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-TABLE OF CONTENTS-

--LIST OF ABBREVIATION-………………………………………………………………… III

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-...........................................................................................................V

-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-...........................................................................................VII

-STATEMENT OF FACTS-..........................................................................................................VIII

-ISSUES RAISED-.............................................................................................................................IX

-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-.....................................................................................................X

-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED-...........................................................................................................1

I. THAT THE RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO FREEDOM
OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION..............................................................1

A. THAT WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE............................1

B. THAT THE WEARING OF HIJAB CAN BE RESTRICTED UNDER ARTICLE 25(1).....................4

II. THAT THE STATE AND THE KARNATAKA UCHHA SHIKSHA KENDRA HAVE POWER TO
PRESCRIBE DRESS CODE RESTRICTING WEARING OF HIJAB...........................................................5

III. THAT RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO FREEDOM
OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)..................................................................8

-PRAYER-..........................................................................................................................................XI

MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS

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-LIST OF ABBREVIATION-

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

& And

¶ Paragraph

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

H.C. Hight Court

Hon'ble Honorable

ILR Indian Law Reports

IPC Indian Penal Code

Ltd. Limited

No. Number

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Ors. Others

PIL Public Interest Litigation

pp. Page

Re. Reference

SC Supreme court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Report

U.O.I Union of India

v. Versus

W.P. Writ Petition

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-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-

CASE LAWS

1. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner Of Police And Ors., (2004) 12 SCC

770...............................................................................................................................................10

2. Ajmal Khan v. Election Commission of India, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 794.......................12, 13

3. Fathima Thasneem v. State of Kerala 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5267....................................16, 18

4. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State Of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.................................11

5. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353....................................14

6. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438...................................17

7. Ramji Lal Modi V. State Of UP AIR 1957 SC 620....................................................................17

8. Resham v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 315...........................................13, 16, 18

9. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355........................................13, 15

STATUTES

1. The Karnataka Education Act, No 1, Acts of State of Karnataka, 1983...............................14, 15

CONSTITUTION

1. INDIA CONST.........................................................................................................................10, 17

2. MALAYSIA CONST.......................................................................................................................13

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES

1. ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, THE HOLY QURAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (2019)
…............................................................................................................................…11, 12

2. V N SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (13th ed. 2017)...........................................................17

MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS

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FOREIGN CASE LAWS

1. Christmas v. El Reno Board Of Education (D.C. Okla.) 313 F SUPP. 618...............................17

2. Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia, Civil

Appeal No. 01-05-92...................................................................................................................14

ONLINE SOURCES

1. Karnataka Government Order on Dress Code for Students, SCO, (May 13, 2022, 7:10 PM),
available at, https://www.scobserver.in/journal/karnataka-government-order-on-dress-code-for-
students/.................................................................................................................................15, 16

STATUTORY RULES

1. The Karnataka Educational Institutions (Classification, Regulation And Prescription Of

Curricula Etc.,) Rules, 1995, Rule 11.........................................................................................15

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-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-

The Petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka under the
provisions of Article 2261 of the Constitution.

*
Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

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-STATEMENT OF FACTS-

-BACKGROUND-

Ms. Rehana is a student of Class XI in Karnataka Uchha Shiksha Kendra. She professes and
practices Islamic faith. She was attending classes online for the past two years in the pandemic.
On physical reopening of school, she covered her head with Hijab in addition to her school
uniform while attending school.

-RESTRICTION-

When she attended the school with her head covered with Hijab, school authorities objected. She
claimed that wearing of Hijab on her head is an essential religious practice of Islamic religion.
School authorities did not accept her argument and restricted her entry into school without proper
uniform sans Hijab.
-PIL-

Following the restriction on wearing Hijab while attending school, Ms. Rehana has filed a PIL
challenging the constitutionality of the restriction in the High Court of Karnataka.

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-ISSUES RAISED-

ISSUE I

THAT THE RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION

ISSUE II

THAT THE STATE AND THE KARNATAKA UCHHA SHIKSHA KENDRA HAVE POWER TO
PRESCRIBE DRESS CODE RESTRICTING WEARING OF HIJAB

ISSUE III

THAT RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

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-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-

I. THAT THE RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High court of Karnataka that the restriction on
wearing of Hijab does not violate right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice
and propagation of religion guaranteed under article 25.

Firstly, on the grounds that wearing of Hijab is not an essential religious practice.

Secondly, wearing of Hijab can be restricted under article 25(1).

