A New Perspective

on Rome’s Desert Frontier

Greg Fisher
Department of History
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T5
Canada
greg.fisher@mcgill.ca

While the debate over the origin and purpose of the Limes Arabicus continues, the
widespread and largely peaceful abandonment of its fortifications lacks a convincing
explanation. Did Justinian’s disbandment of the limitanei mark the decisive end of the
limes (after S. T. Parker), or did the Saracen “threat” simply not warrant a fortified
frontier (after D. Graf)? This study offers a new perspective, suggesting that a combi-
nation of elements ensured a precipitate and early abandonment of the limes as, gen-
erations before Justinian, Constantinople neglected its southernmost provinces in favor
of more pressing problems. In the West, persistent instability and the disastrous Vandal
expedition drained Constantinople’s fiscal and military resources; in the East, Persia
preoccupied both diplomats and soldiers. Christian Arab foederati were a practical so-
lution to the low-level threat on the Arabian frontier, alleviating the ongoing demand
for trained soldiers elsewhere in the empire. Finally, contemporary writers suggest that
Constantinople viewed provincia Arabia as a distant periphery.

ince the publication of Brünnow and Von Do- Following an earthquake in a.d. 502, areas of the fort

S maszewski’s Die Provincia Arabia in 1909,

the Roman fortifications in Arabia and Palaes-
tina Tertia—the so-called Limes Arabicus and Limes
Palaestinae—have attracted significant interest from
historians and archaeologists. While discussions have
primarily focused on the purpose of the fortifica-
tions and the nature of the relationship between the
nomadic and sedentary populations of the region,
there has been comparatively little interest in the
widespread abandonment of the military installations
throughout the limes, the frontier district where mar-
ginal farmland, outlying settlements, and the periph-
ery of the o√koumevnh met the desert (Mayerson 1990:
267; 1986: 38–39; Isaac 1988: 125–47).
S. T. Parker’s pivotal survey of the Jordanian fron-
tier, the Limes Arabicus Project, established that the
bulk of the sites in the sector east of the Dead Sea
were peacefully abandoned in the late fifth or early
sixth century (Parker 1986b: 11, 37–86; 1991: 117–
54). The fort of Lejjun, associated with Legio IV
“Martia” (Not. Dign. Or. 37.22; Brünnow and Von
Domaszewski 1905: 36), presents an interesting case.
(including the principia and barracks) were care-
lessly repaired: the final strata of occupation in the
barracks contained collapsed arches and ash lenses;
the barracks, unswept after the earthquake, were
simply floored over with plaster or beaten earth. The
streets of the fort were unswept, littered with ash and
garbage; there was also a burial in one room inside
the fort, suggesting a lack of military discipline and
authority. Stone-robbing appears to have taken place
in the early sixth century, and interestingly, no ce-
ramics of the period 502–552 were recovered from
the fort’s principia. There is little evidence of occu-
pation in the barracks themselves after 500; the res-
idents of the fort seem to have lived in the courtyards.
There is also no indication of the metalworking that
would be required to maintain the garrison’s weap-
ons, and indeed the survey of Lejjun recovered re-
markably few weapons at all (Parker 1986b: 58–79;
1991: 120–21). Parker’s findings naturally raised the
question of the fort’s occupants during its final phase,
and he originally advanced the idea that an ill-disci-
plined and run-down garrison maintained the fort

49
50 GREG FISHER
until 551, when, according to Procopius, Justinian
demobilized the limitanei (Parker 1986b: 74; Pro-
copius, Anecdota 24.12–14). A mid sixth-century
abandonment of Lejjun is, however, problematic, as
Parker himself showed that the fort’s ancillary system
of watchtowers, such as Rujm Beni Yasser, on a hill
near Lejjun, and the protective castellum of Khirbet
el-Fityan, controlling access to Lejjun from the hills
above, were themselves abandoned no later than the
turn of the sixth century. Parker subsequently offered
the earlier date of 500, based on the dramatic change
in occupational conditions after the earthquake in
502 (Parker 1991: 127) but offered little historical
support for the new date. Certainly, the nature of the
late fifth- and early sixth-century occupation does not
imply a military presence, especially if viewed in
light of arguments—particularly those by B. Isaac
and A. H. M. Jones—opposing the view that the late
limitanei were poor-quality, domestic hereditary mi-
litia (Jones 1964: 651–53; Isaac 1988: 139–47). Fur-
thermore, if the policies of Justinian were behind
both the abandonment of the forts throughout the
limes and the disbandment of the limitanei, there is
an obvious discrepancy with the occupational data
from the forts themselves. Indeed, throughout the
limes zone there is wide-ranging evidence for the
early abandonment of camps and forts: for example,
Qasr Bshir was probably vacated in the late fourth
or early fifth century (Kennedy 2004: 150; Parker
1986b: 55); excavations at Yotvata have pointed to-
ward an abandonment date in the late fourth century
(Meshel 1989: 231–33; Kindler 1989: 265–66), while
work at both Humayma and Mezad Tamar point to
abandonment dates in the early fifth century (Oleson
et al. 1999: 415; Gichon 1976b: 84). Occasionally it
is possible to see evidence of a “clean” abandonment,
as is the case at Avdat, which was evacuated at some
point in the fourth century (Erickson-Gini 2002:
118). Few historical arguments have been advanced
to account for this phenomenon, but the early and
apparently peaceful withdrawal from the fortifica-
tions of the southern limes can be explained by look-
ing at events in the wider Empire.
