Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

JOSEPH G. GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 135698
-versus-

THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ALLAN
L. TAMOR.,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

COMMENT

PREFACE. This is a petition for certiorari alleging that

the First Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order dated
31 January 2011 dismissing the petitioner’s appeal for
failure to pay the appeal fee of P3,000.00 within the
reglementary period set by the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130
dated 18 September 2002.

This petition likewise seeks to annul the Order of the

COMELEC EN BANC dated 16 March 2011 for denying the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner for failure to pay the
required motion fees prescribed under Section 7 (f), Rule
40, Comelec Rules of Procedures amended by Comelec
Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 dated 18 September 2002, in
relation to Section 18, Rule 40, same Comelec Rules.  

THE FACTS. The petitioner JOSEPH G. GONZALEZ and

private respondent ALLAN L. TAMOR. were candidates for
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan, Province of Leyte
during the May 10, 2010 automated elections. Petitioner
garnered 4,930 votes while respondent garnered 5,682
votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
respondent as the duly elected Vice-Mayor, winning by a
margin of 752 votes.
 2

On May 21, 2010 petitioner filed an election protest

before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Hilongos, Leyte,
docketed as EPC No. H-06, impugning the result of the
canvass in seventy nine (79) precincts of Inopacan, Leyte.

On 31 May 2010, respondent filed his Answer with

Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, alleging
that the protest states no cause of action, is insufficient in
form and substance, and is dismissible for failure of the
petitioner to pay the required cash deposit.

In its Resolution dated 12 November 2010, the trial

court held:

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, for insufficiency

in form and content as required under Rule 2, Sec. 10 (c)
(ii) and (iv) and for failing to make the required cash
deposit within the given period, the instant election protest
is hereby DISMISSED.

With costs against the protestant.

On 17 November 2010, petitioner filed a Notice of

Appeal with the trial court, stating therein that she received
the Resolution on 12 November 2010 and that appeal fee of
P1,000.00 has been paid to the trial court. Thereafter, the
records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC First
Division, and docketed as EAC (AE) No. 55-2010.

On 31 January 2011, COMELEC First Division issued an

Order dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the
appeal fee within the reglementary period, thus:

The Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it

hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal case
for protestant-appellant’s failure to pay the amount of
Three Thousand Pesos (Php 3,000.00) appeal fee within
the reglementary period under the 1993 Comelec Rules of
Procedure as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130
dated 18 September 2002.

Section 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure

mandates its payment of the appeal fee within the period
to file the notice of appeal or five (5) days from receipt of
the decision sought to be appealed, while Sec. 9, Rule 22
of the same Rules provides that failure to pay the appeal
fee isa ground for the dismissal of the appeal. These
 3

provisions were reinforced by the ruling of the Supreme

Court in the case of Divinagracia vs. Comelec (G.R. Nos.
186007 & 186016) promulgated on 27 July 2009. The
Ruling declared that for notices of appeal filed after its
promulgation, errors in the matters of non-payment or
incomplete payment of appeal fees in the court a quo and
the Commission on Elections are no longer excusable.

On 14 February 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order dated 31 January 2011, which
he received on 8 February 2011, claiming that he paid the
appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the Commission on December 2,
2010. He cites Pacanan v. COMELEC, GR No. 186224, 25
August 2009, which ruled that Comelec Resolution No. 8486
which took effect on July 24, 2008 clarified the existing rules
on the payment of such appeal fees, and allowed the
payment thereof within 15 days from filing the notice of
appeal.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
COMELE EN BANC in its Order dated 16 March 2011, thus:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

protestant-appellant JOSEPH G. GONZALEZ,through
counsel, by registered mail, on February 14, 2011, seeking
reconsideration of the Order issued by the Commission
(First Division) on January 31, 2011, the Commission En
Banc hereby resolves to DENY the same for protestant-
appellant’s FAILURE to PAY the required motion fees
prescribed under Section 7 (f), Rule 40, Comelec Rules of
Procedure, as amended by Comelec Minute Resolution No.
02-0130 dated September 18, 2002, in relation to Section
18, Rule 40, same Comelec Rules.

