Read Garrett Rolfe's Lawsuit

Case 1:22-mi-99999-UNA Document 1838 Filed 06/10/22 Page 1 of 88
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
GARRETT ROLFE *
*
Plaintiffs, *
* Civil Action
v. * File #_______________
*
KEISHA LANCE BOTTOMS, in her * JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Individual AND Official Capacities *
as Mayor of the City of Atlanta, Georgia *
PAUL HOWARD, in his *
individual AND official capacities, *
and ERIKA SHIELDS, *
in her Individual AND *
Official Capacities *
CLINT RUCKER, in his Individual *
and official capacities *
Donald Hannah II, in his individual *
and Official Capacities *
The City of Atlanta, Georgia, *
Fulton County, Georgia *
*
Defendants. *
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Garrett Rolfe, by and through and his attorneys, Lance
LoRusso and Ken Davis, and for his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well
as various state law causes of action enumerated herein, against Defendants Keisha
Lance Bottoms, Donald Hannah II (Hereinafter “Hannah”), Paul Howard, Erika
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Shields, Clint Rucker, the City of Atlanta, Georgia, and Fulton County, Georgia and
states the following in support thereof:
INTRODUCTION
This is a civil action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 seeking damages against
Defendants for committing acts, under color of law, with the intent and for the
purpose of depriving Plaintiff of his rights secured under the Constitution and laws
of the United States by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Plaintiff also seeks damages for False Arrest under state law. Plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs for Defendants’ unlawful
and tortious actions. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages, attorney fees and
expenses, and costs of litigation including punitive damages against all individual
defendants.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, as made actionable by 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff’s
claims present federal questions over which this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1331 and 28 U.S.C § 1343 (a).
2. Plaintiff also asserts false arrest claims arising under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 51-
7-1, et seq. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction of these state law claims
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367. This Court is a proper venue as the acts giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within this District.
3. Plaintiff properly and timely placed Defendant CITY on notice of their claims as
required by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 by mailing the required notices via statutory
overnight delivery certified, to the parties, within the requisite period of time.
Plaintiff placed Defendants on notice of their claims in substantial compliance
with the Official Code of Georgia. Ante litem received by all individuals, entities,
and relevant parties on December 11, 2020.
4. Plaintiff properly and timely placed Defendant County on notice of their claims
as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 by mailing the required notices via statutory
overnight delivery certified, to the parties, within the requisite period of time.
Plaintiff placed Defendants on notice of their claims in substantial compliance
with the Official Code of Georgia. Ante litem received by all appropriate
individuals, entities, and relevant parties on or about May 5, 2021.
5. Plaintiff has complied with all legal and other preconditions, conditions
precedent, post-conditions, and conditions subsequent to properly file this suit
including any and all notice requirements and/or exhaustion of remedies.
THE PARTIES
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6. Plaintiff resides in the Northern District of Georgia, and is subject to the
jurisdiction of this court.
7. Plaintiff was, at all times relevant, a Police Officer with the Atlanta City Police
Department and a certified peace officer in the State of Georgia. Further, Plaintiff
was a certified Drug Recognition Expert and assigned by the City of Atlanta
Police Department to a specialized unit to detect and arrest drivers who were
operating vehicles under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
8. Defendant Keisha Lance Bottoms was, at all times relevant, the Mayor for the
City of Atlanta, Georgia and a resident of Fulton County, Georgia residing at 4900
Guilford Forest Drive SW, Atlanta, GA 30331 residing in the Northern District of
Georgia. Once served with process, she is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
9. Defendant Erika Shields was, at all times relevant, the Police Chief for the Atlanta
Police Department. She was, at the time of the events outlined herein, a resident
of Cobb County, Georgia residing in the Northern District of Georgia; Defendant
Shields is currently a resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky residing
in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff is not providing her home address herein as a
courtesy as Defendant Shields currently serves as the Chief of Police of the
Louisville Police Department. Once served with process, she is subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court.
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10. Defendant Shields regularly engages in transactions relating to her former
employment with the City of Atlanta, Georgia including, but not limited to,
consulting on pending litigation, participating in meetings with counsel for the
City of Atlanta, voluntarily appearing as a witness for the City of Atlanta in
hearings before the City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, and other routine,
administrative matters consistent with her obligations as a former chief of police.
Further, Defendant Shields is entitled to and draws a pension from the City of
Atlanta and maintains her professional certifications from the Georgia Peace
Officer Standards and Training Council (POST) in good standing. Finally,
Defendant Shields actively engages in efforts to recruit law enforcement officers
from the City of Atlanta to work in Louisville, Kentucky through the posting of
billboards and other advertisements which feature her likeness and a specific
request “Join Us In Louisville.” Defendant Shields has, through said recruiting
efforts, established significant contacts with the Northern District of Georgia.
Therefore, the Northern District of Georgia is a convenient forum for her to appear
as a defendant in this action. Further, Defendant Shields maintains sufficient
voluntary contacts with the State of Georgia to satisfy any minimum contacts
analysis necessary for a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over her as a
defendant regarding the matters pled herein.
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11. Defendant Paul Howard was, at all times relevant, the District Attorney for the
Atlanta Judicial Circuit and a resident of Fulton County, Georgia residing at 920
Dannon View SW, Suite 3202, Atlanta, Georgia 30331, in the Northern District
of Georgia. Once served with process, he is subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
12. At all times relevant, Defendant Howard was acting in a non-prosecutorial
capacity as an employee of Fulton County Georgia.
13. Clint Rucker is a natural person, who on information and belief resides in the
district and is a citizen of the State of Georgia. Clint Rucker is a former Fulton
County Assistant District Attorney, who is being sued in his individual and
official capacities. At all times relevant, Mr. Rucker was acting in a non-
prosecutorial capacity as an employee of Fulton County Georgia.
14. The City of Atlanta, Georgia (“CITY”) is a municipality organized pursuant to
the laws of the State of Georgia and may be served with process by serving Mayor
Andre Dickens at 55 Trinity Ave SW#2500, Atlanta, GA 30303. Once served with
process, Defendant City of Atlanta is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
15. Defendant Donald Hannah was, at all times relevant, an investigator working
with the office of the District Attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit and an
employee of Fulton County, Georgia. He is a resident of Fulton County, Georgia
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residing in the Northern District of Georgia. Once served with process, he is
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
16. Defendants Shields, Hannah, Bottoms, Rucker and Howard, were each, at all
relevant times, acting under color of law.
17. Defendant Fulton County, Georgia (the “COUNTY”) is a political subdivision
of the State of Georgia which may be sued in its own name pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 36-1-3 and may be served with process by serving Fulton County Commission
Chairman Robb Pitts at 141 Pryor Street SW 10th Floor Atlanta, GA 30303. Once
served with process, Defendant County is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Defendant County has waived sovereign immunity in this matter to the extent of
its purchase of liability insurance.
FACTS
18. On June 12, 2020, Officer Devin Brosnan was dispatched to the Wendy’s
restaurant located at 125 University Avenue SW, in regard to a suspect, later
identified as Rayshard Brooks, who was reported as being asleep in a vehicle in
the restaurant’s drive-through.
19. The 911 caller, a Wendy’s employee who indicated her name as Joyce, stated
that she believed the subject was intoxicated.
20. Officer Brosnan responded to the scene and made contact with Brooks.
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21. After determining alcohol may have been a contributing factor in Brooks’
behavior, Officer Brosnan requested the Plaintiff’s assistance.
22. After a thorough investigation, the Plaintiff determined Brooks was impaired –
under the influence of alcohol and drugs - and driving a vehicle in violation of
Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.
23. The Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan were police and courteous to Brooks
throughout the entire encounter.
24. Brooks was intoxicated and under the influence of alcohol and drugs.
25. Brooks was a convicted felon who was not permitted, under Georgia law, to
possess Officer Brosnan’s TASER. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, Possession of
firearms by convicted felons; See also § 16-11-106, Possession of a firearm or
knife during commission of or attempt to commit certain crimes.
26. Brooks was on probation and knew that he risked returning to prison if arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol.
27. Brooks was a member of a violent criminal street gang.
28. Officer Brosnan and the Plaintiff were wearing issued City of Atlanta Police
uniforms and were clearly recognizable as Georgia peace officers and City of
Atlanta Police Officers.
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29. Suddenly, without warning or provocation, Brooks chose to violently attack the
Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan, who were attempting to lawfully take him into
custody.
30. The Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan used the least amount of force possible in their
attempts to arrest Brook.
31. Brooks rapidly and violently escalated his unlawful resistance by punching the
Plaintiff in the face and committing several counts of felony obstruction of an
officer against the Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan.
32. In an effort to place Brooks under arrest and stop his assault, the Plaintiff
lawfully deployed his department-issued TASER twice, but it had no effect on
Brooks.
33. The Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan attempted to leverage Brooks to the ground
while giving him loud, clear verbal commands. In response, Brooks continued
actively resisting lawful efforts to arrest him physically assaulting the two
uniformed City of Atlanta Police Officers.
34. Brooks punched the Plaintiff in the face during the assault.
35. Brooks knocked Officer Brosnan to the ground, slamming Officer Brosnan’s
head to the concrete, and forcibly stole Officer Brosnan’s city-issued TASER
committing a Robbery pursuant to O.C.G.A. §16-8-40 and Removal Or
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Attempted Removal Of Weapon From Public Official, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-33,
both forcible felonies under Georgia law.
36. Brooks then proceeded to aim the TASER at Officer Brosnan’s face, firing and
striking Officer Brosnan in the hand raised to protect his face.
37. Brooks, lawfully under arrest, and now armed, began running through the
crowded parking lot committing a felony under Georgia law, Escape, O.C.G.A.
§ 16-10-52.
38. Plaintiff attempted to subdue brooks, utilizing his TASER, to prevent Brooks
from fleeing, harming, or attempting to harm any of the citizens in the parking
lot, or further harming the now-injured Officer Brosnan; this, however, did not
stop Brooks.
39. Instead of merely trying to escape from the officers’ lawful custody, Brooks
instead reached back with his arm extended and pointed an object at the Plaintiff.
40. The Plaintiff heard a sound like a gunshot and observed a flash in front of him
from the object held by Brooks. Fearing for his safety, the safety of Officer
Brosnan, and the safety of the civilians around him, the Plaintiff dropped his
TASER and fired his service weapon at Brooks.
41. The Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan immediately called for EMS, retrieved first-
aid supplies, and began rendering aid to Brooks.
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42. The Plaintiff retrieved his personal first aid supplies from his vehicle and used
them to render aid to Brooks.
43. When Brooks’ pulse stopped, the Plaintiff immediately began CPR until EMS
relieved him.
44. Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff continued to render aid to Brooks until they were
relieved by emergency medical personnel.
45. At the time of the shooting, Brooks was armed and endeavoring to escape lawful
custody.
46. At the time of the shooting, Brooks was under arrest for Driving under the
Influence of Alcohol, O.C.G.A. §40-6-391, Obstruction of An Officer, O.C.G.A.
§16-10-24, Robbery, O.C.G.A. §16-5-40, Removal Or Attempted Removal Of
Weapon From Public Official, O.C.G.A. §16-10-33, Aggravated Assault
O.C.G.A. §16-10-21, Escape O.C.G.A. §16-10-52, and Possession of a Firearm
in the Commission of A Crime O.C.G.A. §16-11-106.
47. At the time of the shooting, Brooks was a suspected felon in possession of deadly
weapon or any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against
a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury within the
meaning of O.C.G.A. §17-4-20(b).
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48. At the time of the shooting, Brooks posed an immediate threat of physical
violence to the Plaintiff or others within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §17-4-20(b).
49. Further, Plaintiff had probable cause to believe that Brooks had committed
crimes involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm
within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §17-4-20(b).
50. The Plaintiff’s use of both non-deadly and deadly force in this incident, as noted
above, was well within the practices, policies, procedures and customs of the
Atlanta Police Department, including agency work rule 4.2.50, “Maltreatment or
Unnecessary Force,” Standard Operating Procedure 3042, “Conducted Energy
Weapon (CEW),” Standard Operating Procedure 3010, “Use of Force,” and
Standard Operating Procedure 3030, “Arrest Procedures.”
51. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s conduct complied with the law of the United States
as enumerated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), standards of the
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), and the
state law of Georgia, as enumerated through O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20, §16-3-21 and
§ 17-4-20.
52. The City of Atlanta Police Department policies, including but not limited to
Atlanta Police Department SOP .3010 entitled Use of Force and APD Work Rule
4.2.50, entitled Maltreatment or Unnecessary Force, adopt, reference, and
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incorporate the use of force standards set out in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989).
53. The City of Atlanta Police Department policies, including but not limited to
Atlanta Police Department SOP 3010 entitled Use of Force and Atlanta Police
Department SOP .3042 entitled Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW), adopt,
reference, and incorporate the use of force standards set the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, aka CALEA.
54. Further, Plaintiff’s use of force and actions were consistent with his training as
a City of Atlanta Police Officer.
55. The Plaintiff’s use of force complied with the prevailing standards of the law
enforcement profession.
56. At the time of the incident, the Plaintiff was a member of the High Intensity
Traffic Team and the Governor-funded H.E.A.T. unit and has specialized training
in DUI investigations.
57. The Plaintiff had made at least 300 DUI arrests and completed the 160-hour Drug
Recognition Expert course, graduating as valedictorian.
58. The Plaintiff was also valedictorian of his Atlanta Police Academy class, which
he began at twenty years of age.
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59. On June 13, 2020, the day following Rayshard Brooks’ violent attack on the
Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan, the Plaintiff was contacted by an attorney with the
International Brotherhood of Police Officers, (IBPO), Raemona Byrd-Jones, who
informed him that she had information that the city intended to terminate his
employment. This was the only notification that Plaintiff Rolfe received of his
termination. No official notification was ever made directly to him, either via in-
hand delivery, or certified mail as is required by City of Atlanta Municipal
Ordinance including, but not limited to, 114-530.
60. Ken Allen, National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) Vice
President, received copies of the city’s “Notice of Proposed Adverse Action”
(NPAA) form and the city’s “Notice of Final Adverse Action” (NFAA) form,
and received them at the same time.
61. City ordinances, policies, procedures, practices, and customs require that the
“Notice of Proposed Adverse Action” be received prior to dismissal and that the
employee be given time to review files and prepare for a mandatory Employee
Response Session.
62. Neither Defendant Chief Shields nor any member of the Chief’s staff or her
designee was present when Ken Allen received copies of the NPAA and NFAA.
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63. Both forms described above note a violation of work rule 4.2.50, “Maltreatment
or Unnecessary Force,” in regard to the incident. Both forms are dated on June,
13, 2020, have the printed name “Chief E. Shields,” and bear a signature believed
to be that of Assistant Chief Todd Coyt.
64. As to the required Employee Response Session, both forms further note that
“Employee did not attend.”
65. Both forms bear a witness signature which is undecipherable but believed to be
that of Ken Allen. The witness signatures, however, are dated June 11, 2020.
Clearly this is an impossibility, as on June 11 the incident had not yet occurred.
66. The “Notice of Adverse Action” form has a pre-printed block addressed to the
employee, explaining an employee’s right to either provide a written response or
appear before the disciplinary authority, with blank spaces for dates and times.
Handwritten on the form is an indication that a response was due on June 13, at
4:45 P.M. This is the same date the form was reportedly issued. It is unknown
when this notation was added to the form.
67. Again, the Plaintiff never received either of these notifications, and even if he
had, such notice is improper under the City of Atlanta City Ordinances including,
but not limited to, City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinance 114-530 which set
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mandatory deadlines and opportunities for an employee to prepare for and
respond to proposed discipline.
68. The Plaintiff was never provided an opportunity to respond, either orally or in
writing, to the disciplinary charges that were made against him as required by
both City ordinance and Atlanta Police Department policy.
69. Additionally, contrary to the clear policies, procedures, customs, and practices
of the City of Atlanta, the Office of Professional Standards did not, or was not
permitted, to conduct an investigation prior to the Plaintiff’s termination.
70. While the final adverse action forms produced by the City of Atlanta bear the
name of Defendant Shields, it is readily apparent, by her own statement, that
Defendant Bottoms improperly and unlawfully made the decision to terminate
Plaintiff Rolfe or, at the very least, ratified the improper and unlawful decision
to terminate Plaintiff Rolfe.
71. City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinances 98-26 and 98-28, makes it clear that
Defendant Bottoms was not authorized to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment.
72. Having achieved the status of a “non-probationary employee” and employee in
the “classified service,” pursuant to City of Atlanta Municipal Code 114-84(d);
114-502; 114-516; 114-517; 114-518; 114-528(a); and 114-546 the Plaintiff had
a legally protected property right in his employment and could only be terminated
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or disciplined for cause. These procedural safeguards were denied to the Plaintiff.
Said denial was perpetrated thorough a policy, practice and custom of the City of
Atlanta.
73. The provisions of the City of Atlanta Municipal Code cited here which provided
Plaintiff due process created and set out duties upon Defendants Shields and
Bottoms which were ministerial in nature and not discretionary.
74. In a press conference held on June 13, 2020, Defendant Keisha Lance Bottoms
discussed the incident and her review of the body camera video: “For the third
time in just two weeks I have spent the better part of a day reviewing video
footage involving allegations of excessive use [sic] by members of the Atlanta
Police Department. Tragically, the most recent incident involved the fatal
shooting of a 27-year-old man, Rayshard Brooks.”
75. As the press conference continued, Defendant Bottoms stated that “While there
may be debate as to whether this was an appropriate use of deadly force, I firmly
believe that there is a clear distinction between what you can do and what you
should do.”
76. Defendant Bottoms further stated, “I do not believe that this was a justified use
of deadly force and have called for the immediate termination of the officer.”
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77. In another press conference, held on June 14—the effective date of Plaintiff
Rolfe’s dismissal—Defendant Bottoms publicly referred to the death of Mr.
Brooks as “murder,” and acknowledged her rush to judgement:
“On Friday evening, we saw the murder of Rayshard Brooks. And as I

