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Appraising the “Thucydides Trap” Geographically: The Korean Factor in Sino‐

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 Appraising the “Thucydides Trap” Geographically:
The Korean Factor in Sino-US Relations

Xiangfeng Yang*

In lieu of taking stock of the many problems presently plaguing Sino-US

relations, this research zeroes in on just one of them – the evolving situ-
ation on the Korean Peninsula that has both alarmed and captivated the
world. Korea, prima facie, is a case that has the likely potential to erupt
into an open conflict between China and the United States. Situated
against the broad context of great power entanglement on the Peninsula,
this paper examines the convergence, as well as divergence, of interests
and strategic objectives for both China and the United States in terms of
areas of cooperation and competition. It argues that their shared aver-
sion to a war, and the complex, multilateral nature of the matter, distin-
guishes Korea from other disputes, particularly Taiwan and the South
China Sea. Korea, therefore, is not at the center of a Sino-US Thucydi-
des Trap. Nevertheless, Sino-US competition to shape the future of the
strategic landscape of the Peninsula will undoubtedly continue and might
even intensify.

Key words: Thucydides Trap, Sino-US relations, North Korea, complete,

verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement.

Introduction
The “Thucydides Trap,” popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham
Allison, has captured the public’s imagination with the long, simmering, wide-
ranging tensions in Sino-US relations, while injecting into the debate an unmis-
takable dose of foreboding.1 At the same time, not only has it been criticized for

*The author would like to thank Son Daekwon and the anonymous reviewers for comments and
suggestions.

1. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Pacific Focus, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (August 2019), 183–203.

doi: 10.1111/pafo.12144
© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

183
184 / Pacific Focus

its Western-centric biases2 and for being part of the “hackneyed language that
hampers the West ties with China,”3 it has also been dismissed as inapplicable
by none other than the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, himself.4 That notwith-
standing, this bilateral relationship, arguably the most important one today, is at
an inflection point. Entering the 2010s, the underpinning of the decades-long
engagement strategy that was the centerpiece of US policies toward China was
largely repudiated by US scholars, public intellectuals, and policy practitioners.5
Such a profound strategic rethinking and recasting is, of course, not lost on
China,6 not the least because China’s own international behavior is going
through a paradigmatic transition.7
Mutual disillusionment aside, a corollary question is: what contentious issue
or issues might realistically set off a crisis and push this relationship over the
edge? The list is lengthy. For example, Gregory J. Moore, a US scholar based in
China, laid out seven general areas of tension and grievances between the United
States and China.8 Only tangentially touched upon by Moore was North Korea
(also DPRK), which – in the telling of Patrick Cronin – was “the security litmus

2. David Kang and Xinru Ma, “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,” The
Washington Quarterly 41-1 (2018), pp. 137–154.
3. Charles Parton, “Hackneyed Language Hampers the West’s Ties with China,” Financial Times
(9 May 2018), at <https://www.ft.com/content/89f2d524-52e3-11e8-b24e-cad6aa67e23e> (searched
date: 10 May 2018).
4. It has since been echoed by numerous Chinese officials and scholars. See, for example, Yafei
He, “zhongmei zhijina meiyou suowei de ‘xiuxidite xianjing’ [There Is Not Such a Thing as ‘Thu-
cydides Trap’ between China and the United States],” Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], (20
November 2018) at <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2018-11/13594836.html>
(searched date: 14 April 2019); Zhicheng Wu and Huiting Wang, “‘Xiuxidide xianjing’ dui
zhongmei guanxi fazhan de feishiyingxing fenxi [The Analysis of the Inapplicability of Thucydi-
des’ Trap for the Development of Sino-U.S. Relationship]” Zhengzhixue yanjiu [Journal of Political
Science] 1 (2017), pp. 15–25; Yang, Yuan, “Escape both the ‘Thucydides trap’ and the ‘Churchill
trap’: Finding a Third Type of Great Power Relations under the Bipolar System,” The Chinese
Journal of International Politics, 2-11 (2018), pp. 193–235.
5. Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American
Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97–2 (2018), pp. 60–70; Jisi Wang, et al, “Did America Get China
Wrong: The Engagement Debate,” Foreign Affairs 97–4 (2018), pp. 183–195; Xiangfeng Yang,
“The Anachronism of a China Socialized: Why Engagement is not All it’s Cracked up to be,” The
Chinese Journal of International Politics 10-1 (2018), pp. 67–94.
6. Wang, Hao, “Telangpu zhengfu duihua zhanlue tiaozheng de shuangchong luoji jiqi hudong
[Dual Logic of the Adjustments of the Trump Administration’s China Policy and Their
Interactions],” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] 3 (2018), pp. 47–69;
Xinbo Wu, “Telangpu zhizheng yu meiguo duihua zhengce de xinjieduan [Prospects of China-US
Relations in the Trump Administration],” Guoji wenti yanjiu [China International Studies] 18-3
(2018), pp. 80–93.
7. Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of
International Politics 7-2 (2014), pp. 153–184.
8. Gregory J. Moore, “Avoiding a Thucydides Trap in Sino-American Relations (… and 7 Reasons
Why That Might be Difficult),” Asian Security 13-2 (2017), pp. 98–115.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 185

test” on whether Beijing and Washington could get along.9 Cronin may well be
right. In his first year in office, no other foreign policy issue was higher on
Donald Trump’s agenda than the challenge to tackle North Korea, over which he
publicly traded verbal abuse and threats that alarmed the world. In order to make
his “maximum pressure” campaign a viable strategy, Trump promised to go easy
on trade with China, and even backpedaled on Taiwan by accepting the “One
China” principle, in order to earn the cooperation of President Xi Jinping.10 And
help Xi delivered. Beijing’s implementation of severe economic sanctions was
widely credited with forcing Pyongyang to change course in 2018, which set the
stage for Kim Jong-un’s late March visit to Beijing – his first foray outside North
Korea as its leader – for the inter-Korean summit in late April, and Kim’s high-
stakes meeting with Trump in Singapore on June 12, all in 2018.
A welcome reprieve as they were, these spectacular headlines belie the fluid
but stubborn quality of inter-state politics and the evolving security dynamics
in Northeast Asia. In quick succession following the Trump-Kim summit, the
Trump Administration fired the opening salvo of a trade war with China; Kim
had his third visit with Xi that manifestly put his regime back into the good
graces of Beijing; and North Korea, contrary to Kim’s promises and Trump’s
self-congratulations, has been digging in on concrete denuclearization steps by
demanding sanction relief first. What is more, the intertwining of
Washington’s troubles with Pyongyang and Beijing does not leave much to
the imagination. The same days (in January 2019) when the US delegation
was in Beijing to negotiate a deal to solve the trade spat, Kim paid his fourth
visit to China in 10 months. With Kim’s second summit with Trump in Viet-
nam in February 2019 ending in spectacular failure as a result of the deadlock
over denuclearization and sanction relief, whether China will continue to
implement the sanctions faithfully became a question of immense interest and
impact.
It may well be right to say that “North Korea is a much bigger problem for
regional, and even global stability than China–Japan or China–United States rela-
tions.”11 However, for more than half a century, Sino-US embroilment has been
an indelible property of the Korean quagmire – so much so that some argue that

