BLE CASE DIGESTS 1 – 15

LORENZANA V AUSTRIA

HELD:

CA Ruling:

On the respondent judge austria’s unnecessary bickering with SCP's legal counsel and ruled
that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority.

Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be
temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct
unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.

On the judge’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) — even during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend — constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the public's acceptance of this type of conduct. Likewise, the propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and
that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office

On finding the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
and recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her
office.

SC Ruling:

On the ground of impropriety, judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and
from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby
shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when
she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
To clarify, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. According Section 6,
Cannon 4 of the New Code of Judicial conduct, recognizes that judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions
without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers. Joining social networking sites are not violative of the said code per se.

However, the same code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of
their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary. This rule applies the principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives, as
provided in sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

When communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate — regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties — creates and contributes to the people's opinion not just of the judge
but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part, especially when the posts are
viewable to the general public, and not just by his friends or family.

We are not also unaware that the respondent's act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards
of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves. This exacting standard applies
both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very nature of their
functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety;
both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach. Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their
oath of office as magistrates.
 BELO-HENARES V GUEVARRA

HELD:

The respondent Guevarra invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private
remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus,
when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy.

The court ruled that the defense is untenable. Facebook is a voluntary social network to
which members subscribe and submit information. . . . It has a worldwide forum enabling
friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another. A
user can post on FB, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy
settings. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity — in this case, Facebook — it is first necessary that said user manifests
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. The utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation in the cyber world of the user’s invocation of his/her right to privacy.

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter
has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well
as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's
statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

Even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were viewable by his
"Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same — or other digital content that he
uploads or publishes on his profile — will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy,
in light of the following: (1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way"; (2) A good number
of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number of
"Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user's Facebook friend can
"share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former,
despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.

Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of others who do not belong to one's circle of friends. The
user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore,
respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
The Court did not accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the
exercise of his freedom of speech and expression. It has been held that the freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While the
freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most
zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil
Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of
to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring
them into disrepute. The Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were made
with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI.

Respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are,
therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 — A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

The respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must
behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of
the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning
complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance
of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks
of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession — would
show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and
the law invest in them."
 VIVARES V ST THERESA’S COLLEGE

HELD:

The right to informational privacy on Facebook,

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he
explained the three strands of the right to privacy – (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy, which is defined as the right of individuals to control information
about themselves.

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system's inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual's right to control said flow of information should
be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." It is due to this notion that the
Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the
right to privacy.

This is the reason why the Court provided judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the
right to privacy. In the landmark case, H v. W decided by the South African High Court,
"[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also
socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. . . . It is imperative that the
courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.". As
such, the court developed the Philippine version of the habeas data, in effect recognizing
that an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging
in cyberspace activities, including those in online social networks.
Facebook’s privacy Tools: a recompose to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities.

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images
(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’s profile
picture and ID, by selecting his/her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public — the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends — only the user's Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(c) Friends — only the user's Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom — the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me — the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The said privacy tools, available to Facebook users, are designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user's point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its
users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] — and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences. As the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer
Facebook users can view their post.

STC did not violate the petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy.

It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto. However, this does not mean that FB user
automatically has a protected expectation of privacy in all their FB activities.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners' children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post's or profile detail's privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user's own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at “Friends.”
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebook's privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. Had it been proved that
the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me
Only" privacy setting, or that the user's contact list has been screened to limit access to a
select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user's friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable
 BURBE v MAGULTA (PRACTICE OF LAW IS NOT A BUSINESS)

HELD:

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of
the Complaint on behalf of his client, and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money
given for the filing fee.

The Court held that lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not
only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to
the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. Members
of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between
him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. A lawyer-
client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the former’s business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. A
lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the attorney’s fees. Despite the fact the
lawyer dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor, the lawyer was duty-
bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare — and had actually prepared — at the
soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.

Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.

THE PRACTICE OF LAW IS NOT A BUSINESS

Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profit. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a
byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant — as evidenced
by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent — the latter also violated the
rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them
in their professional capacity. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may
come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true
that lawyers have a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that the may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's
interest within the bounds of law.

Much is demanded from an attorney, because they are entrusted with the privilege to
practice law, which carries with it duties not only to the client, but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his
breach of duty.
 MILLARE V MONTERO (GUN FOR HIRE)

HELD:

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to

represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and
warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03).
In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable
construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law.
He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless action. Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer’s zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications.

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert

every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.

