evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the
EVIDENCE
CASES
A. RULE 128 GENERAL
PROVISIONS
REYES VS. CA 216 SCRA 25
FACTS:
Started in a landholding case involving two farm lots
Farm Lot No. 46 and 106. The landholding case
involves the dispossession of the tenant by the
owners. Tenant won. Petitioners Reyes are among the
defendant in the first landholding case since they own
Lot No. 106. They argued in this separate case that
they are not to be held liable because only Lot No. 46
is involved in the first landholding case. To support
their claims, they presented the 1987 Resolution of
Investigating Fiscal Jesus dismissing the previous
complaint of the tenant against petitioner Reyes.
ISSUE:
Is Lot No. 106 part of the landholding controversy?
RULING: Yes, the Court relied on the findings of the
trial court and appellate court. To overrule the rulings
of the lower court require the examination of the
evidence. This is not allowed since settled is the rule
that only questions of law should be entertained by
the Court in petition for review.
Even if there is a consistency between the claims of
the witness and plaintiff, such inconsistency between
the averment of the complaint and the testimony of
the witness should not be taken against appellee not
only because there was no showing that she intended
to mislead defendants and even the trial court on the
subject matter of the suit.
Finally, the trial court was not mistaken in admitting
the testimony of spouses Tecson even if they were
not presented and subjected to cross-examination
since ROC does not apply in agrarian cases. It is PD
946 and there it is stated that In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or
controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be
allowed and are admissible in evidence.
It is also worthy to note that the quantum of evidence
required in agrarian cases is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence
is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence
is entitled to belief
Imperial textile Mills v. NLRC
FACTS
Certiroari on the decision of the NLRC on an illegal
dismissal case. In this case, the petitioner is the
employer and the priv respo is the employee.
During employee’s leave, she was replaced by
someone from the new management. Because of this,
she asked a separation pay from the company and
the termination of her employment. Employee filed an
illegal dismissal case before the LA against the new
management of the company she worked for 14
years. New management argued that the employee
file dvoluntarily and if she was terminated, ti was with
just cause.
In LA, BOTH PARTIES presented their position
papers. Employers filed an MD because the
employee’s PP is unverified and the employee was
absent during the cross-examination. LA DISMISSED.
NLRC REVERSED THE DECISION because the
employers were not deprived of due process since an
intelligent decision can be achieved without resorting
to a formal hearing. REMANED TO LA. LA RULED
EMPLOYEE RESIGNED. NLRC REVERSED AND SAID
THERE WAS ILLEGAL TERMINATION BECAUSE SHE
WAS ASKING FOR TERMINATION PAY.
Employer MRed. Denied. Hence cert basis is denial of
due process because employer was denied the
opportunity cross-examine during the LA hearing.
ISSUES
Was there a denial of due process? No because
employer was given the opportunity to be heard when
they filed the MD and they filed a position paper with
the LA.
Further, the admission of the unverified position
paper is valid because the rules on evidence is are not
strictly observed by LA for they may avail themselves
of all reasonable means to speedily ascertain the facts
of a controversy. Even the LA admitted that the
unverified PP is a mere procedural infirmity which
does not affect the merits of the case.
Additional: Even if the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period, the Court proceeded to rule
since the circumstances of the case belongs to the
exception—which is to bring substantial justice to the
employer.

People vs. Turco 337 scra 714
FACTS
Petitioner is charged with rape of his second cousin.
Victim was a 12 years and 6 mos old.
Rape happened: 7pm of July 8. Offender went to the
victims house. Covered her face with a toweerl
dragged her 12 m from htiehr house. Inside the pig
pen, the rape was consummated. After th4 e rapew,
offender kissed and touched the nipples of the victim.
Took 10 days before the victim told his bro in law
about the rape. Bro in law told the victim’s father.
Victim as accompanied by her sister to be medically
examined. After the issuance of med certt, they filed
a complaint against petitioner.
Defenses arguments:
1. No positive identification because the
victim’s face was covered immediately after
opening the door
2. even if it was Totong who visited the house,
there was no rape.
3. Even if there was secual intercourse, it was
not rape but a consensual sex since they
were sweethearts. Witness of the defendant
(neighbor of the victim) forwarded the
narrative that the offender and the victim
were sweethearts.
Ruling of the lower courts: GUILTY OF RAPE
1. Witness will not lie because they are blood
relatives and it would be shameful to the
whole family to have this kind of controversy
2. No underlying motive to impute a crime.
3. The complainant is a young girl, a little over
twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate,
having attended school up to Grade III only.
So poor that her family cannot even buy the
cheapest television set
D's appeal: conviction not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
1. Relied only on the testimony of the victim
2. No actual proof that rape actually happened.
And if rape happened, it was not petitioner
who did it.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner Is guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt? YES because the testimony of the
victim was able to show beyond reasonable doubt
that she was raped and it was the petitioner who
raped her.
RULING
Three guiding principles in review of rape cases:
1. Accusation fo rape is diifcult to prove but
more difficult to disprove
2. Since rape is a private crime, the testimony
of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution
3. the evidence for the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense
Credibility of complainant’s testimony is given
primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape.
(the defense tried to destroy the credibility of the
testimony by showing that the victim confused the
events before and during the rape: totong borrowed
guitar at 5:30pm, rape happened 7 pm)
- the court took judicial notice of the victim’s
confusion but such does not her credibility.
Her confusion was just a product of her
youth, her lack of education/low level of
intelligence, and her fear of both the
offender and her father.
- The court also emphasized that declarations
on the witness stand of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence
- Further, the court ruled that minor lapses in
a witness’ testimony is expected considering
how harrowing of an experience rape is. The
testimony of a witness must be considered
and calibrated in its entirety and not by
truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein
- The court also took note of the blood
relationship between the offender and the
victim. The court found no motive from the
victim, one of tender age, to falsely testify
against her cousin.
- The delay in reporting the incident does not
destroy the credibility of the witness because
such is expected, especially in this case that
the victim is a 12 year old girl who is fearful
of his father and cousin.
- Sweetheart story was unavailing because
they failed to introduce love letters, gifts,
and the like to attest to his alleged amorous
affair with the victim.
As to the admissibility of the medical certificate:
Admissible but does not hold much weight because of
the failure of the examining physician to appear
before the court. (note: Med cert is admissible
because it is an exception to the hearsay rule
however it will not be given weight since the
physician was not present during the trial)
However, even if the medcert had only little probative
value, that does not negate the existence of rape.
The existence of rape and the guilt of the accused
was already proven through the testimony of the
victim herself. the victim's testimony alone is credible
and sufficient to convict.
RELEVANCE
Lopez vs. Heseen 365 P.2D
448 1961
FACTS
Gun features:
1. a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle
2. Class 1 safety mechanism
3. Has Mauser type bolt action
First complaint: Lopez and Heseen only.
Second complaint: Lopez v. Heseen and Sears
Lopez was the victim, Heseen was the
shooter/offender. However in this case, it is Sears,
the seller of the gun used by Lopez, who is to be held
liable for the injury. They are to be made liable
because the rifle used by Hesseen was negligently
designed in that the safety mechanism can be easily
moved (raised if safet, horizontal if to be fired.)
Defense of Sears: rifle involved was of a recognized
quality and of proper design and functioned properly
by all commercial sporting arms standards when used
with reasonable care. It is so safe that it has been
manufactured and used by many in US and other
foreign countries. Also, hensen was well-aware of
how the safety mechanism works.
Hesseen only boguth the rifle without the telescopic
sight even if such was advertised for sale. Heesen
went hunting. carried the gun on his right shoulder
and the safety lever was towards his body or leg.
Such psotiion changes when climbing or stepping
upon rock. Heseen only targeted the deer but as he
was about to move closer, he tripped and shot Lopez.
Heesen testified that he had his hand at least six
inches away from the trigger when the gun
discharged. Immediately after the gun discharged he
observed that the gun was on "fire" position
In the jury trial, both parties presented experts as
their witnesses.
 Lopez must prove that the gun is unsafe.
 Sears must show that the rifle is well-
designed and the safety-mechanism is safe
to use and such safety can be vouched for
by experts in the small arms or experts in
gun designing. The design is so safe that
others follow it and the safety mechanism is
so safe that a number of rifles have it.
ISSUE
WON Sears is negligent. Yes (here to prove
negligence, you must show that the rifle’s safety
mechanism is dangerous and that could be proven
through expert testimonies)
 whether the safety mechanism on the
Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous
and defective condition due to its negligent
design, in that it moved readily and in a
dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire"
position. Yes, as proven by the expert
witnesses.
RULING
An allegation of negligence as applied to the conduct
of a party is not a mere conclusion of law, unless
made so by the law, but the statement of an ultimate
pleadable and provable fact. * an expert witness can
express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, but
cannot testify as to the ultimate issue of liability.
WON the safety device is not dangerous or unsafe
can properly be the subject of expert testimony as it
only involves question of facts. The term “negligent
design” imputed to the rifle is not negligence in the
legal sense of the word but in a narrow sense and as
to an ultimate provable fact. Opinion evidence on an
ultimate issue of fact does not attempt or have the
power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this
evidence could not usurp the jury's function because
the jury may still reject these opinions and accept
some other view.
witnesses possessing requisite training, skill, or
knowledge, denominated `experts,' may testify, not
only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting the
facts,
State vs. Ball 339 S.W2D783
1960
FACTS
Ball was found by the jury guilty of robbery. He was
the tall guy (one of the two, the other was short)
recognized by Krekeler. He was recognized because
of his tall hat, brown jacket, and gray stirt.
Defenses raised by Ball in the SC:
1. no direct evidence that krekeler was in fear
2. the testimony of the arresting officers as the
personal items PARTICULARLY THE
US$258.02 seized from Ball should not have
been admitted because they were not
material or relevant or did they prove or
disprove any of the issues involved in this
case. (Ball only objected to the money, not
the accessories seized)
ISSUE
WON the US$258.02 relevant so as to be
admitted? No because firstly, Mr. Krekeler was
unable to identify any of these articles or the money
as having come from the jewelry store robbery. The
mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no
indication that the possessor was the taker of money
charged as taken, because in general all money of the
same denomination and material is alike, and the
hypothesis that the money found is the same as the
money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be
receivable. Also, to be the money relevant, there
must be a plain showing of Ball’s impecuniousness
before the robbery and his sudden affluence.
RULING
COMPETENCE
Exclusionary Rules Secs. 2, 3,
12, 17, Art. 3, Constitution
Statutory Rules of Exclusion in
RA 1405
RA 4200 Anti-Wiretapping
Law
B. RULE 129 JUDICIAL
NOTICE
City of Manila vs. Garcia 19
SCRA 413
FACTS
Defendants were formerly informal settlers but they
became tenants of the lands owned by petitioner by
virtue of the permits. Petitioner asked the D to vacate
and pay the unpaid rentals because they need the
lands for the expansion of the elementary school.
TC ordered D to vacate the premises. D challenged
the finding of the TC that the city truly needs the
lands for school purposes.
ISSUE
WON the finding of the TC that the lands is needed
for expansion is correct. Yes because there is
evidence showing that the city indeed planned for the
expansion fo the school’s premises and the land in
question is needed for that purpose.
RULING
The Court ruled that they will not reopen the case
(reexamine questions of facts) since the decision of
the trial court was based on an admissible evidence.
The lower court was correct in taking judicial notice of
Exhibit E, which was the certification appropriating
100k for the construction of an additional building of
the elem school. The city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take
judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the
municipal board of Manila.
D should have raised the issue on the inconsistency of
the judge.
BAGUIO VS. VDA. DE
HALAGAT 42 SCRA 337
FACTS
Plaintiff questions the dismissal of his complaint for
the quieting of title on the basis of res judicata.
