IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 16-2016-CF-007454-AXXX

DIVISION: CR-A

STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

MARQUIS IHKEEM JEROME JACKSON,

Defendant.
________________________/

ORDER ON STATE’S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for consideration on the State of Florida’s (“State”)

Motion for Clarification (“the Motion”) filed April 8, 2022, regarding its Order Granting

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements: Lack of Probable Cause to

Stop the Defendant (“the Order”) entered on April 26, 2018. The Court has reviewed the

Motion, the Order, the deposition transcript of Sgt. Nobles, and the transcript of the hearing on

the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, and is therefore, fully advised in the premises to respond to

the State’s Motion as follows:

Procedural Issues

In general, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the Motion for Clarification nearly four

years after the State dropped the charges. There is no legal authority for the State to file the

motion. The Court is not aware of a Motion for Clarification in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

For the purpose of filing a timely notice of appeal, following the Supreme Court’s 2005

modification of the rendition rule, the references to motions for “clarification” was expressly

removed from the list of authorized motion in what is now Rule 9.020(h)(1), because that rule no

longer applies to appellate orders and only the appellate rules authorize motions for clarification.
Page 1 of 16
See Rule 9.330. There is no comparable rule of civil or criminal procedure that authorizes a

motion for clarification in trial courts. See Tyler v. State, Governor Chiles, 718 So.2d 811, 812

(Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“motion for clarification was not an ‘authorized’ motion that would delay

rendition of the final order”). Attorneys sometimes file these motions when the underlying order

is confusing or does not appear to be based on the pleadings or the evidence. However, because

a motion for clarification is not recognized as an authorized motion, it will not postpone

rendition of a final order in a civil or criminal trial case unless a party is able to demonstrate that

the motion’s substance permits it to be considered a different motion that would qualify as an

authorized motion such as a timely motion for rehearing or a motion to correct a sentence or

order of probation pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1).

The Court cannot construe the motion’s substance to seek anything other than

“clarification” regarding the extent of its credibility findings related to Sgt. Nobles’ testimony

during the 2018 hearing resulting in the underlying Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements: Lack of Probable Cause to Stop the Defendant

(“the Order”) entered on April 26, 2018. The State never appealed the Order, filed a timely

motion for rehearing, nor otherwise previously sought clarification from the Court concerning its

findings related to Sgt. Nobles’ testimony. Although the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear

any substantive motions and the Motion is not recognized in the Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the issues raised in the Motion present issues of great public importance generally and may affect

the State’s ethical duty to disclose evidence concerning the Court’s findings related to Sgt.

Nobles’ testimony contained in the Order in all pending cases Sgt. Nobles investigated or was

otherwise listed as a witness between the entry of the Order in the above-styled case and the

present, as well as any future cases he is involved in.

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 The Court is entering this Order to explain and repeat what should have been obvious and

straightforward – the Order Granting the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress represents a ruling on

the pending motion to suppress with the Court making findings of fact in support of its decision.

For the reasons in the Order and set forth below, the Court never intended for its credibility

findings regarding Sgt. Nobles’ testimony set forth in the Order to have any import beyond the

Order Granting the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The Court made no finding that Sgt.

Nobles or any other officers involved in the instant traffic stop and arrest engaged in any

personal or professional misconduct, attempted to intentionally mislead the Court, or otherwise

committed perjury. The Court made no finding that the prosecutor suborned perjury, violated

any Rules of Professional Conduct or Rules Regulating the Florida Bar or otherwise engaged in

any unethical behavior or prosecutorial misconduct by failing to notify the Court or defense

counsel of the material change in Sgt. Nobles’ testimony and proceeding to sponsor his

inconsistent testimony during the suppression hearing. Finally, this Order should not be

construed to modify or amend the Order Granting the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress as the

Court maintains and affirms the Order and this Court’s substantive jurisdiction evaporated when

the State dropped the charges against the Defendant.