9. Patrick Cronin, “Could North Korea Help Bring the United States and China Closer Together?”
(4 May 2018), at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/could-north-korea-help-bring-the-united-
states-and-china-closer-together/> (searched date: 4 May 2018).
10. After his electoral victory but before his inauguration, Trump broke decades of precedent by
taking a call from Tsai Ing-wen, president of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Ironically, the fact
Trump asked for Tsai’s help on North Korea and then turn to Beijing is a testament to not only the
degree of seriousness he took to tackling the DPRK but also the indispensability of China’s role in
the process. See David Nakamura and Anne Gearan, “Obama Warned Trump on North Korea. But
Trump’s ‘Fire and Fury’ Strategy Wasn’t What Obama Aides Expected,” Washington Post
(9 August 2017).
11. David Kang and Xinru Ma, “Power transitions: Thucydides didn’t live in East Asia,” The
Washington Quarterly 41-1: 137–154.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

186 / Pacific Focus

the “North Korean problem” was in essence a “US-China problem.”12 For them,
Thucydides may well have reincarnated himself in Korea.13 As a matter of his-
torical fact, not only is the Korean Peninsula the last and only place where China
and the United States fought a bloody war on opposite sides, it is also where
Allison fears it might be reprised, albeit in a high-tech mode.14 By all accounts,
Korea can be utilized as one – among very few – most likely cases, methodologi-
cally speaking, to throw some useful light on the empirical validity and geo-
graphical confines of the Thucydides Trap conjecture.
The coherence and novelty of the Thucydides Trap remains a subject of
intense debate in the study of international relations. Some scholars contend that
the idea is but a mere rehashed formulation of power transition theory, while also
cautioning against over-reading or misinterpreting the ancient tale.15 I do not
wade too much into that theoretical debate, as this article is meant to be more
empirical than theoretical. Using the Thucydides Trap as a short-hand for the
uncertain and precarious future of US-China competition, I seek to provide some
clarity to the question of how Korean affairs mitigate or exacerbate tensions
between Beijing and Washington. In the meantime, from a methodological stand-
point, even though the study is a single-case study, it nevertheless still contrib-
utes to theory building and testing (or “theory-infirming” rather, as a most-likely
case).16
Two caveats are in order. First, while a conflict in Korea as a result of
miscalculation, misperception and unintended escalation remains a perpetual
possibility,17 I assume a priori that actors of different levels of analysis are ratio-
nal, and mostly focus instead on the systemic and structural elements of the issue
at hand. After all, Allison himself attributes the root cause of the Thucydides
Trap to “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to

12. Zhiqun Zhu, “Comrades in Broken Arms: Shifting Chinese Policies toward North Korea,”
Asian Politics & Policy 8-4 (2016), pp. 575–592.
13. I use the singular form of Korea to refer to the whole peninsula as invoking North Korea in
discussion about security invariably implicates South Korea.
14. Graham Allison, “China’s Ready for War – Against the U.S. if Necessary,” LA Times
(8 August 2017), at <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-allison-china-war-20170808-
story.html> (searched date: 7 August 2018).
15. Steve Chan, “More Than One Trap: Problematic Interpretations and Overlooked Lessons from
Thucydides,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 24-1 (2019), pp. 11–24; Jonathan Kirshner,
“The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal
of International Relations 18-1 (2012), pp. 53–75; David Welch, “Why International Relations
Theorists should Stop Reading Thucydides,” Review of International Studies 29-3 (2003),
pp. 301–319.
16. John S. Odell, “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy,” International Studies
Perspectives 2-2 (2001), pp. 161–176.
17. Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2018); Jervis, Robert and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Perception and Mis-
perception on the Korean Peninsula: How Unwanted Wars Begin,” Foreign Affairs 97-3 (2018),
pp. 103–117.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 187

upend a ruling one,”18 to which many Chinese scholars largely agree insofar as
also Korean affairs are concerned.19 Second, as Sino-US competition and rivalry
on the Peninsula is a given, my analysis will zero in on the likelihood of a great-
power war that is the main leitmotif of the Thucydides Trap idea.
In what is to follow, I will provide, in the first two sections, an overview of
the interests and strategic calibrations of China and the United States, respec-
tively. Based on those insights, I will then engage in a dialectic discussion of
some sort centering on two questions of dichotomous nature: (1) To what extent
have their interests converged enough as to stave off a war? and (2) To what
extent have their interests diverged enough as to warrant fierce competition that
might precipitate a war?20 By exploring the two sides of the same coin, I believe
the intricate cause and effect of the two countries’ involvement in Korea can be
better elucidated, clarified, and sort out against their broader bilateral relationship
and their separate regional security strategies. I will conclude the study by argu-
ing that, despite their ongoing maneuvering to one-up each other strategically,
their shared aversion to a conflict on the Peninsula, the important but non-
essential – relatively speaking – evaluation of their interests therein, and the mul-
tilateral feature of the overall Korean security affairs all contribute to lessening
the propensity of Korea’s fall into the vortex of the Thucydides Trap. To put
them in context, while the road to Pyongyang goes to Beijing first, there is no
stop-over between Beijing and Washington.