He argued that the complain SHOULD NOT have been
dismissed because res judicata was not apparent on
the face of the complaint. (SN: He should have raised
the validity of taking judicial notice of prior decisions)
ISSUE
WON the order of dismissal should be sustained. Yes
as the complaint for the quieting of title is barred by
the previous case involving the same parties and
same subject matter. The lower court certainly could
take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a
case that was previously pending and thereafter
decided by it.
RULING
Plaintiff did not deny that there has been a previous
dismissal involving the same property and such
decision has been final.
PRIETO VS. ARROYO 14 SCRA
549
FACTS
In Special Proceedings No. 900, Heirs of the owner of
Lot No. 1 filed a petition to correct the technical
description in their TCT to conform, the decision of
the LRC, wherein their father is the petitioner. The
petition was granted. Prieto sought to annul the order
of SP 900 but he and his counsel did not appear
during the hearing. His petition to annul was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. MRed but was
denied. Prieto did not appeal.
Almost a year after, he instituted another action to
annul SP No 900 and the order therein. The heirs
moved to dismiss on the ground of RJ. The motion to
dismiss was granted.
In the two petitions to annul, same arguments were
raised: he was notified of SP, SP was instituted 6
years after the issuance of the decree.
ISSUE
WON the dismissal of second petition to annul SP 900
order on the ground of res judicata is proper. Yes.
RULING
The Court ruled that the first order of dismissal is
valid. The lower court has acquired JD over their
person when they were served copies of the petition.
The first order of dismissal is also valid because Prieto
failed to show parole evidence to support his claims.
Prieto should not have assyumed that the Court shall,
on its own, take judicia notice of the records in the
multiple LRC cases as his parole evidence.
Generally, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending
before them, of the contents of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge
YAO KEE V. SY GONZALES 167
SCRA 736
FACTS
Sy Kiat had two families and they are arguing on who
is to be appointed the adminsitratrix. Oppositors is
the Yao Kee camp, petitioners is the Sy camp.
The CA ruled that the children from both camps are
only acknowledged natural children. AS to the
oppositors, they are not considered legitimate
children because Yao Kee’s marriage to Sy Kiat was
not proven. As to the petitioners, they are only
natural children because their mother is not married
to Sy Kiat.
Oppositors (petitioners herein) argued that the
marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was in accordance
with Chinese law and custom and such was
conclusively proven. They further alleged that the CA
should have taken judicial notice of the Chinese
law/customs on marriage as in the Sy Quia case.
ISSUE
WON the marriage of Yao Kee to the deceased had
been conclusively proven. No because the petitioners
did not present any competent evidence relative to
the law and custom of China on marriage.
RULING
To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must
be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign
law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence
AS to customs, a local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact"
Here, Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were married according to
Chinese customs. Yao Kee testified that only their
parents signed a document signifying their marriage.
However, such document was not presented before
the Court. Absent that document, there is no proof of
marriage. The testimonies of the witnesses are
admissible since they are not skilled or competent to
testify on Chinese laws. Therefore, For failure to
prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently,
the validity of the marriage in accordance with said
law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Since the Court cannot take judicial notice of Yao
Kee’s marriage in China, their marriage is to be
examined under PH’s marriage laws. Considering that
they were not married before a solemnizing officer,
which is an essential requisite for a valid marriage, Sy
Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee is void. Accordingly, their
children are only natural children, not legitimate.
TABUENA VS. CA 196 SCRA
650
FACTS (land dispute)
Gipalayas si Tabuena but his defense is he is the
absolute owner of the house. Trial court ruled for the
estate.
Faults of the trial court:
1. Motu proprio took judicial notice of Exhibits
ABC even if they were not offered
2. Considered the proceedings in another case
ISSUE
WON the trial court was correct in taking judicial
notice of exhibits ABC? No because these were not
formally offered by the Estate. Further, even if one of
the witness identified the exhibits, she did not recite
or explain the contents of the exhibits.
WON the TC was correct in taking cognizant of the
proceeding in another case. No because petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court
in the case then pending before
RULING
Generally, the Supreme Court accords accord proper
deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is
no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily.
They can only question the decisions of the lower
courts if these do not conform to the evidence on
record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to
sustain their correctness. As in this case.
As to exhibits not offered but admitted
Rule: The mere fact that a particular document is
marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party. At the trial on the merits, the party may decide
to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not
to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given
any evidentiary value.
An evidence may be admitted even if not offered if:
(1) has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and (2) has itself been incorporated in the
records of the case. For the exhibit to be considered
identified, the witness must recite the contents of the
exhibits.
As to the judicial notes of proceedings
GR: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice,
in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending
before the same judge.
XPN: May take judicial notice if the following
conditions are met:
(1) in the absence of objection,
(2) with the knowledge of the opposing party
(3) at the request or with the consent of the
parties
(4) at the request or with the consent of the
parties
(5) admitted as part of the record of the case
then pending.
The conditions are not satisfied in this case. The
petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony
in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the
trial court in the case then pending before
PEOPLE VS. GODOY 250 SCRA
676
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
BPI SAVINGS VS. CTA 330
SCRA 507
FACTS
Tax payer sought to ask for the refund of 112491
Taxpayer previously declared in their 1989 ITR that
they will not get the 297492 but they will be tax
credits instead.
They changed their mind and asked for a refund of
the 112491.
CTA dismissed the petition for refund because the tax
payer did not present their corporate annual ITR to
prove that they had not yet credited the 297492 to its
1990IT liability.
ISSUE
whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of
P112,491.00, representing excess creditable
withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989. Yes
because they were able to offer evidence
showing that they did not credit the amount in
question because of their financial loss. The
absence of credit was evidenced by the
testimony of the company’s VP and the
manager of the accounting department. They
also presented the quarterly returns.
RULING
CA erred when it ignored the copy of the Final
Adjustment Return for 1990 which was attached to
the taxpayer’s MR filed before the CTA. A final
adjustment return shows whether a corporation
incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable
year. The veracity of this document was not
controverted by the BIR,
Relevant to the topic on judicial notice
To support their claims that they could not have
applied the tax credit because of their loss, the tax
payer cited the CTA decision involving the same case.
In that case, CTA accepted the claims that the tax
payer there suffered loss, hence they are entitled for
a refund. (CTA urged the court not to take judicial
notice of their previous decision in conformity with
the rules) However in this case the court ruled that
courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial decision. In
this case, the taxpayer attached said decision to their
petition for review.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
LUCIDO VS. CALUPITAN
(1914)
FACTS
Lucio’s real estates and chattels were sold to one
Rosales who transferred ½ of its interests to Zolaivar.
a public document was executed and signed by all of
the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio
Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and
Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their
rights and obligations pertaining to the property in
question to Calupitan.
Lucido and Calupitan entered into an agreement
where the latter agreed to reconvey the properties to
the former after paying the corresponding redemption
price.
 TC ruled that the agreement was a slae
with the right to conventional redemption.
ISSUE
WON the agreement is a sale with the right to
conventional redemption. Yes, as admitted by
Calupitan himself in his original answer to the
complaint.
RULING
First, the document distinctly stipulated that the right
to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be
exercised after the expiration of three years. The right
to repurchase must necessarily imply a former
ownership of the property.
More importantly, Calupitan stated in his original
answer that the transaction is a sale with the right to
conventional redemption. This original answer was
introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the
objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper,
especially in view of the fact that it was signed by
Calupitan himself, who was at the time acting his own
attorney. Where amended pleadings have been
filed, allegations in the original pleadings are
held admissible, but in such case the original
pleadings can have no effect, unless formally
offered in evidence.
TORRES VS. CA 131 SCRA 24
(1984)
FACTS
1. Margarita had two marriages. She had 6
children in the first one, one child conceived
during cohabitation in the second.
2. Margarita purchased Lot No. 551.
Testimonial evidence is to the effect that
Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his
earnings as a water tender. However, the
last installment was paid after his death.
Twnty days before the second husband’s
death, he transferred the ownership of the
lot to petitioner.
3. A certain Vincent and his first children
claimed ownership of the lot. A title was
issued under the legal heirs’name.
4. Respondents here filed an FE against
petitioner. Respondents won.
5. Petitioner filed an action for partition against
the respodnents saying that the land is a
conjugal property of her parents and that
she has a share on the land because she is
an legitimated child of Margarita Torres.
 CFI ruled that petitioner is a legitimated a
child and should have a share on the land.
 CA reversed the ruling and said petitioner is
not a legitimated child. Accordingly, one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon
Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other half
(1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo. Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all
surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and
heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente
Santillan is already dead. CA ruled that
petitioner did not resent sufficient evidence
to prove that she is an acknowledged natural
child.
Peti requested for a new trial because she discovered
a typewritten Sworn Statement made by her parents
saying that they acknowledged her as their child.
CA did not grant the motion for new trial.
ISSUES
Whether or not petitioner is an acknowledged natural
child. No because there are no evidence to prove it.
RULING
Petitioenr agued that the respondents admitted in
their original complaint that she was an
acknowledged child. However, such statement was
not repeated in the respondent’s amended complaint.
The admission in the original complaint is nto
admissible since they are not offered in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. If petitioner had
desired to utilize the original complaint she should
have offered it in evidence. Contrary to petitioner's
submission, therefore, there can be no estoppel by
extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint,
for failure to offer it in evidence.
BITONG VS. CA 292 SCRA 503
FACTS
Petitioner Nora A. Bitong filed a derivative suit before
the Securities and
Exchange Commission allegedly for the benefit of the
private respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. (Mr.
& Ms. hereafter), among others, to hold respondent
spouses Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol
liable for fraud, misrepresentation, disloyalty, evident
bad faith, conflict of interest and mismanagement in
directing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. to the damage and
prejudice of Mr. & Ms. and its stockholders, including
petitioner. Petitioner testified at the trial that she
became the registered and beneficial owner of 997
shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the 4,088 total
outstanding shares after she acquired them from
JAKA through a deed of sale executed on 25 July
1983 and recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of
Mr. & Ms. under Certificate of Shares of Stock No. 008
 the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed the
derivative suit filed by petitioner. The
Hearing Panel ruled that there was no
serious mismanagement of Mr. & Ms. which
would warrant drastic corrective measures.
Petitioner appealed to the SEC En Banc
 The SEC En Banc reversed the decision of
the Hearing Panel.
 The appellate court rendered a decision
reversing the SEC En Banc and held that
from the evidence on record petitioner was
not the owner of any share of stock in Mr. &
Ms. and therefore not the real party-
ininterest to prosecute the complaint she
had instituted against private respondents.
ISSUE
WON there is a judicial admission made by private
respondents that Biton was a stockholder of Mr. and
Ms.
RULING
A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission
against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence
the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for
the party against whom the pleading is offered to
show that the statements were inadvertently made or
were made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a
party against whom a single clause or paragraph of a
pleading is offered may have the right to introduce
other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission
in the paragraph offered by the adversary.
The answer of private respondents shows that there
was no judicial admission that petitioner was a
stockholder of Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. Where
the statements of the private respondents were
qualified with phrases such as, "insofar as they are
limited, qualified and/or expanded by," "the truth
being as stated in the Affirmative
Allegations/Defenses of this Answer" they cannot be
considered definite and certain enough, cannot be
construed as judicial admissions.
When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to
the Amended Petition, or even the Answer to the
Amended Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to
the legal personality of petitioner to file the
complaint. Every alleged admission is taken as an
entirety of the fact which makes for the one side with
the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its
effect on the other side. The reason for this is, where
part of a statement of a party is used against him as
an admission, the court should weigh any other
portion connected with the statement, which tends to
neutralize or explain the portion which is against
interest. In other words, while the admission is
admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be
determined from the whole statement and others
intimately related or connected therewith as an
integrated unit. Although acts or facts admitted do
not require proof and cannot be contradicted,
however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show
that the admission was made through palpable
mistake. The rule is always in favor of liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real matter in
dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the
court.
