Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 20

Operation Enduring

Freedom—Philippines
Civilian Harm and the Indirect
Approach
By Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall

T
his study examines the military support provided by U.S. Joint Special Operations Task
Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) to Philippine military operations. Building upon the 2010
Joint Civilian Casualty Study—the first comprehensive examination of U.S. prevention
and mitigation of civilian casualties based on U.S. operations in Afghanistan—this current effort
aimed to assess civilian casualties in the different context of indirect U.S. operations. We found
that the evolution of Philippine civilian and military strategy since the mid 2000s has reduced
the occurrence and salience of civilian casualty issues during combat operations. Additionally, the
study revealed many related best practices in JSOTF-P and Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines
(OEF-P) more broadly, and provided insights into the possible future evolution of the mission
and wider implications for foreign internal defense (FID) in the 21st century.
This article provides a historical background of the insurgency and the evolution of the
JSOTF-P mission and its impact. The next section describes a change in the nature of Philippine
operations, followed by best practices, limitations, and a discussion of the issue of civilian
casualties and broader violence against civilians in the Philippines. Finally, the article looks at
overall implications for the U.S. Government in the future.

Major General Geoffrey Lambert, USA (Ret.), is a Consultant at CACI International, Inc. Dr.
Larry Lewis is a Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and Current Field
Representative to the Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division. Dr. Sarah
Sewall teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and is the 2012 Minerva Chair at the
U.S. Naval War College.

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 117


lambert, lewis, and sewall

Given its narrow mission, JSOTF-P has lasted 85 years, making it the longest lasting
been highly successful—particularly consider- such movement in the history of the coun-
ing its relatively small size and low cost. This try) and were never completely subjugated to
success has been driven both by effective U.S. Spanish rule. After the Spanish-American War,
military support at the tactical and operational these same southern islanders resisted the U.S.
levels and by decisions and events outside of claim to the Philippines, leading to the Moro
U.S. control. Key questions are whether the Rebellion, which constituted a southern front
partnership has been able to achieve maxi- of the Philippine-American War.1
mum strategic impact and what it teaches After the establishment of the Philippine
about the need to expand the flexibility and government in 1946, Moro elements in
integration of U.S. responses to buttress weak the southern islands complained about
states and combat regional instability. neglect and discrimination on the part of the
Philippine government. General resentment
A History of Insurgency in the crystallized into armed opposition when doz-
Philippines
ens of Moro Armed Forces of the Philippines
The history of the Philippines is marked with (AFP) recruits were killed by other soldiers
active resistance to standing governments. during their training in early 1968, followed
These resistance movements can be roughly by a government coverup. This event was
divided into two camps: insurgencies rooted the impetus for the formation of the Moro
in religion (specifically, Islam) and those stem- National Liberation Front (MNLF), which took
ming from political ideology (communism). up arms against the government in 1970. Peace
At the same time, the persistence of these talks were held in 1976 after significant losses
insurgencies spans ideology, stemming from on both sides, which led to a general stand-
underlying factors that fuel discontent within down of operations amid the government’s
insurgents and much of the population alike: agreement to give Moro areas more autonomy.
widespread poverty, systemic corruption, ties A few years later, more conservative elements
to criminal interests, and weak governance created a splinter group, the Moro Islamic
over the roughly 7,000 islands that comprise Liberation Front (MILF).
the Philippine archipelago.
Islamic Insurgencies. Religious insurgency religious insurgency groups in the Philippines
groups in the Philippines are rooted in exter- are rooted in external influences that arose
nal influences that arose five centuries ago. five centuries ago
Over time, Islamic beliefs had been largely
embraced by many of the islands. In 1521,
Ferdinand Magellan claimed the Philippine President Corazon Aquino negotiated with
islands for Spain (hence the name of the MNLF leadership after President Ferdinand
islands, after King Philip II of Spain), bring- Marcos stepped down in 1986; these discus-
ing both a Western and Catholic influence to sions resulted in the establishment of the
much of the Philippines. However, the people Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in
of the southern islands resisted this influence 1989, which created autonomy for districts
(including the Dagohoy Rebellion, which with significant Muslim populations in the

118 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

southern islands while preserving the territo- It was strongest on the island of Luzon but had
rial integrity of the Philippines overall. MNLF presence in other areas. After the Philippines
reached a comprehensive peace agreement was established as a sovereign state in 1946
with the government in 1996. Key aspects of with leadership that opposed Marxist posi-
this agreement included promises to provide tions, the Hukbalahap movement (and its
farmland for enemy fighters, government members, the Huk) resisted the newly estab-
resources for southern areas, and integration of lished government. The Huk were aided in
MNLF fighters into the army.2 The U.S. Agency their efforts by significant operational expe-
for International Development (USAID) rein- rience gained during their opposition to the
forced this initiative through focused develop- Japanese occupation. Early Philippine efforts
ment initiatives in the southern Philippines, to oppose the “Huk Rebellion” were largely
such as the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace heavy-handed, and they mostly increased the
project.3 This move appeased the MNLF but not population’s sympathy toward the movement,
the MILF, and the latter continued active resis- doubling the size of the insurgency.
tance against the government. The MILF and In the early 1950s, the Philippine military
Philippine government have engaged in several began to employ a more discriminatory use
peace negotiations since 2005. of force and adopt unconventional warfare
Another Islamic orgnanization, the Abu methods. Guidance provided to the Philippine
Sayyaf Group (ASG), was created in 1990 as forces was first “to act as an ambassador of
elements of the resistance to Soviet occupation good will from the government to the people;
in Afghanistan returned to the Philippines and second, to kill or capture Huk.”4 Philippine
joined forces with radical elements of largely forces were instructed to appear as unthreat-
nascent resistance groups. The ASG held the ening as possible to the population and were
goal of establishing an Islamic state within the supplied with candy and gum to give to chil-
Philippines and used bombings coupled with dren in order to recraft their image as friendly
extortion and kidnappings (to raise needed to the people. Philippine Army Chief Ramon
funds) to meet its ends. The Philippine govern- Magsaysay also took a personal role in investi-
ment regards the ASG as a terrorist group, not gating and court-martialing troops accused of
a political group to be bargained with. mistreating civilians. This resulted in improved
Both the MILF and ASG have been aided professionalism of the force and an enhanced
operationally via training, funding, and opera- reputation among the population. Meanwhile,
tional assistance by cooperating with interna- the Huk insurgency adopted practices that
tional terrorist organizations such as Jemaah alienated the civilian population, and they lost
Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda. their support base as a result. Combined with
Communist Insurgencies. Communist a surge in military forces in the early 1950s
resistance groups have also challenged the and a program for reintegration and land
government since the country’s inception as grants for surrendering Huk members, these
a sovereign nation. During World War II, an factors led to the Huk force negotiating for
underground communist movement created peace in 1954.
in 1932 began a resistance movement to the Communist insurgents continued to
Japanese occupation, known as Hukbalahap. exist at low levels through 1968, when the

