Cline Lawsuit

**** CASE NUMBER: 502022CA005955XXXXMB Div: AF ****
Filing # 151794424 E-Filed 06/20/2022 12:01:06 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15th

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION
LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT, as Case No.

Personal Representatives of the Estate of
CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased; and
KELLY CLINE FAMA, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of KAMERON
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NIKOLE CLINE, deceased,
Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT
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vs.
AGUSTA WESTLAND PHILADELPHIA
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CORPORATION, a foreign corporation;
LEONARDO, S.p.A., a foreign corporation;
and ROTORTECH SERVICES, INC., a domestic
corporation,
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Defendants.
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________________________________________/
Preliminary Statement
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1. This is an action brought by Plaintiffs LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT,
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased; and by Plaintiff

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KELLY CLINE FAMA, Personal Representative of the Estate of KAMERON NIKOLE CLINE
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(“KAMERON CLINE”), deceased, (the decedents are sometimes collectively referred to as the
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“CLINE DECEDENTS”) for all wrongful death and/or survival damages arising from the deaths
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of CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE in the crash of a certain Leonardo/Agusta
AW 139 model helicopter that occurred on July 4, 2019, as a direct and proximate result of the
negligent, reckless and/or careless acts, omissions and/or other conduct of the defendants
AGUSTA WESTLAND PHILADELPHIA CORPORATION (“AWPC”); LEONARDO S.P.A;
FILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, JOSEPH ABRUZZO, CLERK, 06/20/2022 12:01:06 PM
and/or ROTORTECH SERVICES, INC.
2. As detailed herein, prior to the crash, defendants AWPC and/or REDACTED
RE.A, amongst other things, and specifically due to flight training that these defendants provided
to the accident flight crew, were aware, knew and documented that the flight crew was
dangerous, unsafe, and severely deficient in their piloting abilities, specifically including their
collective inability to respond to an emergency situation due to the failure of a critical flight
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system; that the flight crew demonstrated an unacceptable lack of understanding of the accident
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helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems; and most importantly that the flight crew’s piloting
abilities posed a deadly safety risk, including but not limited to, when confronted with an
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emergency situation that arose due to a product or maintenance defect. This specific knowledge,
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and said defendants’ failure to take corrective action as was required, directly and proximately,
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in whole or in part, caused the crash and deaths of the CLINE DECEDENTS.
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3. The decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE were father and
daughter and were travelling as passengers on a certain model Leonardo/Agusta AW 139

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helicopter bearing Federal Aviation Registration Number N32CC, which was owned and/or
operated by non-parties Florida-based Challenger Management LLC (“Challenger

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Management”), and/or Seneca Industries, Inc., and/or Florida-based Cloud 9 Helicopters LLC.
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4. At all times relevant, the accident helicopter was piloted by Florida residents,
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namely, decedents David Jude and Geoffrey Painter (the “Accident Flight Crew”), and the
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CLINE DECEDENTS were killed when the subject helicopter crashed in the territorial waters of
the Bahamas approximately a little more than one minute after takeoff. Three additional
passengers and the Accident Flight Crew also perished in the crash.
5. At all times relevant, the decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE was a Florida citizen,
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and Plaintiffs LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT, were appointed Personal
Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, by the Circuit Court for
Palm Beach County, Florida, Probate Division, on the 25th day of July 2019. Plaintiffs LESSLIE
RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT are collectively referred to as the “CHRISTOPHER CLINE
PLAINTIFFS”.
6. At the time of his death, the decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE, age 60 (date of
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birth July 5, 1958) was one of the largest, if not the largest, independent coal operator in the
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world. Decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE rose from humble beginnings, growing up in a double
wide trailer in the coal country of West Virginia. He began his career as a coal miner at the age
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of 15, and through his sheer skill, acumen and drive, became the most productive coal operator
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in the world, amassing significant wealth. Not one to rest on his past successes, decedent
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CHRISTOPHER CLINE began his next great venture by investing in Canadian coal mines.
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These investments, however, have been significantly and adversely affected by decedent
CHRISTOPHER CLINE’s death, which has resulted in significant losses to his three surviving
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children. He was also, first and foremost, a family man who loved and cared for his family, who
lived his life guided by ethics, commitment and unwavering principles, and was a man of
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extreme charity. Tragically, due to the negligence, recklessness, carelessness and other conduct
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of the defendants as set forth herein, the world has lost a leader not only in the energy business
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but a man whose death has impacted countless lives.

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7. The CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS bring this wrongful death and/or
survival action in their representative capacities on behalf of plaintiffs’ decedent’s Estate, and/or
on behalf of all potential beneficiaries, statutory beneficiaries, survivors, heirs and/or distributees
of the decedent, CHRISTOPHER CLINE, specifically including the decedent’s three surviving
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children, namely, CANDICE CLINE KENAN, CHRISTOPHER L. CLINE, and ALEX T.
CLINE, and on behalf of any other individual entitled to recover under applicable law.
8. At all times relevant, the decedent KAMERON CLINE was a Florida citizen, and
Plaintiff KELLY CLINE FAMA, the mother of KAMERON CLINE, was appointed the Personal
Representative of her daughter’s Estate by the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida,
Probate Division, on the 9th day of September 2019. Plaintiff KELLY CLINE FAMA shall be
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referred to as the “KAMERON CLINE PLAINTIFF”.
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9. Decedent KAMERON CLINE was only 22 years old at the time of her death (date
of birth March 21, 1997) and had graduated college in May 2019, less than two months prior to
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her death. Decedent KAMERON CLINE’s life was tragically cut short due to the conduct of the
defendants as alleged herein. IE

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10. The KAMERON CLINE PLAINTIFF brings this wrongful death and/or survival
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action on her own behalf, in her representative capacity on behalf of plaintiff’s decedent’s Estate,
and/or on behalf of all potential beneficiaries, statutory beneficiaries, survivors, heirs and/or
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distributees of the decedent, KAMERON CLINE, specifically including the decedent’s mother,
KELLY CLINE FAMA, and on behalf of any other individual entitled to recover under
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applicable law.
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11. The CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS and the REDACTED

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REDACTEDshall sometimes be collectively referred to as the “CLINE PLAINTIFFS”.

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12. Due to the crash, and as detailed herein, the CLINE PLAINTIFFS each bring this
action in their individual and/or representative capacities under Florida law and/or the Death on
the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), and as amended, and/or any other applicable law as determined
by the Court, and the CLINE PLAINTIFFS each seek all available recoverable wrongful death
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and/or survival damages arising from the deaths of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, and
KAMERON CLINE, deceased, including, but not limited to, economic and non-economic losses.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
13. This is an action for damages in excess of $15,000 exclusive of costs, interest, and
attorney’s fees and is therefore within the exclusive jurisdictional limits of this Court under
Florida Statute section 26.012. In addition, even if the federal statute known as DOHSA is
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applicable, this action is properly brought in this Court due to the “savings to suitors” clause
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recognized in maritime actions.
Venue
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14. Pursuant to Florida Statute section 47.051, venue lies in this District because
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defendant ROTORTECH SERVICES, INC., a Florida corporation, maintains its principal office
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for the transaction of its business within this County. Venue is also proper under Florida Statute
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section 47.051 in that the training of the Accident Flight Crew by the AWPC and/or
LEONARDO defendants took place in this District giving rise to this cause of action, and/or said
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defendants entered into a contract within this District, and/or provided services pursuant to that
contract within this District, all giving rise to this action.

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Parties and Personal Jurisdiction Allegations

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15. At all times relevant, the decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON
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CLINE were each citizens of the state of Florida and their respective estates are being
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administered by the Court in Palm Beach County, Florida.
16. At all times relevant, defendant AWPC was and is a foreign corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, was registered and authorized to conduct
business in the state of Florida, and has engaged in continuous and systematic business conduct
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within the state of Florida, including, amongst other things, that said defendant entered into
contractual arrangements in Florida with a Florida limited liability company and actually sent its
employees to Florida to provide flight training to the Accident Flight Crew within the state of
Florida in this District as well as elsewhere. The defendant AWPC’s purposeful conduct within
the state of Florida, including the flight training provided to the Accident Flight Crew within
Florida (and in this District) forms, in part, the allegations arising from the deaths of the CLINE
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DECEDENTS.
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17. At all relevant times herein, defendant AWPC, alone and/or in combination with
defendant LEONARDO S.P.A., designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested,
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distributed, serviced, maintained, monitored, marketed, sold and placed into the stream of
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commerce and specifically within the state of Florida, the subject model helicopter, as well as its
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component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, its flight control and avionics
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systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, all of which includes
computers, flight director, linear actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim
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motors, and their associated components, and wrote and/or approved warnings, advice,
instructions and guidance for the subject helicopter, including its helicopter flight manual,
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helicopter operating manual, maintenance manual, maintenance and repair instructions, overhaul
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manual, service bulletins, inspection schedules and service life schedules, and/or performed
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maintenance thereon, and/or provided instruction and guidance concerning training and/or
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instruction with regard to the operation of the subject helicopter and furnished warnings, advice,
instructions and guidance for the subject helicopter to users, including the Accident Flight Crew,
within the State of Florida.
18. As a result of the foregoing, and at all times relevant, defendant AWPC engaged
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in continuous and systematic business conduct within the state of Florida, including, but not
limited to, entering into various contractual agreements in Florida with a Florida limited liability
company, namely Challenger Management, to, amongst other things, provide certain and specific
flight training to the Accident Flight Crew on the subject helicopter as further detailed herein as
well as provide other services on a continuing monthly basis. Amongst other things, the various
contracts were executed by Challenger Management at its principal place of business within the
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state of Florida; Florida-based Challenger Management forwarded payment to defendant AWPC
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from its Florida location for the amounts due under the contracts specifically including for flight
training and other contractual obligations; defendant AWPC sent invoices to Florida pursuant to
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the various contracts, including with respect to the specific flight training at issue; defendant
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AWPC actually performed services within the state of Florida and this District pursuant to the
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contractual agreements, including sending its agents, servants, employees and/or representatives,
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to Florida to provide specific flight instruction in Florida on the subject helicopter and these
services provided in Florida are among those from which said defendants’ liability in this matter
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arises; and defendant AWPC earned substantial revenues from this contractual relationship (and
others) within Florida with Florida-based companies, including Challenger Management. In

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addition, as a result of its purposeful sale of its products within the state of Florida, including that
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it earned substantial revenues therefrom, as well as its purposeful availment of conducting

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business within this state, and based upon all the foregoing, this Court has both general and
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specific jurisdiction over said defendant pursuant to section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes.
19. At all times relevant, CT Corporation System, 1200 South Pine Island Road,
Plantation, Florida 33324, was and is the registered agent of defendant AWPC, and is authorized
to accept service of process pursuant to Section 48.091 of the Florida Statutes.
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20. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant, defendant LEONARDO
S.P.A., f/k/a FINMECCANICA S.P.A., f/k/a AGUSTAWESTLAND S.P.A (“LEONARDO”), is
a company existing under the laws of the country of Italy.
21. At all times relevant, defendants LEONARDO and AWPC were agents of one
another, and/or engaged in a joint venture, and/or engaged in a common enterprise, including,
but not limited to, providing flight training services in Florida and elsewhere, including
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specifically those flight training services in Florida that form part of the basis for these
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Defendants’ liability in this matter, and each defendant was a party to contractual agreements
entered into with Florida-based Challenger Management which form, in part, the basis for this
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action.
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Upon information and belief and at all times relevant, amongst other things,
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defendant LEONARDO, the parent and sole owner of its wholly owned subsidiary defendant
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AWPC, was the certificate holder under Part 142 of the Federal Aviation Regulations which
allowed it to provide certain flight training as alleged herein, and was engaged in continuous and
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systematic business conduct within the state of Florida, and is in the business of, amongst other
things, selling, distributing, installing, monitoring, maintaining, servicing, repairing, replacing,