C. RULE 130 RULES OF
ADMISSIBILITY
I. OBJECT OR REAL
EVIDENCE
1. PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE
99 SCRA 388
FACTS
Marcelina was 14 years of age. Allegedly raped
by Adelino in two locations.
 Complaint charged Adelino with rape
 Adelino signed a confession admitting having
kidnapped and molested Marcelina (Exh C)
 Information charged rape with illegal
detention but also alleged that the rape was
effected by means of force and intimidated,
armed with bolos and at nighttime.
 MARCELINA merely alleged that she was
dragged from the house of Norma Fernandez
by means of force and intimidation and at
nighttime. On the other hand, the
Information added that the accused were
"armed with bolos".
 Amended Information: Rape with Forcible
Abduction since Marcelina alleged that she
was detained and deprived of liberty for 3
days. (justified since the body of the facts in
orig information correspond to the new
designation of crime)
 Defense argued that the elements of rape
were not established.
Physical examination:
1. No evidence of external injuries around the
vulva
 2. Hymen has been lacerated but weeks ago.
Adelino admitted having carnal knowledge but it was
consensual since they were sweetheart.
ISSUE
WON Adelino is guilty of the crime. No because his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
as based in the testimonial and documentary
evidence.
RULING
As to the consistency of the testimony and the
object evidence
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks
more eloquently than all witnesses put together. The
expert opinion on the old laceration which would have
occurred two weeks or even one month in the hymen
refutes Marcelina’s claims that she was raped days
ago. This expert opinion bolsters the defense that
MARCELINA and ADELINO bad previous amorous
relations at the same time that it casts serious doubts
on the charge of intercourse by force and
intimidation.
As to the admissibility of the confession
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall
not be sufficient ground for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus
delicti is proved when the evidence on record shows
that the crime prosecuted had been committed.
Here, proof has not been met because the evidence
establishing more of an elopement rather than
kidnapping or illegal detention or forcible abduction,
and much less rape. Further, The confession was a
result of force and intimidation as ADELINO, aged 18,
was by himself when being investigated by soldiers,
10 without benefit of counsel nor of anyone to advise
him of his rights.
2. SISON VS. PEOPLE
250 SCRA 58
PUNO, J :
FACTS
 A group of Marcos loyalists was accused of
beating up Salcedo to death.
 Started with a rally, dispersed, then the
loyalists got mad then a certain Annie angrily
orered the loyalists to beat up any Cory
follower (any one wearing yellow) Salcedo is
one of them.
 Two eyewitnesses. One photographer and
one who tried to help Salcedo.
 Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial
traumatic." sustained
 various contusions, abrasions, lacerated
wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the
following post-mortem findings
Accused
a. Tamayo (G)
b. Neri (NG)
c. sison- (G)
d. rde los santos (G)
e. nilo (G)
f. joel tan (G)
In the CA, all except Tamayo were guilty of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength.
The appeals rests on the contention that the
eyewitnesses are not credible.
The evidence are (1) testimony of the eyewitnesses
(2) photgraphs of their incidence by news media
outlet
 The admissibility of these photographs is
being questioned by appellants for lack of
proper identification by the person or
persons who took the same.
ISSUE
WON the evidence proved the guilty of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Yes
RULING
As to the eyewitness testimony
 Sumilang reported the incident to the police
and submitted his sworn statement
immediately two hours after the mauling,
even before announcement of any reward.
He informed the police that he would
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's
assailants if he saw them again.
o Sumilang’s credence was given by
the TC
 The fact that Banculo executed three sworn
statements does not make them and his
testimony incredible. The sworn statements
were made to identify more suspects who
were apprehended during the investigation
of Salcedo's death
o Banculo's mistake in identifying
another person as one of the
accused does not make him an
entirely untrustworthy witness.
Ultimately, the testimnony of the witnesses
corroborate each other on all important and relevant
details fo the principal occurrence. Their statement
that they saw victim being maules matches with the
findings of the medico-legal officer where the latter
testified that the victim had various wounds on his
body which could have been inflicted by pressure
from more than one hard object. That fatal injury of
intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in
Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by
contact with a hard and blunt object.
As to the photographs
Photographs, when presented in
evidence, must be identified by the photographer as
to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The admissibility
is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent
witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy.
In this case, the appellants are estopped from
refuting the credibility of the photographs since they
used the same photographs to deny their
participation in the crime. At subsequent hearings,
the prosecution used the photographs to cross-
examine all the accused who took the witness stand.
No objection was made by counsel for any of the
accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third
hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their
admissibility.
Although the photographs only captured the
segments of the event, the testimonies of Sumilang
and Banculo supplied the missing parts.
3. ADAMCZUK VS.
HOLLOWAY 13A.2D2
1940
FACTS
Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass against
defendants for personal injuries and property damage
arising out of a collision between a car owned and
operated by plaintiff.
Exh No. 3 is a photograph showing the scene. It was
presented thrice throughout the stages of the
proceedings but in those instances, it was not
admitted as evidence.
A. On cross-examination it was disclosed that
the witness did not know who took the
picture or when it *265 was taken. He stated
that when the picture was taken the location
of the camera was on route 6 but he did not
know at what distance from the intersection.
He had no experience in photography. He
said he did not know whether the
photographer tilted the camera up or down
when the picture was taken, and he did not
know whether the photographer
"endeavored to accentuate certain parts of
the picture." The court then sustained the
objection to the picture's introduction.
B. Presented again to the witness civil engineer
where the latter opined that the picture was
not accurately portraying the route.
C. At the close of plaintiff’s case where the
court opined that the photograph was not
credible.
ISSUE
WON the photograph be admissible as
evidence. No because there are no witnesses to
corroborate it.
RULING
a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to
the issue and if verified. It does not have to be
verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the
competency of the verifying witness. if a witness is
familiar with the scene photographed and is
competent to testify that the photograph correctly
represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted.
Jurisprudence, however, teaches us that photographs
may be dismissed if it was taken by an inexperienced
amateur photographer, or not taken with care nad
that the photographs were unnecessary for a proper
understanding of the case. It is not reversible error to
exclude a photograph of the situs of an accident
where other photographs in evidence and expert
testimony give a clear picture of it.
4. STATE VS. STATUM
360P.2D754 1961
FACTS
ISSUE
1. WON the Regiscope films (the negative and
the print) authenticated sufficiently to
warrant their admission into evidence. Yes
because the contents of the picture
were sufficiently identified by the
witnesses. The testimony of these two
witnesses taken together amounted to
a sufficient authentication to warrant
the admission of the photograph (both
the print and the negative) into
evidence
2. whether or not witness Dale properly
qualified as an expert witness respecting the
Regiscope process. Yes because he
personally had developed "four to five
hundred thousand" individual
Regiscope films, hence giving him the
adequate experience to talk about the
Regiscope process.
RULING
As to the admissibility of the Regiscope films
The admission or rejection of photographs as
evidence, as well as the sufficient identification
 thereof, lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court.
The quantum of authentication is simply that
some witnesses, not necessarily the
photographer) be able to give some indication as
to when, where, and under what circumstances
the photograph was taken, and that the
photograph accurately portray the subject or
subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be
sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court
and the jury.
In this case, Witness Pentecost testified that she
recognized the background shown in the picture
as that of the food store, and, as mentioned
previously, she also testified as to the store's
standard procedure of "regiscoping" each
individual who cashed a check at the store. Phillip
Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope
process.
II. DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE
A. original document rule  same as best
evidence rule
B. Rules on electronic evidence rule 2 sec. 1,
rule 3, rule 4
1. AIR FRANCE VS.
CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA
155
RTC ordered the petitioner to pay for damages
CA reduced the amount of damages
Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to
make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it.
NOTE To claim damages, Carracoso must prove
that he has the right to the seat and that he
was ousted from the seat and subsequently
subjected to public humiliation.
Issue: WON Carracosos is entitled to damages. Yes
for three reasons: First, That there was a contract to
furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
That said contract was breached when petitioner
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, That there was bad faith when petitioner's
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already seated"
and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
As to the right of the passenger to the seat: It was
proven by the first class ticket with an OK mark on it.
The OK marked, as testified by an employee of the
airline, confirms that the seat is already reserved for
you.
As to the request to vacate the seat: First, the airline
was not able to provide evidence to show that the
white man is has a better right to the seat. Second,
there were testimonies to corroborate Carracoso’s
account that he was forcibly ousted from his first clas
seat. In fact, the purser recorded the inciden in his
notebook.
Plaintiff wished to remove the purser’s notebook as
evidence since it was hearsay, the facts were
recorded 2 hours fater the incident. However,
testimony of the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony
is admissible Besides, from a reading of the transcript
just quoted, when the
dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt.
The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding
his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae.
2. MEYERS VS. US
17F.2D800 1948
Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved
by any person who heard them, as well as by a
reporter who recorded them in shorthand.
3. PEOPLE VS. TAN 105
PHIL 1242
Facts:
respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are
charged with the crime of falsification of public
documents, in their capacities as public officials and
employees, by having made it appear that certain
relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity
indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at such
prices and from such business establishments or
persons as are made to appear in the said public
documents, when in fact and in truth, no such
distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and
supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal
Gonzalez in the public and official documents had
ever been made
juxtaposed with Lucas’and their contents compared.
Reconstructions cannot be admitted because these
were made four to seven year after the alleged
originals.

Evidence: Exh. "D", containing blue invoices 5. PEOPLE VS. TANDOY 192
numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug SCRA 28
Corporation. booklet contained the triplicate copies,
Accused questions the admission by the trial court of
and according to said witness the original invoices
the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill
were sent to the Manila office of the company, the
duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate
The best evidence rule applies only when the
copies remained in the booklet
contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether or not such
TC did not admit the triplicate copies as evidence.
document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
Issue: WON the triplicaste is admissible as evidence.
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
YES
testimonial evidence is admissible
Ruling
Here, Since the aforesaid marked money was
Carbon copies when made at the same time and
presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
on the same machine as the original, are
establishing its existence and not its contents, other
duplicate originals, and these have been held to be
substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
as much primary evidence as the originals. Any one of
therefore admissible without the need of accounting
the dup0licate originals may be introduced in
for the original
evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of
the other.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-
4. SILER VS. LUCAS FILM bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction
of the accused-appellant because the sale of the
797F.2D1504 1986 marijuana had been adequately proved by the
Siler alleged that he first created the character of testimony of the police officers. So long as the
Walker as appeared in the Empire Strikes Back. The marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had
movie was shown in 1980, obtained copyright in been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce
1981. the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal
omission.
In the pre-evidence hearing, Seiler was not able to
produce the original drawings. He only presented the
reconstruction drawings, those which are submitted 6. US VS. GREGORIO 17
to the Copyright Office. PHIL 522
FACTS
WON the best evidence rule applies to this case. Yes
Wa labayad ang debtor so giattach iyang two
because Seiler’s drawings were “writings”
proeprties. Naay ni-interene objecting to the
within the meaning of Rule 1001(1); they
attachment since the other land was sold to the
consist not of “letters, words, or numbers” but
interenor prior to the institution of the case.
of “their equivalent.”
The sale was recorded in a memorandum, made upon
RULING
a private document, according to the alleged copy of
A creative literary work, which is artwork, and a
the latter presented at trial which belonged to the
photograph whose contents are sought to be proved,
owner of the land
as in copyright, are both covered by the best
evidence rule. Moreover, blueprints, engineering
This case concerns the falsity of a document alleged
drawings, architectural designs may all lack words or
to have been written on a date prior to the one
number yet still be capable of copyrgith and
whether it actually was prepared, which instrument
susceptible to fraudulent alteration.
simulates the sale of a parcel of land by its owner to a
third party, with the intent to defraud the creditor
In this case, Seiler claims that the movie infringed his
who, through proper judicial process, solicited and
originals, yet he has no proof of the originals. There
obtained the attachment and sale of the said property
can be no proof of substantial similarity and thius of
copyright infringement unless Seiler’s works are
in order, with the proceeds of such sale, to recover
the amount which the owner of the land owed him.
