Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 93:21–37
DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0179-9
An Examination of the Layers
of Workplace Influences in Ethical
Judgments: Whistleblowing Likelihood
and Perseverance in Public Accounting
ABSTRACT. We employ a Layers of Workplace Influ-
ence theory to guide our study of whistleblowing among
public accounting audit seniors. Specifically, we examine
professional commitment, organizational commitment
versus colleague commitment (locus of commitment),
and moral intensity of the unethical behavior on two
measures of reporting intentions: likelihood of reporting
and perseverance in reporting. We find that moral
intensity relates to both reporting intention measures. In
addition, while high levels of professional identity
increase the likelihood that an auditor will initially report
an observed violation, the auditor’s commitment to the
organization drives perseverance in reporting. Results
may assist organizations and researchers in their under-
standing of antecedents to whistleblowing as a form of
corporate governance and of the effect of these anteced-
ents on whistleblowing perseverance.
KEY WORDS: ethics, moral intensity, organizational
commitment, professional identify, whistleblowing
All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good
men do nothing.
– Edmund Burke (1729–1797)
Introduction
Despite the depth and breadth of authoritative
standards available to guide accountant and auditor
conduct, numerous stories in the press as well as
academic research indicate that these standards have

Springer 2009
Eileen Z. Taylor
Mary B. Curtis
not been completely successful in eliminating ethical
violations by accountants (Kaplan, 1995; Lee, 2002).
While the Enron catastrophe is the most salient case
of ethical violations, many other instances of severe
ethical breaches have slipped past firm and corporate
governance and quality controls.1 Because of these
continued breaches, confidential reporting mecha-
nisms have received significant attention in recent
years. However, new rules and legislation dictating
the availability of hotlines and policies to discourage
retaliation of whistleblowers (for example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) have not made hotline
usage as prevalent as one might expect. In search of
possible explanations for this apparent reluctance to
engage in whistleblower activities, we investigate the
influence of organizational factors, less explored than
the personal and contextual determinants of whis-
tleblowing (Finn, 1995) – even though these factors
may be the most responsive to organizational gov-
ernance (Jenkins et al., 2008). Specifically, we
examine a set of workplace influences that may sway
an individual’s intentions to initially report, and then
persist in reporting, unethical behavior.
We investigate this phenomenon in a public
accounting context. Few studies have considered
whistleblowing in public accounting, although many
firms have recently made confidential reporting
mechanisms available to their employees.2 This con-
text provides an appropriate setting for a test of our
theories, as public accounting commonly requires
individuals to work as part of a team, encompasses
strong professional and organizational cultures, and
requires its members to operate under common pro-
fessional standards. The study of whistleblowing is
particularly important in public accounting due to the
22 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis
recency of hotline availability, as well as the significant
obedience and conformity pressures that public
accountants face, at all levels and across accounting
firms of all sizes.
In multivariate analyses, we find that professional
identity, locus of commitment (organization versus
colleague), and moral intensity are significant across
both ‘‘intention to report’’ measures (likelihood of
reporting and perseverance in reporting). In evaluating
the measures of reporting intention separately, we find
that while high levels of professional identity increase
the likelihood that an auditor will initially report an
observed violation, the auditor’s commitment to the
organization drives perseverance in reporting. As
expected, auditors are more likely both to report and to
persevere when moral intensity is high.
This research contributes to the body of academic
literature on ethics and whistleblowing in several
ways. First, we explore determinants of whistle-
blowing through a new lens, which we call Layers of
Workplace Influence. This perspective allows us to
study the varied commitments that influence indi-
viduals’ ethical judgments. Second, we consider locus
of commitment which recognizes that whistleblowers
must trade-off their commitments to their colleagues
versus their firm in deciding whether to report
observed unethical behavior. Finally, we evaluate
perseverance of reporting to further our understand-
ing of the behavioral dynamics beyond that of initially
reporting wrongdoing. The study informs the practice
community in understanding the likely behavior of
their employees in similar situations, as well as the
potential effectiveness of corporate governance poli-
cies regarding the reporting (both initial and persis-
tence) of unethical behavior.
Theory and hypothesis development
According to Miceli and Near (1984):
Whistleblowing relates to actions taken by current or
former organizational members to report illegal,
unethical, or illegitimate activities, which are under
the control of management, to persons who are willing
and able to correct such misconduct.
Whistleblowing has a checkered reputation, at best.
First, it directly implies ethical failure and involves one
person judging the ethical behavior of another (Hooks
et al., 1994). Second, whistleblowing is often anony-
mous (Miceli et al., 2008), depriving the reported-on
individual the right to face his or her accuser. Third,
whistleblowing often entails reporting outside of the
established lines of communication and authority.
Finally, whistleblowing requires trust in those at the
top of the organization to take appropriate actions
when they learn of misdeeds by their employees.
Unfortunately, even when wrongdoing is detrimental
to a large number of people external to the organi-
zation (e.g. fraudulent financial reporting resulting in
artificially high stock prices), those internal to the
organization often view the whistleblower’s report
(rather than the initial wrongdoing) as the cause of
their losses. Evidence of widespread retaliation and
cost to the whistleblower himself is well documented
(Jos et al., 1989). However uncomfortable we are
with the notion of reporting on the behavior of others,
whistleblowing is an important organizational con-
trol. Indeed, industry surveys (KPMG, 2006; Price-
WaterhouseCoopers, 2005) and academic research
(Kaplan, 1995; Miceli and Near, 2002) support the
contention that reporting mechanisms aid in the
prevention and detection of unethical behavior.
Persistence of whistleblowing
Rest (1986) asserts that, once an ethical decision is
made, the person must have sufficient perseverance,
as well as other skills, to be able to follow through on
his/her moral intention, to withstand fatigue, and to
overcome obstacles. It is unfortunate, yet nonetheless
true, that the first reports of unethical or illegal
activities are often ineffective (Van Scotter et al.,
2005). There are many possible explanations for this,
