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Virtues and ethics within Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku

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Virtues and ethics within Watsuji Tetsurō’s

Rinrigaku

Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth

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ASIAN PHILOSOPHY
https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2020.1736746

Virtues and ethics within Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku

Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth
School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In the second volume of Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsurō focuses on devel- Aidagara; ethical
oping his notion of betweenness (aidagara 間柄) through the ethical organisations; makoto; trust;
organisations (jinrinteki soshiki 人倫的組織) of family, local commu- virtues; Watsuji Tetsurō
nity, economics, cultural community, and the state. Although those
who have commentated on the later volumes have focused on the
controversy which surrounds Watsuji’s account of the state, very little
attention has been paid to the role of virtues within his thought. It is
precisely this academic lacuna which this enquiry is intended to
address. In this paper, there are two particular aims which I hope to
achieve: firstly, I will seek to explicate the role which virtues play
within Watsuji’s ethical system, and secondly, I will attempt to eval-
uate how the virtues inform Watsuji’s normative approach.

Introduction
Watsuji Tetsurō developed his ethical system, Rinrigaku, over the course of three volumes.
The first volume presents ethics as the study of human existence (ningen sonzai 人間存在)
and determines the ethical to be that which takes place between humans (aidagara 間柄).
The second volume builds upon the notion of aidagara and is developed through the
ethical organisations (jinrinteki soshiki 人倫的組織) of family, local community, economics,
cultural community, and the state. The third volume culminates with his theory of history
and climate (fūdo 風土) and how these inform national existence. However, despite the
significance of Watsuji’s thought within Japanese philosophy, only the first volume of his
ethical trilogy has been translated into English. One consequence is that the majority of
literature on Watsuji’s ethics in English has focused upon the abstract account presented
within the first volume. Although there is some secondary literature in English on the
latter two volumes, the majority of commentators, such as LaFleur (2001), Tani (2002), and
Bernier (2008), have focused on his controversial notion of the state. A useful, and
welcome, general overview of the second and third volumes has been provided by
Sevilla (2004, 2017) who also discusses the virtues. However, I intend to go beyond
Sevilla by exploring the way in which these virtues could be constructed to provide an
ethical norm.
There are two particular aims of this enquiry: the first is explicative—i) to focus on
explaining the role of virtues within Watsuji’s ethical system; the second is interpretative—
ii) to determine how virtues inform Watsuji’s normative approach.1 In order to fulfil our aims

CONTACT Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth kshuttleworth01@qub.ac.uk School of History, Anthropology,

Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1PB, UK
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

and accomplish our goal, our enquiry will be conducted in three stages. I will first begin with
a framework for interpretation by discussing alternative normative accounts of virtue-based
ethics (§1). Here I will explicate virtue ethics, within which virtues are foundational, and
virtue theories, which refers to normative theories which incorporate the virtues. Secondly,
I will seek to explicate the role of virtues within Watsuji’s ethical system (§2). Here I will focus
on the second volume of Rinrigaku where Watsuji develops the political connotations of his
theory and demonstrate how the virtues enable the development of ningen sonzai (human
existence) through ethical organisations (jinrinteki soshiki 人倫的組織). Having explicated
the role of virtues within Watsuji’s ethical system, I will then turn to the third stage in my
investigation and attempt to determine the relation between virtues and Watsuji’s norma-
tive approach (§3). Here I will utilise the discussion from the beginning of our enquiry, and
offer some considerations as to whether one ought to conceive of Watsuji as either a virtue
ethicist or virtue theorist.

§1. Ethics and theories of virtues

The English term ‘virtue’ is derived from the Latin virtus which originally possessed
connotations of masculine qualities such as bravery and courage. However, the concept
of virtue eventually came to be applied more generally to people, and to the characteristic
of being good, or doing the right thing (Van Hooft, 2006, p. 2). It is in this respect that we
refer to traits of character which we find to be admirable as ‘virtuous’. Within this article,
we will also understand virtues in this way, namely, as dispositions of character which are
indicative of morally correct actions. The purpose of discussing virtues here is to achieve
an understanding of what these entail, so that we may provide a framework for later
discussion in order to determine the role of virtues with Watsuji’s ethical theory. However,
these aims are frustrated by the fact that there are alterative accounts of how virtues are
to be implemented. More succinctly, in moral theory we find virtue-based approaches
divided into virtue ethics and virtue theories.
Whenever we think of virtues we might initially conceive of virtue ethics, as portrayed
within Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Confucius’ Analects.2 In these texts, the virtues are
morally desirable characteristics which are acquired through habitual action. For Aristotle
(2009), moral virtues are a disposition which is achieved when we act in accordance with
our feelings. In this respect, a virtuous person is one who feels the right emotions when
one ought to, and towards the people whom one ought to feel them (p. 1106b15-24).
However, Aristotle also posits virtues of intellect, which are cultivated by exercising the
rational faculties of deliberation and contemplation. The highest virtue of intellect is
practical wisdom (phronesis) which discloses truth about human goods that govern
action, and which Aristotle (2009) exemplifies through the doctrine of mean, that virtues
are the mean between excess and deficiency (p. 1106a26–b28). For Confucius there are
also two distinct types of virtue: ren and li.3 The former, ren is translated as ‘humaneness’,
and is exemplified through the concept of junzi which denotes an exemplary person. To
achieve ren, Confucius (2004) advocates reciprocity (shu) through the golden mean: ‘what
you do not desire, do not impose on others’ (15.24).4 The latter virtue, li is translated as
‘ritual’, and which encapsulates the ideal of ritual propriety, of conducting funeral rites
and respecting one’s ancestors. Confucius (2004) exemplifies this concept though the
simile of carving a piece of jade, which he draws from the Chinese classic Poetry: ‘as
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 3

