G.R. No.

L-35851 October 8, 1974

MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, and BENITO MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Quezon City,petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and BENJAMIN FARIN, respondents. 
BARREDO, J.:p
Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, Petra Farin, et al. vs. Benito
Macrohon, et al., denying the motion of private respondents therein (herein petitioners) to dismiss the appeal of therein petitioners (herein
private respondents) upon the ground that the latter's record on appeal does not contain any statement to the effect that an appeal bond has
been filed by them, contrary to the requirement of Section 6 of Rule 41 and the consistent jurisprudence of this Court interpretative thereof to
the effect that such omission is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
In resolving herein petitioners' motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals held:
There is likewise no question that in her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss appellant herein admits that there is no mention
in the Record on Appeal regarding fact that an appeal bond was filed on time. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact
appears on the face of the record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the City Treasurer of Quezon City (copy
attached to the opposition as Annex A) to the effect that petitioner-appellants' cash bond was actually filed on October 30,
1970, simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-appellants' Notice of Appeal. Appellants' counsel further contends that
"obviously, because said cash appeal bond was riled simultaneously with the Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel,
through oversight, failed to state or make mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in the record.
Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction docketed with this Court as CA-G.R. NO.
47519-R entitled Petra R. Farin, et al., vs. Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, et al., in which a decision was promulgated by this
Court on August 20, 1971.
One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the appellate court whether an appeal is seasonably filed or not.
The purpose of adding the clause "together with such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid
disputes in the appellate court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal." (Araneta vs. Madrigal, G.R. No. 26227-
28, Oct. 25, 1966).
Now, it is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-mentioned the private parties were the same as appellants and
appellees herein. Paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof contained the following allegations:
"8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a copy of the decision of the respondent
judge;
"9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal, from the said decision, together with
their Appeal Bond and Record on Appeal (Petition, dated February 22, 1971, p. 3 emphasis supplied)
Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los Angeles, Sheriff Benito Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and
Marcelo Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of their Answer, averred:
Admissions
1. That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of
the petition." (Answer dated March 1, 1971, pp. 1-2; note italicize)
There is no specific admission of petitioner's par. 8, but neither is there any specific denial thereof.
In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and respondents "Admissions" (above) this Court, in its statement of the case
said:
"On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal ... (p. 4,
Decision, in CA-G.R. No. 47519-R)
Under the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that this Court has no way of determining whether the present appeal
is seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not only been appraised thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a
clear, unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case, that all the requisites of a valid
have been complied with. Judicial admissions contained in pleadings bind the parties and the principle of estoppel operates.
Hence, there would be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the Record on Appeal a fact about which
there can no longer be any dispute inasmuch as it has already beenjudicially admitted in the pleadings of C.A. G.R. No.
47519-R.
Under the facts thus found by the appellate court, We are more inclined to hold that the present petition cannot prosper. Prescinding from the
other grounds discussed in the impugned resolution, which We do not deem necessary to pass upon in this decision, We are of the considered
view that the Court of Appeals did not in anyway abuse its discretion, but, on the contrary, acted in accordance with law in refusing to dismiss
the appeal of the Farins.
Indeed, the main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should show on its face, by means of statements of the corresponding
specific data, that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed on time is to enable the appellate court to
determine on the basis of the record on appeal itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that the appeal has been made on
time. To allow the parties to indulge in a controversy regarding the timeliness of the appeal and to present their respective conflicting evidence
on that point, which could take much of the time of the court that it could otherwise devote to the disposition of other cases demanding its
attention, is detrimental to the interests of justice and contrary to the public policy intended to be served by the provision in question. But, as
illustrated in the circumstances of the case at bar, there could be instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter which the court can
take judicial notice of and, consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy between the parties in respect thereto could arise. In
such instances, the court is no longer supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by what it has judicial notice of and none
of the parties may be permitted to prove the contrary. In the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Where a fact is one of which the court may judicially
take notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The maxim is "what is known need not be proved." Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of
equal force. As a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands
for proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary. (Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn 489, 71
A., 580; State v. Main, 69 Conn., 123, L.R.A. 623.) Indeed, it is frequently said that neither averment, nor proof or admission, will prevail against
matters which are judicially known to the court. (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202; Graves v. Kelly, 62 Ind.
A., 164, 112 N.E. 899, 901; Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 Fed. 139; Davis v. Southern Ry. Co., 170 N.C., 582, 87 S.E. 745.)."
(Moran, Rules of Court Vol. 5, p. 39).
In the light of these considerations, the reason behind the subject rule is not in any sense violated when, as in the case at bar, the appellate
court relies on what it has judicial notice of in determining whether or not appellants filed an appeal bond on time. When a matter of fact
supposed to be proven to the court is one capable of being taken judicial notice of, being already known to the court because it has already
been proven or was undisputed or judicially admitted in a related proceeding before it, it would be the height of absurdity and contrary to one's
sense of justice and propriety to still require the parties to reopen the issue and litigate relative to the same matter all over again. Both upon
principle and pragmatic considerations, courts are not supposed to ignore facts that the same parties have in a related case considered as
beyond dispute or no longer subject to proof. Any other ruling would only give occasion to the court to arrive at contradictory findings on points
which the parties themselves may not controvert without being inconsistent and unfair. In other words, Section 6 of Rule 41 and the
jurisprudence cited by petitioners have no application to the situation obtaining in this case. The view We have taken here does not constitute a
relaxation, much less a modification of the standing rulings of this Court invoked by petitioners.
Before closing, it is necessary to state here that this case is related somehow to the other cases pending in this Court between the same
parties, namely, G. R. Nos. L-34317 and 34335. To avoid any misconception or misunderstanding, it is here made clear that the result of the
instant case has no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case just mentioned and vise versa.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners.
 ROLEX SUPLICO, G.R. No. 178830
Petitioner,

Present:
versus PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ANDDEVELOPMENT CARPIO,
AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
L. NERI, and the NEDA-INVESTMENT COORDINATION
COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF CORONA,
TRANSPORTATION ANDCOMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), CARPIO MORALES,
represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, AZCUNA,
including the COMMISSION ON
TINGA,
INFORMATIONAND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE CHICO-NAZARIO,*
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE,BIDS AND AWARDS VELASCO, JR.,
FOR INFORMATION ANDCOMMUNICATIONS
NACHURA,
TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed by DOTC ASSISTANT
SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the REYES,
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO BRION, JJ.
FORMOSO,AND ALL OTHER OPERATING UNITS OF THE
DOTC FOR INFORMATION ANDCOMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and ZTE CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM
HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALLPERSONS ACTING IN THEIR Promulgated:
BEHALF,
Respondents.

July 14, 2008

RESOLUTION
 
REYES, R.T., J.:
  Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion[1] dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which states:
 
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the Legal Service
of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the Philippine Governments decision not to
continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project (see attachment [2]). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for
this Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.

On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSGs manifestation and motion and required petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.
 
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and Opposition, [3] opposing the
aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:
 
66.              Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese
President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007 Manifestation and Motion thus depriving petitioners
of the opportunity to comment thereon a mere verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-
DOTC NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.
 
67.              Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of the Meeting Between
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support its allegations or other proof of the supposed decision
to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents can certainly do better than that.[4]
 
Petitioner Suplico further argues that:
 
79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which is vehemently denied), this Honorable
Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may still take cognizance thereof.[5]
 
Petitioner Suplico cites this Courts rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v. Mirasol[8] that despite their mootness, the Court
nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the Courts symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating
guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.
 On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317, also filed their comment expressing
their sentiments, thus:
 
3.                  First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present administration has a very
nasty habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.
  
4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured that the government, in the
event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the now infamous NBN-ZTE
transaction. This is especially relevant since what was attached to the OSGs Manifestation and Motion was a mere one (1) page written
communication sent by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG, allegedly relaying that the
Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project x x x due to several reasons and constraints.
 
Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which among others,
included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its
apparent mootness.
 
On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents reply to petitioners comments on its manifestation and motion.
 
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must
not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.[9]
 
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the government or public interest. Explaining the nature
of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress that it remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent[10] for the agreement to
become effective have not yet been complied with.
Respondents further oppose petitioners claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an absolute right. They contend that the matters
raised concern executive policy, a political question which the judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.
 
On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights from the Notes of Meeting between
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao, held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of
Meeting, the Philippine Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due to several constraints.  The
same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintaos expression of understanding of the Philippine Government decision.
 
We resolve to grant the motion.
Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are:
 
G.R. No. 178830
 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
 
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, issue forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining orderenjoining respondents, their subordinates, agents,
representatives and any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness,
disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;
 
2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
 
3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of
the revised Rules of Court; and,
 
4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and
public bidding for the NBN contract.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
 
G.R. No. 179317
 
WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:
 
A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such amount as the Honorable
Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission on Information and Communications
Technology, all other government agencies and instrumentalities, their officers, employees, and/or other persons
acting for and on their behalf to desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering
into any other agreements and from commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with
the National Broadband Network Project;
  
B.                 the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,
 
C.                 after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to allow
herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE Corporation, and/or
other entities, government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the National Broadband Network
Project.[12](Emphasis supplied)
 
 
G.R. No. 179613
 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:
 
1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
 
2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of
the Revised Rules of Court;
 
3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent
ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the
execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;
 
4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding
procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the
construction of the national broadband network.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
 
On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO[14] in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing
funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:
 
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to wit:
 
G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA
Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, including the Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman, Ramon P. Sales, The Telecommunications
Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC
Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical Working Group for ICT, and DOTC Assistant
Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications
Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.Acting on the instant petition
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to
 
xxxx
 
(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development
Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation
and Communications, Commission on Information and Communications Technology, (iv)
Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications
Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other Operating
Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation;
(vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the
ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.
 
NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondents (i) National
Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and
Communications, Commission on Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other Operating Units of
the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii)
ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are hereby ENJOINED from pursuing, entering into indebtedness,
disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
 
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation. It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract [16] were readily made
available to petitioners.[17] Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
 
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China, informed Chinas President Hu
Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several reasons and
constraints, there is no doubt thatall the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul, set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN
Project) had also become moot.
 
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine Governments decision not to
continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the
President of the Philippines.
 
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
 
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the Philippines,
who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing
facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during
the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in Chinaas an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such
official act without need of evidence.
 
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.
 
In Estrada v. Desierto,[19] the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the petition.
 
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials[20] of informing this Court
of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the
contrary. Other than petitioner AHIs unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in
the present instance.
 
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciarys role of strengthening political stability
indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more
harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to
do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or
antecedents.
 
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court
generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling
or make any pronouncement.
 
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.
 
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,[21] the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities
Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding,
respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic
Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and
the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying for the reinstatement of the
writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the
negotiating table. Its withdrawal had thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the implementation of said
agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary.
 
Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications. There We held, thus:
 
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals Decision nullifying the orders of the SEC en banc and the
SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en
banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.
 
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
 
 In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the concerned parties
from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc.Given that Qualcomm, Inc. is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts,
there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals Decision had the effect of overruling the
Courts Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the appellate court.
 
A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of judicial review. The
exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems.
 
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot
and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and
academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both
bench and bar.
 
In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the implementation of
the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in
this controversy. Except for the determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now moot,
the issues raised in this petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory
provision.[22]
 
Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush aside mootness, the Court cannot
completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires reception
of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated often enough, this Court
is not a trier of facts.
 
Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
 
Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,[23] correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico filed his petition directly with this Court, without
prior factual findings made by any lower court, a determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to wit:
 
(1)               Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese governments over the NBN Project;
 
(2)               Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through the DOTC, and ZTE
International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;
 
(3)               Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;
 
(4)               Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Scheme;
 
(5)               Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under the BOT Law;
 
(6)               Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement under the ZTE Supply Contract;
and
 
(7)               Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more extensive than that under
the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.[24]
 
Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior determination of facts before pertinent legal
issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.
 
In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.
 
In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to
respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the
Constitution, to law and to public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law
regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national
broadband network.
 
It is simply impossible for this Court to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal without any evidence to support a prior factual
finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to
be threshed out.
Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding
procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.[25] It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to
summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects without any
factual basis or prior determination of very particular violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so
would amount to a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error cannot be corrected by committing another
error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just presume that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall
into this trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.
 
Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang
pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag dito.
 
Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which requires a judicial finding of facts.
 
Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared null and void. The foregoing threefold reasons
would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed colleague.
 
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of mootness and because their resolution requires
reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought before the Supreme Court.
 