Chinese Interests in Korea: Divide, Not Conquer

A Thucydides Trap fundamentally arises from an irreconcilable conflict of
interests. Over the past decades, China’s international reach has been fast expan-
ding globally in both scope and depth. So too have its interests. Ascertaining a
high ceiling for its stake in international politics is neither realistic nor feasible.
Establishing a low-end reference point, however, is a lot more practical and
serves some meaningful purposes. Amidst rising tensions with Washington in the
mid-2000s, Beijing promulgated its “core interests” in light of China’s basic
political system and national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
economic and societal development. While Korea was nowhere to be found in
the official iterations of the term, the enduring nuclear rumbling and uncertainties

18. Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s trap, (Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), pp. 29.
19. Zhang Huizhi and Wang Xiaoke, “Zhongmei duichao zhengce jingzheng yu hezuo de taishi
fenxi [SWOT analysis on competition and cooperation of China and the United States’ policies
towards DPRK],” Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum] 5: 31–39.
20. These two questions, incidentally, can be seen as chronologically ordered based on how the
circumstances evolved from hypertension in 2017 to a flurry of fence-mending summitry in 2018.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

188 / Pacific Focus

involving North Korea prompted a few Chinese analysts to call for its inclu-
sion.21 That quest was rebuffed by many others, including the noted strategist
and Peking University Professor Wang Jisi, who rejected subsuming the Penin-
sula into the core interests as “reckless” and unsanctioned by the government.22
To a great degree, the contention stems from the fact that normalcy has long
been missing in China’s relations with either side of the 38th Parallel. For all the
propagandized images of Sino-DPRK brotherhood forged in the blood of the
Korean War, the relationship has frayed irrevocably since Beijing normalized rela-
tions with the South (also, ROK) in 1992.23 That being the case, whereas a unified
Korea – if not a pro-China one, then a neutral one without US military presence –
is acceptable in the long run, and in the interim the uncertainties of the future
renders24 in the interim Beijing is so risk-averse and reactive on the peninsula such
that it is tolerant of the status quo, i.e., division,[1] a far cry from the proactive or
even aggressive manner with which Beijing conducts its diplomacy and defense in
the region that gave rise to the talk about the Thucydides Trap. Over the past two
decades, besides occasionally provoking South Korea, North Korea also thrust itself
onto a direct collision course with the United States in its pursuit of nuclear deter-
rence capabilities. Consequently, not only is China in the unenviable situation of
bordering another nuclear-armed state, it must also balance its own interests with
the expectations and responsibilities foisted upon it by the international community.
Between 2013 and 2016, a confluence of factors propelled Beijing to experiment
with an upgrade of relations with Seoul with great fanfare. The new leadership
under Xi Jinping seemed to realize that Beijing’s overt defense of Pyongyang dur-
ing the twin crises of preceding years excessively alienated Seoul, whose amity
was sorely needed as the Obama Administration’s “pivot” was intensifying.
Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in February 2013 only incurred more wrath from
Beijing. On her part, South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, acutely felt the
indispensability of Chinese cooperation in managing North Korea. There went the
remarkable Sino-ROK honeymoon, when the two sides vowed to push their rela-
tionship to new heights through economic cooperation and strategic coordination.

21. Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of
the Debate in China,” International Affairs 91-2 (2015), pp. 245–266.
22. Jisi Wang, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” For-
eign Affairs 90-2 (2011), pp. 68–79.
23. Min-hyung Kim, “Cracks in the Blood-shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC–DPRK
Relations in the Post-Cold War World,” Pacific Focus 32-1 (2017), pp. 109–128; Jae Ho Chung
and Myung-hae Choi, “Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors? Making Sense of China–
North Korea Relations, 1949-2010,” The Pacific Review 26-3 (2013): 243–264; Jongho Shin,
“China’s Great Power Identity and its Policy on the Korean Peninsula in the Xi Jinping Era,”
Pacific Focus 33-2 (2018), 284–307.
24. Ji You, “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” Journal
of Contemporary China 10-28 (2001), pp. 387–398; Donggil Kim and Seong-hyon Lee, “Historical
Perspective on China’s Tipping Point’ with North Korea,” Asian Perspective 42-1 (2018),
pp. 33–60.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 189

Unfortunately, the lull was punctured by the North’s fourth nuclear test in January
2016. As Park sought Xi’s assistance to no avail, her government reversed course
by opening the door – despite Beijing’s vehement opposition – to the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a powerful military system that the
United States had exhorted Park to install.
The failure of the reset with Seoul is a testament that the strenuous bond
between Beijing and Pyongyang not only emboldened the latter, but also helped
produce a “security trilemma” that hamstrung China’s ability to better manage its
relations with both South Korea and the United States.25 As for the nuclear
standoff, Chinese leaders routinely appealed for calm from all sides while calling
for the Peninsula’s denuclearization through dialogue and negotiation. Over the
years, this principal stance gradually evolved into the formulaic mantra of “no
war, no chaos, no nukes.”26 To the extent that the triple negatives are ominous
and censorious, they can serve as important suggestive parameters of Chinese
interests – albeit in the minimalist sense – vis-a-vis Korea.
Unfortunately for Beijing, the trifecta of interlacing imperatives is at the mercy
of other players, primarily North Korea and the United States. The ramifications
are manifold. First, in an attempt to exculpate itself, Beijing is prone to apply the
time-worn mantra – “He who tied the bell should be the one who unties it” – that
is, the fundamental cause of the Peninsula strife was the US-DPRK animus.27
While that is certainly true, China is also forced to reckon with the consequences
of its inaction and the boiling bad blood between the two sworn enemies. Sec-
ond, torn between the two sides, Chinese officials openly oppose North Korea’s
nuclear program but also implore Washington to address its legitimate security
concerns.28 The stalling of the Six-Party Talks in 2010 and subsequent events
only affirmed that North Korea was determined to develop its nuclear arsenal at
all cost, which in turn marginalized China’s role in the process.29 Third, to the
extent that China maintains some critical leverage over North Korea, utilizing it
to excess goes against Beijing’s own grain.30 A further attendant worry is that

25. Xiangfeng Yang, “China’s Clear and Present Conundrum on the Korean Peninsula: Stuck
between the Past and the Future,” International Affairs 94-3 (2018), pp. 595–611.
26. In the official parlance, “Realizing the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Maintaining
the Non-Proliferation Regime and Persevering Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia is not only
China’s Firm Position but also the Shared Goals of the International Community” Foreign Ministry
Statement (2017), at <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_
676404/1207_676416/t1489453.shtml> (searched date: 12 January 2019).
27. Ying Fu, The Korean nuclear issue: Past, present, and future a Chinese perspective
(Washington, D.C.: John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, 2016).
28. Ying Fu, “China’s Advice to Trump and Kim Jong Un,” The Washington Post (10 June 2017),
May 2017 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/06/10/north-korea-
summit-2> (searched date: 10 June 2018).
29. Yinhong Shi, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Competing Interests and Persistent
Policy Dilemmas,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21–1 (2009), pp. 33–47.
30. Leif-Eric Easley and In Young Park, “China’s Norms in its Near Abroad: Understanding
Beijing’s North Korea Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 25–101 (2016), pp. 651–668.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

190 / Pacific Focus

too much pressure might exacerbate the regime’s internal weaknesses and lead to
its collapse, a scenario that Allison explicitly invoked.31 All in all, be it war or
North Korea’s implosion, either prospect instinctively conjures up trepidations in
Beijing over refugee flow, border security, and worse of all, unification
engineered by the South and the United States without much Chinese input.