though cut, as though chiselled, as though carved, as though polished’ (1.15). That is, in
the same way a jade figurine takes form through continual effort, so too does one’s
character develop.
However, the virtues are not an end in-themselves for Aristotle and Confucius, but the
means to a telos. Aristotle searches for that good which is not reducible to any other good,
but is an end-in-itself. He points out, that when asked, most people will offer a constitutive
list of goods, such as wealth, and friendship. However, Aristotle claims, that good which is
not reducible to any other good, is something which is unique to human beings and
which he terms eudaimonia, or ‘human flourishing’. Thus, on Aristotle’s (2009) account,
that which is conceived of as ‘virtuous’ is rational activity which enables one to achieve
eudaimonia (p. 1098a16). In Confucian thought, the most fundamental concept, and the
end towards which the virtues are directed is dao, which refers to ‘the way’ society ought
to be ordered. For Confucius, to achieve dao is to achieve social harmony and political
stability. Illustrating the similarity between dao and eudaimonia, Yu (1998) claims
‘Aristotle’s eudaimonism is about what is a good human life, and Confucius’ theory of
dao is about which way a human life should take’ (p. 25).
Having discussed alternative approaches to virtue ethics, how then ought we to define
this approach? According to Annas (2011), all virtue ethics advocate arête (excellence),
phronesis (practical wisdom) and eudaimonia (flourishing). Firstly, arête, in general, refers
to excellence of any kind. We can see the virtue of arête within Aristotle’s emphasis on
perfecting the habits, and Confucius’ notion of junzi as encapsulating the ideal of moral
excellence. Secondly, phronesis is a form of practical wisdom, as opposed to theoretical
wisdom, which not only enables one to decide how to achieve a certain end, but also how
to determine that which is consistent with one’s natural end. For Aristotle, practical
wisdom is expressed through the doctrine of mean (virtue as the mean between excess
and deficiency), and in Confucius’ account, practical wisdom is expressed through the
concept of ren which leads one to understand the values one ought to cultivate. Thirdly,
eudaimonia, which is often translated as ‘flourishing’, is considered to be the ultimate end
towards which all human activity ought to be directed. We can see this final dimension in
Aristotle’s account as human flourishing, and in Confucius as dao or ‘the way’, with which
we ought to live in accordance.5
However, simply because an ethical approach contains virtues does not necessitate
that it is a form of virtue ethics. This is evident within Immanuel Kant’s Doctrine of Virtues,
where it is claimed that a virtuous person is one with ethical duties to oneself and to
others. Kant’s (2012) account of virtues are thus secondary to the categorical imperative,
‘act only in accordance to that maxim whenever you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law’ (p. 30). Virtues are then subsumed under this deontolo-
gical approach insofar as Kant formulates the attainment of virtues as an imperative. In
this vein, Kant (2016) declares the ‘supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in
accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have’ (p.
395). Although Kant espouses particular virtues, such as self-respect, honesty, and self-
improvement, he does not adhere to Aristotle’s definition. By ‘virtue’, Kant (2016) means
the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling one’s duty, and he defines duties of
virtue as ‘ends which are also duties’ (pp. 382–386). Moreover, contrary to Aristotle, who
believed humans had a natural end, for Kant, humans are defined by their ability to set
their own end. Thus, unlike Aristotle and Confucius, for whom virtues entail character
4 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

