Party Systems in India: Patterns, Trends and Reforms

Mahendra Prasad Singh*

Krishna Murari**

Speaking politically, the Indian party system has its origins in the nationalist movement for
freedom from colonial rule in British India, and incremental extension of franchise since the
early twentieth century and introduction of universal adult franchise under the Constitution of
independent India enforced since 1950. If democratisation has been the primary causal or
independent variable producing the party system today, the Indian social structure with its
regional and multicultural variations and the nature of the parliamentary federal Constitution
under which Indian democracy has operated for over seven decades now are the intervening
or intermediating variables that have shaped its party system’s patterns and trends. In other
words, the primary effects of democratic mobilisation on the party system have been
funnelled through the Indian political history and diverse cultural and social setting and the
nature of the Indian Constitution. India’s socio-cultural and regional diversities provide a
fecund ground for a multiparty system, so does the federal component of the Indian
Constitution. However, in the initial decades of post-Independence period the tendency
towards multiplication of parties were held in check by the unifying force of the anti-colonial
nationalist movement during the British Raj and the presence of the towering charismatic
leaders of the nationalist movement at the national and state levels. The parliamentary
component of the Constitution, as against its federal component which tends to multiply
parties, exercised a centralising influence and prompted parties to dualistically configure
themselves into the government and the opposition. In a parliamentary-federal system like
India’s, the effects of the two components of the Constitution are thus somewhat
contradictory and cancel each other out. Adoption of plurality electoral law by India rather
than proportional representation also tended to prompt political parties to configure into a
two-party system as per the Duverger-Riker ‘iron law’ which stipulates that plurality system
inevitably produces a two-party system - on account of this system of representation
favouring larger parties at the cost of smaller ones and of voters’ psychology of tactical
voting for parties more likely to win rather than those likely to lose. 1 As a net result of these
*
National Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 171005, India, profmpsingh@gmail.com

**
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Shaheed Bhagat Singh College, University of Delhi,
krishna.murari@sbs.du.ac.in

1
For alternate classifications of phases of party system evolution, but only for post-
Independence India, are available in the existing literature; these are not really contradictory
features, independent India began with a party system characterised as one-party dominance
of the Indian National Congress, the party that emerged out of the Indian freedom movement.
Nevertheless, as India’s social and regional diversities gradually got more and more
articulated during over the decades of electoral political mobilisation, the one-party Congress
dominance gradually yielded way to a multi-party system in the late 1960s and the late 1970s
and irreversibly by the end of the 1980s.

We proceed to delineate here seven phases of party system evolution in India :

(i) The ‘movement party system’ (1920-1947) agitating for national
independence when Mohandas K. Gandhi appeared on the scene and
transformed the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) from a pressure
group into a mass movement;
(ii) The ‘Congress system’ a la Rajni Kothari (1970: chap. 5; 1974) in
independent India, which was the phase of democratic dominance of the
Indian National Congress under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, when an
internally democratic ‘party of consensus’ occupied the vast middle ground of
the party system at the Centre as well as in almost all the states in interaction
with numerous ‘parties of pressure’ on the margins in successive elections
playing the role of responsible opposition and influencing government
policies from the left and right, nationalist and regionalist and communitarian
margins;
(iii) The phase of confrontation between the parliamentary wing of the Indian
National Congress that came to be dominated by Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi and the organisational wing led by the old guard leaders; the Indira
Gandhi faction after the split dispensed with intra-party democracy and took
to authoritarian ways of dealing with the intra-party dissent and the
opposition, and finally, collided with and extra-parliamentary mass movement
of protest led by Jayprakash Narayan (JP) and ended up taking recourse to

