in common and production was intended
to fulfil the immediate needs of households. There was no
in this case refers to land and is either private property, where
the individual or corporate has an exclusive possession; common question of a territorial unit as dynasties rose and fell and frontiers
property, where the possession is shared; state property, where changed from time to time. The agrarian system was characterised
the state controls and directs its use; and open access, where the
by multiple and simultaneous claims on the land; the customary

Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006 439

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
claims of villagers, conditional claims of the intermediaries and Everything, from ploughing to distribution and deficit was regu-
the superior claims of the sovereign. The life of the rural peasantry lated on a cooperative basis. The reclamation and development
was unaffected by periodic changes in ruling dynasties as they of the fertile 'khazan' land was entrusted to a group ('bous').
were locally governed by unwritten codes and functioned as small This resulted in the creation of a regional agro-based society,
republics. The question of 'who owns the land' could not be where the cultivation and administration of village land was
answered as power structures and relations in arable lands were undertaken by a cooperative of coparcenaries called the 'gaonponn'
never the same. Land was an aggregate that was held in common (council of village representatives). Each councillor represented
and every peasant had the right to cultivate the land that belonged a clan ('vangod') that existed at the time of the formation of
to his ancestors. The sovereigns were never interested in asserting the council. The size of the village council varied according to
their suzerainty over the land per se but were keen on getting the number of the clans. The meeting of the Council was held
a share of the agrarian produce. This share was then deposited at a 'chaudi' (central place in the village). They had their own
in the common pool and was used to defray some of the common set of rules and regulations ('mandavoli'). Each councillor had
expenses of the village. But, the common property regimes cannot one vote ('mota'). All the 'nemos' (resolutions) had to be passed
be understood within a standard theoretical construct as no single unanimously and entered in a register ('vahi'). A nay ('naka')
form of property existed all over the world [Shelvankar 1961; was a veto and a single person could block the decision of the
Altekar 1927; Powell 1960; Bandyopadhyay 1993]. The gaonkaria rest. The fertile land was auctioned triennially. The villagers were
in Goa was a typical micro level, socio-economic system that informed about it five nights in advance ('panch rati'). The
managed the CPRs. gaonkars gathered at the 'gaonponn' to make land grants. In case
a gaonkar wanted to sell his rights, the gaonponn had the right
Some Characteristics of Goa of pre-emption. If an outsider wanted to take a bid at the auction,
he had to find a gaonkar who could stand as a security for him.
The state of Goa is located midway on the west coast of India
If the gaonkar was unable to pay his taxes, his rights to the 'zon'
within 14? 53' 54" N and 14? 47' 57" N latitudes and 73? 40' were auctioned during his life time. If the gaonkars were unable
54"E and 74? 20' 11" E longitudes. Ensconced on the slopes of their revenue to the state, they were suspended. If he
to pay
the Western Ghats to the east and lapped by the Arabian Sea
absconded, a time was fixed for his return. If he did not, his heirs
in the west, Goa has an area admeasuring 37.01 sq kilometres. were given an opportunity to assume his obligations. If they
The geomorphology of Goa is made up of marine, fluvial and
refused, the council gave the right to a beneficiary who was
etch landforms in the coastal plains. Physiographically, Goa is to pay the arrears. The council took all the important
willing
divided into the eastern Sahyadris, the central uplands and the
decisions and solved disputes at the local level. These CP regimes
western coastal plains that are formed by the constructional had the capacity to alter, solve and shape the dilemmas that
landscape of the Arabian Sea. confronted users.
Since we are focusing on the gaonkarias, we will restrict this The village council was divided into aggregates ('vaddos') and
study to the coastal belt. Here, 92.5 per cent of the land is the
under
land was divided into different categories depending upon
paddy cultivation. Rice is grown in the fertile 'khazans'its (46.2
quality. The council was headed by a 'vodil' or 'budhvont'
per cent), 'morod' (4.2 per cent), 'ker' (40.7 per cent) and (elder)
in who served as a chief councillor. The chief councillors
the high forest encircled 'kumeri' land [Kamat 1990; Gune were
1979].honoured at regular intervals and used certain status sym-
bols.