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on September 11, 2007 is DISSOLVED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, G. R. No. 183622

Petitioner,
Present:
 CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Promulgated:

Respondent.
February 8, 2012
RESOLUTION
 
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor,
he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same
estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before
Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. [3] The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and
Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case
was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
[4]

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also
insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the appearance of a real
party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have first required the
parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead
filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in
this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for
letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only
party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration
can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same
person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter
was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner
must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner
for letters of administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest
in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person,
in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
 xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner
would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public
document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and
was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the
validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not
being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by
the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner
was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with
Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the
RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer
a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The
trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by
the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
 don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish
the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.  In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution
dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2248             January 23, 1950

In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines. VICENTE ROSAL PARDO, petitioner-
appellee, 
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellant.
J. Perez Cardenas for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 and residing in the Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman
and where he is at present employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800, has been adjudged by the Court of First Instance of Manila
entitled to become a Filipino citizen. That the appellee is unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino languages is the first ground of
appeal by the Government.
The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood in that language. Lino Gutierrez, a respectable citizen who has
intimately known the applicant for 27 years, having had business relations with him, conformed the applicant's testimony. And the trial judge,
who has heard the applicant translate into Tagalog, "He venido residiendo en Filipinas por el periodo de 36 años," appears to have been
satisfied with the correctness of translation (which was not transcribed). The fact that the applicant arrived in the Philippines when he was only
ten years old and has lived here 44 years continuously except for a few months visit in Spain, mingling and dealing by reason of his work with
people who use Tagalog in their daily intercourse, lends credence in his testimony that he has acquired a good working knowledge of that
language. At one time, according to the evidence he owned or managed two stores successively on the Escolta, and lately he has been a
foreman and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.
The portion of the applicant's brief should not be taken isolatedly and at face value. This testimony is obviously extravagant understatement of
the reality, typifying an extreme modesty which is thought by some to be a virtue. We do not believe that this statement represent appellant's
sincere conviction of its literal meaning.
The other assignment of error goes to the sufficiency of the evidence on whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens of that country. The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain in the Philippines, stating that
in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship
in Spain. Article 17 provides that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of naturalization and those who have not obtained such certificate
but have acquired domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards. No discrimination being made in these provisions, they apply to persons
of any nationality.
As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as
matters known to judges of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and nay be judicially recognized by them without the introduction
of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.) Moreover, in a number of decisions mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila has been held to be competent proof of that law. (Yap vs. Solicitor General, L-1602, 46 Off. Gaz.[Supp. to No. 1],
p. 250;1 Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1761;2 Yee Bo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1606, 46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11],
201;3 Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez, L-1563.)4
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

April 28, 1950

TUASON, J.:
This case is again before the court, this time on a motion for reconsideration.
In our decision we say: "As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force in the Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof
may be regarded as matters known to judges of their judicial functions and may be judicially recognized by them without the introduction of
proof." (Section 5, Rule 123.)
The court is supposed to know that the Civil Code is the Code of Spain, and this is judicial embraces all its provisions, including those which
have ceased to be in operation in the Philippines. This court has said that it is not, by reason of an opinion expressed by an expert witness,
precluded from advising itself as to the common law of England. (Bryan vs. Eastern and Western Asso., 28 Phil., 310.) If the court may take
cognizance of the common law of England, there is perhaps at least as much reason that it may do so of the Spanish citizenship law until Spain
relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippines and which is a part of the code that is still the major branch of law of our country although the
said part is no longer applicable here.
In the matter of the application of Rafael Roa Yrostoza for naturalization, L-1394 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11]),5law which grants Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens of that country," and returned the case to the court of origin with instruction to reopen the hearing and give
the parties new opportunity to establish or disprove the existence of such law. We have to confess that the remand for further proceeding was
unnecessary. Oversight is the explanation, made possible by the failure of either party to direct our attention to the articles of the Civil Code of
which we have been, in the present case, apprised by the applicant.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered we also say that in a number of decisions, which we cite, mere authentication of the Chinese
naturalization law by the Chinese Consulate general in Manila has been taken as competent proof of that law. The Solicitor General takes
exception to this passage, in the following observation:
With regard to the second question under consideration as to whether the certification of the supposed naturalization laws of Spain
made by the Spanish Consul General constitutes competent proof of that law, this court cites in the support of its opinion the cases
of Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines,6 G. R. No. L-1761; Bienvenido Yap vs. The Solicitor General7 G.R. No. L-1602; Yee Boo
Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines,8 G.R. No. L-1606; and Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines and Felipe Fernandez,9 G.R. No. L01563. We have carefully gone over these cases and we beg leave to point out that in
each of them this court did not rule that the mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General
of manila constitute competent proof of that law, but that the question as to whether or not the copy of the Chinese Nationality Law
presented in said cases were properly authenticated and admissible in evidence to prove reciprocity, as required in section 4 (h) of the
Revised Naturalization Law, has become academic because of the admission made by counsel for the oppositor (Republic of the
 Philippines) to the effect that in another case, there has been presented a copy of the Naturalization Laws of China duly authenticated
in accordance with the Rules of the Court.
The decisions referred to seem to have been misread. In Yap vs. Solicitor General, L-1602 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], p. 250),2 the
document admitted , EXHIBIT E, purported to be "a copy of the Chinese law of citizenship, where it appears that Filipinos can acquire Chinese
Citizenship by naturalization." There was nothing in that decision which would show that the certificate or authentication was made by a
Philippine diplomatic or consular representative in China. In Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1761, we said that "in
previous cases, a translation of the Chinese Naturalization Law, made and certified to be correct by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila,
was admitted and considered efficient evidence to establish that the laws of China permit Filipinos to become citizens of that country." In Yee
Boo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1606 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11 ], 201, the petitioner introduced in evidence a translation of the
Chinese Naturalization Law, certified to be correct by the Chinese Consul General in Manila. The court held in that case that the objection to the
evidence "is of no moment, since this court has already accepted it as fact in previous naturalization cases that the laws of China permit
Filipinos to naturalize in that country." And the court disposed of Lock Ben Ping vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1675 (47 Off. Gaz., 176),10 on
the strength of the pronouncement, just quoted, in the Yee Boo Mann decision.
If it be true, as the Solicitor General notes, that in the Yap case the ratio decidendi was that "there has been presented a copy of the
Naturalization Laws of China duly authenticated in accordance with the Rules of the Court," then the decision recognized as a fact the
existence of a law of China under which Filipinos may be naturalized. Of this fact the court properly assumed judicial knowledge in the cases
that came up before it soon after.11
We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the applicant's country does not conform to the requirement
concerning the certification and authentication of such law (sec. 41, Rule 123). But the case at bar and the cases cited therein as precedents
are not governed by the Rules of the Court. Rule 1342, entitled "Applicability of the Rules," provides that "These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenience. By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the Rules of
Court, which include rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding like that under the Philippine law is judicial in character, and strict
compliance with the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would be essential, yet when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated
in the premises, it is only necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached on a far consideration of the evidence
on satisfactory proof. Accordingly, evidence of the law of a foreign country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section 41 of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in the light of all
circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, 
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
 
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed
as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged
among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy
Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c)
Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record
on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-
31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy
Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased
[CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment
rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat
to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English
translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be
excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
[CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their
respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe
and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This
petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September
16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO
YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY,
TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO.
[Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress
this argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case,
her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the
agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said
agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze
Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook
Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went
to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is
 exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China,
the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the
parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they
agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some pieces of
jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her
case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a
couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter
and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that
during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride;
that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon
reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to
said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies
helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest
brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were
married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that
it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document
because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that
after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together;
that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to the
Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as
husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the many people who attended the wedding
of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or elders of
the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee
according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom
[CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital
status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China"
[Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status
—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according
to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on
January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the
validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July
30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom
as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43
Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states
that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a
foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved
to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign
law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471
(1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the
foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice
thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the
aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage
was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the
judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of
marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was
whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as
is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p.
51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp.
555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if any: give number of children—
Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive
namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze
Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—
Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the
status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their
conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are
acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he
lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein
Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which they
have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased,
born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that
—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal
shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children,
namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation to
give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the
rental of the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
 (5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the 
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties registered and/or
appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy,
but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278,
Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should
have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known
as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615,
72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg.
129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the
issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said
incident shall be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment
may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to
prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136804             February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, 
vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of Appeals’1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution
of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought
payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned
check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his
complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and
this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on
the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed
the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit
("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law
bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996,
respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated
August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden
affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals
considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the
supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the
supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals
concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed
by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN
BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT
SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the
stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a trial
on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since Rule
35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit,
he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
 The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, shamor fictitious, as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s
complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for
what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense
that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in
Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the
Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that
the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The
resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by
any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony
under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the
same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line
with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of
California as proved by the respondents’ witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent "testified that as an active member of the California
Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal
and Revenue Code as published in Derring’s California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of
practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity
of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate
General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its
cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to
be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open
court.1a\^/phi1.net The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also
because it does not state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded
both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove" actual
damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal
damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use
the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase in all published New York cases,
and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
Guerrero’s claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful dishonor. However,
the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check for
reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a forgery, § 3-510, Official Comment 2. ….. to the
Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature card on …. and could not verify Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion,
consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
 6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither
consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law". UCC 4-
103 further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New
York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful
dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction Corp.
v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep’t 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach of contract.Geler v. National
Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d
387, 390 (3d Dep’t 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep’t 1976). Damage to reputation
is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.1a\^/phi1.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the
performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck
v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dep’t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d 1023
(1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were the type that would naturally arise from the breach
and if they were "brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to
contracting." Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N.Y.
32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless they are provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179
A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep’t 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dep’t
1991). There is no statute that permits attorney’s fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with
malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of …chester11_v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep’t 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110
A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dep’t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by
defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,
179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of
contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance
Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep’t 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws
and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof
of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden
affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply
with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of
New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of
Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just
because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did not
establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the
Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing
affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.14
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be
opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his complaint
itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment.
There is a need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages
under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank’s resort to a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully
defeated the very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26053             February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA —
SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA
SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO
RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA —
EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate,
Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these
premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta
C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria
Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written
permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo
Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and
March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1äwphï1.ñët
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

Amt. due from 

Area  Monthly 
NAME date of delinquency 
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962

1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97

2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08

3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36

4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24

5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34

8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38

9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18

10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to 

lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.

11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26

12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88

 14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32

15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44

16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16

17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98

18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68

Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40

22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

P7,580.69

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it
became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property,
gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City
Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy
and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.2
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and
to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for
school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board.
That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for
the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court
below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously
revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the
very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and
justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done
so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge
could well have taken — because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city
charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of
Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the
premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days'
notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the
premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to
possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify
reversal of the judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes
were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight.
Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious
act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and even against the will,
of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The
pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from recovering
possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property,
government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are
 quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is
abetted by the apathy of some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is difficult to explain
unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the
difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the
detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we
look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had
simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are,
they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to
"safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City
of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing
leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a
compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such
permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It
has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this
country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits
herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that
property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades
has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The
public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount.10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that
they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the
land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish
and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the
city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say that the case should have been started in
the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961,
and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that
their forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession
continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the
Manila Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.14
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the
ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power
inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of
the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River
in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the
west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in
the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are
hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof,
are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the
operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding
(MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to
scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY
EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and
management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic
technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering
the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the
properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit
and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale
down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all
efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU
was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA
7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed
them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.14However, he also
confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He
insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and
implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is
already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative
duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial
doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a
political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are
residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its
object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of
the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts.

He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are

creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or
uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effectonly until
April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed
JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the
Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case
decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called
for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14,
1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical
to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal
heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on
October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children,
respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same
case as the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated
December 6, 1965]." 1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res
judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the
complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on
the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is
barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574
against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in an order dated
December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574
has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action
against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]" 2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the
face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is
that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's
complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them
and father of the rest. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case
which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as
there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its
being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing
but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality
of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the
dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts
have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous
ruling is applicable in the case under consideration." 3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could
be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation
to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been
frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant
should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their
counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.

G.R. No. 85423             May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should
not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In
1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed
lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States.
Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to
Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed
provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following
which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made
upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before
World War II and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale
between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to
resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by
Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally
submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the
use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their
sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits
does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not
among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the
appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted
transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them
at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the
merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at
all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it
has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find
that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because,
even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even
cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her
testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before
the same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
 . . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or
when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the
request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at
the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually
withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here.
On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the
case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him
no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference
thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the
plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial
court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no
explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no
question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to
property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many cases.1âwphi1However, that rule is also not
absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax
declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their
parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there,
he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much
concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At
best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even
as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other
hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were
paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa
Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She
paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land to
the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and
are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by
Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where
there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and
therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing
doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by
the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property
with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary
contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It
is so ordered.

G.R. No. 96721 March 19, 1993

OCCIDENTAL LAND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. and EDGARDO ENERIO, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF TRENCIO ALMEDILLA, ALBERTO PINGKI-AN AND HEIRS OF PACIFICO CARBAJOSA,
SR., respondents.