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providing technical and other support, specifically including, providing training, with respect to
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and for the Leonardo/Agusta AW139 model helicopter involved in the crash which gives rise to
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this litigation, including but not limited to, its component parts, systems and accessories, and is
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the type certificate holder for the accident helicopter.
23. At all relevant times herein, defendant LEONARDO, alone and/or in combination
with defendant AWPC, designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed,
serviced, maintained, monitored, marketed, sold and placed into the stream of commerce and
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specifically within the state of Florida, the subject model helicopter, as well as its component
parts and systems, including, but not limited to, its flight control and avionics systems, autopilot,
flight director, stability augmentation system, all of which includes computers, flight director,
linear actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors, and their associated
components, and wrote and/or approved warnings, advice, instructions and guidance for the
subject helicopter, including its helicopter flight manual, helicopter operating manual,
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maintenance manual, maintenance and repair instructions, overhaul manual, service bulletins,
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inspection schedules and service life schedules, and/or performed maintenance thereon, and/or
provided instruction and guidance concerning training and/or instruction with regard to the
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operation of the subject helicopter and furnished warnings, advice, instructions and guidance for
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the subject helicopter to users, including the Accident Flight Crew, within the State of Florida.
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24. Defendant LEONARDO, through its own conduct and/or through that of its agent,
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joint venturer and/or common enterprise partner defendant AWPC, engaged in continuous and
systematic business conduct within the state of Florida, including, but not limited to, that it was a
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party to contracts with Florida-based Challenger Management under which defendants AWPC
and/or LEONARDO were to provide (and did provide), amongst other things, certain flight
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training to the Accident Flight Crew with respect to the subject helicopter as well as other
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monthly services. The defendant LEONARDO’s purposeful conduct within the state of Florida,
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including the flight training provided to the Accident Flight Crew within Florida (and in this
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District) provides the basis, in part, for the allegations establishing its liability for the deaths of
the CLINE DECEDENTS.
25. As a result of the foregoing and at all times relevant, defendant LEONARDO
(individually and/or jointly with defendant AWPC), entered into contractual agreements in
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Florida with Florida-based Challenger Management, pursuant to which it provided, amongst
other things, certain and specific flight training to the Accident Flight Crew on the accident
helicopter as further detailed herein. The contracts were executed by Challenger Management
within the state of Florida; Florida-based Challenger Management forwarded payment from its
Florida location for the amounts due under the contracts specifically including for flight training
and other contractual obligations; defendant LEONARDO (on its own behalf and/or jointly with
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defendant AWPC) sent invoices to Florida pursuant to the contracts, specifically including for
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the specific flight training at issue; defendant LEONARDO (on its own behalf and/or jointly with
defendant AWPC) actually performed services within the state of Florida pursuant to the
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contractual agreements, including providing flight instruction in Florida on the accident
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helicopter to the Accident Flight Crew; and defendant LEONARDO (on its own behalf and/or
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jointly with defendant AWPC) earned substantial revenues from this contractual relationship
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with Florida-based Challenger Management (and others) within the state of Florida, etc. In
addition, as a result of its purposeful sale of its products within the state of Florida, including that
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it earned substantial revenues therefrom, as well as its purposeful availment of conducting
business within this state, and based upon all the foregoing, this Court has both general and
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specific jurisdiction over defendant LEONARDO pursuant to section 48.193 of the Florida
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Statutes.
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26. At all times relevant, and as a result of defendant AWPC’s inclusion of defendant
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LEONARDO (with defendant LEONARDO’s consent) as a party to the contract with Florida-
based Challenger Management, defendant LEONARDO may be served through defendant
AWPC’s registered agent for service, namely CT Corporation System, 1200 South Pine Island
Road, Plantation, Florida 33324, and as such, said registered agent is authorized to accept service
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of process for defendant LEONARDO pursuant to Section 48.091 of the Florida Statutes. In
addition, the defendant LEONARDO may be served at its principal place of business pursuant to
Section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes and/or may be served pursuant to other applicable law or
other agreement between the parties.
27. At all times relevant herein, and upon information and belief, the defendant
ROTORTECH SERVICES, INC., (“ROTORTECH”) was and is a domestic for-profit
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corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Florida, maintaining a
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principal place of business in the state of Florida, and whose principal office is located in this
County.
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28. At all times relevant herein, defendant ROTORTECH conducted significant
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maintenance on the subject helicopter within this County in the months leading up to the crash,
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including, but not limited to, within one week of the crash, specifically including maintenance on
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the helicopter’s sophisticated flight control and avionics systems, autopilot and associated
components responsible for, in part, controlling the subject helicopter in flight.

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29. Because defendant ROTORTECH is a citizen and resident of Florida, and
conducted substantial and not isolated activity within the state, this Court has both general and
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specific jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes.

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30. At all times relevant herein, JEFFREY KNEEN, Esq., 126 Linda Lane, Palm
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Beach Shores, Florida 33404, was and is the registered agent of defendant ROTORTECH, and is
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authorized to accept service of process pursuant to Section 48.091 of the Florida Statutes.
General Allegations Applicable To All Counts
31. During the July 4th weekend in 2019, the Cline family invited relatives and friends
to decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE’s home located in Big Grand Cay which is part of the
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Abaco Islands in the Bahamas for a family gathering and to celebrate Mr. Cline’s 61 st birthday
on July 5th. What was to be a joyous occasion spent with family and friends ended in tragedy
when the subject helicopter crashed shortly after takeoff from the Bahamas killing decedent
CHRISTOPHER CLINE, his daughter KAMERON CLINE, three other passengers who were all
young adults and friends of Ms. Cline, as well as the Accident Flight Crew.
32. Subsequent investigation revealed that the crash was caused by, amongst other
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things, failures of the flight crew due to their lack of proficiency and/or ability to pilot the
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accident helicopter, including with respect to responding to emergency situations. However, the
Accident Flight Crew’s deficiencies, unsafe practices and dangerous and deadly propensities
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exhibited during the accident flight were specifically known to, and documented by, the
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defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO as a result of flight training that these defendants
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provided to the Accident Flight Crew in 2017 and 2018. This is not mere conjecture as the
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mistakes made by the Accident Flight Crew during the accident flight were identical to the
mistakes that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants observed, documented and highlighted
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during training as detailed herein.
33. As a result of the flight training provided by the AWPC and/or LEONARDO
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defendants to the Accident Flight Crew, these defendants were specifically aware that the
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Accident Flight Crew posed a dangerous, deadly and unsafe safety risk due to their lack of
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proficiency in piloting the accident helicopter, and specifically with respect to emergency
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operations resulting from a product or maintenance defect, yet Defendants AWPC and/or
LEONARDO negligently, recklessly and/or carelessly certified the flight crew as proficient, and
failed to warn their contractual partner Challenger Management of the flight crew’s dangerous,
deadly and unsafe deficiencies, notwithstanding their specific knowledge of same.
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34. Indeed and as further evidence of said defendants’ specific knowledge of the
dangerousness of the Accident Flight Crew, as detailed below, in November 2018, defendant
AWPC contacted its parent, joint venturer and/or enterprise partner, defendant LEONARDO to
advise that the Accident Flight Crew posed significant safety risks in that they were deficient in
piloting the subject helicopter, including, but not limited to, deficiencies with respect to the
crew’s knowledge and understanding of the helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems, emergency
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procedures, cockpit (crew) resource management, as well as other significant deficiencies and
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unsafe practices, including their failure to follow checklists and briefing requirements.
Notwithstanding this specific knowledge, inexplicably and negligently, recklessly and/or
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carelessly, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants certified the flight crew to operate the
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subject helicopter which allowed the Accident Flight Crew to pilot the helicopter on the accident
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flight. Without this certification from the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants, the Accident
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Flight Crew would have been ineligible to pilot the accident helicopter on the night of the
accident.
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Purchase of the Accident Helicopter by Challenger Management
35. In September 2017 Challenger Management purchased the accident helicopter,

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specifically an Agusta/Leonardo AW 139 model helicopter bearing Federal Aviation

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Registration Number N32CC (the “accident helicopter”). As a result of this purchase, Florida-
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based Challenger Management entered into various contracts with defendants AWPC and/or
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LEONARDO (amongst others), including contracting with said defendants to provide specific
flight training to the Accident Flight Crew (decedents David Jude and Geoffrey Painter) as well
as a third pilot, William Sewell.
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Initial Training in 2017
36. Due to the sophisticated nature of the accident helicopter, pilots are required to
obtain a specific “type rating” in order to pilot the subject model helicopter. A type rating is an
endorsement on a specific pilot’s license which demonstrates that he/she has undergone specific
training for a specific aircraft, and that the pilot possesses the requisite proficiency to operate the
specific aircraft or helicopter properly, appropriately and safely.
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37. The pilot must undergo rigorous training to obtain a type rating for a specific
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aircraft, such as the accident helicopter. At the conclusion of the training program, the entity
providing flight training must certify that the pilot has demonstrated the requisite proficiency to
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test for a type rating. The pilot must then undergo an evaluation flight that is conducted by a
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Designated Pilot Examiner (“DPE”) to determine whether the pilot indeed possesses the
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necessary proficiency to obtain the required type rating. Although the type rating issued by the
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DPE is an endorsement on the specific pilot’s Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) pilot’s
license, the DPE, as was the case here, may be an employee of the company providing flight
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training.
38. At the time Challenger Management purchased the accident helicopter, it did not
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have any pilots who were type rated in the accident aircraft. As a result, Florida-based
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Challenger Management entered into various contracts with defendants AWPC and/or
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LEONARDO, specifically including a “training contract”, whereby said defendants were hired to
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provide the requisite flight training so that Challenger Management had available to it pilots who
were type rated in the accident helicopter.
39. No entities other than defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO provided the
Accident Flight Crew with flight training for the accident helicopter.
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40. Upon information and belief, the Accident Flight Crew, along with a third pilot,
collectively underwent initial training on the accident helicopter with defendants AWPC and/or
LEONARDO from August 28, 2017 through approximately October 12, 2017.
41. Upon information and belief, initial training consisted of approximately 60 hours
of ground school (class-based instruction) with flight instruction thereafter. Upon information
and belief, ground school took place from August 28 through September 9, 2017, and initial
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flight instruction took place in Palm Beach County, Florida, in the accident helicopter from
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October 2 through October 12, 2017. To accomplish the initial flight training that occurred in
Florida, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants sent their agents, servant, representatives
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and/or employees to Florida to conduct the flight training in this state, and specifically at Palm
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Beach International Airport which is located within this County.
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42. Contrary to proper training techniques, all initial flight instruction provided by the
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AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants to the Accident Flight Crew took place in the accident
helicopter in Florida, and no flight simulator training was provided during this time. Upon
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information and belief, simulator training was not provided because it had been already
“booked” by others, and thus unavailable, during the time that the Accident Flight Crew
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underwent initial flight training. Instead of rescheduling the initial flight training to a time when
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the simulator was available, the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO chose to provide initial
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flight training in the accident helicopter.

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43. The failure of the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants to provide simulator-
based flight training during initial training was inappropriate and negligent, reckless and/or
careless in that it is impossible to recreate certain flight conditions, including, but not limited to,
emergencies (whether due to product or maintenance defects), in an actual helicopter as opposed
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to conducting that training in a simulator. For example, in simulator-based training responding to
flight emergencies are instructed, practiced, and are able to be simulated, such as avionics
failure, autopilot or AFCS failure, causing the flight crew to experience spatial disorientation,
engine or rotor failure, takeoff and landing in various adverse conditions, etc. However,
emergency situations cannot be re-created during flight training that is conducted in an actual
helicopter because to do so could endanger the lives of the flight crew and instructor, individuals
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on the ground as well as cause substantial damage to the helicopter. Thus, it is virtually
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impossible to provide certain training, specifically including emergency training, in the actual
helicopter as opposed to in the flight simulator where none of the foregoing concerns are present.
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44. Upon information and belief, the Accident Flight Crew’s initial training records
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maintained by the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants indicated early on that the crew
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(individually and/or collectively) had serious problems piloting the subject helicopter, including,
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but not limited to, the fact that their Instrument Flight Rules (“IFR”) flying was weak; their
systems knowledge was lacking and needed improvement; they received poor marks with respect
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to cockpit (crew) resource management; they failed to use required checklists; they became
easily overwhelmed during training, and that their ability to respond to an emergency, due to
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their lack of proficiency, was seriously compromised and placed the lives of the crew and their
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passengers in danger, etc.