Th6 etymology of it indicates that Goa had a rich agrarian andThey had ritual control but their actual control went far
pastoral set-up. The origin of Goa is associated with the ritualism. Their meetings were primary assemblies as they
beyond
Parashurama legend. This legend beautifully summarises theattended by all the male founding family members. The
were
geomorphologic formation of an ecosystem that is unique to gaonkaria
Goa. was a traditional, economic organisation of co-
Following the Aryanisation of Goa, the original inhabitantsproprietors
were wherein the gaonkars jointly held, administered and
enjoyed benefits from the village lands. It was more of a re-
pushed away from the mainstream. The kunbis and gaudis sustained
themselves on resources found on periphery of the village,lationship among people than an objective resource. The former
evolved cooperative strategies to ensure the sustenance and
occasionally cultivating the land that belonged to the dominant
usurpers [Kamar 1999]. Hence, there is a close link between the
survival of the users. The non-agricultural classes and outsiders
social sub-groups and geographical parameters of the land.were
The periodically inducted into the system and compensated by
latter was determined by access to CPRs which was theaonly
share in the produce or by small plots of land.
means of sustenance for these marginalised sub-groups. Each of arable land, including the low lying 'neli', was given to
The
the priestly class and village administrators in lieu of their
these had a distinct life of their own and users rarely competed
with each other for resources as they were abundant and salaries,
access the lowlands which had the houses of villagers circum-
was open. scribed by small plots ('ghar-bhatt') were leased to the gaonkars
and non-gaonkars, the medium quality land (namoxins) was given
Quasi-Democratic Management of Land to the temples or village servants for public utility works and
in pre-Portuguese Goa low quality land was rented out in perpetuity either on a fixed
rent ('cutubona') or a variable tax ('vanty').
The locals were unaffected by political vicissitudes though The distribution of produce and profits was regulated by a
management patterns changed over a period of time. Theresystem are of shares (zon). This was the agrarian surplus that was
studies about how the rural poor commonly accessed and shareddistributed among the gaonkars after deducting the voluntary tribute
common resources. In Goa, the gaonkaria was a self-sufficient,
('koxivorodo') that was to be paid to the king after defraying
quasi-autonomous village community that was formed by descen-expenses for general maintenance of the village infrastructure.
dants of the original settlers ('gaonkars') of a village ('gaon').
The system was in-built and the council was accountable for it.

440 Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
It depended on the sovereign only for defence and security. this was permitted by local customs. Moreover, the land could
Though the administration of the local government varied from not be leased free of cost to non-residents; they had to pay a
village to village, land was owned in common and the rules of fixed amount irrespective of profits and losses. The uncultivated,
the gaonkarias were rigorously observed as they were related to barren land on the borders of the village was leased out against
the village economy, defence of life and property, prevention a certain rent, which could entitle the leases to a kind of ownership
of crime and promotion of the all-round development of the after 25 years. The clerk ('escrivao') maintained the records and
village. The village council also looked after public utility works drew up the resolutions. There is a reference to a gatekeeper,
like building roads, cleaning paths, setting up and cleaning the doorkeeper, 'kamat' (technician of the khazans), 'painni' (watch-
drainage system, constructing tanks for ablution, supplying man) and the 'potekar' (bailiff). These posts were held by an
drinking water for cattle, forging water conduits, erecting bridges outsider and auctioned. The 'gaonkaria' could grant land to
and dams over the rivulets, putting up schools and 'davares' officials in lieu of their services. These land grants were hereditary
or pillars for head loads, planting trees along the roads for shade, and the recipient was obliged to render his services to the village
etc [Powell 1960; deSouza 1979; Pereira 2000; Velinkar 2000]. community. If the recipient wanted to sell his rights, he had to
In due course of time, the gaonkars appropriated the right to take the permission of all the gaonkars who had to sign a sale
reclaim the land and hold it as their hereditary right. This was deed. All hereditary rights had to be enlisted in the documents
strengthened by the Vijayanagar and Adil Shahi rulers who ('escripturas') and all the adult males had to register their names
inducted feudalism and landlordism into the agrarian sector. in the communidades by showing their birth certificates [Gune
During this period, the tribute that was imposed on the gaonkars 1968; Pereira 2000:15-19]. In 1541, the Foral dos Foros specified
was disproportionate to the income of the people. The village the taxes that had to be paid to the crown.
assembly had to stand as a surety for this payment to avoid the In the 16th century, the Portuguese lost their hold over maritime
confiscation of the property for the non-payment of dues. This trade and commerce. As they were involved in the Lusso-Dutch
is one of the reasons that prompted the local Sardesais to instigate conflicts, they had neither the capacity nor the resources to sustain
the Portuguese to take over 'Goa' [Kamat 2001]. their overseas possessions. Therefore, they legislated sweeping
changes in the gaonkarias and rechristened them as communidades.