There being no valid motion for reconsideration to

speak of, the provision of Section 13, paragraph (c), Rule
18, Comelec Rules of Procedure applies, to wit:

Rule 18 – Decisions

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions –

xxx xxx xxxx

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is

seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a
Division shall become final and executory after the
lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and Special
cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions
or proceedings, following its promulgation.
 4

Hence, the Order of the Commission (First Division)

issued on January 31, 2011, a copy of which was received
by protestant-appellant on February 8, 2011, per records
of the case, had become final and executory as of February
24, 2011.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby

RESOLVES to:

1) DIRECT the Clerk of the Commission, Electoral

Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD), this
Commission to:

(a) Issue an entry of judgment in the instant case

and to record the same in the Book of Entries
of Judgments;

(b) Send copies of this Order to His Excellency,

President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Scretary of the
Sanggunian Bayan, Municipality of Inopacan,
Leyte, in accordance with Section 11(b), Rule
18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

2) DIRECT the Chief, Judicial Records Division, ECAD, to

remand the entire records of the above-captioned case
to the court a quo for its disposal.

SO ORDERED.

Attached to the said Order was the ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT1 dated 21 March 2011, and the letter2 of the
Chief, Judicial Records Division, remanding the records of
the case to the court a quo for its disposal. These facts were
deliberately omitted by the petitioner in par. 21 of the
petition.
ISSUE. On 10 April 2011 petitioner filed this petition
raising the issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING
PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY
THE APPEAL FEES WITHIN THE
1
Annex 1 – Entry of Judgment dated 21 March 2011
2
Annex 2 – Letter of Chief, Judicial Records Division, Comelec dated 23 March 2011
 5

REGLEMENTARY PERIOD AND UPHOLDING

THE DISMISSAL IN ITS EN BANC
RESOLUTION, AS THE ACTS ARE CONTRARY
TO COMELEC RESOLUTIONNO. 8486 WHICH
GAVE APPELLANT AT LEAST FIFTEEN (15)
DAYS FROM FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL
WITH THE COURT OF ORIGIN TO PAY THE
COMELEC THE APPEAL FEE OF THREE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,200).

DISCUSSION. The COMELEC First Division did not

gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal,
and the COMELEC EN BANC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
“Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.”
[Carmelinda Barro v. Comelec, et al., En Banc, GR No. 186201, 9 October
2009]
In his petition, petitioner stated that he made payment
to COMELEC the P3,200 appeal fee on 2 December 2010, or
15 days from the filing of the Notice of Appeal; hence, it is
not belated as clarified by Comelec Resolution No. 8486
dated 15 July 2008, thus:

1. That if the appellant had already paid the amount

of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court or lower courts within five-day period, pursuant
to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course
by the Court, said appellant is required to pay the
Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the
Commission’s Cash Division through the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by
postal money order payable to the Commission on
Elections through ECAD, within a period of fifteen
(15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice of
Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made
within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be
dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:
 6

Section 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The

appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at
the instance of the Commission on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal
fee;
xxx
2. That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00
appeal fee with the lower court within the five (5) day
period as prescribed by the Supreme Court New Rules of
Procedure but the case was nonetheless elevated to the
Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed outright by the
Commission, in accordance with the aforestated Section
9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)(Petition, pp. 10-11)

Petitioner contends that the recent case of Aguilar v.

Comelec, GR No. 185140, June 30, 2009 applies to his case,

as the Supreme Court ruled, thus:  

With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the

previous rule that the appeal is perfected only upon the full
payment of the appeal fee, now pegged at P3,200.00, to
the COMELEC Cash Division within the period to appeal, as
stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended,
no longer applies.
 