and no general rule as to which holds in a given cir-
cumstance. This is as true in non-accounting domains
as in accounting. In the development of their original
framework for the study of whistleblower behavior,
Near and Miceli (1985) state that whistleblowing
represents a process rather than an event, and that the
whistleblowing decision may be repeated in various
forms. The notion of persistence is important because
whistleblowing often occurs in multiple stages – the
initial report, which may or may not result in the
desired reaction, and potentially, repeated subsequent
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
reports, which may increase the likelihood of the
desired reaction as well as the potential for retaliation.
It appears that, in many cases, successful whistle-
blowing requires not merely an initial report, but,
more importantly, persistence in reporting. For
example, in one of the most publicized instances of
internal reporting, Sherron Watkins wrote to Enron
CEO and President of the Board Kenneth Lay, then
spoke personally to Lay, and later spoke to the public
accountants (Pasha, 2006). Watkins’ reports demon-
strate these two facets of whistleblowing, the initial
report, and subsequent reports or persistence. Rest
(1986) calls this ‘‘persistence in the face of obstacles.’’
Thus, our study includes likelihood of reporting, as an
important measure of initial whistleblower reporting
intentions, as well as perseverance of reporting, as an
important measure of whistleblower success.
Layers of workplace influence
Becker (1992) proposed a multiple-constituency
approach to the study of commitment in the
workplace, demonstrating that employee commit-
ment to top management, supervisor, and work
groups contributed significantly beyond organiza-
tional commitment to the prediction of many
actions, including prosocial organizational behavior.
Similarly, Meyer and Allen (1997) assert that there
are many entities within the world of work to which
one might become committed, including the orga-
nization, profession/occupation, manager/supervi-
sor, and work team. Becker and Billings (1993) used
cluster analysis to identify differing patterns of
commitment to various constituencies. Within the
organization, they found that individuals may be
locally committed (to co-workers), globally com-
mitted (to upper management and the organization),
committed (possessing both local and global foci),
and uncommitted (those attached to neither the
organization nor colleagues). As Meyer and Allen
(1997) suggest, it is possible to imagine an additional
layer of commitment and, therefore, complexity in
these commitments – commitment to the profession.
Aranya and Ferris (1984) assert that individuals may
be committed to any of these various layers, with the
pattern of commitment varying on an individual
basis. Finally, Bamber and Iyer (2002) evaluate
23
commitment to firm and compare this relationship
with professional identity.
In the study of whistleblowing, it can be assumed
that these complex relationships lead to multiple
influences on an individual’s decision to report an
ethical violation (Figure 1). At the outer most layer
lies the accounting profession. One can think of an
auditor’s professional identity as his or her affinity for
and identification with the audit profession. Within
the profession are public accounting firms. Auditors
can be committed to the profession and the orga-
nization, neither, or both of these entities (Aranya
and Ferris, 1984). Individuals also vary in commit-
ment to their colleagues within the organization.
In-group bias suggests that individuals co-operate
with members of their group more than with non-
group members (Hewstone et al., 2002). Because of
the trade-off between protecting one’s organization
or one’s colleagues in ethics reporting situations, we
consider organization and colleague commitment
to be on a continuum, with the organization at one
end and colleagues at the other. Finally, at the
center of these various and oft-conflicting layers of
PROFESSION
ORGANIZATION
COLLEAGUES
VIOLATION
Figure 1. Layers of workplace influence affecting
the decision processes of a potential whistleblower. Pro-
fession = Commitment to the accounting profession.
Organization versus Colleagues = Locus of Commitment
between the firm and one’s colleagues. Violation =
Moral Intensity of the violation, itself, within the context
of public accounting.
24 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis
commitment is the ethical violation itself and the
individual’s personal reaction to it. One may be
committed to the profession as well as to the firm,
but feel that the core issue, the unethical or illegal
event, is not critical enough to warrant reporting.
Conversely, one may show evidence of low com-
mitment to the profession or the firm, but the event
may be so egregious that the individual feels he or
she must act. Individuals must weigh all of these
influences, attending to each of the layers during their
decision process, to arrive at their reporting intention.
The following discussion addresses each factor indi-
vidually.
Professional identity
Professional identity, a component of a person’s
social identity, is the notion that individuals self-
classify based on their profession.3 Professional
identity is commonly defined as the strength of an
individual’s identification with or involvement in a
profession (Aranya et al., 1981). For example,
auditors begin engaging in impression management
with their earliest training, acting in ways that
communicate their membership in the profession
(Kosmala and Herrbach, 2006). One way in which
individuals demonstrate professional identity is
through adherence to the standards and practices of
their profession. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA, 2006) Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct, Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards, Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) standards, as well as state ethics
laws and regulations provide guidelines for auditors
regarding acceptable behavior. Auditors become
familiar with these guidelines throughout their
careers: they learn of them in college, they study
them for licensure and renewal, they read them
when beginning employment at their firm, and they
live them during their professional careers. Jeffrey
and Weatherholt (1996) find that accountants’ pro-
fessional commitment is positively associated with
rule observance attitudes, such as adhering to pro-
fessional practices, standards and codes of ethics. This
professional identity, leading to standard adherence
and rule observance attitudes, may further manifest
itself through a desire to protect the profession from
reputational damage, such as that sustained when
one of its members fails to adhere to professional
standards or codes of ethics (May 2002).
This desire to protect the profession may also
motivate auditors to avoid public disclosure of vio-
lations of those guidelines. Thus, auditors with
strong professional identities may be inclined to re-
port internally the unethical acts of their colleagues,
both as a means of rooting out violators and of
protecting their profession from possible public
exposure of the violation. Indeed, Kaplan and
Whitecotton (2001) found that professional identity
was positively related to perceptions of responsibility
for reporting the unethical acts of others.
We propose the following hypothesis.
H1: Professional identity is positively associated