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 119


lambert, lewis, and sewall

movement divided into pro-Soviet and pro- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo asking
Maoist groups, mirroring an overall tension U.S. Pacific Command for assistance with ASG
in communist ideologies espoused by the terror threats. The command responded by
Soviet Union and China, respectively. While having Special Operations Command, Pacific
the pro-Soviet group adopted an engagement (SOCPAC) conduct counterterrorism train-
strategy with the Philippine government, the ing for a Philippine Light Reaction Company
Maoist group, known as the Communist Party (LRC) between March and July 2001.
of the Philippines, took on active resistance In May 2001, another ASG operation took
to the government through its armed group, 20 hostages from the Philippine resort island of
the New People’s Army. This group had the Palawan. Three of the hostages were American,
broadest presence of all insurgent groups in including one who was beheaded a few days
the Philippines, an active decision based on later. This incident intensified U.S. support to
a lesson from the Huk Rebellion—that local Philippine counterterrorism operations, with
resistance movements can be more easily iso- SOCPAC providing intelligence assistance in
lated and defeated. After 20 years of insurgent addition to training the LRC. SOCPAC had
activity, events in 1986, including the People’s planned a terrorist coordination and assis-
Revolution and the stepping down of President tance visit to help determine the capabilities
Marcos, removed a number of grievances held and limitations of the AFP and inform future
by the general population, and the group lost support. The visit occurred in October 2001, in
much of its support from the population. the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which raised
More recently, their activities have narrowed the relative importance of the issue of terrorism
to extortion and shadow governance. for the United States. In November 2001, in
the aftermath of that visit, Philippine President
Abu Sayyaf Terror Campaign and U.S. Arroyo and President George W. Bush agreed to
Response
a plan of action to improve the ability of the
In 1998, ASG leadership changed to Khadifi Philippines to combat terror. The United States
Janjalani,5 who took the group in a new direc- would provide the Philippines with military
tion: kidnapping and demanding ransoms assistance and economic aid, and U.S. forces
to finance operations and gain a platform to would deploy to the Philippines to “advise
emphasize its demands for a separate Islamic and assist” the AFP. These initiatives became
state. The year 2000 marked a series of opera- Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, the
tions reflecting this new approach. For exam- second OEF mission addressing terrorist threats
ple, in March 2000, ASG kidnapped over 50 to the United States.6
students and teachers from two schools in
Basilan. Four were killed before the group was
JSOTF-P Mission and Impact
released. The following month, ASG kidnapped Prior to 9/11, Admiral Dennis Blair, com-
21 people from a neighboring Malaysian resort mander of U.S. Pacific Command, funded the
island, Sipadan. Libya served as mediator and training of Philippine LRCs in order to improve
eventually paid a ransom of over $20 million the host nation’s capability to address its inter-
for their release. These and similar events in nal insurgent threats. The training mission
the southern Philippines led to Philippine was assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces

120 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

Group (Airborne). The LRC project served to rapidly deployable task force for responding
build personal relationships that would assist to contingencies. In July 2002, JSOTF-P was
in partnerships that arose after September 2001. established to replace JTF 510.
After 9/11, initial U.S. planning for coun- Special operations forces (SOF) trainers
terterrorism operations on Basilan Island built ranges and taught basic rifle marksman-
included a course of action for a maritime ship and platoon- and company-base defense
joint task force (JTF) to conduct U.S. combat and maneuver. The host nation provided
operations on the island. This plan was dis- 30,000 new rifles and 1 million rounds of
carded quickly when it became apparent that ammunition to support the training. The result
the Philippine constitution forbade direct uni- was small units that could engage targets and
lateral operations by other nations within the conduct maneuver with confidence.
country. Therefore, an indirect/FID approach
had to be developed. a course of action for a maritime JTF was
When SOCPAC was given the preliminary discarded when it became apparent that the
counterterrorism mission, it first assessed the Philippine constitution forbade direct unilateral
situation on Basilan to gain understanding of operations by other nations within the country
the environment. This assessment revealed that
the AFP did not view the population as the cen-
ter of gravity, abuses were not uncommon, and As tactical forces became more proficient
corruption was endemic. In addition, AFP tac- through JSOTF-P efforts, SOF trainers began to
tics were based on maneuver of battalion-sized shift to the professionalization of higher level
forces that were often unable to find and close headquarters. Once joint goals for training and
with terrorists on the island. Complicating fac- equipping targeted AFP units were met, sub-
tors were the AFP’s lack of maintenance capa- sequent assessments resulted in downsizing
bility, mobility, functioning weapons, and JSOTF-P and a change in mission to “advise
training ammunition, as well as weaknesses in and assist,” with a prohibition on military
platoon and company maneuver. training. Operations were extended beyond
The initial intent of U.S. OEF-P forces Basilan Island to Jolo, Mindanao, and other
was to t rain and equip A F P on Basilan, areas of concern. After this change, JSOTF-P
focusing specifically on increasing AFP tac- shifted to operating primarily at higher ech-
tical proficiency against terror elements of elons, with advisors located at the brigade and
concern to the United Sates (such as JI and higher levels and additional liaison coordina-
ASG). Restrictions on foreign military forces’ tion elements at other critical locations.
use of force (except in self-defense) kept U.S. The vast Philippine archipelago compli-
forces from a “trigger-puller” role, and, in cated Philippine security force efforts to main-
deference to this restriction, guidance was tain presence and eliminate terrorist sanctu-
given that U.S. troops had to be at least “one aries. JSOTF-P capabilities assisted Philippine
hill” removed from locations where contact efforts to provide security in the southern
with the enemy could be anticipated. In islands. The JSOTF-P focus transitioned from
January 2001, initial forces deployed under supporting the tactical edge of AFP counterter-
the command of the SOCPAC J T F 510, a rorism operations to a more operational-level