US Interests in Korea: Defend, but Also Multitask

Whereas the Sino-DPRK border is more than 1,000 miles long, the United
States and North Korea are an ocean apart from each other. Distance does not
negate the enormous geopolitical and strategic interests the United States has on
the Peninsula; understanding that requires a comprehensive picture of Asia’s secu-
rity architecture. Since the end of World War II, US strategies toward Asia have
consistently been anchored on Japan, whose centrality is reinforced as the United
States seeks to “construct Japan as a center of power” in confronting a shifting
global and regional order in the wake of China’s rise.32 “Korea matters in US stra-
tegic thinking because of Japan,” said Denny Roy,33 as “extending the perimeter
(or buffer) beyond Japan” means that “Japan is not left alone on the frontier.” That
rationale, of course, can trace its genesis all the way back to the Korean War,
which the United States was initially ill prepared for but nonetheless fully commit-
ted to as it dreaded the consequences of unrestrained communist expansion.
After the Cold War, US involvement on the Peninsula has been characterized by
variegated immediate contingencies and long-term considerations. First, North
Korea’s overt hostility toward the United States and its allies, as exemplified by its
dogged pursuit of nuclear power and delivery capabilities, means that the Peninsula
maintains its status as a perennial trouble spot on the map for Washington decision
makers. Second, while the hovering phantom of war is grounds enough for both
Washington and Seoul to boost their defense ties, China’s rise provides further
impetus for Washington to consolidate the US-ROK alliance and connect it with its
other regional security pacts, especially the US-Japan alliance.34 Third, for all the
importance attached to dealing with the North Korean challenge, with the exception

31. Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s trap, (Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), pp. 179–191.
32. Brendan Taylor, “Asia’s Century and the Problem of Japan’s Centrality,” International Affairs
87–4 (2011), pp. 871–885; Twining, Danial, “America’s Grand Design in Asia,” Washington
Quarterly 30–3 (2007), pp. 79–94.
33. Email communication, 22 January 2018.
34. Hyeran Jo and Jongryn Mo, “Does the United States Need a New East Asian Anchor? The
Case for US-Japan-Korea Trilateralism,” Asia Policy 9–1 (2010), pp. 67–99; Yul Sohn, “Relocating
Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A South Korean Perspective,” in Daniel C.
Sneider, Yul Sohn, and Yoshihide Soeya, eds., U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateralism: Building Bridges
and Strengthening Cooperation (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016);
Chang-hee Nam, “The Alliance Transformation and US–Japan–Korea Security Network: A Case
for Triilateral Cooperation,” Pacific Focus 25–1 (2010), pp. 34–58.

© 2019 Center for International Studies, Inha University

 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 191

of 1994, when a preventive attack was briefly on the table and then rejected,35 for
two decades North Korea has been secondary – more by accident and circumstance
than by design – when juxtaposed against domestic and international contingencies
and priorities: the Bush Administration was preoccupied with the two wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the Obama Administration with the 2008 financial crisis,
Islamic State, and then Iran nuclear deal.36 The election of Donald J. Trump and
North Korea’s closing in on achieving the capability to strike the continental United
States finally pushed it to the top of the White House’s agenda.
Treating the Peninsula as a whole, Nicholas Anderson succinctly summarized
US interests in terms of three aims: complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantle-
ment of North Korea’s nuclear program (CVID); sustainment of its security pact
with the South, which offers logistical support for forward-deployment; and finally,
avoidance of a costly war that might entail ground invasion and forcible regime
change as necessitated by counter-proliferation.37 In his assessment, none of the
three dyadic pairs of goals are internally coherent and attainable, suggesting that
the United States will have to compromise one way or another. By comparison,
some scholars believe that in addition to the goals mentioned above, Washington
also desires stability as much as “a moderate degree of tension” on the Peninsula,
as it constitutes the raison d’être for its military deployment in Northeast Asia.38
The incompatibility of these US aspirations, according to Anderson, principally
arises out of the realities that North Korea is a de facto nuclear state, and reversing
its nuclear clock requires reciprocal concessions from the United States as well.
Naturally, those US objectives broadly track the reiterated demands, or prerequi-
sites, set by North Korea. Over the years – by turns through bluff, deception,
aggression, and provocation – North Korean officials have staked out inter-locking
conditions that run the gamut from the withdrawal of US troops from the South, the
termination of the US-ROK alliance, normalization of bilateral relations, to signing
a peace treaty in which the US foreswears coercive action against it. It has mixed
these conditions with other impositions, such as apologies, food and medical aid,
economic assistance, energy supply as the quid pro quo for freezing or – after it
crossed the nuclear threshold in 2006 – demolishing its nuclear program.39

35. William J. Perry, “The North Korea policy Review: What Happened in 1999,” The Perry Pro-
ject (11 August 2017), at <http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/the-north-korean-
policy-review-what-happened-in-1999> (searched date: 20 May 2018).
36. Tellingly, the Obama Administration phrased its North Korea strategy as “strategic patience,”
which some say is a deliberate act to de-prioritize North Korea. See, for example, Delury, John,
“The Disappointments of Disengagement: Assessing Obama’s North Korea Policy,” Asian Perspec-
tive 37–2 (2013), pp. 149–182.
37. Anderson, Nicholas, “America’s North Korean Nuclear Trilemma,” The Washington Quarterly
40–4 (2017), pp. 153–164.
38. Zhang, Huizhi, and Xiaoke Wang, “zhongmei duichao zhengce jingzheng yu hezuo de taishi
Fenxi SWOT Analysison Competition and Cooperation of China and the United States’ Policies
towards DPRK,” Dongbeiya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum], 5 (2012), pp. 31–39.
39. Victor D. Cha, “What do they really want?: Obama’s North Korea conundrum,” The
Washington Quarterly 32–4 (2009), pp. 119–138.