have said before, I am often reminded of the words of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. that there is a fierce urgency of now in our communities. And
that fierce urgency of now says that while our advisory committee
continues to work to make recommendations to help us implement and
review all of our policies in the City of Atlanta it is clear that we do not
have another day, another minute, another hour to waste ….”
78. As a member of the Georgia bar and former judge, Defendant Bottoms was
aware of the elements of the crime of murder, the crimes committed by Brooks
against Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff, the law surrounding the use of force in self-
defense, to make an arrest, and to apprehend a dangerous, fleeing felon.
79. Defendant Bottoms was aware of the following facts at the time that she made
these statements:
-Brooks was a convicted felon who was not permitted, under Georgia law, to
possess Officer Brosnan’s TASER. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131.
-Brooks was on probation and knew that he risked returning to prison if
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
-Brooks was a member of a violent criminal street gang.
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-Officer Brosnan suffered a concussion and other injuries as a result of
Brooks’ violent assault upon him
-Brooks committed numerous forcible felonies on two uniformed City of
Atlanta Police Officers before he was shot.
-The City of Atlanta Use of Force Policies track, reference and follow state
law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 section (d) which prevents a
municipality from setting more stringent use of force standards than those
allowed by law.1
80. In the same press conference, Defendant Bottoms made a statement indicating
that she herself questioned whether the use of force engaged in by the Plaintiff
was in fact in compliance with his training as provided by the Atlanta Police
Department:
“ … Part of the debate in looking at the shooting from Friday night is,
was that training, is that how our officers are trained; if someone has
your TASER do our policies then allow you to respond with a weapon?
And so, again, as we are taking a look at our use of force polices though
our advisory committee, it is abundantly clear that through my
executive powers we need to reiterate our desire that there be de-
escalation and that there not be an immediate use of force when there
are other options that are available.”
1
O.C.G.A. §17-4-20(d) states “No law enforcement agency of this state or of any
political subdivision of this state shall adopt or promulgate any rule, regulation, or
policy which prohibits a peace officer from using that degree of force to apprehend
a suspected felon which is allowed by the statutory and case law of this state.
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81. It is clear from her statements that Defendant Bottoms improperly interjected her
own subjective feelings as she made determinations of guilt:
“I would venture to say when I saw him run…. he talked about his
daughter’s birthday and the first thing I thought when he ran was that
he probably didn’t want to be locked up over the weekend. And I know
that because I have had family members in that position. They get
locked up on the wrong day for something stupid. It didn’t have to end
that way. It didn’t have to end that way… It pissed me off, it makes me
sad, and I’m frustrated, and nothing I can do is going to change what
happened on Friday.”
82. Defendant Bottoms went on to grossly mischaracterize the circumstances of
Plaintiff’s use of force: “…the fact that I am standing here speaking about the
shooting and killing of a black man who was sleeping in a drive through
restaurant shows that there is a significant disconnect.”
83. Over the next several days, Defendant Bottoms continued to make similar public
statements that were disparaging to the Plaintiff, including statements televised
on national news shows such as “The View” aired on ABC, and the “The Today
Show,” aired on NBC:
a. “It disturbed me so deeply that [Brooks] just didn’t seem to be
humanized in that moment.”
b. Brooks was “not confrontational” he was “a guy that you were rooting
for . . . [this] is so personal to so many people of color . . . That could
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have been any one of us . . . [and] in this case it was: it was someone’s
father[.]”
84. The determination of Defendant Bottoms and Defendant Shields that the
Plaintiff used excessive force, made in the absence of a thorough and informed
investigation mandated by the policies, procedures, practices, and customs of the
City of Atlanta and the City of Atlanta Police Department, was solely based on a
cursory review of the body camera video in a manner completely inconsistent
with the type of review required in Graham and City of Atlanta Police
Department policies and procedures. It gave no allowance for the totality of the
circumstances of the incident, gave no allowance for the split-second nature of
the use of force decision made by the Plaintiff, was not conducted through the
lens of a reasonable officer, and was reviewed in hindsight, with the luxury of
multiple re-plays of multiple videos in a safe and secure setting.
85. In the alternative, Bottoms and Shields knew Plaintiff’s actions were lawful,
reasonable, and appropriate, and intentionally and maliciously disregarded those
facts. Additionally, contrary to the clear policies, procedures, customs, and
practices of the City of Atlanta, the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) did
not, or was not permitted to conduct an investigation, prior to the Plaintiff’s
termination, as required when in connection to any allegations of excessive force
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and misuse of a TASER, more specifically but not limited to City of Atlanta
Police Policy APD. SOP. 2020 “Disciplinary Process.”
86. Plaintiff was entitled to a full, fair, and impartial investigation pursuant to the
policies of the City of Atlanta Police Department and the Municipal Ordinances
of the City of Atlanta. The actions of Defendant Bottoms, Defendant Shields, and
other individuals to be named, constituted a deliberate, concentrated, and
malicious effort, in concert and in conspiracy with one another, to deny Plaintiff
the right to said investigation. Defendants Shields and Bottoms had a ministerial
duty to provide said investigation.
87. With all inferences provided in favor of Mayor Bottoms and former Chief
Shields and any and all officials involved, the adverse employment reactions
evidence incompetence, negligence, animus, maliciousness, and gross
negligence.
88. The Plaintiff’s termination was conducted in an unnecessarily public manner
with public comments widely broadcast by Defendant Bottoms insinuating that
the Plaintiff committed no less than murder. Such statements, made without
meaningful investigation and with reckless disregard for the truth, evidence
actual malice, and are in violation of the policies, procedures, customs, and
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practices of the City of Atlanta and the City of Atlanta Police Department as well
as Municipal Ordinances of the City of Atlanta.
89. Defendant Shields took an oath in her role as the Chief of Police of the City of
Atlanta in which she swore to uphold the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of the State of Georgia, the laws of the State of Georgia, the duly
passed Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, and the policies, rules, and regulations
of the City of Atlanta Police Department.
90. Defendant Shields was employed by the City of Atlanta for twenty-five years,
was familiar with the policies, procedures, customs, practices and duly passed
ordinances of the City of Atlanta.
91. Defendant Shields, as Chief of Police, was both the policy maker and decision
maker of the City of Atlanta Police Department.
92. Defendant Bottoms took an oath in her role as the Mayor of the City of Atlanta,
as set out in Atlanta City Ordinance 2-301(b), in which she swore to uphold the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Georgia, the
laws of the State of Georgia, the duly passed ordinances of the City of Atlanta.
93. Defendant Shields’ actions in punishing Plaintiff Rolfe, as outlined herein,
constitute clear violations of her oath of office.
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94. The oath Defendant Bottoms took reads as follows per city ordinance: "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the
[mayor, president of the council, councilmember] City Council of the City of
Atlanta, Georgia. I will not knowingly permit my vote to be influenced by fear,
favor, affection, or reward, and in all things pertaining to my office. I will be
governed by the public good and the interests of the City. I will observe the
provisions of the Charter, ordinances, and regulations of the City of Atlanta, and
I will support and defend the Constitutions of the State of Georgia and the United
States of America. I am not the holder of any office of trust under the government
of the United States, any other state, or any foreign state which I am prohibited
from holding by the laws of the State of Georgia; I am not the holder of any
unaccounted-for public money due this state or any political subdivision or
authority thereof; I have been a resident of the City of Atlanta [and Council
District] and am otherwise qualified to hold this office by the Constitution and
laws of this State and the Charter and ordinances of the City of Atlanta, so help
me God."
95. Defendant Bottoms, as a member of the Georgia Bar and a duly licensed attorney
since 1994, a former judge, Mayor since 2017, and a member of the Atlanta City
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Council since 2009, was familiar with the policies, procedures, customs,
practices and duly passed ordinances of the City of Atlanta.
96. As the Mayor of the City of Atlanta, Defendant Bottoms was required, pursuant
to Atlanta City Ordinance 2-301(c), to attend training “that shall include, but not
be limited to, matters of campaign and financial disclosure requirements,
standards of conduct, ethics code and the legislative process.”
97. Defendant Bottoms’ actions in terminating Plaintiff as outlined herein constitute
clear violations of her oath of office.
98. Defendant Bottoms’ actions in terminating Plaintiff, as outlined herein,
constitute clear violations of her duties and obligations set forth in City of Atlanta
Ordinances, specifically 98-26 and 98-28, which solely vests the police chief with
the right to terminate a City of Atlanta Police Officer, and subjected her to
removal from office.
99. Defendant Bottoms’ actions at the press conference and through various public
comments and media appearances did not serve any legitimate purpose consistent
with her sworn duties as the Mayor of the City of Atlanta and were perpetrated
with actual malice in a brazen, bold, and desperate effort to advance her political
career.
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100. While the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) commenced an investigation
into the incident referenced above, Defendant, then-District Attorney Paul
Howard, pressed forward to obtain criminal charges against Plaintiff without the
benefit of a completed investigation.
101. After only watching video recordings of the incident, Defendant Howard
instructed DA’s office Investigator Donald Hannah, to obtain arrest warrants for
Plaintiff Rolfe only five days after the incident had occurred, on June 17, 2020.
102. Instead of allowing the GBI, the agency charged with investigating law
enforcement use of force, to complete a thorough investigation, Defendant
Howard abused the authority of his office in bringing charges against Plaintiff
without any meaningful investigation.
103. Investigator Donald Hannah knew the facts of the case because he met with
Officer Brosnan, knew that Brooks had attacked Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff,
knew that Brooks had stolen Officer Brosnan’s TASER, knew that Brooks caused
Officer Brosnan to suffer a concussion and injury to his leg, and knew that
Plaintiff’s actions were justified under Georgia law, yet he still took warrants for
Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff.
104. Defendant Howard then used these charges as a campaign platform in public
forums, podcasts, and media outlets throughout the period leading up to the
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August 11, 2020 Democratic primary runoff for Fulton County District Attorney
in a desperate attempt to secure his reelection as district attorney.
105. This was clearly an inadequate investigation and overstepped Defendant
Howard’s bounds as the District Attorney. In such cases, it is common practice
and custom for a District Attorney to obtain a complete and thorough
investigation from the GBI, and if warranted upon review, prepare an indictment
for presentation to a grand jury. Instead, Defendant Howard took the highly
unusual step of instructing an investigator in his office to obtain arrest warrants
for Plaintiff with essentially no investigation. In every sense, Defendant Howard
acted as the investigator not a prosecutor and then relied upon his faulty
investigation to recklessly pursue charges against Plaintiff for his political gain.
106. On June 18, 2020, Defendant Howard appeared on “expidiTIously” a talk show
focusing on social issues hosted by rapper Clifford “T.I.” Harris.
107. During the episode, which ran approximately one hour and twenty minutes, in
what Harris describes as not a “traditional campaign stop[,]” as Defendant
Howard drank what appears to be alcohol (as bottles of alcohol are between
the men) with Harris, discussed the “merits” of the case, made factual
statements which contradicted statements made in the press conference the
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day prior—and which were equally false—and promoted his political
platform, which was highly dependent on the prosecution of police officers.
108. Defendant Howard made clear that he, his investigators, and the assistant
district attorneys he supervised had created either a habit, custom, or policy
of arresting police officers prior to the issuance of an indictment: that this
practice was implemented “all the time.”
109. Defendant Howard further focused attention on Officer Brosnan stating, again
erroneously, that Officer Brosnan was standing on the “chest” of Brooks
rather than administering aid and that he “kicked Mr. Brooks when he was
laying on the pavement.”
110. Defendant Howard stated that standing on the body of Brooks was more
heinous than shooting him:
For me, being an African American man, I would rather sentence