NOCON, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 affirmingin toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte (Branch VI Dipolog City), presided by the Hon. Daniel B. Bernaldez 2 is whether or not the trial
court can take judicial notice of the decision of another case involving a similar issue. The appellate and lower courts ruled in the affirmative.
The case began with the collision of a Ford Fiera and a Carina Express No. C-24 passenger bus in Bunawan, Calamba, Misamis Occidental on
November 25, 1975 at about six o'clock a.m. As a result of this, the Ford Fiera was thrown into the canal on the right side of the road. Its driver,
Pacifico Carbajosa, Sr. was pinned under the steering wheel, while the engine was burning, causing him to be seriously burned and later die of
such injuries. Trencio Almedilla, the owner of the Fiera which was registered under Sevilla Line, and Alberto Pingkian were likewise in the Fiera
and suffered various injuries as a result of the incident. Neither the driver nor the passengers of the Carina Express No. C-24 stopped to assist
the victims, but rather the bus proceeded towards Sapang Dalaga. 3
The owner of the Carina passenger bus, Occidental Land Transportation Company filed a case for damages against Sevilla Line and/or William
Sevilla, the registered owner of the Ford Fiera, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3156 before the Court of First Instance, Branch III,
Oroquieta City. Trencio Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian also filed a civil suit for damages against Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc.
and the driver of the Carina bus, Edgardo Enerio. Later the heirs of Pacifico Carbajosa filed a complaint-in-intervention. This case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2728 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch VI, Dipolog City.
On July 30, 1977, Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz of the Oroquieta court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 3156 finding the driver of the Carina
passenger bus and not the driver of the Ford Fiera, as negligent. 4
On March 11, 1986, more than ten years after the inception of the case, Judge Daniel B. Bernaldez rendered the decision in Civil Case No.
2728 against Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc. and Edgardo Enerio. 5 The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants, Occidental Land Transportation Company and Edgardo Enerio, to pay to the plaintiffs, Trencio
Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian, the following:
For Plaintiff Almedilla:
(a) P 9,473.80 for the repair of the damaged Ford Fiera;
(b) P400.00 for hospitalization;
(c) P100.00 daily for the income of the Ford Fiera starting from November 25, 1975 to March 10, 1986;
(d) P5,000.00 for moral damages.
For Plaintiff Pingkian:
(e) P5,000.00 for moral damages;
(f) P100.00 for loss of income;
(g) P100.00 for incidental expenses; and
(h) P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
2. Ordering the defendants aforenamed to pay to the intervenors Carbajosas the following;
(a) P6,000.00 for hospitalization;
(b) P3,000.00 for embalming, funeral services and last prayers;
(c) P5,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and
(e) P500.00 for actual and incidental expenses.
3. Dismissing the complaint-in-intervention insofar as it concerns plaintiffs Trencio Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian.
4. Denying the reliefs prayed for in the answer to the complaint-in-intervention of plaintiffs Trencio Almedilla and Alberto
Pingkian;
5. Denying the reliefs prayed for in the answer to the complaint-in-intervention of the aforenamed defendants;
6. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendants aforenamed for lack of merit; and
7. Ordering the defendants aforenamed to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The facts of the case were "adopted by reference" from the decision of the then Court of First Instance, Branch III of Oroquieta City in Civil
Case No. 3156. 7
It reads as follows:
That at about 4:50 o'clock in the morning of November 25, 1975, Trencio Almedilla, who was the real owner of the Ford
Fiera, but attached to the Sevilla Lines of defendant William Sevilla, left for Ozamis City, on board his Ford Fiera, to buy
textiles, together with Alberto Pingkian who wanted to visit his aunt at Ozamis City. Reaching Dipolog City, Trencio Almedilla
came upon Pacifico Carbajosa, who wants (sic) to load fish in the Ford Fiera for Ozamis City. As it was an opportune
occasion, Trencio agreed to load the fish of Pacifico for a freight of P130.00. So they loaded the fish of Pacifico at Miputak,
then got gasoline at a Caltex Station and proceeded towards Ozamis City. Trencio, was driving his Ford Fiera, was running
slowly as Pacifico alias "Balodoy" told him not to go fast so that his fish will not get destroyed. After passing Sapang Dalaga,
at Misamis Occidental, Trencio developed stomach ache. At this, "Balodoy" requested that Trencio allow him to drive the
Ford Fiera as he was an experienced driver. Trencio agreed. And so, with "Balodoy" on the wheels of the Ford Fiera, they
proceeded slowly for fear that the fish will get damaged. Reaching Bunawan, at Calamba, and while negotiating a curb at
 the descending portion of the asphalted national highway, which was wet, as it was raining, a Carina passenger bus was
running fast in an ascent, zigzagging towards them. Because of this, the Ford Fiera went towards the extreme right of the
road with its right front and rear tires already running at (sic) the ground shoulder, but even as the Ford Fiera tried to avoid
the zigzagging Carina Express No. C-24, the said Carina bus jerked towards the left, hitting, as a result, the Ford Fiera at
the left fender and hood, throwing it to the canal at the right side, with engine burning. The Carina passenger bus continued
to swerve towards the left until it turn about, facing towards the direction of Ozamis City. Balodoy was pinned by the steering
wheel to his driver's seat and was seriously injured, Pingkian and Trencio were also injured, but they were well enough to try
to help to extricate Balodoy, not until Genito Compania got a piece of wood from his house nearby, which he used as a lever
to pry out Balodoy. The driver of the Carina passenger bus, which had three (3) passengers, at that time, did not help
Balodoy. Instead it proceeded towards Sapang Dalaga.
The accident was reported to the police authorities of Calamba, as a result of which Acting Station Commander Arceno of
Calamba Police Station, Police District No. II, made a Police Report dated November 25, 1975 as follows:
POLICE REPORT
At about 0645 Hrs More or less 25, Nov. Sevilla Line bearing plate No. 8-B940 which was driven by
Pacifico Carbajosa y Gemillan, 40 years old, married and a resident of 398 Martines St., Dipolog City,
said driver was burned and injured seriously when on the way at Bunawan this Municipality, due to a
bumping incident.
Bus Line marked Carina bearing Plate No. 939 driven by Edgardo Enerio y Paglinawan of Sapang
Dalaga, Misamis Occidental, Hit and run and surrendered to Sapang Dalaga office of the Station
Commander.
The driver of Sevilla Line with his two companions were rushed to the Calamba Community Hospital for
treatment. The scene of the incident was investigated by F/Sgt. Pagalaran, Sr. 8
Petitioners Occidental Land Transportation Company Inc. and Edgardo Enerio appealed from the above-quoted decision to the Court of
Appeals. 9 They assigned the following errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON A DECISION RENDERED IN ANOTHER CASE.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT' THE FORD FIERA WAS EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACCIDENT.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE FORD FIERA DID NOT BELONG TO THE PLAINTIFF
TRENCIO ALMEDILLA. 10
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto and disposed of the errors assigned in the following manner:
Anent the first assigned error, such step of the trial court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 315(6) is sanctioned under
Rule 129, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, as aptly put by Chief Justice Moran "Courts have also taken judicial
notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970, ed., p. 50).
Hence, considering the previous decision in Civil Case No. 315(6) involving the same vehicular accident had already put to
rest the issue as to the negligence of defendants, the court properly took cognizance of said decision as a matter of
convenience, as these facts are capable of unquestionable demonstration (Baguio vs. De Jalagat 42 SCRA 337).
As to the liability of the defendants in the vehicular mishap, We concur with the finding of the trial court in Civil Case No.
315(6) which held inter alia:
Moreover, it does not seem possible, as claimed by plaintiff's own witness, Crisanto Andus, that while
negotiating the curb, and while starting to descend, the Ford Fiera slid towards the Carina Express No.
C-24, hitting its left rear as a consequence. For the Ford Fiera was admittedly loaded with fish and that
consequently, because of the weight of its cargo, in relation to its capacity, it will have more traction even
in a slippery wet asphalted road; and, as such, the probability of its sliding towards the extreme left side
of the road is improbable, if not remote. Not so in the case of Carina Express No. C-24, which had only
three (3) passengers at that time, or even fifteen (15) passengers, as claimed by the plaintiff. For with this
load, the said bus was undoubtedly travelling without much traction, since its passenger load was not
enough to give it stability while running, considering its size and body weight; and that, therefore, it must
have been, as described by defendant's witnesses, that Carina Express No. C-24, was running fast in a
zigzagging manner along the slippery wet asphalted national highway causing its left rear to jerk towards
the left, with the driver losing control, sideswiping the Ford Fiera in the process, and then continuing its
swerving towards the left until it turned about facing Ozamis City.
Correlatively, it is well-settled that the conclusions of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect and shall not be
generally disturbed on appeal, because it is in a better position that the appellate tribunal to examine the evidence directly
and to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying (Hermo vs. Court of Appeals, 155 SCRA 24). 11
Hence this petition.
The errors assigned by the petitioners are almost identical to those raised before the appellate court. They claim that it was error for the
respondent court to "uphold the decision of the trial court based on the judgment rendered in another case," and "uphold the grant of damages
for the Ford Fiera when the same did not belong to Trencio Almedilla." 12
The petition is devoid of merit.
No error was committed by the respondent court when it upheld the findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 2728.
The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general
rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of
Appeals, 13 the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria,14 which We quote:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of
the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the
case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, 'in the absence of objection,' 'with the knowledge of the opposing party,' or 'at the
request or with the consent of the parties,' the case is clearly referred to or 'the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn
from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.' (Emphasis supplied).
The Court in Tabuena ruled that the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable were not established, such as that ". . ., (t)he
petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending
before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was 'unfairly sprung' upon him, leaving him no opportunity to
counteract." 15
The same is not true in the instant case. Civil Case No. 3156, which the lower court in Civil Case No. 2728 took judicial notice of, decided the
issue of negligence between the driver of the two vehicles involved in the subject collision. It was therefore a matter of convenience, to consider
the decision rendered in that case.
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case
No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. This fact was pointed out by the lower court, to wit:
The . . . findings of the Oroquieta Court became as conclusive upon the company and its driver by their acquiescence and
silence. . . . (Decision of lower court. p. 12; records p. 239)
xxx xxx xxx
Returning to Exhibit "O," supra (Decision, Civil Case No. 3156, CFI, Branch III, Oroquieta City), the Court hastens to add:
Said exhibit has not been objected to nor commented upon by the defendants Company and Enerio, through their
counsel, . . . . 16
This being the case, petitioners were aware that Exhibit "O" (Decision in Civil Case No. 3156) had formed part of the records of the case and
would thereby be considered by the trial court in its decision.
Furthermore, upon perusal of Exhibit "O," and the decision of the lower court in the instant case, there is no showing of any irregularity but
rather a logical discussion of the case and the evidence presented before the court. The lower court did not merely "adopt by reference" the
findings of fact of the Oroquieta court, but used it in its discourse to obtain the conclusions pronounced in its decision.
Petitioner alleges that the Ford Fiera did not belong to Trencio Almedilla, but to its registered owner — Sevilla Lines, and therefore the grant of
damages for its repair was improperly awarded to private respondent Almedilla. This factual matter has already been decided upon in the trial
court.
The fact that the Fiera was owned by Almedilla though registered with Sevilla Line, will not alter the conclusion arrived at by the lower court.
The party who stands to benefit or suffer from the decision is admittedly private respondent Almedilla and not Sevilla Lines. William Sevilla
admitted that the real owner of the vehicle was Trencio Almedilla, in the case for damages by Occidental Land Transportation against Sevilla
Lines and/or William Sevilla.17 Having thus been settled in the lower court, petitioner is now no longer in any position to question the ownership
of the Fiera or the award of damages to private respondent Almedilla.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1990 (CA-G.R. CV No. 10176) affirming the
decision of the trial court dated March 11, 1986, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122480             April 12, 2000