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192 / Pacific Focus

Unsurprisingly, many of North Korea’s demands overlap with items on China’s

wish list that are not necessarily openly or publicly articulated. In particular,
whereas Chinese antipathy toward the US alliance system has been well-known,40
Chinese officials and observers in recent years have grown alarmed at the deepen-
ing and multilateralization tendencies of Washington’s traditional “hub and spoke”
arrangements with Japan and South Korea.41 Using the prime example of the
Sino-ROK flare-up over THAAD – which China saw as a Trojan horse planted by
the United States to undermine its own nuclear deterrent42 – some Chinese
researchers perceived there to be sinister intentions at play on behalf of the United
States that intended to drive a wedge between China and both Koreas.43 All things
considered, China and North Korea’s interests are by and large better-aligned when
stacked against US interests and objectives in the region.

The Sino-US Convergence: Avoiding the War

War is the indelible evidence of a Thucydides Trap. But crises do not necessar-
ily necessitate a war. However, the 2017 episode stood out for a reason: not only
was it the first time the United States feared being attacked by North Korea, it was
also when the immensely personalized insults between Donald Trump and North
Korea – accompanied by the latter’s incessant missile and nuclear tests despite
international censure and sanctions – had the dramatizing effect of making many
people believe that a war was forthcoming or imminent. It probably never was,
because insofar as Chinese and US strategic thinking is concerned (as analyzed
earlier) both sides have the utmost incentives to steer clear of armed hostilities.
Nor was North Korea – the weakest of all players in terms of economic
strength – intent to fight. Even though North Korea has long glorified war and
used provocations to achieve its short-term tactical goals,44 there exists scant

40. Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”
International Security 23–4 (1999), pp. 49–80; Liff, Adam, “China and the US Alliance System,”
The China Quarterly 233 (2018), pp. 137–165; Xinbo Wu, “The end of the Silver Lining: A Chi-
nese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly 29–1 (2005), pp. 117–30.
41. Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”
International Security 23-4 (Spring, 1999), pp. 49-80; Adam Liff, “China and the US Alliance Sys-
tem,” The China Quarterly 233 (March, 2018), pp. 137-165; Xinbo Wu, “The end of the Silver
Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly 29-1 (winter
2005-6), pp. 117–30.
42. Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views on South Korea’s Deployment of THAAD,” China Leader-
ship Monitor 52–4 (2017), pp. 1–15.
43. Ling Shengli, “Shuangchong Fenhua: Meiguo Dui Chaoxian Bandao De Xiezi Zhanlue [Dou-
ble Divide: United States Wedge Strategy Towards Korean Peninsular],” Dongbeiya luntan [North-
east Asia Forum] 26–5 (2017), pp. 46–57.
44. Ashley AC Hess., “Why Does North Korea Engage in Provocations?” Journal of Asian Secu-
rity and International Affairs 5–1 (2018): 57–83; Min Y. Lee, “Unveiling North Korea’s Crisis
Provocations: A Garrison State Hypothesis Revisited,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 26–2
(2012), pp. 103–136.

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empirical evidence – even at the time of the Chonan and Yeonpyong incidents
between 2010 and 2011 – that it was bent on initiating a full-out war against the
South, let alone the United States. The double irony here is that, much as
Washington abhors the choice, the sui genesis specter of war hinges on a preven-
tive strike by the United States on North Korea. That impulse, in turn, emanates
from the simple fact that North Korea – which in a short span of years under
Kim Jong-un made strides in its weapons program – was ever closer to passing
another milestone by mastering the materials and technical know-how that
enabled it to initiate a nuclear strike on the continental United States.
Such a formidable menace, coming from such an impoverished state as North
Korea, drove the United States into unfamiliar territory. In July 2017, North
Korea’s announcement that it would test-fire its missiles aimed at the US territory
of Guam prompted Trump to respond with his “fire and fury” remark.45 Buried
in the bouts of shouts and warnings was a rare assurance to Pyongyang by
Trump’s top diplomat and military commander that “The U.S. has no interest in
regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea.”46 Nevertheless, whereas
military action was presented as a last resort, and rightly so, US officials had lit-
tle confidence that such a move would be successful enough – either in terms of
eliminating Pyongyang’s second strike capabilities or sheer shock-and-awe – to
prevent North Korea from retaliating against the South. Worse still, this option,
once exercised, would almost certainly trigger off the Pandora’s box of escalation
that would possibly warrant a ground invasion and result in hundreds of thou-
sands of casualties. So catastrophic is this scenario that even Victor Cha, a har-
dline scholar and Bush Administration official who was in consideration as
Trump’s ambassador to South Korea, came out publicly against it.47
Clear-eyed analysts long argued that because the dynastic regime could be
assumed rational, regardless of its nuclear and technological advances, deterrence
still worked as a viable coping strategy, and negotiation and bargaining that
offered rewards and respect to Pyongyang should help mitigate its militaristic
proclivities.48 That said, despite the high tension and war talk on the surface, on
the US side there was neither active mobilization of troops nor evacuation of its
civilians from South Korea. On the other hand, should the Trump Administration
take steps to put the country on a war footing, public opinion would almost

45. Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ if North Korea Endangers
U.S.,” The New York Times (8 August 2017), at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/
north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html> (searched date: 8 August 2018).
46. Jim Mattis and Rex Tillerson, “We’re Holding Pyongyang to Account,” The Wall Street Jour-
nal (13 August 2017), at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-holding-pyongyang-to-account-
1502660253> (searched date: 13 August 2017).
47. Victor Cha, “Giving North Korea a ‘Bloody Nose’ Carries a Huge Risk to Americans,” The
Washington Post (30 January 2018).
48. David Kang, “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War,” International Stud-
ies Quarterly 47–3 (2003), pp. 301–324; Denny Roy, “Parsing Pyongyang’s strategy,” Survival
52–1 (2011), pp. 111–136.