you for standing on the body even above you shooting him.
Because I think standing on a man’s body is the ultimate insult—
an insult not only to him but an insult to our community—
because when he did that, this man laid in a public parking lot
over at Wendy’s and those policemen knew that there were many
people standing there watching them, but they didn’t care—they
did it anyway.
But to your point, if you saw the video . . . when you see the
conversation between [Mr. Brooks] . . . and these two officers . .
. I agree with you because at that point if Mr. Brooks had been
another kind of man that there is no way that they would have
continued to operate in the same way.
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...
So, when Mr. Brooks tried to run . . . and I know that the public
was somewhat mislead because they were shown a photograph
or a video tape that showed Mr. Brooks firing the taser back at
the officer and what they, what was said at that time is that is
when the officer shot him . . . and so in my view the officer had
no reason to fear Mr Brooks, he had no reason to fear that Mr.
Brooks would harm anyone else.
And this is the thing that I think is critical for people trying to
analyze this case: there is something in the law called excited
utterance and that is when somebody in the heat of the moment
makes a statement but they make the statement without having
the time to consult with somebody . . . they just say whats on
their mind. So in that moment, officer Rolfe said: “I got him.” So
if you interpret that doesn’t sound like I’m scared of him or you
I fear him; he said “I got him”—that’s what he said.
...
We’re going to make reducing police brutality a major function

of the DA’s Office . . . so we are going to set up a second
department. . . to start to attack it . . . The issue with police
brutality we felt is really important . . . We[, the black
community,] are tired too. I’m tired; I’m tired of having to
prosecute the cases; tired of going to the funerals; tired of going
to the memorials . . . I don’t think they’re more tired than we are.
...
[Speaking about the speed of prosecutions of police officers,