[Insert a reference or footnote to the Defendant’s lack of standing to make argument regarding

the Motion]

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The Brady Rule

In Strickler v. Greene,1 the United States Supreme Court summarized the Brady decision,

and its progeny as follows:

In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963)], this
Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373
U.S., at 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194. We have since held that the duty to
disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no
request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107,
96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and that the duty
encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory
evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct.
3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Such evidence is material “if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id., at 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375; see also Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).
Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence “known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor.” Id., at 438, 115 S. Ct.
1555. In order to comply with Brady, therefore, “the individual
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to
the others acting on the government’s behalf in this case, including
the police.” Kyles, 514 U.S., at 437, 115 S. Ct. 1555.2

Materiality

In 1995 the Supreme Court was faced with an issue that Brady and its progeny had not

addressed: whether inadmissible evidence is per se immaterial for Brady purposes.3 In Wood v.

Bartholomew, the Court found that an inadmissible polygraph was immaterial for Brady

purposes.4 However, the Wood Court did not explain whether inadmissibility was determinative

1
527 U.S. 263, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).
2
527 U.S. at 280-281, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. Relying upon the decision in Strickler v. Green, in Deren v. State, 985 So.
2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 2008), the Florida Supreme Court explained that “to establish a Brady violation, the defendant
has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidence, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and
(3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.”
3
See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).
4
Id.
Page 4 of 16
of, or simply a factor of, materiality.5 The federal courts of appeals have subsequently

interpreted the Wood opinion differently, resulting in a split of authority over whether evidence

admissible at trial may nonetheless be material for Brady purposes. The conflict is comprised of

three primary interpretations of the Brady rule’s materiality requirement. The First and Fourth

Circuits interpret Wood as creating a per se rule that inadmissible evidence is immaterial for

Brady purposes.6 The Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits consider admissibility

a factor, but not dispositive, of materiality. Within this interpretation are two methods of

analysis. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh (with appellate jurisdiction over Florida District

Courts) Circuits have held that to be material the inadmissible evidence’s disclosure must lead

directly to admissible evidence.7 The Second and Eighth Circuits demand that the connection

between the inadmissible and admissible evidence be based on more than “mere speculation.”8

The Fifth and Seventh Circuits do not consider admissibility a factor of materiality and instead

ask if evidence’s disclosure would create a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. 9

Giglio Material

The United States Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States10 ruled that when the

reliability of a given witness may be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant,

the nondisclosure of evidence affecting the witness’s credibility falls within the general

disclosure rule of Brady. Giglio clarified the rule in Brady that impeachment evidence for

5
Id.
6
See United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F. 3d 54 (1st Cir. 2000); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F. 3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996).
7
See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 61 (2013); Coleman v. Calderon, 150
F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d in part, 525 U.S. 141 (1998); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 1999).
8
See United States v. Persico, 164 F. 3d 796 (2d Cir. 1999); Madsen v. Dormire,137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he district court’s attempt ‘[t]o get around this problem’ is ‘based on mere speculation.’”).
9
See Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Martin, 248 F. 3d 1161 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1999);
Lieberman v. Washington, 128 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 1997).
10
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Page 5 of 16
witnesses was part of the discovery required by the Due Process Clause.11 Under Giglio, the

prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting false testimony against the defendant,12 and

a defendant’s claim under Giglio is based on an allegation of the prosecutor’s knowing

presentation at trial of false testimony against the defendant.13

To establish a claim under Giglio, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) prosecutor

either presented or failed to correct false testimony, (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was

false, and (3) the evidence was material.14 If the first two elements are proven, materiality is

presumed and the State must prove that there is no reasonable probability that the testimony

affected the verdict because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 The Florida Supreme

Court in Hernandez v. State held that “mere inconsistences” between a witness’s trial testimony

and earlier statements and deposition testimony and “some confusion” in said witness’s rendition

of events were insufficient to establish a Giglio violation for prosecutorial use of false

testimony.16 “[M]ere differences in testimony found in witness statements made at different

times, or between witnesses on the same subject, are not alone sufficient to show perjury.17

Inconsistencies in testimony are not per se perjury.18

Impeachment Evidence

Professor Charles Ehrhardt has noted that:

All witnesses who testify during a trial place their credibility at

issue. Regardless of the subject matter of the witness’ testimony, a
party on cross-examination may inquire into matters that affect the
truthfulness of the witness’s testimony. Although cross-