to mine. See De Scouza and Sridharan (2006: 25-26); Chhiber and Verma (2018: 186-206);
and Vaishnava (2019). Their classifications overlap with each other. The first ends with three
phases and the latter two bring it to 2014. The four phases delineated are : (i) the first party
system (1952-1967), (ii) the second party system (1967-1989), (iii) the third party system
(1989-2014), and the fourth party system (2014- ). My classification takes a more
longitudinal view; it also takes a more nuanced view of the differences between the 1970s
and 1980s, which in my opinion are more empirically relevant and systematic and therefore
theoretically more fruitful.
 authoritarian internal national emergency under Article 352 of the
Constitution entailing the arrest of the opposition party leaders as well as
Congress dissidents and press censorship (Singh 1981);
(iv) The 1977 general elections and return of democracy under the Janata Party
government led by Prime Minister Morarji Desai and guided by Jayprakash
Narayan which, however, prematurely fell mid-term in 1979 due to factional
feuds within it;
(v) The restoration of the Congress under Indira Gandhi in 1980 followed by her
elder son’s succession after her assassination in 1984 and the growing
dissociation and differentiation of the national party system and state party
systems during the decade;
(vi) The deepening of the trend towards regionalised multiparty system with
federal minority coalition governments during the 1990s until 2014, when
initially unstable and subsequently somewhat stable coalition governments,
yet bedevilled by blackmail of the leading party and the Prime Minister by
coalition partners, followed in succession: Janata Party/ Dal-led National
Front/United Front government; Congress minority government led by P.V.
Narsimha Rao; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) governments; and Congress-led United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) governments;
(vii) The rise of the BJP to the status of the majority party in the 2014 general
elections for the first time after a long period of 30 years since 1984, and its
re-election in 2019 with a larger majority, led on both the occasions by
Narandra Modi. Despite its formidable national majority, the Hindu Right
BJP has continued the tradition of federal coalition governments under the
NDA with a grater predominance of the BJP and Prime Minister Modi within
it than what was the case before 2014.
The federal temper and tenor of the party system has waxed and waned through the
seven phases of party system evolution in India sketched out above. For example, the party
system in the phase of Congress dominance (1952-1989) was highly marked by
parliamentary centralism, with some tendency towards decentralisation in the late 1960s and
the late 1970s. It became highly federalised and regionalised during the phase of federal
coalition and minority governments during the phase of multiparty system without and
majority party (1989-2014). Since 2014 to date (May 2020) the system has tended to move to
a middle ground between parliamentary centralism and federal regional decentralism under
Prime Minister Modi, who heads a majority BJP government without dispensing with the
coalitional NDA. The important point is that the federal content in the party system has never
been entirely missing, thanks to India’s socio-cultural and regional diversities as well as the
formal constitutional recognition to the federal political structure under the Constitution Act
of 1935 and the post-independence Constitution of 1950.
In what follows we propose to discuss the ideological spectrum and the structure of
electoral competition of the party system generally but with special reference to the current
phase since 2014. We will conclude with the problem of party system reforms for enhancing
the prospects of federal democracy in India.
Ideological Spectrum
Chhibber and Verma (2018: Chap: .8, p.169) postulate that ‘the ideological divisions between
the politics of statism and the politics of recognition [of identities] have remained stable for
the period for which we have data on party activists and ordinary citizens’. Without disputing
this, we wish to analyse the contemporary crop of Indian political parties in terms of the
following classification which is a product of historical as well as the present patterns of
politics in the country and takes different stances to statism and identity: (i) centralist parties,
(ii) the leftwing, and (iii) the Rightwing. This primary or simplistic three-fold classification
needs to be made more complicated and dynamic and therefore empirically more valid by
inclusion of additional parameters, such, for example, as cultural or ethnic factors as well as
nationalist or regionalist orientations, to say nothing of personalised, dynastic and familial
and personal domination of parties. Moreover, there are compounding factors and resulting
categories of the left-of-the-centre, right-of-the- centre parties as well as purely or
predominantly regional or state parties. These compounded factors apply to most or almost
all parties, considered individually or in terms of ‘party families’, e.g. Congress family,
Sangh (Rashtriya Swaymsevak Sangh or RSS) parivar (family), Janata Party/Dal parivar,
Vampaksha (leftwing), and regional parties including the parties of the Other Backward
Classes (OBCs) (other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), and Scheduled Castes
and religious minorities.
The Indian National Congress (or Congress party) and the Congress family parties
may be regarded as the major examples of the centrist or the left of the centre political parties
in Indian history and politics. The Congress was the locus classicus of the nationalist
movement, a platform holding practically all parties within its fold in conflict and
cooperation relationships, with the possible exception of the Muslim League and the Justice
Party/Dravida Kazhagam parties. Several other splinters from the Congress party after
independence either at the national or state level retain the centrist orientation with a right or
left or regionalist tilt in practically all states and regions in the northern, western, eastern and
the southern parts of the country. Among these numerous splinters, over the decades, those
that still survive as state parties are the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) in Maharashtra, All
India Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal, YSR Congress Party (Yuvajana Sramika
Rythu Congress Party, meaning Youth, Labour and Farmers Congress Party) in Andhra
Pradesh, and Telangana Rashtra Samithi (Telangana Nationalist Council) in Telangana in the
more recently created state of Telangana. Indeed, all these parties are ruling in their
respective states, either in a coalition (in Maharashtra) or in a single party government (in the
rest of the states) at this writing (May 2020). The Maharashtra coalition government
comprises the Shivsena, NCP, and Congress. Shivsena, the only party here without a
Congress past, had been the oldest ally of BJP until its recent desertion for heading this
government by its chief Uddhav Thackre.
These Congress splinters retain, in broad terms, the middle-of-the-road Congress
orientations – right of the centre or left of the centre - with some variations in terms of
regions and personal proclivities of the persons leading them and groups configuring around
them. Political liberalism and socialist pretentions of Nehru (classically reflected in
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India)
gradually changed into political populism of Indira Gandhi (e.g. garibi hatao and primacy of
the Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights), and welfare statist posture of Sonia
Gandhi (e.g. MNREGA or National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, later prefixed
with ‘Mahatma Gandhi’ initiated by Sonia Gandhi as the chair of National Advisory Council
appointed by Prime minister Manmohan Singh to countervail the inequalities-producing
New Economic Policy introduced by the Narasimha Rao Congress minority government)
were all motivated by the middle-of-the-road Indian political liberalism.
The Congress leaders in the Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi eras, especially
in the North at the national level, belonged predominantly to the urban middle class and rural
upper castes, though the party’s support structure was much wider and inclusive of the
middle classes, the peasantry and working classes, and lower castes as well as the minorities
in religious terms. The Congress leadership and support structure in the South had become
subalternised much earlier during the 1950s and 1960s. This process gradually materialised in
the North later and in a more gradual way by the late 1960s and the late 1970s.
A more or less similar trajectory, with some variations of course, can be seen in the
case of the Janata Party, later Janata Dal since 1989, whose genesis goes back to the
Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) Movement and the Emergency era jails where the major non-
Congress and non-Communist party leaders were incarcerated by the Indira Gandhi Congress
government during 1975-1977. Just on the eve of the 1977 general elections four parties -
Congress (Organisation or Opposition), Bharatiya Lok Dal (farmers’ party led by Chaudhary
Charan Singh, Hindu-Right Bharatiya Jana Sangh, and the Socialist Party hurriedly merged to
form a confederal Janata Party, which was also joined in the aftermath of the said elections
by a Congress splinter - Congress for Democracy - led by prominent SC Congress leader
Jagjivan Ram, H.N. Bahuguna and Nandini Satpathi (both Brahmans. In terms of
antecedence, the Congress (Organisation), Lok Dal and Congress for Democracy elements in
the Janata Party had split off from the Congress Party in the recent past, and the Socialists in
the distant past (early 1950s), some of whose elements had rejoined the Congress under
Nehru and Indira Gandhi. The Hindu Right Bharatiya Jan Sangh and some newly mobilised
OBC leaders (largely the products of the JP Movement in the Hindu heartland states) did not
have, of course, a Congress background.
Electoral turnover of 1977 causing the Congress party’s debacle was followed in
quick succession by the Janata Party government under the ideological grey eminence of JP
and headed by Moraji Desai but it fell prematurely in 1979. The Congress led by Indira
Gandhi was restored in 1980 and remained in power until 1989. There followed the Janata
Dal-led National Front government headed by V.P. Singh (1989-1990). After its premature
fall, the Congress minority government of P.V. Narasimha Rao took over and survived a full
term (1991-1996) but by bribing some parties and Members of Parliament leading to court
cases. Then again there followed coalition governments of Janata Dal-led United Front
governments led in a sort of musical-chair game headed by H.D. Devegowda and I.K. Gujral
in quick succession, both falling falling mid-term. None of the post-1989 coalition
governments survived more than a year. In a period of nearly a decade between 1989 and
1999, four Lok Sabha elections had to be held because of governmental instability where
normally two would have sufficed.
It was only a matter of time that the plural and confederal political formation called
Janata Party/Dal fragmented into its regional and caste-oriented splinters of Samajvadi Party
(SP) in Uttar Pradesh led by Mulayam Singh Yadav, Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa/Odhisha
led by Navin Patnaik, Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in Bihar led by Lalu Prasad Yadav and
Samata Party led by Nitish Kumar (an OBC Kurmi) and later renamed Janata Dal (United)
(JDU - both in Bihar, Lok Shakti in Karnataka led by Ramakrishna Hegde (a Brahman) and
Janata Dal (Secular) in Karnataka led by H.D Devegowda (an OBC) and H.D Kumarswamy
(Devegowda’s son). Except for Ramakrishna Hegde, all these aforementioned leaders
belonged to the other Backward Classes/Castes. A common point in these Janata Party/Dal
parivaar parties is that they are all centrist parties in ideological orientation much like their
parent Janata Party/Dal, if somewhat left-of-the-centre outfits. Another point common to
them all, also a legacy of the Janata Party/Dal is that they acquired a strong bias in favour of
the Other Backward Classes/Castes (OBCs), for it was the Moraji Desai Janata Party
government that had appointed the Second Backward Classes Commission chaired by B.P
Mandal (an Yadav leader from Bihar), which first recommended OBC reservations at the
Union level in a addition to the Scheduled Castes/Tribes reservations originally provided for
in the Constitution. Desai was an Anabil Brahman from Gujarat but the Janata Party was a
predominantly OBC-dominated party. The Janata Party government fell prematurely before
implementing this new reservation and was replaced by the return of the Congress party
government of Indira Gandhi in 1980, which kept shelved it for a decade, until the Janata
Dal-led National Front coalition government headed by V.P. Singh (a Rajput) finally
implemented it in 1990 in central government services and in all central universities as well
as in state universities dependent on the central University Grants Commission (UGC)
financing. The OBC reservation was first implemented at the state level in Bihar by the
Janata Party Chief Minister Karpuri Thakur (a Nai or barber) in 1978 and in Uttar Pradesh by
the Samajvadi Party Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1993.The rise of peasant and
OBC castes and decline of the Brahmanas and other castes had already come to pass in south
and west Indian states where the political dominance of Brahmanas had been challenged and
replaced between the 1950s and 1960s in Tamil Nadu by non-Brahman Dravida castes, in
Andhra Pradesh by Reddys and Kamas, in Karnataka by Lingayats and Vokaligas, in
Maharsstra by Marathas, and in Gujarat by Patels and Pattidars. The rise of non-Brahman
upper and middle castes in north Indian states like Jats, Bisnois, Yadavas, Koeris-Kurmis,
etc. to political dominance was largely a phenomenon of the late 1960s, especially the late
1970s. The lower OBC castes and the Scheduled castes in the country came into political
reckoning only by the 1980s and later as balancing forces rather than as ‘entrenched castes’
and ‘dominant castes’ as earlier conceptualised by Rajni Kothari (1973), M.N. Srinivas
(1966), Andre Beteille (1966) earlier and later analysed in more contemporary terms by D.L.
Sheth (2018).
A major new dimension of the Janata party phenomenon was the merger into it of the
Hindu-Right Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in 1977 in the wake of the JP Movement in which
the BJS had also participated. This experience caused the BJS to move from the far-Hindu-
Right position to a position closer to the ‘persistent centrist tendency’ of the Indian politics
(Rudolphs 1987) and the Indian party system. To an extent it liberalised and
constitutionalised its new awatar BJP, much like the Communist parties of India during the
Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras earlier which had gone through a similar process. Even after
the BJS constituent finally deserted the Janata Party in 1980 during the gradual splintering of
the latter party, the newly formed BJP still sought to retain its newly acquired centrist and
multicultural orientations. Even though it continued to profess its commitment to V.D
Savarkar’s Hindutva (1928), its founding resolution in 1980 under the influence of Atal
Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani adopted ‘Gandhian Socialism’ as its new tenet. Yet
BJP did not abandon Savarkar’s Hindutva (1928) and continued to contend against what it
called “Congress’ pseudo-secularism” and ‘minorityism’ and argued for ‘genuine secularism’
and ‘cultural nationalism’ based on Hindutva as an all-inclusive nationalist ideology. They
resented against Congress’ ‘vote bank politics’ of minority appeasement and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s famous statement that the minorities had the first claim on national
resources and welfare measures of the state. Their cultural nationalism of Hindutva as
conceptualised by Savarkar was predicated on two premises: (i) territoriality comprising the
land girded by the Himalayas and the Oceans; and (ii) and the people irrespective of religious
affiliations residing therein and regarding India as their pitribhumi (fatherland) and
punyabhumi (holyland). It was obviously an attempt to make an implied differentiation
between Hinduism as an ethnicity and Hindutva as a nationalism. Later, Vajpayee as Prime
Minister of a BJP-led National Democratic Allaince government (1998-2004) professed that
for him Hindutva and Bharatiyata are one and the same thing. Both these ideological strands
are present in the BJP today. More recently Rashtrya Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS) has also
moved closer to political Hinduism of the BJP imbibed through its participation in electoral
politics and developed a more accommodative multicultural posture and profession
(Anderson and Damle 2018). These shifts have also incrementally brought the BJP electoral
dividends in central and western India at the state level during the 1980s and 1990s. By the
late 1990s and the decades that followed it surged ahead nationally dwarfing the historically
dominant Congress party which seems to have entered into a phase of a serious decline as a
national party, though with occasional spurts in some state Assembly elections subsequently.
The decline of the Congress Party is mainly caused by the loss of its catch-all umbrella
electoral base partly to BJP seeking to become another umbrella party and partly to some
regional parties wedded to segmented ethnic and regional political mobilisation in the post-
Nehru and post-Indira Gandhi/Rajiv Gandhi phases. Congress’ loss of elan and impetus and
its predicament is compounded by its dynastic control over five generations of
Nehru/Gandhis that eventually turned into a factor of diminishing electoral efficiency after
Sonia Gandhi down to Rahul Gandhi. The net effect in the rise of the BJP to a political
dominance is somewhat reminiscent of the Congress dominance of the yore.
 Other religious Right parties like the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) of the Sikhs in
Punjab and neighbouring states; Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) in Kerala, All Assam,
now All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) in Assam founded by Maulana Badruddin
Ajmal; and All India Majlis-e-Ittihadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) founded by Asaduddin Obaisi
in Hyderabad/Telangana are all, by and large, centre-right political formations with religious
slants towards their respective communities with an inclusive multicultural perspective. Like
SAD, AIMIM has also made electoral forays in a few other states like Maharashtra in
constituencies with Muslim concentration.
As already evident in the foregoing fragmentation of parties of all-India standing like
the Indian National Congress and Janata Party/Dal has given rise to or multiplied the number
regional parties limited to one or a few states, despite their proclivity to prefix their names
with the adjective ‘All India...’ these splinters have joined the ranks of older regional parties
in the parts of the country with stronger regional identifications than the Hindi-heartland
harbouring ten Hindi-speaking states (Uttar Pradesh, Uttrakhand, Madhya Pradesh , Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and the National Capital
Region (NCR) of Delhi. Regions strong regional identification are the South, Northwest and
Northeast of the country. More about older regional parties and newer ones arising
independently (not through fragmentation of national parties) later. We must for the present
first turn to sketch out the Leftwing in Indian politics.
The leftwing in India has had two major strands in socialism and communism.
Socialism first surfaced as a ‘party-within-a-party’ in the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) in
the early 1930s with prominent leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), Acharya
J.B.Kripalani, Acharaya Narendra Dev, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Raj Narain, etc. Following
the Independence, the CSP was offered the choice of either to merge with the Congress or
leave. Its leaders opted the latter course and formed in succession the Praja Socialist Party
(PSP) led by Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev, Basavan Singh, which
subsequently merged with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) led by Acharaya Kriplani,
and from which a faction led by Dr. Lohia split off to form the Sanjukta Socialist Party
(SSP). The Socialists made some early electoral ripples nationally and regionally in the 1950s
and 1960s, but by the 1970s they either joined the Congress party or the Lok Dal (a peasants’
party formed by Chaudhary Charan Singh) or electorally faded out.
Communism first emerged in Indian politics under the influence of the Communist
International and the British Communist Party under the leadership of M.N. Roy and Rajani
Palme Dutt respectively and found manifestation in the organisation of the Communist Party
of India (CPI) in the early 1920s. At the time of India’s Independence and Partition, the
incumbent CPI general secretary P.C Joshi advocated a moderate line of ‘responsive
cooperation’ with the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. However, at the
Second Congress of CPI in Calcutta in 1978 the party line dramatically shifted to
revolutionary insurrection under the new general secretary B.T Ranadive without much
headway and was eventually suppressed and contained. The party subsequently tended to
shift to the line of parliamentary communism in the Nehru era, as reflected in the adoption of
the idea of parliamentary road to communism at the party’s Amritsar Congress in 1958. It
was a tactical rather than an ideological conversion; unlike Euro-Communist parties the party
never formally abandoned the revolutionary ideal and the dictatorship of proletariat as a
prelude to communism. Following the division of the international communist movement
between Moscow and Peking, the CPI split into the Moscow-oriented CPI and China-
Oriented CPI-Marxist (CPI-M), both adopting elections as their principal strategy for political
power. Both decided to politically distance themselves from the fringe radical elements like
CPI (Marxist-Leninist) and Maoists. Some CPI (Marxist-Leninist) factions like Indian
People’s Front had occasionally joined the electoral process and one of its leaders had won a
seat in Lok Sabha in 1989 and in Bihar Assembly in 1995. CPI and CPI (M) have
consistently maintained minority presence in parliament, mostly in opposition but
occasionally as coalition partners supporting the government - either only from parliamentary
floor or rarely also joining the cabinet, only CPI opting for the latter course. Regionally, they
have also come to power in West Bengal with CPI (M) heading the Left Front coalition
government consistently from 1977 to 2011 when the Trinamool Congress dislodged it, or in
alternate elections with CPI (M) at the head of the Left Democratic Front (LDF) competing
on the other side with the Congress party-led United Democratic Front (UDF) in Kerala, and
consistently for 25 years in Tripura. At this writing (May 2020), LDF is still in power,
whereas the CPI (M)-led Left Front was trounced in Tripura in 2018 by BJP.
To take up the tack of the remaining regional parties, Singh and Saxena (2020,
chap.12) delineate three geographical zones of varying intensity of regionalism: (i) areas of
strong regional identities, e.g. Deep South, Northwest, and Northwest; (ii) areas of
intermediate regionalism, e.g. West Bengal, Assam, Andhra Pradesh , Maharashtra; and (iii)
areas of moderate regionalism states, which had been the centres or core or contiguous parts
of the subcontinental subcontinental states of the Maurayas, the Mughals and the British
colonial states or nearly subcontinental states like the Guptas,Vijayanagara rayas, Delhi
Sultanate, e.g. the Hindi-speaking states, Odisha, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Karnataka.
Interestingly, there is a plausible correlation between these three types of regions and support
for kinds of regional and national parties in the history and politics of modern and
contemporary India. The first category of regions has produced the oldest and most regionally
oriented parties, some even verging on separatism or secessionism, e.g. Justice Party
(founded in 1914), Dravida Kazhagam (DMK) (1949), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (AIADMK) (1972) and several other smaller and more recent Dravida parties
rooted in independentist Dravida Movement. The DMK dropped the secessionist clause from
its constitution as late as in 1963; it first electorally came to power in Tamil Nadu in the 1967
general elections and the state has since continuously been ruled by DMK or AIDMK, mostly
in coalition with smaller local Tamil parties and allied with a national party - Congress or
BJP - largely in the context of national politics.
This pattern of regional politics is also replicated in the Northwest and Northeast.
Among the regional parties in the Northwest is the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
(JKNC) whose ancestory goes back to Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference founded by
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1932. It merged All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front
with it after the Kashmir Accord (1974) during the reign of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
(Congress) which facilitated the return of Sheikh Abdullah from political wilderness since
1953 as the JKNC Chief Minister in the wake of the Congress government in the state
resigning to make room for him. It signalled the retreat of Abdullah from an independist line
on Kashmir. Since then the JKNC stands for greater autonomy for the state under the Indian
Union going back to the 1953 position when the Nehru Congress government removed
Abdullah from power in the state and arrested him. In 2000, the JKNC government led by
Farooq Abdullah got an autonomy resolution by the state Assembly passed demanding a
return to the pre-1953 position, which however was rejected by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee
government (BJP/NDA) of which the JKNC was a coalition partner. The Narendra Modi
government (BJP/NDA) has gone ahead to deoperationalise Article 370 granting
asymmetrical federal autonomy or special status to the state and also reorganising it into two
Union territories of J&K and Ladakh on August 5, 2019, in the midst of deepening terrorist
violence aided and abetted by Pakistan. The government promises to restore state status to the
Union territory of J & K at an appropriate time.
A relatively newer regional party in J&K is the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
founded by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in 1998, professing ‘self rule’ in the state. It first came
to power in 2002-2008, when it formed a coalition government with the Indian National
Congress, with sayeed as the Chief Minster (CM) for the first half of the term and Congress’
Ghulam Nabi Azad heading the government for the second half. In June 2008, the PDP
pulled out of the coalition government over the allotment of forest land to the Amaranth
Temple by CM Azad that triggered violent protest in the Kashmir Valley. Subsequently, in
2015, in a hung Assembly following an election, it became part of a coalition government
with the BJP, Sayeed as the CM, and later, after his death in harness, his daughter Mehbooba
Mufti succeeding him. The PDP-BJP alliance lasted for three years only, until 2018.
Reportedly, the two parties fell out as they did not see eye to eye over the Centre’s decision
to end the Ramzan ceasefire with terrorists. President’s rule in the state followed after the
resignation of the Mehbooba government.
Another old regional party in the Northwest is the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in
Punjab whose antecedents go back to the Sikh Gurdwara (temple) Reform movement during
1920 -1925 agitating for freeing their principal gurdwaras from the control of their hereditary
udasi panth (sect) mahanths (priests) and bringing them under democratic community
control. The British government responded by legislating the Shiromani Gurdwara
Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) (Apex Sikh Temples Management Committee) Act (1925)
providing for forming the SGPC through periodic elections. The SAD is a product of this
movement and has been the major regional party in the state competing with national parties
like the Indian National Congress, Bhartiya Janata Party during the pre- and post-
Independence periods. The party has stood for greater autonomy for the state within the
Indian Union. During the 1980s Punjab was gripped by insurgency and terrorism for an
independent Khalistan fanned by Pakistan and some elements of the Sikh diaspora in the
West, which was sternly dealt with by the security forces of the state and Union government
under the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution and brought under the control by
the end of the decade. The Akali Dal did not support the Khalistan movement, though they
appeared to be ambivalent and were arrested and put in preventive detention. In 1985 the
Akali leaders were released and the party’s top leader Harcharan Singh Longowal signed the
Punjab Accord with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. It was agreed that the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution of the party for greater autonomy for the states would be referred to the Justice
R.S Sarkari. Commission then examining the issue of the Centre-State relations, which did
not finally recommend any major constitutional amendments other than reorienting the
functioning of federal relations. It was agreed in the Accord that the inter-state river water
disputes would be adjudicated by an independent tribunal, Chandigarh (then the joint capital
of Punjab and Haryana) would be transferred to the former, and some Hindi-speaking areas
called Fazilka and Abohar would be transferred by the former to the latter. Elections to the
Parliament and state Assembly were due in September 1985. On August 20, the day
Longowal announced the party’s participation in them, he was assassinated by terrorists.
However, terrorism in the state was contained and elections held as scheduled in which the
SAD won at both the Union and state levels.
 The major regional political parties in the Northeastern states are Assam Gana
Parishad, Bodoland Peoples’ Front, All India United Democratic Front in Assam; Naga
People’s Front and Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party in Nagaland; People’s Party in
Arunachal Pradesh; Mizo National Front in Mizoram; United Democratic Party and People’s
Democratic Party in Meghalaya; Manipur People’s Party , Peoples Resurgence and Justice
Alliance, North East India Development Party, Naga National Party in Manipur; Communist
Party of India in Tripura; Sikkim Democratic Front and Sikkim Krantikari Morcha in Sikkim.
Such a fragmentation of Party systems in the Northeastern states is a reflection of fragmented
social space in most of these states along tribal and religious lines. Assam, the ‘parent’ of all
the states in this region (except Sikkim), was reorganised along tribal lines over the three
decades of the 1960s to 1980s. In addition, most of these states are multi-tribal and multi-
ethnic. Several states in this region also have parallel channels of party-political-processes
and independentist insurgent groups that keep going underground and coming up and signing
accords with the Union and state governments. Practionally all states of the region are
marked by democratisation and constitutionalisation to a considerable, if variable, extents.
National parties like Congress and BJP have made electoral or coalitional-governmental
forays in all the states of the region.
Finally, we come to take notice of two relatively new regional parties from the Hindi
heartland that appeared to have the promising prospect of making political splash over larger
spaces beyond the states of their initial electoral and governmental forays, i.e. Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP) and Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). BSP is the major Scheduled Caste party founded
in 1984 by Kanshi Ram, a majabi Sikhs (Scheduled Castes) from Punjab who had earlier
served as a research assistant in the Ministry of Defence High Energy Materials Research
Laboratory in Pune, Maharashtra. He was assisted in this venture by Kumari Mayawati, a
Scheduled Caste Jatav and a school teacher in Delhi. BSP rose rapidly as a Scheduled Caste
party in Uttar Pradesh and formed the government with Mayawati as the Chief Minister in
alliance with the Samajwati Party in 1993, which fell half way through its term, but her
government was propped up by BJP in 1995. But this government also fell in less than five
months. Her two more stints as chief Minister backed from outside by BJP followed – six
months in 1997 and 15 months in 2002-03. BSP electorally peaked in UP in 2007 when it
won 206 of 403 Assembly seats and Mayavati ruled as the Chief Minister for a full five-year
term. This success was largely due to the shift in Party’s ideology of exclusive focus on
Bahujan Dalits to sarvajans (all-inclusive people). Dalit-Brahman alliance was the fulcrum
of this first remarkable success. Party’s presence in the national Parliament also increased,
where it generally avoided alliances with any party, but extended support to the Congress-led
United Progressive Alliance in 2009 from the parliamentary floor without joining the
government.
Three other states have larger proportions of Scheduled Castes in populations than in
UP – Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and West Bengal. Why did BSP steal a march over them in
UP? The answer may probably be found in the larger caste plurality as well as consciousness
in UP compared to other states, for one thing, and the political-ideological space in Punjab
being highly mobilised along religious identities and in West Bengal along communist-
noncommunist identies and in Himachal Pradesh being generally less socially mobilised, for
another.
BSP government in UP was marked by rampant corruption and unabashed neo-feudal
megalomania reflected in huge collection of personalised funds in the name of the party,
construction of parks, installation of statues of her own and other Dalit icons, beautification
around Tajmahal in Agra, and amassing of huge personal wealth. The downfall of BSP
started in 2012 Assembly elections in which it lost to Samajwadi Party led by Mulayam
Singh Yadav and his son Akhilesh Yadav and senior Yadav’s brothers. The 2014 Lok Sabha
elections marked by Modi magic, elevated the BJP to the majority position for the first time
since 1984; BSP failed to win a single seat. And in UP Assembly election in 1917, it was
reduced to the third position after the BJP and Samajwadi Party. Presence of the SCs in the
bulk of states of the Indian union had given Mayawati the visions of raising her party to the
ranks of a new major national party and ascending to the position of the Prime Minister of the
country. This hope has remained unrealised.
The AAP was born as a party in the trail of the Anna Hazare led anti-corruption
movement-India against Corruption in 2012. Its supreme leader Arvind Kezrival participated
as one of the leading lights of the movement in 1911 but later fell out with Hazare; the latter
wanted only to pursue the movement course, while Kejriwal wanted to establish a political
party in quest of an ‘alternative politics’ with a ‘party with a difference’ in comparison to the
run-of-the-mill political parties. Its pursuit of ‘alternative politics’ emphasised genuine public
service, participatory democracy, and corruption-free governance (Singh 2020). The Delhi
Assembly elections in 2013 were its first electoral foray. The election results gave the BJP a
plurality, closely followed by AAP, ending the 15-year uninterrupted spell of power of the
Congress party onder Chief Minister Sheela dikshit. AAP formed a minority government
with unsolicited support from the Assembly floor of the Congress party. But it prematurely
resigned after 49 days when its proposed anti-corruption Janlokpal Bill fell for lack of
support from Congress or any other party. It ambitiously entered the 2014 Lok Sabha
elections in its bid to make a national splash by contesting 432 seats and with Kejriwal
standing against the BJP prime ministerial candidate Narendra Mod in the Varanasi
parliamentary constituency. AAP won just one seat across India, four seats in Punjab
becoming a ‘state party’ there as recognised by the Election Commission, and a reasonably
high percentage of votes in Delhi. Kejriwal lost in Varanasi. However, in 2015 Delhi
Assembly election, AAP staged a landslide Victory by winning 67 of 70 seats. BJP won only
three seats and the Congress was reduced to Zero. More about AAP’s electoral trajectory
later in this paper, Here consider the following comment by a veteran analyst of Indian
Politics:
The Aam Aadmi Party is riding a wave. Ever since it hurled the Congress out of
power in Delhi and chipped away a sizable chunk of the BJP’s vote, it has been
making the headlines every single day. To its leaders nothing seems impossible. They
are confident of enrolling one crore members throughout the country and talk of
replacing the Congress as the second tent pole of Indian Politics. To the millions of
ordinary people, living increasingly harsh lives in our congested cities, who are
queing up to join it, it has become a beacon that promises to guide them to a better
future (Jha 2014)
This expectation of Prem Shankar Jha has not materialised in the last two Lok Sabha
elections and, the AAP continues to be a state party largely limited to Delhi
Structure of Competition
National and Regional Parties in Parliament
Tables 1 and 2 present electoral data pertaining to the latest phase of the Indian party
system covering the 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections. Table 1 shows that the BJP under
Modi emerged as the majority party in 2014; no other party had been able to do it since 1989.
Nevertheless, the party system remained considerably fragmented with six national parties
and 25 state parties wining Lok Sabha seats ranging from 282 to one, with vote shares
ranging between 31:34 and 0.03 per cent. If consider only double-digit figures, we have two
national parties, i.e. BJP scoring 282 seats (51.93 percent of total Lok Sabha seats with a vote
share of 31:34 percent) and the Indian National Congress scoring 44 seats (seat share 8.10
percent and vote share 19.52). This was the lowest electoral watermark for the INC in its
history. The second major national party even missed the 10 percent in the Lok Sabha
required for being the official opposition to the government of the day. Party system
fragmentation is, in fact, more evident if we consider the electoral performance of state
parties. Strictly speaking, the remaining four national parties are de facto regional parties, if
we adopt a more stringent criteria for designating national parties (see Notes at bottom of
Table 1 and 2). As many as six state parties won seats in double digits: AIADMK (37), AITC
 (234), BJD (20), Shivsena (18), TDP (16), and TRS (11). Being state parties their share in
national vote in percentage terms is expectedly low, ranging between slightly above 3 and
above 1. However their shares in the total vote in their respective states is rather high, rising
to 44.92 per cent for AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, 23.91 per cent for DMK in Tamil Nadu, 44.74
per cent for BJP in Odisha, for TMC in West Bengal, 29.36 per cent for TDP in Andhra
Pradesh, 26.37 per cent, for SAD in Punjab, 24.4 per cent for AAP in Delhi, 22.35 per cent
for Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, 24.43 per cent for INLD in Haryana , 20.46 per cent
for RJD in Bihar, 16.04 per cent for JDU in Bihar, 20.72 per cent for PDP in Jammu &
Kashmir, 11.22 per cent for National Conference in J & K, 11.7 per cent for Janata Dal (S) in
Karnataka, 68.84 per cent for Naga Peoples’ Front in Nagaland, and 20.01 per cent in
Manipur, 22.84 percent for National Peoples Party in Meghalaya, 53.74 percent for Sikkim
Democratic Front in Sikkim, 14.98 per cent for AIUDF in Assam, etc.