absent GBI investigation:] If I had to do it again what I would try
to do; I would try to charge them a day earlier.
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111. Defendant Howard made these false claims which endangered Plaintiff
Brosnan’s life and violated Defendant Howard’s oaths as an attorney, a
prosecutor, and a District Attorney, all for selfish political gain.
112. Defendant Howard’s false, defamatory statements made in press conferences
and in furtherance of his political ambitions outlined herein constitute clear
violations of his oath of office; Defendant Bottoms’ actions in condemning
Plaintiff Brosnan publicly without cause and making false accusations of
wrongdoing as outlined herein constitute clear violations of her oath of office.
113. On June 17, 2020, Defendant Howard invited members of numerous press
outlets to the press conference, set up a room to allow the gathering and
participation of numerous media outlets, and invited Brooks’ family members,
witnesses, and their counsel.
114. The press conference was set to begin at 3:00 pm and a large contingent of press
was assembled at that time. However, Defendant Hannah applied for the warrant
for Plaintiff at 2:47 p.m. and Judge Rebecca Rieder did not sign the warrant until
2:52 p.m. However, Defendant Hannah applied for the warrant for Officer
Brosnan at 2:47 p.m. and Judge Rebecca Rieder did not sign the warrant until
2:55 p.m. Therefore, the warrant was not secured until after Defendant Howard
called the press conference and invited the media, Rayshard Brooks’ family,
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Rayshard Brooks’ family attorney, and other witnesses and people who spoke at
the press conference.
115. Those assembled at the press conference, held at the Fulton County Courthouse,
had to clear security protocols and were likely in the building and waiting for the
press conference to start before Judge Riedel signed the arrest warrant for
Plaintiff.
116. At the press conference, Defendant Howard announced the following charges
against the Plaintiff:
a. Aggravated Assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21;
b. Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21;
c. Criminal Damage to Property in the First Degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22;
d. Felony Murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1; and
e. Four Counts of Violation of Oath By A Public Officer, O.C.G.A.
§ 16-10-1
117. At the press conference, Defendant Howard violated general canons of ethics
for attorneys and specific canons of ethics for prosecutors.
118. At the press conference, Defendant Howard exceeded the duties of an elected
district attorney by making improper statements concerning evidence, made false
statements concerning evidence which he knew, should have known, or through
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reasonable effort would have known were false, and provided a public forum for
the attorneys for the Brooks family to defame the Plaintiff, portray him in a false
light, and damage his personal and professional reputation. Some of these
statements amount to statements regarding Georgia law which Defendant
Howard, an attorney licensed in Georgia since 1976, knew were false, inaccurate,
and intentionally misleading in violation of his ethical rules as an attorney and a
prosecutor.
119. Defendant Howard’s false statements include but are not limited to the
following:
a. Plaintiff failed to render aid to Brooks;
b. Plaintiff kicked Brooks after the shooting;
c. Plaintiff delayed in giving aid to Brooks after the shooting;
d. Plaintiff violated City of Atlanta Policies and Procedures;
e. Mr. Brooks never presented himself as a threat.
f. The TASER in Brooks’ possession “presented no danger” to the
officers or any other persons.
g. Mr. Brooks was slightly impaired.
h. Mr. Brooks was never informed that he was under arrest for driving
under the influence.
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i. The demeanor of the officers immediately after the shooting did not
reflect any fear or danger of Mr. Brooks.
j. Plaintiff stated “I got him” at the time the shot was fired.
k. You can’t fire a handgun at someone who is running away.
l. Plaintiff knew that the TASER was in Brooks’ possession and that it
was fired twice.
m. Officer Brosnan had become a state’s witness.
120. This content provided in a public forum is in direct disobedience of Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct set by the Georgia Bar Association. More
specifically, Rule 3.6 instructs attorneys to be mindful of any extrajudicial
statements that a reasonable person would believe to be disseminated by means
of public communication. Comment 5[] to Rule 3.6 expressly disallows
extrajudicial statements in criminal proceedings that speak to “the identity of a
witness or the expected testimony of a party or witness,” “the identity of physical
evidence expected to be presented,” and importantly, “any opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could
result in incarceration.” Additionally, attorneys should not share “the fact that a
defendant has been charged with a crime, UNLESS there is included therein a
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation, and that the
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defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty” (emphasis
added).
121. Defendant Howard’s actions at the press conference did not serve any
legitimate purpose consistent with his sworn duties as the elected district attorney
of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, did not advance the criminal case against Plaintiff,
and were perpetrated with actual malice in a brazen, bold, and desperate effort to
advance his political career, as he sought reelection. At the press conference,
Defendant Howard violated the canons of ethics generally for attorneys and the
specific canons of ethics for prosecutors.
122. Defendant Howard exceeded the duties of an elected district attorney by
making improper statements concerning the evidence, made false statements
concerning the evidence which he knew, should have known, or through
reasonable effort would have known were false, and provided a public forum for
witness Shawn Williams, Rayshard Brooks’ wife, Tamika Miller, and their
attorneys to defame Plaintiff, portray him in a false light, and damage his personal
and professional reputation.
123. Defendant Howard also stated that the TASER in Brooks’ possession
“presented no danger” to the officers or any other persons. Just ten days earlier,
Defendant Howard told the public in a press conference that a TASER is a deadly
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weapon when he needed justification for charging Investigators Gardner and
Streeter with Aggravated Assault after they deployed their city-issued TASERs
while on duty.
124. A special prosecutor, Samir Patel, dismissed those charges against
Investigators Gardner and Streeter on May 23, 2022 finding: both Investigators
were “acting within the lawful scope of [their] authority, that [their] actions were
reasonable and in accordance with law, and that [they] did not possess any
criminal intent to violate any criminal laws. Accordingly, Mr. Patel declined
prosecution of the cases and dismissed the Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant
that District Attorney’s Investigator Greg L. Thomas presented to Judge Belinda
Edwards on June 2, 2020.
125. This intentional manipulation of the definition of a deadly weapon in order to
suit the momentary whim of Defendant Howard illustrates his willingness to use
his elected office for political and personal gain in direct contravention of his
oath of office and the ethical requirements of an attorney and prosecutor.
126. Defendant Howard fraudulently stated that “Officer Brosnan has now become
a state’s witness” and consented to a reduced bond for Brosnan to perpetuate this
fabrication.
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127. The other speakers at the press conference reiterated Howard’s statement that
Officer Brosnan would testify for the state against Plaintiff.
128. Through legal representation, Officer Brosnan corrected the record on many
occasions that he would not be operating as a witness for the state. Indicating
publicly that Officer Brosnan was a cooperative witness, when this was not
accurate, Defendant Howard attempted to put Officer Brosnan in a position with
little choice other than to correct the lie and face public condemnation or stay
silent and perpetuate Howard’s lie.
129. Defendant Howard also made the false statement that Officer Brosnan
appearing as a state’s witness was somehow unique, stating that “[Brosnan]
would become one of the first police officers to actually indicate that he is willing
to testify against someone in his own department.”
130. In fact, Plaintiff testified in a Fulton County Grand Jury at the request of Paul
Howard’s office against a City of Atlanta Police Officer in a criminal case. That
officer was indicted and prosecuted – by Defendant Paul Howard.
131. Defendant Howard allowed the attorney for the Brooks family, Chris Stewart,
to speak at the press conference which served no lawful purpose in prosecuting
any criminal charges against Plaintiff and only served to further taint a grand or
petit jury pool.
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132. During the press conference, Defendant Howard stated that Brooks was only
“slightly impaired” on the night of the incident. However, GBI crime lab
toxicology reports state that Brooks was under the influence of alcohol and drugs.
His blood alcohol concentration was .102, and drug tests indicate that his blood
contained eutylone or an isomer of eutylone, cocaine, cocaethylene,
benzoylecgonine, and midazolam-illegal drugs and metabolites of illegal drugs.
133. A review of the video clearly shows Brooks registered a blood alcohol level on
a field breath test providing probable cause that Brooks was well over the legal
limit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391. Therefore, this fact was readily apparent
to anyone who reviewed the videos as Defendant Howard purported to do.
134. Not only did Defendant Howard misrepresent the facts during the press
conference, he misinformed the media and the public about the basis for his “legal
conclusion” in charging Plaintiff. He stated that the two “foundational cases in
this matter” were Tennessee v. Garner2 and Graham v. Connor3.
2
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), held
that deadly force may not be used unless the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others.
3
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989),
held that a claim that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in course
of arrest, investigatory stop or other “seizure” of a person are properly analyzed
under Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard.
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135. He went on further to explain the relevance or applicability of these cases
misrepresenting their holding and applicability. Defendant Howard also failed to
mention Georgia’s justification statutes 4, Georgia’s self-defense statutes 5,
Georgia’s immunity statutes 6, and Georgia’s use of deadly force by law
enforcement statute7.
136. These critical legal omissions show that this live broadcast was simply an
extrajudicial campaign appearance at the expense of Plaintiff in a disgusting
display of arrogance in an obvious effort to secure his re-election using taxpayer
resources.
137. Defendant Howard’s actions at the press conference did not serve any
legitimate purpose consistent with his sworn duties as the elected district attorney
of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. The press conference did not advance the criminal
cases against Plaintiff, and were perpetrated with actual malice in a brazen, bold,
and desperate effort to advance his political career as he sought reelection to his
office.
4
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-20.
5
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21.
6
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2.
7
O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.
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138. Defendant Howard also used the June 17th press conference to advocate for and
petition the Georgia legislature to change the Georgia law to allow him to bypass
a Grand Jury and indict law enforcement officers with the stroke of a pen stating:
“One of the things that I’m hoping that we will pass, not only in our state, but in
the entire country is that I think we need to change the law. I believe that
prosecutors should be allowed to indict cases directly, without a grand jury, when
they involve police shootings.”
139. Even before the press conference, Defendant Howard made nationally televised
appearances concerning the incident.
140. On June 14, 2020, just two days after the incident, Defendant Howard went on
CNN to inappropriately discuss his personal feelings about Plaintiff knowing that
the events occurred in Fulton County and would fall within his jurisdiction in
violation of the canon of ethics for attorneys and prosecutors specifically
including but not limited to Rule 3.6 instructs attorneys to be mindful of any
extrajudicial statements that a reasonable person would believe to be
disseminated by means of public communication. Comment 5[] to Rule 3.6
expressly disallows extrajudicial statements in criminal proceedings that speak
to “the identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a party or witness,” “the
identity of physical evidence expected to be presented,” and importantly, “any
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opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case
or proceeding that could result in incarceration.” Additionally, attorneys should
not share “the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, UNLESS there
is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation,
and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty”
(emphasis added).
141. During said CNN interview, Howard stated that “[Brooks] did not seem to
present any threat to anyone. The fact that it would escalate to his death seems
unreasonable.” The reasonableness of the officers’ actions is a legal conclusion
that should be brought up in a court of law before the judge and/or jury selected
to adjudicate Plaintiff’s case.
142. Defendant Howard, instead, spread this guilt-ridden language across news
platforms far and wide to convince as many Fulton County voters and potential
jurors of both Plaintiff’s presumed guilt and Defendant Howard’s competence as
a District Attorney.
143. In violation of his ethical duties as an attorney and as the elected District
Attorney of the Fulton Judicial Circuit, Defendant Howard knew or should have
known that his actions would taint any grand and petit jury pool.
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144. Given the number of people in the parking lot at the time of the shooting,
Defendant Howard knew or should have known that his statements could have
the effect of influencing potential witnesses while the GBI was still conducting
its investigation.
145. To further defame the Plaintiff, on June 18, 2020 with Andrea Mitchell on
MSNBC, Defendant Howard stated that he and his staff:
“probably had visceral reactions when we saw the videotape of a