with reporting intent.
Locus of commitment
Organizational commitment represents the strength
of employees’ identification with and involvement
in a particular organization, a strong belief in orga-
nizational goals and values, and a willingness to exert
considerable effort on behalf of the organization
(Porter et al., 1974). Public accounting firms seek to
develop robust organizational cultures, based on
organizational commitment, in which members are
indoctrinated in a number of ways (Jenkins et al.,
2008). Individual employees may exhibit varying
levels of organizational commitment, depending on
many factors, including their length of employment
and job satisfaction.
Commitment to the organization contrasts with
colleague commitment, which involves a sense of
responsibility, reliability, and readiness to support
colleagues within an organization (Junger et al.,
2007). Meyer and Allen (1997) assert that people
need to be committed to something: if individuals
become less committed to their organization, they
may channel their commitment in other directions,
such as to their colleagues. Additionally, certain
circumstances may prompt auditors to act on behalf
of their colleagues, mindless of the welfare of the
firm as a whole (Osburn et al., 1990). Thus, unlike
professional identity, which exists independent of
organizational affiliation,4 organizational (firm) and
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
colleague commitment intertwine in many instances –
at times one sustains the other (Abbott et al., 2006),
and in other circumstances, such as when a colleague
performs an unethical act, they create conflicting alle-
giances (Trevino and Victor, 1992). Ray (2006) points
to a ‘‘web of commitments’’ which results in con-
flicting needs of individuals in multiple relationships.
While an organization might experience negative
consequences if standards’ violations go unreported, a
co-worker will likely suffer negative effects if his or her
standard’s violation is exposed. The question arises as to
how observers of unethical acts react when the needs
of the organization and of co-workers are in conflict.
When contemplating making a report, an auditor must
choose between his or her commitments to the two
parties, weighing the harm to the organization from
not reporting against the harm to the colleague from
reporting. Inevitably, one must balance how much
harm to whom versus how much benefit to whom
(Elliston, 1982). Graham (1986) suggests that potential
reporters must use loyalty prioritization during their
decision-making processes, contrasting the two polar-
izing influences of team loyalty and conscientious
individualism. Thus, whistleblowing may be the pro-
totypical example of the ‘‘damned if you do, damned if
you don’t’’ scenario.
Organizational employees have three options to
address an unsatisfactory situation faced within an
organization: (1) exit the organization, (2) voice
discontent (i.e., blow the whistle), or (3) remain
silent (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005).
Employees with greater organizational commitment
may prefer voice to exit. Near and Miceli (1985)
suggest that internal reporters will demonstrate high
levels of firm loyalty in their initial decision to
report. Two studies have tested that theory: Mes-
mer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) expected
organizational commitment to be positively related
to both reporting intent and actual reporting and
Sims and Keenan (1998) expected organizational
commitment to be positively related to external
reporting. Since neither study found significant
results for organizational commitment, it is possible
that a consideration of the influence of organiza-
tional commitment on whistleblowing without the
offsetting consideration of colleague commitment
provides an incomplete view into this complex web
of influences. Thus, our proposed theory of locus of
commitment may better address the true nature of
25
such influences than previous studies that considered
only one side of this relationship.
In recognition of Ray’s (2006) ‘‘web of commit-
ments’’ and Graham’s (1986) ‘‘loyalty prioritization,’’
we define locus of commitment as the direction
to which one’s allegiances turn when an ethical
dilemma pits organizational and colleague commit-
ments against one another. We theorize that, when
contemplating reporting, an individual will weigh the
harm to the organization from not reporting against
the harm to the colleague from reporting. Given that
unreported acts can cause future damage to the firm
and reported acts can cause immediate damage to the
colleague who is the subject of the report, we expect
those individuals with greater organizational com-
mitment to exhibit greater reporting intentions and
those with greater colleague commitment to dem-
onstrate lower reporting intentions. The locus of their
commitment will determine which potential harm is
most influential in their reporting decision.
Based on the above arguments, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H2: Organizational (colleague) commitment is
positively (negatively) associated with report-
ing intent.
Moral intensity
In our Layers of Workplace Influence theory, the
moral intensity of an observed unethical act is the
innermost layer of commitment – commitment to
one’s own moral beliefs. Numerous studies consider
whistleblowers’ behavior in light of moral intensity
and its individual components. Jones (1991) asserts
that individuals assess the moral intensity of observed
ethical violations on six dimensions. Coram et al.
(2008) evaluates auditors’ perceptions of reduced
audit quality acts with respect to three components
of Jones’ moral intensity model (magnitude, social
consensus, and probability of effect). Findings
suggest that auditors’ behavior is issue-contingent,
depending on their perception of moral intensity.
Further, measures of magnitude and probability
differ among auditors’ thus influencing individual
ethical judgments. McMahon and Harvey (2007)
find relationships between several moral intensity
26 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis
factors (probable magnitude of consequences and
social consensus) and ethical judgments.
Miceli et al. (1991) studied the whistleblower
intentions of internal auditing directors, finding
those directors less likely to report incidents of
wrongdoing ‘‘when they did not feel compelled
morally or by role prescription to do so.’’ These
feelings of moral compunction and role prescriptions
form the basis of the moral intensity of a situation.
Graham (1986) asserts that once an individual
becomes aware of an ‘‘issue of principle,’’ the indi-
vidual must assess the context. Similar to Miceli et al.
(1991), Graham suggests that the positive contextual
motivations toward reporting the unethical acts of
others are a combination of the perceived seriousness
of an unethical behavior and the perceived responsi-
bility to act on this behavior. These two factors
possess a reciprocal relationship in that serious issues
may generate increased feelings of responsibility to
respond. Indeed, most studies measuring these indi-
vidual constructs have found them to be highly cor-
related (Curtis, 2006; Kaplan and Whitecotton,
2001).
With respect to seriousness, Near and Miceli
(1985) propose that the seriousness of the ques-
tionable activity will be positively related to
reporting. Seriousness implies that others will also
see the need for reporting and that serious violations