The priorities of the government in Constantino-
ple were not, of course, always concerned with the
periphery of the Empire which was at the limit of the
dry-farming zone and relatively distant from its main
concerns. Indeed, the Empire was distracted by the
constant challenge to juggle the three competing mili-
tary and policy problems facing it: the West, which
included both the Western Empire itself, as well as
BASOR 336
the Vandals; the North, involving the Balkan region,
threatened by the Huns and Goths; and the East, prin-
cipally Persia. The government in Constantinople
was repeatedly forced to ensure peace in two regions
in order to fight a war in the third, but was continu-
ally caught on the wrong foot by opportune invasions
or the results of poor diplomacy, and, despite its best
efforts to avoid such situations, was forced to fight
on multiple fronts (Blockley 1992: 112).
In the first instance, Constantinople’s involve-
ment in the affairs of the Western Empire plagued
the Eastern government with constant obstacles and
frequently drew attention to problems within Byzan-
tium itself. On the surface, Eastern “policy” sought
to strengthen the West as it failed to manage its many
difficulties. For example, the Theodosian Code pur-
ported to offer a joint, united law structure for both
East and West, maintaining a façade of united rule
(Matthews 2000: 4–7); Constantinople sent forces to
reinforce the numerous Western campaigns against
the Vandals (Jones 1964: 204); and the Eastern gov-
ernment sought to strengthen those emperors it rec-
ognized as legitimate—for example, by sending an
expedition to remove the comes domesticorum Gly-
cerius (473–474), who was proclaimed as emperor
but not recognized by Leo (457–474) (Marcellinus
Comes 473–74; Blockley 1992: 80).
Eastern involvement in the West was naturally not
entirely philanthropic, but was intended to reinforce
the primacy of the Byzantine government and pro-
tect its flank from uneven rule in Italy. Interest in
Western affairs, however, sometimes had disastrous
consequences, as the lengthy succession of campaigns
against the Vandals illustrates. In 430, Theodosius II
(408–450) dispatched the magister militum Aspar to
help Western forces, who were under significant pres-
sure from the Vandal king, Gaiseric. Aspar enjoyed
some success, capturing Carthage, although this was
offset by failures elsewhere (Blockley 1992: 60). In
439, another expedition arrived in Sicily, where it
“procrastinated” before returning to the East, having
served only to drain resources, cause supply problems,
and tie down manpower (Rubin 1986: 681). When
Leo succeeded to the Eastern throne in 457, he was
determined to deal with Gaiseric, who had sacked
Sicily and Greece and also abducted the Theodosian
royal women Eudoxia, Eudocia, and Placidia (Pro-
copius, Bellum Vandalicum 3.5.1–3; Theophanes the
Confessor a.m. 5947; John Malalas 14.26). Losing
patience, Leo staved off a threat from the Ostrogoths
in the Balkans with a subsidy (Priscus, in CH 340) and
2004 ROME’S DESERT FRONTIER
negotiated a series of sensitive difficulties with Persia
(Blockley 1992: 74–75) to free up troops and materiel
for an ambitious joint plan between the East and
West to administer a conclusive defeat to the Vandals.
The expedition was a disaster, however, crippling the
Western army and dealing a severe blow to Eastern
forces already overstretched by commitments on the
Danubian and Persian frontiers. According to several
sources, Basiliscus, the expeditionary commander,
accepted bribes from Gaiseric to delay his attack long
enough to allow the Vandals to launch a preemptive
attack with a fleet of fireships. In the resulting en-
gagement, the combined Roman fleet was destroyed
off Cape Bon in 468 (Procopius, Bellum Vandalicum
3.6.1; John Malalas 14.44–45; Theophanes the Con-
fessor a.m. 5961).
It is difficult to overstate the impact of this fail-
ure. The expense alone was staggering—John Lydus
claimed it to be a record, and W. Treadgold has esti-
mated the cost at nearly 9.5 million nomismata, or
nearly 40 percent of the massive treasury surplus left
by Anastasius on his death in 518 (John Lydus 3.43;
Treadgold 1995: 190–93). Staggering, too, were the
losses in manpower and equipment. While a portion
of the Egyptian land army under Heracleius appears
to have escaped (Theophanes the Confessor a.m.
