Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298

5/21/22, 1:46 PM CentralBooks:Reader
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
*
G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999.
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.—The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not
convincingly discharged in the present case.
Courts; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Requisites for a Case to Fall Within the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.--A perusal
of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law
on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the posi-
_______________
* EN BANC.
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tions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act 8249; Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
is the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of Presidential
Decree 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
—Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b
pertains to “other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.” The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender—that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to
the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable—the
party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.—Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan,
is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made
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300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000180e52a2a598cf00eec000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/15
Same; Same; Same; Same; The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.—It
is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class, all of which are present in this case.
Same; Same; The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and
whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under Republic Act 8249, as against those cases where
trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.—The challengers of Sections 4 and
7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those
pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the
law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner
and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
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Same; Statutes; Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.—On the perceived bias that
the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to
nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter
before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Words and Phrases; “Ex Post Facto Laws,” Explained.—This contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one—(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; (d) which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant; (e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added
two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 8249 is not a penal law—it is a substantive law on jurisdiction, and not being a penal law, its retroactive
application cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.—Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their
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ANNOTATED
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto
laws.—Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal
is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover,
the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Same; Statutes; Bills; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments; The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve.—The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is
placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” its
jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title
of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in
the title is satisfied if the title is compre-
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hensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is liberally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since
the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted
within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.”
Courts; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute, and the elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.—The jurisdiction of a court is
defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court
has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is essential that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as “he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”—The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: “The object of this written accusations was—First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place,
names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
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necessary to constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied) It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in
relation to his office is not sufficient—that phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.—The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity
as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is
not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged
and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.—In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What
is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s
official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine National Police officers, the offense charged is plain murder and, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.—Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the
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discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Fotun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
Chavez, Laureta & Associates for petitioners-intervenors.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249—an act which further defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan—is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial
of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commis-
306

sion—Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District
Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by
petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18,
1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers 1 and personnel
allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de
Leon.
Thus,2 on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for
murder before the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.
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1 Rollo, p. 43
2 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-34, 44.
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3
Upon motion by all the4
accused in the 11 informations, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s action. 5
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein 6
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, 7the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and
c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more
of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none
8
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman
and de Leon concurring, and Justices Bala-
________________
3 Their motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file their respective motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s final resolution.
4 Annex “C,” Petition—Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995; Rollo, pp. 37-38.
5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
6 InspectorAlvarez.
7 Entitled “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended.”
8 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, p. 42.
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9
jadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has
the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
10
before the 11issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the
filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 12
1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others,
to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. 13
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on February 5,
1997.
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9 Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special members of the Division pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated
March 26, 1996.

10 Annex “F,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 113-123.
11 Annex “F-1,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 124-134.
12 Annex “G,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 135-145.
13 Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 28, 31. The law is entitled,
“AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25, 1997.
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14
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling
15
that it “stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.”
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
“After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the
pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor’s
motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
x x x x x x x x x
“Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo
M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases—in fact, no order of arrest has been issued—this court has competence to take
cognizance of these cases.
“To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended16Informations in these cases and by
the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.” [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said
law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.” Petitioner argues that:
_________________
14 Rollo, pp. 162-171.
15 March 5, 1997.
16 Rollo, pp. 214, 216-219.
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“a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in
which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has footdragged for nine (9) months the resolution of
a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner’s cases
were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right
of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid “innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law 17
(RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.”
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that “while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have
merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post
18
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case
pending before the Sandiganbayan.” They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to
procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the
_________________
17 Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 10-11.
18 Petition-In-Intervention, p. 9; Rollo, p. 236.
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two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question
19
and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days
from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of
Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to20justify its nullification there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
“SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction
_________________
19 Dated December 15, 1998.
20 Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People, 269 SCRA 402, citing Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.
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over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.”
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
“Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law.”
21
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created22
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following
23
laws on
the Sandiganbayan,
24
in
25
chronological26
order, were enacted:
27
P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No.
1860, P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. No. 8249. Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
_________________
21 Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 229 [1994].
22 Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
23 “Sec.20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. (See also Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 685-686 [1994]).
24 Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
25 Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.
26 Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 [1995]; Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 757 [1997].
27 Approved on February 5, 1995.
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“SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
314

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection
a of this section in relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
“The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor,
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shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
“SEC. 7. Transitory provision.—This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

“SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
316

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
“In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
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VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 317

“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade ‘27,’ or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
x x x x x x x x x
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.”
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word “principal” before the word “accused” appearing in the above-quoted
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word “principal” that the parties herein are at
loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over 28
the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
29
29
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, contends that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
________________
28 This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.), Section 2 of R.A. 7975, while in paragraph a(1) (e) of said Section 2, the rank is “chief superintendent” or
higher.
29 Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249.
318

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b)
30
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
31
of the Revised Penal Code (the
law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple32
or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official
or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of
the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.” The phrase “other offenses or
felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus,
under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender—that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs
a, b and c of the same Section
_________________
30 Items(a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
31 Paragraph c, Section 4, R.A. 8249.
32 The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer
or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
319
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 319

4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because its
enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. 34Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
35
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class;
________________
33 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” (Section 1,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).