II. THAT THE STATE AND THE KARNATAKA UCHHA SHIKSHA KENDRA HAVE POWER
TO PRESCRIBE DRESS CODE RESTRICTING WEARING OF HIJAB

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka that the State government
and the school administration of Karnataka Uchha Shiksha Kendra have power to prescribe a
dress code restricting wearing of Hijab in school.

III.THAT THE RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka that the restriction on
wearing of Hijab does not violate fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(a).

MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS

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-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED-

I. THAT THE RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION

¶1 It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High court of Karnataka that the restriction on
wearing of Hijab does not violate right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice
and propagation of religion guaranteed under article 251. The sub contentions are A) wearing of
Hijab is not an essential religious practice, B) wearing of Hijab can be restricted under article
25(1).

A. THAT WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

¶2 Article 25 guarantees to all persons equality to “freedom of conscience and the right freely
to profess, practice and propagate religion”2 The protection guaranteed under Articles 25 of the
Constitution is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but extends to acts done in pursuance
of religion and, therefore, contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes
of worship which are essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or
essential part of religion has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets,
historical background, etc. of the given religion.

¶3 Essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded.
Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. It is
upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the superstructure of a religion is built,
without which a religion will be no religion3.

¶4 Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to a religion is to find out whether
the nature of the religion will be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that
part or practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its
belief, then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. There cannot be additions
or subtractions to such part because it is the very essence of that religion and alterations will
change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential parts which are protected by the
Constitution. Nobody can say that an essential part or practice of one's religion has changed
1
INDIA CONST. art. 25.
2
id., art. 25(1).
3
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner Of Police And Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 770.
MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS
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from a particular date or by an event. Such alterable parts or practices are definitely not the
“core” of religion whereupon the belief is based and religion is founded upon. They could only
be treated as mere embellishments to the non-essential (sic essential) part or practices.

¶5 A religious practice in order to be called an ‘essential religious practice’ should have the
following indicia: (i) Practice should be fundamental to religion and it should be from the time
immemorial. (ii) Foundation of the practice must precede the religion itself or should be co-
founded at the origin of the religion. (iii) Such practice must form the cornerstone of religion
itself. If that practice is not observed or followed, it would result in the change of religion itself
and, (iv) Such practice must be binding nature of the religion itself and it must be compelling. It
must pass the test of essentiality as is adjudged by the Courts in their role as the guardians of the
Constitution4.

¶6 To ascertain, if wearing of hijab is an essential religious practice, the sources of Islamic

religion are examined. There are four sources of Mahomedan law, namely, (1) the Koran; (2)
Hadis; (3) Ijmaa; and (4) Qiyas. Pre-eminence is to be given to the Quran. Sources other than
the Holy Quran are only to supplement what is given in it and to supply what is not provided for.
Islam cannot be anti-Quran. Surah xxiv Nur and the following Suras talk about dressing and
modesty.

¶7 “That they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display
their beauty and ornaments* except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw
their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty”5.

¶8 “O prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women that they should case
their outer garments over their persons (when abroad) that is most convenient, that they should
be known (As such) and not molested”6.

¶9 Hijab is a veil ordinarily worn by Muslim women. Its origin in the Arabic verb hajaba, has
etymological similarities with the verb “to hide”. Hijab nearly translates to partition, screen or
curtain. In the wording, it is noted that for Muslim women generally, no screen or hijab (Purdah)
is mentioned, but only a veil to cover the bosom, and modesty in dress. The screen was a special
feature of honor for the Prophet's household, introduced about five or six years before his death.
Thus, there is sufficient intrinsic material within the scripture itself to support the view that
wearing hijab has been only recommendatory, if at all it is.

4
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State Of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.
5
ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, THE HOLY QURAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY SURAH xxiv (Nur) (2019).
6
id. SURAH xxxiii (Ahzāb) (2019).
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¶10 Whatever is stated in the above surahs is only directory, because of absence of
prescription of penalty or penance for not wearing hijab, the linguistic structure of verses
supports this view. This apparel at the most is a means to gain access to public places and not a
religious end in itself. It was a measure of women enablement and not a figurative constraint. In
the light of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State Of Kerala, for a religious practice to be
essential, it needs to be mandatory and not merely directive. Since there is an option to choose to
wear or not wear hijab, it ought not to be considered an essential religious practice.