11
Id. at 154-155.
12
Hurst v. State, 18 So.3d 975 (Fla. 2009).
13
Davis v. State, 136 So.3d 1169 (Fla. 2014).
14
Cueto v. State, 88 So.3d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Rivera v. State, 187 So.3d 822 (Fla. 2015); Hernandez v.
State, 180 So.3d 978 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2487 (2016).
15
Hernandez v. State, 180 So.3d 978 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2487 (2016); Huggins v. State, 161 So.3d
335 (Fla. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 357 (2015).
16
Hernandez v. State, 180 So.3d 978, 994 (Fla. 2015).
17
Ferguson v. State, 101 So.3d 895, 897 (Fla. 2012).
18
Floyd v. State, 18 So.3d 432, 450 (Fla. 2009).
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 examination is generally limited to the scope of the direct
examination, the credibility of the witness is always a proper
subject of cross-examination.19

The Florida Supreme Court has recognized the general rule that the “purpose of cross

examination is to elicit testimony favorable to the cross-examining party… and to challenge the

witness’s credibility when appropriate.”20 Any party including the party calling the witness may

attack the credibility of the witness – in other words you may impeach your own witness.21

Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2021) provides five main lines of attack upon the

credibility of a witness:

(1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent

with the witness’s present testimony.

(2) Showing that the witness is biased.

(3) Attacking the character of the witness in accordance with the

provisions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610.

(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the

witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which
the witness testified.

(5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified
to by the witness being impeached.

Unless a method of impeachment is included within the Evidence Code; impeachment of

witnesses is not permissible.22

Section 90.609, Florida Statutes (2021) permits a party to attack or support the

credibility of a witness, including an accused, by evidence in the form of reputation, except that:

(1) The evidence may refer only to character relating to

truthfulness.

19
Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §608.1 at 642 (2020 ed.) (footnotes omitted).
20
Shere v. State, 579 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1991).
21
§90.608, Fla. Stat. (2021).
22
See Rose v. State, 472 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 1985); Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1129 (Fla. 2006).
Page 7 of 16
 (2) Evidence of a truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
reputation evidence.

Section 90.610 allows a party to attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by

evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or

imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the

crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment with some

exceptions.

The Instant Case and Sgt. Nobles

Final disposition of this matter occurred on May 4, 2018, when Assistant State Attorney

Declan Duffy entered a “nolle prosequi code 4” on behalf of the State of Florida following the

Court entering its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and

Statements: Lack of Probable Cause to Stop the Defendant (“the Order”) on April 26, 2018. All

materials referenced in this Order on State’s Motion for Clarification were contained in the Court

record at the time the State dropped the charges against the Defendant and remain public record.

The only issue in this evidentiary hearing on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (“the

Motion”) was whether there was probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle on August 21,

2016. The State called two law enforcement witnesses, Officer J.A. Mills and Sgt. J.C. Nobles

to testify at the motion hearing. Although Officer Mills stopped the Defendant’s vehicle it was

based on traffic infractions witnessed by Sgt. Nobles and reported to Officer Mills over the radio.

Officer Mills did not actually observe the Defendant commit any traffic violation. Therefore,

Sgt. Nobles was the only witness to the Defendant’s alleged traffic violations preceding the stop.

Nearly seven (7) months after the stop in this matter, the Defendant’s attorney took Sgt. Nobles

deposition on March 1, 2017. During the deposition Sgt. Nobles and the Defendant’s attorney

expressed confusion, primarily regarding whether the Sgt. was driving westbound or eastbound
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on 63rd Street when he observed the Defendant’s traffic infractions. See Nobles Depo. pp. 15-17.

During the deposition, Sgt. Nobles drew a diagram so no one would be confused about what

happened. See Nobles Depo. p. 17 and Hearing Transcript p. 57:24 – p. 58:7. Sgt. Nobles

confirmed that his hand-drawn diagram was true and accurate when he made it on March 1,

2017. Hearing Transcript p. 58:8-16. Sgt. Nobles further testified at the deposition that Officer

Mills’ written report was “inaccurate” – because it stated he was traveling eastbound. See

Nobles Depo. p. 16:9-20. At the end of the deposition, the Defendant’s attorney gave Sgt.