34 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
35 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56; Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703; Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988).
320

all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those
36
cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented 37
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define
the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and,
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law.
Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A.
8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
______________
36 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.
37 See Fabian v. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998.
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VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 321

38
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular,
it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during
the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the 39
deletion of the
word “principal” in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A. 8249, while
still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head
of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly 40
empowered by
the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
__________________
38 Senator Raul Roco and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia.
39 Petition, p. 17.
40 Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
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41
constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975. 42
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one—
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such
action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less43or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant;
44
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when done was lawful;
___________________
41 “No expost facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted” (Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution).
42 Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall. 386, 390); Black, Constitutional Law, 595, cited in Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 ed., p. 247.
43 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 770, cited in Bernas, Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 513.
44 This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5 (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Sandiganbayan, 211
SCRA 241.
323
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 323

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection 45

to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
46
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal47
in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain 48acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared
by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
49
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted
50
by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.
_________________
45 En banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. Sandiganbayan, 211
SCRA 241.
46 Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Juarez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180
SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 6 SCRA 1059; Republic v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274.
47 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937).
48 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102.
49 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346.
50 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63; Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433; De Guzman v. People, December
15, 1982.
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51
The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does 52not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty
53
and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 54 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. 55
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the
removal of the intermediate review of facts, 56
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of
innocence has been convincingly overcome.
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to “expand” its
jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly
stated in the title of the law because such is57 the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must
only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects
related
_________________
51 Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
52 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186.
53 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680.
54 Oñas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261.
55 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 cited in Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
56 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.
57 Section 26(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution reads “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
325
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 325

58
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the
general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
59
the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions
of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its
powers since Section 2, Article 60
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to “define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.”
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over61
a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a62 court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
_______________
58 Tiov. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.
59 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291.
60 Sec. 2, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.”
61 People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222 [1995], citing Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211 [1994].
62 People vs. Magallanes, ibid., citing U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 [1913]; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 [1935]; People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218 [1978].
326

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249.
Section 4 requires that the offense charged63 must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers
and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, “in relation to their office as may be determined by
law.” This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that
the Sandiganbayan “shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers. 64
In People vs. Montejo, we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense)
65
is
“intimately connected” with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
66
This
intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties “must be alleged in the information.”
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
“SEC. 9. Cause of accusation—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and
_________________
63 Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, pp. 232-233; People vs. Magallanes, supra, p. 220.
64 108 Phil. 613 [1960].
65 See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 221 [1995].
66 See Republic vs. Asuncion, supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra.
327
VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 327

concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)
67
67
As early as 1954, we pronounced that “the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts.” “The real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision 68
of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
69
or information.”
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:
“The object of this written accusations was—First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these
must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him, as “he is presumed to have
_________________
67 People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 657, 660 [1954].
68 People vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743.
69 3 Phil. 223, 226 [1904]. See also Matilde v. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456, [December 29, 1975]; People v. Labado, 98 SCRA 730, 747 [July 24, 1980], cited in Bernas, The
Constitution of the Philippines—A Commentary, Vol. 1, 1987 Edition, p. 386.
328

70
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders. 71
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations for murder reads:
“AMENDED INFORMATION
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO
O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL
L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime
of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
“That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO
________________
70 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Criminal Procedure, p. 77, cited in Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982].
71 The eleven (11) amended informations were couched uniformly except for the names of the victims.
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T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
“That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police, are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder “in relation to
their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-
fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is
330

alleged therein that the said accessories concealed “the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.” The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused” surprises
the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
“raid.” Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted “at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila” but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in
Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is
puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense “in relation
to office as officers and members of the (PNP),” we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused’s official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in
the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the
discharge of the accused’s official
72
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
_________________
72 249 SCRA 212, 222-223 [1995].
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“It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after
trial.
“In People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x
supervision and control where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed
the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by
said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose,
they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.”
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does not appear in
the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 332

Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged 73
in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Constitutionality sustained.
Notes.—Continued incarceration after the twelve year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
_______________
73 Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides: “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter.” See also People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 223 [1995].
333
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Mallorca vs. Panopio
accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with
equal protection. (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971])
The non-prosecution of another suspect provides no ground for the accused to fault the decision of the trial court convict-ing him.
(People vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 [1995])
——o0o——

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298

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5/21/22, 1:46 PM CentralBooks:Reader

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.

VOL. 301, JANUARY 20, 1999 299

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

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Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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March 26, 1996.

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Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

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(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

Article III, 1987 Constitution).

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all of which are present in this case.

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This Court added two more to the list, namely:

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(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection 45

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Constitution of the Philippines—A Commentary, Vol. 1, 1987 Edition, p. 386.

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