The Colonial Intervention They overhauled its internal mechanism to appropriate land rights
and the agrarian surplus. They also introduced the concept of
The policies that were pursued by the colonial government semi-private
have property or individual property rights in land.
to be studied within a Christocentric, Eurocentric and Lussocentric
In the wake of evangelisation, the temples were destroyed and
perspective. In the early years of conquest, the Portuguese did lands were taken away. Gaonkaria rights were forcibly taken
their
not interfere with the customs and usages of the local people.
away from those villagers who resisted conversion. Religious
Moreover, they were not dependent on land revenue as the
persecution led to large-scale migration of the agro-based com-
lucrative commercial activities that were carried out from the
munities. All these lands were either gifted to the church or leased
entrepot port yielded them rich returns. Having consolidatedout to allies of the crown. This resulted in violent local resistance
their
hold over the old conquests, the Portuguese introduced several of the rural peasantry to these colonial policies that were new
legal provisions to control the functioning of the gaonkaria so subcontinent. Those who helped the Portuguese in sup-
to the
as to assert their absolute control over the metropolis, as the local rebellions were rewarded in terms of land. As a
pressing
former was an important part of the agro-societal life of theof this, the commons lost their lands, allies of the crown
result
village. The 'foral' (charter) of 1526 cordified the local usages
became the proprietary owners of the land and the Portuguese
and had 49 clauses that outlined the relationship between theable to appropriate the agrarian surplus in a legal manner.
were
locals and erstwhile colonial masters. It was based on the as-
sumption that the villages had lost their ownership of the land
17th Century Reforms: Transformation of CPRs
to the Portuguese crown. The thrust of the charter was the into Pseudo-colonial Possessions
principle of common responsibility, where village communities
had to pay a compulsory tax ('foro real') to the colonial sovereign Even after Goa lost its commercial lucre, the colonial gov
irrespective of profits or losses. In case of a default, eight principal ment failed to develop agriculture because Portugal did not
villages were responsible to pay the dues. The land in the defaulting a predominant agrarian base. Nevertheless, in Goa, the P
villages could be leased out by auction during which period the guese were keen on diverting the agrarian surplus to the s
gaonkars lost their gaonkaria rights. The general meeting of the In 1649, the Council of Landed Properties declared that
chiefs of the group of villages was presided over by a 'thanadar' state was the 'lord of all the community lands', the vil
and a clerk who were appointed by the Portuguese. They tookcouncillors were the vassals of the crown and the gaonkars
the decisions and passed the resolutions ('nems') aloud. The chieftenants. In the 17th century, the Portuguese insisted that ten
'thanadar' could call a meeting of all the representatives of the had to compulsorily pay a fixed tribute ('foro corrente') to
village to elect the administrative body at the gaonkaria. When a crown. The charter considerably restructured village life
member of the gaonkarias died without a male issue, got con- retained village communities. Another important regulation
verted to Islam or Hinduism or continued to profess 'his' religion, the Regimento of 1735 that was formulated to regulat
his share lapsed to the king. These properties were then auctioned functioning and management of village communities in th
or gifted by the crown [Kosambi 1947; Powell 1960:161-91]. conquests. The 46 'capitulos' (chapters) maintained autono
The village community was allowed to lease its cultivable land in the functioning of the communidades but made the mem
by auction. This system generated income to the gaonkarias and the administrator, scribe and president responsible and acco
provided agricultural opportunities to the non-gaonkars. This able to the Portuguese. The supervision of each 'mahal' was
auction was extended to the residents of other villages only if carried out by the judge of the communidades who was appo

Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006 441

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
by the Portuguese. Legal proceedings could be carried out against with expenditure, recovery, deficit, debt, sales, mortgages, ac-
the arbitrators, revenue collectors, and clerks of the communidades countability, records and registration of the latter [BG 1880,
for any illegal or unauthorised registration of members. Election 1886; Portarias 1886].
to the agrarian chambers was limited to the converts. The judge In 1905, the first code on the communidades was promulgated.
and revenue officers were entrusted with the task of auditing the It had nearly 750 legislations that were aimed at developing the
administration and accounts of the communidades triennially. vast properties of the communidades and promoting public welfare.
A number of restrictions were placed on the use of money by The land was auctioned every three to six years for cultivation.
the gaonkarias. However, this was relaxed in case of the urgent The 'camara agraria' was abolished and its functions were passed
repairs of 'bunds'. There was a total prohibition against the on to the communidades. In 1933, the code was reframed and
participation of white races in the local units. It was essential had 873 articles. Under the Republican regime, liberal political
to keep money in the safety of cash boxes that had three keys thinkers realised that the communidades were not suited to the
kept in the possession of three separate officials. The village exigencies of time. New settlers were inducted into the system
communities had to propose three names for the post of a head and issued non-transferable shares. They were also entitled to
constable and chief thanadar who were nominated to hold the fixed dividends.
office for three years [Xavier 1831, 1852, Mendes 1923]. In 1961, a code of 660 articles was promulgated. This was
In 1745, the veto system was abolished and resolutions could
complete with annexures, maps, forms, fee tables, etc. The bous
be passed by a simple majority. The mahazans and gaonkars was legally abolished and the government took up the respon-
enjoyed a status that was based on their class, occupationsibility
and of administering the communidades. The number of
influence. In the 1770s, there were periodic attempts to reclaim
personnel and the salaries that they were entitled to were stated.
the land. The bous was institutionalised and empowered to clear
There is a reference to the emoluments and process of calculating
wastelands. In 1776, an agricultural department was created total
todividends, which varied from one communidade to another.
reclaim land under punitive conditions. A superintendent There
of was an annexure that contained the forms to be filled,
agriculture was appointed to supervise the developmentregisters
of to be kept and the certificates to be issued. The
agriculture and infrastructure [Mendes 1923:196, D'souza 2000].
communidades had four ordinary meetings in a year. Extraor-
In the 19th century there were frequent attempts by the dinary
Por- meetings were to be held whenever they were required.