are more likely to result in actions to correct the
situation. Thus, the more serious the activity, the
more likely the report will result in action, leading
an individual to be more willing to report. Finn
(1995) notes that organizations play a part in edu-
cating employees about how to distinguish material
wrongdoing from immaterial issues. Several studies
involving accountants have found support for this
relationship (Curtis, 2006; Kaplan and Whitecotton,
2001; Miceli et al., 1991).
Miceli and Near (1994) point out that individuals
whistleblow because of their own morality – they
feel a responsibility to report. In addition, the
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA,
2006) creates responsibility by requiring auditors to
report certain violations. Prior research has found a
positive association between auditors’ intent to
report and feelings of personal responsibility (Kaplan
and Whitecotton, 2001; Schultz et al., 1993).
Based on the above discussion, we combine the
constructs of seriousness and responsibility into a
single notion of moral intensity. This combined
construct addresses an individual’s moral commit-
ment through the evaluation of a situation with
respect to its seriousness and the related degree to
which the individual feels he or she is morally
required to respond.
We propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Perceived moral intensity is positively associ-
ated with reporting intent.
Research method
Sample
Participants were practicing auditors from an inter-
national (Big-4) public accounting firm, participat-
ing in a multi-day firm training program for audit
seniors. The use of a single firm was considered
advantageous in this case due to differences between
firms in the way in which whistleblower reports are
taken and resolved. These participants should have a
common view of how the mechanism works, thus
removing the variance of a factor that was not of
interest to us – the actual methodology of the
whistleblower mechanism. We provided no incen-
tives for completion, although their firm encouraged
participation as a component of their support for
academic research.
Audit seniors (the majority of our participants)
have adequate experience and are sufficiently
knowledgeable about professional standards to rec-
ognize the ethical violations embedded in our three
scenarios. At this level, they also have adequate
socialization into the public accounting profession
such that their reactions to the scenario behaviors
should be typical of public accountants at various
levels in the firm.
One hundred and twenty-three practicing senior
auditors participated in the study. Three individuals
provided incomplete answers, resulting in a sample of
120. The group was evenly split by gender, with mean
(SD) age of 27 (2.9) and three (0.34) years of profes-
sional auditing experience. Two-thirds had taken
college courses with at least a module on accounting
profession ethics and 93% had received ethics training
post-graduate. Only 5% of the participants had
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
received no ethics training. Two-thirds of the par-
ticipants were born in the US, although most were
educated at universities in the US. One-third of the
participants were licensed CPAs. Finally, consistent
with prior research, about one-third had previously
experienced a situation similar to any described in the
scenarios. Table I presents the primary data for level,
age, and gender, as well as their correlation with
dependent and independent variables.
Procedure
We tested the hypotheses using a research instru-
ment in which public accountants reacted to three
vignettes describing the unethical behavior of a
colleague. The research protocol called for proctors
to begin the session by introducing themselves and
the exercise, and asking participants to read the
Institutional Review Board notification, which
assured participants of their anonymity and right to
non-participation without penalty. Proctors distrib-
uted the paper-based research instrument and par-
ticipants completed the materials at their own pace.
All completed the research instrument within 1 h
and none took an unreasonably short time (less than
35 min). Participants were able to refer back to any
portion of the materials during the session. The
authors and two assistants conducted the sessions.
The research materials began with a short intro-
duction to a hypothetical public accounting firm for
which they were to assume they worked. Then par-
ticipants read the three vignettes. Following each
vignette, participants answered several questions
regarding their intent to report the described incident.
The materials ended with scales to measure indepen-
dent variables and demographic characteristics.
Vignettes
The three vignettes represented various violations of
the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Curtis
and Taylor, in press). In the first, the audit supervisor
instructs the auditor to ‘‘sign-off’’ on an uncom-
pleted audit procedure as completed (violation of
AU 311A.12). In the second, the audit supervisor
discloses a job offer from the current client (violating
independence – AICPA Code 101-2) and then
27
personally performs audit procedures typically com-
pleted by a staff auditor (violation of AU 150.02). In
the third scenario, during an audit of a car dealership,
the auditor observes his supervisor driving a car from
the client’s inventory. Additionally, the supervisor
has discouraged the auditor from performing certain
audit steps typically completed in prior year audits
(violation of AU 311.34). The mean (SD) of per-
ceived moral intensity for the three vignettes was 81
(21.4), 65 (31), and 92 (14), within a possible range
of 0–100. The pattern of results reported here for the
three vignettes combined holds across each indi-
vidual vignette.
Dependent variables
After each vignette, auditors provided their likelihood
to report, as well as their perseverance of reporting
intent. Likelihood of reporting (the typical measure
employed in whistleblowing studies) is the average of
intention questions across the three vignettes, using a
0–100 point scale; endpoints are very unlikely and
very likely. Perseverance is measured in each scenario
using a 5-point scale, with options moving progres-
sively higher through the organization, beginning
with ‘‘would not tell anyone’’ through ‘‘would pursue
to as high a level as needed to get satisfactory action.’’
See Appendix A for this measure.
Prior whistleblowing research has not considered
the perseverance measure. However, we include it
because we agree with Elliston (1982, p. 167) who
states, ‘‘Typically several actions are involved in a
process of blowing the whistle. Though we can treat
whistleblowing as one act, to be more precise
we should from the outset be aware that we are
dealing much more with a series of actions, a
process.’’ Near and Miceli (1985) make similar
assertions. In creating this measure, we envisioned
the levels to which one might report an observed
act, increasing the likelihood of resolution as well as
risk of retaliation as they move up the hierarchy
within a firm. We expect that one might initially
inform a peer of their observation. From this dis-
cussion, he or she may then choose to inform
someone at the same level as the observed wrong-
doer. Based on the feedback from that individual, as
well as other factors, the observer may choose to
inform a superior of the wrongdoer or go even
 28