¶11 In the case of Ajmal Khan v. Election Commission of India 7, Court held that wearing
hijab is not religion-specific. It was prevalent in many cities of the East before the coming of
Islam, but not in the cities of Arabia. The purdah system, as it now exists in India, was quite
undreamt of by the Muslims in the early centuries, who had adopted the face-veil and some
other fashions for their women when they entered the cities of Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia and
Egypt. It was once a concession to the prevailing custom and was a protection to their women
from misunderstanding by peoples accustomed to associate unveiled faces with loose character.

¶12 Later on it was adopted even in the cities of Arabia. It has never been a universal custom
for Muslim women, the great majority of whom have never used it, since the majority of the
Muslim women in the world are peasants who work with their husbands and brothers in the
fields. For them the face-veil would be an absurd encumbrance. Thus the Purdah system is
neither of Islamic nor Arabian origin. It is of Zoroastrian Persian, and Christian Byzantine
origin. It has nothing to do with the religion of Islam, and, for practical reasons, it has never
been adopted by the great majority of Muslim women.

¶13 The Purdah system is not a part of the Islamic law. It is a custom of that Court introduced
after the Khilafat had degenerated from the true Islamic standard 8. The era before the
introduction of Islam is known as Jahiliya-a time of barbarism and ignorance. The Quran shows
concern for the cases of ‘molestation of innocent women’ and therefore, it recommended
wearing of this and other apparel as a measure of social security. May be in the course of time,
some elements of religion permeated into this practice as ordinarily happens in any religion.

¶14 However, that per se does not render the practice predominantly religious and much less
essential to the Islamic faith. This becomes evident from Ali's commentary on verse 60 which
concludes with the following profound line “Alas! We must ask ourselves the question, Are
these conditions present among us today?”9
7
Ajmal Khan v. Election Commission of India, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 794.
8
id.
9
ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, supra note 5.
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¶15 The Court relied on the commentary while analyzing a similar factual matrix of practice
of wearing Hijab as an essential religious practice. Court held that it can be reasonably inferred
that the practice of wearing hijab had a thick nexus to the socio-cultural conditions then
prevalent in the region and not essentially religion10. In the case of Ajmal Khan v. Election
Commission of India,11 court held that “seen from the reported material that there is unanimity
amongst Muslim scholars that purdah is not essential but covering of head by scarf is
obligatory.”

B. THAT THE WEARING OF HIJAB CAN BE RESTRICTED UNDER ARTICLE 25(1)

¶16 Article 25 gives to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess,
practice and propagate religion. This right, however, is not absolute. The opening words of
Article 25(1) make this right subject to public order, morality and health, and also to the other
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This would mean that the right given to a person under
Art.25(1) can be curtailed or regulated if the exercise of that right would violate other provisions
of Part III of the Constitution, or if the exercise thereof is not in consonance with public order,
morality and health.

¶17 In the case of TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka12, court reiterated the same and
held that when the general law made by the government contains provisions relating to public
order, morality and health; these would have to be complied with, and cannot be violated by any
person in exercise of his freedom of conscience or his religion to profess, practice and propagate
religion.

¶18 The expression “public order” is synonymous with public peace tranquility and absence
of disorder. The expression in the interest of public order. It signifies that a law may be enacted
if it is conducive to the maintenance of public order. It empowers restriction of acts under
article 25(1) which have a tendency to lead to disorder.

¶19 In 1992 Justice Eusoff of Malaysian High Court delivered a judgment ruling that the
freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 11(1)13 of the Malaysian Constitution was not
absolute as Article 11(5) did not authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public
order, public health or morality. The case contained a similar factual matrix in which a woman
working in an office was dismissed from her job for not following the dress code order. The
government order instructed the employees to not wear anything which covers their face. The
10
Resham v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 315.
11
Ajmal Khan, supra note 7.
12
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
13
MALAYSIA CONST, ART. 11(1).
MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS
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woman wore a hijab covering her face. Supreme Court of Kuala Lumpur (Federal Court of
Malaysia) deciphered that such prohibition as stated in the Government Order did not affect the
constitutional right to practice her religion. Thus, it could be restricted on the grounds of public
order and decorum14.

¶20 In the present case, allowing wearing of Hijab in the classroom has a tendency to disrupt
public order in a State administered educational institution. It may lead to people demanding to
wear all symbols to profess their religious identity which would in turn lead to disruption of
communal harmony and public order of the state.

¶21 In the light of the facts stated, cases cited and arguments advanced, it is humbly
submitted that the right guaranteed under art 25 is not violated by imposing restriction on
wearing of Hijab in school.

II. THAT THE STATE AND THE KARNATAKA UCHHA SHIKSHA KENDRA HAVE POWER
TO PRESCRIBE DRESS CODE RESTRICTING WEARING OF HIJAB

¶22 It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka that state government
and the school administration of Karnataka Uchha Shiksha Kendra have power to prescribe a
dress code restricting wearing of Hijab in school.

¶23 The power to prescribe school uniform is inherent in the concept of school education
itself. There is sufficient indication of the same in The Karnataka Education Act, 1983 15 and the
1995 Curricula Rules. The Preamble to the 1983 Act mentions inter alia of “fostering the
harmonious development of the mental and physical faculties of students and cultivating a
scientific and secular outlook through education.”

¶24 Section 7(2)(g)(v)16 provides for promoting “harmony and the spirit of common
brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or
sectional diversities to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.” The Apex Court
in the case of Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh 17 construed the term
‘education’ to include ‘curricula’. In the case of Resham v. state of Karnataka 18, the Karnataka
high court elucidated that the word ‘curricula’ employed in section 7(2)19 of the Act needs to be
broadly construed to include the power to prescribe uniform. Under the scheme of 1983 Act
14
Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia, Civil Appeal No. 01-05-92.
15
The Karnataka Education Act, No 1, Acts of State of Karnataka, 1983.
16
id. §7(2)(g)(v).
17
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353.
18
Resham, supra note 10.
19
The Karnataka Education Act, supra note 15, §7(2).
MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS
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coupled with international conventions to which India is a party, there is a duty cast on the State
to provide education at least up to particular level and this duty coupled with power includes the
power to prescribe school uniform.

¶25 In the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 20, the court held that “there,
necessarily, has to be a difference in the administration of private unaided institutions and the
government-aided institutions. In the latter case, the Government will have greater say in the
administration.” Thus, the power to prescribe dress code is with the State in the present case of
pre-university government college.

¶26 Section 133(2) 21 of the 1983 Act vests power in the government to give direction to any
educational institution for carrying out the purposes of the Act or to give effect to any of the
provisions of the Act or the Rules, and that the institution be it governmental, State aided or
privately managed, is bound to obey the same. This section coupled with section 7(2) clothes the
government with power inter alia to prescribe or caused to be prescribed school uniform. The
government vide order22 dated 05.02.2022 accordingly has issued a direction.

¶27 The Order per se does not prescribe any dress code and it only provides for prescription
of uniform in four different types of educational institutions. It directs that the Students should
compulsorily adhere to the dress code/uniform as follows23:

a. in government schools, as prescribed by the government;

b. in private schools, as prescribed by the school management;

c. in Pre-University colleges that come within the jurisdiction of the Department of the
Pre-University Education, as prescribed by the College Development Committee or
College Supervision Committee; and

d. wherever no dress code is prescribed, such attire that would accord with ‘equality &
integrity’ and would not disrupt the ‘public order’.

¶28 The Karnataka Educational Institutions (Classification, Regulation And Prescription Of

Curricula Etc.,) Rules, 199524 through Rule 1125 empowers the educational institutions to
20
T.M.A. Pai Foundation, supra note 12.
21
The Karnataka Education Act, supra note 15, §133(2).
22
Karnataka Government Order on Dress Code for Students, SCO, (May 13, 2022, 7:10 PM), available at,
https://www.scobserver.in/journal/karnataka-government-order-on-dress-code-for-students/.
23
id.
24
The Karnataka Educational Institutions (Classification, Regulation And Prescription Of Curricula Etc.,) Rules,
1995.
25
id.
MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS
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prescribe uniform. “Every recognised educational institution may specify its own set of
Uniform”. In another case of 2018, Justice A Muhamed Mustaque, passed an order dismissing
the petitions filed by two Muslim girl students seeking permission to wear headscarf as well as
full sleeve shirts in their school. He reasoned that “It was purely within the domain of the
institution to decide on the dress code”26.

¶29 In the present case, the respondent that is Karnataka Uchha Shiksha Kendra is a pre
university college where as per the statute, rules and directions of the state government and in
conformity with the circular dated 05.02.2022, the school can regulate and prescribe uniform.
As per the order, in a pre-university college, uniform is to be prescribed by College
Development Committee or College Supervision Committee. The moot proposition is silent on
the question whether any College Development Committee or College Supervision Committee
has been established.

¶30 Even if it is presumed that such committee is not established, the uniform must include
“such attire that would accord with ‘equality & integrity’ and would not disrupt the ‘public
order’”27. Hijab is a distinct deviation from uniform. If it is allowed the school uniform ceases to
be uniform. There shall be two categories of girl students viz., those who wear the uniform with
hijab and those who do it without. That would establish a sense of ‘social-separateness’, which
is not desirable. It also offends the feel of uniformity which the dress-code is designed to bring
about amongst all the students regardless of their religion & faiths 28. This would annihilate the
purpose of uniform and the Karnataka educational institution act. It would also not be in
conformity with the provisions of order prescribing uniform.

¶31 Thus, the State and the educational institutions have power to prescribe uniform. Uniform
restricting wearing of Hijab is also permitted since under article 25(1), State has power to
regulate non-essential religious practices. It has been proved in the above contention that
wearing of Hijab is not an essential religious practice and is merely regulatory.

¶32 In the light of the facts stated, cases cited and arguments advanced, it is humbly
submitted that the State and the Karnataka Uchha Shiksha Kendra have power to prescribe
uniform restricting wearing of Hijab.

26
Fathima Thasneem v. State of Kerala 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5267.
27
Karnataka Government Order on Dress Code for Students, supra note 22.
28
Resham, supra note 10.
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III. THAT RESTRICTION ON WEARING OF HIJAB DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

¶33 It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka that the restriction on
wearing of Hijab does not violate fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(a)29.

¶34 Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression. It is however not absolute.
Fundamental right under article 19(1)(a) is restricted “in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence”.

¶35 The Apex Court in the case of National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India30 said
that dressing too is an ‘expression’ protected under Article 19(1)(a) and therefore, ordinarily, no
restriction can be placed on one's personal appearance or choice of apparel. However, it also
specifically mentioned that this right is “subject to the restrictions contained in Article 19(2) of
the Constitution.” Thus, right to freedom of expression protected under article 19(1)(a) can be
restricted on the grounds cited above.

¶36 The expression “public order” is synonymous with public peace tranquility and absence
of disorder. Article 19(2) uses the expression “in the interest of public order”. It signifies that a
law may be enacted if it is conducive to the maintenance of public order 31. It empowers
restriction of acts under article 19(2) which have a tendency to lead to disorder32.

¶37 In the case of Christmas v. El Reno Board Of Education 33, a regulation was issued
prohibiting male students who wore hair over their eyes, ears or collars from participating in a
graduation diploma ceremony, which had no effect on the student's actual graduation from high
school, so that no educational rights were denied, has been held valid in the interest of equality
and decorum by the Oklahoma Court in America. In the present case, allowing wearing of Hijab
in the classroom has a tendency to disrupt public order in a State administered educational
institution. It may lead to people demanding to wear all symbols to profess their religious
identity which would in turn lead to disruption of communal harmony and public order of the
state.

29
INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(a).
30
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438.
31
V N SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (13th ed. 2017).
32
Ramji Lal Modi v. State Of UP AIR 1957 SC 620.
33
Christmas v. El Reno Board Of Education (D.C. Okla.) 313 F SUPP. 618.
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¶38 In the case of Fathima Thasneem v. State of Kerala 34, court ruled that “where there is
priority of interest, individual interest must yield to the larger interest. That is the essence of
liberty. There has to be balancing of competing interests i.e., the collective rights of the
community at large and the individual rights of its members.

¶39 In the case of Resham v. State of Karnataka 35, answering on a similar factual matrix, held
that restriction on wearing of Hijab does not violate rights under article 19(1)(a). Court further
explained that though individuals have rights to freedom, such freedoms in a ‘qualified public
places’ like schools, courts, war rooms, defence camps, etc., is curtailed consistent with their
discipline & decorum and function & purpose.

¶40 In the light of the facts stated, cases cited and arguments advanced, it is humbly
submitted that the uniform restricting wearing of Hijab does not violate fundamental right
guaranteed under article 19(1)(a).

34
Fathima Thasneem v. State of Kerala 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5267.
35
Resham v. state of Karnataka 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 315.
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-PRAYER-

It is hereby most humbly prayed before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka that, in the light
of arguments advanced, authorities cited and facts mentioned, the Hon’ble Court may be
pleased to adjudicate and declare that:

(i) Wearing of Hijab is not an essential religious practice of Islamic Religion.

(ii) Restrictions on wearing of Hijab in the school does not violate fundamental rights
under article 25 and article 19(1)(a).
(iii) The writ petition has no merit and be dismissed.

And any other relief that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of
justice, equity and good conscience.

All of which is humbly submitted.

Sd/-

-COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS-

MEMORIAL for RESPONDENTS