surveillance tape showing the kick and showing Officer Brosnan
standing on the body of Mr. Brooks. I could not imagine a
circumstance that would illustrate a more total lack of respect for
him and for what he represented. But you've also got to consider
not only were they disrespecting Mr. Brooks, this action took
place in an open parking lot at a restaurant where people were
out filming them, and the officers, apparently that did not mean
anything to them.”
146. On April 22, 2021, the Plaintiff appealed his termination to the City of Atlanta
Civil Service Board.
147. The Civil Service Board granted the appeal and reversed Plaintiff Rolfe’s
dismissal on May 5, 2021 stating, “[d]ue to the City’s failure to comply with
several provisions of the Code and the information received during witnesses’
testimony, the Board concludes the Appellant was not afforded his right to due
process.”
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148. During the hearing on April 22, 2021, the City of Atlanta’s outside counsel
subpoenaed and called Assistant Police Chief Todd Coyt to testify.
149. When asked by the City if Chief Coyt would have done anything differently
had he responded to the call on June 12, 2020, he stated, “[n]o, because I believe
the officers acted accordingly. The officers were trying to show compassion and
they were not overly aggressive. They tried to do everything they could to calm
the situation down, so I don't think it's anything other than that that I would have
done initially when it started [walked Brooks closer to the police vehicle].” He
further clarified that he had no criticisms of Plaintiff’s actions on June 12, 2020.
150. City of Atlanta’s outside counsel also subpoenaed and called Internal Affairs
Sergeant William Dean. They asked Sergeant Dean, in his experience as an
officer, if he would have handled Brooks differently. In response, he stated, “I
think on the onset they were very courteous and professional; they explained
themselves. Things went far left when they tried to handcuff him. Prior to the
attempt to handcuff him everything was perfect. It was peaceful, it was cordial,
it was professional. I don't want to really, like armchair quarterback people in
regards to, you know, their fighting skills or -- I mean, it was definitely a physical
assault on the officers and they attempted to use the TASER, which is less lethal.
I don't know what else I would have done.”
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151. Sergeant Dean was also asked “When you watched the video as a member of
the internal affairs unit, you stated that you did not see anything that could have
been done differently; correct?” And Sergeant Dean stated, “Correct.”
152. In regard to the issuance of the NPAA and the NFAA for Plaintiff, Sergeant
Dean indicated there were “time restraints” involved; when asked if those
restraints concerned Defendant Bottoms’ 5 P.M. press conference on June 13,
Sergeant Dean answered “I believe so.” Sergeant Dean was further asked “So
that’s why the 4:45 at June 13 appears on the notice of proposed adverse action
as the deadline for him to respond. Is that a fair statement?” to which Sergeant
Dean responded “Sounds fair to me.”
153. In addition to his termination, the City of Atlanta falsely reported to the Georgia
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST) that the Plaintiff was
terminated for cause and had used unlawful force in violation of state and federal
law in the arrest of Brooks.
154. The unlawful termination of the Plaintiff has resulted in a POST investigation
which has further publicized his termination and placed his peace officer
certification in jeopardy.
155. Since the Plaintiff’s adverse employment change and his arrest, he has suffered
intense public stigmatization due to Defendants’ reckless allegations and actual
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malice. The very public comments that the Plaintiff’s force was excessive has
had an extremely negative impact upon any present or future employment
prospects and exposed him to death threats, public ridicule, and negative
international media attention.
156. Due to the false statements made by Defendants Bottoms and Howard, and the
criminal charges Defendants Howard and Hannah falsely pursued against him,
Plaintiff was forced to flee his home, live on the run, and hide from constant death
threats.
157. On April 22, 2021, APD Assistant Chief Todd Coyt testified, in Officer Rolfe
successfully appealed his termination, that he believed both Officer Rolfe and
Plaintiff Brosnan, “acted accordingly and… were trying to show compassion and
did everything they could to calm the situation down.” Officer of Professional
Standards Sergeant William Dean stated, “I don’t know what else I would’ve
done. Everything was perfect.” He went on to say, “It was definitely a physical
assault on the officers, and they attempted to use the Taser, which was less
lethal.”
158. APD Police Chief Bryant stated to WSB he believed charges were brought too
quickly against Plaintiff and Defendant Howard’s process was flawed.
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159. Fani Willis, Defendant Howard’s successor, was sworn in as the District
Attorney of Fulton County on January 1, 2021. Shortly thereafter, she sought to
recuse herself and her office from the prosecution of Plaintiff. On June 4, 2021,
Judge Christopher Brasher disqualified District Attorney Fani Willis and her
office from prosecuting the criminal cases against Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan.
160. Ms. Willis compared the case against Plaintiff to a “Ringling Brothers’ show”
and stated:
We can’t even [disagree] anymore if this was political . . . Paul Howard’s ads
that he has running on television, he has images from an open and active case.
The Brooks case. That is unethical to do. It is a violation of Georgia bar rules.
161. Shortly thereafter, the Georgia Attorney General appointed Peter Skandalakis,
Executive Director of the Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia to prosecute
the criminal charges against Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan.
162. Since the June 2020 international broadcast of Defendants Bottoms’ and
Howard’s statements, Plaintiff was forced to abandon his home, suffered adverse
employment change, arrest, intense public stigmatization, and very real danger.
163. Plaintiff Rolfe lived, and continues to live, in constant fear for his own safety
and for that of his family members.
164. The false and very public statements that the Plaintiff’s use of force was
excessive has had an extremely negative impact upon any present or future
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employment prospects and exposed him to credible death threats, public ridicule,
and intense negative international media attention.
165. The continued dangers present in the City of Atlanta make it unsafe for Plaintiff
to work in his chosen profession as a City of Atlanta Police Officer or live in the
City of Atlanta.
COUNT ONE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment—Seizure of Property Absent Due
Process of Law, Against Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker and
Howard, individually and in their official capacities
166. Plaintiff restates and realleges paragraphs 1-165 of this Complaint as if set forth
here at length.
167. Plaintiff had myriad personal property stored in his apartment, and, also of
course, Plaintiff had a possessory interest in the apartment itself.
168. Due to the actions of Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and
Howard, Plaintiff’s possessory interest in both his personal property and his
interest in his apartment itself was significantly interfered with.
169. Plaintiff lost de facto control and possession of both the apartment and all of
his personal property contained therein. Plaintiff was ordered to leave his
apartment complex, was not permitted to enter to retrieve his personal items, and
was threatened with arrest if he returned.
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170. Due to the actions of Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and
Howard, Plaintiff’s life was put in danger and he was forced to flee his apartment,
Atlanta, and ultimately reside in a series of safe houses.
171. Plaintiff had been informed that by law enforcement sources that his life was
in danger. Investigators with the City of Atlanta Office of Professional Standards
acknowledged that it was not safe for Plaintiff to be anywhere within the Atlanta
city limits.
172. Mobs—significantly, in no small part being composed of by members of the
Bloods street gang—had taken possession of part of the city.
173. This Blood-controlled, Autonomous Zone was about a fifteen-minute drive
miles away from Plaintiff’s Apartment and Plaintiff was receiving death threats.
174. Plaintiff’s name had been publicized widely by Defendants Howard and
Bottoms. Further, each of these Defendant’s stated that Plaintiff had committed
a crime based on misrepresentations of facts, which were demonstrably false,
based upon widely available video evidence and information readily available to
the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office, the City of Atlanta Police
Department, as well as Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and
Howard.
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175. This was done with no regard for the likelihood of danger to Plaintiff ’s life,
safety, and well being.
176. Given the environment in which the events took place, it was apparent that any
publication of Plaintiff’s name would place him at risk of injury—literally,
Atlanta was burning and the National Guard had been deployed.
177. The foreseeable and predictable outcome of these public pronunciations of
wrongdoing, guilt, and Plaintiff ’s identity was, of course, that he was put at
immediate risk of bodily injury and loss of life.
178. Plaintiff was forced to abandon his property in order to protect life and limb
and was afforded neither a meaningful opportunity to be heard, nor notice.
179. The acts of the Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard
served no legitimate government interest and were arbitrary and capricious.
180. Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard each had made
statements based on facts they knew, or should have known, were false.
181. To the extent that the statements made by Defendants Hannah, Shields,
Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard were false, motivated by animus, served no
legitimate government purpose, said acts were outside the course and scope of
their respective employment.
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182. The Defendants’ each made clear that their motivations were based on emotion,
anger, sadness, or racial motivations.
183. No rational or reasonable actor in the position of Defendants Hannah, Shields,
Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard would have acted in a like manner.
184. The acts complained of herein were in clear violation of both substantive and
procedural due process as well as the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
185. Directly and proximately due to the acts of Defendants, Plaintiff was deprived
of his property and it was constructively seized absent substantive or procedural
due process.
COUNT TWO
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Reputational Injury – Stigma Plus Against Defendants Howard and Bottoms)
186. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-165 as if fully restated here.
187. Defendants Howard and Bottoms embarked upon a vitriolic public campaign
designed to damage the personal reputation of the Plaintiff and which deprived
Plaintiff of property rights to which he is legally entitled in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
188. These statements are quoted above in paragraphs 71 - 136. Each of these
statements was false, made with knowledge of falsity, or with reckless disregard
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to the truth, and impugned Plaintiff’s competence as a law enforcement office,
accusing him of criminality: each was defamatory per se.
189. These statements were the proximate cause of Plaintiff, literally, fleeing for his
life. They resulted in the loss of personal property as well as Plaintiff’s home.
190. Defendants Howard and Bottoms false statements arbitrarily and illegally
deprived Plaintiff of his property rights, absent due process. Further, the
defamatory campaign of Defendants Howard and Bottoms deprived Plaintiff of
two distinct liberty interests: his interest in his chosen home and his residency in
a particular locale, Atlanta.
191. Defendants Howard and Bottoms were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
rights.
192. Plaintiff has suffered damage to reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, mental
and emotional anguish and distress and violation of right to free speech as
protected under the Constitution as well as other compensatory damages, in an
amount to be determined by a jury and the Court.
193. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed by the Defendants’ unlawful, retaliatory
and defamatory actions.
194. To the extent that the statements made by Defendants Bottoms and Howard
were false, motivated by animus and or political ambition and served no
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legitimate government purpose, said acts were outside the course and scope of
their respective employment.
195. The Plaintiff prays for compensatory and uncapped punitive damages,
attorneys’ fees, expert fees, costs, per se damages, and pre-judgement and post-
judgement interest against Defendants Howard, and Bottoms.
COUNT THREE
Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments—Through False Arrest

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and
Howard
196. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-165 as if set forth fully herein, and states
further:
197. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard secured arrest warrants, under
process of law, for Plaintiff charging him with Felony Murder O.C.G.A. §16-5-
1, Aggravated Assault, O.C.G.A. §16-5-21, Criminal Damage to Property in the
First Degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22, and Violation of Oath by Public Officer
O.C.G.A. §16-10-1.
198. Specifically, Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard acting individually
and in concert, knowingly withheld and misrepresented material and exculpatory
facts which vitiated probable cause for arrest.
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199. Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard were aware of
each and every one of the following facts, but chose to either conceal or
misrepresent them, in spite of the fact that individually and collectively the facts
vitiate probable cause: 1, Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff were assaulted, injured,
hospitalized, and had reason to believe that Brooks was extremely dangerous; 2,
that Brooks was extremely intoxicated on numerous substances; 3, that Officer
Brosnan did not have access to a first aid kit; 4, that Officer Brosnan never
“stood” on Brooks, nor did anything that would constitute Aggravated Assault
under Georgia law, 5. That Plaintiff never kicked Brooks, and 6. That Plaintiff
and Officer Brosnan called for EMS immediately and administered first aid to
Brooks, including CPR, until they were relieved by EMS.
200. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard were not acting in the roles of, or
course of, prosecuting criminal charges against Plaintiff when they secured arrest
warrants for Plaintiff.
201. To the extent that Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard secured an arrest
warrant for Plaintiff that lacked probable cause, said actions were outside the
course and scope of their employment.
202. At all times while pursuing and securing criminal charges and arrest warrants
against Plaintiff, Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard were acting as
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criminal investigators making a decision whether or not to initiate criminal
charges.
203. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard misrepresented, misstated, and
concealed material facts, which were exculpatory. Further, these three defendants
caused a warrant to be issued on materially false inculpatory statements. At all
times, these defendants knew or should have known that the statements were false
and that the statements vitiated probable cause.
204. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard knew or should have known that:
1, Officer Brosnan’s squad car did not have a first aid kit; 2, that Plaintiff and
Brosnan immediately called for medical assistance; 3, that immediately upon
recovering a first aid kit from Officer Rolfe’s patrol car, first aid was
administered; 4, that a total of one minute twenty-nine seconds passed during
which time the scene was secured, medical assistance was called, and Officer
Rolfe secured a first aid kit; and 5, that any “failure to provide assistance” was
neither willful nor intentional.
205. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard knew or should have known that
Officer Brosnan neither “stood” on the chest, shoulders, nor arm of Brooks, but
instead placed a foot on Brooks’ arm to secure the TASER Brooks had robbed
from Plaintiff and fired at Plaintiff and Officer Rolfe.
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Plaintiff did not kick Brooks.
Brooks violently and feloniously assaulted both Officer Brosnan and Plaintiff.
Further, Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard knew or should have known
that Officer Brosnan had been hit with such force as to cause a concussion and
had been shot with the TASER which Brooks had stolen as well as the fact that
Brooks had punched Plaintiff in the face.
Plaintiff’s conduct was authorized under Georgia law to wit; O.C.G.A. § 16-3-
20, O.C.G.A. §16-3-21& O.C.G.A. §17-4-20.
209. As a result of the maliciously procured arrest warrants which lacked probable
cause, Plaintiff was deprived of his liberty and imprisoned at the Fulton County
Jail without bond. This was particularly humiliating for Plaintiff as he had
brought actual criminals to that very same jail. Plaintiff had to be transferred to
another jail and kept in solitary confinement to protect him.
210. At the time Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard secured said warrants,
they lacked probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed the crimes of
Felony Murder O.C.G.A. §16-5-1, Aggravated Assault, O.C.G.A. §16-5-21 and
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Violation of Oath by Public Officer O.C.G.A. §16-10-1 of any violation of
Georgia law.
211. At the time Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard secured said warrants,
they were aware that probable cause did not exist to charge Plaintiff with Felony
Murder O.C.G.A. §16-5-1, Aggravated Assault, O.C.G.A. §16-5-21 and
Violation of Oath by Public Officer O.C.G.A. §16-10-1 or any violation of
Georgia law.
212. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard maliciously, in personal spite or in
a general disregard of the right consideration of mankind, directed by chance
against Plaintiff, pursued and secured arrest warrants against Plaintiff.
213. Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard lacked any good faith basis to
believe that probable cause existed to support criminal charges against Plaintiff.
214. As a direct and proximate cause of the actions of each defendant acting
individually and all defendant’s working in concert, Plaintiff was wrongfully
arrested, suffered and continues to suffer the injuries described above.
215. At all relevant times, Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard were acting
under the color of state law, and with reckless disregard for the truth, and
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights,
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either misrepresented or concealed material facts resulting in the wrongful arrest
of Plaintiff.
216. No reasonable, prosecutor, investigator, or district attorney would have
believed that the conduct of Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard set forth
in this count was lawful or constitutional.
217. The above acts resulted in both a denial of due process and a constitutionally
unreasonable seizure and no reasonable actor would be unaware of this.
COUNT FOUR
False Arrest Per O.C.G.A. §51-7-1, et seq. Against Defendants Hannah,