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45. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and despite the AWPC and/or LEONARDO
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defendants’ specific awareness of the Accident Flight Crew’s known and exhibited unsafe and
dangerous deficiencies, by October 12, 2017, the Accident Fight Crew completed initial training,
and said defendants certified the flight crew as proficient. This certification enabled the
Accident Flight Crew to undergo the evaluation flight for the type rating needed to operate the
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accident helicopter. Upon information and belief, the DPE employed by defendants AWPC
and/or LEONARDO conducted the evaluation flight and provided the Accident Flight Crew with
the required type-rating.
46. Despite that defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO publicly declared the
Accident Flight Crew “proficient” at the conclusion of initial training, upon information and
belief, these defendants requested that the flight crew return in six months for required “recurrent
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training”. This request was highly unusual in that (1) Federal Aviation Regulations (as well as
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industry standards) dictate that recurrent training should be completed every 12 months, and (2)
the revalidation of a pilot’s type rating must be done annually; not on a semi-annual basis.
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47. The request by the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants that the Accident
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Flight Crew return in six months for recurrent training specifically highlighted that said
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defendants were aware in 2017 of the crew’s known problems observed by these defendants
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during initial training, including that these defendants recognized that the Accident Flight Crew
needed additional training notwithstanding their certification that the Accident Flight Crew was
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“proficient”.
Recurrent Training in 2018

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48. Despite that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants understood and
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recognized that the Accident Flight Crew needed additional training at the conclusion of initial
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AW 139 training in October 2017, these defendants became specifically aware that the Accident
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Flight Crew was dangerous, unsafe and posed a deadly safety hazard during recurrent training
that took place in November 2018.
49. Notwithstanding their specific knowledge that the Accident Flight Crew posed a
deadly risk, specifically including their inability to respond to emergencies caused by a product
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or maintenance defect, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants utterly failed in their
responsibilities and allowed the Accident Flight Crew to maintain their type rating which, in
turn, permitted the crew to conduct the accident flight. Specifically, the deficiencies and safety
issues that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants observed, recognized and documented
during recurrent training in 2018 were, in whole or in part, the same deficiencies and mistakes
that these defendants observed in 2017 during initial training and those exact mistakes were
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repeated during the accident flight which directly and proximately, in whole or in part, caused
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the crash.
50. As such, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants’ total disregard of their
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obligations to provide proper and appropriate training to the Accident Flight Crew, and/or to take
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required corrective action, as well as their negligence, recklessness and/or carelessness in
IF
performing their flight training responsibilities, including, but not limited to, allowing the
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Accident Flight Crew to achieve and maintain their type-rating despite their documented
knowledge that the crew was dangerous and unsafe, was a direct and proximate cause, in whole
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or in part, of the crash and the deaths of the CLINE DECEDENTS.
51. By way of background (and as further detailed below), the defendants held
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themselves out as one of the premier fight training academies in the world, especially on the
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subject helicopter since the LEONARDO and/or AWPC defendants were the designer and
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manufacturer of the helicopter and/or provided, amongst other things, technical, maintenance and
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training support for the helicopter.
52. In addition, upon information and belief, in 2013 defendants AWPC and
LEONARDO established a Safety Management System (“SMS”) program to specifically
identify and address any issue that was observed during training. The objective of an aviation-
18
related SMS Program is to ensure safe operations, improve operational efficiency and maintain
aviation safety. In the training context, the defendants established this SMS Program, in part, so
that any deficiencies and/or safety issues identified during training could be reported
immediately by defendant AWPC to defendant LEONARDO for further evaluation.
53. Upon information and belief, from the time the of the creation of the SMS
Program in 2013 up through the time that the Accident Flight Crew underwent recurrent training
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in November 2018, defendant AWPC never used the SMS Program to contact defendant
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LEONARDO to identify or express any concerns regarding safety issues observed during
training or to advise that a specific pilot or flight crew exhibited deficient and safety-concerning
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piloting abilities. All of this changed, however, in 2018 as soon as the Accident Flight Crew
began flight training during their recurrent training. IE

IF
54. The Accident Flight Crew collectively underwent recurrent training from
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November 12 through 16, 2018 at defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO’s facilities in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Recurrent training, also referred to as “refresher training”, is
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necessary to ensure that a pilot has maintained and continues to exhibit the proper skills to safely
pilot the helicopter. In addition, the Accident Flight Crew’s annual revalidation of their type-
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ratings were due.

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55. The initial and recurrent training of the Accident Flight Crew was conducted
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pursuant to a contract entered into between the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants and
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Challenger Management. The agreement provided, amongst other things, that despite agreeing
to perform training, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants did not guarantee that a pilot
would obtain the required skill level to complete training to be eligible to receive a type-rating.
The agreement further provided that defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO could take
19
corrective action if a student was lacking in any respect, including requiring additional training.
56. The recurrent training consisted of ground school as well as flight instruction.
Importantly, and unlike initial training in 2017, the flight training portion during recurrent
training was conducted by defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO in a flight simulator as
opposed to the actual helicopter.
57. Upon commencement of helicopter simulator flight training the AWPC and/or
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LEONARDO defendants’ flight instructor who was assigned to provide the crew with simulator-
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based flight instruction immediately recognized that the Accident Flight Crew posed a significant
safety hazard in that they were dangerous and unsafe, were severely deficient in their ability to
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pilot the accident helicopter and failed to understand the helicopter’s sophisticated computer-
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based flight systems. It was further noted that the Accident Flight Crew was severely deficient in
IF
numerous piloting areas, including, their ability to respond to emergency situations.
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58. Upon information and belief, this flight simulator instructor immediately brought
his concerns to the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants’ Chief Training Instructor advising
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him that the Accident Flight Crew was severely deficient, dangerous and unsafe. To confirm the
instructor’s belief, the Chief Training Instructor assigned a second flight instructor employed by
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defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO to also observe the Accident Flight Crew in the
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simulator. This second simulator-instructor likewise confirmed that the Accident Flight Crew
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posed a serious safety hazard, and both simulator instructors acknowledged that the Accident
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Flight Crew had “real safety issues”.
59. The recurrent training of the Accident Flight Crew was initially conducted by the
AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants under a program known as “progressive recurrent
training”. This is a common method of providing recurrent training to a previously qualified and
20
type-rated United States based flight crew. However, due to the Accident Flight Crew’s
immediate and recognizable poor performance during simulator flight instruction, progressive
recurrent training was halted and the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO switched the
training to “routine recurrent training”. This was necessary because the crew failed more items
than is allowed.
60. Specifically, the Accident Flight Crew failed numerous “check” items and were
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deficient in several areas. It was these failures and the Accident Flight Crew’s lack of proficiency
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that required the AWPC and/or LEONARDO simulator-instructors to cease progressive recurrent
training. The switch from “progressive recurrent” to “routine recurrent” was highly unusual and
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had never before been necessary (especially for a US-based flight crew that was previously type-
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rated in the helicopter), and demonstrated to the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants that the
IF
Accident Flight Crew posed a significant and dangerous safety risk in their continued piloting of
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the accident helicopter.
61. Indeed, upon information and belief, prior to the Accident Flight Crew’s recurrent
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training, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants had never ceased progressive recurrent
training for any US-based type-rated flight crew, and the necessity of the switch in training, in
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and of itself, demonstrated that these defendants were specifically aware that allowing the
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Accident Flight Crew to continue to pilot the accident helicopter posed significant safety risks.
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62. Throughout recurrent training the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants

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specifically recognized and documented the grave hazards and risks to safety posed by the
Accident Flight Crew (individually and/or collectively), including, but not limited to, that:
a. the Accident Flight Crew repeatedly exhibited serious problems associated with
their ability to fly the accident helicopter, specifically including their inability to properly
21
respond to an emergency due to a manufacturing or maintenance defect;
b. nearly every AWPC and/or LEONARDO instructor who provided flight training
to the crew similarly documented that they had serious problems, including, but not limited to,
poor cockpit (crew) resource management, their collective inability to understand the
helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems, their inability to properly fly the helicopter, their
repeated failures on training items, including, exhibiting below average capabilities concerning
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“skill and decisiveness” in piloting the accident helicopter, as well as their inability to recognize
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and respond to emergency situations;
c. the crew became easily overwhelmed while piloting the accident helicopter which
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became exacerbated during an emergency when a flight crew must have complete command of
the subject helicopter; IE

IF
d. the recurrent training instructors immediately recognized that the flight crew
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received insufficient instruction during initial training (which was also provided by defendants
AWPC and/or LEONARDO) and that their piloting skills, systems knowledge, and ability to
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respond to emergency situations were well below where they needed to be to safely pilot the
accident helicopter;
A
e. the flight crew’s simulator-based recurrent flight training demonstrated that the
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crew still failed to understand the helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems, failed to conduct
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required briefings, failed to follow checklists, made incorrect callouts (or failed to make any
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callouts) during the simulator-based training flights, and exhibited poor cockpit (crew) resource
management which led the crew to become overwhelmed and make numerous mistakes – skills
that are needed to fly the helicopter especially when confronted with an emergency;
f. the flight crew’s abilities and/or their lack of knowledge and understanding of the
22
aircraft’s sophisticated systems exhibited during recurrent training posed a significant safety risk
and was “unacceptable”;
g. even after “routine recurrent training” began due to the crew’s failures that were
documented during “progressive recurrent training”, the Accident Flight Crew still needed
additional flight training time in the flight simulator – something that the AWPC and/or
LEONARDO defendants had never seen before with respect to a US-based type-rated flight
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crew; and
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h. during recurrent training the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO recognized
that the flight crew were well below average and were a “fail” in various required training items.
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63. The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive list of the specific knowledge that the
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AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants had regarding the inability of the Accident Flight Crew
IF
to safely pilot the accident helicopter. For example, despite that defendants AWPC and/or
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LEONARDO specifically knew that the Accident Flight Crew operated the subject helicopter at
night to and from the Bahamas, and despite their marketing materials stating that training is
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tailored to the customers’ needs (as discussed below) these defendants failed to provide any dark
night takeoff and landing training, nor did they provide any spatial disorientation training despite
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knowing that operating the subject helicopter in a dark night environment without visual cues
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could easily lead a flight crew to become spatially disoriented.