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 121


lambert, lewis, and sewall

focus, helping units to structure balanced cam- procedure that has considered the population
paigns in their local areas. and minimized civilian harm.
JSOTF-P provided support, such as fus- Prior AFP Approach: Scouring and Civilian
ing intelligence and developing targeting Casualties. In the early 2000s, Philippine secu-
approaches, to specific counterterrorism opera- rity forces (both AFP and Philippine National
tions. It also provided mentoring in areas that Police [PNP]) faced a series of high profile ASG
aided the AFP in separating terrorists from operations in addition to continuing pressure
the population, such as civil-military opera- from the New People’s Army, MNLF, and MILF.
tions,7 public affairs, and Military Information Similar to the early days of the Huk Rebellion
Support to Operations. JSOTF-P also contrib- in the late 1940s, Philippine forces were seen as
uted enabling capabilities in support of AFP heavy handed in their response, causing signifi-
high-value individual operations, including cant numbers of civilian casualties and exten-
full motion video from Scan Eagle and video- sive damage to property.9 One factor was their
equipped low-signature aircraft. indiscriminate approach to operations, engag-
ing all individuals in areas where the enemy
recent U.S. military assessments state that the operated and considering civilians as the enemy
major counterterrorism campaign objectives of or enemy supporters. Forces were rewarded for
OEF-P have been accomplished that because a metric for success was the body
count from each operation.10 Forces also used
imprecise methods of engagement, such as
The consensus between the U.S. and unguided air munitions, unobserved artillery,
Philippine governments is that OEF-P has been and naval gunfire to soften targets.11
successful, as terrorist groups in the southern At the same time, Philippine security
Philippines since 2001 are isolated in smaller forces tended to be ineffective because of poor
and smaller geographical areas, have increas- operational security. As a result, the enemy
ingly ineffective and uncoordinated leadership, could evade AFP operations or prepare an
are unable to effectively recruit personnel and ambush for the AFP, causing large numbers of
move them into the Philippines, are unable to friendly casualties.12
garner significant financial support, and are New Approach: Restraint and Considering
unable to conduct significant operations. The the Population. By the end of the decade, the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review points out Philippine forces, particularly the AFP, had
OEF-P as a successful model for operations developed a different approach to dealing
that is applicable to operational environments with terrorist groups. The AFP moved from
beyond the Philippines.8 indiscriminate operations to giving signifi-
cant consideration to the general population,
Evolution of the AFP Approach and including civilian casualties, property dam-
Accounting for Civilian Harm
age, human rights, civil-military operations,
A key component of the success against terror- and the welfare of displaced persons. 13 This
ist groups in the Philippines in the past decade change of approach was illustrated in 2008
appears to be the AFP transition from employ- when MILF resorted to kinetic operations
ing a brute-force approach to a highly focused after a Supreme Court ruling that threw out

122 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

the proposed terms of a negotiated peace and performing civil-military operations. The
accord. The AFP responded with restraint and “20 percent” activities were mainly conducted
consideration of the population, establishing by specialized units, specifically Joint Special
camps for displaced persons and providing Operations Groups (JSOGs), which special-
food and water. The response from the popu- ized in direct action operations and targeting,
lation was positive, and the AFP was seen as and Philippine National Police–Special Action
protectors of the population, building trust Force (PNP-SAF), a police element dedicated
that aided their overall campaign. One mem- to warrant-based captures of high-profile indi-
ber of the U.S. Embassy team described this viduals.16 The use of these specialized, highly
transformation, stating, “They were seen as trained elements for targeting helped to com-
the savior of the people—it was a watershed bat operational security problems and spared
moment for them.”14 That reinforced the value garrison forces from the fallout resulting from
of the population-centric approach they had direct action operations.17
recently adopted. This and other instances Civil-military operations. Following the
gradually showed the AFP that, as one officer early example of U.S. forces in Basilan in
noted, “Constraint is a weapons system”15 that 2002,18 the AFP largely embraced the use of
can be effective in countering terrorist groups. civil-military operations, providing services to
Elements of the new approach are described the population overall and specifically flood-
below. ing areas affected by kinetic operations with
An 80/20 approach. The AFP changed its aid to win the support of the population and
approach to focus on the population through maintain freedom of action. 19 Because the
the use of civil-military operations geared employment of civil-military operations cre-
toward improving the relationship between ated greater contact with the population, the
the AFP and the population, winning civilian AFP could better understand the local environ-
support for the AFP and Philippine govern- ment and know which areas were permissive
ment, and discouraging support for terrorist or nonpermissive.
groups. Civil-military operations were seen as The AFP’s use of civil-military operations
so valuable that the AFP established an 80/20 tended to sway the population as well as aid
approach, where 80 percent of AFP activities in counterterrorism operations. For example,
were to consist of civil-military operations and in Cotabato City, one local stated that the
20 percent were to be targeting/combat opera- AFP “used to come in with guns, missiles, and
tions. The shift began in April 2007 under AFP heavy weapons. Now, they are messengers of
Chief of Staff General Hermogenes Esperon, peace and building our schools.”20 Similarly,
Jr., who indicated that the military would in Basilan, the use of civil-military operations
abandon its previous procedure, focused on helped to communicate the message that the
kinetic operations, and instead would concen- AFP was opposing only the ASG, with the
trate on civil-military operations. goal of protecting the population.21 Activities
Under this new approach, battlespace included providing food, water, and shelter for
owners would conduct the population-centric displaced individuals and humanitarian assis-
activities (the “80 percent”): protecting the tance during natural disasters. These activities
population, gathering human intelligence, served to separate JI/ASG terror elements from