TABLE I
Correlation matrix

Pearson product correlations between variables Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent
variables

LIKELI PERSEV PI LC MI LEVEL AGE Mean Theoretical range Min-Max SD

LIKELI 72.54 0–100 11.1–100 19.84

PERSEV 0.682** 3.90 1–5 1.7–5 0.724
PI 0.349** 0.250** 22.19 6–30 13–30 3.62
LC -0.223** -0.263** -0.402** 9.79 3–15 4–15 2.20
MI 0.637** 0.554** 0.345** -0.318 79.58 0–100 40–100 15.39
LEVEL -0.059 -0.230* -0.117 0.034 -0.065 2.93 1–5 1–4 0.34
AGE -0.038 -0.052 -0.157 -0.228* 0.159 0.083 27 0–99 21–39 3.02
GENDER -0.015 -0.199* -0.071 0.068 0.056 -0.031 -0.097 1.5 1–2 1–2 0.5

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test).

Dependent variables – reporting intentions: LIKELI likelihood of reporting: how likely are you to report this, on a scale of 0–100% – measure is the average
Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis

across three cases; PERSEV perseverance: what is the highest level you would report this? Answers range from ‘‘would not tell anyone’’ at the lowest end to
‘‘would pursue to as high a level as necessary’’ at the highest end – measure is the average across three cases.
Independent variables: PI professional identity: extent to which participant personally identifies with the accounting profession – higher values indicate greater
identification; LC locus of commitment: lower values indicate a greater commitment to the organization while higher values indicate a greater commitment to
colleagues; MI moral intensity: combination of the seriousness of the event and the individual’s responsibility for reporting the event – measure is average of
seriousness and responsibility across the three cases. Higher values indicate greater intensity; LEVEL level in the firm: higher values represent higher positions
within the firm; AGE age of auditor; GENDER gender of auditor: coded as 1 = male, 2 = female.
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
higher. Perseverance is indicated as the level within
the firm where one would terminate the effort at
reporting the observed act.
Independent variables
For Professional Identity, we chose six questions from
a professional commitment scale developed by Ara-
nya et al. (1981) and used by numerous accounting
researchers (c.f. Jeffrey and Weatherholt (1996)). The
5-point scale depicts strongly agree and strongly dis-
agree as end-points, with neutral at the center.
We also constructed a locus of commitment scale
based on the general idea of the questions in the scales
used by prior research (Aranya and Ferris, 1984; Jef-
frey and Weatherholt, 1996). We designed questions
to contrast the trade-off between organizational and
colleague commitment to highlight the individual’s
loyalties. Although it is certainly possible to exhibit
high commitment to both the organization and to
colleagues, the unique nature of whistleblowing re-
quires that the individual choose one over the other
(Graham, 1986). Participants responded to three
items asserting commitment toward the organization
over commitment to colleagues, each on a 5-point
scale with ends of strongly agree and strongly disagree.
We measure the moral intensity of each vignette
based on the auditors’ perceptions of the seriousness
of the unethical behavior and the auditor’s responsi-
bility to report the unethical behavior. Auditors were
asked to refer back to the vignettes and indicate
seriousness and responsibility for each on scales of
0–100, where 0 is least serious or responsible and 100
is most serious or responsible (Kaplan and White-
cotton, 2001). We combine these measures to gen-
erate a measure of moral intensity for each vignette.5
We include these scales and measures in Appendix A.
Results
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses of measures
We constructed variables as follows. First, we aver-
aged responses to reporting intention questions across
vignettes to arrive at two overall measures, one each
for likelihood and perseverance. Next, we averaged
the responses to the seriousness and responsibility
29
questions across vignettes and combined these to
generate an overall measure for moral intensity.
In order to assess discriminant and convergent
validity, we performed factor analysis on the indi-
vidual questions representing the professional iden-
tity and locus of commitment scales, finding that all
questions for each measure loaded on the appropri-
ate factor with strong reliability. Cronbach’s alpha
for professional identity is 0.79 and the lowest
loading factor analysis was 0.65. Cronbach’s alpha
for locus of commitment is 0.69 and the lowest
loading factor analysis was 0.78. Confirmatory factor
analysis, using AMOS, supports the assignment of
questions to their theoretical construct. Therefore,
scale measures were the sum of all items for each
scale. Table I includes descriptive statistics for these
variables.
Table I also includes correlations among depen-
dent and independent variables. The correlations
among the independent variables support the
expected pattern of attitudes. Specifically, as moral
intensity increases, so do professional identity and
organizational commitment (as the locus of com-
mitment). Significant correlations between the
dependent and independent variables provide pre-
liminary support for all hypotheses. The dependent
variables demonstrate significant correlations with
moral intensity, professional identity, and locus of
commitment.
As depicted in Table I, there is significant corre-
lation between the two dependent variables.
Therefore, we employ MANCOVA to assess the
overall relationships between dependent and inde-
pendent variables, followed by individual univariate
analysis to identify unique patterns of relationships.
Tests of hypotheses
As depicted in Table II, multivariate analyses indi-
cate that moral intensity and professional identity
significantly relate to reporting intent, supporting
hypotheses H1 and H3.6 However, the relationship
between locus of commitment and reporting intent
(H2) is marginal in multivariate analyses.
In univariate analyses (also presented in Table II),
professional identity (H1) significantly relates to like-
lihood of reporting (p < 0.02), but not to perseverance
of reporting (p > 0.34). While professional identity
30 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis

TABLE II
Analyses of variance for moral intensity, professional identity, and locus of commitment on reporting intentions

Source MANCOVA ANCOVA – likeli- ANCOVA –

reporting intent hood of reporting perseverance

F p t p t p

Professional identity 2.63 0.038 2.16 0.016 0.39 0.348

Locus of commitment 1.88 0.075 -0.62 0.252 -1.91 0.029
Moral intensity 37.78 0.000 8.23 0.000 6.65 0.000
R2 0.46 0.34

Dependent variables – reporting intentions: Likelihood of reporting how likely are you to report this on a scale of 0–100% –
measure is the average across three cases; Perseverance what is the highest level you would report this? Answers range from
‘‘would not tell anyone’’ at the lowest end to ‘‘would pursue to as high a level as necessary’’ at the highest end – measure is
the average across three cases.
Independent variables: Professional Identity extent to which participant personally identifies with the accounting profession –
higher values indicate greater identification; Locus of commitment high/low split employed in this analysis to indicate the locus
(organization versus colleague); Moral intensity combination of the seriousness of the event and the individual’s responsibility
for reporting the event – measure is average of seriousness and responsibility across the three cases.