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in
refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep
money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed
the December 24, 1993 Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is hereby DENIED and this Petition for Review is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution5 denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are reflected:
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Less:
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of
the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income
Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for
the same year.
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for
review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as
evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the
amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990
income tax liability.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May
6, 1994.6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount
of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said
amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no
basis to grant the claim for refund. . . .
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to
be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests
upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund.8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491.90, representing excess creditable
withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989.9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
 Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491.
Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or
(2) to credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount
as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would
claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the
excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the
CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the
amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does
not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant
facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA,
Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a
certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be
automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31,
1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to
know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return
clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final
Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein,
the CA did not pass upon that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial.1âwphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax
Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The
paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not
bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary
to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well
as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of every action. They are tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality,
the Return submitted before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990;
accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied. Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to
withhold the tax refund which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but
petitioner's first two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment
Return was attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by respondent were in
fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its
Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897,
involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year
1990 . . . ." 18 Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed
before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even
dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a
tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the
fact appearing therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by
petitioner's other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the
stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be construedstrictissimi juris against the claimant.
Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of
procedure; it may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to disregard this cold, undisputed
fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by
the government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its
taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments
of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in
1989. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123539. June 27, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO AUSTRIA alias "ANOY", accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Charged with, tried, and convicted for the crime of rape, accused-appellant Mariano Austria82 years old at the time of the commission
of the offensenow comes before us to assail the decision, dated 31 October 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-5239, adjudging him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages plus cost of the proceedings.
The information[1], dated 15 January 1995, charged octogenarian accused-appellant Mariano Austria with the rape of minor Prescila
de Vera, as follows:
" That on or about the 22nd day of November 1994 at 12:00 o clock noon (sic) in Barangay San Jose, Municipality of
Aguilar, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused
armed with a scythe, taking advantage of his superior strength, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Prescila G. de Vera against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty after which trial on the merits ensued, where the prosecution presented the
testimonies of complainant Prescila; Myrna de Vera, mother of Prescila; Nieves de Vera, aunt of Prescila; and Dr. Cecilio Guico, Jr.,
the physician who conducted the medical examination on Prescila and prepared the corresponding medical certificate thereon.
At the time of the alleged rape, Prescila was 12 years old having been born on 01 May 1982[2]; accused-appellant claimed to be 82
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, having been born on 12 September 1912.[3] However, no official record or
document was presented or available to ascertain the actual age of accused-appellant.[4]
As gleaned from the collective narration of the prosecution witnesses, the facts unfold.
Twelve-year-old Prescila de Vera, a grade three student and only daughter of Rodolfo de Vera and Myrna Garcia, had been staying
with her grandmother Brigida at San Jose, Aguilar Pangasinan, for a year already prior to the alleged rape.[5]
As a student, Prescila attended the morning and afternoon school sessions at Anonang Elementary School[6] located around ten
kilometers away from Brigidas residence.[7]
On 22 November 1994, as Prescila was passing a ricefield[8] on her way home for lunch, accused-appellant Austria, whom she refers
to as "Lake Anoy,"[9] suddenly accosted her and grabbed her left wrist. Accused-appellant then drew an eight-inch scythe and despite
Prescilas resistance and protestations, dragged the girl toward a part of the field where banana plants abound.[10]
Amid the cover of vegetation, accused appellant poked his scythe on Prescilas throat,[11] removed Prescilas short pants and
underwear and on pain of death forbid her to report the incident. Accused-appellant then removed his short pants, as he was not
donning any underwear, laid Prescila down and, with his finger, fondled Prescilas vagina,[12] which bled. As accused-appellant
commenced to unleash his lust, the young lass felt pain in her vagina.
Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed Prescila, mashed her breast and probed his finger into her vagina. Unsatisfied, accused-
appellant touched himself by masturbating his penis.[13]Then, perched on top of the young girl and while in the heat of fondling himself,
accused-appellant held Prescilas hand. Prescila protested, struggled and pushed accused-appellant away causing the latter to fall
down. She attempted to escape but accused-appellant stepped on Prescilas foot[14] thus rendering futile her efforts to extricate from
the lecherous advancement of accused-appellant.
Insatiated, accused-appellant positioned himself on top of Prescila, inserted his penis into her vagina and worked his way with a
"push-and-pull-movement". Again, Prescila felt pain in her vagina.
Having spent his lust, accused-appellant stood up, wore his short pants and went away. Feeling sick, dizzy and devoid of strength,
Prescila rested for a while after which she put on her underwear and proceeded home.[15]
Upon arriving home and fearing that her grandmother Brigida would whip her, Prescila chose not to divulge immediately the traumatic
event as her grandmother was strict.[16] After the passage of two weeks, however, Prescila, unable to conceal the ordeal to herself,
disclosed the rape incident to her Aunt Nieves de Vera, who eventually reported the same to Brigida.
At the witness stand, Prescila testified that she had her menstrual period on the day accused-appellant ravished her. Further, she
described appellants penis"like a new Peso coin," about an inch in diameter, around four inches in length and black in color.
[17]
 Prescila categorically declared that prior to the rape incident she did not have sexual intercourse with anyone[18] and that as a result
of the rape, she stopped attending school for fear of her life.
On 26 December 1994, Dr. Cecilio Guico, Jr., resident physician of the Mangatarem District Hospital, physically examined Prescila,
which test yielded that[19] Prescilas hymen had old lacerations at "1,3,7 and 9 o clock" which could have been caused by a blunt object
forcibly entered into the victims vagina.[20] According to the medical report, Prescilas vagina was negative for spermatozoa and easily
admitted one examining finger.[21] No other external physical injuries were found at the time of examination which was conducted 34
days after the alleged incident.[22]
In contrast, accused-appellant principally adopted a two-pronged defense riveted on denial and impotency. Thus, according to
accused-appellants testimony, as corroborated by defense witness Rudy Garcia,[23] around noon of 22 November 1994, accused-
appellant was busy harvesting palay in the ricefield owned by Austrias nephew Romualdo Gondayao. As accused-appellant was
conversing with Rudy Garcia, who was then overseeing the mango trees, Prescila, accompanied by another girl, approached[24] and
asked Austria for money.[25] Upon accused-appellants refusal to give money, Prescila grabbed his wallet containing
P1,600.00[26] tucked in the right back pocket of his pants. Accused-appellant then held Prescilas right hand and recovered the wallet
from her. Thereafter, Prescila retreated and from a distance of five meters, picked-up and threw hardened soil at accused-appellant
hitting his right knee.
Beyond this, accused-appellant raised the defense of impotency. On the stand, accused-appellant testified that since reaching the age
of 60 years, his penis is not anymore capable of erection[27] because of his rheumatic condition. Upon reaching the age of 70, he also
claimed to be afflicted with hernia;[28] he cannot anymore run fast because his knees are already weak.[29]
In its bid for acquittal, the defense presented Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta[30] who testified that she examined accused-appellant on 11
January 1995 and found him suffering fromEpidideguio Orchites or "epidition of testicles plus the left tube". According to Dr. Peralta,
the left testicle[31] of accused-appellant was "swollen, larger than the right and tender". She added that the illness, which is different
from Hernia[32] and caused by viral or bacterial infection,[33] is painful.
During trial, the court observed and noted that the forefinger, fourth finger and thumb of the accused are severed from accused-
appellants right hand. The forefinger is about an inch in length.[34]
Moreover, the testimonies of SP02 Luis Padama of the PNP Aguilar Police Station, and Magdalena Fernandez, daughter of accused-
appellant were presented by the defense. Magdalena testified that on 10 September 1994, she heard Prescila crying and reporting to
her Aunt Nieves that one Sammy Valdez, who was drunk, dragged Prescila to his house and raped the young girl. Magdalenas
recollection though was never corroborated.
Similarly, through the testimony of Magdalena, the defense interjected an angle of personal vendetta theorizing that the rape charge
against accused-appellant could have been filed due to Magdalenas refusal to grant Brigidas request to let the latter transfer and
occupy the formers land.[35] Brigida is Prescilas grandmother.
On 31 October 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellant, the decretal portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, in the light of the considerations discussed above, the court finds and holds the accused, Mariano Austria alias
"Anoy", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby sentences the said accused
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and its accessory penalties provided by law and to further pay the costs of the
proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify the victim Prescila de Vera the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant appeal where the defense ascribed to the trial court the following errors:
I
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant Mariano Austria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code considering that:
A. The conduct of Prescila De Vera after the supposed rape belie her claim and seriously puts her
credibility in issue;
B. The delay in reporting the crime was not reasonably explained. Thus, it casts a serious doubt on the
truth of the charge for rape;
C. The prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of impotence on the part of accused-appellant
Mariano Austria who was already eighty-two (82) years old at the time of the alleged rape;
D. The prosecution failed to prove force and intimidation as an element of the crime of rape.
II
The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of the defense when the version of the prosecution is incredible
failing thus to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
A. The story of the prosecution is replete with material inconsistencies and fails to discharge its burden of
proof sufficient to warrant a conviction.
As these proffered arguments are specious, the conviction of accused-appellant Austria necessarily stands.
Beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecutions collective evidence indubitably established not only the commission of the rape but also
accused-appellants precise degree of culpability and guilt therefor. Of equal importance is the glaring fact that Prescila, in open court,
positively identified[36] accused-appellant as the defiler of her virtue.
In an attempt to evade criminal liability, accused-appellant, in effect, assails the credibility of Prescila by casting doubts on
complainants conduct after the incident and by interposing the issue of delay in reporting the crime. On this score, we reiterate the
long-standing rule in this specie of cases, that the lone testimony of a rape victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction.[37] Courts usually lend credence to testimonies of young girls, especially when the facts point to their having been victims of
sexual assault.[38]
Though insensate, the records still reveal that at the time accused-appellant ravaged complainants budding womanhood, Prescila,
despite her being twelve years old, was still in grade three having failed grade one thrice and grade two once.[39] Given the naivet and
limited intelligence of the complainant, we do not believe that she could have fabricated her charges against accused-appellant,
weaving a tale of pure fantasy out of mere imagination. She does not appear to have such inventiveness.[40]
Neither is it proper for us to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior
expected under the circumstances from mature people.[41] Also, it is a matter of judicial cognizance that in rural areas in the
Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their
reputation shall remain untainted.[42]
In the course of trial, the lower court observed that Prescila was sincere and frank in answering questions propounded to her. At
times, Prescila even "shed tears as she recalled and narrated the harrowing experience and tragedy that befell upon her." Of judicial
cognizance is the fact that the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge.[43] Likewise,
the trial court recognized no "tone of hesitancy and artificiality in her voice as she testified and narrated how the accused deflowered
her."
To our mind, Prescilas testimony is unsoiled by deceptiveness and untouched by the vice of falsehood. Her story of defloration, woeful
as it is, bears the earmarks of truth; her narration deserves outmost credence and weight, as opposed to accused-appellants self-
serving declarations and tale of denial.
As to the alleged delay, Prescilas disclosure that she has been raped must not be taken lightly, as it is not uncommon for a young girl
to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue because of the rapists threats on her life, fear of public humiliation, and/or lack of
courage and composure to immediately explain that she has been sexually assaulted.[44]
For while a complainants act in immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by the Court as a factor
strengthening her credibility, delay or vacillation in criminal accusations does not necessarily impair the complainants credibility if such
delay is satisfactorily explained.[45]
In the case before us, the rueful ordeal that Prescila bitterly experienced in the vicious hands of accused-appellant, coupled with the
fear of disappointing her grandmother and the serious threats on her life arewithout doubtmore than enough to cow a young girl from
immediately articulating the bestiality that miserably visited her at such blooming age.
To put it differently, silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim.[46]
Granting too that the delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation made and exercised by the accused on the victim,
such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint.[47]
Contrary to accused-appellants arguments, the prosecution clearly showed that force and intimidation attended the commission of the
crime. Thus on the stand, Prescila narrated how "Lake Anoy", far more advanced in age than her and formidably armed with a scythe,
threatened to snuff out her life if she were not to bow down to accused-appellants salacious desires.
In a decided case,[48] this Court ruled that it is not necessary that force and violence be employed in rape, intimidation is sufficient, and
this includes the moral kind, i.e., threatening the victim with a knife. Moreover, if the use of a knife and the threat of death against the
victims parents was, in People vs. Pada[49] deemed intimidation sufficient to cow the victim into obedience, a fortiori, must we, in the
instant case, uphold the presence of force and intimidation, considering that accused-appellant directed the threats against
Prescilathe victim of rape herself.
Consequently, we consider the aggravating circumstance of deadly weapon[50] in the commission of the rape, contrary to the trial
courts pronouncement that the scythe " is a necessary implement to earn a livelihood of the accused (sic) who is a farmer." As can be
seen, the scythe was used by accused-appellant as a tool to intimidate the victim and facilitate the consummation of this deplorable
offense.
Notably, jurisprudence is replete with cases that threatening the victim with bodily injury while holding a knife or bolo constitutes
intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission to the lustful desires of the molester.[51]
As to the alleged inconsistencies in Prescilas testimony, we consider them to be only minor and trivial so as not to diminish, much less
shatter the weight accorded to her narration concerning the commission of the rape and the identity of the despicable author
thereofaccused-appellant Austria. Besides, Prescilas charge is fortified by the evidence on record specifically the medical findings and
testimony of Dr. Cecilio Guico, Jr., that the lacerations found in the victims hymen could have been caused by a blunt object forcibly
enteredinto Prescilas vagina.[52]
Obviously, when the victims testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physicians findings of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[53]
Arguing on the last ditch, the defense volunteers that "the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of impotence on the part
accused-appellant who was already eighty-two years old at the time of the alleged rape."
This contention is dissident to settled jurisprudence.
Clearly, the presumption had always been in favor of potency.[54] Stated differently, impotencythe physical inability to have sexual
intercourseis considered an abnormal condition and should not be presumed, thus: [55]
"Impotence, in Medical JurisprudenceInability on the part of the male organ of copulation to perform its proper function.
Impotence applies only to disorders affecting the function of the organ of copulation XXX (Dennis, System of Surgery;
Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles Third Revision, Vol. II, p. 1514);
"Impotence.
3. Law & Med. Incapacity for sexual intercourse." (Websters New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, p.
1251).
"Impotency or ImpotenceWant of power for copulation, not mere sterility. The absence of complete power of copulation is
an essential element to constitute impotency. (31 C.J. p. 259)."
In rape cases, impotency as a defense must be proven with certainty to overcome the presumption in favor of potency.[56] Under the
present circumstances, the evidence proffered by the defense failed to discharge such burden, inasmuch as the very testimony of Dr.
Wilma Flores-Peralta repudiates the claim that accused-appellant could not have performed the sexual act.
Although Dr. Peraltas findings prove that accused-appellant was afflicted with "Epidideguio Orchites", such piece of evidence however
does not categorically conclude, nor even hint that Austria was sexually impotent. The evidence on this point is wanting.
Assuming further that accused-appellant was 82 years old as he claimed he was at the time of the commission of the crime, his
advanced age does not ipso facto mean that sexual intercourse is no longer possible, as age is not a criterion taken alone in
determining sexual interest and capability in middle-aged and older people.[57] Moreover, as in People vs. De Guzman[58], the
protestations of accused-appellant that he could not have raped the complainant because he was already old at that time are belied
by his physical condition.
To this end, the trial court had these words to describe accused-appellant Austria:[59]
"During the trial of the case, the court had occasion to observe the movements of the accused and found him still strong,
agile and capable of committing sexual act. In fact, it has been established during the trial that Mariano Austria could still
work in the farm and was harvesting palay at the time the incident happened. The court also entertains serious doubts that
the accused is 83 years old. His physical built, appearance and movements strongly negate the assertion of the defense that
Mariano Austria is 83 years old."
Notwithstanding, we consider accused-appellants old age to mitigate his liability.[60]
As to the proper penalty, where appellant committed the rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the law provides that the range of
penalty imposable on him shall be the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.[61]However, in view of the mitigating
circumstance of his age and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetua shall be meted
to him.
One last note. The records show that at the time of the rape, Prescila had her menstrual period. Regardless, the presence or absence
of menstruation does not negate the crime of rape nor render its execution impossible;[62] lust, after all, manifests no reverence for
occasion, location or the victims condition.
For lechery is a beast that knows no master; it is an ogre that cradles no conscience.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, that in addition to the P50,000.00 awarded as
moral damages,[63] he is ordered to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity[64] plus costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner
portion of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without her consent.[1]
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4
Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half
years old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria
asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias husband Col. Buenafe, [4] she waited until their arrival at
past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Buenafe
thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily
admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped
accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he
admitted the imputations against him, on account of which he was detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa
bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up with her report dated November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the
examining index finger.
xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect
penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.[8]
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997.  He
denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be
ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her
husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in
him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter
because she had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the mother of the victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was going with her gusband (sic) to the children of
the husband with a former marriage.[9]
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly
sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of
having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the
admission was even expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of
November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like this should be absolutely
admissible and competent.
xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon
him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out of fear, having been elicited only after
Cyra Mays parents bullied and questioned him.He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements
during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely as an additional ground to convince
itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence
suffices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
accusations. Thus she testified on direct examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
xxx
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir.[13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details of her ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on November 17, 1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what his penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
 C o u r t:
Continue
xxx
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
xxx
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her
testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he [was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at that time, on November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995
with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellants commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is
vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsels above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having testified that she learned of it on November
20, 1995[16] while Cyra May said that immediately after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it:
[17]
 This is a minor matter that does not detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following portion of her testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that of hearing her mother utter  sinira niya ang
buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television
programs, is preposterous. It is true that the ordinary child is a great weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce (her) to relate
something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience. [19] But Cyra Mays account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy
tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts,
and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial.[20]
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined,
could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May
as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with
the competence to testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others of her age are but her narration of Kuya Ronnies
placing his titi in her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a common childs tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel and of
the Court established her consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a bad act of the accused
unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her
unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to questions further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness.[21] (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra May was already suffering from
pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out
this possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. [22] The
abrasions could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of the examination does not
preclude accused-appellants conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape.[23]
 More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in
both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her
vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for the childs defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to
physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the
following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia majora,[27] proving that there was indeed penetration
of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve
years of age.[28] As shown in the previous discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The
same is true with respect to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[29] provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article
states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases, this Court, in the
recently decided case of People v. Pruna,[30]established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact
age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even
mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old
at the time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel
asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was
born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was
below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final
nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document
should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of
objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age
for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission
of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of
Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. For example, the
Court, in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling inPeople v. Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape
victims age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age
who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen
where minority may seem to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact
that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases [34] holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to which he will not be required to offer
evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the need of evidence. [36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a
loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms
of judicial notice.[37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial
notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the
court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. [38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts
which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the
provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a
person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the
evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do
away with the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does.  A persons appearance, where
relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its
roots in ancient judicial procedure.[39] The author proceeds to quote from another authority:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of
objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of
one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of writings, to determine whether they are
()blemished,() the implements with which a crime was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few
illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries past.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually
regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. [41] Experience teaches that corporal
appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case
such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an
alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious. [42] Consequently,
the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such persons. [43] The formal
offer of the person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting
him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. [44]
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,[45] this Court
ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission
into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may take into
consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not
without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v. Agadas,[46] this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following
january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell exactly because I do not
remember when I was born, but 17 years is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to
that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years
old. He has shown that he has no positive information on the subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the defense to establish by satisfactory
evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance.
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years of
age. There was no other testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving
his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo, held:
We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of Estavillo from the latters personal appearance. There is no proof in the
record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that the trial court had an opportunity
to note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two
years over 18. This appellant testified that he was only 16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference in the
penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the appellants ages were 16 and 14
respectively.
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal
appearance of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a
reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must
be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio
mayor.x x x.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to
accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact
age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the
court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative
value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty
of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of
the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims
age in the present case spells the difference between life and death.[47]
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.  The victim
and her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial
court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second
element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year
old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled
to an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May
Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
 SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, G.R. No. 177809
Petitioners,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
- versus - Acting Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
ABAD,* JJ.

ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
October 16, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
 
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1] (1) reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;[2] and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3]
 
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
 
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located
at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
 
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as
lessees thereof.
 
The contract of lease reads:
 
CONTRACT OF LEASE
 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
 
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
 
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy.
Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
 
- and -
 
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes
Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
 
 
WITNESSETH
 
 
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at  158
Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
 
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the
following terms and conditions, to wit:
 
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine
Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the
monthly rental;
 
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
 
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;
 
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from the
LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original
conditions at their expenses;
 
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of
flammable or combustible materials.
 
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions shall
be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract
they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
 
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of
Manila, Philippines.
 
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
L E S S O R L E S S E E
 
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
 
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
 
Republic of the Philippines)
C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
 
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
 
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on
11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
 
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and
the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
 
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at
the City of Manila, Philippines.
 
 
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
 Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4]
 
 
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she
instituted the aforesaid complaint.
 
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by
receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:
 
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles
located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND[5] Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
 
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
 
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
 
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
 
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
 
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
 
____(sgd.)___
Received by:[6]
 
 
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in
mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still
under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building
giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
 
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five
(5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus,
they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
 
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1stand 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue
corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of
SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December
2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001
to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the
Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the
[Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
 
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
  
SO ORDERED.[7]
 
 
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was
not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only
stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit
the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in
big commercial lease contracts.
 
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles
for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply
goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart
from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for
a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the
lease period.
 
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
 
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is
hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former
 
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
 
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
 
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorneys fees; and
 
(4)               costs of suit.
 
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
 
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of
lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the
alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted
payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church.
According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City
Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
 
SO ORDERED.[9]
 
 
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
 
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
 
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of
prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
 
We disagree.
 
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
 
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
 and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
 
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
 
 
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:
 
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
 
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
 
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed
with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge
of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are commonly known.
 
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the
course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries
or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.[11]
 
 
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [12] which
cited State Prosecutors:
 
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
 
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the
course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries
or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide
variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of
any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
 
 
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet
the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common knowledge or notoriously known.
 
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00
simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that
the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking
of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
 
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to
Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court What need not be proved.
 
 Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State
Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
 
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary
evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
 
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had
been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:
 
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1 st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a
commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie].
The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied
in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between the
parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is
unclear.[13]
 
 
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a
complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively,
which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the
need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
 
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they
occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.
 
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in
the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals
by Spouses Latip.
 
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
 
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
 
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases
that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.
 
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is
most adequate to render it effectual.
 
 
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made
a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this
finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:
 
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles
located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
 
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
 
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
 
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
 
 (sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
 
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
 
___(sgd.) ____
Received by:[14]
 
 
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period
of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but
this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed
pointing to the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that
Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded
payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.
 
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid
rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of  P2,570,000.00,
covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300
is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount
of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.  SO ORDERED.
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON,
MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J.
SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner;
in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner
as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by
such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship
of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has
acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law
partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all
newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when
their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the
fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of
the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is
an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case)
continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising
the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China
Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene asamicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a
Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as
those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of
the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name
of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised
to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the
use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of
non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be
held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees
received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because
such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held
liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations
value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride
on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within
Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a
dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues
the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over
situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of aprofessional partnership, with no
saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable
goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry
on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable
such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as
an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law
on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It
is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been
stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to
business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception
is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the
firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and
changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled
out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their
memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of
the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and
was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy.
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval
of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter
and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local
custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does
not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins
cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly
ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-
making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their
fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There
should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with
no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely,
organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective
firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA
NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-
appellants",and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al., defendants-
appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The Order of
the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate
(part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804
issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan.
Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely:
Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas
and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the
cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation,
petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of
Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of petitioner
whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her
father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A").
Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father,
passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to
Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On
December 13, 1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the
said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the
purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau
of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-
half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name,
which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of
Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7, 1957, also
in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza,
Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon
demand. For her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita Torres. The
ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is
their legitimated child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only
heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the
paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to
petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending its resolution, the
Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two cases, which, however, were later
partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting reconsideration and amending the Decision
of November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres;
 (3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in
equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of
the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties,
each party should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In
case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres,
had the capacity to marry each other. There was no legal impediment for them to marry It has also been established that
Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism
(Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father,
Leon Arbole, and that her father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents were married on June 7, 1909, she became
the legitimated daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal
part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal
shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be
alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres, the former not having been
legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in their brief, the
fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism
(Exhibit "C") shows that she was given the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged
natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children shall be considered legitimated by
subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof, and
Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement of a natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or
in some public document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a natural child should be
made. The certificate of baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This
article of the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a will or other public document, it must be
made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In support thereof, petitioner submitted a
typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority age, and residents of the Municipality of
Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza,
Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of her mother's at the time she was baptized
as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy be made for the change of the surname of
said Macaria de Torres as desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of March 1930.
 
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
Signed in the prsence of:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
x----------------------------------------------------x
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate
being exempt on account of going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate being
exempt on account of her sex.
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO 
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
Not. Reg. No. 56 
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter,
Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may
have attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and contended that it is not newly discovered
evidence which could not have been produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not
new trial should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed of
Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or
having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both
reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente Santillan and
the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are
brother and sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita
Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire
share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis
supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she
cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother,
etc. will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which action may be commenced only
during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in
Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. (Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the
disputed property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted
so that the statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20,
1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further
function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint
lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility
of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial
admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:
Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for new trial, knowing as it does that
the judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part of the
petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered as it was found from the personal belongings of
Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such
vital considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil
Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article
121 of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the consent
necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon petitioner the
status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence,
and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly
discovered evidence, which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if it really had been
in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court
shall also resolve the respective participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997
FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC. and MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents.
RESOLUTION
 
