REPUBLIC v.
NAGUIT margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
Naguit filed a petition for registration of land to confirm her imperfect title.
OSG opposed. Sabi naging disposable lang daw only on Oct. 1980. OSG
suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of
the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Wrong! Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to
be registered be already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. Requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under § 14(1)
• That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain;
• That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-
in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; an
• That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HEIRS OF LACAMEN v. HEIRS OF LARUAN
Laruan sold property to Lacamen (both illiterate non-Christians) without
the approval of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu. Everything was
cool until 30 years later when Laruan’s heirs procured a new OCT, alleging
that their copy was lost. Lacamen’s heirs sued Laruan’s heirs. The latter
invoked the non- approval of the Commissioner as their defense. Court said
that the non- approval was the only “drawback” which the heirs of Laruan
took advantage of as their lever to deprive Lacamen’s heirs of the land and
that their motive is out of greed. As between Lacamen and Laruan, the sale
was regular. While a person may not acquire title to the registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the
original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right
to recover back the possession of such property by reason of latches.
BINALAY v. MANALO
Manalo claims the lot (river beds) by way of accretion. Bawal. The land
being claimed are river beds and therefore part of the public domain. Art.
420 of the Civil Code states that rivers are property of the public domain.
Therefore, Faustina, the person Manalo bought the property from, never
actually owned that part of the land since it was public property.
REPUBLIC v. CA (1998)
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the
opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip
of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a
beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing,
we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only
signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121,
as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
CHAVEZ v. PEA
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. The Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC
the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing
public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively? –
NO. The prohibition does not apply to Acme. Acme had already obtained
vested rights under the 1935Constitution when it purchased the land from
the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting
the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or
associations cannot be retroactively applied.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. ABAIRO
OSG questions the decision of the TC confirming the ownership of Abairo
of a parcel of land. It contends that Abairo filed for confirmation on March
1, 1971, after December 31, 1968, the date set by R.A. No. 2061 as the time
limit for the judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles like
that of applicant, and before the effectivity on June 19, 1971, of R.A. No.
6236 extending the time limit for such purpose. OSG is wrong. It is clear
from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their
titles at any time prior to the cutoff date of December 31, 1976 (as provided
for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even if such application were filed
during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971, like
the application of respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1,
1971.
OH CHO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
1. There must first be an application for registration before a decree
of registration to issue under the Public Land Act.
2. Under 1the provisions of the Public Land Act invoked by the
applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot,
because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
REPUBLIC v. CA and LAPINA
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from
a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under
the Public Land Act (CA 141)? Yes. Torrens system was not established as
a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias
v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. In the case at bar, private respondents were
undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of
the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the
Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house
of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapiñas mother.
HEIRS OF TENGCO v. HEIRS OF ALIWALAS
A homestead patent, once registered under the LRA, becomes an
indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Aliwalas’ title to the property having
become incontrovertible, it cannot be collaterally attacked. If there had
been any fraud or misrepresentation, the proper remedy is an action for
reversion instituted by the OSG.
CRUZ v. SEC. OF DENR (with sep. opinion of J. Puno)
Petitioners assail the constutionality of the IPRA because it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples. SC said IP rights
is an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. The existence of native title to
land or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim
of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from
the Spanish Crown as an EXCEPTION to the theory of JURA REGALIA
(Carino vs. Insular Government)
CHEESEMAN v. IAC
White guy married Filipina. Filipina acquired property believing she is sole
owner. White guy then filed suit with CFI for annulment of sale because it
was executed without his knowledge and consent. Denied! The
Constitution prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.Assuming that
it was Thomas’ intention that the property be purchased by him and
Criselda, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of
the purchase. and in attempting to acquire right or interest in land,
vicariously or clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
sale as to him is void.