O
64. Most glaring and further indicative that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO
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defendants were specifically aware that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous and unsafe, at
the conclusion of recurrent training in November 2018, and for the first time in its history, the
defendant AWPC utilized the SMS Program described above and sent a Safety Hazard
Notification to defendant LEONARDO advising of the serious safety risks posed by the
23
Accident Flight Crew, and insisting that actions must be taken to ensure that they never “see
something like this again”. Upon information and belief, amongst other things, defendant AWPC
was specifically concerned, and advised defendant LEONARDO, about the Accident Flight
Crew’s inability to respond to an emergency.
65. Notwithstanding that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants were
specifically aware of and documented significant deficiencies and safety hazards and risks posed
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by the Accident Flight Crew, said defendants (and contrary to the agreement with Challenger
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Management) failed to take any corrective action and allowed the flight crew to maintain their
type-rating which, in turn, allowed the crew to pilot the accident flight which resulted in the
D
deaths of the CLINE DECEDENTS.
66. IE
Upon information and belief, as further evidence that the AWPC and/or
IF
LEONARDO defendants were specifically aware and documented that the Accident Flight Crew
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posed a significant, unsafe and deadly risk, at the conclusion of recurrent training defendant
AWPC’s Chief Training Instructor advised the Accident Flight Crew that their performance
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during recurrent training was “less than ideal”, and he further requested that they return for
additional recurrent training in six months. This was the second time in approximately one year
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that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants made the highly unusual request that the
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Accident Flight Crew return for recurrent training 6 months after completing training, and further
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establishes that said defendants were specifically aware that the Accident Flight Crew posed a
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significant and deadly safety hazard and that the crew needed substantial additional training to
safely pilot the accident helicopter.
67. Despite defendants’ AWPC’s and/or LEONARDO’s specific and documented
knowledge that the Accident Flight Crew posed a significant and deadly safety hazard, these
24
defendants failed to take any corrective action, such as requiring additional training and/or
refusing to certify the flight crew as eligible to maintain their type-rating, and said defendants
acted negligently, recklessly and/or carelessly and their conduct, including their failure to act as
was required, enabled the Accident Flight Crew to conduct flights on the accident helicopter
including the accident flight that killed the CLINE DECEDENTS. These unsafe piloting
practices of which the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants were specifically aware of, and
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documented during training, were the same deadly mistakes that the flight crew made during the
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accident flight. Indeed, due to these defendants’ specific knowledge of the dangerousness and
significant safety hazards posed by the flight crew, it was not if, but when, a crash would occur.
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Inexplicably, however, these defendants failed to take any corrective action and nonetheless
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allowed the flight crew to complete training and maintain their type rating which was necessary
IF
to pilot the accident helicopter. Thus, the defendants’ negligence, reckless and/or carelessness, in
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whole or in part, was a direct and proximate cause of the crash and the CLINE DECEDENTS’
injuries and deaths.

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The Accident Flight
68. Over the course of the July 4th Holiday weekend in 2019 the Cline family held a
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gathering at decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE’s home in the Bahamas. During the evening
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hours on July 3, 2019, one of decedent KAMERON CLINE’s friends became seriously ill.
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Shortly thereafter the decedent KAMERON CLINE likewise fell ill.

N
69. An emergency room physician from Florida happened to be a guest at the
gathering. She examined the young women who fell ill and advised decedent CHRISTOPHER
CLINE that although she did not believe that the illnesses posed a life-threatening situation, she
advised that they needed more medical attention than she could provide. As a result, and as a
25
concerned and loving parent, at approximately 11:24 p.m. on July 3, 2019, the decedent
CHRISTOPHER CLINE contacted decedent David Jude and requested that he fly the accident
helicopter from Florida to the Bahamas so that he could transport the young women to a hospital
in Florida for appropriate medical care. In turn, the decedent David Jude contacted the decedent
Geoffrey Painter to act as co-pilot, and the Accident Flight Crew departed Florida at
approximately 12:55 a.m. on July 4, 2019, for the flight to the Bahamas to transport the young
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women back to the United States for medical care.
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70. Although the flight from Florida to the Bahamas was uneventful the cockpit voice
recorder indicated that the Accident Flight Crew repeated the same mistakes during this flight
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that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants observed and documented during initial and
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recurrent training described above. These mistakes included, but were not limited to, the failure
IF
to conduct required briefings and checklists, failure to make proper callouts during the flight,
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failure to utilize proper and appropriate cockpit resource management techniques, etc. – all
needed skills in the event of an emergency. In addition, the flight crew specifically discussed the
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possibility of spatial disorientation and landing and taking off in a dark night environment
without visual references – an environment that the defendants AWPC and LEONARDO
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specifically knew that the Accident Flight Crew would operate in, yet they provided no training
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in this regard.
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71. The accident helicopter landed at Big Grand Cay in the Bahamas at approximately
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1:42 a.m. on July 4, 2019. With the engines running, the two ill young women (including
decedent KAMERON CLINE), two of their friends and decedent CHRISTOPHER CLINE all
boarded the helicopter for the flight to Florida.
72. The accident helicopter remained on the ground in the Bahamas for
26
approximately 10 minutes. During this time, the pilots filed an Instrument Flight Rules flight
plan for the flight to Fort Lauderdale, Florida although the flight plan was never activated. In
their pre-flight preparation for the return flight to Florida, the pilots again repeated identical
mistakes that the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants observed and documented during
training, namely, failure to conduct checklists and required briefings, including emergency
procedures, failure to discuss the appropriate procedures for takeoff, exhibited poor cockpit
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(crew) resource management, failed to understand the helicopter’s sophisticated flight control
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and avionics systems, etc.
73. The accident helicopter departed the helipad in the Bahamas at approximately
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1:52:17 a.m. on July 4, 2019. Data retrieved from the cockpit voice recorder and digital flight
IE
data recorder indicated that immediately upon takeoff the Accident Flight Crew was again
IF
making the same mistakes that the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO observed and
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documented during training. This included, but was not limited to, the pilots’ failure to
understand the accident helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems, the crew exhibited
CE
inappropriate cockpit (crew) resource management, failed to brief each pilot’s responsibilities
during the takeoff sequence, or should an emergency arise, etc.

A
74. Approximately 40 seconds after takeoff the discussion captured on the cockpit
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voice recorder further identified additional mistakes made by the Accident Flight Crew and these
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errors were identical to those that defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO observed and
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documented during training. This discussion evidenced the Accident Flight Crew’s complete
lack of understanding of the helicopter’s flight systems as well as their inability to properly pilot
the helicopter. During this time, notwithstanding that the helicopter was in the takeoff phase and
should have been gaining altitude, the accident helicopter climbed to approximately 190 feet
27
above the water and had then begun a descent which was unrecognized by at least one member
of the flight crew due to his failure to understand the accident helicopter’s sophisticated flight
systems and instrumentation. Upon information and belief, the un-arrested and/or inadvertent
descent was due to a problem associated with the avionics suite that was installed on the accident
helicopter and/or the crew’s inability to properly pilot the helicopter.
75. Once the Accident Flight Crew finally recognized that they were in a descent, the
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descent was arrested and the accident helicopter then began to ascend, reaching a maximum
CO
height of approximately 212 feet above the water. Then at approximately 1:53:13 a.m. (less than
one minute after takeoff), the accident helicopter began a second fatal dive which was neither
D
recognized nor arrested by the flight crew. The data captured by the flight data recorder and
IE
cockpit voice recorder further demonstrated that during this sequence the pilots exhibited a
IF
complete lack of understanding of the emergency situation caused by the helicopter’s flight
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systems and/or improper piloting, including, but not limited to, the failure to understand the
helicopter’s sophisticated flight systems, inappropriate cockpit (crew) resource management,

CE
etc., – the precise mistakes that defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO documented and
recognized during initial and recurrent pilot training. Indeed, in the seconds prior to the crash,
A
referring to the first descent that was arrested, the co-pilot commented on the fact that there was
T
a prior fatal crash in the United Kingdom where the flight crew became spatially disoriented
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notwithstanding that during this discussion the helicopter began its second fatal descent; yet the
N
crew lacked the training and piloting techniques to respond to the emergency and arrest the
second descent prior to water impact.
76. At approximately 1:53:22 a.m. on July 4, 2019, the subject helicopter was in a
nose down descending left-hand turn and crashed into the water killing the CLINE
28
DECEDENTS as well as all other occupants on the accident helicopter.
77. The injuries and deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON
CLINE were caused in whole or in part by the acts and/or omissions of the defendants named
herein with no negligence on the part of the CLINE DECEDENTS contributing thereto.
78. As a result of the foregoing and as a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or
omissions of all defendants, jointly and severally, there was a measurable and significant period
PY
of time prior to the deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE
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whereby they experienced unusual G-forces, physical injuries, conscious pain and suffering,
mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of impending death, and other injuries and damages that
D
ultimately caused their deaths.
79. IE
As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, the heirs, beneficiaries and
IF
distributees of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, specifically including his three
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surviving children, namely, CANDICE CLINE KENAN, CHRISTOPHER L. CLINE, and
ALEX T. CLINE, as well as anyone entitled to recover under the applicable law and/or Mr.
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Cline’s Estate, all represented by the CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS, seek all wrongful
death and survival damages under applicable law, including, but not limited to, all economic and
A
non-economic damages, including the loss of the gross earning power of the decedent; the loss of
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the full value of the life of the decedent; loss of the parental relationship arising from the death of
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the decedent; the loss of financial support and contribution of the decedent; loss of services; loss
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of inheritance; loss of accumulations; full pecuniary loss of the decedent; loss of past and future
income, support, society, love, grief, consortium, services, guidance, care, comfort, and
companionship of the decedent; loss of life’s pleasures; loss of enjoyment of life of the decedent;
and damages for mental anguish and mental pain and suffering; and the heirs, beneficiaries and
29
distributees of the decedent’s estate were caused to incur other necessary and reasonable
expenses as a result of the decedent’s death and are entitled to all such damages, and were
otherwise damaged.
80. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, the heirs, beneficiaries and
distributees of the Estate of KAMERON CLINE, deceased, specifically including her surviving
parent, KELLY CLINE FAMA, as well as anyone entitled to recover under the applicable law
PY
and/or Ms. Cline’s Estate, all represented by the KAMERON CLINE PLAINTIFF, seek all
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wrongful death and survival damages under applicable law, including, but not limited to, all
economic and non-economic damages, including the loss of the gross earning power of the
D
decedent; the loss of the full value of the life of the decedent; loss of the parent-child relationship
IE
arising from the death of the decedent; the loss of financial support and contribution of the
IF
decedent; loss of services; loss of inheritance; loss of accumulations; full pecuniary loss of the
RT
decedent; loss of past and future income, support, society, love, grief, consortium, services,
guidance, care, comfort, and companionship of the decedent; loss of life’s pleasures; loss of
CE
enjoyment of life of the decedent; and damages for mental anguish and mental pain and
suffering; and the heirs, beneficiaries and distributees of the decedent’s estate were caused to
A
incur other necessary and reasonable expenses as a result of the decedent’s death and are entitled
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to all such damages, and were otherwise damaged.