Rucker, and Howard
218. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the paragraphs 1-165 as if set forth fully
herein, and states further.
219. Defendants caused the false arrest of Plaintiff by committing the acts
specifically complained of in paragraphs 1-165 above.
220. To the extent that Defendants Hannah, Rucker, and Howard pursued and
obtained an arrest warrant against Plaintiff through false and misleading
statements and or pursued criminal charges in the absence of probable cause, said
acts were outside the course and scope of their respective employment.
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221. Defendants’ actions caused damages to Plaintiff including but not limited to
loss of income, and loss of and damage to their professional reputations, as well
as mental and emotional anguish.
COUNT FIVE
Ratification Against Defendant Howard
222. Plaintiffs restate paragraphs 1-165, as if fully restated here.
223. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-12 details liability for ratifying a tort.
224. Through his public comments, it is clear that Defendant Howard ratified the
tortious actions of Defendant Hannah, for his own benefit specifically including
but not limited to political gain and advancement of his career.
225. Defendant Howard ratified the tortious actions of Defendant Hannah by
failing to properly investigate or pursue any effort to examine the evidence
available to him in an effort to confirm that the charges against Plaintiff were
based upon probable cause.
226. Defendant Howard had full knowledge of all material facts that the arrest of
Plaintiffs was based on an insufficient investigation.
227. Defendant Howard remained willfully ignorant or purposefully did not seek
further information before ratifying the unlawful arrest of Plaintiff despite that
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true and accurate information was readily ascertainable upon diligent effort to
investigate the events leading to Plaintiffs’ unlawful arrests.
228. The facts contained herein demonstrate that Defendant Howard’s conduct
would cause inequity to others if Defendant Howard were allowed to assert that
he has not ratified the unauthorized acts of Defendant Hannah.
229. To the extent that Defendants Howard’s actions ratified improper and or
unlawful said acts were outside the course and scope of his employment.
230. Defendant Howard’s actions caused damages to Plaintiff including but not
limited to loss of income, and loss of and damage to their professional
reputations, as well as mental and emotional anguish.
COUNT SIX
Ratification Against Defendant Bottoms
232. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-12 details the liability for ratifying a tort.
233. Through her public comments, it is clear that Defendant Bottoms ratified the
tortious actions of Defendant Shields, for her own benefit specifically including
but not limited to political gain and advancement of her career.
234. Defendant Bottoms knew Plaintiff was terminated in violation of his due
process rights and facilitated his termination.
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235. To the extent that Defendants Bottoms’ actions ratified improper and or
unlawful said acts were outside the course and scope of her employment.
236. Defendant Bottoms’ actions caused damages to Plaintiff including but not
limited to loss of income, and loss of and damage to his professional reputation,
as well as mental and emotional anguish.
COUNT SEVEN
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
GEORGIA CONSTITUTION
238. Defendants Howard’s, Rucker’s and Hannah’s actions in securing arrest
warrants for Plaintiff without sufficient probable cause constitute unreasonable
seizures in violation of Plaintiff’s federal and state constitutional rights.
239. Defendants Howard, Rucker, and Hannah violated clearly established law, as
no reasonable officer could have believed that it was lawful to prosecute Plaintiff
under the facts set forth herein.
240. To the extent that the actions of Defendant Hannah, Shields, Rucker, Bottoms,
and Howard were unlawful, intentionally focused on violating Plaintiff’s
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constitutional rights, and malicious and or wanton, said acts were outside the
scope of their respective employment.
241. The actions of Defendants Howard, Rucker, and Hannah were the proximate
cause of the harm suffered by Plaintiff.
COUNT EIGHT
CIVIL CONSPIRACY AS TO DEFENDANTS

HANNAH, SHIELDS, BOTTOMS, RUCKER, AND HOWARD
243. Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard conspired, in
concert with each other and others not yet known to Plaintiff, to deprive Plaintiff
of his constitutional rights under the United States and Georgia Constitutions to
be free from unreasonable seizures.
244. Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard knew or should
have known their conduct arbitrarily deprived Plaintiff of life, liberty, or property
guaranteed them by the Constitutions and laws of the United States and the State
of Georgia.
245. Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and Howard have been
stubbornly litigious and are liable for attorney’s fees.
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247. The Plaintiffs pray for compensatory and uncapped punitive damages,
judgement interest against Defendants Hannah, Shields, Bottoms, Rucker, and
Howard in their individual capacities.
COUNT NINE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment—Negligent Training and Supervision
Monell Claims Against Fulton County, Georgia and the City of Atlanta,
Georgia.
248. Plaintiff restates and realleges paragraphs 1-165 of this Complaint as if set
forth here at length.
249. Plaintiff restates and realleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if
set forth here at length.
250. Fulton County and the City of Atlanta, either intentionally, or by deliberate
indifference, created a de facto policy, practice, or custom of condemning police
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officers absent due process of law. Each Defendant knew or should have known
that such constitutional violations were occurring or were likely to occur.
251. Each Defendant, by and through its final policy maker, was acting under color
of state law during the periods relevant to this Count.
252. The City of Atlanta, by and through its final policy maker, Mayor Bottoms,
created an environment where due process was refused police officers accused of
certain misconduct, namely excessive force. Mayor Bottoms not only knew of this
practice and the high likelihood of clear constitutional violation, but actively
participated in the process and encouraged others to do the same.
253. Prior to any investigation, of any sort, Mayor Bottoms caused Officer Brosnan
to be put on administrative duties without pay and fired Plaintiff.
254. Prior to any investigation, Mayor Bottoms began making the national news
“rounds”; during this press blitz, Mayor Bottoms identified both Officer Brosnan
and Officer Rolfe—this occurred less than 24 hours after the incident.
255. There was a de facto seizure of significant portions of Officer Brosnan’s
property which can be directly traced to the custom, culture, and practices which
Mayor Bottoms actively encouraged and participated in.
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256. Due to the actions of Bottoms, and the lack of training, supervision, and
policies of the City of Atlanta, Officer Brosnan lost all meaningful possessory
interest in his apartment as well as personal property contained therein.
257. More specifically, and by way of an example only, the City of Atlanta failed
to properly train Defendant Shields on the required and ministerial acts required
of a City of Atlanta Police Chief concerning the discipline of City of Atlanta
Police Officers as required by the duly passed municipal ordinances of the City
of Atlanta.
258. More specifically, and by way of an example only, the City of Atlanta failed
to properly supervise Defendant Shields as she administered discipline on
Plaintiff and other similarly situated City of Atlanta Police Officers.
259. Comments made by Mayor Bottoms related at length above, condemned
Plaintiff prior to both a completed investigation, of either the Office of Fulton
County District Attorney, or the GBI.
260. As a result of both the direct acts of Mayor Bottoms, as a final decision and
policy maker, and the policies, practices and customs of the City of Atlanta,
Plaintiff was forced to abandon his apartment to protect his own life; his life was
only in danger due to the publication of his name and the public pronouncement
of his guilt by Bottoms and other city officials.
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261. Plaintiff had no meaningful opportunity to be heard and was deprived of this
property and his good name, absent due process.
262. Defendant City of Atlanta demonstrated this pattern, practice, and custom in
terminating Investigators Streeter and Gardner approximately ten days earlier in
complete contravention of their due process rights as guaranteed under the duly
passed municipal ordinances of the City of Atlanta and their rights under the
United States and Georgia Constitutions.
263. Fulton County, either intentionally, or by deliberate indifference, created a de
facto policy, practice, or custom of condemning police officers absent due
process of law. Each Defendant knew or should have known that such
constitutional violations were occurring or were likely to occur.
264. Each Defendant, by and through its final policy maker, was acting under color
of state law during the periods relevant to this Count.
265. Plaintiff had no meaningful opportunity to be heard and was deprived of this
property, and his good name, absent due process.
266. Fulton County acting through the final decision maker, Defendant Howard,
each failed to provide policies, training, or supervision to prevent predictable
constitutional violations. Each of the final policy makers of each of these bodies
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knew or should have known of the violations which occurred or were likely to
occur.
267. Fulton County placed training responsibilities for county employees tasked
with investigatory tasks in the hands of Defendant Howard. Defendant Howard
was likewise the final decision maker for the training of County-employee
Assistant District Attorneys and Investigators.
268. Fulton County’s final decision and policy making body is the Board of
Commissioners; the final decision maker of the Fulton County District
Attorney’s Office at the relevant time was D.A. Howard.
269. The Fulton County Board of Commissioners, not only failed to put in place
proper supervision, policies, and customs, but also actively put forth policy
statements which created an environment which encouraging other county-level
actors to act in a like manner.
270. Specifically, the Fulton County Board of Commissioner’s passed a resolution
stating:
WHEREAS, minorities, not only in history, but in our current

time, have consistently been devalued and dehumanized by
authorities in the criminal justice system; WHEREAS, on June
12, 2020, the murder of another unarmed black man, Rayshard
Brooks, while fleeing from the police with a non-lethal weapon
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in his hand, immediately upon the heels of the death of George