MULLER v. MULLER
German married Filipina. Separated. TC ruled for separation of properties
and ordered equal partition, including property in Antipolo acquired by
German’s own funds. TC however ruled that German can’t recover such
property because of the prohibition. SC affirmed. The argument that he is
merely asking for reimbursement cannot also prosper because it is only the
inverse of the purchase. TO give him back the money would allow him to
profit from a purchase that he was not allowed to make.
PHIL. BANKING CORP v. LUI SHE
As a sign of gratefulness, Justina executed a contract of lease over a
property to Wong (Chinese) for a period of 50 years with option to buy if
Wong gets naturalized. SC said the contracts are VOID. A contract may be
valid; however, if is against the constitution (e.g. foreign ownership of
lands), such contract is considered null and void. It is clear that the
arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus
utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (
jus disponendi).
RAMIREZ v. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
Wanda (alien) was granted usufructuary rights over a property by virtue
of a will. Pweds. The Constitutional provision which allows aliens to
acquire lands by succession does not apply to testamentary succession. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. However,
an alien may be bestowed usufructuary rights over a parcel of land. A
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to the land in favor of aliens which
is proscribed by the Constitution.
TING HO JR. v. TENG GUI
Petitioner and respondent are siblings. Both claim title to the property.
Respondent claims that the property was sold to him by their father.
Petitioners contend that the respondent is only a dummy for their father
as the latter is a Chinese national. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserve for Filipinos or corporations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by Filipinos. The father of the petitioners and respondent
was Chinese; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real
property in the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying the subject
property by virtue of the permission granted him by the then US Naval
Reservation Office of Olongapo. Therefore, the Decease (father) was never
the owner of the lot and respondent did not act as the dummy for his father.
JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS v. CA
The prohibition under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution applies only to
ownership of land – it does not extend to immovable or real property as
defined under Art .415 of the Civil Code. Respondent is not prohibited to
possess (it they exercise the right of first refusal) the disputed property.
The right of first refusal over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas
the capacity to own lands pertains to the corporation. The fact the
respondent owns land cannot deprive stockholders of their right of first
refusal. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
landholding corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign
equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
Petitioner invoked Lui She case where the court invalidated the option to
buy because it amounted to a virtual transfer of ownership. This is not
applicable in this case as the case at bar involves a right of first refusal
over shares of stock while Lui She involves an option to buy the land itself.
As discussed, there is a distinction between the shareholder’s ownership of
shares and the corporation’s ownership of land arising from the separate
juridical personalities of the corporation and its shareholders.
RD OF RIZAL v. UNG SIU TEMPLE
RD refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed in favor of the
unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple," operating
through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. Yep. Donation was not
valid. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious
associations. The fact that the appellant religious organization has no
capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since
it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. Also, Act 271,
which authorized the acquisition of lands for religious purposes has been
repealed by the Constitution for being incompatible.
REPUBLIC v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES
There is an absolute prohibition for corporations to own land under the
1987 Constitution. But corporations may still acquire land if the same had
become private during the subsistence of the 1935 Constitution (no
prohibition).
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO v.
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION
Sale of real property to Petitioner, a corporation sole organized and
existing in accordance with Philippines Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault,
a Canadian Citizen as actual incumbent is VALID. Although a branch of
the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic
Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located,
is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted
to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct
from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without
prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by
the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
ARANDA v. REPUBLIC
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original
registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section
14(1) thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following
requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC
Applicants under 14(1) of PD 1529 in relation to sec 48(b) of CA 141 acquire
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession. It is sufficient that the land be declared
alienable and disposable at the time of the filing for the application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title and the land need not be alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession.
MARTINEZ v. CA
When the conditions under 48(b) of CA 141 are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens Title.
REPUBLIC v. HANOVER
An applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under PD 1529, sec
14(1) in relation to CA 141, sec 48(b) must prove that the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain AND that they
have been in OCEN possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Here, the applicant
is not entitled to registration because it had not proven possession since
1945, but had only proven such since 1965.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC (supra)
Under 14(2) of PD 1529, applicants acquire ownership of the lands through
prescription in the Civil Code. However, the applicants may only acquire
patrimonial lands of the public domain, which only become such after they
have been declared alienable and disposable and there must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Only when the land has become
patrimonial property can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
Notes:
1. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
2. If the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, he shall file
with his application an instrument in due form appointing an agent
upon whom service shall be made.
3. Applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect through
possession shall not extend beyond December 31, 2020.
BUREAU OF FORESTRY v. CA
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified
and certified as such by the Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands
are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the
Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is more
valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture. As provided for under
Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification
of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. With
these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain but the
Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription since the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain and
cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It
is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership.
REPUBLIC v. HEIRS ALEJAGA
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued,
the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to
the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the
latter. However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that
the registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself
vest title; it merely confirms the registrant’s already existing one. Verily,
registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.
REPUBLIC v. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOC.
Under Sec. 83 of the Public Land Act, the President, by proclamation, may
designate any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations
for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses
or purposes. Land reserved as such will be non-alienable, not subject to
sale or other disposition. Consistent with the foregoing postulates,
jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part
thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore,
not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as
disposable and alienable public land. Until reclassified by law or
presidential proclamation, its status as part of a military reservation
remains, even if it is not used as a military camp or for defense.
REPUBLIC v. VERA
A Cadastral proceeding is in rem. Parties are precluded from re-litigating
the same issues already determined by final judgment. One of the main
purposes of a cadastral proceeding is to settle titles to lands. Anyone
claiming ownership of any land so affected should lay claim. Failure to do
so authorizes the court to declare the land public.
DE VERA-CRUZ v. MIGUEL
Tax declarations are not proofs of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a
claim of ownership or an indicium of possession in the concept of
ownership. Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when
not supported by other effective proofs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA
The classification, delimitation and survey of lands of the public domain
are vested in the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of the
DENR. (Sec. 6, C.A. 141) The assignment of forest land for agricultural
purposes is vested in the Secretary of the DENR. Court erred in
disregarding the certification of the Bureau of Foresty that the land
became alienable and disposable only in 1961.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. RIVAS
The Spanish titles informacion possessoria and composicion gratuita can
no longer be used as bases for application for registration because PD 892
discontinued their use as titles of ownership.
EVANGELISTA v. SANTIAGO
Petitioner’s failed to establish legal or equitable title to the land. Spanish
titles can no longer be presented as proof of ownership whether in a land
registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
PALALI v. AWISAN
A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his
predecessors, enjoys the presumption of ownership. Respondent failed to
prove possession of the property, her claim rests merely on her tax
declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive
evidence of ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership. Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore, cannot serve as
basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession of the subject property
since before the war. Possession coupled with a tax declaration is a weighty
evidence of ownership and is certainly more weighty and preponderant
than a mere tax declaration alone.
REPUBLIC v. FELICIANO
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion possessoria
held by respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such
title, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
REPUBLIC v. GUINTO-ALDANA
In relation to PD 1529, Section 14(1) - The law speaks of possession and
occupation. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words OCEN, the word occupation
serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. Tax declarations are a good
indication of possession in the concept of an owner. These documents at
least constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
And a tax declaration also announces his adverse claim over the land
SOUTH CITY HOMES v. REPUBLIC
Petitioner claims Lot 5005 which is situated between 2 lots owned by
petitioner. Petitioner claims that it acquired the property by prescription.
Republic asserts the prescription is not applicable because petitioner has
not established the requisite possession of the lot. The present possessor
may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his
possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-interest. However,
tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a privity of contract or
relationship between the previous and present possessors. In the absence
of such privity, the possession of the new occupant should be counted only
from the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by connecting it
with the possession of the former possessors.
TOTTOC v. IAC
The mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of Forestry that
a part of the public domain is timberland is not controlling in all cases
especially when no actual verification was made prior to the issuance of
the certification. As opposed to on-the-spot relocation surveys.