Table 1
Performance of Parties in the Lok Sabha General Election, 2014

Party Percent vote

Type Seats Per cent of Deposit over total
Seats
PARTYNAME Contested total seats Forfeited valid vote
Won
polled

National
Bharatiya Janata Party 428 282 51.93 62 31.34

National
Indian National Congress 464 44 8.10 178 19.52

Communist Party of India National

93 9 1.66 50 3.28
(Marxist)
National
Nationalist Congress Party 36 6 1.10 13 1.58

National
Communist Party of India 67 1 0.18 57 0.79

National
Bahujan Samaj Party 503 0 00 447 4.19

Total of National Parties 1591 342 62.98 807 60.70

 Party Percent vote
Type over total
Seats Per cent of Deposit valid votes
Seats
PARTYNAME Contested total seats Forfeited (and Votes
Won
polled in the
state)

State 3.27 (44.92

in Tamil
All India Anna Dravida
40 37 6.81 0 Nadu and
Munnetra Kazhagam
18.48 in
Puducherry)
State 3.84 (39.79
West Bengal,
3.75 in
All India Trinamool
131 34 6.26 85 Manipur and
Congress
1.55 in
Arunachal
Pradesh)
State 1.71 (44.77
Biju Janata Dal 21 20 3.68 0
in Orissa)
State 1.85 (20.82
Shivsena 58 18 3.31 38 in
Maharashtra)
State 2.55 (29.36
Telugu Desam Party 30 16 2.95 2 in Andhra
Pradesh)
State 1.22 (14.03
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 17 11 2.03 3 in Andhra
Pradesh)
State 0.41 (6.50 in
Lok Jan Shakti Party 7 6 1.10 0
Bihar)
State 3.37 (22.35
Samajwadi Party 197 5 0.92 119 in Uttar
Pradesh)
State 2.05 (24.4 in
Punjab and
Aam Aadmi Party 432 4 0.74 413
33.08 in
Delhi)
State 1.34 (20.46
in Bihar and
Rashtriya Janata Dal 29 4 0.74 1
1.66 in
Jharkhand)
State 0.66 (26.37
Shiromani Akali Dal 10 4 0.74 0
in Punjab)

All India United State 0.42 (14.98

18 3 0.55 8
Democratic Front in Assam)

Jammu & Kashmir State 0.13 (20.72

5 3 0.55 2
Peoples Democratic Party in J&K)
 State 0.51 (24.43
Indian National Lok Dal 10 2 0.37 4
in Haryana)