development, which in turn leads to eudaimonia, the end for Kant is to realise one’s end.
That is, whilst eudaimonia entails a natural teleology, Kant claims the individual must posit
their telos for themselves.
A further approach which deviates from virtue ethics, but which differs from Kant’s
account, is that developed by John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism. For Mill, we cultivate
virtues with the belief that they will lead to the end of happiness. As Mill (1998) himself
elucidates, ‘those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the con-
sciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or
for both reasons’ (p. 172). In this way, an action is virtuous not because of its innate value,
such as character development, but only on account of its consequence.6 That is, we do
not engage in courageous acts simply to be courageous, but because we believe doing so
will increase happiness. This approach is then contrary to Kant, who emphasises that we
ought to adhere to moral absolutes and we are only considered virtuous to the extent
that we adhere to these. Mill’s approach also deviates from the virtue ethics of Aristotle
and Confucius, which not only focus on character development, but by doing so con-
tribute to the preservation of society. It also differs from Kant insofar as an action is
deemed to be virtuous based on the consequence, rather than duty.
Although it has been illustrated that Kant’s and Mill’s approaches to normative ethics
also contain virtues, this, however, does not make them virtue ethics. According to
Hursthouse and Pettigrove (2016), if virtues are reduced to some other normative concept
which is taken to be more fundamental then it is not a virtue ethic, but a virtue theory.
That which defines a virtue theory is that whilst an ethical norm is central, the virtues are
nevertheless incorporated. Thus, contrary to virtue ethics, which focuses on how one
should live, virtues of theory are more concerned with what one should do. A further
difference, which becomes apparent from the aforementioned distinction, is that theories
of virtue are focused on action, whereas virtue ethics are focused on character. We can
thus categorise Kant and Mill as virtue ethicists insofar as they are both ultimately
concerned with our actions. Kant advocates virtues to the extent that we recognise our
duties to others and ourselves, and for Mill, virtues are desirable only when they bring
about the consequence of increased pleasure. Having explained the two alterative, virtue-
based, ethical norms, we will now turn our attention to explicating Watsuji’s account of
virtues and the role which virtues play within his ethical system.

§2. Ethical organisations and virtues

In the untranslated second volume of Rinrigaku, Watsuji develops his ethical perspective
regarding the dual structure of human existence and its negative unfolding.7 Here,
however, he moves from abstract ethical theory to illustrate the concrete application
and physical manifestation of his concept of betweenness (aidagara 間柄). The account
which Watsuji develops is unmistakably indebted to the third sphere of right within
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1991), where Hegel develops his theory of ethical life (sit-
tlichkeit). Watsuji’s interpretation of sittlichkeit is ‘ethical organisation’ (jinrinteki soshiki 人
倫的組織) which is composed of family, local community, economy, cultural community,
and the state. As with Hegel’s account, dialectic and mediation are also fundamental to
Watsuji’s ethical organisations. The dialectic element concerns the movement from the
particular to the universal. This is expressed through the development from private life,
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 5

which is portrayed as the exclusion of others, to public existence, which emphasises

increased social involvement. This dialectical movement is facilitated by instances of
mediation which unify those who share a particular relation, and exclude those who
do not.
Where Rinrigaku differs significantly from Philosophy of Right is in the idea that each
stage is dependent upon trust (shinrai 信頼) within each relationship, by which the
individual expresses sincerity, or truthfulness (makoto 真).8 Watsuji develops this account
at the end of volume one, where ‘trust’ and ‘truth’ are employed as technical terms with
very specific meanings. Trust is not simply putting one’s faith in another with the hope
that one’s faith will be upheld. For Watsuji, rather, trust refers to the fulfilment of relations
which move from the negation of private life towards increased public existence. As
Watsuji (1996) himself explains, ‘the ground of trust consists exactly in the movement of
the multiplication/unification of subjects through the path of negation’ (p. 269). This path
of negation entails the negation of negation, and which Watsuji appropriates from Hegel.
Truth is likewise employed in a very particular manner, and is defined in relation to trust.
Rather than expressing an epistemic condition, Watsuji’s account of truth entails the
sincere realisation of trust between two parties. In Watsuji’s (1996) own words ‘makoto
as an attitude assumed in response to trust consists of the realization of socio-ethical unity
via the path of negation and hence reveals the authentic feature of ningen sonzai’ (p. 276).
Through the concepts of trust and truth an ethical relation is then established. However,
we also see the introduction of virtues (bitoku 美徳) within the second volume of
Rinrigaku and it is this particular aspect which we will focus our attention on explicating.9
Watsuji’s account of ethical organisations begins with the family. In his analysis, the
smallest social totality is the couple, which he characterises through participation and
exclusivity. What this entails is that the couple achieve unity, or participation by excluding
others from their relationship. In order for this dialectical relationship to develop, in terms
of individuality to totality, Watsuji explains the role of marital virtues. In his account,
participation and exclusivity are achieved when the virtues of fidelity (teisou 貞操), and
marital harmony (fūfu sōwa 夫婦総和) are adhered to by husband and wife. Through
vowing their loyalty and keeping their word, the two individuals transcend their indivi-
duality to become a self-sufficient unit. Thus, whenever both individuals trust one another
to be loyal the totality of husband and wife is achieved. However, when the couple
procreate, the sexual intimacy between them is negated by their child. This, however, is
seen as a development in the family relation since the child mediates the couple’s
connection through a shared blood-relation. Whilst the couple’s connection developed
trust through faithfulness, the child achieves the ideal of trust through the Confucian
virtue of filial piety (kō 孝). As Watsuji elucidates, ‘that which is called “filial duty” toward
children is this “sincerity” (makoto). In the same way, a parent also places a deep trust in
a child. When the child is young, this potential is trusted; and when the adult matures, this
actuality is trusted’ (p. 401).10 That is, whenever the parents trust the child to fulfil its filial
duties, and the child does not betray their parents, but behaves in a truthful way, harmony
is achieved within the family.
Although the family forms a communal totality in Watsuji’s account, the privacy of the
family relation is negated by that of the local community. Here the relation is between
neighbours who share a way of life, rather than a bond built upon sexual intimacy or
blood relations. In this way, the dialectical movement is achieved through a literal
6 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