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COUNT I
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NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANTS AWPC AND/OR LEONARDO
81. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege all allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 80 as though fully set forth at length herein.
30
82. At all times relevant, the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO advertised and
held themselves out to the public, and specifically to the owners and operators of the make and
model of the accident helicopter, as experts in, amongst other things, providing ground and flight
training so that helicopters such as the accident helicopter can be piloted safely, properly and
appropriately to ensure the safety of all occupants who travel in helicopters piloted by
individuals who had been trained by the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants.
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83. Indeed, these defendants’ website touts their expertise in this field and that they
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provide “mission specific” ground and flight training; and that their state-of-the-art facility
allows them to “provide both theoretical knowledge as well as flight training to students from
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ab-initio to advanced experience and recurrent training”. (See
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https://helicopters.leonardo.com/en/products/awpc-training-academy.)
IF
84. Further, these defendants’ training brochures echo and parrot this expertise and
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provide, amongst other things, that “safety and professionalism have always been [our] priority”;
that the defendants training mission “is to provide outstanding flight. . . training enabling our
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customers to achieve the highest level of safety. . . in the operation of their helicopters”; that we
“enhance and tailor the Training Content to the Customers’ actual needs”; that the defendants are
A
a “world leader” in providing the necessary AW 139 training so that operators can operate their
T
aircraft efficiently and in the safest manner possible; and that they have over 50 years’
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experience delivering high quality training to aircrew. See

N
https://helicopters.leonardo.com/documents/16114711/18059045/LHTA_Catalogue2021_REV.0
1.pdf/2a3e32c6-071b-c1f5-31e7-2a06b46ceb2a?t=1619704199281.
85. As detailed herein, however, the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants utterly
failed in their training responsibilities and breached their obligations. These defendants observed,
31
documented and were specifically aware that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous, unsafe
and lacked the required knowledge and/or understanding to properly, appropriately and safely
pilot the accident helicopter in expected and emergency situations, and further these defendants
specifically knew that the Accident Flight Crew posed a significant and deadly risk. Despite this
specific and documented knowledge the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants twice certified
that the flight crew was “proficient” (at the conclusion of initial training in 2017 and recurrent
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training in 2018) when they specifically knew this was not the case.
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86. Since these defendants publicly proclaim that safety is their number one training
priority, and given their specific and documented knowledge that the flight crew was unsafe,
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dangerous and posed a deadly threat to all those who travelled aboard the accident helicopter,
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these defendants were obligated to either refuse to certify that the flight crew was eligible for a
IF
type-rating evaluation flight, and/or require that the crew obtain significant additional training to
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ensure that the crew was in fact safe. Tragically, these defendants failed to act, and took no
corrective action despite their specific knowledge and their negligence, recklessness and/or
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carelessness was, in whole or in part, the proximate cause of the accident complained of herein.
87. Moreover, the failures of the AWPC and/or LEONARDO defendants to provide
A
additional and/or proper training (or their refusal to certify the flight crew as eligible for a type-
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rating evaluation flight) and the crash of the accident helicopter are proximately and directed
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related. The deficiencies and safety issues identified, observed and documented by these
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defendants during initial and recurrent training repeated themselves, and were identical to the
mistakes the Accident Flight Crew made during the fatal flight. Indeed, given their known
deficiencies and deadly safety risks, this was, tragically, an accident waiting to happen; it was
not if an accident would occur but rather when one would occur.
32
88. The crash which resulted in the injuries and deaths of the decedents
CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE was caused, in whole or in part, by the
negligence, recklessness and/or carelessness of the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO
including, but not limited to, that:
a. these defendants utterly failed to comply with their obligations to provide proper
and appropriate training to the Accident Flight Crew despite their public proclamations to the
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contrary;
CO
b. these defendants specifically observed, documented and were aware that the
Accident Flight Crew was dangerous, unsafe and posed a deadly risk, yet they twice certified the
D
crew as “proficient” when they specifically knew this was not the case, including with respect to
the flight crew’s ability to respond to an emergency; IE

IF
c. as a result of these defendants’ specific knowledge that the flight crew was
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dangerous and unsafe the defendants were obligated to either require substantial additional
training or refuse to certify that the crew was eligible for a type-rating – these defendants did
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neither and their failure to take corrective action placed the lives of the CLINE DECEDENTS in
fatal jeopardy;
A
d. due to the fact that the flight simulator was apparently “booked” and thus
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unavailable, these defendants improperly and inappropriately conducted all initial training in an
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actual helicopter as opposed to a flight simulator which prevented the Accident Flight Crew from
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being trained in, amongst other things, emergency procedures, including, but not limited to, how
to respond to spatial disorientation;
e. at the conclusion of initial training in 2017 these defendants requested that the
Accident Flight Crew undergo recurrent training in a mere 6 months – a highly unusual request
33
since the Federal Aviation Regulations and industry standards require recurrent training to be
conducted annually, establishing that even after initial training in 2017 these defendants knew
that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous and unsafe;
f. upon commencement of recurrent training in the flight simulator in November
2018 the defendants’ flight instructor immediately recognized on the first sortie (flight) that the
Accident Fight Crew posed a serious safety issue and that the flight crew was dangerous and
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unsafe;
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g. the defendants’ recurrent training instructors specifically documented that the
flight crew received insufficient instruction during initial training (which was also provided by
D
defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO) and that their piloting skills and systems knowledge
were well below where they needed to be; IE

IF
h. during recurrent training the flight crew failed various training items and were not
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proficient in other areas requiring that progressive training be halted, and traditional recurrent
training begin. This change from “progressive” to “traditional” recurrent training was incredibly
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rare, and had not seen before with respect to any US-based type-rated flight crew further placing
these defendants on notice that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous and unsafe;
A
i. defendant AWPC utilized the SMS Program to send a Safety Hazard Notification
T
to defendant LEONARDO advising that the flight crew was dangerous, unsafe, lacked the
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necessary piloting skills, including, but not limited to, their ability to respond to an emergency,
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and insisting that something needed to be done so that a crew this deficient is never seen again in
recurrent training – this was the first time that such a message had been sent since the inception
of the SMS Program in 2013 but notwithstanding this, these defendants failed to take any
corrective action;
34
j. amongst other things, throughout initial and recurrent training these defendants
consistently observed and documented that the Accident Flight Crew were dangerous and unsafe,
and repeatedly and continuously: (1) failed various training items; (2) failed to exhibit proper
piloting techniques; (3) failed to practice acceptable cockpit (crew) resource management; (4)
failed to conduct required briefings and checklist usage; (5) were severely deficient in their
knowledge and/or understanding of the accident helicopter’s sophisticated computer-based flight
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systems and instrumentation; (6) exhibited failing marks concerning “Skill – Decisiveness”; (7)
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the crew became easily overwhelmed while piloting the helicopter; (8) exhibited well below
acceptable performance during training, including, but not limited to, their failure to properly
D
monitor and/or understand the helicopter’s flight instrumentation; (9) repeatedly failed to make
IE
proper and appropriate “callouts” during flight; (10) were utterly deficient in their ability to
IF
respond to an emergency situation; and (11) repeatedly and consistently failed to act as a flight
RT
crew with each pilot acting as a solo pilot which led to dangerous and unsafe piloting practices;
all of which imputed knowledge to these defendants that the Accident Flight Crew was
CE
dangerous and unsafe, and all documented mistakes that were repeated during the fatal flight in
which the CLINE DECEDENTS were killed;

A
k. even after progressive recurrent training was halted the Accident Flight Crew
T
required additional simulator flight training during “routine recurrent training” – something that
O
these defendants had not seen before with respect to any US-based type-rated flight crew, further
N
placing them on notice that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous and unsafe;
l. despite that these defendants were specifically aware that the conduct of the flight
crew during recurrent training posed a dangerous and deadly safety risk and was unacceptable,
they failed to take any corrective action in either demanding that the crew undergo additional
35
training and/or refusing to certify that the crew was eligible to receive a type-rating on the
subject helicopter;
m. these defendants failed to provide the crew with training at night, notwithstanding
that they were specifically aware that the crew flew from Florida to the Bahamas on a regular
basis – contrary to said defendants’ marketing materials;
n. these defendants failed to provide any spatial disorientation training especially
PY
during recurrent training when the flight instruction portion was conducted in the flight
CO
simulator;
o. in a highly unusual move further establishing that these defendants were
D
specifically aware that the flight crew was dangerous and unsafe, at the conclusion of recurrent
IE
training in November 2018, the defendants’ Chief Training Instructor advised the Accident
IF
Flight Crew that their performance was “less than ideal” and he requested that they return in 6
RT
months for additional recurrent training, despite that recurrent training is accomplished pursuant
to FAA requirements and industry standards once every 12 months;

CE
p. the safety issues presented by the flight crew during recurrent training had never
been encountered before with respect to any US-based flight crew as their performance was
A
“abnormal” and “not common” and as further evidenced by, amongst other things, the Safety
T
Hazard Notification sent as a result of the flight crew’s substandard performance during
O
recurrent training;
N
q. further establishing that these defendants were specifically aware of the dangerous
and unsafe propensities of the Accident Flight Crew, the DPE (also an employee of the
defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO) who conducted the type rating evaluation check ride at
36
the conclusion of recurrent training was told by defendants’ flight instructors to “keep an eye” on
the flight crew;
r. these defendants were specifically aware that the Accident Flight Crew was far
below what was expected of a professional flight crew engaged in piloting the accident
helicopter;
s. the defendants’ training facilities, at which they provided ground, flight and/or
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simulator training, exhibited a complete lack of coordination, communication and
CO
standardization which resulted in improperly “signing off” the accident flight crew;
t. these defendants failed to advise their contractual partner Challenger Management
D
of the dangerous and unsafe propensities of the Accident Flight Crew despite their specific
knowledge of same; and IE

IF
u. said defendants were otherwise negligent, reckless and/or careless.
RT
89. Despite their specific and documented knowledge acquired during training that
that the Accident Flight Crew was dangerous, deadly and unsafe, defendants AWPC and/or
CE
LEONARDO failed to take any corrective action, including, but not limited to, refusing to certify
the flight crew as eligible for a type rating, and it is the foregoing failures which directly and
A
proximately, in whole or in part, caused the crash in which the CLINE DECEDENTS were
T
killed.
O
90. Specifically, the mistakes that these defendants observed, documented and
N
commented upon during training (as set forth herein) were repeated and were identical to those
mistakes made during the accident sequence which led to the fatal crash. Had the defendants
complied with their obligations and public proclamations that they provide unmatched and the
safest possible flight training, these defendants were required to either demand that the crew
37
undergo significant additional training to ensure that the pilots were safe and/or refuse to certify
that the crew was eligible for a type rating evaluation flight. Had either of these obligations been
met the crash would not have occurred.
91. As demonstrated herein, this litigation against the AWPC and/or LEONARDO
defendants is not based upon a claim of what is sometimes referred to as simple “educational
malpractice”. Indeed, the CLINE PLAINTIFFS are not criticizing the mode of the alleged
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training, are not asking this Court to assess the training standard of care against which the
CO
defendants conduct may be measured, nor are the public policy concerns attendant with a claim
sounding in educational malpractice pertinent here.
D
92. Rather, as a result of flight training that these defendants actually provided, and
IE
their documented knowledge that said defendants acquired during the training of the Accident
IF
Flight Crew, defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO became specifically aware that the
RT
Accident Flight Crew was dangerous, deadly, unsafe and severely deficient in their ability to
pilot the subject helicopter and that they posed a significant safety risk, including when
CE
confronted with an emergency situation. Despite this knowledge, these defendants took no
corrective action as they were required to do, placing the lives of all occupants on the accident
A
helicopter, specifically including the CLINE DECEDENTS in danger.

T
93. In addition, these defendants violated the applicable training contract which
O
specifically provided, amongst other things, that if they were aware that a particular pilot did not
N
achieve the necessary proficiency during training (as was the case here), the defendants, at their
option, could demand that the pilot undergo additional training, and that there was no guarantee
that at the conclusion of flight training a pilot will achieve the necessary proficiency to qualify
for a specific “type-rating”.
38
94. Notwithstanding their specific and documented knowledge gained during training
regarding the dangerousness and unsafe propensities of the Accident Flight Crew as alleged
herein, these defendants took no corrective action and negligently, recklessly and/or carelessly
certified the Accident Flight Crew which enabled them to pilot the accident helicopter. The
failure of these defendants to take required corrective action, including failing to provide
additional training and/or their negligent, reckless and/or careless certification of the Accident
PY
Flight Crew, despite their specific knowledge that the crew posed dangerous and deadly safety
CO
risks, was, in whole or in part, the direct and proximate cause of the crash that killed the CLINE
DECEDENTS. In fact, the mistakes that these defendants observed and documented during
D
training were the same mistakes that the Accident Flight Crew made during the fatal accident
sequence which led to the deaths of the CLINE DECEDENTS.IE

IF
95. The defendants’ specific knowledge of the dangerousness of the Accident Flight
RT
Crew, as set forth herein, provides that this claim is not one sounding in simple “educational
malpractice” but rather, this is a claim sounding in negligence due to defendants’ specific and
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documented knowledge of the dangerous and deadly propensities of the Accident Flight Crew
and their failure to take required corrective action.