Nobles another opportunity to make further corrections to Officer Mills’ written report, but he

declined to do so. Nobles Depo. pp. 44:12-45:6. Despite all of the “confusion,” Sgt. Nobles

elected to waive his right to read the deposition which would have permitted him to fill out an

errata sheet to correct any inaccuracies in his testimony. See Nobles Depo. p. 45:8-10. In

addition, the Assistant State Attorney did not attempt to ask Sgt. Nobles any questions to make

sure any confusion about the direction he was traveling, the accuracy of Officer Mills’ report, or

his hand-drawn diagram were resolved. See Nobles Depo p. 45:8.

Nearly one year later, on February 20, 2018, the evidentiary hearing on the Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress was held. The Assistant State Attorney who was present at Sgt. Nobles’

deposition had been replaced by another Assistant State Attorney who was not present at the

above referenced deposition. The Court did not review Sgt. Nobles’ deposition testimony prior

to the hearing. Furthermore, the Assistant State Attorney never attempted to alert the Court nor

Defendant’s attorney about any anticipated change or correction to Sgt. Nobles deposition

testimony prior to the hearing.

After the hearing commenced, the Assistant State Attorney conducted a brief direct

examination of Sgt. Nobles, during which there was no effort made to address any

inconsistencies between his deposition testimony and hearing testimony; Sgt. Nobles testified to
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what he believed was the “correct” description of the direction he was traveling and the events

prior to the traffic stop. Hearing Transcript pp. 9-14. The Court was not aware of any

inconsistencies between Sgt. Nobles’ hearing testimony and his previous deposition testimony

until the Defendant’s attorney conducted cross-examination and attempted to impeach Sgt.

Nobles’ credibility pursuant to Section 90.608(1) by leading him through the obvious

inconsistencies between his hearing testimony and previous deposition testimony. See Hearing

Transcript p. 19:20 - p. 25:4; 28:18-25; 29:5-11; 33:10-16. During the redirect examination by

the Assistant State Attorney, Sgt. Nobles confirmed once again that he was confused during the

deposition, but there was no effort made by the State or the Defense to elicit testimony of how

Sgt. Nobles determined his deposition testimony was incorrect, when that determination was

made, and what, if any, effort was made prior to the hearing to resolve the problem. See Hearing

Transcript pp. 49-52. As a result, the Court asked follow-up questions to provide Sgt. Nobles an

opportunity to explain the reasons for the changes in his deposition testimony, when he

discovered his testimony was inconsistent, and the efforts made to notify all parties of the

change. See Hearing Transcript p. 58:21-60:21. His testimony was candid and can be

summarized as follows:

• Sgt. Nobles discovered his deposition testimony was wrong regarding eastbound vs.

westbound the day after his deposition was taken when he drove the area where the stop

occurred.

• He also realized at that time that the arrest and booking report was accurate rather than

“inaccurate” as he testified at the deposition.

• Sgt. Nobles conceded that he did not attempt to contact the State Attorney’s Office to

report that his deposition testimony was inaccurate until he met with the Assistant State

Attorney the morning of February 20, 2018, prior to the hearing.

Page 10 of 16
 During arguments at the close of the Motion hearing, following the presentation of

testimony and evidence, the attorneys for the State and the Defendant agreed that the Court

should judge the credibility of Sgt. Nobles by following the Florida Standard Jury Instructions

for Criminal Cases. See Hearing Transcript p. 158:7-21. The State had the burden to prove that

the officers had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The only eyewitness to the

alleged traffic infractions supporting the traffic stop who testified was Sgt. Nobles. As explained

in the Order, in considering a Motion to Suppress, the role of the trial court is to weigh the

credibility of witnesses and to resolve evidentiary conflicts. See the Order pp. 10-11. Pursuant

to the agreement of the attorneys for the State and the Defendant, the Court carefully weighed

the credibility of Sgt. Nobles’ testimony by applying Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (“S.J.I.”) (Crim) 3.9

“Weighing the Evidence.” As it concerned Officer Mills, he conceded that he did not see the

alleged traffic infractions, therefore, applying S.J.I. 3.9, he was not a credible witness to the

alleged traffic infractions preceding the stop because pursuant to S.J.I. 3.9(1), he did not “have

an opportunity to see” the traffic infractions. As it concerned Sgt. Nobles, the Court also

applied S.J.I. 3.9 to his testimony and concluded that he was not credible as it concerned his

observations of the alleged traffic infractions based upon his original deposition testimony

concerning the direction he was traveling because pursuant to S.J.I. 3.9(1) he would not have had

“an opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified” concerning the

traffic infractions preceding the stop. The Court also concluded that Sgt. Nobles’ day-of-

hearing-testimony had changed materially and significantly from the deposition testimony

given nearly a year before the motion hearing was not credible by applying the same S.J.I. 3.9,

specifically the following considerations found in said jury instructions:

Page 11 of 16
 2. Did the witness seem to have an accurate memory?