ISSUES
WON the copy of the memorandum be
admissible as evidence. NO as it could not be
ascertained who had the original of the
document containing the memorandum in
question, nor the exact date when the latter
was written
RULING
certainly the mere exhibition of a copy of an
unauthenticated public document could not legally
produce the effect of suspending the sale of the said
land, inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of
the right of the intervener and opponent, being a
mere copy of a private document whose legality has
not been proven.
In a criminal cause for the falsification of a document,
it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have
before them the document alleged to have seen
simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that
they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at
trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was
actually committed; in the absence of the original
document, it is improper to conclude, with only a
copy of the said original in view, that there has been
a falsification of a document which was neither found
nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the
existence of such original document may be doubted.
In this case, the said memorandum, presumed to be
simulated and false, was not literally compared by the
sheriff who testified that he had seen its original for
but a few moments, nor by any other officer
authorized by law to certify to documents and
proceedings such as are recorded in notarial
instruments, nor even by two witnesses who might
afterwards have been able to testify before the court
that the copy exhibited was in exact agreement with
its original
7. FISCAL OF PAMPANGA
VS. REYES 55 PHIL 905
FACTS
A libelous statement was released in a local
newspaper in Pampanga.
The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the
prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C,
and D, which are copies of the Ing Magumasid
containing the liberous article with the innuendo,
another article in the vernacular published in the
same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel
for the defendant objected to this evidence, which
objection was sustained by the court
ISSUE
WON the newspaper articles should be admitted in
evidence even if only the translated version thereof
was included in the information. Yes.
RULING
The general rules regarding the admissibility of
evidence are applicable to cases of libel or
slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not
hearsay. The rule of procedure which requires the
production of the best evidence, is applicable to the
present case, and the copies of the weekly where the
libelous article was published, and its translation,
certainly constitute the best evidence of the libel
charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of
an article published in it
8. VDA DE CORPUS VS
BRABANGCO 59 OG 8262
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
9. COMPANIA VS. ALLIED
FREE WORKERS 77 SCRA
24
FACTS
 The Union’s arrastre and stevedoring
services were terminated because of their
poor service.
 Said services were awarded by the Company
to another company
 the union members picketed the wharf and
prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association
from performing arrastre and stevedoring
work. The picket lasted for nine days.
 the company sued the union and its officers
in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for
the rescission of the aforementioned 1952
contract, to enjoin the union from interfering
with the loading and unloading of the cargo,
and for the recovery of damages.
 The trial court awarded actual damages
amounting to P450,000 on the basis of the
auditor's reports, Exhibits A to I. Exhibits
B, C and D are not auditors' reports

ISSUE
WON the amount of damages are correct. No
because these were not supported by
evidence. The company’s reports only
asked 350k as damages but the trial court
awarded 450k as damages.
RULING
The best evidence on the cost of the said
equipment would have been
 the sales invoices instead of the oral
testimony of Teves or the accountants.
AS to the amount of total damages:
Evidence is inadmissible
Generally, an audit made by, or the testimony of,
a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as
proof of the original records, books of accounts,
reports or the like. It can only be admissible as
evidence if the voluminous character of the
records have been duly established. That general
rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the
company failed to make a preliminary showing as
to the difficulty or impossibility attending the
production of the records in court and their
examination and analysis as evidence by the
court.
AS to Jayme’s computation on unrealized
freight
Applicable rule: The auditor's summary should
not include his conclusions or inferences (29 Am
Jur 2d 519). His opinion is not evidence.
Jayme testified that the company would nto ave
fufered loss were it not for the por servie of the
Union. What are the mistakes in his statement?
 There was no corroborative evidence. He
stated that he attached to his report on the
comparative statement of gross revenue a
certificate of the captain of the vessel Panay
showing the delays in its dismissal in Iligan
City as indicated in its logbook. No such
document was attached to Jayme's report.
 Jayme’s estimates are not supported by
reliable evidence. They can hardly be
sanctioned by the "generally accepted
auditing standards" alluded to in
Jayme's report. The pertinent records of
the company should have been produced in
court. The purser and steward did not
testify.
 Photostatic copies of some manifests
and bills of lading proving that the
company was not able to collect the
stipulated freight on the alleged
shutout cargoes should have been
proforma. in evidence as supporting
papers for Jayme's report. No such
exhibits were presented.
As to the damages computed by Magante
Magante did not testify on his statement. Instead,
accountant Jayme, substituting for Magante, testified
on that statement. Jayme said that he verified the
consignees. records on which Magante based his
statement. Jayme assured the court that the figures
in Magante's statement were supported by the
consignees. records. THIS IS HEARSAY BECAUSE of
the FOLLOWING REASONS:
 Magante should have been proforma. as a
witness. Jayme was not competent to take
his place since the statement was prepared
by Magante, not by Jayme.
 More appropriate still, the documents and
records on which the statement was based
should have been proforma. as evidence or
at least brought to the court for examination
by the union's counsel and its accountant
As to SOjo’s computation
Sojos’ reports were hearsay because The person who
had personal knowledge of the operating expenses.
was not examined in court. Further, the original
documents, on which the reports were based, were
not presented in evidence and, therefore, appellants'
counsel and the court itself were not able to gauge
the correctness of the figures or data contained in the
said reports.
10. VILLA RAY TRANSIT
VS. FERRER 25 SCRA 845
FACTS
To prove that Jose and the petitioner corporation are
the same thing Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22 were
presented. These are photostatic copies of ledger
entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-
mingled his personal funds and transactions with
those made in the name of the Corporation, are very
illuminating evidence.
Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these
exhibits, contending that no evidentiary value
whatsoever should be given to them since "they were
merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best
evidence being the originals themselves." According
to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said
exhibits, it was the most likely possessor of the
originals thereof because they were stolen from the
files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able
to produce the alleged photostat copies thereof.
ISSUE
WON the three exhibits in question shall be admitted.
yES
RULING
it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce
secondary evidence to show that the original is in the
actual possession of his adversary. It is enough
that the circumstances are such as to indicate
that the writing is in his possession or under
his control. Neither is it required that the party
entitled to the custody of the instrument
should, on being notified to produce it, admit
having it in his possession. 14 Hence, secondary
evidence is admissible where he denies having
it in his possession. The party calling for such
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case
of loss. For, among the exception to the best
evidence rule is "when the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court. 15 The
originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed
to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits
such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no
doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6
to 19 and 22
11. MICHAEL AND CO
VS. ENRIQUEZ 33 PHIL
87
FACTS
Appellant also attempted to prove the fact that
the instrument so executed and delivered was
lost, it being his purpose to lay the basis for the
introduction of secondary evidence as to its
contents. the trial court also prevented appellant
from proving that fact.
ISSUE
RULING
the writing itself must be produced unless it has
been lost or destroyed, in which case, before its
contents may be proved by other evidence, it
must be shown by the person offering the
secondary evidence (1) that the document was
duly executed and delivered, where delivery is
necessary, and (2) that it has been lost or
destroyed.
Proving the execution
The execution and delivery of the document may
be established by:
(1) the person or persons who executed it,
(2) by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledge, or
(3) by any person who was present and saw it
executed and delivered or who, after its
execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the
signatures; or
(4) by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof.
Proving destruction
By any person knowing the fact
Proving loss
(1) any person who knew the fact of the loss
(2) any who has made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has make any
other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
Scenario 1: Proved that document exists
If it appears, on an attempt to prove the loss,
that the document is in fact in existence, then
the proof of the loss or destruction fails and
secondary evidence is inadmissible unless section
322 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be
applicable.
Scenario 2: Proved that document is indeed loss
or destroyed.
After proper proof of the due execution and
delivery of the instrument and its loss or
destruction, oral evidence may be given of its
contents by any person who signed the
document, or who read it, or who heard it read
knowing, or it
being proved from the other sources, that the
document so read was the one in question. Such
evidence may also be given by any person who
was present when the contents of the document
were talked over between the parties thereto to
such an extent as to give him reasonably full
information as to its contents; or the contents
may be proved by any person to whom the
parties to the instrument have confessed or
stated the contents thereof; or by a copy thereof;
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document.
In this case, the mere fact that counsel for
appellant, in putting his question to the witness,
characterized or described the instruments as
one of transfer, while objectionable, was not
sufficient to cut him off altogether from proving
the execution and delivery of the document if
other requisites were present.
12. DE VERA VS.
AGUILAR 218 SCRA 602
FACTS
1. Two of theirs mortagegd the property so
someone. Debt natured, the sps agular
redeemed the property and the matriarch
sold the land to them
2. A title was issued to Aguilars and since then
they have been paying the taxes.
3. The heirs of marcosa argued that tey are co-
owners hence they are asking for a partition.
The heirs also alleged that the Aguilars
resold the property to Marcosa.
4. Petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance
TC ruled in favor of the petitioners. the trial court
admitted, over the objection of the respondents,
Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an
alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by
the respondents selling, transferring and conveying
unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for
and in consideration of P1,500.00.
CA reversed TC’s decision as it found that the loss or
destruction of the original deed of sale has not been
duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary
evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the
alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.
ISSUE
WON the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the
loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the
presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
RULING
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually llost or destroyed. But prior
to the introduction of such secondary evidence,
the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument.
All duplicates or counterparts must be
accounted for before using copies. For, since all
the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing
itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of
the writing itself can be regarded as established until
it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost,
retained by the opponent or by a third person or the
like). In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr.,
notary public who notarized the document testified
that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five
original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted
for before secondary evidence can be given of any
one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that
petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or
five original copies.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
RULE
1. ENRIQUEZ VS. RAMOS 6
SCRA 219
FACTS
Action: Action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage
[contract of conditional sale] Defendant bought 20
parcels of land from the petitioner D made
downpayment but D mortgaged several properties to
secure payment. Such mortgage was registered. D
broke certain stipulations. Hence the current action.
D said that the contract does not show the true
agreement of the parties because certain impt
cnditions agreed upon were not included therein. The
reciprocal obligation of P to construct were not stated
in the contract.
TC ruled in favor of D and found that plaintiffs really
assumed the construction of the roads as a condition
precedent to the fulfillment of the obligation
stipulated in the contract on the part of defendant,
and since the same has not been undertaken,
plaintiffs have no cause of action.
ISSUES
WON the contract did not show the true intent of the
parties. Yes
RULING
As to the terms not reflected in the contract.
when the sale in question was being negotiated the
construction of roads in the prospective subdivision
must have been uppermost in the mind of defendant
for her purpose in purchasing the property was to
develop it into a subdivision. That such requirement
was uppermost in the mind of defendant is proven by
the execution by the plaintiffs of the so called
"Explanation" (Exhibit 3) on the very day the deed of
sale was executed wherein it was stated that the sum
of P50,000.00 was advanced by defendant as her
contribution to the construction of the roads which
plaintiffs assumed to undertake "in accordance with
the provisions of the City Ordinance of Quezon City."
It is to be noted that said document specifically states
that the amount of P50,000.00 should be deducted
from the purchase price of P235,056.00 appearing in
the deed of sale, and this is a clear indication that the
real purchase price is only P185,000.00, as claimed by
defendant, which would approximately be the price of
the entire area of the land at the rate of P16.00 per
square meter.
Was the introduction of Exh 3 a parol evidence?
Section 22, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing it is to be considered as
containing all that has been agreed upon, and that no
evidence other than the terms thereof can be
admitted between the parties, holds true only if there
is no allegation in the pleadings that the agreement
does not express the true intent of the parties.
The fact that such failure has been put in issue in this
case is patent in the answer wherein defendant has
specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in
question does not express the true intent of the
parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
2. CANUTO VS. MARIANO
37 PHIL 840
FACTS
 1. P sold the land to D reserving the right to
repurchase. In the written contract, until
Dember 4, 1914.