5963), there is no indication in either Procopius or
Priscus that any of the army evaded captivity or re-
turned from the expedition. John Malalas records that
only Basiliscus escaped, in a fast ship; the rest of the
expedition perished in the ambush (John Malalas
14.44). John Lydus recorded the strength of the ex-
pedition at 400,000 men, which Treadgold reckoned
to be plausible based on his reconstruction of con-
temporary pay scales (John Lydus 3.43; Treadgold
1995: 191). Taking the military strength of the entire
Empire on paper in 395 as 645,000 (Treadgold 1995:
89; Jones 1964: 680), the losses incurred at Cape
Bon are astounding, even allowing for the discrep-
ancy in dates and the fact that a large number of the
force were oarsmen recruited for the expedition and
not part of the regular army.1
The huge cost of this failure can be linked to troop
dispositions on the Limes Arabicus. In the lead-up to
1
A useful comparison (Treadgold 1995: 60) is the campaign
of Belisarius in 533, where it is reckoned that of the 48,000 men
involved, only 16,000 were soldiers (6,000 cavalry and 10,000
infantry). It is quite possible that the figure of 645,000 for the
empire in a.d. 395 is far too high; if so, the loss of manpower
from the Vandal expedition may have been even more cata-
strophic than suggested here.
51
the expedition, Leo’s generals were certainly faced
with the challenge of finding sufficient manpower.
One solution was to borrow forces from a peripheral
or over-manned area: the southern limes met both re-
quirements. Based on the Notitia Dignitatum and the
work of A. H. M. Jones, Treadgold has estimated
the “official” strength of the frontier armies of Pal-
estine and Arabia in 395 at about 29,000, while in the
provinces bordering Persia, the numbers were about
the same (Treadgold 1995: 48–49; Jones 1964: 682–
63). Treadgold’s numbers are open to interpreta-
tion, but it is significant, however, that whatever the
actual strength of legions, cohorts, and alae in this
period, the Notitia Dignitatum indicates a certain
degree of parity between the quantities and types of
units assigned to both the northern and southern
regions of the eastern border of the Empire.2 While
relations with the Persians were smoother than usual
in the fifth century, denuding the northern provinces of
their defenses was certainly imprudent. With the ca-
veat that the numbers quoted are estimates of paper
strength for 395, what evidence is there to support
the suggestion that Constantinople withdrew elements
of the Arabian garrison for logistical reasons related
to the Vandal campaign?
I. Shahîd and W. Ball have already linked the sud-
den disappearance of the Salihids, Rome’s primary
Saracen foederati for most of the fifth century, with
the defeat at Cape Bon (Shahîd 1989: 95; Ball 2000:
101). If the Salih joined this expedition, it is highly
unlikely that they were sent unaccompanied by Ro-
man forces from the same area, who usually worked
closely with their Saracen foederati (cf. Mayerson
1991: 291–95). Evidence from Lejjun strongly sup-
ports an earlier reassignment of elements of the Ara-
bian army for Julian’s Persian campaign in 362/363
(Parker, ed. 1987: 816–18; Parker 1980: 874; 2000:
380–81), and intriguing, too, is the lack of coinage
recovered at Lejjun from the period 455–491. While
2
For example, two legions were assigned to each of Arabia
(Not. Dign. Or. 37), Osrhoëne (Not. Dign. Or. 35), and Mesopo-
tamia (Not. Dign. Or. 36); the latter provinces marked the most
easterly border between the Eastern Empire and Persia in a.d.
395. Palestine (Not. Dign. Or. 34) was assigned only one legion,
but eleven cohorts; two cohorts each were assigned to Osrhoëne
and Mesopotamia, with five in Arabia. Cavalry units are also
fairly evenly assigned to each of these areas, with the surprise
exception being Mesopotamia (three). Between Arabia and Os-
rhoëne, Syria (Not. Dign. Or. 33) and Phoenice (Not. Dign. Or.
32) possessed three legions and nine cohorts between them
(Treadgold 1995: 50–51).
52 GREG FISHER
J. W. Betlyon suggested that this was due to the gov-
ernment’s inability to pay the troops (1987: 675–
76), it is equally likely, if not more likely, that there
were in fact no troops at Lejjun at this time, given
the long gap in the coin record. The possibility exists
that they were transferred for the war itself, to re-
place other units assigned to the war, or to deal with
problems unrelated to the Vandal campaign: in Thrace
and Illyricum, the sudden departure of the Ostro-
gothic mercenaries in the wake of Aspar’s fall from
grace or Marcian’s aggressive stance against Attila
were both situations that demanded additional man-
power (Priscus, in CH 314). Whether the impetus
was the Vandal war or the replacement of other fron-
tier troops, the striking absence of coins in this
period suggests that the garrison at Lejjun was on
duty elsewhere; and Parker’s description of the later
occupancy in the fort implies that the troops did not
return.
The dramatic career of the Saracen adventurer
Amorkesos also demonstrates the weakness of the
Roman military on the southern frontier after the
Vandal war, supporting the contention that Roman
forces had already been transferred from this area of
operations. Amorkesos, appearing on the scene in
472, grew dissatisfied with life as a Persian vassal
and moved south to Arabia (Malchus, in CH 404).