Floyd, also at the hands of law enforcement . . . 8
271. The actions, customs, lack of training, and policies created by Fulton County
by and through its final decision and policy makers proximately caused numerous
constitutional violations, which were the natural consequence of that custom,
lack of training, lack of supervision, and enactment of policy.
272. None of the actions complained of in the instant Count were reasonable, and
no reasonable actor in a situation similar to that of the final decisionmaker would
fail to supervise and train, or put in place policies and customs of the sort
complained of herein.
273. Fulton County, by and through its final decisionmaker Defendant Howard,
failed to supervise and train employees adequately. This occurred not in their
training as prosecutors, but instead was the result of training and supervision
related to investigatory functions.
274. Further, there existed a public and stated policy of “speedy investigations,”
which were not only constitutionally inadequate, but involved the concealment
of exculpatory evidence, fabrication of evidence, and misrepresentation of
evidence.
8
See, supra, n. 10
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275. Defendant Howard knew, or should have known, that his staff was violating
the rights of certain accused parties, because of the investigatory policies and
customs he encouraged.
276. Defendant Howard specifically encouraged hasty investigations and dubious
investigatory policies in cases where he believed it politically advantageous to
effect an arrest and garner positive media attention.
277. Further, Defendant Howard actively encouraged emotionally involved
investigators to work on investigations that involved perceived damage done to
their community. As Defendant Howard stated in an interview with Andrea
Mitchell on MSNBC on June 18, 2020, that he and his staff had:
visceral reactions when we saw the videotape of a surveillance tape sh

owing the kick and showing Officer Brosnan standing on the body of
Mr. Brooks. I could not imagine a circumstance that would illustrate a
more total lack of respect for him and for what he represented. But
you've also got to consider not only were they disrespecting Mr.
Brooks, this action took place in an open parking lot at a restaurant
where people were out filming them, and the officers, apparently that
did not mean anything to them.
278. Defendant Howard encouraged an “us” and “them” adversarial investigatory
process that stripped investigators of objectivity and placed racial tensions and
broader social tensions to the forefront.
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279. Investigators were allowed, if not encouraged, in an ends-justify-the-means
practice, to reach a desired outcome regardless of objective evidence—Defendant
Hannah in particular acted to suppress exculpatory evidence and to misrepresent
fact in order to secure an arrest warrant and ultimately charges, both without
probable cause.
280. As a direct and proximate cause of the lack of training, lack of supervision,
and of the policies and customs of Fulton County, Plaintiff was denied his rights
in clear violation of the Constitution of the United States.
281. As a direct and proximate result of the policies and customs, as well as due to
the lack of supervision and training, of each of the Defendants, Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated in two distinct ways: 1, his property was seized
absent due process; and 2, his good name and reputation were damaged absent
due process.
282. The damage done to Plaintiff’s good name directly impacted his finances, his
ability to secure employment, and did him economic harm. Each of these results
was foreseeable. Even full expungement of all records of his arrest and charges
under Georgia law will not prevent any law enforcement agency, licensing board,
or security clearance investigation from learning about his arrest and charges.
Further, the media records of the events will forever be available on the internet.
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283. The acts complained of caused damages to Plaintiff including but not limited
to loss of income, and loss of and damage to their professional reputations, as
well as mental and emotional anguish.
COUNT TEN
CONSPIRACY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 RESULTING IN

VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT
HANNAH, SHIELDS, RUCKER, BOTTOMS AND HOWARD
284. Plaintiff restates paragraphs 1-165, as if fully restated here.
285. Plaintiff was deprived of the liberty guaranteed him by the Constitutions and
laws of the United States and State of Georgia by Defendants acting in
concert under the color of law.
286. Defendants knew or should have known that their actions arbitrarily deprived
Plaintiffs of life, liberty, or property.
COUNT ELEVEN
Denial of Equal Protection Claim against Defendants Shields and Bottoms
288. Plaintiff restates paragraphs 1-165, as if fully restated here.
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289. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to equal protection and equal treatment under
the law.
290. Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to equal protection by, among other
things, subjecting Plaintiff to discriminatory and disparate treatment not
otherwise imposed on similarly situated persons, more specifically, taking action
to separate him from employment without a thorough investigation and in
violation of numerous policies and procedures of the City of Atlanta Police
Department and duly passed ordinances of the City of Atlanta.
291. More specifically, and as one example only, an Atlanta Police Lieutenant,
charged with felony charges on another Atlanta Police Officer was permitted to
continue working pending resolution of the criminal charges.
292. Defendants Shields and Bottoms subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment and
discriminatory rules and regulations not otherwise imposed on similarly situated
individuals by failing to follow established procedures, policies, and duly passed
City of Atlanta municipal ordinances including, but not limited to 114-530.
293. More particularly, Defendants Shields and Bottoms wrongly disciplined
Plaintiff.
294. Defendants Shields and Bottoms had no rational basis for the punishment.
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295. At all times relevant hereto, the law was clearly established that the actions of
Defendants Shields and Bottoms violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to wit: Plaintiff
had a property right interest in his employment, could only be terminated for
cause, and was entitled to procedural due process prior to termination pursuant
to duly passed City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinances including, but not limited
to 114-530.
296. Defendants Shields and Bottoms undertook all of the unlawful conduct giving
rise to the Plaintiff’s claims while acting under color of State and local law and
within the course and scope of their employment.
297. Defendants Shields and Bottoms failed to perform ministerial acts in
connection with the denial of rights to Plaintiff including but not limited to:
a. Failing to follow City of Atlanta Police Policies which required a full
investigation of the incidents outlined here by the City of Atlanta Police
Department’s Office of Professional Standards;
b. Failing to interview Plaintiff as a part of a thorough administrative
investigation; and
c. Failing to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the allegations
of misconduct lodged against him.
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298. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed by Defendants’ unlawful actions.
299. Defendants Shields and Bottoms acted intentionally and with callous
disregard for Plaintiff’ known statutory and constitutional rights.
300. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of Defendants Shields and
Bottoms, Plaintiff has been deprived of rights to which he was entitled and
suffered loss of income and revenue as a result thereof.
301. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed by the unlawful, retaliatory and
defamatory actions of Defendants Shields and Bottoms.
302. As a direct and proximate result of the policies and customs, as well as due to
the lack of supervision and training, of each of the Defendants, Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated in two distinct ways: 1, his property was seized
absent due process; and 2, his good name and reputation were damaged absent
due process.
303. The damage done to Plaintiff’s good name directly impacted his finances, his
ability to secure employment, and did him economic harm. Each of these results
was foreseeable. Even full expungement of all records of his arrest and charges
under Georgia law will not prevent any law enforcement agency, licensing board,
or security clearance investigation from learning about his arrest and charges.
Further, the media records of the events will forever be available on the internet.
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304. As direct and proximate results of the actions of Defendants Shields and
Bottoms, the Plaintiff suffered damages including financial damage, emotional
distress, mental anguish, inconvenience, loss of income and benefits, humiliation,
and other indignities.
305. Defendants Shields and Bottoms denied Plaintiff the equal protection of the
law through an unconstitutional and improperly established policy put in place
following the terminations of City of Atlanta Police Investigators Gardner and
Streeter who were terminated without an investigation, in violation of numerous
policies and procedures of the City of Atlanta Police Department and duly passed
City of Atlanta municipal ordinances including, but not limited to 98-28 & 114-
530.
306. Defendants Shields and Bottoms established a custom, policy, custom, and
practice of disregarding the established policies, procedures and duly passed City
of Atlanta Ordinances to terminate law enforcement officers during high profile
cases to further their political standing.
307. To the extent that Defendants Shields and Bottoms acted in reckless disregard
for Plaintiff’s rights, acted with specific intent to harm, and or failed to fulfill
ministerial obligations set out in duly passed municipal ordinances of the City of
Atlanta, said actions were outside the scope of their employment.
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308. Plaintiff prays for compensatory attorneys’ fees, expert fees, costs, and per se
damages against Defendants Shields and Bottoms.
309. Defendant Bottoms’ conduct was intentional, reckless, and malicious. The
Plaintiff prays for punitive damages, without limits against Defendant Bottoms
in her individual capacity.
310. Defendant Shields’ conduct was intentional, reckless and malicious. The
Plaintiff prays for punitive damages, without limits against Defendant Shields in
her individual capacity.
COUNT TWELVE
Deprivation of Reputation Liberty

(Reputational Injury – Stigma Plus Against Defendants Howard and Bottoms)
312. Defendants Howard and Bottoms embarked upon a vitriolic public campaign
designed to damage the personal reputation of Plaintiff and deprive Plaintiff of
property rights to which he is legally entitled in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
313. Plaintiff, having achieved the status of a “non-probationary employee” and
employee in the “classified service” pursuant to City of Atlanta Municipal code
114-84(d), 114-502, 114-516, 114-517, 114-518, 114-528(a), and 114-546, had
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a legally protected property right in his employment and could only be terminated
or disciplined for cause.
314. Defendant Bottoms’ actions as outlined herein constitute clear violations of
her obligations under City of Atlanta Ordinance, specifically 98-26 which solely
vest the police chief with the right to terminate a City of Atlanta Police Officer,
and subject her to removal from office.
315. Defendant Bottoms was acting as the final decision and policy maker for the
City of Atlanta in each and every statement made. Her statements represented
those of the City.
316. Defendant Bottoms was acting as the final decision and policy maker for the
City of Atlanta in each and every statement made. Her statements represented
those of the City.
317. These statements, quoted above, were false, made with knowledge of falsity,
or with reckless disregard to the truth, and impugned Plaintiff’s competence as a
law enforcement officer, accusing him of criminality: each was defamatory per
se.
318. These statements were the proximate cause of Plaintiff, literally, fleeing for his
life. They resulted in the loss of personal property as well as Plaintiff’s home.
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319. Defendants Howard and Bottoms false statements arbitrarily and illegally
deprived Plaintiff of his property rights, absent due process. Further, the
defamatory campaign of Defendants Howard and Bottoms deprived Plaintiff of
two distinct liberty interests: his interest in his chosen home and his residency in
a particular locale, Atlanta.
320. Defendants Howard and Bottoms were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’
rights.
321. Plaintiff has suffered damage to reputation, humiliation, embarrassment,
mental, emotional anguish and distress, loss of liberty and property interests
protected by the Constitution.
322. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed by the Defendants’ unlawful, malicious,
and defamatory actions.
323. The Plaintiff prays for compensatory and uncapped putative damages,
judgement interest against Defendants Howard, and Bottoms.
324. Defendants Howard and Bottoms arbitrarily and illegally deprived Plaintiff of
his property rights and undertook all of the unlawful conduct giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claims while acting under color of State and local law.
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325. Defendants Howard and Bottoms were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
rights.
326. Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, damage to reputation, embarrassment,
mental and emotional anguish and distress and violation of right to free speech
as protected under the Constitution as well as other compensatory damages, in an
amount to be determined by a jury and the Court.
327. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed by the unlawful, retaliatory, reckless,
and defamatory actions of Defendants Howard and Bottoms which were
undertaken with actual malice.
328. The statements made by Defendant Bottoms at the June 14th and June 15th
press conferences and in speaking engagements following the press conference,
regarding Plaintiff, deprived Plaintiff of his reputational liberty rights as
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
329. The statements made by Defendant Howard at the June 17th press conference
and in speaking engagements following the press conference, regarding Plaintiff,
deprived Plaintiff of his reputational liberty rights as protected by the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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330. Statements made publicly and to the media by Defendants Howard and
Bottoms were neither required nor necessary to fulfill any official function of
their office and were solely done to intentionally deprive Plaintiff of his
reputational liberty. Such statements include but are not limited to, a report to
the Georgia POST council of Plaintiff’s suspension, which placed his
professional peace officer certificate in jeopardy.
331. Defendants Howard and Bottoms were aware that their actions would lead to
the immediate suspension and or investigation of Plaintiff’s certifications as a
Peace Officer by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council
(POST) thereby having a negative effect on Plaintiff’s professional reputation
and state licensure.
332. The Plaintiff prays for compensatory and uncapped punitive damages,
attorneys’ fees, expert fees, costs, and per se damages against Defendants
Howard and Bottoms.
COUNT THIRTEEN
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS SECURED UNDER GEORGIA CONSITUTION,