2. But P alleged that an extension was
agreed upon via oral agreement.
3. She paid the repurchase price two days after
expiration of the redemption period but she
was not being able to redeem the land.
RTC accepted the allegation that there is a verbal
agreement providing for extension and the testimony
of Pascual who corroborated P’s testimony.
ISSUES
WON the parol evidence proving the oral
agreement is admissible. YES because the PE
here is intended to prove the new agreement
which is the extension of the loan.
RULING
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic
evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written
instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties in writing, entered into
subsequent to the time when the written
instrument was executed, notwithstanding such
agreement may have the effect of adding to,
changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating
the contract of the parties as evidenced by the
writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way
deny that the original agreement of the parties was
that which the writing purports to express, but merely
goes to show that the parties have exercised their
right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a
new and independent contract.
4. YU TEK & CO. VS.
GONZALES 29 PHIL 384
FACTS
1. P bought sugar from D however D was not
able to deliver sugar and P was not able to
recover the 3k.
2. D argued that he was not able to deliver
because of the total failure of his crop. He
alleged that the contract did nto show their
agreement htta the sugar must be harvested
from his own crop.
ISSUES
WON parole evidence proving the unwritten
agreement is admissible. No because there is not
the slightest intimation in the contract that the
sugar was to be raised by the defendant.
RULING
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways
to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into
the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake.
In this case, there is no clause in the written contract
which even remotely suggests such a condition. The
defendant undertook to deliver a specified quantity of
sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no
restriction upon the defendant in the matter of
obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to
purchase it on the market or raise it himself. It may
be true that defendant owned a plantation and
expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not
limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. our
conclusion is that the condition which the defendant
seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot
be considered. The rights of the parties must be
determined by the writing itself.
3. LAND SETTLEMENT VS.
GARCIA PLANTATION 7
SCRA 750
FACTS
1. Action for Specific Performance of contract
by petitioners against respondents.
2. Defendants bought two tractors from
petitioners. Two PNs were executed.
3. D admitted the execution of PN but then
they alleged that it was novated by a
subsequent agreement contained in a
letter giving the defendant an
extension up to May 31, 1957. The
complaint was filed on February 20, 1957
making the case premature.
4. The plaintiff admitted the letter marked
EXHIBIT L but they contended that it did not
express the true intent and agreement of the
parties.
RTC did not give the defendants the opportunity to
present the testimony of the Legal Officer of the
Board of Liquidators and the writer of the letter to
testify that the letter did not contain the true
agreement.
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in excluding the parol
evidence tending to prove the true intention and
agreement of the parties and the existience of a
condition precedent, before the extension granted the
defendants, contained EXH L could becme effective.
YES because the fact that the letter failed to
express the true intent has been put in issue by
the Answer of the plaintiff warrants the
admission of the parol evidence.
[so the testimonial evidence is admitted as
parol evidence]
RULING
The lower court should have admitted the parol
evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure
of the document in question to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties. It should not have
improvidently and hastily excluded said parol
evidence, knowing that the subject-matter treated
therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol
evidence rule. When the operation of the contract is
made to depend upon the occurrence of an event,
which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such
may be established by parol evidence. This is not
varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic
agreement, for the simple reason that there is no
contract in existence; there is nothing to which to
apply the excluding rule.
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or
contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show
prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be
received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains reference to such collateral
agreement.
In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous
agreement, in the second paragraph of letter Exhibit
L, and although a document is usually to be
interpreted in the precise terms in which it is
couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion,
may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in
order to arrive at the true intention of the parties
4 MAULINI VS. SERRANO
28 PHIL 640
FACTS
1. D received a contract of indorsement in
favor of plaintiff
2. Plaintiff argued that he was never an
indorser, he never owned the note but he
only acted as an agent of the indorsee. The
indorsee was really the owner of the PN.
ISSUE
whether or not, under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, an indorser of a negotiable promissory note
may, in an action brought by his indorsee, show, by
parol evidence, that the indorsement was wholly
without consideration and that, in making it, the
indorser acted as agent for the indorsee, as a mere
vehicle of transfer of the naked title from the maker
to the indorsee, for which he received no
consideration whatever. YES
RULING
The purpose of the parol evidence was to
demonstrate, not that the indorser did not intend to
make the particular indorsement which he did make;
not that he did not intend to make the indorsement in
the terms made; but, rather, to deny the reality
of any indorsement; that a relation of any kind
whatever was created or existed between him
and the indorsee by reason of the writing on
the back of the instrument; that no
consideration ever passed to sustain an
indorsement of any kind whatsoever.
Parol evidence is admissible also to prove that
the name of the indorser was forged. And if
proved, forgery can be a complete defense.
PH NATIONAL BANK VS.
SEETO 91 PHIL 756
FACTS
Seeto presented a check to PNB. Check was drawn by
Gan Yek Kiao. Respondent made a general and
unqualified inforsement of the check and the
petitioner accepted it. The chek was dishonored for
insufficient funds. Petitioner asked the respondent for
reimbursement however respondent refused to make
the refund demanded, claiming that at the time of the
negotiation of the check the drawer had sufficient
funds in the drawee bank, and that had the
petitioner's Surigao agency not delayed to forward
the check until the drawer's funds were exhausted,
the same would have been paid.
RTC ruled found that the respondent made an
undertaking to refund the amount of the check in the
even of the dishonor.
CA reversed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner argued that the verbal assurances given by
the respondent t the employees of the bank that he
was ready to refund the amount if the check should
be dishonored by the drawee bank is a collateral
agreement, separate and distinct from the
indorsement, by virtue of which petitioner herein was
induced to cash the check and therefore was
admissible as an XPN to the parol evidence rule.
ISSUE
WON the admissions of the indorser are
admissible. YES
RULING
Assurances made by an indorser that the
drawer has funds, which assurances induced
the bank to cash the check, are admissible in
evidence but they are merely expressions of
the obligations of the indorser as prescribed in
Section 66, Negotiable Instruments Law.
These are not modifying or changing the terms of the
contract but only supporting the obligations of the
indorser. In fact, these are already part of the
contract. And these obligations are, under the law,
considered discharged by an unreasonable delay in
the presentation of the check for payment.
SHERG’S OPINION:
The correct here is that the verbal assurances
should have been admitted because the parol
evidence rule does not apply since there is no
written contract.
A check is not a contract but only an
instrument of payment. It is used to perform
an obligation in some underlying contract.
WOODHOUSE VS. HALILI 93
PHIL 526
FACTS
1. Exhibit H contains the agreement between
P and the Mission Dry Corporation of LA,
California USA manufacturers of the bases
and ingredients of the beverages. This
contains the agreement that the
manufacturer will invest half a million dollas
in the bottling and distribution and tht had
the right to bottle and distribute
2. Exhibit A contains the agreement between
P and D to set up a partnership for the
bottling and distribution with corresponding
duties.
3. Exhibit II or OO was the draft agreement
prepared by the plaintiff’s lawyer creating a
corporation, not a partnership.
4. Exhibit HH was the D’s lawyer
5. Exhibit V was the franchise agreement
between between the Mission Dry
Corporation and Fortunato F. Halili and/or
Charles F. Woodhouse, granting defendant
the exclusive right, license, and authority to
produce, bottle, distribute, and sell Mission
beverages in the Philippines.
6. P demanded that the partnership papers be
executed but D failed to do so hence the
complaint.
ISSUE
WON the previous draft admitted as parol
evidence. YES because the purpose of of
considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or
modify the agreement, but to discover the
intent of the parties thereto and the
circumstances surrounding the execution of
the contract
RULING
The issue of fact is, did plaintiff represent to
defendant that he had an exclusive franchise?
Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the
agreement are essential and relevant to the
determination of said issue. The act or statement of
the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to
change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to
prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it -
to prove the representations or inducements, or
fraud, with which or by which he secured the other
party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded
from the parol evidence rule.
Fraud and false representation are an incident
to the creation of a jural act, not to its
integration, and are not governed by the rules
on integration. Where parties prohibited from
proving said representations or inducements, on the
ground that the agreement had already been entered
into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud. The parol evidence rule
expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when
the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the
pleadings (sec. 22-a of Rule 123)
NB. THEORY OF INTEGRATION OF JURAL ACTS—
Under this theory, previous acts and
contemporaneous transactions of the parties are
deemed integrated and merged in the written
instrument which they have executed. When the
parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is
presumed that they have made the writing the ONLY
REPOSITORY and MEMORIAL OF THE TRUTH, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived and abandoned.
What are the parol evidence
1. The drafts which contained the
representation that plaintiff has the franchise
2. Testimonial evidence of P’s lawyer
3. Letter to Mission Dry Corporation
ROBLES VS. LIZARAGA
HERMANOS 50 PHIL 387
FACTS
Anastacia de la Rama, as administratrix of the estate
of her husband, leased the hacienda to one of her
children.
Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga
Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to buy
all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As
Robles, Jr., still had over two years in his lease
contract, he was asked to surrender such last two
years and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take
possession as buyer. Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to
pay him the value of all betterments made on the
hacienda and to buy from him all that belonged to
him personally on the hacienda. However, no
reference ng the date when the lease should end, nor
of anything said concerning the improvements or
property of a personal nature, was placed in the
instrument of conveyance later executed.
Robles, Jr filed a complaint against Lizarraga
Hermanos for the recovery of compensation for
improvements made by him on the hacienda
and the value of implements and farming
equipment supplied by him, as well as damages
for breach of contract. As evidence, he
presented a letter written by Severiano
Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made
to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga
Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the
letter as being prohibited parole evidence.
ISSUE
WON the letter shall be admissible as evidence
apart from the instrument of conveyance. YES
RULING
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or
contradict a writing does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show
prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be
received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains reference to such collateral
agreement.
Further, The rule that a preliminary or
contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to
vary a written contract appears to have more
particular reference to the obligation expressed in the
written agreement, and the rule has never been
interpreted as being applicable to matters of
consideration or inducement.
In the case before us the written contract is complete
in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself,
and it is a collateral to the written contract,
notwithstanding the fact that it deals with
related matters.
Other related scenarios:
in case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may
prove an independent verbal agreement on the part
of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe
condition; and a vendor of realty may show by parol
evidence that crops growing on the land were
reserved, though no such reservation was made in
the deed of conveyance
CRUZ VS. CA 192 SCRA 209
FACTS
 Peti cruz loaned money from PR Salonga as
shown in Exhibit D evidences the loan
agreement (Salonga is the CR in exh D)
 (Salonga is the DR in Exh. I)Cruz denied the
loan. No loan was agreed. Instead, he
entered into an agreement with Salonga
whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw)
fish in certain areas of the fishpond from
May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They also
agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga
would sublease (bubuwisan) the same
fishpond for a period of one year. Salonga
received money from peti, not as payment of
any loan, but as consideration from their
pakyaw agreement. Exhibit I evidences the
pakyaw agreement
 Salonga filed a complaint for collection and
dmaages against Peti Cruz
 TC ruled in favor of Cruz
 Ca ordered Cruz to pay.
ISSUE
WON exhibits D and I should be inadmissible as
evidence. YES
RULING
As to Exhbit D, the receipt
The parole evidence rule is not applicable in the case
at bar. Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the
existence of a document embodying the terms of an
agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an
agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the
fact Fthat petitioner received from the private
respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and
could have not been intended by the parties to be the
sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that
gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only
be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an
acknowledgment of the receipt of money
executed by the petitioner for the private
respondent's satisfaction.
As to the pakyaw agreement
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which
also declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The
petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when
and under what circumstances the amount of
P28,000.00 was received. Their testimonies do not in
any way vary or contradict the terms of Exhibit I.