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 3677 promulgated on August 4,
1994 affirming in toto the decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-9801 entitled "Florentino L. Atillo
III versus Amancor, Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
The material antecedents are as follows:
On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AMANCOR for brevity), a corporation then owned and controlled by
petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III , contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured by real
estate properties owned by the petitioner. 1 Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated June
14, 1988 (Annex "A" of the Complaint) with respondent Michell Lhuillier (hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for brevity) whereby the latter
bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of
the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%. 2
In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLLER
executed another Memorandum of Agreement on February 13, 1989 (Annex "B" of the Complaint) by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to
invest additional capital in AMANCOR. 3 As an addendum to the foregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
the petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11, 1989. 4 Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement which provides as follows:
4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of
AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to
re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. 5
Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company. After offsetting the amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which
remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, the latter filed
a complaint for collection of a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. Ceb-9801 against AMANCOR and LHUILLLER before Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
At the pre-trial conference, petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER, assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on the following:
1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 June 1988 (Annex
A), the Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989
(Annex C);
2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to P199,888.89 as of October 1, 1990; 6
and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court:
a. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C, is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable to the plaintiff?
b. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J. Lhuillier, if the latter is liable, pay the
plaintiff? 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner,
ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount of P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing as of March 11, 1989.
LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor. 8
It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to respondent court, arguing therein that as LHULLLIER signed the
Memorandum of Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR, LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and
severally liable with AMANCOR. 9
The respondent court found petitioner's contention bereft of merit and held in part that:
Contrary to plaintiffs-appellants (sic) allegation, the indebtedness of P199,888.89 was incurred by defendant AMANCOR,
INC., alone. A thorough study of the records shows that plaintiff's cause of action for collection of a sum of money arose
from "his payment of the defendant corporation's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company" . . . Considering the allegations in the complaint and those contained in the Memorandum of Agreement, the
respondent court properly ruled that the liability was incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC., singly. We grant that if plaintiff
really believes that the indebtedness was incurred by defendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity, he should not have
offsetted (sic) some of his accounts with the defendant corporation,
. . . As it is, plaintiff could have ofted (sic) to sue defendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity the whole amount of
indebtedness and not implead the defendant corporation as co-defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he indebtedness was incurred by the defendant corporation as a legal entity to pay the mortgage loan. Defendant
Lhuillier acted only as an officer/agent of the corporation by signing the said Memorandum of Agreement. 10
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent court, petitioner brought this instant petition submitting the following issue for the resolution of this
Court:
When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has personal liability in a certain transaction, may a court rule
against such an admission despite clear indications that it was not affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise? 11
Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that:
3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of Amancor,
Inc.
 xxx xxx xxx
3.14. Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to the personal agreement between plaintiff
and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most,
unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned. 12
And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of personal
liability is manifest error for being contrary to law, particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.
Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the consistent pronouncement of this Court that: ". . . an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted
by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not . . . 13
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the
abovementioned provision of law and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it
and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it
is shown that no such admission was in fact made. 14 The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such
an admission.
For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the admission "out of context", then the one
making the admission may show that he made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear." That is the reason for the
modifier
"such". 15 [Emphasis supplied.]
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is
seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer
in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in
AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner. 16 Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made
with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. 17 It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11
has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations,
LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer
asserted the following:
3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B)
and par. 4 of the actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C), Lhuillier did not
engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to release the property to plaintiff. On the
contrary, as explicitly stated in the aforesaid par. 4 of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in the position to repay
said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate."
3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier . . . only agreed, for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre-terminated
corporate loans with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancor's finances, for said corporation to pay interest at
prevailing bank rate. . . . 18 (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the
issues to be resolved by the trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of whether or not LHUILLIER is
personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner. 19 Moreover, as correctly observed by respondent court, if petitioner really
believed that the liability was incurred by LHULLLIER in his personal capacity, then he should not have offset his accounts with those of
AMANCOR's. The foregoing act of petitioner is a clear indication that he recognized AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the obligor.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is
not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs.Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in
open court to override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:
The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and in his declarations in open court differed
will not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general rule, facts
alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and
inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As
ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and against his own
interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his
credibility and we find no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon. 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for
resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as
ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of
Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.
Furthermore, on the basis of the same evidence abovementioned, respondent court did not err when it refused to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction, thereby absolving LHUILLIER of liability for corporate obligations and deciding the question in this wise:
The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporation fiction may be pierced and the
individual shareholder may be personally liable (sic) to the obligations of the corporation only when the corporation is used
as "a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to achieve equity or when necessary
for the protection of the creditors. This situation does not obtain in this case. In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellant failed to
show that defendant Lhuillier acted otherwise than what is required of him as an agent of a corporation. It does not appear
 either that defendant-appellee Michel (sic) Lhuillier is jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR, INC., absent an express
stipulation to that effect and sans clear and convincing evidence as to his personal liability." 21
The foregoing pronouncement is based on factual findings of the lower court which were upheld by the respondent court, and which are thus,
conclusive upon us pursuant to the well established rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on the
record, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 22
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E.
MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued
by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al.,
and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the
amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million
inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups,
using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their
answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements [6] dated December 28, 1993 were executed
by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos
family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the
enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to
be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises
or whereas clauses the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting
petitioners request for legal assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal
provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent
Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the
Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate
transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the
funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed
in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its
resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000,
respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment
pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE
ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE
FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN
THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]
 Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds
sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioners motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her
co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.
In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31,
2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.[10]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed
their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for
reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioners motion
for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no
legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been
without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that --
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E.
MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH
PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT
OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER;
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE
THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R.
MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO
TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR
SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT
ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION
OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13]
 Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration
were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the
Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for
reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore
because said decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength of what had
been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus
belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for
extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on
May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of
availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not
comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to
trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the
Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM
DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents Answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the
case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound
itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3
thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership,
and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly acquired during their incumbency.
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple acquired or own the Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has
no evidence showing how much of the Swiss funds was acquired during the incumbency of the Marcos couple from 31
December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and
income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c)[15] (d),[16] and (e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the
inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can,
therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF
CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND
THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial
statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing
that no such judicial admissions were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE,
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.[18]
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain
requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and incidents
 which should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the
authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned.  Respondent Mrs.
Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially
translated in our known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This
should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of
merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari
under Rule 65[19] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari.
Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is undeniably
ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth
reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first
Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1,
issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting
the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described
by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice
but also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely
serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But
substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and
firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with
dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.[23]
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either
justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic,
summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but
after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents.
This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them.
Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.[25]
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. [26] The theory of summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or
admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct
action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the
position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of
Human Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME
xxx
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976
until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2 hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3 hereof).
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years
from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as follows:
Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the
Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount
of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food
Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development
Mutual Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents receivables from prior years during the
period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an
extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and
that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately
preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as
income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he
has no known law office. As previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda
cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as Miscellaneous Items and Various
Corporations. There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax
transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon
City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any
filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses
paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for
subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes
and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the
Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and
additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet
attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which
FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning
capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to
Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees,
fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is
confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
 24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as
Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto
empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971
in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of
Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12,
1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded
on December 14, 1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981,
Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank
Hofman in Zurich under the account Reference OSER. The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR
FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members
of the Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since
Fides Trust Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATIONas of
February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the
Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986.However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with
SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundations funds to another account or bank but this was prevented by the
timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by
Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA
shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the Marcos Familie
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled
$3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos
dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of
both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Banks
dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM
SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with
the same bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in
haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for Declaration/Specimen Signatures submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the
caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and
maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the
Board of Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed
by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the
first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third
beneficiaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the
outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to
the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later,
WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA
FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category
S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is
certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989
amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities
included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed
by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the Marcos Families.
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS
FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were
named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated
November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions
of FM on November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard
to Charis Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in
writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account
Reference OMAL. The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981.
 40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of
Valamo Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31,
1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to
Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundations German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category
CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the
safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations
directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both
dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong)
and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a
written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited
against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written information from
SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus
the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the
assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad
to dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account Reference Dido, Rayby was dissolved on
April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides
Trust Co, as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner
was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of
Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same
securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is
Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned by Marcos Familie.
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-
Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of
the bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300
with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and
R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-
laws dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further
confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of
Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found among Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that
50% of the Companys assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal
parts among their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr.
Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple,
also mentioned in the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed
to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word JOHN LEWIS. This word will have
the same value as the couples own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier
as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael
Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981
appear to be the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management
of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundations Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258,
respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which
was subsequently transformed into a foundation.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as
shown by Annex R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof.
x x x x x x.[27]
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B
Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being
false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or
the attachments thereto.
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as
to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender
genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial. Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of privity or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago or, on
the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses
were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta
adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children)
adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed
by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
 (g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
     Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner
required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a
long time ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment
made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.[28]
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of
petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent
unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true
terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapiers thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts
surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other
respondents that the funds were lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in
this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can
prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of
denial in respondents answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this
Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in
the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were
supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[31]
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to
Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees,
fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is
confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.[32]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.[33]
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at.[34] Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[35]
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph
22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for
forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations
and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not
having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.[36]
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial
facts alleged in the Republics petition for forfeiture:
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as
to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds
involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with
exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as
their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republics petition for forfeiture. Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that the funds involved were lawfully acquired was an
acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the
petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the
Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a[39] of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank
deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all
respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by
them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the
transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital documents[41]attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos
failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.[42]
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs.
Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed out by
Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and
income of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5)
changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the
Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets
deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.[43]
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and
the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation and
control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and
the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the
contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses
could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and
opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial.[44] An unexplained
denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective
denial.[45]
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of
confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of delay .
[46]
 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by
presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleaders knowledge or means of knowing
is as ineffective as no denial at all.[47]Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the
petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its specific denial of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when
such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.[48]
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense
because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis
the Swiss funds.
      PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
 The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to
present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.[49]
It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses
intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of
documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the
documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine
issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and
specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the
prompt disposition of the action.[50]
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of
their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance
and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning
tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for
summary judgment.
      OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted
by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[51]
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republics motion only
demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
   Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]
Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely
made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine
issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a
beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republics allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos
children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject
matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos
herself. Thats your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this
case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55]
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what
issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now this
Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
   Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either
that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a long time
ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of
the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos
assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss
funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The facts pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising
important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and constituted no genuine
issues for trial.
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise
issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules
must ensue as a matter of law.[56]
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine
issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. [57] A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on
the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine
issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no
serious controversy.[58] Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal
issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to
tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court
is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.[59]
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who had personal
knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or
foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent
pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at
the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a
summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of
petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense
is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail
of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino
people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents good faith should have been made to the court below.Without the
deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy responses like lack of
sufficient knowledge or lack of privity or they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago or, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully
acquired. But, whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate.  It
has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend
that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had
bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment."[60]
 We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary
judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought
may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis
ours)[61]
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served."No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the phrase
"any time after the answer has been served?
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an
examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in
order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may
move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for
summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion for summary
judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served. [62] Under said rule, after issues have
been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive period is provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made
until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary judgment. [64] And like the New
York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the
interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.
And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice,
the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that
the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both
motions and the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil
Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to
summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a
determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not
preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66]
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence.
Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary
judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67] the
defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her
right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for
summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner
moved for summary judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil
Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that
the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go
against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and
loss of time involved in a trial."[68]
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope
that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we
cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That
is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we
hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents answer was filed or, for that
matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for
summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
 This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules
should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."[69]
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had long
been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against
petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert
it.[70] In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the
rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".[71]
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent
Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because of the pending
compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss
funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events
that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because
of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for
forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them
might result unless the action is barred.[72]
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits.
Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by petitioner's
alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights.[73] Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74]
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. [75] Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the
people's case against the Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is
manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA
1379[76] provide:
x x x x x x
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
x x x x x x
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the
State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The
Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss
deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public
officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute.
Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the
personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted in
their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June
1976 to February 1986.[78]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which
referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. [79] The combined accumulated salaries of the
Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.
[80]
 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount
of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couples combined salaries from January to February 1986 in
the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the
corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an
equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to
1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[81]
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the
petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise,
under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government
or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly
prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or
indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x
x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as
counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as
may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima
facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove
the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and
should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the
presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other
sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their
answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the
accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of
record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in
their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking
dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that
respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22
of respondents' answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 8 [86] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the
claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The
whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle
to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final
judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be
eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter
into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their
ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he
did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void.
[89]
 They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they stood on the same ground as an
accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130 [90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following constitutional and
statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunityto the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGGs commitment to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the governments undertaking to cause the
dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the
judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents admission
with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now
deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later
declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have
been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents
contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents.[91]
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the
purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or
delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.[92]
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on
April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We
quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind of agreement
between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were
initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very much always in
search of resolution to the problem of the family and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my
reaction was the same as what I have always why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end to this problem.[94]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the banks in Switzerland which may
necessarily be not cash.[95]
xxx xxx xxx
 PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded through the Philippine
government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadnt really
discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I
was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to
implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end.[96]
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents recognition of their ownership
of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a
fact, such concession has the force of a judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.s testimony that the Marcos family
agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding
the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand
partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own
knowledge.[98]
In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of
the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim
that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating
her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of
such documents, especially those involving William Saunders and Jane Ryan which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos,
respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments
bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with
Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement and the
subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses
defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful
origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and
unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and
transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas admission of the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact the
Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset.
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a
motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Courts protective
mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the
considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the
Marcoses ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of
the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the
Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving
US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final
judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned
human rights victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss
funds and that it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was
able to treat these as judicial admissions. The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and document
submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to
ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this case,
we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which,
by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely
binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former.[107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of estate exists between the declarant and the party, the
term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in rights. [108] Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is
competent.[109] Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested
in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.[110]
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not
borne out by the voluminous records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple
indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by
them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officers
salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been
established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also
evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We believe
petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and
patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an
amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the
Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture
to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2,
whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the
Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.[111]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without
whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations
rendered the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-
inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow,
deprived them of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.[112]
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,[113] taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an
indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable
parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114]
An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot
render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in
his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
 There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and
(2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? [116] There is, however, no fixed formula for determining
who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan
that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the estate of Ferdinand
Marcos.[117] Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings
did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of
the $356 million was neither inimical to the foundations interests nor inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The admission of
respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were established precisely to hide the
money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned
even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned anominal share of the assets. [118] But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs.
Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive
given by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they
might have had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no
longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the action was unnecessary:
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the
companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not
proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed
wealth at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in
terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the
latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Governments cause of action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the
result of their members (or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they
are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to
implead them as defendants in said actions.
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of
the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of
cause of action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable
error, as held in the previously cited case ofRepublic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of
public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion
that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of
amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting
omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old
familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment;
and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no
judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of
judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.[121]
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment
of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the
judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 [122] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the
amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.[123]
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124] on indispensable parties was copied,
allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief. [125] Mere
delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable. [126] Thus, respondent
Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign
foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties
before it though not on the absent party. [127] If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign
foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she
assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify
the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of
the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court
shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse
of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations
were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss
decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
 While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor
the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the public
respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent on the determination
of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to
the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic
or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand
tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits
which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
 GREGORIO SILOT, JR., G.R. No. 159240
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 4, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
 
This is a petition for review of the Decision [1] dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 entitled Estrella de la Rosa v.
Gregorio Silot, Jr. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Joint Decision [2] dated May 24, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Naga City, in Civil Case Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750, and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated May 24, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 61, Naga City in
Civil Cases Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750 is herebyAFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, deleting the award for nominal damages and
reducing the award of attorneys fees to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
Other awards not otherwise modified or deleted stand.
 
SO ORDERED.[3]
As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and respondent Estrella de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-
apartment building on Lot 1-A-9-D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the
total value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover in February 1997 of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased
was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount
due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her repeated demands
fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot.
Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive P1,281,872.40[4] but was only
paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.
The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose
admitted Goingos proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making
of the additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the
total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is onlyP826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess
payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.[5]
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Civil Case No. 3736 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit; while in Civil
Case No. 97-3750, defendant Gregorio Silot is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to the plaintiff, Estrella de la Rosa; to
pay P100,000.00 for [a]ttorneys fees and P50,000.00 as nominal damages.
 
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the instant petition wherein Silot assigned the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE ADMISSION MA[D]E BY ATTY. SAN JOSE ON THE
PURPOSE FOR THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS ARIEL [GOINGO] AS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
 
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING AND ORDERING PETITIONER-APPELLANT TO RETURN
THE AMOUNT OF P191,525.02 TO RESPONDENT APPELLEE AND ALSO TO PAY P20,000.00 ATTORNEY[]S FEES.[7]
Simply stated, petitioner is raising the following issues to be resolved: (1) whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot,
constituted judicial admission of respondents evidence; and (2) whether the appellate court erred in ruling that Silot should return the claimed amount
of P191,525.02 to de la Rosa.
 Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that the subject of Goingos testimony was that stated in the offer of
testimony, but he did not admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty. San Jose could not and should not have admitted the testimony
because he had no special power of attorney to enter into such stipulations or to compromise his clients right without the latters direct intervention.[8]
Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as well as the negligence of their counsel. She enumerates several Court
decisions to support her contention, among them the following cases:
(1) Ongson v. People,[9] where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified admission that he received private complainants demand letter with
notice of dishonor. The admission binds him considering that he never denied receipt of the notice of dishonor.
(2) Republic v. Sarabia,[10] where the Court held that an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and are conclusive as to him.
(3) People v. Genosa,[11] Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran,[12] Carandang v. Court of Appeals,[13] in which cases the Court held that judicial admissions are
conclusive upon the party making it and may not be contradicted in the absence of prior showing that the admission had been made through palpable mistake,
or no admission was in fact made.
(4) People v. Razul[14] and Lim v. Jabalde,[15] where it was held that stipulations are recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions,
hence, binding upon the parties.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel.[16] The only exception to
this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.[17]
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would plainly show, Silot was not
deprived of his day in court.Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to controvert or
correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given every opportunity to be heard
through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for
plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silots counsel, if he would admit the purpose for
which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that We will admit
that. And when asked by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.[18]
More importantly, Silots counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed
with. In People v. Hernandez,[19] we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions,
to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing
and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed
thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: [] an attorney who is employed to manage a partys conduct of a lawsuit []
has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be
withdrawn are conclusive. (Italics supplied.) In fact, judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record,
who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with
proof of some fact, [] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the
admissions had been made through palpable mistake.[21]
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals,[22] this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and dispensing with the testimony of
the proposed witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as summarized in the offer
made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel.  With the said admission, the testimony of said witness is uncontroverted
and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.[23]
On the issue of insufficient payment, Silot avers that he has rendered or provided labor for the total amount of P1,281,872.40, and that de la Rosa
has benefited and profited from these labors. [24] Without the labors provided by Silot, the constructed building would not have been painted, provided with
electrical works and other works which were additional works on the building, and that to sanction de la Rosas claim would be to allow unjust enrichment on
the part of de la Rosa.[25] However, this claim has been belied by the admission made by his own counsel, as plainly manifest in the transcript:
ATTY. TERBIO
The purpose for which this witness will testify are the following: If admitted, we are willing to dispense the testimony. He will testify
that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the
additional works mentioned were all considered; he will testify that Silot was paid of all works that was performed as
well as all materials supplied were considered, and that the sum total of which is P2,504,469.65 and 33% of which
is P826,474.98, and that De la Rosa paid the total amount of P1,018,000.00, and therefore, there is an excess payment
of P191,525.00; he will testify that De la Rosa never received the demand or was confronted by Silot regarding an
alleged balance, now, if the counsel wish to admit this.
 
ATTY. SAN JOSE
 
We admit that.
 
ATTY. TERBIO
 
Because these are all evidentiary and this has not been adequately covered.
 