common-ground which is shared by a particular group of people. To achieve a higher

level of totality within the local community, Watsuji argues that the family must place the
community before themselves by employing civic virtues. The particular virtues which
enable this communal shift are integration (ichinin mae ni naru 一人前になる), frater-
nity (hakuai 博愛), and consideration (kokorozukai 心遣い). Here we see the develop-
ment of trust relations between members of the community who arrive at truth through
acting towards the greater good, rather than individual interest. That is, whenever
individuals act virtuously by integrating and putting the community first, consider others
instead of themselves, and form fraternal bonds, we see the ethical establishment of the
local community. Thus, it is only by becoming an active member of one’s community,
through establishing common-bonds and by putting the community before one’s own
personal interests, or family relations, that the ethical relation within the community can
be realised.11
For Watsuji, the next stage of ethical organisation is the economy. Within the local
community a connection was established through the inhabitation of shared land, how-
ever the economy transcends the local community insofar as workers jointly labour upon
this shared land. Whilst modern homo-economicus theory focuses on the individual agent,
Watsuji rejects this perspective and instead presents a relational account of economics.
Building upon Bronisław Malowinski’s anthropological theory of reciprocity, Watsuji
argues that economic relations are established through exchange. That is, rather than
simply satisfying individual desire, Watsuji understands the primary purpose of economic
activity as developing relations with others through products, and supporting one’s
family in doing so. For example, a farmer does not keep livestock for the sole purpose
of capital acquisition, but to provide for members of their community and to feed their
family. As Watsuji explains, ‘economic organisation is an inter-human ethical organisation
mediated by goods. And what the economic activity within this organisation aims for is not
the satisfaction of desires, but inter-human ethical unity’ (p. 489).12 In order to develop the
ethical totality inherent within economic exchange, Watsuji emphasises the virtues of
mutual service (sōgo ni hōshi 相互に奉仕) in economic relations, and building human
bonds through products (seisan katsudō o tsūjite musubareru ningen kankei 生産活動を
通じて結ばれる人間関係). Providing mutual service is virtuous because it aids the
further development from individual interest towards that of the economy, enriching
the lives of those whom it affects. Furthermore, it builds bonds beyond the local com-
munity since products can be traded and exported to other communities.
This leads to the next stage of ethical organisation: cultural community. For Watsuji,
culture is composed of language, art, scholarship, and religion. Language is the most
fundamental aspect of culture because it underpins all other aspects. Through communal
membership, language expresses a pre-existing mutual understanding which is shared
between the members of a particular community. However, in bringing those within
a shared community together, language also excludes those from other cultures (pp.
528–532). Art expresses the essence of a community—the ground of existence with which
a particular culture identifies, and as such, art is culturally specific (pp. 532–555).
Scholarship is part of culture because it does not merely represent the individual’s private
learning but is a cumulative process of shared understanding (pp. 549–551). Religion also
symbolises the return to the home-ground of existence. However, religion is not universal,
but distinctive of a particular community (pp. 559–561). In Watsuji’s account, those who
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 7