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the
procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees. For this
purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No.
8486, which the Court takes judicial notice of.

xxxx

x x x The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's

decision in election contests involving municipal and
barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal
fee to the court that rendered the decision within the
five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the
insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to
the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section
3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not
affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule
22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be
dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same
rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take
action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely
given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
 7

Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First

Division, may dismiss petitioner's appeal, as it in fact did, for
petitioner's failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC

First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioner's appeal. The Court notes that the notice of
appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed
and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April
21, 2008. On that date, the petitioner's appeal was deemed
perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the
rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or
almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on
July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of
Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioner's appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash
Division of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before

the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioner's appeal
should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No.
8486. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC First
Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory
resolution, and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and
only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First
Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the
recently promulgated clarificatory resolution which had taken
effect only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an
invitation to outrage.

In the Aguilar case, the appeal to the COMELEC was

perfected when petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal and paid
the appeal fee of P1,000.00 on May 13, 2008, which was
two months before the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8486, clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees.

In the case of Pacanan, the notice of appeal was filed

on January 10, 2008; in Barro, the notice of appeal was filed
on May 13, 2008; and in Duco v. Comelec, GR 183366 dated
19 August 2009, the notice of appeal was filed on 25
January 2008. All of them were made prior to the issuance
of Comelec Resolution No. 8486 on 15 July 2008.

As such, it was clarified in Barro v. Comelec, thus:

“It must be stated, however, that for notices of

appeal filed after the promulgation on July 27, 2009
of Divinagracia v. Commission on Elections , errors in the
matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two
appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.”
 8

Hence, in the instant case, the notice of appeal was fled

on 17 November 2011, or more than two years after the
promulgation of the Divinagracia case. As such, petitioner or
counsel must be fully aware of the clarification of Comelec
Resolution No. 8486.

As such, the COMELEC (First Division) was correct

when it ruled, thus:

Section 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure

mandates its payment of the appeal fee within the period
to file the notice of appeal or five (5) days from receipt of
the decision sought to be appealed, while Sec. 9, Rule 22
of the same Rules provides that failure to pay the appeal
fee is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. These
provisions were reinforced by the ruling of the Supreme
Court in the case of Divinagracia vs. Comelec (G.R. Nos.
186007 & 186016) promulgated on 27 July 2009. The
Ruling declared that for notices of appeal filed after
its promulgation, errors in the matters of non-
payment or incomplete payment of appeal fees in
the court a quo and the Commission on Elections are
no longer excusable. (underscoring supplied)

In Duco v. COMELEC, GR No. 183366, 19 August 2009,

the Supreme Court clearly enunciated its ruling, thus:

In Loyola v. COMELEC, we emphatically announced

that we would bar "any claim of good faith, excusable
negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full
amount of filing fees in election cases which may be
filed after the promulgation of this decision."

Loyola has been reiterated in Miranda v. Castillo, Soller v.

Commission on Elections, and Villota v. Commission on
Elections, with the Court repeating the warning that any
error or deficit in the payment of filing fees in election
cases was no longer excusable.

In Zamoras v. Court of Appeals, the petitioner therein

timely filed his notice of appeal on December 2, 2004 but
paid only P600.00 as appeal fee. On January 17, 2003, the
COMELEC’s Judicial Records Division directed him to remit
the deficiency amount of P2,600.00, which he paid by
postal money order on January 28, 2003, allegedly the
date on which he received the notice dated January 17,
2003. Nonetheless, the COMELEC issued an order on
March 10, 2003 dismissing his appeal for failure to perfect
 9

it within the 5-day reglementary period (under Sec. 3 and

Sec. 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure)
after it was determined that he had received the decision
of the trial court on November 29, 2002 but had appealed
only on December 9, 2002, or 10 days from his receipt of
the decision. He filed a motion for reconsideration by
registered mail on March 21, 2003, but did not pay the
necessary motion fees required under Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He later on filed
another motion for reconsideration on May 16, 2003, also
by registered mail, remitting the required fees by postal
money order, but the COMELEC still rejected the motion
for reconsideration due to the finality of the orders earlier
issued. When the COMELEC’s actions were challenged, the
Court held:

xxx

The subsequent payment of the filing fee on 28 January

2003 did not relieve Zamoras of his mistake. A case is not
deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of
the filing fee. Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of
the filing fee is deemed the actual date of the filing of the
notice of appeal. The subsequent full payment of the filing
fee on 28 January 2003 did not cure the jurisdictional
defect. The date of payment on 28 January 2003 is the
actual date of filing the appeal which is almost two (2)
months after Zamoras received the MTCC Decision on 29
November 2002, This is way beyond the 5-day
reglementary period to file an appeal.