ATTY. SAN JOSE
 
We will admit that.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, given the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals did not err in ordering petitioner to return to respondent the amount
of P191,525.02 overpayment.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68062 is AFFIRMED.Petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to respondent Estrella de la Rosa, and to
pay P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 
 RUSTICO ABAY, JR. and REYNALDO DARILAG, G.R. No. 165896
Petitioners,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 19, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated October 27, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No.
25212. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, finding petitioners guilty of the crime
of Highway Robbery in Criminal Case No. 9045-B.
The facts are as follows:
On January 13, 1995, an Information was filed charging Rustico Abay, Jr., Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde, Ramon Punzalan, Ariston
Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello and Danilo Pascual with the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. Said information reads:
xxxx
That on or about 7:30 oclock in the evening of February 17, 1994, at the South Luzon Expressway, Municipality of Bian,
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Ramoncito Aban y Casiano, Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano,
Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon Punzalan y Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario, Leonardo Perello y Esguerra and Danilo Pascual
y Lagata, who are principals by direct participation, conspiring and confederating together with Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y
Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, who are principals by indispensable cooperation and mutually helping each other, form
themselves as band of robbers and conveniently armed with handguns and deadly bladed weapons, and while on board a Kapalaran
Bus Line with plate number DVT-527 bound for Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a semi stainless owner type jeep with plate number PJD-599 as
backup vehicle, accused with the use of the aforesaid handguns and bladed weapons with intent to gain and taking the passengers of
the bus by surprise, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest and take away personalties of the passengers and/or
occupants therein, among them were:
a)            Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana, P3,500.00 cash;
b)            Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat, P30,000.00 cash, $2,000.00 dollars and eyeglasses (Perare) worth P5,000.00;
c)            Lilian Ojeda y Canta, P120.00 cash;
d)            Paul Masilang y Reyes, assorted used clothes of undetermined amount;
and by reason or on occasion of the said robbery, accused shot passenger Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, inflicting upon him gunshot
wounds on the neck, thus, accused performed all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of homicide, but nevertheless,
did not produce by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely medical assistance rendered to
Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, and to his damage and prejudice and to the damages and prejudices of the following:
a)            Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana in the sum of P3,500.00;
b)            Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat in the sum of P30,000.00;
c)            Lilian Ojeda y Canta in the sum of P120.00
That the commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band and with the
use of motor vehicle.
With the additional aggravating circumstance that accused Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, being
prison guards, have taken advantage of their public position by bringing out prison inmates and equipped them with deadly weapons
and were utilized in the commission of robbery:
With the further additional aggravating circumstance on the following accused/inmates, as follows:
1)      Ramoncito Aban y Casiano with prison number 121577 as recidivist, having been convicted by final judgment on
June 15, 1984 by the RTC, Branch VI, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3874-M for Robbery with Homicide;
2)      Ariston Reyes y Plaza with prison number 115906-P, as recidivist, having been convicted by final judgment on
March 11, 1982 by the CFI, Manila in Criminal Case No. 82-3001 for Robbery; having been convicted by final
judgment on September 2, 1987 by the RTC Branch 94, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. 37432 for Robbery; and
for Reiteracion or habituality for having served sentence for Homicide, convicted on March 25, 1991 by the RTC,
Branch 34, Quezon City;
 3)      Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario with prison number 129552-P for reiteracion or habituality for having been
previously punished for an offense of murder in Criminal Case No. 039 by the RTC, Branch 5, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
and as a recidivist for having been previously convicted by final judgment on July 8, 1987 by the same Court in
Criminal Case No. 040 for Robbery;
4)      Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico with prison number 132566-P as a recidivist for having been previously convicted by
final judgment on August 31, 1988 by the RTC, Branch 163 Manila, in Criminal Case No. 71060 for Theft;
5)      Ramon Punzalan y Carpena with prison number 113605-P as recidivist for having been previously convicted by
final judgment by the RTC, Branch 111, San Pablo City on the following dates, to wit:
January 8, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 2454-SP, for Robbery in Band;
December 8, 1981, in Criminal Case No. 2549 for Theft;
October 7, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 2550-SP for Carnapping; and
Having been previously convicted by final judgment by the City Court of San Pablo City on March 30, 1981 in
Criminal Case No. 17738 for simple theft;
6)      Ernesto R[i]calde y Jov[i]llano with prison number N92P-2735, as a recidivist for having been previously convicted
by final judgment on August 2, 1992 by the RTC, Branch 54, Lucena City in Criminal Case No. 91-679 for simple
theft.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, upon motion filed by accused Ramoncito Aban, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and
private complainants Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino, he was allowed to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty. Thus, on September 11,
1997, Ramoncito Aban, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded guilty to the crime of simple robbery and on even date, the trial court sentenced him. Meanwhile,
trial proceeded with respect to the other accused.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Thelma Andrade, Gloria Tolentino and Ramoncito Aban.
Thelma Andrade, a conductress of the Kapalaran Bus Line, testified that in the evening of  February 17, 1994, the bus she was on was held-up. She
said that Ramoncito Aban took from her, at gunpoint, the fares she collected from the passengers of the bus. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. and
Ernesto Ricalde as two of the other companions of Aban. [5]
Gloria Tolentino, a passenger of the bus, testified that someone shouted hold-up and ordered them to bow their heads. She obeyed the order but once in a
while she would raise her head. According to Tolentino, the man seated beside her, Ariston Reyes, took her money and pieces of jewelry and handed them
over to Reynaldo Darilag. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. as one of the companions of the robbers. [6]
Ramoncito Aban, the last witness, testified that on February 22, 1994, Camacho and Espeleta, who were both prison guards of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
took him and his companions, Ricalde, Abay, Jr., Punzalan, Darilag, Reyes, Perello and Pascual, on board the owner-type jeepney of Camacho to stage a
hold-up. He said they held-up a Kapalaran bus and it was Punzalan and Darilag who took the money and other belongings of the passengers in the bus. He
further testified that the February 22, 1994 hold-up was the fourth staged by their group. According to Aban, the other hold-ups were carried out on
February 11, 13 and 17, and all four hold-ups were staged by the same persons.[7]
The defense, for its part, presented the testimony of petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr., and Reynaldo Darilag, the other co-accused,
and Genaro Alberto.
All the accused denied participation in the robbery that happened on February 17, 1994. Abay, Jr., Darilag, Reyes and Ricalde, who were detention
prisoners, testified that they were confined in the NBP at the time the incident happened. [8] Pascual and Perello, both civilians, testified that they were at home
then.[9] Genaro Alberto, a prison guard at the Bureau of Corrections, testified that during the headcount of the inmates conducted at 5:00 p.m. and 8:00
p.m. on February 17, 1994, no inmate was found to be missing.[10]
In a Decision dated November 29, 2000, the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 found petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, as well as the other accused guilty of
the crime charged.The trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment convicting accused Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico,
Ramon Punzalan y Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag yApolicario, Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles, Cesar Camacho y Deolazo,
Leonardo Perello y Esguerra and Danilo Pascual y Lagata of the crime of highway robbery/holdup attended by the aggravating
circumstance of a band only and hereby sentences each of them:
1)      to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment [of] twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to thirteen (13)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days as maximum, both of reclusion temporal in its minimum period;
2)      to indemnify Thelma Andrade, the amount of P3,500 and Gloria Tolentino, the amount of P30,000 and US$2,000; and
3)      to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Court of Appeals on appeal acquitted Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan of the crime charged but affirmed the conviction of petitioners Abay,
Jr. and Darilag, Ricalde and Reyes. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated October 27, 2003 states:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 9045-B,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, but only insofar as accused-appellants Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho and Ramon Punzalan, are
concerned, for insufficiency of evidence. Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho and Ramon Punzalan are herebyACQUITTED. Unless held for
any other charge/charges their immediate release is hereby ordered.
With respect to accused-appellants Rustico Abay, Jr., Ernesto Ricalde, Reynaldo Darilag and Ariston Reyes, the said decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch31, in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of highway robbery/hold-up is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but their motion was denied. Hence, they filed the instant petition
raising a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONIES OF RAMONCITO ABAN, THELMA ANDRADE
AND GLORIA TOLENTINO.[13]
Stated simply, did the Court of Appeals err in affirming on the basis of the testimonies of said three witnesses the conviction of petitioners Abay,
Jr. and Darilag?
In their petition,[14] petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag assert that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. They argue that  Ramoncito Aban is
not a credible witness and that he testified on an incident which happened on February 22, 1994 and not on February 17, 1994 as alleged in the
information. Petitioners also claim that no physical evidence linking petitioners to the crime was presented. They likewise point to a related case filed
against them wherein they were acquitted. They fault the trial court and Court of Appeals for disregarding their defense of alibi and in giving credence to
the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino, contending that these testimonies were incredible and unsubstantiated. They likewise contend that the lower
courts erred in relying on Abans extrajudicial confession which was coerced.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) challenges the petition on the ground that the petition raises a question of fact.  It also maintains that Aban is a
credible witness and that petitioners defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. [15]
After a thorough examination of the evidence presented, we are in agreement that the appeal lacks merit.
At the outset, we note that it was not Abans extrajudicial confession but his court testimony reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial
admission, pointing to petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in convicting petitioners of the crime charged.  Settled is the rule that when
the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay.  It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an
eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates. [16] Here, the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during the
trial. Thus, such confession already partook of judicial testimony which is admissible in evidence against the petitioners.
We likewise agree in finding without merit the petitioners argument that, since Abans testimony is not credible as to Espeleta, Camacho
and Punzalan who were acquitted, then it should also be held not credible as to them. But in our considered view, the petitioners are not similarly situated
as their aforementioned co-accused. Other than the testimony of Aban, there were no other witnesses who testified on the participation of Espeleta,
Camacho and Punzalan. In contrast, anent the herein petitioners participation in the crime, not only is their conviction based on the testimony of  Aban, but
it was also established by the eyewitness testimony of Andrade and Tolentino who identified positively the petitioners in open court.
Petitioners further aver that Aban testified on a robbery which took place on February 22, 1994, not February 17, 1994. Granted that Ramoncito Aban in
fact testified on the details of the robbery which happened on February 22, 1994. However, it is also worth stressing as part of the prosecution evidence
that Aban testified that malefactors used the same route and strategy in the perpetration of the robberies which happened on four occasions -- February 11,
13, 17 and 22, 1994. What happened on February 22 was but a replication, so to speak, of the robbery scenarios earlier perpetrated by the same gang on three
previous dates. It is very clear, however, that Aban, on the witness stand was testifying specifically also about the offense that took place on February 17 in the
Expressway, Bian, Laguna.
Petitioners claim that no physical evidence was presented by the prosecution linking the petitioners to the crime charged. But in this case, the alleged
failure of the prosecution to present physical evidence does not adversely affect the over-all weight of the evidence actually presented. Physical evidence would
be merely corroborative because there are credible witnesses who testified on the complicity of petitioners in the crime charged.[17]
Further, petitioners assert that in a similar case filed against them, they were acquitted by the trial court of Imus,  Cavite. As correctly observed by
the OSG, there is no showing that the amount and quality of evidence in the present case and those in the case where petitioners were allegedly acquitted
are the same. Indeed, if petitioners truly believed that the prosecution evidence is deficient to establish their  guilt, their defense could have earlier filed a
demurrer to evidence in this case. But, they did not.[18]
Additionally, petitioners claim that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense of alibi. [19] However, we are in
agreement with the OSG that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused in this case.
Worth stressing, this Court has consistently ruled that the defense of alibi must be received with suspicion and caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated. [20] Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the positive
identification of the accused. An alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioners by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify
falsely.[21]
In this case, petitioners defense of alibi rested solely upon their own self-serving testimonies. For their defense of alibi to prosper, it should have been
clearly and indisputably demonstrated by them that it was physically impossible for them to have been at, or near, the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. But as the trial court correctly ruled, it was not impossible for the petitioners to be at the scene of the crime since petitioners place of detention is
less than an hour ride from the crime scene. Moreover, no dubious reason or improper motive was established to render the testimonies of Andrade, Tolentino
and Aban false and unbelievable. Absent the most compelling reason, it is highly inconceivable why Andrade, Tolentino and Aban would openly concoct a story
that would send innocent men to jail.[22]
Similarly, petitioners assert that the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino are incredible and unsubstantiated.  They question the failure of
Tolentino to identify Punzalan in court, and stress that Andrade and Tolentino were not able to identify all the accused. The OSG, on the other hand,
maintains that the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino are credible since the facts testified to by them and Aban support each other.
We find petitioners allegations untenable. The testimonies given by Andrade, Tolentino and Aban corroborate each other. Their testimonies agree
on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole. The failure of Tolentino to point to Punzalan in court does not dent her
credibility as a witness. It must be noted that it took years before Tolentino was placed on the witness stand. As to the allegation that the testimony of Andrade
and Tolentino are incredible because they were not able to identify all the accused deserves scant consideration. During the robbery, they were told to bow
their heads and hence, they were only able to raise their heads from time to time. It is but logical that the witnesses would not be able to identify all of the
accused.
Considering the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented by the parties, we are in agreement that the crime of Highway
Robbery/Brigandage was duly proven in this case. As defined under Section 2(e) of Presidential Decree No. 532, [23] Highway Robbery/Brigandage is the
seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway. Also, as held in People v. Puno:[24]
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime
is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants
 Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against
only a predetermined or particular victim[Emphasis supplied.]
The elements of the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage have been clearly established in this case. First, the prosecution evidence demonstrated with
clarity that the petitioners group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery in a highway. Next, there is no predetermined victim.
The Kapalaran bus was chosen indiscriminately by the accused upon reaching their agreed destination -- Alabang, Muntinlupa.
All told, we rule that petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway
Robbery/Brigandage.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 27, 2003 and the Resolution dated October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No.
25212, affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 
G.R. No. 106094 December 28, 1992
PSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION), petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 132, Makati, Metro Manila, NOTARY PUBLIC ENRIQUE I.
QUIASON, and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.
RESOLUTION
 