A
T
CLINE were caused, in whole or in part, by the acts and/or omissions of the defendants AWPC
O
and/or LEONARDO as alleged herein with no negligence on the part of the CLINE
N
DECEDENTS contributing thereto.
omissions of the Defendants, jointly and severally, there was a measurable and significant period
of time prior to the deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE
39
whereby they experienced unusual G-forces, physical injuries, conscious pain and suffering,
mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of impending death, and other injuries and damages that
ultimately caused their deaths.
PY
CO
D
IE
IF
RT
CE
A
T
O
otherwise damaged.
N
40
PY
CO
D
to all such damages, and were otherwise damaged. IE

IF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT, Personal
RT
Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, and Plaintiff KELLY
CLINE FAMA, Personal Representative of the Estate of KAMERON CLINE, deceased, jointly
CE
and severally, seek all wrongful death and survival compensatory damages for and to each of
plaintiffs’ decedent’s Estates, and for and/or on behalf of all statutory wrongful death
A
beneficiaries and any other individual entitled to recover under applicable law, as well as costs
T
and such other relief this Court deems appropriate, and further demand a trial by jury of all issues
O
triable as of right by jury.

N
COUNT II
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANTS LEONARDO AND/OR AWPC
41
101. As a manufacturer, type certificate holder, designer, seller, product supporter,
maintainer, overhauler, and/or distributor of helicopters (specifically including the accident
helicopter), helicopter component parts, and/or services associated with the continuing
airworthiness of helicopters, defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC were required to comply
with all applicable duties concerning the design, manufacture, sale, distribution, etc., of the
accident helicopter as well as to act and carry out said duties professionally, prudently, and in a
PY
manner that would not cause a dangerous product to enter or remain in the marketplace.
CO
102. The subject crash, injuries and deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents CHRISTOPHER
CLINE and KAMERON CLINE were caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence,
D
recklessness and/or carelessness of the defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC in that they
IE
individually and/or jointly, including their officers, agents, servants and/or employees, (either on
IF
their own and/or in conjunction with other defendants) negligently, recklessly and/or carelessly:
RT
a. designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed, serviced,
maintained, monitored, marketed, sold and placed into the stream of commerce, and specifically
CE
into the state of Florida (and/or allowed said product to remain in Florida), the subject helicopter
and its component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, its flight control and avionics
A
T
computers, flight director, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors,
O
and its warning and protection systems, and their associated components;
N
b. failed to warn of the risks associated with the subject helicopter and its
component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, its flight control and avionics
computers, flight director, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors,
42
and its warning and protection systems, and their associated components, including, but not
limited to, risks associated with the failure of the force trim release switches to disengage when
no longer depressed;
c. failed to design, manufacture, and assemble the subject helicopter free of all
defects, including, but not limited to, with respect to the autopilot system including all of its
attendant components and parts, including, actuators, relays, and the force trim release switches;
PY
d. provided improper warning and/or guidance to pilots operating the subject
CO
helicopter, including, but not limited to, with respect to its flight control and avionics systems,
autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, all of which includes computers, flight
D
director, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors, including
IE
recognizing and correcting an un-arrested and/or inadvertent descent at low altitudes and/or
IF
unexpected loss of control, including autopilot control;
RT
e. failed to provide warning, advice, instruction and/or guidance regarding the
subject helicopter’s flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability
CE
augmentation system which includes computers, flight director, actuators, synchros, sensors,
servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors, including, specific pilot inputs to arrest an uncontrolled
A
and/or inadvertent descent, and/or concerning the effects of the failure of the force trim release
T
switches to disengage when no longer depressed, as well as failed to require necessary simulator
O
training concerning the flight control and avionics systems and autopilot use, especially during
N
takeoff and landing in a dark night environment without reference to visual cues;
f. failed to provide adequate warning, advice, instruction and/or guidance
concerning proper takeoff and landing procedures in a dark night environment;
43
g. provided improper guidance concerning the use of the subject helicopter,
including the flight control and avionics systems and autopilot during takeoff and landing in a
dark night environment;
h. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
including its flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, and stability
augmentation system, all of which includes computers, flight director, actuators, synchros,
PY
sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors equipped with movable parts of a design
CO
subject to malfunction, pitting, seizing, fracturing, jamming, hard over, unexpected loss of
control, including loss of autopilot control, short circuiting, arcing, improper closing of the relay,
D
overrun, and/or runaway, which could cause an un-arrested and/or inadvertent descent and/or
IE
unexpected loss of control, including loss of autopilot control, and create a deadly situation
IF
especially at low altitudes;
RT
i. failed to design, manufacture, sell, support and/or maintain the subject helicopter,
including, its flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, and stability
CE
sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors to override pilot inputs in certain flight profiles
A
to prevent the helicopter from inadvertently impacting terrain especially during the takeoff phase
T
of flight and/or when the helicopter is at a low altitude;

O
j. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,

N
sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors with components susceptible to malfunction,
jamming, sudden release, un-commanded behavior, short circuiting, arcing, improper closing
44
of the relay, all inducing hard over, hard over coupled with sudden release and/or unexpected
loss of control, including loss of autopilot control;
k. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
including its flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation
system, all of which includes computers, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays,
and trim motors in such a manner that induces hard over, unexpected loss of control, including
PY
loss of autopilot control, runaway movement and/or jamming of the autopilot linear actuators,
CO
relays and motors, or otherwise causes the helicopter to become uncontrollable and/or results in
an unexpected loss of control, including autopilot control, without appropriate safety features to
D
prevent such occurrences;
l. IE
designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
IF
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system, all of which includes computers, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays,
and trim motors with computers and/or software that induces hard over, unexpected loss of
CE
control, including loss of autopilot control, run away movement and/or jamming of the autopilot
linear actuators, relays and motors, or otherwise causes the helicopter to become uncontrollable
A
and/or inadvertent loss of control, including autopilot control, without appropriate indications to
T
the flight crew of a dangerous condition;

O
m. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,

N
system, all of which includes computers, flight director, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos,
linkages, relays, and trim motors which can place the helicopter in an unsafe and unrecoverable
flight regime with insufficient time for pilot correction;
45
n. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
augmentation system in that it lacks appropriate, and/or incorporates the inappropriate software
coding and design, incapable of limiting movement of the flight control and avionics systems to a
safe value in the event of a malfunction of the automatic flight control system;
o. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
PY
CO
augmentation system in that it lacks appropriate, and/or incorporates the inappropriate software
coding and design, capable of inducing a hard over, unexpected loss of control, including loss of
D
autopilot control, jamming and/or runaway configuration of the automatic flight control system;
p. IE
designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject
IF
helicopter’s computer and software systems, including, circuit boards, circuit board fasteners,
RT
circuit board components such as resistors, diodes, and relays, and actuation motors, the
malfunction of which will induce a hard over, unexpected loss of control, including loss of
CE
autopilot control, jamming and/or runaway placing the helicopter in a perilous situation
especially when such failures occur at low altitudes;

A
q. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,

T
including the flight control system with motors, electrical and/or hydraulic systems, including
O
cyclic control that jam, stick, arc, improperly close, and/or malfunction in a manner inducing
N
hard over, runaway and/or unexpected loss of control, including loss of autopilot control;
r. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
including the flight control system without necessary electrical limiting circuitry to prevent over
voltage, under voltage, arcing and/or improper closing of relays, and effects thereof causing the
46
subject helicopter to become uncontrollable and/or result in an unexpected loss of control,
including autopilot control;
s. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
including the flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, and stability
augmentation system with components susceptible to stickage, jamming, arcing, improper
closing of relays, hanging, blockage, sudden release, and/or un-commanded behavior all
PY
inducing hard over, hard over coupled with sudden release, and/or unexpected loss of control,
CO
including loss of autopilot control;
t. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,
D
including flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, and stability
IE
augmentation system with computer and/or computer software that induces hard over,
IF
unexpected loss of control, including loss of autopilot control, jamming, run away movement of
RT
the autopilot servos and motors, or otherwise causes the subject helicopter to become
uncontrollable and/or result in unexpected loss of control, including autopilot control, without
CE
appropriate safety features to prevent such occurrences;
u. certified the subject helicopter, its flight control and avionics systems and the
A
component parts thereof as airworthy, when they were not;

T
v. designed, manufactured, sold, supported and/or maintained the subject helicopter,

O
including the flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation
N
system with an electrical and/or software architecture capable of commanding an in-flight loss of
control and/or unexpected loss of control, including autopilot control, with no means to arrest or
prevent the loss of control;
47
w. failed to adequately and properly test, inspect and/or analyze the subject helicopter,
its flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system,
all of which includes computers, actuators, synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim
motors for their intended application prior to and/or after manufacture to ascertain the true nature
of the defects and dangerous conditions in the helicopter and systems;
x. failed to ensure quality assurance and quality control during the manufacturing
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and/or design process;
CO
y. failed to require proper and appropriate training concerning the operation of the
subject helicopter; and
D
z. said defendants were otherwise negligent, reckless and/or careless.
103. IE
The injuries and deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON
IF
CLINE were caused in whole or in part by the negligence, recklessness, and/or carelessness of
RT
the defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO as set forth herein with no negligence on the part of
the CLINE DECEDENTS contributing thereto.

CE
104. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of the Defendants,
jointly and severally, there was a measurable and significant period of time prior to the deaths of
A
decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE whereby they experienced unusual
T
G-forces, physical injuries, conscious pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, fear
O
of impending death, and other injuries and damages that ultimately caused their deaths.
N
48
PY
CO
D
IE
IF
otherwise damaged.
RT
CE
A
T
O
N
49
to all such damages, and were otherwise damaged.
Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, and Plaintiff KELLY
PY
CLINE FAMA, Personal Representative of the Estate of KAMERON CLINE, deceased, jointly
CO
and severally, seek all wrongful death and survival compensatory damages for and to each of
plaintiffs’ decedent’s Estates, and for and/or on behalf of all statutory wrongful death
D
beneficiaries and any other individual entitled to recover under applicable law, as well as costs
IE
and such other relief this Court deems appropriate, and further demand a trial by jury of all issues
IF
triable as of right by jury.
RT
COUNT III
BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST DEFENDANTS LEONARDO AND/OR AWPC

CE

A
108. On and prior to July 4, 2019, defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC, expressly
T
and/or impliedly warranted that the subject helicopter and its component parts and systems,
O
including, but not limited to, the flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director,
N
stability augmentation system, and their associated components, including the computer
hardware, software and associated electrical systems, which were sold, supplied and placed into
the stream of commerce were airworthy, of merchantable quality, fit and safe for the purposes
for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, sold, serviced,
50
repaired, maintained, overhauled, intended and used, and said defendants further warranted that
that the subject helicopter and its component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, the
flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, and
their associated components, including the computer hardware, software and associated electrical
systems, and their associated components, were free from all defects, and said defendants knew
that these warranties would be, and actually were, relied upon, including by the decedents
PY
CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE; and said defendants warranted expressly
CO
and/or impliedly that the warnings, advice and instructions for the subject helicopter and its
component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, the subject helicopter’s flight control
D
and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, and their
IE
associated components, including the computer hardware, software and associated electrical
IF
systems, and their associated components, including its flight manual, maintenance manual,
RT
maintenance instructions, overhaul manual, service bulletins, inspection schedules and service
life schedules were proper, adequate and correct.