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194 / Pacific Focus

certainly balk at the recurrence of the Korean War, which was dubbed “the for-
gotten war,” as the US people continue to suffer from war fatigue from nonstop
military missions overseas since 11 September 2001. One survey, for example,
found that a great majority of those interviewed opposed a military response on
North Korea.49
On the Chinese side, the revulsion toward an open war was just as strong and
pervasive. First, under Xi Jinping, who is bent on restoring China’s historical
glory while extending its influence far and afield, the Chinese had little appetite
to fight over Korea. Whereas certainly the interpretation of what is in “core inter-
ests” is entirely up to the Chinese government itself, thus far Beijing is keener to
attend to interests deemed more critical or more value-added than North Korea,
and they are bountiful. Fitting the description, for example, was China’s territo-
rial claim to Donglang (Doklam) deep in the Himalayas,50 over which China and
India were betting over who would blink first in the summer of 2017, just when
the rest of the world was engrossed by the North Korean nuclear crisis.
China’s fighting for North Korea was further improbable in the event that –
far-fetched as it seems – North Korea plunges in first. Since around 2009, the
Chinese government piloted the notion of a “normal state-to-state relationship” –
as opposed to that of “lips and teeth” in the Maoist era – to redefine its connec-
tion with the erstwhile ally,51 which was evidently intended as a thinly veiled
warning to Pyongyang even though the Sino-DPRK Mutual Aid and Cooperation
Friendship Treaty in its current form remains in effect until 2021. Intellectual dis-
sent over the strategic utility and loyalty of North Korea, tightly controlled until
then, too began to “[bubble] to the surface” after its third nuclear test in early
2013.52 As the nuclear drama unfolded in 2017, a verbal shoot-out between Bei-
jing and Pyongyang even preceded the feverish pitch of heated rhetoric between
Washington and Pyongyang,53 at which point, a Global Times editorial – known
for channeling the authoritative voice of the Chinese government overall or some
bureaucracies within it – conveyed a double-edged message to both sides: while
China continued to oppose efforts by the United States and South Korea to sub-
vert North Korea’s political system and change “the political pattern of the
Korean Peninsula,” it also would stand “neutral” should North Korea unleash

49. Clement, Scott and Phillip Rucker, “Poll: Far More Trust Generals than Trump on N. Korea,
while Two-Thirds Oppose Preemptive Strike,” The Washington Post (24 September 2017).
50. This piece of strategic territory is in fact a dispute between China and the tiny Buddhist coun-
try of Bhutan, whose foreign relations have been under India’s guidance since 1949.
51. Ren Xiao, “Toward a Normal State-to-state Relationship? China and the DPRK in Changing
Northeast Asia,” North Korean Review 11–2 (2015), pp. 63–78.
52. Jane Perlez, “Chinese Annoyance with North Korea Bubbles to the Surface,” New York Times
(20 December 2014), at <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/chinese-annoyance-
with-north-korea-bubbles-to-the-surface.html> (searched date: 20 December 2014).
53. Jane Perlez, “China and North Korea Reveal Sudden, and Deep Cracks in their Friendship,”
New York Times (24 February 2017), at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-
north-korea-relations-kim-jong-un.html> (searched date: 24 February 2017).

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missiles first at the United States.54 Behind the scenes, some Chinese military
sources even envisioned the unthinkable possibility of “opposing, not supporting,
North Korean troops.”55
It would be hard to discount the seriousness of the Chinese to forestall a war
that they would be dragged into. Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, could not
be more emphatic when he said that even a one percent probability of war was
unacceptable.56 More importantly, these words were matched by action. Not only
did Beijing give its blessing to fresh rounds of UN Security Council sanctions,
unbeknownst to most, it also meted out harsher punishment than what the UN
mandate required.57 As Zhu Feng of Nanjing University noted, “Beijing has
never been more seriously committed to ‘maximum sanctions’ in the past two
years, and Pyongyang has felt the sting of those sanctions like never before.”58
It usually takes one to initiate a war. In the fabled “land of lousy options,” the
requisite number is two, dictated by the unique structural attribute of peninsular
international relations. In this case, the one and only Korean War, which in 1950
Kim Il-sung could not have started without either Mao or Stalin’s approval, is a
parallel case. The difference this time is that the Chinese were steadfast against
another Korean war at their doorsteps, and the current occupant of the White
House is a self-proclaimed disrupter of the status quo. Xi, who unconfirmed
sources say had once prioritized North Korea’s denuclearization over other
imperatives, ought to have re-arranged the sequence of the “Three No’s” after
witnessing, in their first meeting in April 2017, a cavalier Trump authorizing air
strikes over Syria while enjoying the “most beautiful piece of chocolate cake.”59
Whether or not it was the case, Beijing was galvanized into tightening the
restraining order on North Korea – including its broad economy and the lifeline
of its war machine, fuel – in an unprecedented manner.

54. It should be noted that the degree to which it mirrors government position is a point of debate
among China observers. Global Times, “Reckless game over the Korean peninsula runs risk of real
war,” at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1060791.shtml> (searched date: 23 May 2018).
55. Oriana S. Mastro, “Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea: What to Expect if Things Fall
Apart,” Foreign Affairs 97–1 (2018), pp. 58–66.
56. Wang, Yi, “Chaoxian bandao bushi zhongdong, baofa zhanzheng de kenengxing 1% dou
buxing” [The Korean peninsula is not the Mideast. Even 1% chance for the outbreak of war is not
acceptable], (28 April 2017), at <http://cj.sina.com.cn/article/detail/6152009417/232947> (searched
date: 12 May 2018).
57. Talmadge Eric, “China Goes Beyond U.N. Sanctions to Apply its Own Maximum Pressure
Policy on Pyongyang,” Chicago Tribune (7 April 2018).
58. Feng Zhu, “Why the Trump-Kim Meeting Hinges on China,” (17 March 2018), at <https://www.
scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2137380/why-trump-kim-meeting-hinges-china> (searched date:
17 March 2018).
59. Dan Merica, “Trump, Xi talked Syria Strike Over ‘Beautiful’ chocolate cake,” (Accessed
12 July 2017) at <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/donald-trump-xi-jingping-syria-
chocolate-cake/index.html. (searched date: 23 May 2018).

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196 / Pacific Focus

The Sino-US Interests Divergence: Shaping the Future

Beginning with Kim Jong-un’s 2018 new year speech, North Korea set in
motion a head-spinning turn of events generally in a positive direction. With
North Korea halting its missile tests and Trump agreeing to suspend military
exercises, the Chinese proposal of “double suspension” basically came to fru-
ition, and a military clash, whose momentum was building throughout 2017, was
averted. The global sigh of relief notwithstanding, Kim’s latest gambit has had
the effect of triangulating North Korea’s relations with China and the United
States in a way that breeds tension and suspicion between the two great powers.
For starters, China – long in the throes of a loss-aversion mentality toward
North Korea given their “mutual hostage” relationship60 – was jolted into action,
of which the whirlwind of Kim’s four face-to-face encounters with President Xi
in less than a year speaks volumes.61 The race is now to shape and guide North
Korea’s course of action to its liking. By at least paying lip service to denuclear-
izing itself while pursuing peace talks with the South and the United States, Kim
removed the biggest stumbling block on his way to Beijing. In the decade before,
as North Korea inexorably embarked on a nuclear path, Chinese critics of the
regime had called on Beijing to take a more punitive stance by attaching the
moniker of “negative asset” to North Korea. Unable to downplay its continued
disrespect and obstinance, pro-DPRK officials and scholars on the defensive
instead justified their support by portraying it as a strategic buffer, especially in
the context of the US diplomatic and military offensive in the region. Kim Jong-
un’s about-face – retiring his byungjin line and prioritizing economic develop-
ment, in addition to nuclear disarmament – aligned North Korean interests with
those of a “normalized” Korean state long envisioned by Beijing.62
In what looks like a notable retreat from the “normal state-to-state relation-
ship” characterization, Xi Jinping, in his post-Singapore meeting with Kim,
pledged “three non-changes” in China’s relations with North Korea – phrased in
terms of the determination of the Chinese government, the Communist Party,
and the Chinese people to support the DPRK.63 Although speculations abound
that China has eased – but not officially lifted – the UN-mandated sanctions,