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 123


lambert, lewis, and sewall

the population.22 In one example, an individ- engage their intended targets, they chose not
ual in Jolo was so impressed by local AFP care to engage due to collateral damage concerns:
of the population that he provided the tip that “We will get them another day.”26
led to Abu Solaiman in 2007, a key high-value Currently, therefore, AFP conduct of
individual in the southern Philippines. When focused operations is centered on consider-
the AFP formalized this method in 2007, ation of civilian casualties and protecting the
Khaled Musa, the deputy chairman of the population.27 This consideration even includes
MILF committee on information, commented a medical evacuation response: if civilian casu-
that the AFP’s use of civil-military operations alties occur, the AFP will take those casualties
was “more lethal than brute force” to the orga- to a military hospital to receive medical care.
nization, and noted that a similar approach The AFP reported giving civilians a higher evac-
to MNLF led to a mass surrender of insurgent uation priority than its own forces to empha-
fighters in the 1996 peace agreement with the size AFP concern for the civilian population.28
government.23
Focused operations. Specialized elements of the forces displayed tactical patience, where,
the army and police conducted a large num- despite having the opportunity to engage their
ber of targeting operations comprising the 20 intended targets, they chose not to engage
percent of the Philippine 80/20 approach. due to collateral damage concerns
These operations were highly focused, aimed
at capturing or killing the intended target with
a minimum of civilian casualties or damage. Philippine leadership: A forcing function
This process began with solid and complete for new approach. Philippine forces discussed
intelligence. JSOG tended to develop its own how their changed focus toward the popula-
intelligence for its operations, though it did tion and avoidance of civilian casualties and
at times rely on intelligence from the United human rights was driven by senior leaders in
States to verify what it had.24 PNP-SAF required the government. They ascribed prior heavy-
intelligence and information adequate for handed practices to the legacy of the Marcos
obtaining a warrant before they could oper- dictatorship and a lack of appreciation for how
ate.25 Both groups stated that they were careful counterproductive these practices were. A piv-
about intelligence they gave to ground com- otal year for this change in focus was 2007,
manders to ensure it was reliable. On AFP when General Esperon emphasized civil-mil-
direct action missions, the forces took great itary operations in AFP operations. President
pains to obtain accurate positive identification Arroyo and the rest of the government rein-
of the target during the operation and chose forced this change in direction by establishing
precise means of engagement with a low risk the National Development Support Command
of civilian casualties. They did not engage oth- and putting human rights into laws govern-
ers on the objective even if they had weapons, ing Philippine counterterrorism operations.29
unless the force was compromised and they Other senior AFP leadership promoting this
needed to engage those individuals in self- new approach included Lieutenant General
defense. They also displayed tactical patience, Raymundo Ferrer and General Alexander Yano.
where, despite having the opportunity to Leaders we spoke to noted that the Arroyo

124 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

government’s emphasis on a negotiated solu- leaders in their counterterrorism campaign.


tion also represented an important turning So, while the changes in the AFP approach
point. The momentum appears to be continu- to more carefully conform to human rights
ing in the new Internal Peace and Security Plan considerations and reduce civilian casualties
issued by the Aquino government on January was a Philippine-led transformation, JSOTF-P
1, 2011, which recasts the ongoing counterter- probably provided tools that helped the AFP
rorism campaign as “winning the peace.” It achieve those changes.
focuses on an integrated interagency approach, Limiting second-order effects: Civilian casual-
nonkinetic aspects of the campaign, and trust- ties and political primacy. The Philippine security
building in support of a negotiation process. forces face a number of challenges that affect
One senior leader concern also traced their ability to maintain security and neutral-
the new approach to policies and laws that ize terrorist elements. Specialized units of the
affected rank and promotion decisions. For AFP tended to capture and kill the majority
example, the AFP “relieves commanders a of the targets. Because the specialized units33
lot more than we [the U.S. military] do” for were better resourced and trained to support
human rights concerns and civilian casualty their missions so they could operate in confi-
incidents.30 Philippine law now allows individ- dence, the two main concerns of these units
uals to charge AFP and PNP forces with human appeared to be mission success and avoiding
rights violations, such as civilian casualties and civilian casualties. AFP concerns about not
violating the rights of detainees.31 A charge of only potential civilian casualties but also
a human rights violation is forwarded to the any form of cost or blowback from an opera-
appropriate army or police office (for example, tion appeared to be a constraining factor in
the human rights office for the AFP) and an the AFP approach to offensive operations.
unresolved charge can prevent promotion of As noted earlier, the AFP had come to see
officers accused of violations.32 Consequently, civilian casualties through a domestic rather
commanders and forces are aware of civilian than international legal lens. This meant that
casualties and how detainees are treated in instead of a proportionality assessment of the
their commands. potential risks of civilian casualties, they were
The change in mindset, while driven effectively defaulting to a zero-casualty goal.
by Philippine leadership from above, was This was reinforced by their keen perception
likely enabled in part by U.S. military efforts. that their careers were vulnerable to abuse
JSOTF-P “advise and assist” efforts helped to allegations.
professionalize the AFP and improve profi- Additionally, the AFP was highly sensi-
ciency and professionalism, enabling both the tive to the government’s desire for a political
more effective use of civil-military operations settlement with insurgent (instead of terrorist)
and the conduct of focused operations with groups. The AFP thus sought to avoid alienat-
minimized collateral damage. International ing potential negotiating partners or otherwise
Military Education and Training efforts also prejudicing the political process. The effect of
exposed AFP officers to U.S. doctrine and tac- these political priorities allowed terrorist sanc-
tics, techniques, and procedures that aided in tuaries to exist, since the JI group enjoyed pro-
operationalizing the intent of the Philippine tection from an insurgent group (the MILF).

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 125


lambert, lewis, and sewall

Nonetheless, most observers argued that JI this article, but a wide range of reports and
was actually contained within this “sanctuary.” reporting suggests that corruption and a lack
Political concerns also appeared to constrain of effective ministry capability remain major
military operations in specific geographic areas impediments to sustainable progress in field
or times. One of the roles of U.S. intelligence operations. International Crime Investigative
support was to provide reassurance regarding Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a U.S.
the likely success and limited second-order Department of Justice training program for
effects of raids. improving Philippine police effectiveness, is
In one sense, this evolution of the AFP’s one solution for addressing this key shortfall.
attitude represented a victory for civil-mili- However, the program has a tactical focus
tary relations, respect for human rights, and only, so institutional shortcomings were not
long-term effectiveness and internal trust of being addressed in U.S. efforts. While the
military institutions. 34 However, it also had overall Philippine goal is to move the coun-
accompanying near-term effects that rein- ter terrorism mission to law enforcement
forced “the speed of sovereignty” and the agencies, this goal is undermined by a police
political, vice technical, limits on military force that often lacks the capacity for that
operations. While American partners some- mission, with the exception of the PNP-SAF.
times found this fr ustrating considering The next two sections contain the study
swiftly fulfilling the JSOTF-P counterterror- team’s observations of best practices exhib-
ism mission, they fully accepted the need to ited in OEF-P. The best practices include
allow the Philippine government and AFP to
conduct operations as those actors deemed one of the major advances in Philippine
appropriate. Though difficult for some ini- thinking was the need to integrate police into
tially, this acceptance reflected the broad and counterterrorism operations
sophisticated understanding of the indirect
approach evident in JSOTF-P.
Shifting counterterrorism to law enforcement. approaches by JSOTF-P, the Country Team
One of the major advances in Philippine in the U.S. Embassy, and Philippine forces,
thinking was the need to integrate police into as well as observations concerning key con-
counterterrorism operations, both to expand straints that limited the benefits and sustain-
capacity to handle terrorists “downstream” ability of the overall OEF-P effort.
and to reinforce the notion that this is a crim-
inal law enforcement effort. The ANP also
Best Practices
noted that this minimized the potential for Creation of Precision Units. With U.S. assis-
false claims of mistreatment of civilians. tance, the Philippines created and improved
However, both the PNP and Philippines upon several specialized precision units that
criminal justice system in general are weak, have additional training and higher levels of
limiting the effectiveness of this shift in technology and resourcing than other host
approach. 35 Examination of the profession- nation security forces: the Philippine JSOG,
alism and capacity of Philippine adminis- the Light Reaction Company, and the PNP-SAF.
trative institutions is beyond the scope of Operating with JSOTF-P advice and assistance,