Rule 12.02 – a lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 – a lawyers shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgement
or misuse court processes.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when,
by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, the defendant ventures to another for a
more favorable resolution of his case. By having willfully and knowingly abused his rights
of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed
respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just
and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws. In filing a
number of pleadings, actions and petitions, respondent has made a mockery of the judicial
processes and disregarded the canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the
rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgement in the case was rendered, thus, abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice.
 CAYETANO v MONSOD

HELD:

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law" particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement – that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first
becoming lawyers.
 PIMENTEL V LEB

HELD:

Contrary to the petitioners claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over
legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court
invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of legal
education is an Executive function.

COURT’s ECLUSIVE RULE-MAKING POWER COVERS THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND NOT
THE STUDY OF LAW

The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the
power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.

Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the
Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized
practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law
is a judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles.”

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to
cover the study of law.

A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which
the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and
supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by
the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.

CONCLUSION

In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not
encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the Constitution. The State has the jurisdiction to lay down laws relative to legal
education, the same being instilled with public interest.

The Court affirms that the supervision and regulation of legal education. is a political
exercise, where judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent
branch of government, but as part of the sovereign people.
With regards to the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged is settled as
belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which,
by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the Court's
exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck
down.

However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude
for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among
the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the
PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic
freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these
objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to protect public interest
by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the
institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit
pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the
recognition of academic discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise
should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.

The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.

CONSTITUTIONAL
Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set
the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the
qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum
qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning.

Unconstitutional for encroaching on the power of the Court

Sec 2, par 2 as it unduly includes “continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control
Sec 3 (Aa) (2) and Sec 7 (2) the objective of legal education to increase awareness among
members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors
of society;
the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar
Sec 7 (h) as it gives the LEB the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal
education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary
Unconstitutional for being ultra vires

The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying
admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to
admit, particularly

Provides that all college graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the
basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to
any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as
a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws
or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the
start of studies for the basic law course.

Prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law schools.

The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and
classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of
institutional academic freedom on who may teach.

The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach
 SIBAL V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

HELD:

It must be pointed out that in Sibal’s petition for relief he stated that he instructed his
counsel to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal of the Decision
dated December 5, 2001, whereas in his affidavit of merit, he claimed to have told his
counsel to simply file a notice of appeal thereof.

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the
petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable
negligence to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/petitioner to pursue his appeal

Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him
for the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary
relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced;
that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in his situation considering that it was a
counsel de officio, a lawyer from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that reliance
on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a
crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness.

The court granted the petition.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Rule 46, on the ground that petitioner failed to attach certain documents which
the CA found to be relevant and pertinent to the petition for certiori

The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and pertinent
to the petition rests on the petitioner. If the CA is of the view that additional pleadings,
documents or orders should have been submitted and appended to the petition, the
following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings,
documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an
amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a
fixed period.

In the case at bar, the CA failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was filed by
petitioner, a detained prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a
lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced
lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. We have held in a civil case that to demand as
much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn
the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of
his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not
know how to establish such right.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the
judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded
the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an
on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the
lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. No arrangement or interpretation of alw
could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and
that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.

The filing of the petition for certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted
the CA and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel.
Although the petition filed before the CA was a petition for certiorari assailing the RTC
Order dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to
be given the chance to file an appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is
more pronounced.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the

bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Cases
should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory,
we have on some occasions relaxed this rule.

The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. The power to
suspend or disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final.

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation.

Sec 2, rule 1 of the rules of court provides that. These rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Bacuraya is not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of
detention. The petitioner only received the Resolution, we find the two days delay in filing
his motion for reconsideration pardonable as it did not cause any prejudice to the other
party. There is no showing that he was motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or
obstruct the administration of justice. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case
since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
petitioner.

Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must be avoided.

While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind the
client, the exception is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court.

Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the
fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer.

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error

committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause,
is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client
another chance to present his case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was
not presented because of counsel's error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure
a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good defense and that the acquittal would in
all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. What should guide
judicial action is that a party be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
action or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner
prescribed by law. An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and
instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While
this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a
violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO

HELD:

While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. In spite of his knowledge, he
chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willing fully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one's assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and
Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
 SANTIAGO V RAFANAN (LAWYER SHALL AVOID TESTIFIYING IN BEHALF OF HIS
CLIENT)

HELD:

LAWYERS AS WITNESS FOR CLIENT

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina
an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent's clients, allegedly in
violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 — A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and

the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except
only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-
client relationship. The reason is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. It is difficult
to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will
provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible
reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as
partial and untruthful.

Although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case.