8. Did the witness at some other time make a statement

that is inconsistent with the testimony he gave in
court?

Although Sgt. Nobles’ “changed” day of hearing testimony concerning his driving direction

made it possible for him to see the defendant’s traffic infraction, its inconsistency and the above

described circumstances surrounding the change resulted in a finding by this Court that it was

not credible. It should also be noted that S.J.I. 3.9 instructs the court that “[T]he fact that a

witness is employed in law enforcement does not mean that his testimony deserves more or less

consideration than that of any other witness.” As outlined in the Order, the Court found that as

to this motion hearing Sgt. Nobles did not have an accurate memory. See the Order p. 12. The

Court also noted the observations made of the way Sgt. Nobles acted during cross-examination,

See the Order p. 12, because S.J.I. 3.9 instructs to consider “how the witness acted, as well as

what they said.” However, the Court’s description of Sgt. Nobles’ demeanor during cross

examination was not intended to raise any misconduct or ethics concerns. Sgt. Nobles appeared

to be equally frustrated with both the Assistant State Attorney and the Defendant’s Attorney due

to his understandable frustration with the way his testimony unfolded during the evidentiary

hearing.

Conclusion

As it concerns Sgt. Nobles, the findings the Court made regarding his credibility

required no different consideration than those made by judges presiding over criminal divisions

every day concerning testimony offered by civilians and law enforcement officers in routine

motion to suppress hearings, bond hearings and sentencing hearings or by juries in criminal and

civil trials. The Court’s finding that the testimony offered by Sgt. Nobles was not credible in the

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instant motion hearing was based on the above detailed application of S.J.I. (Crim.) 3.9 and the

following provisions of Section 90.608 Florida Statutes:

(1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the
witness’s present testimony.

(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe,

remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified.

In other words, the decision was based on hearing testimony by Sgt. Nobles, that was

inconsistent with his deposition testimony, and as it concerns Sgt. Nobles deposition testimony, a

defect in his ability or opportunity to observe the alleged traffic infractions based upon the

direction he was traveling.

Although the Court found Sgt. Nobles’ testimony not credible for the purposes of ruling

on the instant Motion to Suppress, said finding was not intended to be “weaponized” for any

other purpose, including, but not limited to, use in other proceedings, or carry any significance or

weight beyond the four corners of the Order on the instant motion. The Court made no finding

that Sgt. Nobles or any other officers involved in the instant traffic stop and arrest engaged in

any personal or professional misconduct, attempted to mislead the Court, or otherwise committed

perjury. The Court has no record of the State prosecuting Sgt. Nobles for perjury related to his

testimony in the instant case. Despite the apparent lack of preparation for the evidentiary

hearing, the failure to communicate with Sgt. Nobles well in advance of the hearing which could

have resolved the problems, and the resulting confusion and failure of the Assistant State

Attorney to immediately bring the problem of Sgt. Nobles’ “changed” testimony to the Court’s

attention and notify defense counsel before the motion hearing began, the Court did not make

any findings that the prosecutor violated any Rules of Professional Conduct or other Rules

Regulating the Florida Bar or engaged in any unethical behavior or prosecutorial misconduct. In

sum, Sgt. Nobles’ impeached testimony resulting in the Court’s finding that he was not credible
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was likely the product of lack of communication between the Assistant State Attorney and Sgt.

Nobles and lack of diligence and preparation for the hearing on the motion to suppress by the

Assistant State Attorney.

The Defendant did not claim the prosecutor committed a Brady/Giglio violation during

the February 20, 2018 evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Suppress and the Court is not aware

of any such Brady/Giglio claim being made during the time period between the hearing and the

Court entering the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress on April 26, 2018 nor the

time period between the entry of said Order and the State dropping the charges on May 4, 2018.