Malchus tells us that Amorkesos established him-
self at Iotabe, an island with a Roman customs post
somewhere in the Red Sea, before sending his bishop
Peter to treat with the emperor Leo. Amorkesos was
subsequently recognized as fuv larcoÍ of the area in
473 (Malchus, in CH 406). The occupation of Iotabe
allowed Amorkesos to amass “considerable wealth”
from customs duties (Mayerson 1992: 1). His family
retained control of Iotabe for another 25 years with,
surprisingly, no response (at the time) from Leo, who
was undoubtedly looking for alternative sources of
income to replenish the treasury after the Vandal war
and to meet the burden of ongoing subsidy payments
elsewhere. The striking absence in the sources of any
response from the most obvious direction—Legio X
“Fretensis” (Not. Dign. Or. 34.30) based at Aila—
can perhaps be explained by the possibility that this
unit had already been withdrawn for the campaign of
363 (Ammianus Marcellinus 18.9.3; Shahîd 1984:
74). It is also noteworthy that Humayma, the most
significant military installation on the road between
Petra and Aila, was also abandoned at the time of
Amorkesos’s seizure of Iotabe. Apart from Udruh,
about which comparatively little is still known, Lej-
BASOR 336
jun was the next installation to the north of Humayma
with a significant legionary garrison; there is no at-
tested Roman response to Amorkesos.
Shahîd has offered the intriguing suggestion that
the Amorkesos episode represents the early entry
into the empire of the Ghassan, based largely on the
identification of Amorkesos with Imruª al-Qays, a
Ghassanid patricius (Shahîd 1989: 61). The unop-
posed emergence over 25 years of the Ghassan—who
would surpass the Kinda and the Salih to assume the
supreme phylarchy under Justinian, perhaps simply
confirming a preexisting arrangement—highlights
the impotence of the Salih and the Roman defenses
at the time. The Salihids could not have been im-
pressed by the new phylarch in their territory (Block-
ley 1992: 78); yet they too remain ominously silent.
On balance, the lack of response to Amorkesos, com-
bined with the evidence from Lejjun and the massive
impact on manpower and resources of the Vandal
war, indicates that there were few or no troops in the
region to deal with Amorkesos. In comparison to the
situation at Humayma, it is also highly probable that
regular forces had abandoned Lejjun by this time.
Elsewhere, open conflict was, of course, not nec-
essary to tie down troops or occupy the resources of
the government. Constantinople’s bizarre preoccu-
pation with a relatively cordial Persia is a case in
point.3 The two short wars of the fifth century—one
in 421/422 and the other in 441/442—reveal a dis-
tinct stubbornness in Constantinople. For their part,
the Persians faced a serious threat from the Huns,
against whom they had fortified the Caspian Gates.
Numerous appeals to Constantinople for financial
assistance in this matter were met with rebuttal, de-
flection, or false promises; it is clear that the Eastern
government saw the defense subsidy as a tribute and
a slight to Roman honor, regardless of the rationale
behind Persia’s request (Priscus, in CH 346, 354;
Rubin 1986: 677).
Roman intransigence on the Caspian Gates acted
as a catalyst for the conflict of 441/442, despite the
fact that an agreement on joint fortification had ap-
3
The somewhat odd episode given by Procopius, telling of
how, on his deathbed, Arcadius designated Yezdegerd as the
guardian of the young Theodosius II, is quite possibly apocryphal
(Procopius, Bellum Persicum 1.2.1–10). Yet the story may indi-
cate “an attempt to enhance the stability” of Rome/Persian rela-
tions, as does a section of Sozomen, describing a new truce with
Persia which can be seen as reconfirmation of the truces of 363,
387, and 400 (Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 9.4; Blockley
1992: 51–54).
2004 ROME’S DESERT FRONTIER
parently been made, and the Persians had fortified
the pass on the strength of it (John Lydus 3.52–53;
Rubin 1986: 683). At the same time, however, The-
odosius II initiated a frontier building program (for-
bidden under the truce ending the conflict in 421/
422) with the apparent aim of making Roman par-
ticipation in the defense of the Caspian Gates unnec-
essary. This highly visible treaty violation, as well
as repeated refusals to pay the subsidy, pushed the
two powers into a crisis which resulted in open war,
revealing an honor-driven obstinacy on the part of
the government, a preoccupation with the strength of
Persia, and a willingness to fight, if necessary, rather
than show flexibility or any sign of military weak-
ness (Procopius, Bellum Vandalicum 1.2.15; Joshua
the Stylite 9–10; Blockley 1985: 66).
Roman religious militancy caused friction as well.
Before his death in 420, Yezdegerd had favored good
relations with the Romans, tolerating Christianity
within Persia, often at the expense of the nobility and
the Zoroastrian priesthood (Decret 1979: 150–52).