126 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

these units allow the Philippines to be more This move enables the AFP commitment to
surgical in the execution of combat operations, a larger role for civil-military operations in
improving effectiveness against terrorist ele- its overall approach, a role that JSOTF-P has
ments while lessening civilian casualties and encouraged. The population views these units
human rights abuses. favorably since they demonstrate the govern-
Full Integration across U.S. Embassy ment’s will to improve the lives of its citizens,
Country Team: Mindanao Working Group. The and the resulting operations have aided the
Country Team/JSOTF-P relationship has effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.
improved significantly over the past year due Corruption does, however, remain an issue.
to concerted attention. Weekly Country Team Replacing Search-and-Destroy Tactics with
meetings and JSOTF-P’s full-time liaison in Focused Operations. The Philippine approach
the Embassy have been helpful in integrating to combating terror and insurgency has moved
JSOTF-P efforts into the overall Country Team from counterproductive search-and-destroy tac-
plan. JSOTF-P elements working with the tics to focused targeting operations. Focused
Deputy Chief of Mission crafted the Embassy’s operations are characterized as having clearly
Mindanao Work Group, which by mid-2011 articulated objectives, detailed planning and
was essentially a steering group effort for the rehearsal, robust intelligence on both the target
Country Team’s initiatives in the southern and the immediate environment, and the abil-
Philippines. The JSOTF-P commander stated ity of ground commanders to abort operations
that such an integrated effort was essential for when there are concerns of civilian casualties.
a comprehensive approach to addressing U.S. Partnered Control of Technology. U.S.-
counterterrorism goals in the Philippines. Philippine combined/joint fusion cells facili-
Robust Liaison. JSOTF-P liaison activities tate partnered use of U.S. weapon systems
range well beyond a narrow U.S. counterterror- technology to enable host nation operations
ism focus, reaching broadly into host nation and give them capability they otherwise lack.
combat units, civic actions, police, and other Partnered control of precision weaponry
locations, reflecting a deliberate effort to pur- equals partnered accountability and respon-
sue an indirect approach. Resultant relation- sibility while allowing host nation use of
ships with key influencers provide for optimal advanced capabilities to maximize mission
exchange of information, strengthened under- effectiveness.
standing of terrorist and insurgent operations, Combining Direct and Indirect Approaches
greater acceptance of U.S. presence, and oppor- to Counterinsurgency. The Philippine politi-
tunities for synergy and force multipliers in cal, military, and police leadership agree
support of shared goals. that the previous heavy-handed strategy for
Activation of a National Civic Action prosecuting the 40-year war against multiple
Command. The AFP established a National simultaneous insurgencies, characterized by
Development Support Command, which human rights violations and civilian casual-
includes forces such as civil affairs, medical, ties, has failed. The Philippines has adopted a
engineer, and other units charged with the old new approach that combines direct and indi-
U.S. doctrinal mission of civic action as part rect methods in concert to combat terrorism.
of internal defense and development strategy. It uses a division of labor to blunt terrorism

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 127


lambert, lewis, and sewall

while fostering national reconciliation. While this office was helpful to individuals who had
precision security force units will focus on crit- been falsely accused of such violations. This
ical kinetic direct action operations, the bat- overall approach appears to clearly fix personal
tlespace owners in the AFP and locally based responsibility for conduct and avoidance of
PNP will carry 80 percent of the load by con- human rights violations, facilitating a change
ducting security operations, civic action, and in mindset of host nation forces in ways that
intelligence-gathering to separate the people have helped the population welcome their pres-
from the terrorists. ence and activities, leading to improved success
Strategic Tempo and Tactical Patience. in counterterrorism operations.
Philippine counterterrorism operations are Low Visibility Dispersion. Having widely
conducted in the context of an internal 40-year dispersed JSOTF-P air operations, command
conflict. There is no timetable for Philippine and control, and liaison coordination ele-
forces to withdraw—unlike U.S. forces in Iraq ments enhance force protection by lowering
and Afghanistan—since they stand on national visibility of U.S. presence. Living in safe areas
sovereign territory. Civilian casualties and on host nation bases also reduces force sig-
human rights are key concerns that can out- nature and the likelihood of adversary attack.
weigh temporary military gains from specific Attention to Internally Displaced Persons.
operations. Therefore, Philippine forces have IDPs have been a significant problem through-
learned the benefits of tactical patience—if nec- out the Philippines’ troubled past in light of
essary, many targets can wait for opportunities its history of internal conflicts and natural
when they can be actioned and these key con- disasters. IDPs are now considered in military
cerns can be avoided. JSOTF-P advisors have and police operational planning. Capabilities
learned to adjust their tempo to avoid stressing of military, police, and governmental social
host nation sovereignty, governance, and trust. welfare agencies can be integrated to mitigate
Host Nation Human Rights Officers and IDPs caused by military operations or natu-
Training. The Philippine security forces require ral disasters. Such aid helps to influence the
that an officer in each battalion serves as a population and improve relationships between
human rights officer, usually as an extra duty. civilians and security forces. In contrast, fail-
The officers train the units on human rights ure to consider and factor in considerations for
policy and ensure that human rights are a con- IDPs in operations in Afghanistan harmed the
sideration during operations. Any citizen may relationship with the population and provided
accuse a member of the police or armed forces material for enemy information operations.
of a human rights violation. Those accused have
their careers flagged until the matter is resolved
Key Constraints
in civilian court. The Armed Forces Joint Staff Indirect Operations Equal No Use of Force
has a human rights office on it, and human from the United States. A key aspect of plan-
rights training is part of the AFP National Police ning by the United States for operations in the
academy’s curriculum. The AFP human rights Philippines was the prohibition against the
office was established as a single point of con- United States using force in offensive opera-
tact for concerns about violations by the AFP. tions. Therefore, an indirect/FID approach was
Soldiers met by the study team mentioned that developed to accomplish the U.S. objectives