While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982, it does not
make any categorical declaration that the amount of
P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the
petitioner on that same date. That date may not
therefore be considered conclusive as to when the
amount of P28,000.00 was actually received. Parol
evidence may therefore be introduced to
explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to
the petitioner's receipt of the amount of
P28,000.00 and of the date when the said
amount was received.
A distinction should be made between a statement of
fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the
contractual act. The former may be varied by parol
evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of Rule 130
clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and
provides that "there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other
than the contents of the writing.
Collateral matters:
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made
as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the
objection must be made when the objectionable
question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by
reason of such answer.
SIMPLY STATED, NO PAROLE EVIDENCE SHALL
BE ADMITTED TO SUPPORT “EXH. D” BECAUSE
IT IS NOT A CONTRACT. WHILE A PAROL
EVIDENCE CAN BE ADMITTED TO SUPPORT
“EXH. I”.
LECHUGAS VS. CA 143 SCRA
335
FACTS
FE was filed first then action for recovery was
filed after. The land in question is Lot 5456.
Petitioners were forcibly evicted from their lot.
However, defendant argued that they were only
exercising their right of ownership over the lot.
Petitioner tried to prove her ownership by showing
the deed of sale as shown in Exh. A.
Defendant argued that the land which plaintiff bought
from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 as evidenced by the
deed exhibit A, is different from the land now subject
of this action.
 countered that evidence by presenting the
vendor as witness.
o Vendor traced the titles
o The vendor stated that the land in
the sale does not intent to sell the
land in question
ISSUE
WON the testimony of the seller should be admitted
as parol evidence. Yes
RULING
The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may
not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one of
the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of
a party to the written instrument in question
and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or
the relation established thereby.
 Strangers to a contract are, of course, not
bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic
evidence in the construction of writings is
inapplicable in such cases;
The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia
Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The
dispute over what was actually sold is between
petitioner and the private respondents. In the
case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia
Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended
to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No.
5522 but not being able to read and write and fully
relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the
petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece
of paper which petitioner told her was the document
evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale
described the disputed lot instead.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action
for the
reformation of Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The
undisputed fact is that the
respondents have timely questioned the validity of the
instrument and have
proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect the
true intention of the vendor.
INCIONG VS. CA 257 SCRA
578
FACTS
Petitioner was one of the solidary obligors in a PN.
Petitioenr and his co-obligors did not pay the PN
when it become due and demandable.
Petitioner contended that he is not liable on the PN
since it was through fraud that he was made liable for
the amount of 50k. To support his claim, petitioner
presented an affidavit of his other obligor stating that
they were induced to sign the promissory note on the
belief that it was only for P5,000.00, adding that it
was Campos who caused the amount of the loan to
be increased to P50,000.00. The affidavit. Both of
them wants to have the Court declare that the PN is
null and void.
To justify the admission of the affidavit, petitioner
said that since the promissory note "is not a
public deed with the formalities prescribed by
law but . . . a mere commercial paper which
does not bear the signature of . . . attesting
witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the
contents of the promissory note.
The petitioner wishes to admit an affidavit executed
by an MTC judge and his co-debtor that their liability
is only up to 5k only.
 The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress
petitioner's contention in the instant petition
that the Court of Appeals should have
declared the promissory note null and void
ISSUE
WON the parol evidence should be admitted.
No
RULING
For the parol evidence rule to apply, a written
contract need not be in any particular form, or be
signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes
and other instruments of a similar nature are
not subject to be varied or contradicted by
parol or extrinsic evidence.
By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was
actually in the right direction towards proving that he
and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only
considering that, where a parol contemporaneous
agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the
written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence.
15 However, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of
evidence, not even being adequate. 16 Petitioner's
attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was
evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and,
expectedly, self-serving testimony
ORTANEZ VS. CA 266 SCRA
561
FACTS
Action for specific performance to deliver the
titles paid for by the plaintiff.
Two deeds of sale were entered into by petitioner and
private respondents. Private respondents received the
payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to
deliver the titles to petitioner.
Privat respondents argued that they did not deliver
the lands because petitioners did not comply with
the conditions they verbally agreed upon
[which was not reflected in the deed of sale]
 private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a
former judge, orally testified that the sale
was subject to the above conditions
ISSUE
WON the parol evidence stating the oral conditions
should be admitted. No
RULING
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporatinginto the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
There is nothing in the contract that would suggest
that the sale is subject to certain conditions. Further,
the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
mistake
or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the
terms thereof. Fourth, the respodents did not
expressly pleaded that the deeds of sale were
incomplete. The issue on incompleteness must be
squarely presented.
INTERPRETATION OF
DOCUMENTS
ARTS. 1370-1379 NCC
Art. 1370. intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former. (1281)
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
(1282)
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
(1283)
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should
admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to
render it effectual. (1284)
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of
them taken jointly. (1285)
Art. 1375. Words which may have different
significations shall be understood in that which is
most in keeping with the nature and object of
the contract. (1286)
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall
be borne in mind in the interpretation of the
ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission
of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
(1287)
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity. (1288)
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle
doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least
transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If
the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in
favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the
contract in such a way that it cannot be known what
may have been the intention or will of the parties, the
contract shall be null and void. (1289)
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be
observed in the construction of contracts. (n)
LAMBERT VS. FOX 26 PHIL
588
FACTS
action brought to recover a penalty prescribed in a
contract as punishment for the breach thereof.
P and D are the major shareholders ina company.
They agreed that they should not sell their shares for
one year. However, D sold his share within the one
year period. D argued that the intention not to sell
within 1 year from the incorproaiton is to ensure
financial stability in the company. Since the comp was
already financially stable, he can already sell his
shares.
ISSUE
WON the one year period be interpreted literally. YES
RULING
The intention of parties to a contract must be
determined, in the first instance, from the
words of the contract itself. It is to be presumed
that persons mean what they say when they
speak plain English. Interpretation and
construction should be the instruments last resorted
to by a court in determining what the parties agreed
to. Where the language used by the parties is plain,
then construction and interpretation are unnecessary
and, if used, result in making a contract for the
parties.
In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that
the contract should last one year. No reason is shown
for saying that it shall last only nine months.
Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was
their agreement that the contract should last a year
and it was their judgment and conviction that their
purposes would not be subserved in any less time.
CAPTAL INSURANCE VS.
SADANG 21 SCRA 1183
FACTS
1. EXH A. P secured Pinto’s obligation to pay
the rentals
2. Exh B and C indemnity agreement entered
into by pinto and Sadang
3. Pinto failed to pay the rentals. P paid on
Pinto’s on behalf.
4. P sued defednants for failure to reimburse
5. Exh E allows P to file a case against Pinto if
naexhaust na ang properties sa spouses but
judgment is not yet satisfied.
a. P is suing the defendants on the
basi of the indemnity agreement
and the REM
D argue that the liability under the REM is only 20k is
limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be
incurred under the bond and that since Mateo Pinto
actually paid Macondray Farms, Inc., the amount of
P19,700.00, they are liable to pay only the amount of
P300.00 which remain after deducting what was paid
by Mateo Pinto to Macondray Farms, Inc. from the
first
liability of P20,000.00.
ISSUE
WON the liability is limited only to the first 20k. YES
hence they are liable to pay only the amount of
300 pesos.
RULING
If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to
be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved
against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the
document, and in accordance with the real intention
of
the parties as explained by defendants- appellees

TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE
QUALIFICATIONS OF
WITNESSES
PEOLPLE VS. DE JESUS 129
SCRA 4
NOTE THIS IS A 1984 CASE
FACTS
The rape victim was a minor and feeble-minded. The
victim testified that there was penetration by the
penis to the vagina. The offender assailed the
competence of the complainant as a witness on the
ground that being feeble-minded she is not a
competent witness in contemplation of the rules and
therefore her testimony should have been rejected by
the lower court.
ISSUE
WON the witness is competent. YES
RULING
That the complainant was feebleminded and
had displayed difficulty in comprehending the
questions propounded on her is an undisputed
fact. However, there is no showing that she
could not convey her ideas by words or signs.
It appears in the records that complainant gave
sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions
propounded by the court and the counsels. The
court is satisfied that the complainant can
perceive and transmit in her own way her own
perceptions to others. She is a competent
witness
PEOPLE VS. SALOMON 229
SCRA 402
FACTS
Salomon and Conge was charged for conspiring to
rape Sylvia.
 Sylviabrotherfatherpolice
 Was medically examined.
At the original proceedings:
 P presented the p’s testimony and this was
corroborated by the physician who medically
examined her.
 For the defense, the testimony of the
accused.
 Judge ruled in favor of P.
At the appeal
 the defense suggests that the testimony of
Sylvia Soria is flawed because she is an
insane person who was confined at the
National Mental Hospital a few months
before the alleged incident.
 It is also argued that her testimony was
fabricated at the instance of her father, who
had a bone to pick with Salomon's father.
ISSUE:
WON Sylvia can be a competent witness. YES
RULING
Mental retardation is insufficient to consider
someone as an incompetent witness. As in the
case of other witnesses, acceptance of his
testimony depends on its nature and credibility
or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions
and the manner he can make them known to
the court.
In this case, although Sylvia's speech was slurred and
it was necessary at times to ask her leading
questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain,
coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not
vitiate her credibility.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA GR NO
113791 FEBRUARY 2, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J :
FACTS
The 5 year old child is the only witness to the events
leading to the burning of her mother. His father
questioned his competency as witness.
ISSUE
WON the child can be a competent witness.
YES
RULING
In the present rules, every child is presumed to
be a competent witness.
The requirements then of a child's competency
as a witness are the:
(a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication
And in ascertaining whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements, it is settled that the
trial court is called upon to make such
determination
IN THIS CASE: A close and careful examination of
the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time
he testified, he could be deemed a child of above
average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive
answers to the questions asked of him by the trial
judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to
such recollections
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
ORDOÑO VS. DAQUIGAN 62
SCRA 270
FACTS
Petitioner was first charged with the rape of his eldest
daughter. This was borne out of the testimony of the
mother that her husband raped her kids.
Another rape charge was filed against petitioner for
raping his second daughter. In that charge, the
mother also testified as witness.
In the trial of the rape case of Leonora, the second
daughter, On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented
Catalina Ordoño as the second prosecution
witness. After she had stated her personal
circumstances, the defense counsel objected (on
trial) to her competency. He invoked the
marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130
of
the Rules of Court.
Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoño had not
consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's
testifying against him.
The trial court overruled the objection.
ISSUE
whether the rape committed by the husband against
his daughter is a crime committed by him against his
wife within the meaning of the exception found in the
marital disqualification rule. YES
RULING
When an offense directly attacks, directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one
shall not be a witness against the other except
in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
(by) one against the other.
in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the
father against his daughter is a crime committed by
him against his wife (the victim's mother).
PEOPLE VS. CASTAÑEDA 88
SCRA 562
FACTS
Wife filed a falsification of public document case
against her husband since the husband forged the
signature of his wife in a deed of sale involving their
conjugal house. At trial, prosecution called the
complainant-wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness.
Prosecution argues that the case falls within the
exception.
ISSUE
WON the falsification be considered as a crime
committed by the husband against the wife.
YES because the forgery of the wife’s signature
constitutes a breach of the wife’s confidence
which gave rise to the offense charged.
Because of this breach of confidence, the
marital relations was strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed.
PEOPLE VS. FRANCISCO 78
PHIL 694
FACTS
The wife’s testimony was presented as rebuttal
evidence since the husband accused her as the
one who killed their son.
ISSUE
WON the wife’s testimony is admissible as
rebuttal evidence. Yes because the husband
has waived all objection to the wife’s testimony
upon rebuttal when he imputed the crime of
killing their child to his wife.
RULING
The purpose of the wife’s testimony is: (1) self-
defense; and to defense herself from any or all of
various possible consequences which might flow from
her silence namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against
her which might be instituted by the corresponding
authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid
testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her
being believed by those who heard the testimony
orally given, as well as by those who may read the
same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant
child.