ARTICLE I, § 1, ¶ II AGAINST DEFENDANTS SHIELDS AND BOTTOMS
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334. The Georgia Constitution protects the equal protection rights of its citizens,
stating “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
335. This provision requires that “the State treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner,” Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844, 846 (2005). Further, Georgia
courts have consistently treated individuals who perform the same work as being
similarly situated in regard to equal protection. 9
336. In this case, the ranks of the Atlanta Police Department are replete with
officers who engaged in similar conduct and faced similar allegations as Plaintiff
but who were not terminated from their employment, let alone terminated without
proper procedure. This includes an Atlanta Police Lieutenant charged with
Aggravated Assault who was permitted to continue working pending the
resolution of the criminal charges.
337. Defendants Shields and Bottoms deliberately violated Plaintiff’s rights by
denying him the due process guaranteed to him by the policies and procedures
of the City of Atlanta Police Department and the duly passed City of Atlanta
Municipal Ordinances including, but not limited to 98-28 & 114-530.
338. Defendants Shields and Bottoms were following an unwritten custom,
policy, and practice put in place following the termination of City of Atlanta
9
See Jackson et al. v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 736 (2020).
79 of 88
Police Investigators Mark Gardner and Ivory Streeter to wit: termination of
police officers accused of misconduct in high visibility events without affording
them due process and bypassing the due process guaranteed by the policies and
procedures of the City of Atlanta Police Department and the duly passed City of
Atlanta Municipal Ordinances including, but not limited to 98-28 & 114-530.
339. Defendants Bottoms and Shields implemented and enforced this
unconstitutional custom, policy, and practice for political gain.
340. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants Bottoms’ and Shields’
actions, Plaintiff suffered irreparable harm.
341. Plaintiff prays for compensatory attorneys’ fees, expert fees, costs, and per
se damages against Defendants Shields and Bottoms.
COUNT FOURTEEN
ALLEGATIONS REGARDING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY OF
DEFENDANT CITY OF ATLANTA
Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, and Practices-Monell Liability
343. At all times relevant to the events described in this complaint the City of
Atlanta Police and the City of Atlanta and in particular Defendants Shields and
Bottoms had a custom, policy and/or practice to ignore duly passed municipal
ordinances of the City of Atlanta, including, but not limited to, 98-28 and 114-
80 of 88
530, and established policies and procedures to terminate officers accused of
excessive force without affording them procedural due process.
344. Among other examples to be proven at trial are:
a. Investigator Mark Gardner was terminated within twenty-four (24) hours
following an accusation of excessive force on May 31, 2020 without an
investigation by the Office of Professional Standards as required by police
policy namely City of Atlanta Police Policy APD. SOP. 2020 “Disciplinary
Process” and without having an opportunity to respond to the allegations
against him as set out in City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinance 114-530;
b. Investigator Ivory Streeter was terminated within twenty-four (24) hours
following an accusation of excessive force on May 31, 2020 without an
investigation by the Office of Professional Standards as required by police
policy namely City of Atlanta Police Policy APD. SOP. 2020 “Disciplinary
Process” and without having an opportunity to respond to the allegations
against him as set out in City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinance 114-530;
c. Defendant Bottoms set out an unconstitutional custom and practice on or
about June 1, 2020 setting forth that officers accused of excessive force
would be fired immediately;
81 of 88
d. Defendant Bottoms’ actions as outlined herein constitute clear violations of
her obligations under City of Atlanta Ordinance, specifically 98-26 which
solely vest the police chief with the right to terminate a City of Atlanta Police
Officer, and subject her to removal from office.
345. The termination of Plaintiff described herein was conducted pursuant to
unconstitutional official policies of the Atlanta Police Department and the office
of the mayor which authorized and ratified the unlawful termination of officers
accused of using excessive force in violation of their due process rights as set out
in written policies and procedures and duly passed City of Atlanta Municipal
Ordinances.
346. As described herein, the policy of depriving officers accused of using
excessive force of their rights under the city code was widespread and well-
known within the APD and the Office of the Mayor and widely tolerated.
347. Prior to the conduct described herein, the City of Atlanta was aware of
pervasive violations of employee due process in the termination of officers
accused of excessive force violations as set forth in the examples of Investigators
Gardner and Streeter.
348. Despite knowledge of these pervasive Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations the City of Atlanta acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of
82 of 88
persons, namely employees such as Plaintiff, with whom Defendants Shields and
Bottoms would come into contact by failing to provide appropriate training,
guidance and discipline to Defendants Shields and Bottoms regarding the
policies, procedures, and duly passed City of Atlanta Municipal Ordinances
including, but not limited to 98-28 & 114-530.
349. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants Shields, as an employee
of the City of Atlanta, was acting under the direction and control of APD and was
acting pursuant to the official custom, policy and/or practice of the City of
Atlanta.
350. As chief of police, Defendant Shields was a policy and decisionmaker
responsible for establishing, perpetuating, and implementing this
unconstitutional custom and practice.
351. As the Mayor and chief executive officer of the City of Atlanta, Defendant
Bottoms was a policy and decisionmaker responsible for establishing,
perpetuating, and implementing this unconstitutional custom and practice.
352. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the City of Atlanta as set forth
herein, the Plaintiff suffered physical injury, mental anguish, lost wages, and
other general and special damages in connection with the deprivation of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
83 of 88
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and protected by 42 U.S.C.
§1983 and are thereby entitled to a judgment against the City of Atlanta for those
damages and injuries suffered.
COUNT FIFTEEN
Punitive Damages
353. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if set forth
fully herein, and states further:
354. Defendants Hannah, Howard, Rucker, and Bottoms acted with specific intent
to harm Plaintiff.
355. Defendants Hannah, Howard, Rucker, and Bottoms acted with wanton and
reckless disregard of the consequences of their tortious actions.
356. As noted herein, Defendants Hannah, Howard, Rucker, and Bottoms acted
maliciously, intentionally, and with complete indifference as to the damage
which was likely to occur and to the injuries which actually did befall Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff respectfully request the following relief:
A. That all Defendants be served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint in this
case;
84 of 88
B. That all Defendants be required to timely answer the allegations and averments
contained in the Complaint;
C. Declaratory judgement that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights;
D. Compensatory damages against Defendants in an amount in excess of seventy-five
thousand dollars ($75,000) to be determined at trial by jury;
E. For an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1920; and, O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11;
F. Punitive damages against Defendants Bottoms, Shields, Hannah, and Howard -all
individual defendants-as to all applicable Counts;
G. A trial by jury upon all claims and matters for which a jury can be empaneled;
H. Award to Plaintiff, from the Defendants, all the monetary damages to which he is
entitled, in order to fully compensate him for the harms inflicted upon him; and
I. Award such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper.
This 10th day of June, 2022.
LoRusso Law Firm, P.C.
By: /s/ Lance J. LoRusso

Lance J. LoRusso
Georgia Bar No. 458023
Ken Davis
85 of 88
1827 Powers Ferry Road, S.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30339
Phone: 770-644-2738
Fax: 770-644-2379
lance@lorussolawfirm.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
THIS DOCUMENT APPEARS IN TIMES NEW ROMAN 14 POINT FONT.
86 of 88
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
GARRETT ROLFE *
*
Plaintiffs, *
* Civil Action
v. * File #_______________
*
KEISHA LANCE BOTTOMS, in her * JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Individual AND Official Capacities *
as Mayor of the City of Atlanta, Georgia *
PAUL HOWARD, in his *
individual AND official capacities, *
and ERIKA SHIELDS, *
in her Individual AND *
Official Capacities *
CLINT RUCKER, in his Individual *
and official capacities *
Donald Hannah II, in his individual *
and Official Capacities *
The City of Atlanta, Georgia, *
Fulton County, Georgia *
*
Defendants. *
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I electronically filed the within and foregoing with the Clerk of
Court using the CM/ECF system.
87 of 88
This 10th day of June, 2022.
LoRusso Law Firm, P.C.

By: /s/Lance J. LoRusso_____
Lance J. LoRusso
Ken Davis
1827 Powers Ferry Road, S.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30339
Phone: 770-644-2738
Fax: 770-644-2379
lance@lorussolawfirm.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
88 of 88

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Case 1:22-mi-99999-UNA Document 1838 Filed 06/10/22 Page 1 of 88

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Lance Bottoms, Donald Hannah II (Hereinafter “Hannah”), Paul Howard, Erika

states the following in support thereof:

This is a civil action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 seeking damages against

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

United States Constitution, as made actionable by 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff’s

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1331 and 28 U.S.C § 1343 (a).

to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within this District.

required by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 by mailing the required notices via statutory

Plaintiff placed Defendants on notice of their claims in substantial compliance

and relevant parties on December 11, 2020.

as required by O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 by mailing the required notices via statutory

Plaintiff placed Defendants on notice of their claims in substantial compliance

individuals, entities, and relevant parties on or about May 5, 2021.

precedent, post-conditions, and conditions subsequent to properly file this suit

including any and all notice requirements and/or exhaustion of remedies.

6. Plaintiff resides in the Northern District of Georgia, and is subject to the

jurisdiction of this court.

operating vehicles under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

of Cobb County, Georgia residing in the Northern District of Georgia; Defendant

Shields is currently a resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky residing

in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff is not providing her home address herein as a

courtesy as Defendant Shields currently serves as the Chief of Police of the

jurisdiction of this Court.

10. Defendant Shields regularly engages in transactions relating to her former

consulting on pending litigation, participating in meetings with counsel for the

City of Atlanta, voluntarily appearing as a witness for the City of Atlanta in

administrative matters consistent with her obligations as a former chief of police.

Officer Standards and Training Council (POST) in good standing. Finally,

Defendant Shields actively engages in efforts to recruit law enforcement officers

request “Join Us In Louisville.” Defendant Shields has, through said recruiting

efforts, established significant contacts with the Northern District of Georgia.

as a defendant in this action. Further, Defendant Shields maintains sufficient

defendant regarding the matters pled herein.

of Georgia. Once served with process, he is subject to the jurisdiction of this

12. At all times relevant, Defendant Howard was acting in a non-prosecutorial

capacity as an employee of Fulton County Georgia.

prosecutorial capacity as an employee of Fulton County Georgia.

14. The City of Atlanta, Georgia (“CITY”) is a municipality organized pursuant to

process, Defendant City of Atlanta is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

employee of Fulton County, Georgia. He is a resident of Fulton County, Georgia

residing in the Northern District of Georgia. Once served with process, he is

subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

relevant times, acting under color of law.

17. Defendant Fulton County, Georgia (the “COUNTY”) is a political subdivision

its purchase of liability insurance.

restaurant located at 125 University Avenue SW, in regard to a suspect, later

identified as Rayshard Brooks, who was reported as being asleep in a vehicle in

the restaurant’s drive-through.

that she believed the subject was intoxicated.

behavior, Officer Brosnan requested the Plaintiff’s assistance.

Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.

throughout the entire encounter.

possess Officer Brosnan’s TASER. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, Possession of

firearms by convicted felons; See also § 16-11-106, Possession of a firearm or

knife during commission of or attempt to commit certain crimes.

for driving under the influence of alcohol.

27. Brooks was a member of a violent criminal street gang.

Atlanta Police Officers.

attempts to arrest Brook.

Plaintiff in the face and committing several counts of felony obstruction of an

officer against the Plaintiff and Officer Brosnan.