Indian Union Muslim State 0.2 (4.59 in

25 2 0.37 22
League Kerala)
State 0.67 (11.07
in Karnataka
Janata Dal (Secular) 34 2 0.37 8
and 1.71 in
Kerala)
State 1.08 (16.04
Janata Dal (United) 93 2 0.37 55
in Bihar)
State 0.3 (9.42 in
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 21 2 0.37 16
Jharkhand)
State 0.05 (35.64
All India N.R. Congress 1 1 0.18 0 in
Puducherry)
State 0.08 (2.39 in
Kerala Congress (M) 1 1 0.18 0
Kerala)
State 0.18 (20.01
Manipur and
Naga Peoples Front 2 1 0.18 0
68.84 in
Nagaland)
State 0.1 (22.84 in
National Peoples Party 7 1 0.18 5
Meghalaya)
State 0.33 (3.17 in
Pattali Makkal Katchi 9 1 0.18 3
Puducherry)

Revolutionary Socialist State 0.3 (2.46 in

6 1 0.18 1
Party West Bengal)
State 0.03 (53.74
Sikkim Democratic Front 1 1 0.18 0
in Sikkim)
State 0.09 (3.77 in
AJSU Party 10 0 00 1
Jharkhand)
State 0.22 (2.17 in
All India Forward Bloc 39 0 00 36
West Bengal)
State 0.1 (3.87 in
Asom Gana Parishad 12 0 00 12
Assam)
State 0.06 (2.21 in
Bodoland Peoples Front 2 0 00 1
Assam)

Desiya Murpokku Dravida State 0.38 (5.19 in

14 0 00 11
Kazhagam Tamil Nadu)
State 1.74 (23.91
in Tamil
Dravida Munnetra
35 0 00 3 Nadu and
Kazhagam
8.44 in
Puducherry)
Haryana Janhit Congress State 0.13 (6.14 in
2 0 00 0
(BL) Haryana)

Jammu & Kashmir State 0.07 (11.22

3 0 00 0
National Conference in J&K)

Jammu & Kashmir State 0.01 (1.23 in

13 0 00 8
National Panthers Party J&K)

Jharkhand Vikas Morcha State 0.29 (12.25

16 0 00 2
(Prajatantrik) in Jharkhand)

Maharashtra Navnirman State 0.13 (1.47 in

10 0 00 10
sena Maharashtra)
State 0.01 (7.96 in
People's Party of
2 0 00 2 Arunachal
Arunachal
Pradesh)
State 0.13 (0.86 in
Rashtriya Lok Dal 10 0 00 2 Uttar
Pradesh)
State 0.02 (10.19
United Democratic Party 1 0 00 0 in
Meghalaya)

Total of State Parties 1374 182 33.52 873 ---

Party Percent vote

Type over total
Seats Per cent of Deposit
Seats valid votes
PARTYNAME Contested total seats Forfeited
Won polled in the
state

Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Registered

Congress Party (Unrecogn
ised) 38 9 1.66 12 2.53

Rashtriya Lok Samta Party Registered

(Unrecogn 4 3 0.55 1 0.19
ised)

Registered
Apna Dal
(Unrecogn 7 2 0.37 5 0.15
ised)
Registered
All India Majlis-E-
(Unrecogn 5 1 0.18 4 0.12
Ittehadul Muslimeen
ised)
Swabhimani Paksha Registered
(Unrecogn 2 1 0.18 0 0.2
ised)

Other Registered Registered

(Unrecognized) Parties (Unrecogn 1996 0 00 1977 ---
ised)
 Total of Registered
(Unrecognised) Parties 2052 16 2.95 1999 ---

Independent ---
3235 3 0.55 3218 3.02

Grand Total
8251 543 --- 6897 98.92*

Source: Election Commission of India, data Compiled from various tables downloaded on 18 May 2020 from

1. There are some parties got status of State Party in one or two or three states but contested in other states as
well where these parties are Registered (Unrecognised) Party. In this table, under the category of State Parties
cumulative data of those state parties are given that includes their data of those states where these parties have
status of Registered (Unrecognised) Party.

2. Under the category of Registered (Unrecognised) Parties only those parties are mentioned who have managed
to win any seat. Cumulative data of other parties are mentioned as other Registered (Unrecognised) Parties. This
does not include the data of those parties have status of State Party in any state.

3. There are total 18 State parties are there who contested in other states where these parties have status of
Registered (Unrecognised) Party. These parties are, Aam Aadmi Party, AJSU Party, All India Forward Block,
All India Trinamool Congress, All India United Democratic Front, J&K National Panthers Party, Janata Dal
(Secular), Janata Dal (United), Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik), National
Peoples Party, Parrali Makkal Katchi, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal, Revolutionary Socialists Party,
Samajwadi Party, and Shivsena.

4. At present, according to Election Commission of India, a political party shall be eligible to be recognised as
national party if (a) candidates of a party scored not less than six percent of valid votes in any four or more
states in last Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly elections and, in addition, it secured at least four seats in
Lok Sabha from any state or states; OR (b) at the last general election to the Lok Sabha, the party won at least
two percent of the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha (i.e. 11 seats at present), any fraction exceeding half
being counted as one and the party’s candidates were elected to the Lok Sabha from not less than three states;
OR (c) the party fulfilled the criteria to be recognised as state party in at least four states [Election Commission
of India, 2010, In re: Rashtriya Janata Dal-Withdrawal of recognition as a National Party, order dated 26
August 2010, accessed from Accessed on 26 August 2013].

5. A political party shall be eligible to be recognised as state party, if, (a) at the last general election to the State
Assembly candidates of the party secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes polled in the state and,
in addition, the party secured at least two seats in the State Legislative Assembly; OR (b) at the last general
election to the Lok Sabha, the candidates of the party secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes
polled in the state and, in addition, the party secured at least one seat to the Lok Sabha from that state; OR (c) at
the last general election to the State Legislative Assembly, the party won at least three percent of the total
number of seats in the Assembly, where any fraction exceeding half being counted as one, or at least three seats
in the Assembly, which ever is more; OR (d) at the last general election to the Lok Sabha in that particular state,
the party has secured at least one seat for every 25 seats or any fraction therefore allotted to that state (Election
Commission of India, 2010: 2-3). [Election Commission of India, 2010, In re: Rashtriya Janata Dal-
Withdrawal of recognition as a National Party, order dated 26 August 2010, accessed from Accessed on 26
August 2013]

Table 2
Performance of Parties in the Lok Sabha General Election, 2019
Name of the Party Party Seats Seats won Per cent of Deposit Percent vote over
Type Contested total seats Forfeited total valid vote
polled
 Bharatiya Janata National 436 303 55.9 51 37.76
Party

Indian National National 421 9.59 148 19.7

52
Congress
All India Trinamool National 62 4.1 20 4.11
22
Congress

Bahujan Samaj Party National 383 10 1.8 345 3.67

Nationalist Congress National 34 0.92 14 1.4

5
Party
Communist Party of National 69 0.55 51 1.77
3
India (Marxist)
Communist Party of National 49 0.37 41 0.59
2
India

Total of National 1454 73.25 670 69

397
Parties
Name of the Party Party Seats Seats won Per cent of Deposit Percent vote over
Type Contested total seats Forfeited total valid vote
polled in the state

All India Anna State 21 6.83 0 18.72 in Tamil

Dravida Munnetra 37 Nadu
Kazhagam
Dravida Munnetra State 23 4.24 0 33.18 in Tamil
23 Nadu
Kazhagam

Yuvajana Sramika State 25 4.06 0 49.89 in Andhra

22 Pradesh
Rythu Congress Party
State 98 3.32 75 23.5 in
Shivsena 18 Maharashtra

Janata Dal (United) State 25 16 2.95 8 22.26 in Bihar

Biju Janata Dal State 21 12 2.21 0 43.32 in Odisha

Telangana Rashtra State 17 1.66 1 41.71 in

9 Telangana
Samithi
State 49 0.92 13 18.11 in Uttar
Samajwadi Party 5 Pradesh

Indian Union Muslim State 9 0.55 6 5.48 in Kerala

3
League
Jammu & Kashmir State 3 0.55 0 7.94 in J&K
3
National Conference
All India Majlis-E- State 3 0.37 0 2.8 in Telangana
2
Ittehadul Muslimeen
Shiromani Akali Dal State 10 2 0.37 0 27.76 in Punjab
 State 35 0.18 30 7.46 in Punjab and
Aam Aadmi Party 1 18.2 in Delhi

AJSU Party State 1 1 0.18 0 4.39 in Jharkhand

All India United State 3 0.18 0 7.87 in Assam

1
Democratic Front
Janata Dal (Secular) State 9 1 0.18 2 9.74 in Karnataka

Jharkhand Mukti State 13 0.18 9 11.66 in

1 Jharkhand
Morcha

Kerala Congress (M) State 1 1 0.18 0 2.08 in Kerala

Mizo National Front State 1 1 0.18 0 45.12 in Mizoram

Naga Peoples Front State 1 1 0.18 0 22.55 in Manipur

State 11 0.18 10 1-91 in Manipur

National Peoples 22.2 in Meghalaya

1
Party
1.49 in Nagaland

Nationalist State 1 0.18 0 49.84 in Nagaland

Democratic 1
Progressive Party
State 6 0.18 5 2.46 in Kerala
Revolutionary
1 0.37 in West
Socialist Party
Bengal

Sikkim Krantikari State 1 0.18 0 47.76 in Sikkim

1
Morcha
All India Forward State 35 00 35 0.42 in West
0 Bengal
Block
Bodoland Peoples State 1 00 0 2.51 in Assam
0
Front

Desiya Murpokku State 4 00 2 2.22 in Tamil

0
Dravida Kazhagam Nadu

Indian National Lok State 10 00 10 1.9 in Haryana

0
Dal
Indigenous People’s State 2 00 2 4.2 in Tripura
0
Front of Tripura
Jammu & Kashmir State 8 00 8 0.96 in J&K
National Panthers 0
Party
Jammu & Kashmir State 2 0 00 1 2.38 in J&K
Peoples Democratic
 Party
Jharkhand Vikas State 2 00 0 5.08 in Jharkhand
0
Morcha (Prajatantrik)
People’s Party of State 2 00 2 4.3 in Arunachal
0 Pradesh
Arunachal
State 21 00 2 15.68 in Bihar
Rashtriya Janata Dal 0
2.45 in Jharkhand

State 3 00 0 1.69 in Uttar

Rashtriya Lok Dal 0 Pradesh

Rashtriye Lok Samta State 5 00 0 3.66 in Bihar

0
Party
Sikkim Democratic State 1 00 0 44.21 in Sikkim
0
Front
United Democratic State 1 00 0 19.7 in Meghalaya
0
Party
Total of State 511 25.28 221 13.69 (Average)
137
Parties
Name of the Party Party Seats Seats won Per cent of Deposit Over Total valid
Type Contested total seats Forfeited
Votes Polled in

State

Registered 2 0.37 0 1.21

Apna Dal (Soneylal) (Unrecogni 2
sed)

Registered 1 0.18 0 2.06

Rashtriya Loktantrik (Unrecogni 1
Party sed)

Registered 6 0.18 5 0.40

Viduthalai (Unrecogni 1
Chiruthaigal Katchi sed)

Other Registered Registered 2766 00 2510 ---

(Unrecognised) (Unrecogni 0
Parties sed)

Total of Registered 2784 .74 2515 NA

(Unrecognised) 4
Parties
Independent 3443 4 0.74 3431 2.71 (Average)

Grand Total 8027 542 --- 6897 ---

Source: Election Commission of India, data Compiled from various tables downloaded on 18 May 2020 from
Notes: 1. There are some parties got status of State Party in one or two states but contested in other states as well
where these parties are Registered (Unrecognised) Party. In this table, under the category of State Parties
cumulative data of those state parties are given that includes their data of those states where these parties have
status of Registered (Unrecognised) Party.

2. Under the category of Registered (Unrecognised) Parties only those parties are mentioned who have managed
to win any seat. Cumulative data of other parties are mentioned as other Registered (Unrecognised) Parties. This
does not include the data of those parties have status of State Party in any state.

3. All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen and Indian Union Muslim League are state parties in Telangana and
Kerala respectively but their candidates were had contested in other states as well where the status of these
parties is Registered (Unrecognised). There are 14 more political parties who have status of in one or two states
but contested in other states as well. The data these parties where they are not the State Party are also added
under the category of Registered (Unrecognised) Parties. For example Aam Aadmi Party, All India Forward
Block, Janata Dal (Secular), Janata Dal (United), JK National Panther Party, Pattali Makkal Katchi,
Revolutionary Socialist Party, Shivsena, and Samajwadi Party. However, these parties did not secure any seat
under this category.

4. At present, according to Election Commission of India, a political party shall be eligible to be recognised as
national party if (a) candidates of a party scored not less than six percent of valid votes in any four or more
states in last Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly elections and, in addition, it secured at least four seats in
Lok Sabha from any state or states; OR (b) at the last general election to the Lok Sabha, the party won at least
two percent of the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha (i.e. 11 seats at present), any fraction exceeding half
being counted as one and the party’s candidates were elected to the Lok Sabha from not less than three states;
OR (c) the party fulfilled the criteria to be recognised as state party in at least four states [Election Commission
of India, 2010, In re: Rashtriya Janata Dal-Withdrawal of recognition as a National Party, order dated 26
August 2010, accessed from Accessed on 26 August 2013].