Waiver of incompetency
Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may
be waived as in the case of the other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her
privilege by calling the other spouse as a
witness for him or her, thereby maling the
spouse subject to crossexamination in the
usual manner. It is well established that where an
accused introduces his wife as a witness in his
behalf, the state is entitled to question her as
to all matters germane and pertinent to her
testimony on direct examination. It is also true
that objection to the spouse's competency must be
made when he or she is first offered as a witness,
and that the incompetency may be waived by the
failure of the accused to make timely objection
to the admission of the spouse's testimony,
although knowing of such incompetency, and the
testimony admitted, especially if the accused has
assented to the admission, either expressly or
impliedly. Other courts have held that the witness's
testimony is not admissible even with the other
spouse's consent. Clearly, if the statute provides that
a spouse shall in no case testify against the other
except in a prosecution for an offense against the
other, the failure of the accused to object does not
enable the state to use the spouse as a witness
LEZAMA VS. RODRIGUEZ 23
SCRA 1166
FACTS
Because of the mismanagement of the spouses, the
ice plant was placed under receivership and during
the pendency of the receivership, Roque filed a claim
against La Paz Ice plant for the sum Roque lent La
Paz. Summons were served on the spouses. Through
the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to
obtain judgment by default
against the company.
the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while
admitting that the company was placed under
receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama
nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice
Plant and that as such he had authority to receive in
behalf of the company the court summons in Civil
Case 39827. They denied entering into collusion with
Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's
claim because they knew it to be a legitimate
obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred
pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
Dineros issued a subpoena to the wife to testify
as a witness. Plaintiff objected.
ISSUE
whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband
in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by
the adverse party under Section 6 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, without infringing on her marital
privilege not to testify against her husband under
Section 20(b) of Rule 130. In this case, no because
the charge is collusive fraud.
RULING
GR: Spouses cannot testify on behalf or against each
other
XPN: The spouses can be a hostile witness against
the other spouses when (1) both spouses are
separate or separable; (2) or the spouse offered as a
witness is merely a formal or nominal party
XPN2XPN: When the main charge is collusive fraud
between the spouses and a third person and the
evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove
that charge.
In this case, Paquita Lezama was asked to directly
examined as an adverse party because she was the
sec of the company who signed the minutes of the
meeting at which Lezema was allegedly authorized to
negotiate the loan and that she, as a sec, made the
entry in the books of the corporation. Note that
Lezema was to be offered as an adverse party, not a
spouse witness for or against her husband.
However, the court did not allow Paquita to be
examined since the inevitable result would be to pit
her against her husband. The interests
of husband and wife in this case are necessarily
interrelated. Paquita’s testimony would tend to show
the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses
and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the
possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her
own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a
manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
NOTE: A party may interrogate any unwilling or
hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call
an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party,
and interrogate him by leading questions and
contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he
had been called by the adverse party and the witness
thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or
on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be
cross-examined to the adverse party only upon the
subject- matter of his examination in chief."
US V ANTIPOLO 37 Phil 726
FACTS
Antipolo was accused of killing Fortunato. To prove
his innocence on appeal, they asked Susana, the
widow to testify for the reason that Fortunato made a
dying declaration to Susana regarding the true cause
of his death, which is the injury Fortunato suffered
from a fall. Fiscal objected. Counsel for
defendant insisted that the witness was
competent.
TC did not permit on the ground that spouses SHALL
not testify for or against each other.
Counsel of the D insisted that the witness was
competent, arguing that the disqualification which the
fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in
which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a
proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the
prosecution of a criminal case are the Government
and the accused; that, furthermore, the marriage of
Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the
death of her husband, she is no longer his wife.
ISSUE
WON the wife is a competent witness. YES
RULING
The rule disqualifying spouses to testify for or against
each other does not apply in the case of dying
declarations. when a person at the point of death
as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a
statement regarding the manner in which he received
those injuries, the communication so made is in no
sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose
that it may be communicated after the death of
the declarant to the authoritiesklase concerned
in inquiring into the cause of his death. The
prohibition relates only to cases in which the
testimony of a spouse is offered for or against
the other in a proceeding to which the other is
a party.
The term afterwards contemplates the legal
separation of the spouses, not separation due
to death of either of the spouses.
The US Courts have been consistent in ruling that the
declarations of a deceased person while in
anticipation of certain impending death, concerning
the circumstances leading up to the death, are
admissible in a prosecution of the person charged
with killing the declarant.
Dying declarations are not within the ambit of
privileged communications. On the contrary, it was
evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the
express purpose that it should be testified to in the
prosecution of the defendant.
PP V REYES 76 Phil 354
FACTS
Virginia owned a sow. It got lost but after 2 days it
reappeared. It was Marina who filed a complaint
against Reyes after seeing Reyes leading a pig. Reyes
was accused and convicted of stealing Virginia’s sow.
Reyes explained that the hog is leading is his and this
was corroborated by Mr. Velo, who was boarding his
house.
Marina said that the wife of reyes told her that it was
Reyes, her husband, who stole the pig.
ISSUE
WON the testimony of the wife is admissible. NO
because aside from it is hearsay, it is
incompetent and inadmissible.
RULING
Move to strike out the testimony if one of the spouse
testified for or against the other.
TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE
MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS
PEOPLE VS. CARLOS 47 PHIL
626
FACTS
Husband killed the physician. Hubsand said it was
made as self-defense. Prosec claims it was murder
since there was pre-meditation. Such element can be
found in Exh L which was the letter written by the
wife addressed to D. shows that the writer feared that
the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased. Such letter was
discovered through a search on the premises of
husband’s house.
D argued that the contents in the letter is a privileged
communication.
ISSUE
WON the letter is a privileged communication.
NO
WON the letter should be admitted in evidence.
NO
RULING
Where a privileged communication from one
spouse to the other comes into the hands of a
third party, without collusion or voluntary
disclosure on the part of either of the spouses,
the privilege is privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if
otherwise competent, becomes admissible in
evidence.
 If they were obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still be
privileged (for otherwise the privilege could
by collusion be practically nullified for written
communications); but if they were obtained
surreptitiously or otherwise without the
addressee's consent, the privilege should
cease.
Even if the letter is not a PC, it still should not be
admitted as evidence since the wife is not put on trial
to testify against her husband and the letter was not
offered to impeach the testimony of the wife. The
letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right
of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted
with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the
opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect
there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged.
The situation is different in a testimony of a third
party as to a conversation between a husband and
wife overheard by the witness. It is admissible on the
ground that it relates to a conversation in which both
spouses took part and on the further ground that
where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do
so, his silence implies assent.
ATTY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
UY CHIKO VS. UNION LIFE 29
PHIL 163
FACTS
Peti’s company was destroyed by fire. CR want to
collect their debt. The company of petitioner was
palced under administration. The lawyer of the
petitioner surrendered the insurance policies pursuant
to the compromise agreement entered into by peti’s
dad.
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if
he had any objection to his attorney's testifying
concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he
replied in the negative. The attorney was then called
for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff
formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the
plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney
on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this
appeal, base their argument on the proposition that a
waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at
any time before acted upon,
Applicable law:
"A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He
shall not be permitted in any court, without the
consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to
any facts imparted to him by his client in professional
consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice
upon legal matters
[dapat open court and consent sa client for the client
to reveal the PC]
ISSUE
WON the testimony of the attorney is admissible. YES
RULING
Communications made by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of being communicated to others are not
privileged after they have been so communicated,
and may be proved by the testimony of the attorney.
It must be understood that the PC between LandA is
for the purpose of advising the client on what to do.
If the communication given by the client to the
attorney was intended to be received by the third
person, that communication is no longer privileged
once communicated to the 3P. a communication, after
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least,
is a communication between the client and a third
person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role
of intermediary or agent.
REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
262 SCRA 124
FACTS
respondent PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a)
the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the
deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of
its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
ISSUE
WON the A&C privilege can be invoked as a ground to
refuse the disclosure of the clients’ names involved in
the coco levy controversy. YES because the client’s
name is within the ambit of the privileged
communication.
RULING
Privileged communication of A&C
All communications made by a client to his
counsel, for the purpose of professional advice
or assistance, are privileged, whether they
relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to
any other matter proper for such advice or aid
Client’s identity as PC
GR: a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client
 court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood
 privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client
 relationship has been established privilege
generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
 the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary.
XPN: Client’s identity is privileged in the Barton filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover
following circumstances: damages for the alleged breach of contract. Exhibit
1. a strong probability exists that revealing the 14, which was offered in evidence by the defendant,
client's name would implicate that client in consists of a carbon copy of a letter dated June 13,
the very activity for which he sought the 1921, written by the plaintiff to his attorney, Frank B.
lawyer's advice. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which plaintiff states,
2. a strong probability exists that revealing the among other things, that his profit from the San
client's name would implicate that client in Francisco contract would have been at the rate of
the very activity for which he sought the eighty-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity of
lawyer's advice. this city document is admitted, and when it was
3. Where the government's lawyers have no offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant
case against an attorney's client unless, by the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no
revealing the client's name, the said name objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in
would furnish the only link that would form evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain
the chain of testimony necessary to convict where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney
an individual of a crime for the defendant informed the court that he received
the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant
In sum, information relating to the identity of a client without explanation of the manner in which the
may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the document had come into their possession.
client's name itself has an independent significance, ISSUE
such that disclosure would then reveal client RULING
confidences. the letter was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client, this
a case where a client Does not fall under the privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands
takes on the services of privilege of the adverse party.
an attorney, for illicit
purposes, seeking The law protects the client from the effect of
advice about disclosures made by him to his attorney in the
how to go around the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a
law for the purpose of document, containing admissions of the client, comes
committing illegal to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
activities adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
A case where a client Falls within the privilege
thinks he might have because whether or not
ORIENT INSURANCE VS.
previously committed the act for REVILLA 54 PHIL 919
something which the client sought
FACTS
illegal and consults his advice turns out to be
Action on the insurance policy. The insurance
attorney about it. illegal, his name cannot
company did not pay because the action was
be used
instituted beyond the 3-month prescription period.
or disclosed if the
The president of Orient was presented as evidence in
disclosure leads to
chief by the insurance company. He was narrating
evidence, not yet in the
why he instituted the action late. He referred to the
hands of the
letter wrote by his lawyers to him. Only one part of
prosecution, which
the letter was read. The lawyer of the P objected to
might lead to possible
the reading of the other part since it is a privileged
action against him
communication. The insurance company contended
that since a part of the letter was already read, then
The logical nexus between name and nature of the entire letter should have been admitted as
transaction is so intimate in this case that it would evidence.
be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
this sense, the name is as much "communication" as No objection sa one part explaining the reason of
information revealed directly about the transaction delay while there was an objection as to putting on
in question itself, a communication which is clearly record the contents of the other part.
and distinctly privileged.
ISSUE
BARTON VS. LEYTE ASPHALT WON the entire letter be admitted. Yes since it
is not covered by the atty-client privilege.
46 PHIL 938
FACTS RULING
With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a
contract for fees could be considered privileged.
Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances,
certainly be, but not privileged. Of course contracts
between attorneys and clients are inherently personal
and private matters, but they are a constant subject
of
litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially
not of a privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to
communications from client to attorney, an idea
which of course includes communications from
attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
Even supposing that the matter contained in the letter
and withheld from the inspection of the adversary
was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was
waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the
letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of
Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part has
been given in evidence by one party, makes no
exception as to privileged matter; and the
jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any
exception
HICKMAN VS. TAYLOR 329 us
496
FACTS
A tug sank while trying to tow a car float. 5 of the
crew died. Before the court action, the lawyer of the
tug owner interrogated anyone who had personal
knowledge of the incident in anticipation of a lawsuit.