BELLOSILLO, J.:
At issue in this petition for review is whether a request for admission directed to an adverse party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court
may be answered only by his counsel.
On 17 March 1988, petitioner PSC Financial Corporation (PSCFC) filed a complaint against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) for annulment of foreclosure proceedings and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-368.
Petitioner PSCFC alleges that as land developer it availed itself of the Home Financing Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the
amount of P6,630,690.00 as "developer loan." As security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which properties
were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only after
the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of
the loan value of the lots and houses bought by them. However, on 25 September 1987, without the loan having matured as none of the lots
have been conveyed to buyers, such that the latter could now take the place of petitioner as mortgagors, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of private respondent Banco Filipino.
In their answer of 10 June 1988, private respondents admitted the loan of P6,630,690.00 for which petitioner had executed a promissory note
secured by a real estate mortgage on the properties described in the complaint. However, they denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco
Filipino's Home Financing Plan, averring instead that under the promissory note and the contract of mortgage, the subject loan would fall due "1
year from date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose the mortgage under Act
No. 3135 as in fact it did, upon compliance with the legal requirements with respect to extrajudicial foreclosures.
On 21 June 1988, petitioner served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain matters set forth as follows:
1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) ... was ... granted by you under BF Home Financing Plan, on the security of mortgages constituted
on the lands acquired, under the terms of which the developer loans, despite the contents of the covering promissory notes
and security instruments, would mature only after the development of the acquired lands into residential subdivision and the
resale of the ... lots ... to interested third parties who would then be substituted as mortgagors ...
2. ... in 1984, availing itself of your said Home Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained from you a loan ... of P6,630,690.00 for
which it signed in your favor a promissory note on the security of a mortgage constituted on ... lots, which were not then yet
sold to any third person ...
3. ... on September 25, 1987, without the said loan having yet matured for the reason that none of the ... lots had yet been
the subject of sale to third persons such that substitution of the latter as mortgagors in your favor could not yet be had, a
certificate of sale was executed by the Notary Public over the ... lands in your favor. 1
On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun.
Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans.
However, respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the maturity of the debt
would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots.
On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having
been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968
and therefore did not have personal knowledge of the financing scheme. The second request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did not
send a formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of
general circulation.
By way of response made 26 August and 4 November 1988, respondent Banco Filipino objected to the matters requested on the ground of
irrelevancy and denied all the rest. In its motion of 7 November 1988, petitioner asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be
admitted in its second bid for admission should be considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was not
qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted. In insisting that only a client could make a
binding admission in discovery proceedings, petitioner cites Koh v. IAC. 2 It even went to the extent of quoting in its petition, found on pages 15
-16, certain paragraphs supposedly taken therefrom which are not actually found therein, except the last paragraph which states: "... All the
parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case."
In any case, the lower court was not persuaded, so that petitioner went to the Court of Appeals maintaining that there was a tacit admission of
the matters included in its second request for admission as the answer thereto was signed only by Atty. Fortun who had no personality to do so.
The appellate court sustained the trial court; hence, this instant recourse.
Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party himself and nobody else, not even
his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn
statement would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it must be the part itself who must respond to the
request for admission and that a mere reply made and verified by its counsel alone is insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent
behind recourse to modes of discovery.
The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ... 3
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which
enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and
their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trail in behalf of the client,
he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure ..."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party
may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously;
otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, 4 as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rule of Court. 5
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino,
which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the
response made by its counsel in its behalf.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to: (a) DENY the instant petition for utter lack of merit; and, (b) REQUIREcounsel for petitioner, ATTY.
LUTGARDA C. BAQUIRAN-PERALTA, of the BALGOS & PEREZ LAW OFFICE, 5th Floor, Corinthian Plaza, Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro
Manila, to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why she should not be administratively dealt with for misquoting the text of the
decision in Koh v. IAC, supra, to support her position and attain a favorable judgment for her client.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of
P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was dishonored for the reason that the
said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent
hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the
offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made
during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on
August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
(Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador,
No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November
25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What
the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to
submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of
Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the
culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set
aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to
the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner, 
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, respondents.
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that
his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was
pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife
as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January,
1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R.
Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason
petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to
represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal
with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him
as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will
unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his
evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962
when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal
to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964, petitioner now files his
petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal
separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or
divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court). The same
rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously because
the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred
and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance
and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the
fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the
court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo
vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79;
Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER.
G.R. No. 72806 January 9, 1989
EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ, petitioners, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO VALMEO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners seek herein the review and reversal of the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-
06317 1 which dismissed their petition for certiorari questioning, inter alia, the judicial foreclosure and the judicial confirmation of the subsequent
sale of their property pursuant to the judgment of the therein respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VIII; 2 as well as the
resolution 3 of the herein respondent court denying their motion for reconsideration.
The challenged decision of the respondent court provides the factual background of this case, thus:
The relevant and undisputed facts indicate that petitioners mortgaged certain properties to private respondents who
eventually sued them for non-payment and for the judicial foreclosure of aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court. In the course of the proceedings a compromise agreement was reached and this became the basis of the
Judgment on Compromise issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Pertinent parts of the Agreement, as embodied in the decision, reads:
3. Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00 within the period agreed upon, the plaintiff shall deliver to
the defendants Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32286 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch,
together with all the documents submitted to the plaintiff;
4. Should the defendants fail to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, the defendants shall pay plaintiff the
entire sum of P92,149.00 under the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'C' and an additional
sum of P44,700.00 as attorney's fees;
5. Upon failure of the defendants to pay the sums agreed upon within the period stipulated, plaintiff shall be entitled to a writ
of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages subject matter of this litigation and to the principal sum of
P300,000.00 in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'B shall be added the sum of
P44,700.00 as attorney's fees.
For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of the agreement, private respondent moved for a writ of
execution. The mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an auction sale and were purchased by the private
respondents as the highest bidder. The sale was latter judicially confirmed. 4
Preliminarily, We dispose of the procedural issue raised by petitioners over the statement of respondent court that appeal should have been
their proper remedy in said court at that juncture, since their objections to the judicial foreclosure proceeding and the subsequent confirmation
of the sale, if correct, would constitute errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners' justification of their remedy, contending that the
compromise agreement was null and void and that the writ of execution thereafter issued and enforced was invalid, as well as their arguments
thereon, are pointless at this stage. The fact remains that, obviously in the broader interests of justice, the respondent court nevertheless
proceeded to decide the petition for certiorari and ruled on the specific points raised therein in a manner akin to what would have been done on
assignments of error in a regular appeal. The petition therein was, therefore, disposed of on the merits and not on a dismissal due to erroneous
choice of remedies or technicalities.
Central to the controversy as the vital issue for resolution, instead, is the submission of petitioners that the aforestated judgment on
compromise was null and void ab initio because it allegedly "denied them their equity of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court, by not allowing the petitioners to pay 'into court within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of said
order,' and that it is only if the petitioners default in said payment that the property should be sold to pay the judgment debt." 5
The provision relied upon reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth
in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including
interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be sold
to realize the mortgage debt and costs.
The procedure outlined therein obviously refers to the situation where a full-blown trial, with the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that
the trial court has to thereafter determine whether the allegations in the complaint have been proved, then ascertain the total amount due to the
plaintiff, and thereafter render judgment for such amount with an order for the payment thereof in accordance with the prescription of the
aforequoted section, sans the agreement of the parties on those particulars. There being no such agreement, the specified procedure has
necessarily to be followed and the minimum period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred to as the period for the exercise of the equity,
as distinguished from the right, of redemption has to be observed and provided for in the judgment in the foreclosure suit. Jurisprudentially, it
has also been held that the exercise of the equity of redemption may be made beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure sale is
confirmed by the court. 6
It stands to reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure cannot be of substantial application to, and can be modified by, a valid agreement of
the parties, such as in the compromise agreement subject of and constituting the basis for the judgment on compromise rendered in Civil Case
No. 7418-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, as hereinbefore stated. The dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot apply since
the parties therein had specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid, when they should be paid and the effects of non-payment or violation of
the terms of their agreement. Thus, the petitioners undertook to pay on the obligation subject of the compromise agreement, P55,000.00 on or
before August 20, 1984 and P320,000.00 on or before September 30, 1984 7 and, in case of default on their part, the consequences are spelled
out in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their aforequoted compromise agreement, 8 all of which are premised on the precise contingency of failure by
the petitioners to comply within the period stipulated.
Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the happening of the aforesaid contingency contemplated therein, private respondent Godofredo
Valmeo shall be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages subject matter of said litigation. It is noteworthy that
this particular proviso is what distinguishes this case from other judicial foreclosure cases decided on the bases of compromise agreements but
which did not have the same specification. Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein thereby waived their so called equity of redemption and
the case was necessarily removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule 68 insofar as its provisions are inconsistent with the judgment on
compromise.
This is not an isolated proposition as it may initially appear. True, the procedural requirement in Section 2 grants a substantive right to the
mortgagor, consisting of the so-called equity of redemption, which after the ordinary adversarial course of a controverted trial of a case may not
be omitted in the relief to be awarded in the judgment therein. 9 The same, however, may be waived, as already demonstrated.
In the same manner, the procedural requirements for the appointment of and proceedings by commissioners in actions for expropriation 10 and
judicial partition 11 may be said to likewise confer substantive rights on the party defendants therein, which procedural steps may not be omitted
over their objection but can likewise be waived or dispensed with on mutual agreement. In these three special civil actions, although dissimilar
in the specific procedure in their special features, their rationale and specific objectives are congruent in that they afford added protection to
proprietary rights, but which additional protection may be waived, as by stipulations to that effect in compromise agreements.
It is hornbook knowledge that a judgment on compromise has the effect of res judicata on the parties and should not be disturbed except for
vices of consent or forgery. 12 To challenge the same, a party must move in the trial court to set aside the said judgment and also to annul the
compromise agreement itself, before be can appeal from that judgment.13 Definitely, the petitioners have ignored these remedial avenues.
There can be no pretension that the compromise agreement as formulated and approved is contrary to law, public policy or morals or that the
same was tainted with circumstances vitiating consent. The petitioners entered into the same duly assisted by competent counsel and the entire
judicial proceeding was under judicial scrutiny and supervision.
Hence, as correctly observed by the respondent court:
(1) Re the 'equity of redemption'. It is true that under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, the debtor-mortgagor is allowed a period
of 90 days within which to pay his debt, to prevent foreclosure, but this right, to Our mind was impliedly waived when the
parties signed the compromise agreement, which was later embodied in the Judgment. The agreement in effect says that
upon breach of the same (and this fact is not disputed), foreclosure should be resorted to. The agreement was clear that
payment had to be made within the stipulated period. It would be absurd to say that after said stipulated period, petitioners
would still be given an additional 90-day period for the 'equity'. Had petitioners intended still an exercise in 'equity', they
should have insisted on a clarificatory provision in the agreement. 14
Petitioners next shift to the writ of execution pursuant to which the foreclosure sale was conducted by respondent sheriff, stigmatizing it as a
falsified writ of execution. This is unwarranted and baseless.
What actually transpired was that the respondent Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution on October 9, 1984 containing the following
directives:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to execute and make effective the aforequoted decision of this Honorable
Court dated August 20, 1984 and make a return of this writ within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. But if sufficient
property cannot be found thereon, then we command you that of the land and building of said defendants you make the said
sum of money. 15
This honest and inconsequential mistake on the part of the respondent clerk, subsequently rectified by the respondent sheriff, was satisfactorily
explained by the court a quo in its order resolving several motions on May 27, 1985 16 as follows:
As to the alleged defect in the writ of execution, the mortgagors could have moved to have the writ quashed before the
confirmation of the sale, but they failed to raise that point or any point for that matter. He alleged defect in the writ of
execution is that it differs from that quoted in the notice of sale. The writ issued by the Branch Clerk of Court included an
extra sentence which reads: 'But if sufficient personal property cannot be found thereon, then we command you that of the
land and buildings of said defendants you make the said sum of money.' The surplusage is understandable and excusable
as these wordings are usually included in the standard form copied by the stenographer in ordinary writs of execution. It has
been held that if the writ of execution does not conform to the judgment, the writ may be amended so that the judgment may
be properly satisfied. In fact, the slight difference between the writ handed by the Branch Clerk and that reproduced in the
notice of sale was for the reason that the Deputy Sheriff, realizing the imperfection of the original writ, rectified it by
eliminating the surplusage to make it conform to the terms of the judgment. Although the better step that should have been
taken by the sheriff was to inform the Branch Clerk about it for the proper amendment, the rectification done by said sheriff,
in effect, was confirmed and adopted by the court when it confirmed the sale without any objection from the herein movants.
At any rate, there is no showing of any detriment to the interest of the mortgagee resulting from this rectification. 17
Petitioners' complaints about the supposed irregularity in the publication of the notice of sale involve questions of fact which cannot be resolved
by this Court. Furthermore, petitioners had all the opportunity, in the several motions filed in and heard by the trial court and especially in the
hearing for the confirmation of sale, to ventilate the alleged irregularities but they never did so.
Neither are We inclined to nor justified in disturbing the factual findings of the respondent court debunking petitioners' claim that private
respondent Valmeo had, subsequent to the foreclosure sale of the property, agreed to allow petitioners to redeem the property. In reliance upon
the findings of the trial court in its orders of October 8, 1984 18 and March 20, 1985, 19 the respondent court categorically declared:
(5) Re the 'new agreement to redeem'. There was actually NO SUCH AGREEMENT. True, petitioners had been informed in
Court by private respondents' previous counsel (Atty. Cecilio de la Merced) that he was allowing petitioners 'to redeem'. BUT
this was without any authorization from the private respondents. In fact, in due time, private respondents were able to inform
the respondent Judge of this non-authorization and the Judge was able to rectify her previous order allowing such
'redemption'. Be it noted that aforementioned previous counsel's services were TERMINATED by the private respondents. 20
Petitioners close their jeremiad by an appeal for consideration on ground of equity. However, We also recognize the principle of countervailing
equity in favor of the adverse party, opposed to that which petitioners seek to be recognized, and which should not be subordinated because it
is of equal strength and equally deserving of consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.