The meetings were preceded by a public announcement or a
tuguese to appropriate local resources and undertake adventurous
experimentation with the land systems of the impoverished 'pergoes' in the different wards or with notices. The communidades
peasantry of the sub-ghat region. As the threat from Indian used to give loans at 4 per cent interest whenever there was
enemies subsided, the Portuguese began to encroach upondisposable
the money in the cash boxes against a security of gold,
feudal privileges of the 'ryots'. The decree of 1836 abolished
silver or shares ('accoes') of the communidades [Portarias 1904,
BG 1908, CC 1961].
the posts of judge and chief thanadar in village communities.
The judicial cases were now referred to the district judge. TheAn important fallout of the colonial intervention was that the
Regimento of 1871 had eight articles that tried to regulate surplus
the was gradually but legally diverted to the Portuguese.
functions of the village communities [Decree, December 7, 1836; Insiders gradually began to ignore their obligations and rural poor
D'souza 1992, BG 1871]. were pauperised as they lost their sustenance. The distribution
In the face of the British threat, the survival of the 'Estadoof land was unequal and landholdings were small, scattered and
da India' became the dominant 'weltanschuang'. Economic stag-unviable as the bulk of the land was appropriated by allies of
nation and the systematic disappearance of the old grandeur ofthe Portuguese. The Portuguese were allowed to overrule the
the colonial state resulted in large-scale emigrations. The originaldecisions of the goankars. Though the general body meetings
inhabitants were now called 'emigres' as they moved out in search were held on a mutual consultation, all the gaonkars no longer
of remittances as an alternative source of income. This resulted enjoyed formal rights in the colonial set-up.
in the further neglect and exodus from the agrarian sector. The
decree of 1880 extended the membership of the communidades Post-Liberation Reforms
to the shareholders, associates and the public in general. In the
new conquests, a new system of shareholders ('accionistas') was A cadastral survey that was conducted around 1961 indicated
devised. The dividend of the alienable share and net income of that the communidades owned 34.9 per cent to 85.0 per cent o
the village community was divided among a fixed number of the cultivable land in Goa. They owned 200 to 400 hectares o
shareholders who were non-gaonkars. But, they were not allowed land in the coastal tracts and 2 to 40 per cent of the land in th
to take part in the administration of the village communities or interior of the villages. There were 224 communidades in th
in the auction of the fields. It also specified the structure of the
10 'talukas' of Goa that owned 11.2 per cent or 14,968 hectares
governing bodies of the communidades at the village level and of land. The communidades owned 85 per cent of land in Barde
the agrarian chamber at a higher level. The aspects related to34.9 per cent in Tiswadi, 60 per cent Marmagao and 60 per cen
auctions, leases and the collection of revenue were dealt with in Salcete. In 1961, private owners owned 54 per cent of th
in such a manner that the state received a share of the surplus.
land, the government owned 32 per cent, Catholic institutions
During the Republican regime, the Portuguese made some at-had 0.3 per cent while the municipality and others owned th
tempts to improve agriculture through the enactment of the Loanrest [Gune 1979, NCAER 1964, Kamat 2001:147-48, Almeida
Act of 1883. 1967, GoI 1982].