Pulcheria’s militant brand of Christianity, however,
spilled over into foreign policy and, combined with
a change in Persian leadership, eventually pushed
the two empires into the war of 421/422. Constan-
tinople actively sought to “accept” (or recruit) Chris-
tians from Persia who were feeling the worst of the
switch in leadership. Once they were in Byzantine
territory, the “refugees” were not returned to Persia,
even when Persia asked for them back. Furthermore,
these “refugees” were probably Persia’s Saracen
allies in the first place, whom Byzantium was trying
to acquire for its own use under the guise of mission-
ary work (Socrates Scholasticus 7.18; Rubin 1986:
683). The situation quickly deteriorated into hostili-
ties for which Byzantium held the greater share of
the responsibility.
Constantinople’s role in starting the two wars of
the fifth century, the refusal to pay the defense sub-
sidy, and ongoing religious tensions indicate, among
other things, an overprioritization of the relation-
ship with Persia. There were secondary effects: troops
were tied down to defend a border against an enemy
who, for most of the fifth century, tried to avoid
armed conflict. While Constantinople was focused on
religious and financial problems with the Persians,
it was distracted from other, more serious threats
from the Huns and the Goths (Gordon 1949: 66).
Only the liberal use of bribes, the fortuitous death of
Attila, and the diversion of Theoderic to Italy re-
lieved the pressure on Constantinople’s northern bor-
53
der. In times of crisis, the Eastern Empire was not
capable of fielding sufficient forces to deal with dis-
parate threats, and Constantinople’s efforts to avoid
fighting wars on multiple fronts were, in the end,
undermined by their own policy toward Persia. This
is not to say that subsidies were not paid, but fre-
quently only in times of great crisis. In 421/422, for
example, there is evidence to suggest that Theodo-
sius II was forced to bribe the Persians to divert his
full resources against a serious Hunnic attack on the
Danube (Thaªalibi 1900: 560; Priscus, in CH 226;
Blockley 1992: 57). The war of 441 was equally
inopportune: a large portion of the army was on
campaign, stalled in Sicily waiting for orders when
the invasion began (Marcellinus Comes 441). Caught
with their armed forces elsewhere, the East Romans
were saved only by a fortuitous bout of bad weather
that hampered the Persians and allowed the govern-
ment time to muster an army (Theodoret, Bishop of
Cyrrhus 5.36; Rubin 1986: 682–83). Assailed from
all sides, Aspar’s forces failed to prevent the cap-
ture of several major strongholds in the Danubian
theater and, again, the Romans were forced to bribe
the Huns to stop their attack (Marcellinus Comes
441). Two decades later, Leo similarly bought peace
with the Persians (probably with a fortification sub-
sidy) to allow the campaign against the Vandals to
proceed. The fact that Leo was only able to send his
expedition if the eastern front was quiet is echoed in
Theodoret’s indignant narrative on the war of 441/
442. Squarely blaming Persia for the war, the troops
had only left to fight the Vandals in the first place, he
says, because the “treaty” with Persia assured the
peace (Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus 5.36).
Throughout the fifth century, therefore, the impe-
rial government faced a series of competing military,
financial, and political challenges and was frequently
unable to meet simultaneous major commitments
in more than one theater. In southern Arabia and
Palestine, however, the threat was very different
from that posed by the Huns, Vandals, Goths, or Per-
sians. Building on earlier theories, Parker has argued
strongly for a nomadic threat to the settled areas in
Transjordan, warranting, in his view, a police force
of infantry and cavalry “to monitor the movements
and control the raids of tribes along the frontier”
(Parker 1986b: 8–9), protecting travelers, traders, and
the local inhabitants from the razzia, or nomadic raid
(Parker 1987a: 45; 1987b: 156; Brünnow and Von
Domaszewski 1905: 1–176; Poidebard 1934: 197–
201; see also Luttwak 1976). While there has been
54 GREG FISHER
some support for this view from Gichon (1986: 584–
86; 1993: 21–22; 2002: 185–96; cf. Parker 1997:
581–82; cf. Speidel 1977: 724), and North African
models have expressed some similarities (e.g., Re-
buffat 1977: 404–5), historians and archaeologists
have recently challenged Parker’s model. It is now
clear that the limes can no longer be considered a
fortified line where the primary concern was to pro-
tect those that lay on one side from those on the
other; rather, the limes in southern Arabia and Pales-
tine is best understood as a settled zone of frontier
country where the nomadic and sedentary popula-
tions merged, and where forts and fortified build-
ings existed to serve a number of diverse purposes
(Isaac 1986: 384; Mayerson 1986: 38–39; Whittaker
1994: 66; Banning 1986: 25–50; Speidel 1977: 726;
cf. Brown 2003: 48–51). Critically, E. B. Banning,
C. R. Whittaker, B. Isaac, J. Magness, and R. Harper
have all offered alternative explanations for appar-
ently defensive military buildings, with Harper link-
ing Upper Zohar and its immediate neighbors at Ein
Boqeq and Hatrurium with local route security—a
duty intimately connected with the economic and ad-
ministrative well-being of the region (Banning 1987:
52; Whittaker 1994: 121; Isaac 1992: 173–75, 408–
9; Magness 1999: 204; Harper 1995: 115). Mag-
ness’s reconsideration of two of these sites supports
this view and, by questioning the purpose of two
“links” on the limes Palaestinae, Magness also casts
further doubt on the theory of a linear limes or “Flan-
kenschutz” (Magness 1999: 190–91, 204–6; Gichon
1993: 22). As a result, the importance of internal po-
licing, protection against banditry, and the control
of reservoirs and roads is now emphasized (Fiema
1995: 267; Mayerson 1986: 43; Ball 2000: 32; Isaac
1984: 185–91; 1992: 89–97). The frequency with
which fortifications were well located to control ac-
cess to water sources and lines of communication,
even if this necessitated their siting in poorly defen-
sible positions (as is the case with Lejjun) lends fur-
ther support to this view (cf. Gichon 1976a: 188;
Meshel 1989: 228; Parker 1986b: 60). Internal con-
cerns are also echoed in D. Graf ’s argument that the
Saracen “menace” was nebulous and that the Limes
Arabicus forts could best be interpreted as “monu-
ments” to the memory of the Palmyrene revolt (Graf
1989: 392–400; cf. Graf 1978: 19).