The State Attorney’s Office is solely responsible for defining what is Brady/Giglio

material and disclosing any such material to a defendant. The Court does not have or maintain a

“Brady List” and has no involvement in, nor control over, whatever process or criteria the State

Attorney’s Office employs to determine who to place on any such list, nor whether any evidence

or information should be defined as Brady material and disclosed to Defendants. Although the

Court has no understanding of what criteria the State Attorney’s Office applied in deciding to

place Sgt. Nobles on a “Brady List” the Court’s intention in writing the instant Order was to

fulfill its responsibility to make a written ruling deciding the Motion to Suppress and explain the

findings and reasons for making that decision. The finding that Sgt. Nobles’ testimony was not

credible was based on a material contradiction between his deposition testimony and hearing

testimony impacting his ability to be a credible eyewitness to the alleged traffic infractions

leading to the stop. Prosecutors have the sole responsibility to identify Brady material and

disclose it, and the Court has no control over, nor involvement in, that process. However, the

Court did not intend for this Order to be the basis for the State Attorney’s Office to place Sgt.

Nobles on a “Brady List.” Neither the Order on the Motion nor the Court’s credibility findings

specifically outlined in the order, narrowly restricted to Sgt. Nobles impeached testimony during
Page 14 of 16
the instant Motion hearing, were intended to be listed in all other cases Sgt. Nobles investigates

or otherwise serves as a witness, as exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence, material or

otherwise, pursuant to Sections 90.608, 90.609 or 90.610, and produced to defendants in other

criminal cases involving Sgt. Nobles pursuant to the Brady decision and its progeny.

The Court made the above referenced credibility findings concerning Sgt. Nobles’

testimony detailed in the Order based only upon the record admissible evidence presented to the

Court in the form of his deposition testimony and his impeached testimony during the hearing on

the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The Court’s credibility findings concerning Sgt. Nobles’

hearing testimony were not intended to constitute reputation evidence attacking his character

related to truthfulness pursuant to Section 90.609, Florida Statutes.

THEREFORE, the Court summarizes the detailed explanation provided above with the

following CLARIFICATION:

1. For the purpose of rendering the order granting the Defendant’s motion to

suppress, this Court’s finding that Sgt. Nobles’ testimony was not credible was based on the

above referred portions of Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 3.9 “Weighing the Evidence”, and that was

the basis for the Court finding the State failed to meet the burden required to deny the Motion.

In deciding to grant the Motion, the Court did not find, nor believe Sgt. Nobles had lied or

committed perjury, or otherwise attempted to intentionally mislead or deceive the Court or

counsel. Similarly, the Court did not find, nor believe, the prosecutor who called Sgt. Nobles as

a witness, failed to disclose his materially changed testimony to the Court and defense counsel,

and sponsored his materially changed testimony lied or attempted to intentionally mislead or

deceive the Court or counsel or otherwise suborned perjury. As detailed above, it was the

Court’s belief that Sgt. Nobles’ confusing, inconsistent, and self-contradictory testimony during

his deposition and the hearing on the motion to suppress was the result of lack of preparation and
Page 15 of 16
on the part of Sgt. Nobles and the prosecutors who attended the deposition and participated in the

hearing on the motion to suppress, together with a failure to communicate with each other. It

was the Court’s belief these collective failures and mistakes by Sgt. Nobles and the State

constituted honest mistakes. The prosecutors failed to effectively disclose Sgt. Nobles’

inconsistent and changed testimony in a manner that would have permitted reconciliation of the

various versions of his testimony during the deposition and hearing on the motion.

2. In rendering its Order on the Motion to Suppress, the Court did not believe, nor

find that Sgt. Nobles lied in his hearing testimony or in his sworn testimony, otherwise

committed perjury or intentionally misled or deceived the Court or defense counsel. Such a

finding or belief was not necessary for the Court to grant the Defendant’s motion to suppress

following the Court’s credibility determination pursuant to Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 3.9

“Weighing the Evidence.”

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida this ____

day of April 2022.

_______________________________
BRUCE R. ANDERSON, JR.
Circuit Judge

Copies to:
Office of the State Attorney
L. E. Hutton, Chief Assistant State Attorney

Anthony D. Rosati, Esquire

Attorney for Defendant

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