In 1886, nearly 465 articles relating to the functions of officials
At the time of liberation, an average communidade distribute
who administered the assets of the communidades were intro-
16 per cent of its earnings as dividends. They spent 22 per cen
duced. The legislations regulated the powers of the government
on administrative expenses, 19 per cent as land tax or quit rent
vis-a-vis the communidades. related to procedures associated
16 per cent on extraordinary expenses, 6 per cent on religious

442 Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
and social work, 2 per cent on the amortisation of loans and in the overexploitation of common resources. Even the non-
payment of interests and 19 per cent on miscellaneous expen- agricultural, barren wastelands that belong to the communidades
diture. By law, the 'escrivao' is accountable to the administrator are grabbed by both insiders and outsiders. Periodical statements
the communidade. Today, there appears to be minimum account- are issued by politicians regarding the demolition of houses that
ability in the use and management of funds [Sinha 2002]. are built on the encroached lands of communidades. However,
In the old conquests, the communidades owned nearly half the little has been done till date. Agriculture is carried out by a few
paddy fields. Agriculture was an important sector of the economy who cling to village life with indolence. The rural poor who are
but the least productive. Village communities were stagnant and priced out in the process are also encroaching upon the
contributed merely to one-sixth of total state income. Recent communidade lands. The welfare schemes that distribute land
statistics show that rice production in Goa is merely 3 tonnes to the landless have caused the bulk of land to lapse to the
per hectare (in 2001). There is a spate of land conversion in beneficiaries.1
Goa. In the 1990s, 65-80 per cent of lands were used for non- The rents that were hitherto collected by the communidades
agricultural purposes (Navhind Times, December 5, 2003; Goa are no longer claimed. The system of an annual, public auction
Today, Vol 24, p 22). of the plots owned by the Gaonkaria is abolished. The Goa,
The land that was hitherto owned by village communities was Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 provided se-
auctioned triennially to the highest bidder. This was replaced by curity to and reduced the burden of the tenant cultivators. They
a 25 year and later a 99 year lease. The bidders now became were freed from the exploitation of absentee landlords and kept
quasi-permanent owners of the community lands. This adversely in direct contact with'the state. The act tried to abolish inter-
affected the pattern of rural development. Today, there is a need mediaries and simplified the collection of land revenue. The
to review the legal structure on a rational basis as it legally bans tenure of land held by farmers was legalised and special privileges
the access of traditional users to the land that always paid a 'foro' were given to the tenants to make them occupants. The tenants
(tribute) to the communidade. The new social actors no longer pay associations were entrusted with the task of paying an irrigation
any tax and the concerned authorities have failed to monitor this. tax, leasing the khazan lands (under the supervision of the
The communidades have become defunct and traditional in- collector) and had to maintain the bunds (50 per cent of the costs
were borne by the state). The Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars
stitutions are unable to perform the legitimate duties they were
obliged to perform in the past. The khazans along the riverside
Act, 1975 was inclined in favour of giving land to the occupants
have become prone to inundation. The total of 7,333 hectares and assured them permanent rights including the right to purchase
of khazan land in 81 villages is managed by 138 tennant asso-sites around the house. In 2003, the act was declares 'ultra vires'
ciations; 6,500 hectares is used for traditional fishing but the to the Constitution as it was not included in the IXth Schedule.
additional area is illegally flooded and zonal agricultural officers
The Eviction from Property bill quashed the amendments of 1956
and tenant associations have failed to take any action. Coastal and 1996. In 2004, the Goa Mundkars Bill (Protection from
khazans are neglected and have become vulnerable to vector Eviction) was reintroduced in the state assembly and is yet to
borne germs and the ecologically balanced subsistence produc- be passed. The common lands are now in the hands of tenants
tion system is disturbed [Varde and Kamat 1992, Bulletin and of mundkars who are manipulated by land dealers and builders.
Vector Borne Diseases, Vol III, 1991 ]. Today, the communidades Even the wastelands are infiltrated upon. The state government
have become complex and unwieldy institutions that are merely is powerless to check this.2
interested in collecting the foro (tribute) and distributing theThe Konkan Railway project, the National Highway projects,
surplus to gaonkars in the form of 'zono' (shares). and irrigation, road and other state sponsored infrastructure
Conventionally, the gaonkars were specific, localised sub- projects have encroached upon the land of the commons. The
groups of the descendents of the original settlers of the land. state government has bought the non-saleable, common property
The former had an organic relationship with the land and 'in its perpetum'. In fact, after liberation, the state government has
resources. After liberation, many dominant gaonkars immigrated. been unable to assert its suzerainty over this land.
Of the 36,000 gaonkars who figured in the 224 communidades
in Goa in the late 20th century, 18,000 lived in the villages of Panchayati Raj: The Alternative
their birth, 10,000 lived in other parts of Goa and 8,000 have
immigrated [Ferandes 1996, Dias 1964]. But, even they enjoyCommon properties are generally overexploited as there are
their zons in absentia. Many outsiders came to settle downno instrong incentives that make it rational for users to protect them,
the villages. In the communidades the president, attorney and as the benefits would then be appropriated by others. To overcome
treasurer are elected on the basis of a narrow, adult male franchise.
this problem, three alternatives are proposed. It is proposed to
The dominant social groups are able to encroach on the land with
convert the common property resources into private property so
the help of the latter. This has cut off the access of the rural
that only an exclusive group of users could have an access to
poor from their key physical and cultural resource. them. Privatisation ensures protection of property as there are
The economic development and diversification of the Goan
strong incentives that make it rational and legal for owners to
do so. They also have the social sanction to exclude others and
economy dealt a further blow to localised institutions. The gaonkars
who have immigrated have acquired a 'nouvean riche' status. this overcomes the problem of free riders and ensures security
They have adopted a highly luxurious, leisure-oriented lifestyle
of tenure. However, it is argued that this alternative is unpro-
and invest in real estate, hospitality concerns and commercial
ductive, as the new owners are not acquainted with the land.
complexes. The market value of land has increased tremendously.