xxx

Zamoras is not only chargeable with the incomplete

payment of the appeal fees but he also failed to remit the
required filing fees for his motion for reconsideration. The
payment of the filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement and
non-compliance is a valid basis for the dismissal of the
case. The subsequent full payment of the filing fee after
the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure the
jurisdictional defect. Such procedural lapse by Zamoras
warrants the outright dismissal of his appeal. This left the
COMELEC with no choice except to declare the Orders final
and executory.

xxx

At any rate, the plea for a liberal application of technical

rules of procedure to promote the ends of justice is
undeserving of any sympathy from us. Time and again, we
have ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket
fee within the period to appeal is a sine qua non
requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Such payment
 10

is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an

essential requirement, without which the decision or final
order appealed from becomes final and executory, as if no
appeal was filed. Moreover, as we observed in Lazaro v.
Court of Appeals:

xxx the bare invocation of "interest of substantial justice"

is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not
to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. The Court reiterates that rules of procedure
especially those prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy discharge of business. xxx

The petitioner ought to be reminded that appeal is not a

right but a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised
strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law.

xxx

Having determined that the petitioner’s appeal was

properly dismissed, the COMELEC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In a special civil action for certiorari, the
petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public
respondent for his issuance of the impugned order. Grave
abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." In other words, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed
decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic
manner. Alas, the petitioner did not discharge his burden.

III

We consider it timely to note, before closing, that on July

15, 2008, after the second assailed resolution was issued
on May 22, 2008, the COMELEC promulgated its Resolution
 11

No. 8486, 29 effective on July 24, 2008,30 ostensibly to

clarify the requirement of two appeal fees being separately
imposed by different jurisdictions, that is, by the Supreme
Court, through A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, 31 and by the
COMELEC, through its own Rules of Procedure, as
amended by Resolution No. 02-0130. For the first, the
appeal fees are paid to the clerk of court of the trial court;
while, for the latter, the appeal fees are paid to the clerk of
court of the COMELEC.

Considering the decisive significance of the perfection of an

appeal within the brief span of 5 days from notice of the
decision of the trial court, the party aggrieved by the trial
court’s decision should be instructed that he needs to
pay both appeal fees within such period under the existing
rules of the Supreme Court and the COMELEC, or else his
appeal risks dismissal.

Verily, in Aguilar v. COMELEC, the Court has discerned the

impact of Resolution No. 8486 on A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC by
observing:

[Resolution No. 8486] is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-

SC and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The
appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in
election contests involving municipal and barangay officials
is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary
period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of
the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC
Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect
the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright
or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.ten. Following, Rule
22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be
dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the
same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may
refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a situation,
the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the
appeal or not.

Thus, recently, in Divinagracia, Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court

has issued the following dictum for the guidance of the
Bench and Bar:

In Aguilar, the Court recognized the Comelec’s discretion

to allow or dismiss a "perfected" appeal that lacks payment
of the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee. The Court stated
that it was more in keeping with fairness and prudence to
allow the appeal which was, similar to the present case,
 12

perfected months before the issuance of Comelec

Resolution No. 8486.

Aguilar has not, however, diluted the force of Comelec

Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the
Comelec-required appeal fees. To reiterate, Resolution No.
8486 merely clarified the rules on Comelec appeal fees
which have been existing as early as 1993, the amount of
which was last fixed in 2002. The Comelec even went one
step backward and extended the period of payment to 15
days from the filing of the notice of appeal.

Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on

July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to
further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which
it precisely articulated through the specific guidelines
contained in said Resolution, the Court now declares,
for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, that for
notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this
decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or
incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in
election cases are no longer excusable. (underscoring
supplied)

Thus, the applicable case in the instant petition is

Divinagracia Jr., repeated in Duco and Barro. The foregoing
dictum forecloses the petitioner’s plea for judicial
understanding.

PRAYER. FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is

respectfully prayed that the petition be DENIED FOR LACK
OF MERIT.

Tacloban City for Manila. 27 August 2011.

ELLADO & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES

Counsel for the Protestee
253 Avenida Veteranos, Tacloban City

By:

JASON G. ELLADO
Roll No. 50787
IBP Lifetime No. 01773; 3-24-10; Leyte Chapter
PTR No. 8476423; 1-4-16; Tacloban City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0054253; 7-6-10
 13

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Tacloban ) SS

VERIFICATION
With Statement of Material Date

I, ALLAN L. TAMOR., of legal age, Filipino, married

and with postal address at Barangay Maljo, Inopacan, Leyte,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, do
hereby depose and say: THAT---

I am the private respondent in the above entitled case;

I caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing
COMMENT; I have read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.

I received thru counsel the NOTICE dated 31 May 2011

on 22 August 2011, requiring me to COMMENT on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof, or until
September 1, 2011. This COMMENT is seasonably filed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto affix my

signature this 27 August 2011 at Tacloban City, Philippines.

ALLAN L. TAMOR.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, this 27

August 2011 at Tacloban City by ALLAN L. TAMOR., who is
personally known to me, and who has satisfactorily proven
his identity through his Professional Driver’s License No.
H05-99-009360 to expire on 30 October 2011, that he is the
same person who personally signed the foregoing
verification before me and acknowledged that he executed
the same.

Doc. No. 439

Page No. 88
Book No. 60
SERIES OF 2011
 14

COPY FURNISHED BY REGISTERED MAIL

AS PER AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE SHOWN BELOW:

ATTY. MITCHELLE MAY A. CALADES.

Counsel for the Petitioner
143 Del Pilar St., Tacloban City

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

BRANCH 18, Hilongos, Leyte

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Intramuros, Manila 1002

EXPLANATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

A legible copy of the COMMENT was filed with the

Supreme Court and copies furnished to Atty. MITCHELLE
MAY A. CALADES. and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Hilongos, Leyte, through registered mail because of the
impracticability of personal service due to the distance
between their offices and that of the undersigned.

JASON G. ELLADO
 15

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Tacloban ) SS

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, LARRY ROQUE, of legal age, Filipino, single and a resident of

Tacloban City, under oath state: THAT—

1. I am Secretary of the LEO GIRON/TIGER LAW OFFICE, Tacloban

City;

2. Pursuant to instructions, I filed with the SUPREME COURT the

foregoing COMMENT in the above-captioned case by registered mail, and
furnished a copy thereof also by registered mail to:

ATTY. MITCHELLE MAY A. CALADES.

Counsel for the Petitioner
143 Del Pilar St., Tacloban City

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

BRANCH 18, Hilongos, Leyte

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Intramuros, Manila 1002

by depositing sealed envelopes containing said COMMENT with the Tacloban

City Postal Office as indicated by attached Registry Receipts / Registry
Receipt Numbers listed above, with instruction to the Postmaster to return
the envelops to sender after ten (10) days should it remain unclaimed.

2. Service by registered mail is being made to the above named

addressees through registered mail because of the impracticability of
personal service due to the distance between their offices and that of the
handling lawyer.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 27

August 2011 at Tacloban City, Philippines.

LARRY ROQUE
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27 August 2011 at

Tacloban City, Philippines by LARRY ROQUE, who has satisfactorily proven his
identity to me through his CTC # 09895047 issued on 1-3-11 at Tacloban
City, that he is the same person who personally signed the foregoing affidavit
before me and acknowledged that he executed the same.

Doc. No. 440

Page No. 88
Book No. 60
SERIES OF 2011