and perseverance are not significantly related in the
presence of other independent variables, bivariate
correlations (reported in Table I) between the two
variables are significant. Correlation analyses also sup-
port the direction of the relationship hypothesized in
H1: as professional identity increases, reporting
intentions increase. These results suggest that profes-
sional identity is an important determinant of the initial
decision to report observed unethical behavior, but
other factors may have a stronger influence on the
perseverance of reporting intentions.
H2 predicted that greater commitment to the
organization would relate positively to reporting
intentions. Recall that multivariate analysis of this
hypothesis was only marginally significant. Univari-
ate analyses support the relationship of locus of
commitment to perseverance of reporting (p < 0.03),
but not to likelihood of reporting (p > 0.25) –
although bivariate correlations support significant
relationships for locus of commitment with both
dependent variables. Correlation analyses also support
the hypothesized direction of these relationships: as
an individual’s commitment moves toward the
organization and away from colleagues, likelihood of
reporting and perseverance increase. Just as profes-
sional identity appears to impact initial reporting
intention, our results suggest that locus of commit-
ment is a significant determinant of the decision to
persevere in reporting. Thus, locus of commitment,
toward the organization, may increase one’s dedica-
tion to reporting until the issue is resolved.
H3 proposed that moral intensity relates positively
to reporting intent. In addition to the multivariate
support for this association, univariate analyses
(reported in Table II) support the relationship
between moral intensity and both dependent vari-
ables: likelihood of reporting (p = 0.00) and perse-
verance (p = 0.00). Correlation analyses (reported in
Table I) support the direction of this relationship
hypothesized in H3: as moral intensity increases,
both measures of reporting intention increase. This
suggests that the inner-most layer, one’s commitment
to his or her own personal moral judgments, is a
significant determinant of both the initial decision to
report the unethical behavior of others in the work-
place, as well as the extent to which one is willing to
persevere in that reporting.
In summary, we find that support for H1 (pro-
fessional identity) is supported through multivariate
analyses, correlational analyses for both dependent
variables, and univariate analyses for likelihood of
reporting. H2 (locus of commitment) is supported
by only marginal significance in multivariate analy-
ses, but correlational analyses support the relation-
ships for both dependent variables, and univariate
analysis supports the relationship with perseverance.
Finally, H3 (moral intensity) is supported with both
dependent measures of intent. The relatively high
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
adjusted R2 values reported in Table II suggest that a
fairly large proportion of the overall variance in both
likelihood of reporting (0.46) and perseverance
(0.34) is explained by this combination of indepen-
dent variables. Thus, it appears that auditors are
more likely to report observed unethical acts when
they have relatively greater commitment to their
profession, when their locus of commitment aligns
with their firm, and when they perceive the act to be
of greater moral intensity.
Post hoc analyses of moral intensity
In our theory section, we argue for the combination
of the two measures of seriousness and responsibility
into one construct, which we labeled moral inten-
sity. Correlational analyses indicate that the measures
of seriousness and responsibility are significantly
correlated (0.674). This strong correlation would
suggest that the two variables measure the same
construct. When the two measures are included
separately in the analyses depicted in Table II,
however, they are each significant (p < 0.01) and
the significance of the other two variables (profes-
sional identity and locus of commitment) increases
slightly. Additionally, tests of mediation do not
support a hierarchical relationship between the two
variables. We feel these results support our conten-
tion that moral intensity is composed of two related
but separate measures, seriousness of the behavior
and responsibility to report the behavior. The strong
correlation between the two, however, suggests that
the appropriate treatment for statistical analysis is the
combination of the two into one measure.
Post hoc analyses of demographic covariates
We employed the methods suggested by Sharma et al.
(1981) to investigate demographic moderators. First,
we added the demographic variables of current level
in the firm, age, and gender to the model reported
in Table II and re-performed the analyses. The
hypothesized relationships reported in Table II do
not change with the addition of these variables nor do
the demographic variables interact with the model
predictor variables. However, we do find that all
31
three demographic variables (level: F = 2.49,
p < 0.03; age: F = 3.52, p < 0.04; gender: F = 6.33,
p < 0.01) are significant in the multivariate analysis.
In univariate analyses, level in the firm and gender are
not significantly related to reporting likelihood (level:
F = 0.62, p > 0.60; gender: F = 1.19, p > 0.25), but
those at lower levels in the firm and males assert a
greater intention to persevere in reporting (level:
F = 3.22, p < 0.03; gender: F = 12.10, p < 0.01).
Also in the univariate analyses, age is significantly and
positively related to both likelihood of reporting
(F = 4.83, p = 0.03) and perseverance (F = 5.86,
p < 0.02) with younger individuals indicating a
greater likelihood of reporting and persevering.
Interestingly, these associations with age are not sig-
nificant in bivariate correlations. Thus, only after
removing the variance explained by the layers of
workplace influence does age gain significance.
Sharma et al.’s (1981) second step, after testing for
interactions, is correlational analysis to determine
if potential moderators are related to predictor
(independent) or criterion (dependent) variables. As
Table I depicts, age correlates with locus of com-
mitment, while level and gender relate to persever-
ance. Additionally, all of the primary dependent and
independent variables exhibit correlation. Thus,
according to Sharma et al.’s framework for identifying
moderator variables, moderators are not present for
the predictor variables in this study.
Discussion
This study contributes to the existing whistleblower
literature by testing a theory of Layers of Workplace
Influence. We isolate the effect of various environ-
mental layers of influence to explain whistleblowing
intentions: namely professional identity, locus of
commitment, and moral intensity. Finally, we con-
sider a broader definition of reporting intentions
than has previously been considered, including not
only likelihood of reporting, but also perseverance in
reporting observed unethical behavior.
We hypothesized that reporting intentions would
increase when the observer’s professional identity
was greater, when the observer’s locus of commit-
ment aligned with their organization rather than
with his or her colleagues, and when the moral
32 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis
intensity of the observed behavior was greater.
Results indicate that all predictors relate to reporting
intentions.
Two specific exceptions to this general finding are
noteworthy. First, professional identity and persever-
ance in reporting behavior are not significantly
related, although professional identity and likelihood
of reporting are significantly related. Thus, we find
the pattern that, in the presence of other variables,
professional identity is more closely related to initial
likelihood of reporting than to perseverance of
reporting. However, bivariate correlation confirms
that likelihood of reporting and perseverance in-
crease as professional identity increases. One possible
reason for this finding is that reporting the unethical
behavior complies with professional requirements –
there is no professional requirement, however, that
one continues to report until appropriate action is