CE
109. The defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC breached said warranties in that the
subject helicopter and its component parts and systems, including, but not limited to, the subject
A
helicopter’s flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation
T
system, and their associated components, including the computer hardware, software and
O
associated electrical systems, and their associated components, were not airworthy, not of
N
merchantable quality and were not fit for the purposes for which they were designed,
manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, sold, serviced, repaired, maintained, overhauled,
intended and used, and were not free from all defects; and that the warnings, advice and
instructions for the subject helicopter, and its component parts and systems, including, but not
51
limited to, the subject helicopter’s flight control and avionics systems, autopilot, flight director,
stability augmentation system, and their associated components, including the computer
hardware, software and associated electrical systems, and their associated components, including
its flight manual, maintenance manual, maintenance instructions, overhaul manual, service
bulletins, inspection schedules and service life schedules were improper, inadequate, incorrect
and misleading.
PY
110. In addition to the foregoing, defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC also
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breached their implied warranties of merchantability in one or more of the following ways in
that:
D
a. said defendants as a merchant in the goods and type used by the CLINE
IE
DECEDENTS did not have the subject helicopter, its flight control and avionics systems,
IF
autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system which includes computers, actuators,
RT
synchros, sensors, servos, linkages, relays, and trim motors adequately designed, developed,
tested, inspected, assembled and manufactured;

CE
b. said goods were not of fair and average quality in the trade in which defendants
LEONARDO and/or AWPC are engaged;

A
c. said goods were not fit for the ordinary purpose for which said goods were used;
T
d. said goods were not in conformity with, in so far as safety was concerned, those
O
generally used in the trade or business in which defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC are
N
engaged;
e. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that the
goods were not fit for their ordinary purposes;
52
f. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that said
goods were defectively designed, manufactured, tested, sold, inspected, supplied and marketed
and as such were dangerous to the CLINE DECEDENTS and others who travelled in the subject
helicopter;
g. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that said
goods were inadequate and dangerous for the purposes intended and were dangerous to the safety
PY
of all persons who travelled in the subject helicopter, specifically including the CLINE
CO
DECEDENTS; and
h. said goods did not conform to the normal commercial standards of the trade in
D
which the defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC are engaged.
111. IE
In addition to the foregoing, defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC also
IF
breached their implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose in one or more of the
RT
following ways in that:
a. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that said
CE
goods would be used by all persons who travelled in the subject helicopter, specifically including
the CLINE DECEDENTS;

A
b. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that all
T
persons who travelled in the subject helicopter, specifically including the CLINE DECEDENTS
O
did and would rely upon said defendants to furnish goods which were not defective;
N
c. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC knew or should have known that the
goods were not adequately and/or properly designed, manufactured, tested, sold, inspected,
supported, marketed, supplied or placed into the stream of commerce and therefore would not be
fit for the purposes for which all persons who travelled in the subject helicopter, specifically
53
including the CLINE DECEDENTS would be using them; and
d. defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC failed to provide a safe and non-defective
helicopter and components as detailed herein which would not cause injury, harm and damage to
all persons who travelled in the subject helicopter, specifically including the CLINE
DECEDENTS.
112. As a direct and proximate result of the defendant LEONARDO’s and/or AWPC’s
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breach of warranties, in whole or in part, as set forth herein, the subject helicopter crashed into
CO
the Atlantic Ocean, injuring and killing the decedents, CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON
CLINE.
D
113. As a result of the foregoing and as a direct and proximate result of the
IE
aforementioned breaches of warranties by the defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC, jointly and
IF
severally, there was a measurable and significant period of time prior to the deaths of decedents
RT
CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE whereby they experienced unusual G-forces,
physical injuries, conscious pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of
CE
impending death, and other injuries and damages that ultimately caused their deaths.
A
T
surviving children, namely, CANDICE CLINE KENAN, CHRISTOPHER L. CLINE, and ALEX T.
O
CLINE, as well as anyone entitled to recover under the applicable law and/or Mr. Cline’s Estate, all
N
represented by the CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS, seek all wrongful death and survival
damages under applicable law, including, but not limited to, all economic and non-economic
damages, including the loss of the gross earning power of the decedent; the loss of the full value of
the life of the decedent; loss of the parental relationship arising from the death of the decedent; the
54
loss of financial support and contribution of the decedent; loss of services; loss of inheritance; loss of
accumulations; full pecuniary loss of the decedent; loss of past and future income, support, society,
love, grief, consortium, services, guidance, care, comfort, and companionship of the decedent; loss
of life’s pleasures; loss of enjoyment of life of the decedent; and damages for mental anguish and
mental pain and suffering; and the heirs, beneficiaries and distributees of the decedent’s estate were
caused to incur other necessary and reasonable expenses as a result of the decedent’s death and are
PY
entitled to all such damages, and were otherwise damaged.
CO
D
IE
and/or Ms. Cline’s Estate, all represented by the KAMERON CLINE PLAINTIFF, seek all wrongful
IF
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non-economic damages, including the loss of the gross earning power of the decedent; the loss of the
full value of the life of the decedent; loss of the parent-child relationship arising from the death of
CE
the decedent; the loss of financial support and contribution of the decedent; loss of services; loss of
inheritance; loss of accumulations; full pecuniary loss of the decedent; loss of past and future
A
T
O
N
distributees of the decedent’s estate were caused to incur other necessary and reasonable expenses as
a result of the decedent’s death and are entitled to all such damages, and were otherwise damaged.
Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased, and Plaintiff KELLY CLINE
55
FAMA, Personal Representative of the Estate of KAMERON CLINE, deceased, jointly and
severally, seek all wrongful death and survival compensatory damages for and to each of plaintiffs’
decedent’s Estates, and for and/or on behalf of all statutory wrongful death beneficiaries and any
other individual entitled to recover under applicable law, as well as costs and such other relief this
Court deems appropriate, and further demand a trial by jury of all issues triable as of right by jury.
COUNT IV
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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AGAINST
DEFENDANTS LEONARDO AND/OR AWPC
CO
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117. On and prior to July 4, 2019, the subject helicopter and its component parts and
IE
systems, including, but not limited to, the subject helicopter’s flight control and avionics systems,
IF
autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, and their associated components, including
RT
the computer hardware, software and associated electrical systems, and their associated components,
and their attendant warnings, advice, instructions and guidance, were being operated and used for the
CE
purposes and in the manner for which they were designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected,
A
tested, distributed, sold, serviced, maintained, and/or repaired, and intended to be used, in a manner
reasonably foreseeable to the defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC, and in a condition without
T
O
substantial change from their original condition when sold by the LEONARDO and/or AWPC
N
defendants.
118. On and prior to July 4, 2019, the subject helicopter and its component parts and
56
and their attendant instructions, were defective and unreasonably dangerous and unsafe in one or
more of the following ways in that defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC:
a. defectively designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed, sold,
warned and instructed, serviced, maintained and/or repaired the subject helicopter and its component
parts and systems, including, but not limited to, the subject helicopter’s flight control and avionics
systems, autopilot, flight director, stability augmentation system, and their associated components,
PY
including the computer hardware, software and associated electrical systems, and their associated
CO
components;
b. failed to warn of the defects in the design, manufacture, testing, inspection, sale and
D
supply of the helicopter and said components;
c. IE
provided inadequate, improper warnings, advice, instructions and guidance, for the
IF
helicopter and said components, including, but not limited to, lack of airworthiness and/or continued
RT
airworthiness;
d. improperly manufactured, designed, sold, and/or supplied the subject helicopter and
CE
said components without performing proper testing during certification, manufacture and/or any time
thereafter;
A
e. defectively designed and/or manufactured the subject helicopter and said components
T
in such a manner that rendered them not suitable for use or for their intended purpose;
O
f. certified the subject helicopter and said components without proper testing, both pre-
N
and post manufacture and pre-and post delivery to the consumer or purchaser;
g. designed and manufactured the subject helicopter and its component parts in such a
manner that rendered them defective and inadequate and/or otherwise failed to incorporate into their
design and manufacture safe, suitable and proper materials which met or satisfied all government
57
required specifications;
h. designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied defective products as allged herein,
and/or failed to correct the same once defects in their design and manufacture became known or
should have been known;
i. failed to correct known or readily knowable defects in the subject helicopter and said
components and/or properly warn of same;
PY
j. failed to recall, replace or retrofit the subject helicopter and said components;
CO
k. failed in their post-sale duty to warn of and/or otherwise remedy the defects and
dangerous conditions in the subject helicopter and said components;
D
l. designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied defective product(s) with a dangerous
IE
condition(s) that was unknowable and unacceptable to the average or ordinary consumer;
IF
m. designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied defective product(s) such that a
RT
reasonable person would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by that
product outweighed the burden or costs of taking proper precautions with respect thereto;
CE
n. failed to ensure quality assurance and quaility control in manufacturing and design;
o. designed, manufactured, sold, and/or supplied defectively designed product(s)

A
consisting of improper materials which were unsuitable for their intended use; and
T
p. such other defects associated with the subject helicopter and said components.
O
119. All of the foregoing had the potential to lead to an unsafe condition, including, but
N
not limited to, an unexpected hard over, departure from controlled flight, and/or loss of control,
including autopilot control, with little or no warning provided to the flight crew of the impending
deadly situation, which could, and did, in whole or in part, lead to the crash complained of herein.
120. The crash, injuries and deaths of the decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and
58
KAMERON CLINE, were caused, in whole or in part, by the aforementioned defective,
unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition of the subject helicopter and its component parts and
and their attendant warnings, advice, instructions and guidance, in conjunction with said defendants’
PY
improper and inadequate warnings, advice and instructions, as well as said defendants’ failure to
CO
take appropriate measures to remedy and correct known defects and dangerous conditions, or
provide accurate and up to date information in the flight manual, maintenance manual, maintenance
D
instructions, overhaul manual, service bulletins, inspection schedules and service life schedules all of
IE
which had the potential to lead to an unsafe condition, including, but not limited to, an unexpected
IF
hard over, departure from controlled flight, and/or unexpected loss of control, including autopilot
RT
control, with little or no warning provided to the flight crew of the impending deadly situation,
which could, and did, lead to the crash complained of herein, and accordingly, the defendants
CE
LEONARDO and/or AWPC are strictly liable in tort to the Plaintiffs.
121. As a direct and proximate result of said defendants’ product and warning defects and
A
strict liability in tort, as set forth above, in whole or in part, the subject helicopter crashed into the
T
Atlantic Ocean, injuring and killing the decedents, CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON
O
CLINE.
N
omissions by the defendants LEONARDO and/or AWPC, jointly and severally, there was a
measurable and significant period of time prior to the deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE
and KAMERON CLINE whereby they experienced unusual G-forces, physical injuries, conscious
59
pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, fear of impending death, and other injuries
and damages that ultimately caused their deaths.
PY
CO
D
IE
IF
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CE
A

T
O
N
60
PY
CO
D
IE
IF
RT
CE
COUNT V
A
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT ROTORTECH

T
O

N
126. The defendant ROTORTECH is in the business of inspecting, maintaining, servicing,
and repairing aircraft, specifically including with respect to the accident helicopter.
127. At all times relevant, defendant ROTORTECH knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, that its failure to provide proper, safe and non-negligent inspection,
61
maintenance, service and repair to the accident helicopter or any of its component parts could and
would create an unreasonable risk of harm or death to persons who travelled aboard the subject
helicopter, specifically including the CLINE DECEDENTS.
128. The subject helicopter was required to be maintained by defendant ROTORTECH to
the highest standards required by manufacturers and regulatory authorities, as well as by said
defendant’s own Part 145 operating specifications, Part 145 Repair Station Manual, and applicable
PY
maintenance manual and/or other proper maintenance requirements.
CO
129. Upon information and belief, in the months leading up to the crash complained of
herein, including within the week before the crash, defendant ROTORTECH conducted certain and
D
extensive maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection on the subject helicopter, including with
IE
respect to the helicopter’s flight control and avionics systems.
IF
130. Upon completion of the maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection performed by
RT
the defendant ROTORTECH, it pronounced the subject helicopter safe for flight and airworthy in all
respects, when it was not.