5. A political party shall be eligible to be recognised as state party, if, (a) at the last general election to the State
Assembly candidates of the party secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes polled in the state and,
in addition, the party secured at least two seats in the State Legislative Assembly; OR (b) at the last general
election to the Lok Sabha, the candidates of the party secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes
polled in the state and, in addition, the party secured at least one seat to the Lok Sabha from that state; OR (c) at
the last general election to the State Legislative Assembly, the party won at least three percent of the total
number of seats in the Assembly, where any fraction exceeding half being counted as one, or at least three seats
in the Assembly, which ever is more; OR (d) at the last general election to the Lok Sabha in that particular state,
the party has secured at least one seat for every 25 seats or any fraction therefore allotted to that state (Election
Commission of India, 2010: 2-3). [Election Commission of India, 2010, In re: Rashtriya Janata Dal-
Withdrawal of recognition as a National Party, order dated 26 August 2010, accessed from. Accessed on 26
August 2013]

The foregoing evidently suggest two parallel trends in the Indian party system: (i)
centralisation as indicated by the rise of the first national party (BJP) to a great height and the
dwarfing of the second national party (INC), on the one hand, and (ii) and the holding of the
forts with impressive performance by a set of state parties in regional arenas, on the other
hand. which is an indicator of a regionalised or regionalising polity.
A look at Table 2 shows that the pattern of electoral outcome in 2014 was largely
maintained in 2019, with a few modifications. BJP and INC remain the major two largest
national parties and the remaining five national parties qualify to this category due to a rather
loose or liberal definition of national parties maintained by the Election Commission. The
two major national parties improved their tally: BJP from 282 seats to 303 and vote
percentage from 51.93 to 55.9, and INC from 44 seats to 52 and vote percentage from 8.10 to
9.59. In terms of the relative political clout, BJP remained far ahead of INC. Other, national
parties - NCP, CPI(M), CPI - slipped lower in their tallies, except for BSP which went up
from o (zero) to 10 seats, though its vote percentage went down from 4.19 to 3.67. There was
a change of category in case of TMC from a state party to a national one in 2014; it became a
national party in 2019, wining 22 with 4.11 per cent of votes as against 34 seats and 3.84 per
cent of votes in the previous election. Since it spread its wings over more states now than in
the past, so it has became a national party despite its seats and votes falling in 2019.
Regional or state parties had a mixed performance - some marginally increasing their
tally (e.g. LJSP, IUML, and JD-U); some staying at the level of the previous election (e.g.
AIADMK, Shivsena, (S.P); and some getting reduced returns (BJD,TDP,TRS, AAP,RJD,
SAD, AIUDF, INLD, JD-S, JMM). A new entrant - YSR Congress in Andhra Pradesh - made
impressive debut winning nine seats and 49.89 per cent AP votes got transferred to the
category of a state party from the ranks of registered unrecognised parties. The net effect was
increase in the share of national parties in the total valid votes polled form 60.70 per cent in
2014 to 69 per cent in 2019. Yet important state parties were far from eliminated. In fact, the
DMK, which had been wiped out by the AIADMK in the Lok Sabha polls in 2014, staged a
return in 2019 with 23 seats and 33.18 per cent votes in the state. Regional parties like
AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, TRS in Telangana, YSR Congress in Andhra Pradesh,
Shivsena in Maharashtra, SAD in Punjab, PDP and National Congress in Jammu & Kashmir,
Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, BJD in Odhisha, JD-U in Bihar and several tribal
parties in the Northeast remained political forces to reccon with. Some of these like Shivsena,
JD-U and SAD have been allies of the BJP for fairly long. Recently, Shivsena deserted BJP
in the wake of Assembly elections in Maharashtra in November 2019 to form a government
in coalition with NCP and Congress.
The rise and rise of BJP in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014 and 2019 must be
juxtaposed with state Assembly elections to get the complete picture of the party system.
Electoral stability in the latest phase of the national party system is accompanied with
electoral volatility in the state party systems. For example, Assembly election held in
November-December in 2018 in Madhya Pradesh. Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Telangana, and
Mizoram, the ruling BJP lost to INC in the first three states, the ruling TRS maintained itself
in power, and the MNF trumped the ruling INC. In October 2018, BJP lost exclusive control
of Haryana and formed a coalition government with Jananayak Janata Party (JJP) led by
Dushyant Chautala, a scion of the Chaudhary Devi Lal Jat clan, a splinter form INLD. In the
wake off the December 1919 Jharkhand Assembly elections, BJP lost power to JMM led by
Hemant Soren, son of the JMM patriarch Shibu Soren.
Electoral volatility at the state level significantly impacts the federal balance
of forces at the national level. Rajya Sabha, the federal second chamber, is indirectly elected
by the elected members of the legislative Assembly of each state in accordance with the
system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. Thus, the state
party systems are clearly reflected in the pry composition of the Rajya Sabha. In the phase of
Congress dominance, when this party was uniformly dominate at the national as well as state
levels, there existed bicameral concordance in party terms in both the houses of the
Parliament. This has come to end with the transformations in the national and state party
systems since 1989. Since then no coalition or minority or party government has uniformly
controlled both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. Government’s majority control of the
Lok Sabha has been countervailed by the opposition’s control of the Rajya Sabha. In
pursuance of the parliamentary principle of government, the Lok Sabha has been given
primacy over the Rajya Sabha in matters of parliamentary control or confidence in the
government of the day and passage of money bills. However, in deference to the federal
principal of government the two houses have been given more or less equal powers in matters
of passage of general bills or legislations, subject to the provision of a joint session of the two
chambers in case of disagreement between the two houses. In the joint session the larger
number of the members of the Lok Sabha may prevail upon the smaller number of Rajya
Sabha members. But then the Presidents may frown upon the government proposal to
convince a joint session on all and sundry cases of a deadlock between the two parliamentary
chambers, although the President may be prevailed upon by reiterating the proposal. So far in
the last over seven decades, only four joint sessions have been called. Notably, the Rajya
Sabha enjoys a virtual veto in matters of approval of President’s rule in a state under the
emergency Article 356 and in an amendment to federal provisions of the Constitution. For in
this matter the Constitution does not provide for a joint session. Moreover, the Rajya Sabha
enjoys certain special powers as a federal second chamber in resolving to allow the
government to create a new all India Service other than the existing three – the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), and Indian Forest Service (IFS).
Thus, in the fourth phase of the party system marked by ascendance of BJP under Prime
Minister Modi, ‘legislative federalism’ via persistence of a set of regional parties and
opposition’s majority in the federal second chamber is more in evidence than ‘executive
federalism’ via the constitutional heads of the federal and regional states, Chief
Ministers’/Ministers’/Secretaries conferences, etc. Prime Minster Modi had a good relations
with President Pranab Mukherjee (2012-2017), elected to the high office during the preceding
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. The government had no
instances of open differences with the President. Modi government’s amendment to the land
acquisition legislation passed by the UPA government in 2013 was sought to be
operationalised by successive ordinances thrice, none of which could be made into statute
within the constitutionally stipulated period of three months due to apprehended hurdle to it
in the Rajya Sabha. The President didn’t express his initial right to advise to the government
against the ordinance route; he could of course have been prevailed upon by reiteration of the
government’s proposal to the President under the Constitution. However, the government did
not exercise the constitutional option of requesting the President to convene a joint session of
the two houses (where the Lok Sabha majority would probably prevail upon the Rajya Sabha
opposition) to get the ordinance replaced by a parliamentary law. Probably the President
strongly advised against it and the Prime Minister didn’t seek to get the President prevailed
upon by cabinet’s reiteration of the government’s determination to go ahead anyway. After
Mukherjee’s term as President ended in 2017, the new incumbent elected to the office, Ram
Nath Kovind, is Prime Minsiter Modi’s trusted persona. As for the Governors, the
government soon after coming to power prompted the Governors appointed by the previous
UPA regime to resign, some complied and others demurred but they were unceremoniously
removed under the doctrine of ‘President’s pleasure.’ Under the Constitution the Governors
are appointed for five years but they hold office during the pleasure of the President. It was
something the preceding UPA government had also done and earned judicial reproach but not
reversal (B.P. Singhal v. Union of India & Another, Supreme Court, 2010). Nine
gubernatorial heads rolled in the present instance. Article 263 of the Constitution setting up
the Inter-State Council (ISC) may be considered the fulcrum of executive federalism in India.
However, it was kept inoperationalised until 1990; it was set up by a Presidential Order in
1990 but by dropping Section (a) empowering it to inquire into and advise upon inter-state
disputes. It weakened its mandate and reduced its importance. All governments have since
then kept it sidelined, despite the repeated underlining of its utility by constitutional
Commissions like the two Commissions on Centre-State Relations (1988 and 2010) and the
National Commission on the Working of the Constitution (2002), the latter recommending to
use the ISC with additional consultative role for state governments in foreign policy issues
concerning some or all states. But these recommendations remain unimplemented by the
Union governments of all party affiliations. Informal Chief Ministers’ conferences have
indeed been held during the Modi governments, including video conferencing to deal with
Covid-19 since March this year (2020). During the coronavirus pandemic,’ the Prime
Minister tended to act unilaterally in imposing a country-wide lockdown to prevent the virus
from spreading, but subsequently conceded to the Chief Ministers’ demand for autonomy to
take decisions about relaxing the lockdown as per local situations varying by states, cities,
and mohallas. The Modi Cabinet is essentially a Prime Ministerial one, and a factor of
centralisation in the working of the parliamentary component of the political system and also
of the federal component, by and large, especially in comparison with the federal coalition
governments led by a national party lacking majority in the Lok Sabha between 1989 to 2014.
Federalism via some autonomous regulatory commissions situated within the
executive and the legislature are executive in nature but supposed to be independent from the
government. The constitutionally entrenched Comptroller and Auditor General of India has
been more insulated from governmental interference. Among statutory autonomous
commissions, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has also been able to maintain
its autonomy better as it is in concurrent jurisdiction of the Union and state government and it
has a judicial chairman. Other statutory autonomous regulatory authorities in Central
jurisdictions have been in less enviable position. Central Vigilance Commission, Central
Information Commission, National Statistical Commission, Telecom Regulatory
Commission, Central Bureau of Investigation, etc. have often suffered vacant positions
remaining unfilled or often being ignored or put under pressure. The position of the Lokpal
under the relevant statute enacted in 2013 was filled belatedly in March 2019. A good
initiative was taken in enacting the Real Estate (Regulation and development) Act, 2016,
providing for a regulatory authority in each state for regulation of the real estate sector for
adjudicating disputes between builders and buyers. Most state governments have
operationalised the Act and the central government has also set up a Central Advisory
Council in December 2017 to ensure protection to home-buyers with right implementation of
RERA throughout the country.
State Party Systems in Legislatures
State Party Systems in Legislatures

The pattern of party systems in Indian states should not be determined on the basis of mare
one assembly election. It is advisable to consider 20 years or four back to back elections
result to determine the pattern. In this chapter we are analysing the current party systems on
the basis of last two Parliamentary elections. So, to determine the pattern of party systems in
Indian states the last two assembly election results are analysed here. To get the most
appropriate pattern of party systems in Indian states, it is most important to assess the
participation of political party/parties in forming the government. Here we are considering
only two Assembly elections for the above purpose.. Moreover, securing seats and percent of
votes of total votes polled by the political parties in the considered Assembly elections are
important to study the existence of political parties in the state. 

Here, it is important to understand two important questions. The first is, why did state party
systems get differentiated from the national party system? The party systems in the states are
based on the participation of parties in the formation of the governments at the states.
However, the national party system is based on the basis of participation of political parties
in formation of the government at the Centre. However, the votes and seats share by political
parties in the National Chamber of the Parliament (the Lok Sabha) is also important to assess
the existence and strength of parties at the Centre. Party system at the Centre is one at a point
of time, however, changes in the pattern have been noticed time to time. At the state level,
simultaneously many forms of party system exists in different states.

The second question is, how the central and the state party systems are interlinked? The
pattern of party system at the state level may create some impact on the pattern at the Centre.
This impact can be seen through four ways; firstly, if the ruling parties in the states are
different from the party(s) at the Centre, in this case, the parties at the state may provide
strength to the opposition at the Centre. Secondly, state party systems directly impact the
pattern of party composition in the federal second chamber of the parliament (the
Rajyasabha). Thirdly, if the party competition in the states are different from that of the
Centre, it increase the bargaining power of the state parties with the Central government. The
bargaining power of different ruling state parties may not directly affect the party system at
the Centre, but they can create some impact by challenging the dominance of the ruling party
at the Centre, even if it has full majority in the Lok Sabha. In the contrary, if the ruling
party(s) at the Centre is/are also ruling at the majority of the states then it discourage the
opposition party and strengthen the ruling party at the Centre. Fourthly, it has also been
noticed that the pattern of party competition in various states may also influence the party
competition in the Lok Sabha elections. So, the interlinkage of the party systems at the both
levels can be understood under the following conditions. In the first condition, if the party
competition in the states are led by those parties which are against the party in power at the
Centre then they may challenge the party at the Centre through their existence and
strengthening the opposition in the federal second chamber of the Parliament. In the second
condition, if the Central ruling party is also getting in the power at the states then it will help
in creating a dominant party system at the Centre. In the third condition, if the party at the
Centre is ruling in the states with its ally parties, even this condition provide strength to the
party at the Centre, however, its ally parties may also get greater bargaining power in the
states and at the Centre. So, the party competition at both the levels are interlinked if not so
much in the National Chamber yet certainly in the Federal Chamber of the Parliament.