Moreover, they are keen to convert essentially productive land
This has resulted in the large-scale encroachment on common into residential areas, as agriculture is unprofitable. Such an
property. Population pressure and the scarcity of land has option denies access to the rural poor [Acheson 2000, Scott 1954,
Bob 1998, Karanth 1992, Nadkari 1990].
increased the commercial value of common property and resulted

Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006 443

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 The second suggestion is to hand over common properties to call a gram sabha meeting at least twice a year. Here, those whose
the government. The state regulation school argues that the names were included in the electoral rolls were expected to
government is the only authority competent to manage such land participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation of pro-
efficiently as their productive returns are poor. However, it is development community projects. They were also expected to
argued that this option results in land grabbing by powerful discuss proposals for increasing revenue, organise community
bureaucrats. State involvement supplants the local initiative by services, mobilise locals for voluntary programmes and other
top-down bureaucratic intervention and superimposes upon the special work, identify schemes, etc. Gram sabhas could be more
inherent decision-making system. Large and centrally adminis- realistic and community-oriented if they were be based on a
tered bureaucracies represent an inefficient and potentially thorough, mutual consultation and dialogue with the people but
destructive means of allocating resources within a society [Hardin this has remained more in theory than in practice. Therefore, the
1968; Ostrom 1990; Chopra et al 1990; Marothia 2002]. National Government implemented the XIth Schedule (Extension
It is proposed that the use and regulation of common Act) by which it was obligatory for every panchayat to have a
properties be entrusted to the user community to ensure a demo- gram sabha so that "the people could ensure their control and
cratic and decentralised management. The stakeholders have rights over their natural resources and preserve their identity in
include community groups, informal organisations, self-help participatory manner". The said amendment legally entrusted 29
groups, etc, that supposedly operate within the paradigm of a funds, 29 functions and 29 functionaries to the panchayats. On
'moral economy'. There are also periodic references to trans- the basis of this, the government of Goa passed the Goa Panchayat
formational participation that depends on the collective action Raj Act, 1994, by which the gram sabha was statutorily entrusted
of the people whose lives are affected by the system. Local with supervisory, vigilance, financial and community-oriented
institutions in this case occupy a distinct domain for the man- functions. It was obligatory for the sarpanch to call a meeting
agement of natural resources that are neither recognised by the at least twice a year. The resolutions that were passed by the
state nor have legal status and are, as such, linked to the concept gram sabhas were binding on the panchayats [Pal 2004; GoI
of local democracy [Das 2000; Foucault 1983; Chopra et al 1990; 2001]. The misuse of common property at the local level can
Pasha 1992; Western and Wright 1994; Putnam 1993; Scott 1976]. be averted by entrusting its utilisation and management to the
In Goa, none of these alternatives are practical. Prior to lib- gram sabhas. The gram sabhas can constitute a local committee
eration, the communidade was the predominant institution that for this purpose, in coordination with the panchayats and the
catered to rural areas. But after liberation no attempt was made block development authorities. Today, the state can declare itself
to understand its peculiarities. After Goa was integrated into the as the overlord of land in the village. A one-time policy can be
Indian mainstream, the bureaucrats could have been raised the announced to regulate any illegal encroachment into common
gaonkarias to the status of self-governing institutions by land and entrust the functioning of the same to the respective
democratising their formation and extending the membership to panchayat. A periodic review of the functioning and performance
a wider franchise. A more broad based, democratic institution of the system is the need of the hour.
would improve the quality of life in the village. The state government can bear the initial costs and pump in
Article 40 made provisions for the establishment of village considerable resources into the system. It can also make a set
panchayats. In Goa, the government ignored endemic institutions of rules to regulate the effective channelisation of these resources.
and thrust the gram panchayats on a similar institution. 188 The commitment of the government and an effective and selfless
panchayats were set up in the union territory. These were local, bureaucracy is required at this point. NGOs and civil society can
self-governing, democratic institutions based on universal adult also be assimilated into the system to make it more transparent
franchise that were oriented towards planning and promoting and responsive to the public needs. Some methods that have been
public welfare activities at the local level and at "providing an proposed to improve the effectiveness of the management of
adequate space for the marginalised groups in the federal setup".3 CPRs are beneficiary assessment, stakeholder based evaluations
Gradually, the panchayats encroached upon a number of duties and monitoring systems, collaborative monitoring and evaluating
that were performed by the goankarias and later by the systems and participatory assessment systems [Rajakutty 2000,
communidades. The maintenance of village infrastructure, de- Dadibhavi 2000, Wade 1994]. All these aim at increasing the
salination of the khazans, repair of bunds, construction and participation of those people who were associated with the
maintenance of village roads, dykes, canals, culverts, wells, Common Property Regimes for centuries.
maintenance of community assets, etc, were now handled by the
panchayats. This further diminished the rationale behind the very Conclusion
existence of the communidades.