128 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

by, with, and through the Philippine secu- local leaders. JSOTF-P lacked such a mecha-
rity forces. What might have initially been nism, however. Another lost opportunity was
perceived by the U.S. military as a constraint JSOTF-P inability to travel with AFP leaders on
resulted in an operational strategy that military aircraft without prior coordination
helped the AFP avoid fueling the decade-long and U.S. military four-star approval. JSOTF-P
Philippine insurgency. Nonetheless, there stated that the inability to host AFP leaders in
were several other constraints that limited certain occasions precluded taking advantage
the benefits and sustainability of the indirect of opportunities for influence. Overall, mili-
approach in the Philippines. tary forces require flexibility to apply resources
Limited Authorities/Capabilities/Resources
for the Indirect Approach. Some limitations the lack of an agile mechanism to get
hindered JSOTF-P ability to influence the needed resources for influence operations
host nation. U.S. forces did not have all of the led to missed opportunities
resources they believed they needed to build
influence and relationships with Philippine
forces and government elements. For exam- in unconventional ways to empower the indi-
ple, the need for a low level of discretion- rect approach. Thus, the lack of an agile mech-
ary funding was an early lesson in Iraq and anism to get needed resources for influence
Afghanistan, which has been addressed by operations led to missed opportunities.
providing military forces with Commander’s Efforts Did Not Feature Institutional
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds Reform (Sustainability). The later phase of
to aid them in influencing the population and OEF-P was an advise-and-assist mission in

DOD (Michael J. Carden)

U.S. Soldier serving in Operation Junior Heroes in Philippines looks at children’s book teaching IED
awareness

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 129


lambert, lewis, and sewall

support of Philippine counterterrorism opera- Afghanistan have many examples of senior


tions and was not geared toward improving leaders actively establishing and maintaining
institutional capability. For example, JSOTF-P these relationships.
was not authorized to conduct training. While Even with an integrated U.S. Country
there were ways to work around this restric- Team effort in 2011, many of those inter-
tion, the study team sensed that this limi- viewed expressed a lack of understanding or
tation was frustrating to some elements in appreciation of a common plan or coordi-
JSOTF-P because their impact was limited to nated approach within the team. It was not
the forces with whom they could work directly. clear whether a more conscious counterter-
Authorization to include training in their rorism approach could be agreed upon across
mandate, even without additional resources, the U.S. Government or would be accepted
might have allowed them to create greater syn- by the Philippine government. Nonetheless,
ergies and expand their impact. For example, from the JSOTF-P perspective, it would be a
they wished to use available resources to tie welcome development. For example, despite
together advise/assist topics for inclusion in USAID priorities having a strong focus on the
curricula for AFP schoolhouses, which would southern Philippines, the agency dedicated
have helped make their advising mission more $400 million to work in Mindanao, which
sustainable and increased the impact of U.S. was 60 percent of the total USAID investment.
efforts. This challenge is one example of the JSOTF-P members noted that it was hard to see
inherent stovepipes created by limited author- any impact from that development. Military
ities granted in Title 10 (for example, opera- officials perceived development work as con-
tional advise and assist) and Title 22 (security ducted to “better the lives of people in the
assistance) missions. Philippines” instead of “make development
Inconsistent Interagency Teaming. Ideally, work [to] reinforce [U.S.] interests.”
OEF-P would be an integrated interagency Another example is justice system reform.
effort, pulling in different aspects of national This appeared critical to military actors since
power to best effect. Different phases of the process to prosecute terrorists was lengthy
OEF-P have featured such interagency inte- and sometimes ineffective. To improve this
gration. At the same time, this integration has process, JSOTF-P pursued a team effort with
been inconsistent, pointing out the ad hoc the Department of Justice’s ICITAP program.
and personality-dependent nature of inter- But the ICITAP program appeared to be a
agency teaming. Integration was reported by poor fit to the challenges in the Philippines.
both military and Department of State ele- ICITAP trains police skills, but without a
ments to be strong between 2002 and 2007. higher level program to reform police leader-
During this time, different elements of the ship accompanied by addressing pay issues,
U.S. Countr y Team would meet weekly to training basic skills to police forces can sim-
focus and synchronize effects in Mindanao. ply help make a corrupt force more efficient
Such strong integration appeared to emerge in its corruption. Importantly, this situation
again in 2010 and 2011. While it is not clear has changed in the past few months because
why interagency teaming was not as strong in of the work of the Mindanao Working Group
the years between these two periods, Iraq and within the U.S. Embassy, which started to

130 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

move U.S. efforts back toward an enterprise temporar y solution to a problem that will
approach with increased unity of effort. likely reemerge.
These considerations point to the fact One corollary to this is that U.S. military
that, for all its successes, OEF-P was not forces require resources that are unconven-
designed to be sustainable. There is no com- tional yet appropriate to the use of the indirect
ponent of OEF-P that is chartered to fold key approach and influence operations in the name
components of the advise-and-assist mission of national security. These can include a process
into AFP institutions so they can be perpetu- for agile resourcing of requirements, such as a
ated. Therefore, hard-fought progress could CERP-like mechanism, as well as the ability to
be lost when the U.S. effort is reduced in obtain requirements that may seem unconven-
scope or eliminated. OEF-P also stands as tional to a procurement system that normally
an example of how the U.S. Government has operates for conventional military resources.
not been consistently able to synchronize
and synergize its efforts in the Philippines for while U.S. direct action operations alone can
maximum effect. In a time of decreasing U.S. make short-term gains against global terrorism,
resources, it becomes even more important a U.S. kinetic approach is unsustainable in itself
to consider how effects can be made sustain-
able and how limited resources can be used
to obtain maximum effect. Other resources that can be useful in pur-
suing the indirect approach are intelligence
Lessons for the United States products that support an accurate understand-
The lessons of OEF-P are instructive for the ing of the population as well as threat groups,
United States over the next decade as it is faced since this facilitates efforts to separate terrorists
with maximizing desired effects in an austere from the population. At the same time, assess-
budgetary environment. ments to understand host nation capabilities
Use of the Indirect Approach for Security and limitations—including operations analysis
Concerns. Progress in the Philippines sug- for understanding what elements of the host
gests the importance of the indirect approach nation approach were or were not working—
to FID and security assistance in addressing would be valuable in helping the U.S. military
U.S. national security concerns. While U.S. tailor its advise-and-assist efforts to areas where
direct action operations alone can make they are most needed. It may also be valuable
short-term gains against global terrorism, to provide expeditionary intelligence, surveil-
a U.S. kinetic approach is unsustainable in lance, and reconnaissance platforms to give
itself. Partners are essential in the struggle intelligence support to host nation targeting
against violent e xtremism, and par tners and boost its confidence.
may require the United States to adopt an Monitoring and Reducing Civilian Harm.
indirect approach to a common challenge. When host nation security forces injure civil-
In addition, the histor y of the Philippines ians, the political costs can be significant
e x pe r ie nce w it h e x t remism shows t hat both domestically and internationally. In the
direct action without addressing underly- Philippines, extra-judicial killings (noncom-
ing factors that lead to grievances can be a bat-related deaths of civilians) alleged to have