CE
131. Prior to the subject crash, the defendant ROTORTECH, by and through their agents,
servants, representatives, workmen and/or employees, performed maintenance, service, repair and/or
A
inspection on the subject helicopter’s flight control and navigation system(s), autopilot, avionics and
T
other related systems, as well as addressing a customer complaint of the subject helicopter’s cyclic
O
control jamming in flight. These maintenance activities were required to include, amongst other
N
things, tests and inspections performed either in accordance with the defendant ROTORTECH
and/or manufacturers’ required maintenance and inspection procedures, upon completion of which
defendant ROTORTECH was required to, and did, certify that the subject helicopter was safe,
reliable and airworthy, when it was not.
62
132. As a result of the maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection performed by the
defendant ROTORTECH on the subject helicopter and its flight control and navigation system(s),
autopilot, avionics and other related systems, the defendant ROTORTECH, by returning the
helicopter to service, certified that the subject helicopter and each of these specific systems and/or
subsystems, were properly maintained, repaired, and/or inspected, were airworthy, were in
compliance with all applicable airworthiness and continuing airworthiness requirements pertaining
PY
thereto, and that the subject helicopter and these systems and subsystems were otherwise safe for
CO
flight, when in fact they were not.
133. The defendant ROTORTECH owed duties to all persons who travelled on the subject
D
helicopter, specifically including the CLINE DECEDENTS, to use due and reasonable care, and/or
IE
to exercise the highest degree of care in connection with any maintenance, service, repair and/or
IF
inspection performed on the subject helicopter and all of its component parts and systems, including
RT
but not limited to, the flight control and navigation system(s), autopilot, avionics and other related
systems, and the helicopter trim systems.

CE
134. In addition to the above-referenced duties imposed by common law, defendant
ROTORTECH was also subject to duties imposed by regulatory and/or other law with regard to
A
maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection, including, but not limited to, complying with the
T
applicable maintenance manuals, its Repair Station Manual, and/or other applicable maintenance
O
requirements with respect to the accident helicopter and its component parts and systems.
N
135. At all times relevant, it was foreseeable, and defendant ROTORTECH knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known, that any negligent or improper acts or omissions by
it with regard to performing maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection on the accident helicopter
or any of its component parts or systems, would create an unreasonable risk of harm and injury or
63
death to all persons who travelled on the subject helicopter, specifically including the CLINE
DECEDENTS.
136. The defendant ROTORTECH had a further duty to inform all pilots, owners and/or
operators of the accident helicopter of any unresolved and/or actual deficiencies or discrepancies,
known or suspected, relating to maintenance, service, repair and/or inspection, while the subject
helicopter was under their care and/or control.
PY
137. The subject crash, injuries and deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents CHRISTOPHER
CO
CLINE and KAMERON CLINE were caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence, recklessness
and/or carelessness of the defendant ROTORTECH in that it, individually and/or jointly, including
D
its officers, agents, servants, representatives, and/or employees, negligently, recklessly and/or
carelessly: IE
IF
a. failed to maintain, service, repair and/or inspect the subject helicopter and/or ensure
RT
that same was in an airworthy condition;
b. failed to properly identify problems with and/or otherwise properly maintain, service,
CE
repair and/or inspect, the flight control and navigation system(s), avionics, and autopilot system
and/or their interface, including associated components, switches and relays;

A
c. failed to identify problems with and/or otherwise properly maintain, service, repair
T
and/or inspect the avionics suite;

O
d. failed to identify problems with and/or otherwise properly maintain, service, repair
N
and/or inspect the flight control, automatic flight control, avionics, trim and/or stability
augmentation systems;
e. failed to identify problems with and/or otherwise properly maintain, service, repair
and/or inspect the interface between the flight control and associated systems, including the trim
64
systems, including, but not limited to, cyclic control and associated components;
f. failed to properly inform Challenger Management (the owner and/or operator of the
subject helicopter) of the nature and extent of problems with the subject helicopter, so that it could
make a reasoned and informed decision as to whether the helicopter was safe for flight;
g. failed to properly test the subject helicopter after service to ensure that all systems
functioned properly;
PY
h. failed to maintain the subject helicopter to the standards of a reasonably prudent
CO
mechanic or maintenance facility, as they were required to do, such that the subject helicopter was
unsafe for flight and a danger to its pilots, passengers, and those on the ground, specifically
D
including the CLINE DECEDENTS;
i. IE
failed to adequately test and inspect the subject helicopter and all of its component
IF
parts and systems, including, but not limited to, the flight control and navigation system(s),
RT
autopilot, avionics and other related systems and the helicopter trim systems, including cyclic
control, and all of their associated components, to determine whether they were safe, whether any
CE
defects or dangerous conditions existed or were likely to exist, and whether they would cause or
contribute to cause injuries to, and/or deaths of, pilots and/or passengers using the subject helicopter
A
for its intended purpose, specifically including the CLINE DECEDENTS;

T
j. failed to make necessary and proper modifications and/or repairs to the subject
O
helicopter and its flight control and navigation system(s), autopilot, avionics and other related
N
systems and the helicopter trim systems, including cyclic control, and all of their associated
components, in order to guard against their propensity to cause and/or contribute to cause injuries
and/or death to users and/or passengers on board the helicopter, specifically including the CLINE
DECEDENTS;
65
k. failed to provide proper warnings concerning the hazards and/or defects in or created
by the subject helicopter and flight control and navigation system(s), autopilot, avionics and other
related systems and the helicopter trim systems, including cyclic control, and all of their associated
components, specifically including with respect to the maintenance activities said defendant
performed;
l. failed to correct known defects, dangers or deficiencies in materials used or installed
PY
in the subject helicopter;
CO
m. failed to comply with their responsibilities as a repair station pertaining to
maintenance, service, repair, inspection, airworthiness and/or continued airworthiness of the subject
D
helicopter;
n. IE
failed to reasonably and properly instruct, warn and otherwise provide information
IF
regarding the unsuitability of the subject helicopter for its intended use;
RT
o. failed to reasonably and properly test and analyze the subject helicopter and its flight
control and navigation system(s), autopilot, avionics and other related systems and the helicopter
CE
trim systems, including cyclic control, and all of their associated components, for their intended
application after repair and maintenance conducted by itself and/or others;

A
p. maintained, repaired, serviced, inspected, troubleshot, tested, installed, assembled, re-

T
assembled and returned to service the subject helicopter and/or its component parts and accessories
O
in an unsafe and improper manner;

N
q. otherwise improperly maintained, serviced, repaired, tested and inspected the subject
helicopter;
r. failed to warn owners and operators of the defects and dangerous conditions in the
subject helicopter;
66
s. failed to properly supervise its agents, servants, representatives and/or employees
who performed maintenance, service, repair and inspection on the subject helicopter;
t. failed to properly follow and/or adhere to airframe, engine and/or component part
manufacturer(s) inspection, maintenance and repairs manuals and/or other technical publications or
bulletins;
u. failed to properly diagnose, correct and repair customer complaints, specifically
PY
including jammed cyclic control during flight, and failed to ensure that such failure does not
CO
continue to occur; and
v. said defendant was otherwise negligent, reckless and/or careless.
D
IE
CLINE were caused, in whole or in part, by the negligence, recklessness, and/or carelessness of the
IF
defendant ROTORTECH as set forth herein with no negligence on the part of the CLINE
RT
DECEDENTS contributing thereto.
CE
omissions of the Defendant, jointly and severally, there was a measurable and significant period of
time prior to the deaths of decedents CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE whereby
A
they experienced unusual G-forces, physical injuries, conscious pain and suffering, mental anguish,
T
emotional distress, fear of impending death, and other injuries and damages that ultimately caused
O
their deaths.
N
67
PY
CO
D
IE
IF
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CE
A
T
O
N
68
PY
CO
D
Dated this 20th day of June 2022.
IE
Respectfully submitted,
IF
s/ David Buckner_____________
DAVID M. BUCKNER, Esq.
RT
Florida Bar No.: 060550

Email: david@bucknermiles.com
BUCKNER + MILES
2020 Salzedo Street, Suite 302
CE
Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: (305) 964-8003
A
-and-
DOUGLAS A. LATTO, Esq.

T
Email: dal@speiserkrause.com
O
JEANNE M. O’GRADY, Esq.

Email: jog@speiserkrause.com
N
SPEISER KRAUSE PC
800 Westchester Avenue, Suite S-608
Rye Brook, New York 10573
Telephone: (914) 220-5333
(pending pro hac vice admittances)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
69

Cline Lawsuit

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Cline Lawsuit

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**** CASE NUMBER: 502022CA005955XXXXMB Div: AF ****

Filing # 151794424 E-Filed 06/20/2022 12:01:06 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15th

LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT, as Case No.

AGUSTA WESTLAND PHILADELPHIA

1. This is an action brought by Plaintiffs LESSLIE RAY and TIMOTHY ELLIOTT,

Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER CLINE, deceased; and by Plaintiff

of CHRISTOPHER CLINE and KAMERON CLINE in the crash of a certain Leonardo/Agusta

AGUSTA WESTLAND PHILADELPHIA CORPORATION (“AWPC”); LEONARDO S.P.A;

2. As detailed herein, prior to the crash, defendants AWPC and/or REDACTED

daughter and were travelling as passengers on a certain model Leonardo/Agusta AW 139

operated by non-parties Florida-based Challenger Management LLC (“Challenger

but a man whose death has impacted countless lives.

7. The CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS bring this wrongful death and/or

defendants as alleged herein. IE

11. The CHRISTOPHER CLINE PLAINTIFFS and the REDACTED

REDACTEDshall sometimes be collectively referred to as the “CLINE PLAINTIFFS”.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

contract within this District, all giving rise to this action.

Parties and Personal Jurisdiction Allegations

administered by the Court in Palm Beach County, Florida.

defendant LEONARDO S.P.A., designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested,

within the State of Florida.

others) within Florida with Florida-based companies, including Challenger Management. In

it earned substantial revenues therefrom, as well as its purposeful availment of conducting

to accept service of process pursuant to Section 48.091 of the Florida Statutes.

S.P.A., f/k/a FINMECCANICA S.P.A., f/k/a AGUSTAWESTLAND S.P.A (“LEONARDO”), is

a company existing under the laws of the country of Italy.

things, selling, distributing, installing, monitoring, maintaining, servicing, repairing, replacing,

the type certificate holder for the accident helicopter.

with defendant AWPC, designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed,

the CLINE DECEDENTS.

it earned substantial revenues therefrom, as well as its purposeful availment of conducting

based Challenger Management, defendant LEONARDO may be served through defendant

other agreement between the parties.

ROTORTECH SERVICES, INC., (“ROTORTECH”) was and is a domestic for-profit

components responsible for, in part, controlling the subject helicopter in flight.

29. Because defendant ROTORTECH is a citizen and resident of Florida, and

specific jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes.

General Allegations Applicable To All Counts

during training as detailed herein.

deadly and unsafe deficiencies, notwithstanding their specific knowledge of same.

Notwithstanding this specific knowledge, inexplicably and negligently, recklessly and/or

Purchase of the Accident Helicopter by Challenger Management

35. In September 2017 Challenger Management purchased the accident helicopter,

specifically an Agusta/Leonardo AW 139 model helicopter bearing Federal Aviation

as a third pilot, William Sewell.

specific aircraft or helicopter properly, appropriately and safely.

were type rated in the accident helicopter.

flight training in the accident helicopter.

emergencies (whether due to product or maintenance defects), in an actual helicopter as opposed

passengers in danger, etc.

the required type-rating.

Recurrent Training in 2018

that took place in November 2018.

or in part, of the crash and the deaths of the CLINE DECEDENTS.

training support for the helicopter.

LEONARDO established a Safety Management System (“SMS”) program to specifically

immediately by defendant AWPC to defendant LEONARDO for further evaluation.

began flight training during their recurrent training. IE

November 12 through 16, 2018 at defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO’s facilities in

ratings were due.

training was conducted by defendants AWPC and/or LEONARDO in a flight simulator as

CASE NUMBER: 502022CA005955XXXXMB Div: AF