The purpose and intention behind the fortifica-
tions throughout the limes in Arabia and Palestine
does not, therefore, intimate the same kind or level
BASOR 336
of organized military threat that faced Roman forces
on the border with Persia farther north, or those sta-
tioned in the volatile Balkan region in close proxim-
ity to the imperial capital. It is important as well to
differentiate between the more striking examples of
raiding or disturbances that are often included as part
of the nomadic threat, and the less spectacular prob-
lems that may not be visible in the literary or archae-
ological record. As one critic of Parker’s position
has argued, the numerous literary references to dra-
matic plundering expeditions perhaps reflect only
the most acute occurrences, expressed in the “media”
of the time (Banning 1987: 53; cf. Isaac 1984: 173).
Indeed, the most serious problems that tested the
defenses in Arabia throughout the fourth and fifth
centuries were not nomadic raids, but disturbances
among Byzantium’s foederati in the region, during
Mavia’s federate revolt against Valens and the so-
called Kindite War of 502 which saw the Ghassan,
in particular, emphasize their military and political
strength (Theophanes the Confessor a.m. 5990, 5994,
5995; Blockley 1992: 87). Apparently, however, nei-
ther federate unrest nor nomadic raiding were sig-
nificant enough to cause any major additions or
alterations to the largely Diocletianic system in the
province (cf. Whittaker 1994: 137).
Nevertheless, the abandonment of the limes forts
did not necessarily mean that the southern provinces
would go without some form of military protection
and policing. Like nomads elsewhere, the Saracens
enjoyed a multifaceted relationship with the Ro-
mans. Like modern Bedouin, the Saracens could be
found in the desert one day and in the cities the next;
they could act as traders, guides, messengers, and
soldiers in the regular army as well as foederati. All
of these roles were, in some respects, an extension
of an already well-established relationship (Mayer-
son 1986: 35–36; 1989: 72–75). There was, indeed,
a long tradition of alliances between Rome and her
Arab neighbors in this region, and the relationship
between Constantinople and her tributary Saracens
points to several excellent reasons why, in the fifth
century, they were the ideal candidates for provid-
ing security in the frontier zone. Parker argued that
it was only when the Ghassanids obtained what he
called the “superphylarchy” under Justinian that the
responsibility for providing security in the limes
passed squarely to the federates, an event apparently
described by Procopius (Procopius, Anecdota 24.12–
14). Yet federates appear in the sources as a sig-
2004 ROME’S DESERT FRONTIER
nificant force on the frontier even before the fifth
century, and the sources often speak more of them
than of the Romans themselves.
One way to achieve commonality or trust was in
religion; indeed, as the relationship with Persia
showed, Christianity, as an ideological force, could
play a potent role. Amorkesos, probably a Chalce-
donian (Shahîd 1989: 73), had used his bishop, Peter,
to negotiate with Leo, also a Chalcedonian, before
he went to Constantinople himself. Malchus records
the curious note that the Emperor presented Amorke-
sos as one who had been convinced to convert to
Christianity, an action presumably designed to in-
still some credibility in Amorkesos when he was pre-
sented to the members of Leo’s court (Malchus, in
CH 407). Elsewhere, Marcian had used an Arian
bishop to negotiate with Gaiseric (Priscus, in CH
332), and Eunapius describes an incident where Ro-
mans granted a treaty to some unspecified barbarians
because they professed (falsely, as it turned out) to
be Christians (Eunapius, in CH 74).