share a landmass and language are referred to as ‘friends’ (yūjin 友人) and by participating
in culture form a spiritual community. For this reason, Wastuji claims that by cultivating
the virtue of friendship (yūjō 友情) the cultural community progresses towards totality,
through which a spiritual community is formed that transcends filial and geographical
relations. Thus, by treating those as friends who share a culture, a spiritual community is
formed which bounds those from a range of backgrounds.
The final stage in Watsuji’s social account is that of the state. Unlike modern states,
which are but one among many social organisations, Watsuji takes the state to be an all-
encompassing ideal which incorporates the aforementioned aspects of society. That is,
the state contains the family, local community, economy, cultural community, and their
constituent parts. In this way, the state represents the highest social totality within which
all private existence has been transcended. In Watsuji’s account, the cohesive aspect of
the state, which bounds and orders all subsequent ethical organisations, is termed
‘sacredness’. The sacredness between the various organisations is then mediated by the
force of law which compels and maintains the structural order of the prior stages of
ethical organisation. In order to preserve this ethical totality, Watsuji advocates
a Confucian-inspired political programme. Watsuji defines justice (seigi 正義), as ‘giving
all citizens their place’ by which he means ‘working toward every person being able to
realize communal existence through the mediation of one’s private existence, and that
[every person] may be a member of the state as the unity of the realization of their paths’
(p. 623).13 The relationship between the citizen and the ruler develops to the extent that
the ruler trusts the citizen to behave in a lawful way, and this trust is qualified when the
citizens exercise the virtue of absolute obedience (zettai fukujū 絶対服従) to the state.
This relationship, however, is reciprocal insofar as the citizen must simultaneously trust
the ruler not to become a tyrant, and the ruler rewards the citizen’s trust through the
virtue of benevolent rule (jinsei 仁政). Thus, for Watsuji, it is only when these trust
relationships are fulfilled that the citizens may find their place, and be obedient, and
which will in turn lead to the benevolence of rulers and harmony within the state.14
Having provided a brief account of Watsuji’s ethical organisations, we are now in
a position to address our first question—what role do virtues play within Rinrigaku?
Through analysing each of the particular ethical organisations within Watsuji’s account,
it was revealed that each organisation is composed of a unit whose relationship is
developed towards public life through a particular medium and which is realised and
protected through organisation-specific virtues. That is, the family, for example, is com-
prised of the couple whose sexual relationship is developed through love, and the love
between them is mediated through marital harmony (see Figure 1. below for
a categorisation of these). A further way in which virtues develop private life towards
public existence is by ensuring the development of trust relations between couples,
parent and child, community members, friends, and citizens to rulers. Through these
trust relations, private life is negated and existence becomes increasingly more communal
and inclusive. From our analysis, we can therefore reveal that the role of the virtues within
Rinrigaku is to ensure the development of trust and the realisation of truth. Having
revealed the role of virtues within Watsuji’s ethical system, we will now turn our attention
to determining whether his account ought to be interpreted in terms of virtue ethics or
virtue theory.
8 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

Ethical Unit Relation Means of Virtues

Organisation Mediation

Family Couple Sexual Love Fidelity, Marital harmony

Children Biological Filial piety

Community Neighbours Geographical Shared way Integration, fraternity,

of life consideration

Economy Community Reciprocal Goods Mutual service, building bonds

through products

Language, Language,
Culture Art, Scholarship, Spiritual Art, Friendship
Religion Scholarship,
Religion
Family,
State Community, Sacred Law Absolute obedience, Justice,
Economy, Benevolent rule
Culture

Figure 1. Watsuji's ethical organisations, their relations, means of mediation, and respective virtues

§3. Watsujian virtue ethics or virtue theory?

In the first section, it was noted that there are two possible approaches: virtue ethics,
within which virtues are fundamental, and virtue theories, which incorporate virtues. Here
we will turn our attention to determining which of these, if either, Watsuji’s account ought
to be categorised as. As already noted, Aristotle is considered to be one of the founders of
virtue ethics, and as many of the key features of virtue ethics are derived from his account
I will begin by comparing Watsuji’s approach to Aristotle’s. A political comparison of
Watsuji’s system to Aristotle’s has previously been conducted by Okuda Kazuhiko, who
notes the positive influence exerted upon Watsuji by Aristotle. Okuda (1997) begins by
illustrating how Watsuji follows from Aristotle in terms of situating the ethical develop-
ment of humans in relation to their political structure. More specifically, ‘Watsuji saw in
Aristotle the prototypical science of ethics as the study of ningen as well as the role of the
polis (the nation) in the moral development of people in everyday life’ (p. 2). However,
whilst Okuda notes the similarity between Aristotle and Watsuji, he also recognises the
differences. That is, ‘Watsuji finds Aristotle’s concept of ethics very congenial, though not
identical, to his concept of ethics as the study of ningen’ (p. 3). The main ways in which
Watsuji diverges from Aristotle, in Okuda’s account, are in terms of his concept of
‘inbetweenness’, and the dialectical unity of opposites which Watsuji derived from
Hegel. As Okuda elucidates, ‘Watsuji’s point of departure from Aristotle is recognizable,
for human existence (ningen sonzai) is disclosed in the dialectical unity of the opposites of
individual and the public’ (p. 3).
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 9