taken (Lampe and Finn, 1992). Additionally, while
an auditor with high professional commitment will
seek to root out those who violate professional
standards, he or she may not want to harm the
profession’s identity by persevering to the point that
the violation becomes public, thus tarnishing the
reputation of the profession as a whole.
The second finding contrary to our expectations
is that locus of commitment and likelihood of
reporting are not significantly related, although locus
of commitment and perseverance of reporting are
significantly related. Thus, we find the pattern that,
in the presence of other determinants, locus of
commitment is more strongly related to persever-
ance than to the initial decision to report. Addi-
tionally, the significant bivariate correlations confirm
that both likelihood and perseverance increase as
one’s locus of commitment moves toward the
organization and away from colleagues. This finding
is consistent with Finn (1995) who asserts that, after
the recognition of unethical behavior, one faces the
options of resigning from the firm, whistleblowing,
or doing nothing. The first and third options,
resigning or doing nothing, may not be acceptable to
one committed to his or her firm. Rather, those
with organizational commitment may persevere in
their reporting to purge their organization of
unethical individuals – both for their own good and
for the good of the organization. Thus, while pro-
fessional identity may influence auditors’ initial
reporting intentions, their commitment to their firm
may determine how far they will go in acting on
those intentions.
Two prior studies expected, but failed to find, a
relationship between organizational (firm) commit-
ment and whistleblowing (Mesmer-Magnus and
Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims and Keenan, 1998). We
believe our results both support their theory and
explain their lack of results. First, the reporting
intention that is most related to organizational
commitment appears to be perseverance (unique to
our study), rather than likelihood of reporting (the
dependent variable of interest in these studies).7
Neither of the prior studies considered this measure
of whistleblowing intentions. Second, neither study
considered the trade-off of commitment between
the organization and one’s colleagues, which may
more fully explain reporting behavior. Finally,
Aranya and Ferris (1984) discuss inconsistent find-
ings between professional identity and organizational
commitment, with some researchers asserting that
these two must be in conflict. They contend that
conflict should not arise when organizationally
directed behavior is consistent with that specified in
the professional code. Consistent with that study
and with Bamber and Iyer (2002), we find profes-
sional identity and the firm direction of locus of
commitment to be positively related, suggesting little
professional–organizational conflict. Additionally,
Bamber and Iyer (2002) assert that such conflict
declines as rank increases. Our participants, audit
seniors, are relatively low in the organization; none-
the-less, they demonstrate strong positive correlation
between professional and organizational commit-
ment.
We situate our investigation within the context of
public accounting because of the role that whistle-
blowing can play in firm governance (Bedard et al.,
2008) and because many public accounting firms have
recently made confidential reporting mechanisms a
part of their governance system. The study of
impediments to whistleblowing may be particularly
important in public accounting due to the recency of
hotline availability, but also because of the significant
obedience and conformity pressures that public
accountants face (DeZoort and Lord, 1994; Lord and
DeZoort, 2001). The hierarchical structure and
frantic pace of public accounting may also deter the
introspection necessary to motivate whistleblowing.
Given the recent increased focus on audit firm quality
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
control (see, for example, PCAOB, 2004), we believe
that exploration of auditor hotline reporting ante-
cedents is both timely and relevant.
What are the professional implications of these
findings? Given that reporting likelihood is most
strongly influenced by professional identity and per-
severance by organizational commitment, firms
should work to align organizational commitment
with professional identity. Auditors who believe their
firm supports the profession and adheres to its stan-
dards will be more likely to both report and persevere.
Is locus of commitment stable over time or can
the firm influence it? We are of the opinion that
individuals’ positions on this scale may vary over
time. If locus of commitment can waver, then the
creation of ‘‘institutional capital’’ or firm loyalty
should be a primary goal of firms (Oliver, 1998).
The tendency of commitment to fluctuate also
suggests that a consistent and prolonged message may
be necessary to secure commitment. Firms may then
use that organizational commitment in emphasizing
the harm that could befall the firm and the profession
should unethical behavior continue unabated.
Finn (1995, p. 309) encourages an organizational
attitude change to increase the chance that unethical
and unacceptable practices are detected. Training
programs can serve to communicate and reinforce
this attitude change. This is consistent with the
report of The Public Oversight Board (2000), which
encouraged firms to utilize acculturation processes to
align the individual goals of their employees with
firm goals. The report recommended that firm
leaders frequently deliver a ‘‘positive, constructive
message that is refreshed frequently’’ that applauds
‘‘taking difficult stands’’ when needed. A key part of
firm ethics training should include encouraging
individuals to use the firm’s hotline. Finally, it is
possible that effective mentoring relationships could
reduce the need of employees to utilize anonymous
hotlines, instead relying on their mentors to provide
the conduit to those who can appropriately react to
unethical activity.
Limitations
Finn (1995) asserts that all whistleblowing dilemmas
involve consideration of previous actions and reactions
that are evident in the organizational environment,
33
both from the responses of fellow employees and from
management. Therefore, is it possible that auditors
react from a locus of ‘‘fear’’ rather than or in addition
to ‘‘commitment’’? Certainly, a consideration of the
cost of whistleblowing is common in the ethics lit-
erature. It is possible that fear is as relevant to the
decision as commitment and may create yet another
layer to consider. Innumerable press reports suggest
that whistleblowers can experience considerable
repercussions for their actions and that firms and
whistleblower protection laws do not always protect
against or compensate for retaliation (Chung, 2008).
We leave the exploration of this issue for future study.
We premise this study on a desire to increase
whistleblowing among public accountants, with the
expectation that firms will deal appropriately with the
resulting reports and the reported-upon individuals.
We acknowledge that there are differences of opinion
regarding the ethicality of whistleblowing and the
willingness of firms to encourage whistleblower re-
ports. Our perspective is that while we cannot force
firms to act or to react appropriately, firms cannot
react at all if they are unaware of problematic
behavior. Thus, we consider the act of whistleblow-
ing as a necessary, but not sufficient, step in the process
of firm governance. Once the report is made, those at
the upper levels must complete the process by taking
appropriate actions to resolve the situation. Finally,
personal feelings toward the observed individual may
play into the whistleblowing decision. We control for
this, but encourage future research to consider the role
of interpersonal affect in whistleblowing.
Additionally, participants, setting, and task can all
limit results. Professional environments, like public
accounting, may be different from contexts in pre-
vious whistleblowing research – thus, limiting gen-
eralizability of results to some extent. In certain
studies, individuals may exhibit self-serving biases to
avoid appearing unethical. In this study, participants’