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 131


lambert, lewis, and sewall

been perpetrated by government officials have situation. For instance, several examples exist
been of particular concern over the past decade. in which forces significantly reduced civil-
Nongovernmental organizations have issued ian casualties while maintaining or improv-
critical reports about extra-judicial killings, ing operational effectiveness. Other examples
and, in 2007, the U.S. Government and United show that when the military does not address
Nations Special Rapporteur for extra-judicial this issue, it can find its freedom of action seri-
killings both issued critical reports about them ously curtailed. Given these lessons, the U.S.
in the Philippines.36 Human rights violations military and Embassy team should be more
remain liabilities for the host nation govern- deliberate in tracking and remediating civilian
ment and its partners, so much so that they harm given its strategic impact, including in
become evidence of the government’s failure to partnered operations.
protect civilians or effectively prosecute human Tailored Human Rights Training for Host
rights abusers. Moreover, where government Nation Forces. The Philippine forces’ attitudes
employees are directly involved in such abuses, toward civilian casualties suggested the need
they bespeak the failure of government and for a more nuanced appreciation of civil-
its institutions. Such considerations impact ian casualty issues and frameworks by U.S.
U.S. assistance to foreign militaries such as Country Teams and forces working indirectly
the Philippines due to legislation prohibiting with host nation security forces. In the case of
aid to nations with established human rights the AFP, concern about the potential personal
abuses. Therefore, human rights abuses com- career ramifications of causing civilian casual-
mitted by government actors, even if outside ties appeared to induce significant caution with
official military operations, are cause for con- regard to combat operations. One contribut-
cern of the Country Team as well as U.S. and ing factor was the fact that AFP operated under
host nation forces. domestic law, which served to reinforce con-
Despite this importance, neither the sequences for their actions during operations.
Philippine military nor partnered forces suc- This stands in substantive contrast to the Law
cessfully tracked or analyzed violence against of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is more per-
civilians. This is a common omission. For missive with regard to civilian casualties, and
example, the United States and North Atlantic in procedural contrast to the more insulated
Treaty Organization were both unaware of any U.S. military justice system. The result for AFP
civilian harm during Operation Odyssey Dawn soldiers was a desire to avoid military action
and Operation Unified Protector in Libya in in populated areas or without adequate intel-
2011, despite the mission being civilian pro- ligence or real-time verification that no civil-
tection and the likelihood of civilian harm ians would be harmed. This case suggests that
during airstrikes.37 The exception appears to be FID efforts should not simply assume the cur-
International Security Assistance Force opera- rent U.S. framework for understanding human
tions in Afghanistan, where coalition forces rights and LOAC (both of which are interna-
both tracked civilian casualties and analyzed tional in focus) when working with other
them to find opportunities for reducing civil- forces. Instead, U.S. forces should develop the
ian harm. Importantly, Afghanistan shows that awareness to assess, discuss, and accommodate
focusing on civilian casualties can be a win-win local national law and political considerations

132 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

regarding civilian casualties or human rights.38 Given that many nations approach counterter-
Failure to do so may make it more difficult to rorism as a law enforcement activity, this lack
communicate and effectively shape host nation of authority is a significant limitation to sup-
force thinking and behavior. porting partner nation counterterrorism activi-
Training on Nonlethal Skill Sets. Military ties. This limitation is exacerbated by current
forces working in an indirect role would also shortfalls in scope in other U.S. Government
appear to benefit from a focus on enhancing programs that could potentially fill this gap,
host nation nonlethal skill sets, such as civil such as ICITAP.
affairs, military information support to opera-
tions, and public affairs. In the case of the in the case of the Philippines, U.S. civil affairs
Philippines, U.S. civil affairs and engineering and engineering initiatives provided an alternate
initiatives provided an alternate population- population-centric approach to counterterrorism,
centric approach to counterterrorism, address- addressing root causes
ing root causes that have fueled cycles of vio-
lence for decades. This model was so effective
that Philippine forces adopted the practice in A Model for Interagency Teaming. Joint
their own operations and established a perma- Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental
nent command to foster its practice. Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Sustaining Progress: Supporting Both Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II,
Operations and Institutions. Security assistance notes the challenges of interagency coordi-
activities should also attempt to make their nation and the value of a clear mission state-
benefit as sustainable as possible given over- ment. The Philippines shows both that such
all cost constraints and U.S. national interests interagency coordination can occur and suc-
in global stability. This is a matter of making cess tends to be ad hoc and personality depen-
the most of available resources to make long- dent. The Mindanao Working Group suggests
lasting benefit. For example, training could a way ahead for formalizing such coordination
be conducted now within JSOTF-P with little in a focused geographical area that might be
impact, given its expertise on AFP capabilities expanded across the country. The military often
and limitations and its relationships that pro- instigates innovation within the interagency,
vide natural openings with AFP personnel in its as was true in the exemplary example of Joint
schoolhouses. Funding restrictions for Title 10 Interagency Task Force–South. U.S. Special
and Title 22 activities can thus create an artifi- Operations Command has a charter through
cial impediment to U.S. forces when there are its Global Synchronization Conferences to
simultaneous requirements to provide support help coordinate the U.S. effort against terror-
to operations and institutional security assis- ism, although this remains largely a top-down
tance activities. undertaking. The JSOTF-P support for the
Limited Authorities for Support to Police Mindanao Working Group represents a bot-
Forces. Most U.S. forces currently lack authori- tom-up approach that may be more successful
ties needed to provide information and oper- because it more closely reflects agency capac-
ational support to host nation nonmilitary ity and self-interest in developing a common
agencies, such as the police or justice system.39 strategy and implementation plan.