However, whilst Okuda expresses the relation between Watsuji and Aristotle, and
provides us with a useful context, his enquiry is firmly fixed on political philosophy and
does not say anything specific about virtues. From our explication of Watsuji’s account,
we may, however, detect one significant difference in the role of virtues between these
two theorists. For Aristotle, virtues transcend filial, economic, and political relations. That
is, when an individual cultivates courage they do not act in isolation for themselves,
their family, or economy, but always towards the cultivation of their community as
a whole. In Watsuji’s account, on the other hand, each level of relations has its own
virtues. As Sevilla (2017) makes explicit, ‘“virtue” is always specific to particular trust
relationships: marital harmony is between husband and wife, mutual service is in
economic relations, and justice is in the relationship of citizens and the state’ (p. 91).
In this way, Watsuji’s account of the virtues departs from Aristotle’s, offering a more
nuanced approach.
We can nevertheless see correlations between Watsuji and Confucius in many of the
virtues and the functions they fulfil in developing social relations. For example, the
relationship between husband and wife, as one which is complimentary. As Watsuji
(1962) elucidates, ‘what we can draw out from the unity of a couple is the complementary
relationship between husband and wife. This has been understood as a yin-yang relation-
ship since olden times . . . ’ (p. 379).15 We can also see parallels between the virtues, such as
the child’s filial piety, the citizens’ absolute obedience, and the ruler’s benevolence. In
exemplifying the obedience of citizens, Confucius (2004) claims ‘the ruler is to be like the
wind; the people like the grass that bends in whatever direction the wind blows’ (12:19).
Whilst we have illustrated that Watsuji’s account of the virtues diverges from many of the
characteristics of Aristotelian virtue ethics, we can nevertheless see correlations with the
virtue ethics of Confucius. However, perhaps a more congenial approach, to determine
whether Watsuji is an advocate of virtue ethics, would be to question whether his account
adheres to Annas’ threefold criteria of arête (excellence), phronesis (practical wisdom) and
eudaimonia (flourishing).
For both Aristotle and Confucius, human flourishing is that which the virtues work
towards achieving, but what would this entail within Watsuji’s account? It was previously
suggested that the virtues led to the development of trust relations. However, according
to Tani Toru, truth and trust are not fundamental, but instrumental to another end. As Tani
(2002) makes explicit ‘despite their prominence, [truth and trust] are valued only for their
roles in the movement toward totality, and are not recognised as being independent
values or goods in themselves. For Watsuji, it is rather the recovery of totality that is
regarded as the ultimate good’ (p. 513). What, then, is this totality, and do trust and truth
cause this totality? According to Tani, they do not, and this totality is the movement
towards honraisei (本来性), which has been translated as ‘authenticity’ and which signifies
the homeground of existence.16 As Tani continues ‘[truth and trust are not to be] regarded
as being the cause of the recovery movement of totality, since the movement occurs of
itself, as a return movement toward honraisei or “authenticity”’ (Watsuji, 2002).
However, one ought to question whether Tani is correct in asserting that trust and
truth are mere means. This comes into question because there is an alternative reading of
honraisei as the dynamic process of endless double-negation, within which it appears that
one cannot have honraisei without its realisation through trust and truth. In Watsuji’s
(1996) own words, ‘the standpoint of the whole is established as the negation of the
10 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

negation of absolute negativity; that is, as its returning to itself’ (p. 121). However, he
elucidates that this is only attained within the ethical organisations of family, community,
economy, culture, and nation. As Watsuji (1996) explains, ‘without the formation of the
socio-ethical whole, the movement of returning to the Absolute could not occur’ (p. 122).
In line with that which has been established in the previous section, I acknowledge that
honrasei is achieved through a process of double-negation within the socio-ethical whole.
However, whilst Watsuji claims totality is dependent upon the socio-ethical whole, this
reading does not necessarily entail that trust and truth are other than a means to
honraisei. Thus, in this respect I side with Tani, that the end towards which the virtues
are directed, and that which we ought to understand as Watsuji’s equivalent to eudaimo-
nia is honraisei or ‘authentic’ existence.
With regards to arête, we might conceive of individuals as achieving excellence in the
attainment of emptiness. In the first volume of Rinrigaku, Watsuji claims that emptiness is
something which individuates, but this nevertheless leads to totality. In order to explain,
Watsuji (1996) offers the examples of Jesus and Buddha as people who realise emptiness
in individual existence and then return to non-duality of self and other by reintegrating
into society. That is, Jesus and Buddha were both individuals insofar as they both rejected
their contemporary social norms, and set out on their own paths. However, neither Jesus
nor Buddha remained outsiders upon rejecting the social conventions but sought to
reintegrate and improve their society: ‘they returned into the midst of the socio-ethical
organization, expounded a “new social ethics” or established a society of priests as an
ideal yet typical socio-ethical organization’ (p. 122). In this respect, both Jesus and Buddha
achieved excellence in the attainment of emptiness insofar as they did not remain part of
their community, nor did they become solitary individuals, but transcended this
dichotomy.
In Watsuji’s account, however, we cannot find a corresponding conception of the
dimension of phronesis, which denotes practical wisdom in terms of knowing how to
cultivate a more virtuous disposition. It could be said that for Watsuji, practical wisdom is
made manifest when one acts upon one’s ethical inclinations and works towards
increased public life within one’s respective ethical organisation. That is, whilst one may
realise that economic activity enables one to live a luxurious lifestyle, or provide for one’s
family, one can be seen to exercise practical reason when one recognises the benefit of
mutual exchange. However, to posit such an approach would be to go against the
fundamental constitution of aidagara, which is key to Watsuji’s conception of ethics itself.
Moreover, as seen in the prior section, any such progress occurs and is achieved through
the dynamic process of the negation of negation within society itself.
Despite demonstrating that Watsuji’s account of the virtues adheres to eudaimonia and
arête, the dimension of phronesis remains amiss. Since Watsuji cannot be said to hold
a theory of virtue ethics, in accordance with Annas’ threefold criteria, I will now turn to
considering Watsujian virtues in accordance with the definition of virtue theory. There
were two main characteristics which separated virtue theory from virtue ethics. Firstly,
whilst virtue ethics places an emphasis on character development, virtue theorists are
more concerned with action, which Kant understood in terms of duty and Mill understood
as consequence. Thus, we will begin by questioning whether Watsuji places a premium on
what one ought to do. As stated above, Watsuji’s account of virtues does not lead to
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 11