As we have delineated the changing pattern of party systems at the Centre in seven phases,
but at the state level different models of party system are existing simultaneously. Party
systems in states are mostly either "two-party systems" or "coalition based multiparty
systems". Some states are “one party dominant systems” and some are "mixed types
systems". So, we can categorize the states over the model of party systems as follow:

1. "Two-party system states"(where two parties alternated in power),

2. "Coalition based multiparty system states” (where coalition governments came to
power in both the elections),
3. "One-party dominant system states" (where the same party came to power in the two
elections), and
 4. Mixed type states (where the one of the above type came to power in one election and
another type in the other).

Table: 3

Classification of states according to the forms of party systems

Nature of party system States Number of states

Two-party system Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal 11

Pradesh, Chhatisgarh,
Himachal Pradesh,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Mizoram, Rajasthan, Sikkim,
Tripura, Uttar Pradesh

Coalition based multiparty Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala, 6

system Maharashtra, Meghalaya,
Pondicherry

One-party dominant system Delhi, Gujarat, Odisha, Tamil 6

Nadu, Telangana, West
Bengal

Mixed type system Assam, Goa, Haryana, 7

Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab,
Uttarakhand

Source: Created by the authors of the chapter on the basis of performance of political parties
in the last two state Assembly elections and formation of government in the states

Note: This table also include two Union Territories where state assembly is existing (Delhi
and Pondicherry)

1. Two-Party System States

In two-party systems states only two major parties alternates in power, however, other parties
do exist but they are mostly in very limited role and do not impact the formation of the
government in that state. If any of these parties play important role in one election it again
reaches to its limited role in the next election. On the basis of last two elections total 11 states
are under two-party system states (See Table 3). In these 11 states there are three kind of
competitions have evolved in last two Assembly elections; i) competition between the BJP
and the Congress, ii) Either the BJP or the Congress is competing with a state party or a
national party in the state, and iii) two state parties are competing with each other.

i) Six states out of the total 11 states fall under the first category where the BJP and the
Congress are in competition. Under this category Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal
Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan come. In these states either the BJP
forms the government of the Congress. However, in Madhya Pradesh the BJP formed the
government in 2013 and managed to win 143 seats out of total 240 seats (see table 4). In
2018 Assembly elections The Congress formed the government by due to split in the
Congress in March (when Jyotiraditya Scindia joined the BJP with his supporters) again the
BJP formed the government.

ii) Three states out of total 11 two-party system states come under subcategory two. In
Mizoram the congress and Mizo National Front (MNF) were in power in turn. Tripura was
dominated by Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) since 1978 but in 2015 it had lost
the election against the BJP and this state was converted to two-party system state in 2018.
Earlier it was one party dominated state. In 2018 the BJP got 35 seats out of total 60 seats and
managed to get 43.59 per cent of total vailed votes polled. Nest state is Uttar Pradesh comes
under this sub category. However, Uttar Pradesh experienced big sifts in past elections but in
last two elections it has two parties with clear majority. In 2012 Samajwadi Party (SP) got
224 seats out of total 403 seats but in 2017 Assembly elections it could manage to win only
47 seats out of 403 seats. In 2017 Assembly elections the BJP could manage to win 312 out
of total 403 seats.

iii) Out of 11 states only two states have competition between two state parties. In Andhra
Pradesh Telugu Desam Party (TDP) formed the coalition government in 2014 but it was in
majority after creation of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh. But in 2019 YSR Congress Party
(YSRCP) got 151 seats out of total 175 seats and TDP could manage to win only 23 seats.
However, it still could manage to get 39.2 per cent of total vailed votes polled. Sikkim
Democratic Front (SDF) was in power in Sikkim since 1994 with full majority but in 2019 it
was challenged by Sikkim Krantikari Morcha (SKM) and SDF lost the election against SKM.
SKM managed to win 17 seats out of total 32 seats where SDF could manage to win 15 seats.

2. Coalition Based Multiparty System States

Under this category all those states are included where in both the elections no party could
manage to secure majority in the assembly and coalition was compulsion to form the
government. In the states under this category generally two or more parties form the
government in both the elections. There are total 5 states and one Union Territory come under
this category: Bihar, Jharkhand, Kerala, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, and Pondicherry.

In these states parties are mostly clustered in two groups and they form bi-nodal coalitional
system. These coalitions are mostly pre-election but some coalitions have been formed after
elections also. Shift of political parties from one coalition to the other coalition have also
been witnessed. For example, in Maharashtra, in 2019 Assembly elections the BJP and Shiv
Sena (SHS) were allies at the time of election. In this election, the BJP got 105 seats out of
total 288 seats where Shiv Sena managed to win only 56 seats. Both the parties could not
make an understanding regarding the post of Chief Minister. Finally, Shiv Sena moved to
form the government by making coalition with the Congress and the Nationalist Congress
Party (NCP). Shift of party from one coalition to other has also been witnessed in Bihar.
Janata Dal United (JDU) has been part of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) since 2003.
But on the issue of Prime Minister’s candidate of NDA for 2014 Lok Sabha election the JDU
separated itself from the NDA in June 2013. In 2015 Bihar Assembly election the JDU and
Rashtriya Ranata Dal (RJD) made a Mahagathbandhan (grand coalition) and both managed
to win 71 and 80 seats respectively out of total 240 seats. In this election the BJP could
manage to win 53 seats only. The grand coalition of the RJD and the JDU formed the
government but due to several charges of corruptions on the RJD leaders Nitish rejoined the
NDA in August 2017 and formed the government with the BJP-led NDA.

Jharkhand is also witnessing bi-nodal coalitional party system. But in Jharkhand, several time
the independent candidates become the king maker. It has witnessed a divided mandate in
Assembly elections and shift of parties from one coalition to the other. On 30 December 2009
Shibu Soren, with the support of BJP and AJSU, became the Chief Minister of Jharkhand.
But when Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) voted in favour of UPA in Lok Sabha, prompted
BJP to withdraw its support. After 102 days of President Rule the BJP again came formed the
government after coalition with the JMM and Akhil Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) and
Arjun Munda became the CM of Jharkhand. But again on 17 January 2013 the JMM
announced withdrawal of its support from the BJP-led government on 8 January 2013. On 13
July 2013, Hemant Soren, of JMM, became Chief Minister with the support of the Congress.
In the 2014 Assembly election, the BJP-led NDA coalition formed the Government and
Raghubar Das became Chief Minister of Jharkhand, he was the sixth Chief Minister of the
state in 13 years (Krishna Murari, 2017: 373). In 2018 Assembly election the JMM managed
to win 30 seats out of total 81 seats and formed the government with the Congress. In this
election the BJP could manage to win 25 seats only.

Kerala had long experience of bi-nodal coalition where the Congress-led United Democratic
Front (UDF) and the CPM-led Left Democratic Front (LDF) have been competing for power
and forming the government in alternated manner. In 2011 Assembly election, the Congress
led UPA formed the government and in 2016 Assembly election the CPM-led LDF. The BJP-
led NDA is also trying to emerge as the third front in the state but could not found enough
space to build it ground yet. Meghalaya has a long history of coalition politics but the
government was formed by the coalition led by the Congress. The Congress use to be the
single largest party for more than three decades in the state. In 2013 election, the Congress
managed to win 29 seats out of total 60 seats and formed the coalition government. But in
2018 Assembly election National People’s Party (NPEP) strongly emerged, challenged the
Congress and formed the government with the BJP and other smaller parties. In this election
the NPEP could manage to win 19 seats and the BJP 2 seats out of total 60 seats. Still the
Congress was the single largest party with 21 seats but could not form the government. In
Puducherry, All India N.R. Congress (AINRC) and the Congress are the parties competing
for the power. In 2011 the AINRC could manage to win 15 seats out of 30 and formed the
coalition government and in 2016 the Congress got 15 seats and formed the coalition
government with Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).

In these states, where coalition politics has become the main feature of the state politics,
shifting of small parties is a common tendency. This can be noticed in a regular manner.
Actually, these smaller regional parties generally move from one coalition to the other on the
basis on the possibilities of getting greater share in the power structure of the state. Moreover,
if they have differences over the Common Minimum Programme (CMP) with the leading
party of the coalition, in this condition also the smaller parties shift to other coalition.

3. One-Party Dominant System States

Six states can be categorized under this where the same party came to power in the last two
elections. Delhi, Gujarat, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and West Bengal can be
considered under this category. Delhi is a unique example in this category, the Congress ruled
over the state for 15 years from 1998 to 2013. In 2013 Assembly election the BJP was the
single largest party and it managed to win 31 seats out of total 70 seats and Aam Aadmi Party
(AAP) could win 28 seats. The AAP formed the government after getting an out side support
of the Congress. In the last two assembly elections the AAP got massive support and
managed to win 67 and 63 seats respectively in 2015 and 2020 Assembly elections. The BJP
got 32.3 in 2015 and 38.51 in 2020 per cent of total valid votes polled in the state but could
manage to win only 3 and 7 seats respectively. Moreover, The BJP secured all 7 Lok Sabha
seats in both the last two Lok Sabha elections in 2014 and 2019. But on the basis of the
performance of the Aam Aadmi Party in the state Assembly election Delhi has become a state
with one party dominant system. In West Bengal, from 1967 to 2011 the CPM-led Left Front
coalition ruled over the state but in 2011 the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) defeated
the coalition and formed the government after getting clear majority. Again in 2016 the AITC
got clear majority and formed the government. The BJP is continuously trying to build its
strong base their, which could be seen in 2019 Lok Sabha election where the AITC won 22
seats and the BJP bagged 18 seats in West Bengal. In the 2021 Assembly election, the BJP
may present a tough competition for the AITC in West Bengal.

Tamil Nadu had experience of bi-nodal coalitional system led by DMK and All India Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). In last two elections the AIADMK could manage
to get clear majority. In 2011 Assembly election, the AIADMK won 150 seats out of 234
total seats and in 2016 Assembly election, it could manage to win 135 seats. But after demise
of Jayalalithaa in December 2016. After her death, the AIADMK had to face internal disputes
for power and positions and had also faced split in February 2017. The party was divided
between the groups of V.K. Sasikala and O. Panneerselvam. After Sasikala sentenced for four
year imprisonment E. K. Palaniswami became the leader of that fraction. In August 2017
Panneerselvam and Palaniswami merged their fractions and formed the government (The
Indian Express, 21 August 2020). Legal claim of Sasikala over the AIADMK was rejected by
both the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court. The existing fractions and split in the
AIADMK may lead to change in the party system in 2021 Assembly election in the state.

Gujarat and Odisha are the two states dominated by one party in last two elections. In Odisha,
the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) is managing to get clear majority since 2009 in all the three
Assembly elections. Even before this the BJD was forming the government but after coalition
with the BJP or the other state parties. In Gujarat, the BJP is getting clear majority since
1995. However, the Congress is still trying to reemerge and securing some votes and seats as
well but for last 30 years it could not manage to get majority in the state. Telangana is the
newest state in India that was formed in June 2014. And faced only one election after its
creation but has faced two governments. In 2014, after creation of the state, Telangana
 Rashtra Samiti (TRS) formed the government and in the 2018 Assembly election again the
TRS managed to win 88 seats out of the total 119 seats.

In this party system states other party also exist and their performance is also remarkable so
they may come to power in any election and change the pattern of the party system in these
states. For example, Madhya Pradesh, Sikkim, Rajasthan, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland. In
these states, in continuous three or more elections, one party was securing clear majority but
in the last election the party could not get clear majority of failed to form the government.

4. Mixed Type States

Under this head those states can be categorized where the one of the above type of party
system was experienced in one election and another type in the other. Total eight states, for
example: Assam, Goa, Haryana, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab, and Uttarakhand can be put
under this head. In Goa and Haryana the BJP had clear majority in 2012 and 2014 Assembly
elections respectively but in 2017 Assembly election in Goa and 2019 Assembly election in
Haryana, the BJP could manage to form the government but could not secure clear majority.
In Assam the Congress had clear majority in 2011 election but lost in 2016 and now the
government is fromed by the coalition of the BJP and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). In
Manipur, the Congress had clear majority but in 2017 the Congress could manage to win 28
seats of the total 60 seats. Still the Congress was the single largest party of the state. The BJP
secured 21 seats but formed the coalition government with Naga People’s Front. In Nagaland,
the NPF had clear majority in 2013 Assembly election but it could not manage to get clear
majority on its own but it is an ally of the NDA so formed the coalition government in 2018
with the BJP. In 2018 Assembly election the NPF could manage to win 26 seats out of the
total 60 seats and the BJP won 12 seats.

In Punjab, in 2012 Assembly election the BJP and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) formed
the coalition government but could not manage to win enough seats in 2017 Assembly
elections to form the government. In 2017 Assembly election the Congress got clear majority
and formed the government. In Uttarakhand, the Congress had formed the coalition
government in 2012 but the BJP has managed to get clear majority in 2017 Assembly
election. In 2017 Assembly election, the BJP won 56 out of total 70 seats. States under this
category may experience changes in the pattern of party system in the upcoming Assembly
elections.