60. Ellen Kim and Victor Cha, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic
Dilemmas with China and the United States,” Asia Policy 21–1 (2016), pp. 101–21.
61. The two had never met before, and Kim’s March 2018 visit to China was his first since taking
over from his deceased father in December 2011.
62. In the words of Jin Canrong, an well-known scholar in Beijing, China encouraged North
Korea’s political and economic soft-landing through economic reform and opening-up so that it
would put economic development above military modernization. In the course of transition, North
Korea would rationally give up its nuclear program. See Canrong Jin, “Dongbeiya xin bianju yu
‘Hou Jin Zhengri shidai’ de chaoxian bandao’, Xiandai guoji guanxi 1 (2012), pp. 3–5.
63. See “guanyu zhongchao guani, Xi Jinping shuole sange ‘buhuibian’” (On Sino-DPRK rela-
tions, Xi Jinping said there would be three ‘non-changes’), (22 June 2018), at <http://china.
chinadaily.com.cn/2018-06/22/content_36435372.htm> (searched date: 21 July 2018).

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 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 197

Beijing does appear ready to revert to positive inducement that was experimented
with between 2009 and 2012.64 At a minimum, it has already publicly urged the
easing of sanctions.65 On his part, having endeared himself to the Chinese leader-
ship at the precise time when they were gearing up for a show-down with
Washington over trade,66 Kim Jong-un was able to use the renewed “friendship”
with Beijing to strengthen his hand before his history-making sit-down with
Trump. Kim’s January 2019 audience with Xi ahead of his second summit with
Trump appears to follow the same playbook.
Second, the way the blitzkrieg of breakthroughs in the spring were achieved
lacked US-China coordination and fostered distrust, as if they were straining to
outgun and out-stun the other party.67 When Trump announced on 8 March
2018 his acceptance of Kim’s invitation for a meeting – relayed by South
Korean officials in the White House with the understanding that “the routine
joint military exercises between the Republic of Korea and the United States
must continue” – Chinese leaders were widely believed to be blindsided like
everyone else. As a result, many Chinese analysts publicly bemoaned that
China was sidelined.68 When Kim made his maiden trip half a month later to
Beijing – believed to be initiated by North Korea and accepted by China – it
was Trump’s turn to be kept in the dark. In April 2018, North Korea appeared
to have reversed course by demanding that Washington cancel the planned joint
drill with the South. Amidst the confusion, Kim flew in early May to the Chi-
nese coastal city of Dalian for a second meeting with Xi. Believing that Xi
goaded Kim into putting the old demands back on the table, Trump canceled
the Singapore meeting, only to put it back on after South Korea’s President
Moon intervened and Pyongyang demonstrated more good will; Chinese and
South Korean officials, however, blamed the referencing by John Bolton –
Trump’s hawkish national security adviser – of the “Libya model” as an exam-
ple that North Korea should follow for derailing – temporarily – the Singapore
summit.69
In Singapore, Trump awarded Kim (and Xi) a pleasant surprise by canceling the
joint US-ROK military exercise for the summer and even signaling – tentatively – his

64. Tat Y. Kong, “China’s Engagement-Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements
and Limitations,” The Pacific Review 31–1 (2018), pp. 76–95.
65. So have Russia and South Korea.
66. Both the trade negotiations and preparations for the Singapore summit played out in a very
public and zig-zagging fashion from March to June.
67. Sun Yun, “The US-DPRK summit: Assessing Chinese anxieties,” 38 North. (27 March 2018),
at <https://www.38north.org/2018/03/ysun032718/> (searched date: 20 May 2018).
68. John S. Van Oudenaren, ‘How Leaving China in the Dark Helped Doom the Trump-Kim
Summit,’ The Diplomat. (26 May 2018), at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/how-leaving-china-
in-the-dark-helped-doom-the-trump-kim-summit/> (searched date: 20 May 2018).
69. The Straits Times, “South Koreans Blame John Bolton for Trump-Kim Summit Snag,” (22
May 2018), at <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreans-blame-john-bolton-for-
trump-kim-summit-snag> (searched date: 20 May 2018).

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198 / Pacific Focus

intention for a draw-down of US troops in the South.70 The real test came after Singa-
pore, as the United States wanted to see concrete steps toward denuclearization and
North Korea demanded immediate sanction relief. As North Korea drags its feet,
China usually gets the blame. The bane of the friction goes both ways. On the US side,
in his dash to make it into history books, Trump brushed aside prevalent disbelief –
including from the Central Intelligence Agency71 – that North Korea would honor the
denuclearization commitment. On the Chinese side, much as China was against North
Korea’s nuclearization in the first place, the two found common ground in exacting
the highest-bidding price from the United States now that the locus of the game has
shifted to the terms of denuclearization. Deception is a mainstay of international diplo-
macy, as is blaming others for one’s own misfortune. By all means, suspicion will only
engender more distrust and competition between Beijing and Washington.
A final point of contention and intrigue has to do with the pace of denucleari-
zation. As the countdown to Trump’s 2020 reelection is within sight, this tussle
is a race against time for the US people. Whereas the Trump Administration
wants the process to be completed in a matter of months or a couple of years, in
their first meeting in March, President Xi and Kim publicly championed “phased
and synchronous measures” that came implicitly with US concessions in return.
In this case, there is little daylight between Beijing and Pyongyang but plenty
between Beijing and Washington. Unlike the US people, the Chinese never set
forth a concrete timetable. So long as North Korea complies with Beijing’s
vision in terms of denuclearization, China can afford to be patient. Beijing has
not only more time at its disposal than Washington thanks to its one-party sys-
tem, but also more cards against North Korea: carrots in terms of economic aid
and investment that can be subsumed into the Belt and Road Initiative, and sticks
in terms of manipulating the valve of trade and energy supply upon which North
Korea is heavily dependent. After Kim and Trump’s failure to reach a deal in
Hanoi, Beijing continues to counsel patience and dialogue as it did before. In this
respect, the downside for Beijing, however, is that North Korea might be
emboldened into deliberately stalling the denuclearization process knowing that
their Chinese patrons are reluctant to use the sticks on it and will not abandon it.