Christianity was well attested among the Arabs of
the hinterland regions, and bishops who ministered
to the nomadic tribes attended ecumenical councils
throughout the fourth and fifth centuries (Triming-
ham 1979: 112–17; Bowersock 1996: 141). The em-
ployment of foederati was also frequently related to
their conversion to Christianity. Sozomen, for ex-
ample, describes the story of Zokomos, chief of the
Salihids (ca. 410). Childless, he was told to pray to
God; miraculously he had a son, and his entire tribe
was converted with him (Sozomen 6.38; Triming-
ham 1979: 95, 114). The Salihids became Rome’s
primary foederati in the Arabian region, and Sozo-
men described them as fortunate (“blessed by God”)
and consequently a formidable threat to the Persians
(Sozomen 6.38). Beneath the almost mythical quali-
ties of the story, it is possible to see the mutual re-
lationships of reliance and dependence that could
characterize Roman-Saracen relationships, and in this
case, it is perhaps no accident that the Salihids re-
mained the foederati du jour for most of the fifth
century. Christianity could, of course, be divisive:
the ill-thought decision of Valens to force an Arian
bishop on the Tanukh resulted in a serious revolt
under their queen, Mavia. Yet Christianity could also
play a vital role in bridging cultural gaps and making
the peoples of the hinterland more palatable to the
Romans as allies: Mavia’s valuable reappearance un-
der foedus to the Romans only came about, accord-
55
ing to Socrates, when the vexing problem of the
bishop was settled (Socrates Scholasticus 4.36; cf.
Sozomen 6.38; Shahîd 1984: 142–58).
Martial ability, too, qualified the Saracens for mili-
tary duties throughout the limes, with a number of
ancient authors speaking respectfully of Saracen skill
in Arabia and elsewhere as both allies and enemies
of Rome. Mavia enjoyed such success against Roman
forces that, according to Sozomen, the divisional
commander of the East was recalled to deal with the
problem; yet even he needed to be rescued by the dux
Palaestinae, a military embarrassment that Shahîd
also related to Rome’s sapping international commit-
ments (Sozomen 6.38; Shahîd 1984: 148). Zosimus
commented, too, on the prowess of the Saracens in
Thrace, noting that the speed of the Arabs and skill
with their horses persuaded the Scythians to face the
Huns, rather than receive the Saracen assault (Zosi-
mus 4.22); and Procopius (echoed later by Evagrius)
wrote with fulsome respect of the early sixth-century
Persian-allied Lakhmid king Mundhir (Âlamouv n-
daroÍ) who frequently “proved himself ” against the
Roman forces (Procopius, Bellum Persicum 1.17.40–
45; Evagrius, Historia Ecclesiastica 4.12). A major
benefit was that the Saracens—usually mounted—
had specialized local knowledge (Trimingham 1979:
86; Fiema 1995: 267). The invention of the North
Arabian camel saddle greatly improved the ability of
riders mounted on camel-back (Bulliet 1975: 110),
and cavalry mounted either on horse or camel were
ideal for the difficult terrain found, for example,
throughout the Moab and in the escarpment country
toward Aila. Often highly mobile, Arab foederati
were thus arguably far more appropriate than infantry
(who formed a large part of the garrison forces) for
policing and security duties in the region (Shahîd
2002: 38–39), and figures such as Mundhir demon-
strate why keeping the Saracens on good terms with
the Romans was a matter of political expediency—
not least to prevent their allying with Persia, the
other major employer of federate Saracens. The phi-
lologist Ibn Habib, for example, explicitly states that
Anastasius was quick to conclude an alliance with
the Ghassanids after the Kindite War in 502, “lest
they should ally themselves against him” (Ibn Habib
1942: 371–72; Shahîd 1995: 8–9). In this case, both
Anastasius and Jabala, the Ghassanid leader, were
monophysites, a doctrinal similarity that probably
strengthened the treaty (Shahîd 1995: 993). Christian-
ity, already embedded in the state’s foreign policy,
56 GREG FISHER
provided a cultural glue that acted over and above
the normal foedus bonds of alliance, favor, and sub-
sidy (Trimingham 1979: 160; Blockley 1992: 167).
Using foederati to provide security in the frontier re-
gion on a more than part-time basis was also a useful
solution to a consistent and pressing problem—the
army itself.
Much has been written about the quality and effec-
tiveness of the late Roman army, and while there are
a number of indications that point toward a change in
role, if not in value, the financial difficulties of keep-
ing the troops in an under-threatened region was key.
With the ratio of frontier to field troops heavily
skewed in favor of the frontier, siphoning off the lim-
itanei or replacing them with less costly alternatives
was inevitable; indeed, the suitability of the Saracens
for work in the desert hinterland made this a sensible
policy (Treadgold 1995: 58–59). Constantinople, too,
felt the pressure of recruitment problems. Desertion
was common, and it was not unusual for potential
recruits to engage in self-mutilation to avoid service;
even before Adrianople, Valentinian decreed this to
be an offense punishable by death (C.Th. 7.22.1).