anonymity should mitigate this bias. Additionally,
widespread impression management on the part of
the participants would bias the study toward no
significant differences between participants. Since
we did find significant differences, we can assume
that attempts at impression management, if they did
occur, were not sufficient to mask the actual atti-
tudes of the individuals. Individuals may have had
prior experiences with whistleblowing or with cir-
cumstances similar to those in the vignettes that
34 Eileen Z. Taylor and Mary B. Curtis
could influence their answers. However, based on
data we gathered regarding auditors experiences and
analyses including this measure, it does not appear
that prior experiences with events such as those
described in the vignettes influenced responses.
Additionally, absent incentives for performance,
subjects may put forth inadequate effort, skewing
results. While we eliminated the responses of three
individuals due to incomplete answers, the remain-
der appeared to work the exercise diligently. As
noted earlier, no participants took an unusually short
time to complete the exercise.
Finally, this survey created an artificial setting, thus
potentially compromising results (Pedhazur and
Schmelkin, 1991). Despite our study of ‘‘real’’ pro-
fessionals in a ‘‘real’’ setting, there may be a difference
between an individual’s stated likelihood of whistle-
blowing and that person actually whistleblowing.
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran caution research-
ers against drawing too strong a relationship between
intent and action. Applications of the Theory of
Planned Behavior by Ajzen (1991) and many others
report a wide range of correlates between intention
and action, but the vast majority (c.f., Dowling, 2009)
find that intent provides predictive support for future
action. Certainly, other conditions beyond mere
intent, particularly perceived behavioral control,
influence behavior (Ajzen, 1991).
Future research
This study represents relatively early work on
whistleblowing in audit firms. As the focus on cor-
porate governance increases and as regulation of the
auditing profession increases, it will become more
important for firms to identify and prevent unethical
behavior by employees. Future research topics could
explore additional organizational variables, such as
organizational structure and culture, mentoring or
employee turnover intentions, as well as individual
variables such as level of cognitive moral develop-
ment, age, gender, locus of control, and education
(McDevitt et al., 2007). Future researchers may also
identify mediators between the organization’s
behaviors and those of the employee, such as per-
ceived organizational justice or perceptions of the
success of other whistleblowers’ claims in the same/
similar organization/industry.
Hall et al. (2005) propose three dimensions of
professional commitment (identity) that have differ-
ing effects on employee behavior. Future research
could further explore these dimensions concerning
their influence on whistleblowing intentions. We find
organizational commitment and professional identity
to be correlated, with no interaction in their effect on
reporting intentions, while others have found differ-
ing relationships between the two (Aranya and Ferris,
1984; Bamber and Iyer, 2002). Future research could
further explore when these two commitments act in
concert and when they conflict, particularly con-
cerning ethical dilemmas. Drawing on prior literature
between personal characteristics and ethics,
researchers could also investigate auditors’ personal
characteristics and whistleblowing. For both organi-
zational and personal characteristics, the model pro-
posed by McDevitt et al. (2007) identifies many
possible determinants that have yet to be explored.
Finally, as firms develop reporting mechanisms,
research regarding the effectiveness of various features
of these mechanisms will be important. Such options
could include reporter anonymity, communication
method, and administration (internal or external) of
the hotline.
Notes
1
While it is certainly possible for organizations’ or
those who direct them, to be engaged in unethical or
even illegal conduct, internal whistleblowing cannot
correct this behavior. Thus, the scope of this study is
limited to organizations who want to engage in ethical
conduct and need the assistance of their employees to
identify instances when these standards are violated.
2
According to partners in the Big-4 firms, recent
adoption of hotlines in public accounting is driven both
by recognition of the role that whistleblowing can play
in firm governance (Bedard et al., 2008) as well as re-
cent legal actions by the SEC.
3
Following the lead of Bamber and Iyer (2002), we
use the term ‘‘professional identity,’’ although several
studies also refer to this phenomenon as professional
commitment. Jeffrey and Weatherholt (1996, p. 14) de-
fine commitment as ‘‘…the relative strength of identifi-
cation with and involvement in a particular profession.’’
4
The independence of professional identity and orga-
nizational commitment is supported by Aranya and Fer-
ris (1984) and Bamber and Iyer (2002).
 Whistleblowing Likelihood and Perseverance in Public Accounting
5
Combining these measures also resolves multicolline-
arity issues experienced in prior studies (Kaplan and
Whitecotton, 2001).
6
Repeated measure analysis across cases demonstrates
that moral intensity is significantly related to variations
in reporting intentions between cases (p = 0.00), which
supports our contention that moral intensity is a con-
text-specific indicator. However, professional commit-
ment and locus of commitment are not significantly
related to differences in reporting intentions between
cases (p > 0.21 and p > 0.84, respectively). Addition-
ally, repeated measure analyses mirror the patterns of
significance reported in Table II. Thus, because the
individual cases do not appear to differ in the influence
of professional commitment and locus of commitment
on reporting intentions, we do not find value in delving
into case-specific analyses. Therefore, we average likeli-
hood of reporting and perseverance of reporting across
cases, resulting in one likelihood measure and one per-
severance measure per participant.
7
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) looked
both at intent to report and actual reporting behavior,
but did not consider perseverance.
Appendix A: Experimental measures
Professional identity
1. My values are similar to the audit profes-
sion’s values.
2. I am proud to tell others that I am an auditor.
3. I am extremely glad that I chose to be an
auditor.
4. I really care about the future of public account-
ing.
5. I feel a responsibility to uphold the standards
of public accounting.
6. I will work to protect the reputation of the
auditing profession.
Participants responded based on a 5-point scale:
1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Dis-
agree, 5 = Strongly disagree
Locus of commitment
1. I am more committed to my firm than to
the individuals with whom I work.
35
2. I am more responsible for the success of my
firm than the personal success of my col-
leagues
3. I identify more with my firm than with my
co-workers.
Participants responded based on a 5-point scale:
1 = Strongly-agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Dis-
agree, 5 = Strongly disagree
Moral intensity
Please rate the seriousness of the violations in
each of the scenarios on a scale of 0–100, where
0 is the least serious and 100 is the most serious.
Please rate your responsibility to report the viola-
tions in each of the scenarios on a scale of
0–100, where 0 is the least responsible and 100
is the most responsible.
Perseverance of reporting intention
What is the highest level to which you would report
this event?
1. Would not tell anyone
2. Would tell my peer
3. Would report to someone at the same level
as the affiliate in-charge
4. Would report to someone at the level above
the affiliate in-charge
5. Would pursue to as high a level as needed to
get satisfactory action
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Eileen Z. Taylor
North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, NC, U.S.A.
Mary B. Curtis
University of North Texas,
Denton, TX, U.S.A.
E-mail: Mary.Curtis@unt.edu