4 settled while one proceeded with a court action.
The petitioner filed a motion for written
interrogatories to the tug owner asking for any
document that is connected with the incident. The
38th interrogatory read:
"State whether any statements of the members of the
crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or
of any other vessel were taken in connection with the
towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug
'John M. Taylor.'
The tug owner did not comply with the 38 th
interrogatory. While admitting that statements of the
survivors had been taken, they declined to summarize
or set forth the contents on the ground that such
requests called "for privileged matter obtained in
preparation for litigation," and constituted "an
attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files." It
was claimed that answering these requests "would
involve practically turning over not only the complete
files, but also the telephone records and, almost, the
thoughts, of counsel."
petitioner was seeking the production of the
memoranda and statements gathered by Fortenbaugh
in the course of his activities as counsel.
ISSUE
RULING
Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions
prepared or obtained from interviews with witnesses
by counsel in preparing for litigation after a claim has
arisen are not within the attorney-client privilege, and
are not protected from discovery on that basis.
the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend
to information which an attorney secures from a
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the
memoranda, briefs, communications, and other
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in
prosecuting his client's case, and it is equally
unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories.
UPJOHN VS. US 449 US 383
FACTS
Petitioner, an international pharmaceutical company
discovered through an independent audit that one of
its foreign subsidiaries might have made payments to
foreign government officials in order to secure
government business. Gerard Thomas, Petitioner’s
General Counsel, was notified and he consulted with
outside counsel as well as Petitioner’s Chairman, all of
whom decided an internal investigation as to
“questionable payments” was necessary. As a result,
questionnaires were sent to all foreign and area
managers inquiring as to information regarding any
such payments. This procedure of collecting
information had been deemed “highly confidential.”
Petitioner voluntarily sent a preliminary report to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
IRS. The IRS began an investigation and was given
lists by Petitioner of all those who were interviewed
and all whom had responded to the questionnaire.
The IRS then sought production of all files relative to
the investigation conducted under Gerard Thomas’
supervision. The requested production included,
but was not limited to the written
questionnaires and memoranda or notes of
interviews conducted in the US and abroad of
officers and employees of Petitioner and its
subsidiaries. Petitioner refused, citing
attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product in anticipation of trial. The Respondent,
the United States (Respondent), filed a petition
seeking enforcement of the summons in the United
States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, which was granted. Petitioner then
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
which rejected the District Court’s finding of waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, but agreed that the
privilege did not apply to the communications made
by officers and agents not responsible for directing
Upjohn’s actions in response to legal advice. The
Appellate Court remanded to the District Court to
determine who was within the control group.
ISSUE
WON the communication between the employees of
the company to the company lawyer is covered by the
atty-client privilege. YES
WON the notes of oral communications is covered by
the work-product doctrine. YES
RULING
As to the applicability of the atty-client
privilege
The privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it, but
also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice. The Court
rejects the control group test adopted by the court
below tas it frustrates the very purpose of the
privilege by discouraging the communication of
relevant information by employees of the client to
attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation.
The court believed that the attorney's advice will also
frequently be more significant to noncontrol group
members than to those who officially sanction the
advice, and the control group test makes it more
difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the
employees who will put into effect the client
corporation's policy. The test restricts the availability
of the privilege to those officers who play a
"substantial role" in deciding and directing a
corporation's legal response.
However, it is to be noted that the privilege only
protects disclosure of communications; it does not
protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those
who communicated with the attorney. So, the
opposing counsel may ask the clients “what do you
know about the incident?” but they may not ask
“what did you tell your attorney regarding the
incident?”
In this case, the Government was free to question the
employees who communicated with Thomas and
outside counsel. Upjohn has provided the IRS with a
list of such employees, and the IRS has already
interviewed some 25 of them. While it would probably
be more convenient for the Government to secure the
results of petitioner's internal investigation by simply
subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes
taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of
convenience do not overcome the policies served by
the attorney-client privilege
As to the applicability of the work product
doctrine
The Rule permits disclosure of documents and
tangible things constituting attorney work product
upon a showing of substantial need and inability to
obtain the
equivalent without undue hardship. The court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation. no showing of necessity can overcome
protection of work product which is based on oral
statements from witnesses. Notes of conversation
with
witness "are so much a product of the lawyer's
thinking and so little probative of the witness's actual
words that they are absolutely protected from
disclosure."
IN SUM The notes and memoranda sought by the
Government here, however, are work product based
on oral statements. If they reveal communications,
they are, in this case, protected by the attorney-client
privilege. To the extent they do not reveal
communications, they reveal the attorneys' mental
processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule
26 and Hickman make clear, such work product
cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of
substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent
without undue hardship.
US VS. NOBLES 422 US 225
FACTS
Respondent was charged with robbery. Only the
testimony of the witnesses provide the link between
him and the crime. In the course of preparing
respondent's defense, an investigator for the defense
interviewed both witnesses and preserved the
essence of those conversations in a written report.
When the witnesses testified for the prosecution,
respondent's counsel relied on the report in
conducting their cross-examination. The witnesses
were brought to the stand and were asked to recall
what they shared with the investigators. The
prosecution again sought inspection of the relevant
portion of the investigator's report, and respondent's
counsel again objected. The court declined to order
disclosure at that time, but ruled that it would be
required if the investigator testified as to the
witnesses' alleged statements from the witness stand.
court further advised that it would examine the
investigator's report in camera, and would excise all
reference to matters not relevant to the precise
statements at issue.
After the prosecution completed its case, respondent
called the investigator as a defense witness. The
court reiterated that a copy of the report, inspected
and edited in camera, would have to be submitted to
Government counsel at the completion of the
investigator's impeachment testimony. When
respondent's counsel stated that he did not intend to
produce the report, the court ruled that the
investigator would not be allowed to testify about his
interviews with the witnesses.
[the recollection of the witness of the identity
of the man was less clear than the first stage of
the trial. So the investigator was called to the
stand to impeach the credibility of the witness.
Because the account of the witness and the
investigator differ, the judges asked to look
into the report in search for truth]
ISSUE
WON the disclosure of the reports would
violate respondent’s right against self-
incrimination. NO because it is not the
testimony of the respondent that is presented,
but the witnesses.
WON the reports are within the protection of
the work-product doctrine. No but it has been
waived by the respondent when he presented
the investigator to the stand to impeach the
credibility of the witnesses.
RULING
As to the right against self-incrimination
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant,
does not extend to the testimony or statements of
third parties called as witnesses at trial.
As to the work product doctrine application
It applies in this case. the doctrine protect material
prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those
prepared by the attorney himself. Moreover, the
concerns reflected in the work product doctrine do
not disappear once trial has begun. Disclosure of an
attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure
during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly
development and presentation of his case
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
275 SCRA 505
FACTS
1. Sansaet was the lawyer of the civil and
criminal case.
2. Paredes falsified documents to get a free
patent over the land. To evade responsibility
for his own participation in the scheme,
Sansaet claimed that he filed falsified
documents upon the inducement of
Paredes.
 They falsified documents before the
Tanobayan with the hopes that the charge
against them will be dismissed.
 But the complainan shpwed that there was
no order of dismissal in the first place, hence
the order of dismissal submitted by sansaet
was false.
This was intended to pave the way for his discharge
as a government witness in the consolidated cases.
The proposal for the discharge of Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman, reasoning
that the confession of Sansaet falls under the
privileged communication between him and his
client, Paredes, which may be objected to if
presented in the trial. Thus, the three criminal
cases were filed in the Sandiganbayan. A motion was
filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge
of Sansaet as a state witness.
ISSUE
WON the projected testimony of respondent
Sansaet as proposed state witness is barred by
the ACP.
RULING
Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed,
made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof,
are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
Here, the communication made for purposes of
an in reference to the crime of falsification
which had not yet been committed in the past
by Paredes but later committed. Having been
made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the scope of
protection under the ACP.
Further, in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
LIM VS. CA 214 SCRA 273
FACTS
The husband filed a petition for annulment of such
marriage on the ground that the wife has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present."
The husband orally applied for a subpoena against
the wife’s doctor. Despite the wife’s objections, the
subpoena was granted. The doctor took the witness
stand and answered hypothetical questions asked by
the husband’s lawyer.
ISSUE
WON the testimony of the doctor be admissible. Yes.
RULING
Scope of the PPP
 only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege.
 It is the tenor only of the communication
that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated."
the statutory physician-patient privilege is not violated
by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical
question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is based strictly
upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
disregarding any personal professional knowledge he
may have concerning such patient
KROHN VS. CA 233 SCRA 146
FACTS
In a petition for annulment of marriage, took the
witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. The
wife seeks to enjoin the husband for presenting the
psychiatric evaluation report. Before leaving for Spain
where she has since resided after their separation,
Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to
oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even
during her absence.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may testify on the report. No.
RULING
Requisites in claiming the physician-patient
privilege
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed
is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he
was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient."
In this case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the
patient's husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by
medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not
fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
In this case, the doctor did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview
and treatment of the petitioner. the facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not
refer to and had no bearing on whatever information
or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the
patient. her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between them.
STATE SECRETS
US VS. NIXON 418 US 683
FACTS
Seven men involved in the Watergate break-in, a
break-in of the Democratic National Committee's
headquarters located in the Watergate complex, were
indicted by a federal grand jury. President Richard
Nixon was named by the grand jury as an unindicted
co-conspirator. Archibald Cox, who had been
appointed as special prosecutor to investigate the
Watergate affair, obtained a subpoena that required
President Nixon to deliver to the district court tape
recordings of his meetings with various assistants.
The president released certain edited versions of the
tapes to the public, but refused to yield the full
transcripts to the district court. Both Cox and the
president filed special petitions to have the issue
heard immediately by the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON the tapes are admissible as evidence. No.
RULING
when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal
trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Chief Justice Burger asserted that the claim of
privilege did not rest on the ground that the tapes
contained military or diplomatic secrets; thus, it was
appropriate to subordinate the privilege to the search
for truth in a criminal trial.
the privilege was merely presumptive, rather than
absolute; thus, it might be overcome in certain cases
by the "legitimate needs of the judicial process."
BANCO FILIPINO VS.
MONETARY BOARD 142 SCRA
523
FACTS
Bank moved for respondents to pay the backwages of
its employees because the former has custody of the
bank’s assets. The management of the assets of the
Bank has been transferred to the Respondents'
Receiver who perceived that the directive to pay back
salaries after closure of the Bank would be dissipation
of the banks' assets to the prejudice of its various
creditors. There is an order from the Court requiring
the bank to pay the backwages of its employees.
Now, the bank moved for the production, inspection,
and copying of certain papers and recordswhich are
claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the
preparation of its comments, objections,
andexceptions to the Conservator's report dated
January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report.
MB contested the motion for production.
ISSUE
WON the documents are privileged. No
RULING
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as
to communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
question.
IN THIS CASE, respondents have not established that
public interest would suffer by the disclosureof the
papers and documents sought by petitioner.
Considering that petitioner bank was already closed
asof January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the
aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time poseno danger or peril to our economy. Neither
will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state
secrets.Respondent's reason for their resistance to
the order of production are tenuous and specious. If
therespondents public officials acted rightfully and
prudently in the performance of their duties, there
shouldbe nothing at all that would provoke fear of
disclosure.
On the contrary, public interests will be best served
by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the
banks
and its employees but also its numerous depositors
and creditors are entitled to be informed as to
whether
or not there was a valid and legal justification for the
petitioner's bank closure
PARENTIAL AND FILIAL
PEOPLE VS. PUBLIKO 17 CA
REPORTS (2S) 703 1972
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
NEWSMAN PRIVILEGE IN RA
53 AS AMENDED BY RA 747
Section 1. Without prejudice to his liability under
the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor,
columnist or duly accredited reporter of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source
of any news-report or information appearing in said
publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such
revelation is demanded by the security of the State.