Table 4

State Wise data of Performance of Major Political Parties in last two State Assembly
Elections

State/UT (Total Political Party Seats won, percent votes of valid

seats) votes polled
Andhra Year & total seats 2014 (294) 2019 (175)
Pradesh BJP 09, 4.1 0, 0.8
CPI 01, 0.5 0, 0.1
 CPM 01, 0.8 0, 0.2
INC 21, 11.7 0, 1.2
TDP 117, 32.5 23, 39.2
TRS 63, 13.4 ---
YSRC 70, 27.9 151, 49.95
Others 12 01
Arunachal Year 2014 (60) 2019 (60)
Pradesh BJP 11, 31.0 41, 50.9
INC 42, 49.5 4, 16.9
Others 7 15
Assam Year & total seats 2011 (126) 2016 (126)
AGP 10, 16.0 14, 8.1
BJP 05, 11.5 60, 29.5
INC 78, 39.2 26, 31.0
AIUDF --- 13, 13.1
BOPF --- 12, 3.9
Others 33 1
Bihar Year & total seats 2010 (243) 2015 (243)
BJP 91, 16.5 53, 24.5
INC 04, 8.9 27, 6.7
RJD 22, 18.9 80, 18.4
JD-U 115, 22.6 71, 16.8
LJP 03, 6.8 2, 4.8
IND 07 4, 9.4
Others 1 06
CHHATT- Year & total seats 2013 (90) 2018 (90)
ISGARH BJP 49, 41.0 15, 32.97
INC 39, 40.3 68, 43.04
Others 2 7
DELHI Year & total seats 2015 (70) 2020 (70)
BJP 03, 32.3 07, 38.51
INC 00, 9.7 00, 4.26
AAP 67, 54.3 63, 53.57
GOA Year & total seats 2012 (40) 2017 (40)
BJP 21, 35.5 13, 32.48
INC 09, 34.9 17, 28.35
MAG 03, 5.9 3, 11.27
Others 7 7
GUJARAT Year & total seats 2012 (182) 2017 (182)
BJP 115, 47.85 99, 49.05
INC 59, 38.0 77, 41.44
Others 8 6
HARYANA Year & total seats 2014 (90) 2019 (90)
BJP 47, 33.20 40, 36.49
INC 15, 20.58 31, 28.08
INLD 19, 24.11 1, 2.44
Others 9 18
HIMACHAL Year & total seats 2012 (68) 2017 (68)
PRADESH BJP 26, 38.5 44, 48.79
INC 36, 42.8 21, 41.68
 Others 6 3
JAMMU & Year & total seats 2008(87) 2014 (87)
KASHMIR BJP 11, 12.45 25, 23.0
INC 17, 17.71 12, 18.0
JKNC 28, 23.07 15, 20.8
JKPDP 21, 15.39 28, 22.7
Others 10 7
JHARKHAND Year & total seats 2014 (81) 2019 (81)
BJP 37, 31.26 25, 33.37
INC 06, 10.46 16, 13.87
JMM 19, 20.43 30, 18.72
JVM 08, 9.99 3, 35.74
Others 11 7
KARNATAKA Year & total seats 2013 (224) 2018 (224)
BJP 40, 20.1 104, 36.22
INC 122, 36.6 78, 38.04
JD-S 40, 20.0 37, 18.36
Others 22 5

KERALA Year & total seats 2011 (140) 2016 (140)

CPI 13, 8.7 17, 8.09
CPM 44, 28.2 61, 30.45
INC 38, 26.7 24, 24.09
MUL 20, 8.28 7, 7.30
IND 02, -- 5, 6.03
Others 23 26
MADHYA Year & total seats 2013 (230) 2018 (230)
PRADESH BJP 165, 44.9 109, 41.02
INC 58, 36.4 114, 40.89
Others 07 07
MAHARASHT Year & total seats 2014 (288) 2019 (288)
RA BJP 122, 27.81 105, 25.75
INC 42, 17.95 44, 15.87
NCP 41, 17.24 54, 16.71
SHS 63, 19.35 56, 16.41
IND 7, 4.71 13, 9.93
Others 13 16
MANIPUR Year & total seats 2012 (60) 2017 (60)
BJP --- 21, 36.28
INC 42, 42.43 28, 35.11
MSCP 05, 8.4 ---
TMC 07, 17.0 1, 1.41
NPF 4, 7.17
Others 6 6
MEGHALAYA Year & total seats 2013 (60) 2018 (60)
BJP --- 2, 9.63
INC 29, 34.8 21, 28.5
NCP 02, 1.9 1, 1.61
NPEP --- 19, 20.60
UDP 08, 17.11 ---
 Others 21 17
MIZORAM Year & total seats 2013 (40) 2018 (40)
BJP --- 1, 8.09
INC 34, 44.6 4, 29.98
MNF 05, 28.7 27, 37.7
IND --- 8, 22.94
Others 01 00
NAGALAND Year & total seats 2013 (60) 2018 (60)
BJP --- 12, 15.31
INC 08,24.9 0, 2.07
NPC 04, 6.1 ---
NDPP --- 17, 25,30
NPF 37, 40.4 26, 38.78
Others 11 5
ODISHA Year & total seats 2014 (147) 2019 (147)
BJP 10, 18.0 23, 32.49
INC 16, 25.7 9, 16.12
BJD 117, 43.4 112, 44.71
Others 4 3
PUDUCHERR Year & total seats 2011 (30) 2016 (30)
Y AIADMK 05, 13.75 4, 16.82
DMK 02, 10.68 2, 8.85
INC 07, 26.52 15, 30.60
AINRC 15, 31.75 8, 28.82
Others 1 1
PUNJAB Year & total seats 2012 (117) 2017 (117)
BJP 12, 7.2 3, 5.39
INC 46, 39.9 77, 38.5
SAD 56, 34,6 15, 25.4
AAP --- 20, 23.72
Others 3 2
RAJASTHAN Year & total seats 2013 ( 2018 (200)
200)
BJP 163, 45.2 73, 38.77
INC 21, 33.1 100, 39.30
IND 7, 8.21 13, 9.47
Others 9 14
SIKKIM Year & total seats 2014 (32) 2019 (32)
SDF 22, 55.0 15, 47.63
SKM 10, 44.8 17, 47.03
Others 00 00
TAMIL NADU Year & total seats 2011 (234) 2016 (234)
AIADMK 150, 38.4 135, 40.77
CPM 10, 2.4 0, 0.77
DMK 23, 22.4 88, 31.64
INC 05, 9.3 8, 6.42
PMK 03, 5.2 0, 5.32
Others 43 (DMDK: 29, 3
7.88; CPI: 9, 1.97)
TELANGANA Year & total seats 2018 (119)
 AIMIM 7, 2.71
INC 19, 28.43
TRS 88, 46.87
Others 5
TRIPURA Year & total seats 2013 (60) 2018 (60)
BJP 35, 43.59
CPM 49, 48.1 16, 42.22
INC 10, 36.53 0, 1.77
Others 01 09
UTTAR Year & total seats 2012 (403) 2017 (403)
PRADESH BJP 47, 15.0 312, 39.67
BSP 80, 25.9 19, 22.23
INC 28, 11.6 7, 6.25
SP 224, 29.16 47, 21.82
RLD 9, 2.33 1, 1.78
IND 6, 4.13 3, 2.57
Others 9 14
UTTARAKHA Year & total seats 2012 (70) 2017 (70)
ND BJP 31, 33.1 56, 46.51
BSP 03, 12.2 0, 6.98
INC 32, 33.8 11, 33.49
Other 4 3
WEST Year & total seats 2011 (294) 2016 (294)
BENGAL AIFB 11, 4.80 2, 2.82
AITC 184, 38.93 211, 44.91
BJP 0, 1.46 3, 10.16
CPI 02, 1.84 1, 1.45
CPM 40, 30.08 26, 19.75
INC 42, 9.09 44, 12.25
RSP 07, 2.96 3, 1.67
Others 8 4
Source: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports of Various States/UTs Vidhan
Sabha Elections, retrieved from on 7 June 2020.

The pattern of party systems in the states are different because different determining factors
in different states dominate. In different elections these factors may also vary in the same
state. Changes in the party system in India can be understood by understanding the changing
pattern of voting behavior. India is experiencing changes in socio-economic front and that
reflects in their determinant of voting behavior and finally in the party competition. Caste and
religion were the most important determinant in Indian elections, where dominance of upper
caste and rise of middle and lower castes in different regions have been notices. In the last
three decades, gender, economic growth, market, development, employment, etc. registered
its rapid emergence. All major political parties are trying to cover these emerging issues on
the surface but carrying the traditional issues of caste and religion under the ground. Despite
the differences of ideologies among the political parties their electoral manifestos present
similar promises and assurances with minor differences. The changes in the socio-economic
conditions and preferences of the electors will continue reflecting in the party systems in the
states. These kind of changes quickly impact the state party systems but also impact the party
system at the Centre in a long run.

Reforms

Since political parties have grown in most democracies outside the framework of
constitutions, the makers of the Indian Constitution did not pay any attention to structures of
parties and party system. This was perhaps so because the health of the Indian National
Congress, the dominant political entity in the Constituent Assembly and the provisional
Parliament (both overlapping with each other) then, did not ring any alarm bells. Even Dr.
B.R Ambedkar, the chairman of the drafting committee of the Constitution, whose own party,
Scheduled Castes Federation of India, was in an anaemic state, did not show any concern on
this account. In his last address to the Constituent Assembly he expressed a great satisfaction
with the emergent text and mentioned a few preconditions for its prospective success such as
social equality to supplement political equality, a functional bureaucracy, and quality of
persons working it; he did not refer to the factor of a good party system in this context (GoI,
Constituent Assembly Debates, 2003: 972-981). Over the decades since then, especially in the
post-Nehru era, the absence of a wholesome party system has loomed large as the Achilles
heel of Indian Democracy. In the Nehru era and under his early successors (Lal Bahadur
Shastri and early Indira Gandhi) intra party, inter-party, and intergovernmental relations
remained fairly democratic, pluralist, and federal. Since the 1969 Congress split and political
ascendance of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1971, there has been a precipitous decline of
intra-party democracy in the ruling party, inter-party relations, and qualify of parliamentary-
federal governments as well as governance. The flickers of democratic and federal revival
during the Janata Party government, the P.V Narasimha Rao Congress minority government,
and the euphoria of the ‘Modi magic’ have never been really sustained. In a nutshell, the
party systems, indeed the political process as a whole, has become comprehensively
fragmented, corrupt and criminalised.
Following the early efforts to build up apolitical discourse for party and party system
reforms a la V.M Tarkunde Committee Report (1975), Dinesh Goswami Committee Report
(1990), Indrajit Gupta Committee Report on State Funding of Elections (1998), a law
Commission Report (1999), there followed the Report of the National Commission to Review
the Working of the Constitution (2002)(chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah), which
addressed this problem more comprehensively in chapter 4 of its Report (see Singh and
Sexena, 2020: chapter 12: and Krishna Murari, 2019: 55-60).
 The NCRWC has recommended a comprehensive legislation on political parties
providing for ‘compulsory registration for every political party or pre-poll alliance [of
political parties]. Such registration with the Election Commission of India would require (i)
declaration of allegiance to the basic constitutional values; (ii) all-inclusive membership
criteria for all citizens equally; (iii) 30 percent reservation to women for all party positions
and legislative representation; (iv) transparent and audited party finances and funds and
expenditure ; (v) open declaration of assets and liabilities by persons nominated by the party
for contesting legislative and parliamentary elections; and (vi) intra-party democratic
elections at regular intervals as per the party constitution (NCRCW Report, 2002 para 4.30.1
to 4.30.6).

None of the governments of India has so far initiated any legislative move to
implement the recommendations of the NCRWC Report. T.N. Seshan, the 10 th Chief Election
Commissioner of India (1990-1996) initiated move to require political parties to hold intra-
party elections in a flash of reformist activism, which has not been sustained under his
successors. The Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another V the Chief Election
Commissioner and Others (1977) has given a very wide interpretation of the powers of the
Election Commission and ‘exceptional electing time’ (from notification to completion) under
Article 324 of the Constitution independent from the executive and judiciary, arguing that the
Commission may have to deal with contingencies not adequately covered by existing laws.
Three judges of this five-judge Constitution Bench - Chief Justice M.H Beg and Justices P.N
Bhagwati and V.R Krishna Iyer - went to the extent of saying that ‘Article 324, on the face
of it, vests vast functions, which may be powers or duties, essentially administrative and
marginally even judicative or legislative’ (para 50). Two other judges - Justice P.K Goswami
and P.N Singal – wrote a separate judgement but substantially in agreement with the above
(ECI, 1999:484-560). Except for Chief Election Commissioner T.N Seshan, other incumbents
have not been inclined to invoke this wide reservoir of powers. The Supreme Court in a
directive to the Election Commission ordered it to require candidates filing nomination for
election to state Legislatures and Parliament to attach an affidavit concerning their financial
assets and liabilities and charges framed in a court of law. Election Commission of India
formalised it and required Form 26-Afifavit, as amended from time to time, to be submitted
by candidates along with their nomination papers (ECI n.d. b). Subsequently, the Supreme
Court, in its judgement in Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India on February 13, 220,
directed political parties to disclose criminal antecedents of contesting candidates along with
criteria for selecting candidates, notwithstanding their winnability. The Election Commission
also issued a circular implementing the apex court order (Verma 2020).