excellence of character, but the development of relations between humans. Can this,
however, be understood as a prescriptive ethic?
For Kant, one’s actions are based on duties which are derived from particular laws. The
correct action for Kant is that which one determines and acts in accordance with. Watsuji,
however, advocates an account which negates any sense of individuality. And although
his account of law is derived from the state, there is no sense of duty on the citizen’s
behalf. Mill’s emphasis on action, on the other hand, is not based on obligations which we
are expected to fulfil, but what is important is the consequence of one’s action. In
particular, the end goal of human action for Mill is happiness. Whilst the end for Watsuji
is to realise the social totality through trust and truth, we can nevertheless understand this
in terms of consequentialism. In saying that, there is an emphasis on cultivating virtues as
a means towards the action of increased totally. Thus, although Watsuji does not empha-
sise that agents possess any particular duties, as in the case with Kant, his account can
nevertheless be understood to be action based, insofar as the virtues work towards the
consequence of social harmony.
The second key characteristic of virtue theory was that rather than leading to the telos
of eudaimonia, the virtues are relegated to an alternative ethical norm. And although we
have previously demonstrated that honraisei is the end goal of ethical action, perhaps it
ought to be understood as a norm, as opposed to teleology. That is, rather than leading to
honraisei, can Watsujian virtues instead be understood to be relegated to honraisei
instead? Due to the structure of Watsuji’s ethical organisations, there is a very definite
development towards an end which the virtues facilitate. Namely, through enabling trust
and truth to be established, the virtues lead to increased communal existence, which
culminates in honraisei. Thus, the virtues are not subsidiary, but instrumental in the
realisation of honraisei. In this sense, Watsuji departs from Kant, for whom the categorical
imperative is that which compels one to act, rather than any particular end goal. And
although Mill’s account can be understood to be teleological, insofar as it works towards
the end of happiness, it is nevertheless reducible to the norm of maximising pleasure.
That is, for Mill, whilst happiness is the end goal of human action, this goal is justified in
terms of the principle of utility. In this way, Watsujiian virtues do not correspond to virtue
theory, insofar as Watsuji holds a teleological account of eudaimonia rather than a norm
which the virtues are reduced to. What we have revealed within this enquiry is that
Watsuji’s account corresponds to virtue ethics in terms of eudaimonia and arête, but bears
a similarity to virtue theory insofar as it emphasises action in terms of consequences, as
opposed to character development. What, then, are we to conclude?

Conclusion
This article began with the intention of achieving two particular ends: firstly, to explicate
the role of virtues within Watsuji’s ethical system, and secondly, to determine how the
virtues inform Watsuji’s normative approach. With regards to the first question, it was
revealed that virtues enable the development of trust relations through the realisation of
truth. That is, by developing trust among different social groups, an ethical totality can be
formed which leads to increased public existence until we arrive at the highest totality of
the state, where ethics is realised in terms of the state which preserves each of the
preceding stages within an ethical totality. In our attempt to determine the role which
12 K. M. J. SHUTTLEWORTH

virtues play within Watsuji’s ethical system, it appears as though he offers an amalgama-
tion of Hegel’s concept of society which is substantiated with Aristotelian and Confucian
virtue ethics. However, perhaps as a consequence of this philosophical-fusion, Watsuji’s
account cannot be categorised in terms of virtue ethics, or virtue theory. From our
definitions, of virtue ethics as focused on character with virtues leading to eudaimonia,
and virtue theory as action-based with the virtues facilitating duty, Watsuji’s account
cannot be reduced to either of these rigid categories. Watsuji’s account bears similarities
to each, though to attribute it to either would require us to make concessions, which
would ultimately distort Watsuji’s account. Thus, rather than attempting to force his
account into a pre-established category, we will instead offer a more nuanced conclusion,
and claim that, in true Watsujian style, his account of virtues is not reducible to either
virtue ethics or virtue theory, but instead exists in the in-betweenness of these two
theories.