However, the panchayats do not have adequate resources The
to traditional past survives in a hierarchical present and
polarities and continuum between the two have to be unders
undertake such activities. Although the plan outlay for the schemes
and programmes to be implemented by the state government A have
new, assimilative, broad system based has to be evolved.
been outlined by the XIth Schedule, the state governmentRegional
has Plan of Goa, 2001 aimed at integrated rural dev
ment and resource utilisation but, more remains to be done. G
neither appointed state finance commissions nor has it statutorily
devolved any financial resources to the panchayats. The panchayats
the peripheral position of the rural poor, the developme
do not have the support of the gaonkars to undertake voluntarycommon property will assure participative or collabora
work on a cooperative basis. As a result of this, village infra-
development. The democratisation and empowerment of
structure is neglected resulting in epidemics and other disasters.
administrative bodies can enhance participation in decision-
The 73rd Amendment Act (1992) recognises the gram ing, particularly among groups that have been marginalise
sabhas as the basic institution in the three-tier structure of local
local political processes. The participation of the locals in decis
self-government. The act made it mandatory for panchayats making
to bodies can lead to an improvement in self identity

444 Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
worth, which can break down customs of inequality and discrimi- Gomes Pereira, Rui (2000): Gaunkari: The Old Village Associations,
Panjim.
nation. This will also provide local people with important skills
Gune, V T (1968): 'An Outline of the Administrative Institutions of the
in bookkeeping, leadership, etc, that will make them confident Portuguese Territories in Goa', Studies in Indian History, Kolhapur,
in other walks of life. Community participants have existed for pp 68-69.
centuries, we only need a broader mechanism to regulate the - (ed), (1979), Gazetter of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu,
Part I.
traditional management system through the gram sabhas.4 B3
- (1999): Farar Far: Local Resistance to Colonial Hegemony in Goa
(1510-1912), Panaji, pp 137-38.
Email: avinash63 @siffy.com - (2001): 'Peasantry and the Colonial State in Goa (1946 to 1961)' in Charles
Borges, Oscar G Pereira and Hannes Stubbe (eds), op cit.
Notes Hardin, Garrett (1968): 'The Tragedy of the Commons', Science, 162,
pp 1243-48.
1 Some of the issues are addressed by Kamat (2001). Jodha, N S (1986): 'Common Property Resources and the Rural Poor in
2 Notification GAD/EST-1265 March 29, 1965; Goa Daman and Diu, Dry Regions of India', Economic and Political Weekly, July 5, p 1169.
Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964; Government of Goa, Advances inKamat, Pratima (1990): 'Historical Geography and Natural Resources' in
Agriculture, 1996; Navhind Times, December 3-19,2003, and February 10, T R de Souza (ed), Goa through the Ages - An Economic History,
2004. New Delhi.
Karanth, G K (1992): 'Privatisation of Common Property Resources: Lessons
3 Goa, Daman and Diu, Village Panchayat Regulation Act, 1962; Gune
1979, pp 661-62; Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. from Karnataka', Economic and Political Weekly, August 7.
4 Such options have already been discussed by NGOs like Peaceful Society Kosambi, D D (1947): 'Village Community in Old Conquest of Goa',Journal
and GOA DESC that are based in Goa. The state government has also of the University of Bombay, Vol 15, No 4, pp 63-78.
voiced its opinion in favour of strengthening the panchayats but the policy- .(1956): 'Indian Feudalism', An Introduction to Study of Indian History,
awaits implementation. Bombay.
Marothia, Dinesh (2002): Institutionalising Common Pool Resources,
New Delhi.
References
Mckean, Margaret (1992): 'Success of the Commons: A Compara
Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Manageme
Acheson, James (2000): 'Clear Cutting Maine: Implications for the Theory
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol 4, No 3, pp 247-82.
of Common Property Resource', Human Ecology, 28(2).
Mendes, A Lopes (1923): A India Portuguesa, Panaji, Vol II, p 37
Almeida, J C (1967): Aspects of the Agricultural Activity in Goa, Daman
and Diu. Nadkari, M V (1990): 'Use and Management of Common Lands: Tow
Altekar, A S (1927): A History of Village Communities in Western India,An Environmentally Sound Stratergy' in Cecil J Saldanha (ed), Karn
Madras. State of Enviornment, Report IV, pp 127-30.
NCAER (1964): Technoeconomic Survey of Goa, Daman and Diu, p
Bandyopadhyay, Rekha(1993): 'Land System in India: A Historical Review',
Economic and Political Weekly, December 25, p 149. NRC (1986): Proceedings of a Conference on Common Property Res
BG (1871): Boletim do Governo (Official), No 40, May 26, pp 213-14. Management, National Research Council, Washington.