Yet the real problem was the chronic shortage of
trained soldiers (and good officers), resulting from
the battles at Adrianople and the Frigidus, and the
subsequent unrelenting endemic warfare (Treadgold
1995: 11; Southern and Dixon 1996: 53). The prac-
tical considerations of fielding good troops in a
war-weary army aggravated the general shortage of
soldiers. Many recruits came from agricultural jobs,
while the land itself was often ravaged by constant
warfare, magnifying the problem. This in turn con-
tributed to the government’s desire to avoid war on
multiple fronts, all of which placed intense pressure
on the frontier army which comprised the bulk of the
numbers (Southern and Dixon 1996: 177; cf. Mac-
Mullen 1980: 460). Furthermore, not until the reign
of Anastasius did pay increase sufficiently to attract
men to a profession that was not only dangerous but
also liable to separate a soldier from his family for,
at best, extended periods of time. By converting the
quinquennial donative to a pay increase and allow-
ances in kind to pay, and by inflating the uniform
and equipment allowance, Anastasius was able to
bring the salary of soldiers to a level not seen for
some time (Treadgold 1995: 154–55, 164). In the
case of the Limes Arabicus and Limes Palaestinae,
the provincial armies that served there were already
small to begin with, and elements of the exercitus
Arabicus may not have survived the war with Zeno-
BASOR 336
bia or returned from transfers out of the area (Parker
1986a: 641). Given the government’s military prior-
ities in the fifth century, and the difference in prestige
between the comitatenses and the limitanei, a swift
and significant reduction of numbers among the lim-
itanei who necessarily suffered a much lower rate of
combat-related attrition should not be ruled out.
Away from practical concerns, the writings of
John Malalas and Theophanes provide valuable clues
as to how authors writing from a perspective schooled
in the imperial capital viewed this barren southern
territory. Malalas rarely mentions Arabia, except as
a place of exile for troublesome bishops, usually to
Petra (John Malalas 16.5). For his part, Theophanes
describes Marcian’s deposition of one Theodosius, a
rogue bishop who had installed himself in Jerusa-
lem; pursued by the emperor’s agents, Theodosius
fled to the Sinai, where he was sufficiently removed
from civilization not to cause any more problems
(Theophanes the Confessor a.m. 5945). The choice of
Petra for exile—a city in a marginal farming area on
the periphery of the 200-mm rainfall line and which,
while not poor, no longer maintained the economic or
cultural primacy it had once enjoyed—provides a
succinct insight into how the authorities viewed that
part of Byzantium’s territory. P. Brown, discussing
the role of the desert in religious consciousness,
noted that the desert ascetics such as St. Simeon de-
rived some measure of their power from what he
called the “notional chasm between the desert and the
world” (Brown 2003: 173–74). The desert, of course,
as Brown states, was not geographically impenetra-
ble: residents of a major desert settlement such as
Humayma were part of the oijkoumevnh but squarely
within a desert landscape at the tip of the Hisma,
which was both marginal and distant from more cos-
mopolitan centers. Arguably the limes—and espe-
cially the barren desert of the Negev and the Hisma,
in particular—played a powerful role as a remote
mental space: Sozomen recorded exiles to “the fur-
thest parts of Arabia”—inside the Empire, but apart
from it (Sozomen 4.15), and Procopius described in
a Herodotean fashion the land beyond where the fed-
erated Saracens lived (which he mysteriously called
“the palm groves”) as featuring a procession of in-
creasingly outlandish nations until the “man-eating”
Saracens (Procopius, Bellum Persicum 1.19.8–16). In
addition, a recent article by J. P. Oleson suggested
that a significant cultural gulf existed between the
original, indigenous inhabitants of Humayma and
the army garrison, a situation that perhaps reinforced
2004 ROME’S DESERT FRONTIER
“urban” perceptions of the limes (Oleson, Reeves,
and Fisher 2002: 121). Again, I would argue that
the under-threatened desert region of Palaestina III
received a low measure of priority—not only out of
practical considerations, but also from a psychologi-
cal perspective.
This study has sought to suggest a variety of rea-
sons for the fifth-century abandonment of the limes
forts by looking at wider issues in the Empire. Jus-
tinian’s actions, outlined in Procopius and initially
suggested by Parker as the “end” of the frontier, are
too late to explain the neglect of the desert fortifi-
cations. It is far more likely that the potent combina-
tion of consistent pressure on the Balkan frontier, the
specter of Persia, and Constantinople’s aspirations
toward the West resulted in the consistent assigna-
tion of a low priority to the southern limes which, in
any case, was never seriously under threat. Con-
stantinople’s preoccupation with the Persian frontier
and domestic considerations in the capital precipi-
tated two short wars which, although brief, main-
tained the illusion that Persia was the main danger.
Combined with more serious events elsewhere, troops
acknowledgments
A version of this paper was given at the Ninth Annual
UCLA Graduate Conference on Late Antiquity, held at the
University of California, Los Angeles on May 1, 2004. I am
indebted to Elizabeth Digeser, Faith Wallis, Andrew Sher-
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