Before making the attorney administratively liable, the Court must consider that it is the
duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the
benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter's life and liberty are
at stake. It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to
rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts
that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted,
such conviction is according to law.
The respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients
from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present — by all fair and honorable means —
every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his
clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.

Likewise, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing
innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them
from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper.

Nevertheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from

accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he
may be an essential witness for the prospective client. In future cases in which his
testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession
require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
 TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT V NLRC AND CRUZ

HELD:

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY'S FEES; A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY
BE ASSERTED EITHER IN THE VERY ACTION IN WHICH THE SERVICES OF A LAWYER HAD
BEEN RENDERED OR IN A SEPARATE ACTION. — It is well settled that a claim for
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a
lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. Attorney's fees cannot be determined
until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorney's fees may be
filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or
as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which
the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the
determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for
attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the
proceeds thereof delivered to the client. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a
lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private
respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of
the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete
resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before
the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options
and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.

Retainer fees:

general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services
as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business
of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are
secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed
retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The
fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the
remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a
fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunities. A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service
rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases demanding special or
individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for
attorney’s fees, each fee is considered as a special retainer.

THE P3,000.00 MONTHLY FEE PROVIDED IN THE RETAINER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNION AND THE LAW FIRM REFERS TO A GENERAL RETAINER OR A RETAINING FEE. —
The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the
services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the
former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a
consideration for the law firm's commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A
(General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement. Evidently,
the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the
law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the
law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its "commitment to render the legal
services enumerated." The fee is not payment for private respondent's execution or
performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications
or permutations stated there. We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent
and different from the compensation which private respondent should receive in payment
for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the
latter's promise to extend services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law
firm's actual performance of services in favor of the union. Hence, the retainer agreement
cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondent's services.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO AN ADDITIONAL REMUNERATION FOR

SPECIAL SERVICES RENDERED IN THE INTEREST OF PETITIONER IS BASED ON QUASI-
CONTRACT. — The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of
the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not
absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of
the latter. Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of
extracontractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the
Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our
law, certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-
contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another. A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private
respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioner's cause without
awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from
private respondent's efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay
differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly
retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private
respondent's actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.

THE LABOR ARBITER ERRONEOUSLY SET THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON THE
BASIS OF ART. 111 OF THE LAB OR CODE; A HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED
FOR THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. — Here, then, is the flaw we
find in the award for attorney's fees in favor of private respondent. Instead of adopting the
above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorney's
fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of
Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorney's fees. As already stated, Article 111 of
the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of
damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as
the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal
services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney's
fees, it does not direct instantaneous and automatic award of attorney's fees in such
maximum limit. It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances
similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe
the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract
and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's
fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and
not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the
parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private
respondent's fees.
 RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

HELD:

By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta
Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage
over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating
or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

Canon 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated
the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law
instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the
Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law
graduate's academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.

ATTY DANILO DE GUZMAN petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003
Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law
firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for
Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his action and solemnly
pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five
(5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is no doubt that the petitioner
had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping of
his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment,
as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known
probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his
intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and
participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance,
petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means
possible. This only proves petitioner's strength of character and positive moral fiber.

The court believes that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his
action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected
on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian
considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension.

Considering the fact that the petitioner had already been disbarred for more than 5 years,
the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may
now be allowed to resume practice of law.

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment
imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer
and the conduct of his public life during his years outside the bar.

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since
his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People's Law Enforcement
Board. The attestations by his peers in the community and the esteemed members of -the
legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge
Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical
community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large
since the unfortunate events of 2003

Likewise, his subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if
he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
 JULIETA NARAG V ATTY NARAG

HELD:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on account of his having
committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e. , abandoning his wife and children to live with
his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more reprehensible than betraying
one's own family in order to satisfy an irrational and insatiable desire to be with another
woman. The respondent's act was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness
to be part of the noble legal profession.

More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now professes that he had
already repented and expressed remorse over the perfidy that he had brought upon his
wife and their children. That such repentance and remorse, the respondent asserts,
together with the long years that he had endured his penalty, is now sufficient to enable
him to be readmitted to the practice of law.

The respondent’s please are mere word that are hallow and bereft of any substance. The
Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of
law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself
of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However,
the respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the
woman for whose sake he abandoned his family, which proves that the respondent has not
yet learned from his prior misgivings.

With regard to Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had
likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent
had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral
conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.

Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all his
properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be
demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the
respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a different tenor
once he had been readmitted to the legal profession.

the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions
and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal
profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character.
GUEVARRA V EALA