Conclusion

Pessimism about the broad trajectory of the US-China relations that pro-
foundly resonates with the Thucydides Trap has gained more momentum in the

70. Josh Rogin, “Trump Still Holds Jimmy Carter’s View on Withdrawing Troops from South
Korea,” The Washington Post (7 June 2018); Nakamura, David and Anne Gearan, “Obama Warned
Trump on North Korea. But Trump’s ‘Fire and Fury’ Strategy Wasn’t What Obama Aides
Expected,” Washington Post (9 August 2017).
71. Jennifer Rubin, “Trump is Wrong about North Korea, Says the CIA,” The Washington Post
(30 May 2018).

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 The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relation / 199

wake of the 2018 trade war and the Korean drama. Moving ahead, the future of
the Peninsula’s affairs promises to be a drawn-out grind, riddled with false starts,
dashed hopes, and other setbacks. There will also be plenty of cloak-and-dagger
trickeries and hard-nosed bargaining. Nevertheless, unlike in 1950, a war on the
Peninsula pitting China against the United States is unlikely. If anything, Korea
is a playground with a robust geopolitical overlay. Barring any unforeseen cir-
cumstances, it will not reprise the accidental theatre of war it once was.
First, all state-players involved are dissatisfied with the Peninsula’s status quo,
just not to the extent that the use of force is warranted. For both the United States
and China, there are more vital interests at stake elsewhere. Having been suffer-
ing from war fatigue since 9/11, certainly the United States has no such appetite
to sacrifice its flesh and blood. Nor is there a desire to fight for North Korea
again in China. Insofar as a direct causal factor where a US-China conflict is con-
cerned, Korea pales alongside Taiwan – arguably “the single issue to which
China [continued] to subjugate any broad conceptions of grand strategy” well up
to the early 2000s72 – and the South China Sea, both of which Chinese leaders
have repeatedly vowed to defend, with force if necessary.
Second, to the extent that there is intense competition between China and the
United States over Korea, its war-proneness can be ameliorated by the multilat-
eral and complex character of the Peninsula’s affairs. Korea, after all, is divided
into two sovereign states. Since the emergence of Korea from Japanese colonial
rule in 1945, the United Nations has been deeply involved in events here, includ-
ing the Korean War. So have other key state players and international organiza-
tions, particularly the United Nations. By way of comparison, any other dispute
in Sino-US relations – be it Taiwan, the South China Sea, or trade – is primarily,
if not exclusively, between Beijing and Washington and therefore more straight-
forward and combustible.73 Moreover, regarding the first two disputes, Beijing
has never flinched from embracing war as a solution as they are deemed as mat-
ters of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In contrast, as concluded by Denny
Roy, “China does not covet North Korean territory.”74 That, in turn, means that
Korea, as a security matter, can be relegated to a lower category of interests and
concerns in Chinese eyes.
Third, in terms of scale, depth and intensity, neither the Sino-DPRK relations
nor the US-DPRK relations are comparable to the Sino-US relations. In other
words, Korea is not integral to the overall relationship between China and the
United States. China was not a party to the Agreed Framework (1994–2002) but

72. Evan Feigenbaum, “China’s Challenge to Pax Americana,” Washington Quarterly 24–3
(2001), pp. 31–43.
73. This is of course in relative terms. Other participants in those disputes do have their agency.
74. There does exist a controversy over interpretation of history. Roy, Denny, “The North Korea
Crisis in Sino–US Relations,” The Journal of Comparative Asian Development 10–2 (2011),
pp. 281–304; Gries, Peter, “The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Rela-
tions Today,” East Asia 22–4 (2005), pp. 3–17.

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200 / Pacific Focus

was largely cooperative thereafter with the United States over North Korea by
hosting the Six-Party Talks. Ironically, it is during this time, some argue, that the
broader shift of US strategic thinking in Asia – which evolved into the eventual
rejection in the mid-2010s by elite consensus of engaging and integrating China
– was fomented.75 That the official declaration by the Trump Administration of
China as “revisionist” and a major “competitor” – which sounded the death knell
for engagement as a China strategy76 – was announced – while the North Korean
crisis was still raging – was by design as much as by coincidence. While the two
problems were quintessentially distinct from each other, some confusion was
nonetheless manifested in a secondary debate over which one – China or North
Korea – should be prioritized as the paramount threat to the United States.77
In sum, Allison was wise to caution that the Sino-US discord must be carefully
managed, and war is not inevitable. Nevertheless, by claiming that, among a
laundry list of disputes of temporal sensitivity, “even ordinary flashpoints of for-
eign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict,”78 he may have unintentionally mag-
nified the probability of a nightmare situation. Putting Korea into the basket of
potentialities that could entrap the two superpowers in a conflict is a judgement
overblown. While tension was mounting throughout 2017 for what seemed like a
denouement, ultimately there was not enough spark to ignite a Korean War do-
over. The bigger lesson learned, therefore, is that while Chinese and US leaders
should, of course, delicately handle the three broad drivers fueling the vicious
cycle of animosity – “interests, fear, and honor,” according to Allison – they
must also prioritize and address security issues of a bilateral nature with the
utmost care.

References
Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

75. SNina ilove, ‘The Pivot Before the Pivot: US strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia’,
International Security 40–4 (2016), pp. 45–88.
76. Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House.
18 December 2017).
77. While a majority of them would agree with Victor Cha, according to whom ‘the North Korea
problem is immediate, the longer-term strategic competitor in Asia is China’, others saw North Korea
merely as ‘a distraction’. A small minority even argued that North Korea could be turned into an
American ally against China. Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, “The Right Way to Coerce North
Korea: Ending the Threat without Going to War,” Foreign Affairs 97–3 (2018), pp. 87–100; Michael
Fullilove and Herve Lemahieu, “North Korea is a Dangerous Distraction,” (May/June, 2018), at
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/23/north-korea-is-a-dangerous-distraction> (searched date:
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