Notes
1. Although the aim of this article is to determine that which is entailed by Watsuji’s normative
approach, my intention is to provide a foundation for future research. In particular, once
I have provided the foundation here, I intend to build upon this exposition by demonstrating
the importance of Watsujian virtues in relation to alterative normative approaches, such as
the exemplary virtue ethics and Kantian and consequentialist virtue theories discussed here.
2. Confucius himself did not commit any of his thought to paper (or bamboo), but rather the
ideas which are attributed to him within the Analects are supposed teachings which were
posthumously collected and composed by his students.
3. Hui-chieh Loy also includes yi (right conduct) as a virtue, but as he also notes, unlike ren and li,
which are focused in character, yi is concerned with action, and as such, it is not a virtue per se.
As Loy makes explicit, ‘just as ren is most naturally taken to be an attribute of character, yi is
most naturally construed as a quality of actions; a concern with yi thus seems to be a concern
with right action rather than good character.’ (Loy, 2014, p. 290)
4. Whilst shu functions negative insofar as it tells us what not to do, there is also a positive
dimension of reciprocity (zhong), which tells us how we ought to act.
5. Although the virtue ethics which have been discussed are both eudaimonian, there are also
alternative approaches, such as agent-based virtue ethics, and target-centred virtue ethics.
Agent-based virtue ethicists, such as Michael Slote (2001) and Linda Zagzebski (2004), argue
that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia—are traced back to and
ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents. The
target-centred view developed by Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing
conceptions of the virtues.
6. Contemporary consequentialist approaches to virtues include Philippa Foot, who in Virtues
and Vices characterises virtues in terms of the consequentialist properties of their ability to
achieve human goodness (Foot, 1978). Julia Driver, in Uneasy Virtue, likewise argues that ‘a
virtue is a character trait that produces more good (in the actual world) than not system-
atically.’ (Driver, 2001, p. 82)
7. In the first volume of Rinrigaku, Watsuji argues that human nature possesses a dual structure.
Namely, persons are both individuals and social beings. However, whenever we privilege one
over the other, we must negate the other. That is, we become individuals by negating our
community, and more communal by negating our individuality. However, Watsuji claims
neither of these approaches are acceptable and instead suggests that we must overcome this
dichotomy through ‘double negation’. That is, we must endorse neither individuality nor
community, but negate both. It is this double negation which leads to the true ethical
standpoint where we discover all things exist in an interconnected web of relations. Only
 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 13

when we realise our interconnectedness can we discover our authentic existence (honraisei)
and truly act ethically.
8. For Hegel, on the other hand, it is the development of freedom through the unfurling of
absolute spirit. For a comparison of Watsuji’s jinrinteki soshiki to Hegel’s sittlichkeit, see
Liederbach (2016).
9. Although Watsuji himself does not explicitly demarcate the attributes which I will focus on as
’virtues’ within Rinrigaku, I follow from Anton Sevilla in my embellishment of these as virtues
on Watsuji’s behalf. This reading is, however, qualified by Watsuji himself in Various Aspects of
Virtues (美徳の諸祖) which appears as an ‘attached explanation’ at the end of the tenth
volume of Watsuji Tetsurō Zenshū. (Watsuji, 1962)
10. 子への「孝養」として言い現されたものはこの「まこと」であった° 同様に親もまた子
に対して深い信頼をかける° 子の幼い間はその可能性が信頼され、子が成長すればこの
現実性が信頼される° .
11. Although private existence is negated, it is simultaneously preserved, for example, whilst the
dimension of exclusivity is lost between the couple this is also made manifest in terms of
a common way of life shared by the community. (pp. 460–468). Furthermore, the family is
preserved through the negative connotations which surround bigamy and infidelity.
12. 経済的組織は財を媒介とする人倫組織である° そうしてこの組織における経済的活動
が目ざすところは、欲望の充足そのものでなくして、欲望充足を通じて人倫的合一で
ある° .
13. 万民に右のごとき所を得しめることを我々は正義と呼ぶことができるであろう° それは
いかなる人もがそれぞれ私的存在を媒介として共同存在を実現し得るよう に、そうし
てそれらの道の実現の統一として国家の成員たり得るように、仕向けることである° .
14. Watsuji has been criticised by Naoki (1997) and Harootunian (2001) on the grounds that his
notions of absolute obedience and benevolent rule are indicative of totalitarianism.
However, on this debate I side with LaFleur (1978), Shields (2009), Kalmanson (2010), and
Sevilla (2014), who each hold that Watsuji’s account does not in fact lead to totalitarianism
or fascism.
15. 夫婦の和合の道としてあらわに説かれ得るのは、夫婦の間の補足的関係である° これは
古くより陰陽の関係として把捉せられていたものであって° ° ° .
16. In Ethics, it can be seen that the emptiness which Watsuji contends is the ‘origin’ (honraisei 本
来性) out of which self and other both emerge, is the same emptiness which the meditator
breaks through to as the true reality (shinsō 真相) of the body in an event which discloses it as
united to the emptiness of the world. (WTZ 10, 71, 195.) For discussion and development of
honraisei as an ethical ideal within Rinrigaku, see Shuttleworth and James (2019).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5994-3351

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