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 133


lambert, lewis, and sewall

Conclusion require flexibility to be able to apply resources


The United States faces a host of national in unconventional ways to empower the indi-
security concerns, which includes the threat rect approach.
of terrorist attacks and the global challenge Indirect military action can be a cata-
of combating violent extremism. Given U.S. lyst for reform of U.S. Government structures
budget challenges and the exhausting legacy and processes to the requirements of national
of two lengthy wars, future military operations security. Best practices have been observed at
to address these concerns will likely be char- the tactical edge of the interagency, such as the
acterized by presence and shaping combined Philippines and certain activities in Iraq, as well
with direct action against discrete threats and as the counterdrug interagency command in
individuals. SOF will continue to be in high Key West. These are examples where interagency
demand for direct action to counter more partners, compelled by the need for success
immediate threats to U.S. interests. SOF also on the ground, overcame barriers of author-
have an opportunity to showcase their unique ity, resources, disparate goals, and culture and
skills and value in FID, security assistance, and moved toward a synergistic whole-of-govern-
other shaping missions in order to address ment approach. In times of limited resources
underlying factors that lead to violent extrem- and compelling global requirements, the need
ism. Such activity can both sustain progress for better interagency integration is obvious,
against terrorist elements and reduce the base- and the U.S. Country Team is a good starting
line of violent extremism in the future. point for pursuing such integration. PRISM
This indirect approach is a critical com-
ponent of sustaining U.S. national security.
However, while many resources and much Notes
attention have been placed on improving
means of direct action and degrading ter- 1
Robert Day McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History
rorist networks, the indirect approach has and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia (Grand
not received the same attention. Indeed, the Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2002).
2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism con- 2
Moro National Liberation Front fighters were
cludes that a redoubling of efforts is needed promised positions in the Philippine army, with the
in addressing “specific drivers of violence”40 ability to stay in their local areas.
3
and terrorist messages. Seizing this opportu- The Louis Berger Group currently maintains the
Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) project for
nity may require some additional action, a
the U.S. Agency for International Development, avail-
slight rebalancing of resources, and creative able at <www.louisberger.com/OurProjects/Asia/LEAP>.
4
thinking about partnerships. The alternative, Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S.
Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism,
however, would be to repeat post-Vietnam
1940–1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).
U.S. withdrawal from indirect activities with 5
Khadafi Janjalani was killed in 2006 by the
the resulting reduced inf luence and effects Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) during Operation
throughout the world.41 Given the strategic Ultimatum in Jolo.
6
The first Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mis-
challenges the United States faces in a world
sion focused on al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan; the
of changing power dynamics, this would be a third OEF mission addressed al Qaeda and associated
shortsighted approach. Overall, military forces enemy networks in trans-Sahara Africa.

134 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no . 4


operation enduring freedom—philippines

7 31
Civil-military operations are the “activities of a For example, Philippine law affords much protec-
commander that establish collaborative relationships tion to detainees and specifies that detainees can only be
among military forces, governmental and nongovern- held for 24 hours without being charged with a crime.
32
mental civilian organizations and authorities, and the Interview with JSOG, May 2011.
33
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile opera- JSOG and PNP-SAF; interview with JSOTF-P per-
tional area in order to facilitate military operations that sonnel, April 2011; interview with JSOG and PNP-SAF,
are nested in support of the overall U.S. objectives.” May 2011.
34
See Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations One of the contributions to this evolution
(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 8, 2008). appears to be the Leahy Amendment, which applies vet-
8
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, ting of human rights practices and policies to decisions
DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 28. regarding U.S. funding. This policy was seen by some
9
Interview with Joint U.S. Military Assistance to have a restraining effect on the host nation regarding
Group (JUSMAG), May 2011. human rights violations.
10 35
Interview with U.S. Joint Special Operations “Several key institutions, including the judi-
Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) personnel, April ciary and law enforcement agencies, remain weak,”
2011. World Report 2012–Philippines (New York: Human Rights
11
Interviews with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011. Watch, January 22, 2012), available at <www.unhcr.org/
12
Interview with JUSMAG, May 2011. refworld/docid/4f2007c83c.html>.
13 36
Interviews with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011; U.S. Department of State, “2006 Country Report
and JUSMAG, May 2011. on Human Rights Practices: Philippines,” March 2007;
14
Interview with JUSMAG, May 2011. and United Nations Human Rights Council, “Promotion
15
Interview with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011. and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
16
Several individuals pointed to Operation Petas in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including The
Western Sulu on December 6, 2010, as evidence that the Right to Development: Report of the Special Rapporteur
Philippine National Police–Special Action Force (PNP- on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
SAF) were becoming an effective targeting force. Appendix: Philippines, Philip Alston,” 2007.
17 37
Interviews with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011; For Operation Odyssey Dawn, Vice Admiral
and with Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) and William E. Gortney, former director of the Joint Staff,
PNP-SAF, May 2011. stated that there were “no reports of civilian casualties
18
For example, this approach was discussed in caused by coalition forces,” news transcript, Department
a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald of Defense, March 24, 2011. For Operation United
Rumsfeld to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Protector, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and Deputy Secretary of Defense in September 2003 Secretary General Anders Rasmussen stated that “We
as an example of how effective the use of the indirect have no confirmed civilian casualties caused by NATO,”
approach can be in combating terrorism. transcript, Monthly Press Briefing, November 3, 2011.
19
Interview with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011. These claims are contrary to credible claims in the media
20
Ibid. and by the new government of Libya.
21 38
Ibid. This also suggests that Iraqi and Afghan forces
22
“Global War on Terror (GWOT) Quick Look,” that have been trained to U.S. military standards for
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis brief, 15, operations governed under Law of Armed Conflict con-
August 2007. siderations may not have this mindset of restraint during
23
B.A. Patty, “To Raise Them Up. Part 1: The Lesser their operations.
39
and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines,” Small Wars U.S. Special Operations Command forces are an
Journal, October 15, 2007. exception.
24 40
Interview with JSOG, May 2011. 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 19.
25 41
Interview with PNP-SAF, May 2011. This point is emphasized in the 2010 National
26
Interview with AFP, May 2011. Security Strategy: “It would be destructive to both
27
“They’re very aware of the fact that it’s their own American national security and global security if the
country,” interview with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011. United States used the emergence of new challenges
28
Interview with JSOG, May 2011. and the shortcoming of the international system to walk
29
Republic Act 9327, Human Security Act, 2007. away from it.”
30
Interview with JUSMAG, May 2011.

PRISM 3, no . 4 lessons learned | 135


This content is in the Public Domain.

You might also like