Besides the forgoing tack of electoral and party reforms, we must take note of
the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) during elections introduced by a consensus built by
political parties and supervised by the Election Commission, and of the anti-defection law
enshrined in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution by an amendment. Finally, we conclude
with our comments on Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018, of the BJP-led Nation Democratic
Alliance government.

The MCC is a non-statutory guidelines notified by the ECI to regulate political

parties and candidates prior to every election to ensure free and fair elections. This done by
the Election Commission under its powers and functions under Article 324 of the constitution
which is operative from the day of notification of an election to the Parliament and /or state
Assembly elections till the date results are declared. Its origins go back to the Assembly
elections in Kerala in 1960. In the 1962 general elections to the Parliament and state
Assemblies it was circulated among parties recognised by the Election Commission and their
feedback sought. In 1979, the Commission added a section to it to regulate the party/parties
in power to ensure a levelled playing field for all parties. In 2013, in the runup to the 2014
general elections, the Commission added a section regarding election manifestos at the
direction of the Supreme Court. The MCC comprises eight points dealing with general
conduct, meetings, processions, polling booths, observers, election manifestos for all political
parties, including the one in power, and candidates (ECI n.d. a; PRS India 2019). In practice,
the MCC has had some positive impact on the conduct of elections, depending upon the
conscience and courage of the Election Commission and consensus and cooporation of
political parties and support by the media and finally the constitutional courts. The analysts
and the Election Commission are generally agreed that it is preferable to keep the code as
ethical/moral rather than making it statutory/legal, to avoid long-drawn prosecution and
dilatory adjudication.

In orders to curb defection of Members of Parliament and Members of

Legislative Assemblies and Councils from one party to another by floor crossing for power
and money, which became rampant from the late 1960s, the Parliament enacted and anti-
defection law by expanding on Articles 102(2) and 192(2) of the Constitution dealing with
disqualification from membership of houses concerned and added the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, and further changed it by the 91 st
Amendment Act, 2003. Under the Tenth Schedule, a member of the house belonging to any
political party shall be disqualified (i) if one voluntarily resigns from the membership of such
political party, or (ii) if one votes or abstains from voting against any direction or whip issued
by such party without prior permission to do so, within 15 days from the date of such voting
or abstention. However, such disqualification would not apply (i) where one’s original
political party fully merges with another political party; or (ii) where not less than two-thirds
members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger (Tenth Schedule,
Para 7). The presiding officer of the house concerned has the power to finally decide any
question as to the disqualification of a member on ground of defection. He is also authorised
to make rules as to the record of membership of parties in the house concerned and issues and
events relating to al defection, and contravention of these rules would be tantamount to the
breach of privilege of the house. Courts are barred to have any jurisdiction on any matter
relating to disqualification of any member of the house under this Schedule.

There have been a large number of cases concerning the irregular and arbitrary
exercise of power by the presiding officers of houses, which have finally landed in High
Courts and the Supreme Court. In a landmark judgement from the point view of
constitutional law the Supreme Court as per majority opinion ruled that Para 7 of the Tenth
Schedule was unconstitutional for lack of ratification required under Article 368 (2) by state
Legislators (being an amendment of a federal provision of the Constitution)[Kihoto Hollohon
V. Zachilhu (1992) 1 SCC 309]. In another judgement the Supreme Court held that Speaker’s
order disqualifying a legislator for defection goes beyond the legislative action and amounts
to a quasi-judicial order subject to judicial review under Articles 32, 226, and 136 of the
Constitution [D. Sudhakar (2) v. D.N. Jeevaraju (2012) 2 SCC 708]. In a more recent
judgement in January 2020 the Supreme Court directed the Parliament to amend the
Constitution to divest the legislative Assembly speakers of their exclusive power to decide on
a disqualification of a legislator on account of defection, for the Speaker also belongs to a
political party. It suggested that an independent tribunal ought to be created instead to
adjudicate on defection of an MP or MLA who has crossed floor for money or power or
patronage (Rajagopal 2020).

Electoral and party financing has been an important aspect elections and party
systems in every established and functioning democracy in the world, including in India
(Sridharan 2006: chap. 12, pp. 311-340). The latest bid to reform the major source of party
financing in India happens to be the Electoral Bonds introduced by the BJP/NDA government
headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced in the Budget Speech 2017-18 of
Finance Minister Arun Jaitely. It was followed by the Finance Bill/Act amending Section
13A of the Income Tax Act (1961) and the Representation of the People Act (1951). Under
the new arrangement a corporate house can buy these bonds from the State Bank of India and
donate them to a political party of its choice. Donations are tax deductible for donors and the
political party getting it will get a text exemption for the amount received. The electoral
bonds are required to be anonymous, neither the donor company nor the name of the recipient
political party is to be revealed by the Bond. Previously, under Section 182 of the Companies
Act (2013) a company could donate only up to 7.5 per cent of its average profit of last three
years, and was mandated to disclose the amount donated as well as the beneficiary political
party. Now the value of donations in the electoral bonds can be unlimited. Now even loss-
making companies or shell companies and individuals can and can be used to donate
unlimited amounts to a political party anonymously. In addition, under the amended Section
13A of the Income Tax Act companies donating through electoral bonds are not required to
keep records of such donations and under the amended Representation of the People Act,
1951, parties getting money through electoral bonds are under no obligation to inform the
Election Commission of any amount received above Rs. 2000/-.

A related development is that in amendment to the Finance Bill, 2018, made in the
Parliament amended the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), 2010, exempting
from scrutiny foreign funds received by all political parties with retrospective effect from
1976. A background to it is Delhi High Court’s indictment of the INC and BJP for accepting
foreign funds from the company Vedanta and its subsidiaries in violation of FCRA and RPA
law that barred parties from accepting contributions from foreign sources and the directed the
government and the Election Commission to take action against the two parties.

In response to these developments, Narayan and Panda (2018) sketches international

laws and practice on funding, spending, disclosures in the United Kingdom, Germany, the
USA, and South Africa and finds India in a comparative democratic deficit in this regard.
They go on to recommend enactment of an electoral and party finance law requiring
transparency disclosure of candidates’ assets and liabilities (including the sources of assets),
registration of political parties on stricter legal criteria, and application of the Right to
Information Act, 2005, to parties; an absolute cap on anonymous donations, corporate
donations for parties preferably through an Election Commission-controlled Trust, regulated
advertisements, prevention of foreign donations, outlining permissible expenditures, and
banning a third-person-or-organisation expenditure; strict enforcement of above regulations
with penalties such as deregistration of erring parties, and enhanced independence of the
Election Commission under the Constitution and the laws.

Interim studies have revealed that within a year of introduction of the scheme in early
2018, Electoral Bonds have elbowed out other routes of political funding as is evident from
the case of seven political parties including BJP and Congress, accounting for almost 2/3rds
of their total donations in 2018-219. In a study carried out by Venkatesh Naik of the
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) revealed that he annual audit reports of the
two above mentioned national parties and five state parties (TMC, BJD, JD-S, TRS and
YSRCP) received a total of Rs. 3,696 crore through different sources including corporations,
individuals electoral trusts, and Electoral Bonds, but as much as 65.51 percent of all these
donations were sourced via Electoral Bonds alone (Indian Express News Service, 2020).

In an appeal against the Electoral Bonds, the Supreme Court on April 12, 2019,
refused to annual them but directed all political parties to submit receipts of the donations
received along with the details of the identity of donors in a sealed cover to the Election
Commission as an interim measure to ensure that these was no undue imbalance in favour of
one party (India Today, April 12, 2019). At this writing (May2020) no further move to or by
the Supreme Court is in evidence.

Conclusion

To sum up, we have sought in this chapter to present an analytical view of the ideological
spectrum, structure of competition, and the issue of reforms in the Indian party system with
special reference to its latest phase since the 2014 general elections. There have always been
parties of all ideological persuasions in this party system, ranging from Right through Centre
to the Left, nationalist to regionalist, secular to communal, evolutionary to revolutionary, but
the system’s major movement has been marked by what the Rudolphs (1987) have called
‘the persistent centrism of Indian politics.’ Our analysis here shows this with illustrations
drawn from the Indian National Congress and Congress parivar (family) parties, the Janata
Party/Dal and Janata parivar parties, the BJP and the Sangh parivar organisations, which
have been animated by centrist drives, either inherently or by adaptation and acculturation.
Excesses of neoliberalism have been contained by welfarism of MNREGA introduced by
Congress-led UPA but continued after initial reservations against it by BJP-led NDA.
Excesses of mynorityism or OBCism have been held in check by the rise of BJP’s Hindutva
nationalism. Much like revolutionary communism in the past, Hindu revivalism in more
recent decades has also been liberalised and constitutionalised.
 Nevertheless, the party system in India has been caught between a double bind of
degeneration to amoral familism, personalism, and authoritarianism in periods of one-party
dominance, on the one hand, and pulverisation of governmental and oppositional unities in
phases of multiparty systems. Barring the Congress hegemony in the Nehru era (1950-1964)
and the brief period of Janata Party ascendancy (1977-1979), the above generalisations are
aptly illustrated by the phase of Congress dominance under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi
(1970s-1980s) and periods of multiparty coalition governments (1989-2014). The period of
the emergent de facto BJP majority/dominance, albeit in a coalitional framework under Prime
Minister Modi since 2014 to date, has not been as problematic as Congress’ under Indira
Gandhi. Yet veiled governmental pressures on autonomous institutions of government and
civil society and dissenting and protesting voices in general cannot be gainsaid. Moreover,
electoral turnover at the national level, if any, is haunted by difficult prospect of unifying the
fragmented party system for government formation and maintenance. For the rise and rise of
BJP still finds some opposition parties holding their forts - singly in states like Andhra
Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, West Bengal, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh, and in
coalitions in Maharashtra, and Jharkhand (at this writing in early June 2020). The
government majority in Lok Sabha is also countervailed in Rajya Sabha. But these non-BJP
parties have not been able to put up a concerted opposition due to seemingly terminal decline
of the second major national party, Indian National Congress, and the failure of any other
opposition party to rise to the space being vacated by it and lack of any unifying drive among
the smaller national and state parties. The fragmentation among this set parties opposed to
BJP is reminiscent of the Belgian syndrome; after the federal elections there in June 2010
government formation could not be possible for a full year – until June 2011 due to extreme
fractionation of the country’s party system.

We contend that the Indian party system defies the Duverger-Riker ‘iron law’ of
plurality electoral law uniformly producing a two-party system (and proportional
representation system uniformly leading to a multiparty system). India has always functioned
under the plurality representation at the legislative level but has never have had a two-party
system. The answer to this puzzle can be found in India’s all-inclusive nationalist movement
and early post-Independence all-inclusive Indian National Congress, on the one hand, and the
multi-faceted socio-cultural and regional diversities that came to impact the politics of the
country after the decline of the Congress dominance, on the other. Both these features have
been lacking in the locus classicus of Anglo-Saxon and the White Commonwealth
democracies where Duverger and Riker discovered their iron law. These intervening ‘third’
factors between the bivariate relationship between electoral law and party system is vitiated
in the Indian case, where we find an one-party dominance early on and a multiparty system
since 1989 onwards, with some tendency towards BJP dominance under Prime Minister Modi
since 2014. This is aided by the phenomenon of the rise of Rightwing nationalism across the
world including India since the Great Economic Recession of 2008 and trend towards de-
globalistation and ‘slowbalisation.’ This trend indeed may in all likelihood be deepened by
Covid-19 and the resultant economic collapse. Use of proportional representation in
European democracies have, of course, invariably produced multiparty systems in that
continent. Multiparty system is also correlated with coalitional governance which is evident
in Europe as well as in India but the latter is greatly bedevilled by the politics of defection
and unstable coalition governments. These features contribute to greater federalisation in the
polity which our analysis focused on India in this paper/chapter amply demonstrates.

Finally, we maintain that the issue of party and party system reform has been growing
acute in the post-Nehru era which has witnessed a secular decline of intra-party democracy,
dynastic/familial/personal control of parties, tensions in inter-party and intergovernmental
relations, undemocratic party financing and electoral malpractices, and corruption and
criminalisaton of politics. The makers of the Indian Constitution were not much concerned
about these issues which have loomed larger in political discourse since the late 1960s and
the late 1970s. Committees and constitutional commissions in recent decades have
proliferated but their reports and recommendations have been uniformly ignored by the
Union and state governments. Some reforms that have in fact entered into the Constitution
and legislations like the anti-defection Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and Electoral
Bonds and some related statutes have in fact compounded rather than resolved the malady. A
few wholesome electoral reforms like mandatory affidavits about financial assets and
liabilities and criminal antecedents of candidates seeking elections to Assemblies and
Parliament with their nomination papers owe their implementation to the Supreme Court
directives and Election Commission enforcement. A non-statutory Model Code of Conduct
got initiated by consensus among political parties and it has been enforced by the Election
Commission variably depending on its incumbents at a timeframe. These reforms are
obviously not enough. This is a most important matter that must be adequately addressed by
the political elite to save Indian democracy and federalism. Undemocratic party system and
electoral process may turn out to be the Achilles heel of Indian federal democracy.