Ostrom, Elinor (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution
- (1880): Boletim do Governo (Official), No 118, October 23, pp 703-07.
- (1886): Boletim do Govero (Official), No 246, December 10, p 1005, Institutions for Collective Action, New York.
e passim; Portarias, No 591, October 30. Pal, Mahi (2004): 'Panchayati Raj and Rural Governance: Experien
- (1908): Boletim do Govero (Official), No 63, August 14, p 765. a Decade', Economic and Political Weekly, January 10, p 137.
- (1933): Boletim do Governo (Official), No 40, May 20. Pasha, S A (1992): 'Common Property Resources and the Rural Po
- (2000): 'The Village Communities: A Historical and Legal Perspective' Micro Level Analysis', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 27
November 14.
in Charles Borges, Oscar G Pereira and Hannes Stubbe (eds).
Portarias (1904): No 315, December 1.
Blaikie, P and H Brookfield (1987): LandDegradation andSociety, Routledge.
Bob, Sam (1998): 'Tragedy of Commons', Journal of Rural Development, Powell, Baden (1960): 'Villages of Goa in the Early 16th Century', The
17 (1). Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, April.
Bromley, D (1992): 'The Commons, Property and Common Property Regimes' Putnam, Robert (1993): Making Democracy Work: Tradition in Modem
in D Bromley (ed), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Italy, Princeton.
Policy, San Francisco, pp 3-15. Rajakutty, S (2000): 'Peoples' Participation in Monitoring and Evaluation
CC (1961): Codigo das Communidades, Panjim. of Rural Development Programmes: Concepts and Approaches', Journal
Chopra, Kanchan, Gopal K Keidekodi and M N Murthy (1990): Participatory of Rural Development, Vol 18 (9).
Development People and Common Property Resource, New Delhi. Scott, G H (1954): 'The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource',
Dadibhavi, R V (2000): 'Management of Common Property Resources: A Journal of Political Economy, 62 (2).
Review and Some Policy Issues', Journal of Rural Development, Vol 19, Scott, James (1976): The Moral Economy of the Peasants: Rebellion and
(2), pp 199-217. Subsistence in South East Asia, New Haven.
Das, Jishnu (2000): 'Institutions and Incentives in a Garwhal Village- Shelvankar, K S (1961): 'Precapitalist Economic Culture' in A R Desai (ed),
Common Property Regime in Traditional Society', Economic andPolitical Rural Sociology in India, pp 150-52.
Economy, December 2. Sinha, Arun (2002): Goa Indica: A Critical Potrait of Post Colonial Goa,
Demsetz, Harold (1967): 'Towards a Theory of Property Rights', American New Delhi, pp 68-69
Economic Review, 57(2), pp 347-59. Stevenson, G G (1991): Common Property Economics: A General Theory
de Souza, T R (1979): Medieval Goa: A Socio-economic History, New Delhi. and Land Use Application, Cambridge.
Dias, A L (1964): Report of Land Reform Commission. Varde, N P S and Nandkumar Kamat (unpublished) (1992): Report of the
D'Souza, Carmo (1992): Legal System in Goa, Judicial Institutions, [1510- Agricultural Land Development.
1982], Vol I, pp 39-40. Velinkar, Joseph (2000): 'Village Communities in Goa and Their Evolution'
Fernandes, Tony (1996): Report of the Study on the Commission on the in Charles Borges, Oscar G Pereira and Hannes Stubbe (eds), Goa and
Agrarian Condition. Portugal: History and Development, New Delhi.
Foucault, Michel (1983): 'Afterword: The Subject and Power' in Hubert Wade, R (1987): 'The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, a Cooperative Solution', Research Observer, (2).
Chicago. - (1994): Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action
GoI (1982): Report of Task Force on Economic Development Plan for Goa, in South India, Oakland.
Government of India. Western, David and Michel Wright (eds) (1994): Natural Connections:
- (2001): Report of the Task Force on the Devolution of Powers and Functions Perspectives in Community Based Conservation, Washington.
upon Panchayati Raj Institutions, Ministry of Rural Development, August. Xavier, F N (1831): Bosquejo historico das Communidades das aldeias dos
Gold, N (1990): 'Stakeholders and Programme Evaluation: Characteristics Conselhos das Ilhas; Salcete e Bardez, Panjim, pp 378.
and Reflections' in A S Bryk (ed), Stakeholders Based Evaluation,- (1852): Collecao dos leis peculiares das Communidades, Panjim, Part I,
San Francisco, pp 63-72. Doc 64, pp 92-118.

Economic and Political Weekly February 4, 2006 445

This content downloaded from

49.37.175.47 on Tue, 11 May 2021 04:48:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms