Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Domingo - Brigette - midtermsCIV12022 CHECKED
Domingo - Brigette - midtermsCIV12022 CHECKED
2020-110258
1.
a. The estate shall be distributed as follows: Php20,001,000 goes to Jane A.
being a Primary Compulsory Heir as his surviving spouse and the
additional Php1,000 was pursuant to the provision in the will;
Php20,000,000 goes to John E’s illegitimate parents and they shall divide
it between them, so they have Php10,000,000M each; the remaining
disposable free amounting to Php40,001,000M. Php1,000 shall be
received by John Jr pursuant to the will and the remaining Php40M shall
be divided between Jimmy, Sammy, Lippy and Bird and each shall
receive Php10M.
The first thing to be determined is the validity of the John E’s will. Article 843
of the New Civil Code provides that even though the testator may have
omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in such manner that
there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be
valid. Thus, the validity of John E’s will is unaffected by the fact that Jimmy,
Sammy, Lippy and Bird were merely identified therein by their first names
because they were aptly identified by their respective circumstances.
2020-110258
Next, Jane A’s marriage status with the decedent must also be determined.
The facts provided that Jane A’s was terrified by decedent into marrying him
10 years ago by waving a gun at her face. The same constitutes as vitiation of
consent that is a ground for annulment under Art. 45 of the NCC. There
being no case for annulment filed and no signs of ratification, their status of
marriage is considered still valid until annulled. Thus, Jane A. is entitled to
inherit 20,000,000 constituting ¼ of the Php80M and an additional Php1,000
for being an instituted heir in the will.
As to John E’s son, it was stated that John Jr. was born out of wedlock. Being
an illegitimate child, it is compulsory upon him to duly establish his filiation
with John E. in order to become a compulsory heir by filing an action to
compel recognition even alongside the action to claim inheritance as
provided in the case of Tayag v. CA. However, John Jr. was not able to
establish filiation with decedent and so he cannot inherit any legitime.
Instead, pursuant to John E’s will, John Jr. shall inherit Php1,000.
Finally, after settling the legitimes, the disposable free portion is now down
to Php40,000,000. The same shall be divided equally between Jimmy, Sammy,
Lippy and Bird for being instituted heirs without designated shares pursuant
to Art. 846 of the NCC.
2.
Bloom’s contentions are correct.
Article 1061 of the NCC defines collation as the act of returning or restoring
to the common mass of the hereditary estate, either actually or fictitiously,
JOMILLA, Ferdinand Elbert Jr., D.
2020-110258
any property which a person may have received from the decedent during
the latter’s lifetime, but which is understood for legal purposes as an advance
from the inheritance.
Under the Barrier Rule enshrined in Art 992 of the NCC, an illegitimate child
cannot inherit by intestate succession from the legitimate children or relatives of
his father or mother; neither can such legitimate children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Here, since your parents are not legally married and your were born out of
wedlock, you are considered as an illegitimate child. Thus, you cannot inherit
from your grandfather on the paternal side who is the legitimate parent of your
father because the barrier rule applies.
Under jurisprudence, an adopted child may not inherit from the legitimate
ascendants of the adopter because the ascendants of the adopter are not
related to the adopted. In adoption, the ascendants of the adopter are total
strangers to the adopted because the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child.
Hence, since you were merely adopted by Mr. Patrice, by virtue of adoption,
your link is exclusive only between you and Mr. Patrice. Following the SC ruling,
such link cannot be extended to the adopter’s parents or any of the latter’s
relatives for that matter. From the foregoing, I regret to inform you that you will
not be able to inherit from you lola.
JOMILLA, Ferdinand Elbert Jr., D.
2020-110258
4. A possible defense is that the property constitutes the spouses’ family home.
From the facts, it did not appear that the construction firm was able to prove the
foregoing conditions. Hence, the same may be a valid defense against
execution.
2020-110258
Furthermore, the parties must be capacitated to marry each other and they
must exclusively live as husband and wife.
Here, Mina is below 18 years old when she began cohabiting with Alex. The
same is proved by the facts when it was stated that 3 years from Mina’s debut,
she moved out but she has been living with Alex for five years already, meaning
she was still underaged when it began. Next, their cohabitation was not
exclusive because Alex has a one-year affair which already interrupted their
supposedly 5-year cohabitation. Thus, the applicable law to govern their
properties is Art 148 of the NCC.
Under Valdez v, RTC, actual joint contributions of money, property and industry
are owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution.
Thus, Mina’s contribution of sedan to the relationship is owned jointly by Mina
and Alex. Hence, she has the claim to it.
Under Art. 148, wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Thus, since the desktops were bought by Alex’s salary, the same
belong to him exclusively. Mina cannot claim them.
Under Art 148, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in
a co-ownership. They can only be presumed to be equal upon proof of actual
contribution which is required by law and even if proven, co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of proven actual contribution of property. In the absence of
proof, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
2020-110258
In Concepcion v. CA, the Court held that only the husband can impugn the child’s
legitimacy because he is the one directly confronted with the scandal by his
unfaithful wife. It is only upon his death that his heirs acquire the right to
impugn the child’s legitimacy. Thus, a child himself cannot choose his own
filiation especially when the putative father does not impugn the legitimacy of
the child. The child’s status is fixed and the child cannot successfully maintain an
action to claim illegitimate filiation.
However, the New Civil Code also allows children to file for an action for
illegitimate filiation. Thus, even illegitimate children may claim recognition but
the same may only be brought during the lifetime of the parents.
Here, although Lianne has a birth certificate showing her name same as the
couple, the same must be signed by the parents involved or named therein.
Nothing in the facts show the same. Upon confirming the legitimacy of the birth
certificate, neither Stephen nor Gella confirmed. Gella merely admitted that she
had a daughter.
Hence, following the rule that only the father can impugn legitimacy and
the fact that Lianne’s basis is fickle, Stephen is correct in saying that only
he has the right but he is not correct in saying that the same cannot be
availed of by illegitimate children.
Under Art 35(4), the prior marriage is either valid or voidable; in Art 40, the prior
marriage is void but a subsequent marriage is contracted prior to a judicial
declaration of the absolute nullity of the prior marriage. Thus, the governing
property regime of bigamous marriages under Art 35(4) is that provided in Art
148; whereas under Art 40, the regime may either be absolute community of
property (ACP) or conjugal partnership of gains (CPG), unless the parties
provided for complete separation as their property regime in their marriage
settlement. Thus, under Art 148 in relation to a bigamous marriage pursuant to
JOMILLA, Ferdinand Elbert Jr., D.
2020-110258
Art 35(4) wages and salaries earned by each party belong to either of them
exclusively. Furthermore, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual and joint contribution of money, property and industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
On the other hand, in a bigamous marriage under Art 40, if the parties choose
ACP as their property regime, there is a special kind of co-ownership and the
parties become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage and the
provisions on co-ownership shall apply suppletorily. If they choose CPG, the
parties place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from
their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Here, the provisions on partnership shall apply
suppletorily. Finally, should the parties choose complete separation of property,
to each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or
industry and all its fruits.