Petitioner had open, uninterrupted, and peaceful possession and
occupation of the disputed land since 1949, being a grantee of pasture lease
permits which expired in 1969. Private respondent, on the other hand,
stared his controversial cultivation of the lot only in 1963 and secured the
questioned certification in 1965. The long period of time from 1949 to 1969
during which the land was under pasture lease permits granted to
petitioner all the more lends credence to the fact that said land was within
the Forest Zone as only lands of the category of public forest land can be
the subject of such permits.
VDA. DE RAZ v. CA
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing
his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the
identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is
either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If , as in this case,
he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly
prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title. In
this case, with the exception of 620 sqm., there has been no satisfactory
showing of how the applicant acquired the remainder of the subject land.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. REYES
The submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for is
a statutory requirement. Unless a plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the Director of Lands, the plans are not much of value.
The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original
survey plans.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. TESALONA
The heirs of Tesalona claims a land on the basis of a Spanish title. They
have no rights over the lots. They did not submit the original of the
possessory information title. The original tracing cloth plan of the land was
not submitted in evidence by the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their
application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.
DIVINA v. CA
Respondent sought to register land. Petitioner opposed, alleging fraud.
Petition wins. Section 15 of PD 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the
application for registration of land titles, the application shall also state
the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the
adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the
search made to find them
A mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants
and adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to
find them is necessary.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA
CA held that publication of the petition for registration of title need not be
published in a newspaper of general circularion. Wrong! GADALEJ. The
all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
FRANCISCO v. CA
A land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice thereof by
publication binds the whole world, inclusive of those who may be adversely
affected thereby, innocent factually as they might have been of such
publication. However, the Rule in Alba case as to in rem character of land
registration proceeding should not deprive victims of fraud. Here,
respondents committed fraud when they did not state the true adjoining
owners of the land in question at the time they filed their application for
registration. The intent and motive was to deliberately prevent notices of
their application for registration to be sent to the owners to prevent them
from filing an opposition.
REPUBLIC v. HERBIETO
Republic opposed the application of Habierto brothers because it suffers
from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two
parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants and
that they failed to comply with the required period of possession. SC
agrees. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in this
case, Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were only classified
as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963
ALBANO v. CA
In the case at bar, the inaction of defendants-appellants with regard to the
donations from 1910 to 1972 or a span of 63 years will surely constitute
laches. The failure of Fr. Platon Villanueva to deliver the riceland should
have been the proper time to revoke said donation. But defendants-
appellants never lifted a finger to enforce their rights. Also, they argue that
as between the State and the IFI, the disputed property is still public land
and the latter, as a corporation sole, is disqualified to own the property in
view of the prohibition imposed by the Constitution. Be that as it may,
there is still an obstacle to the view advanced by petitioners which must be
recognized. If it is petitioners' opinion that ownership of the disputed
parcel of land is still vested in the State, then it is the State, and the State
alone, that is entitled to question the occupation by IFI of the subject
property.
CITY OF DAVAO v. MONTEVERDE-CONSUNJI
The rights of the City of Davao over the subject property had already been
in existence and recognized at the time of the issuance of OCT No. 116 to
the Monteverdes. TC ruled in favor of Davao. CA reversed. SC affirmed TC.
Act No. 496, 29, cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling that
the land registration court should have issued a certificate of title in the
name of the City of Davao if the latters title indeed existed at that time,
was amended by Act No. 3901, which took effect only on November 17,
1931, or more than seven years after the issuance of OCT No. 116 on April
7, 1924. As a matter of fact, as early as 1929, the procedure for the original
registration of real property had already been modified when Act No. 3621,
amending Act No. 496, was enacted. But, prior to these amendments, the
only way whereby one who opposed the registration of land in the name of
another and secure an affirmative pronouncement concerning his rights
and interest was for him to become himself an applicant. The provisions of
Act No. 496 prior to the said amendments were set upon preventing
affirmative relief to an oppositor such that he must totally change his
character as a litigant before he can secure that advantage.
HEIRS OF LOPEZ v. ENRIQUEZ
Heirs filed with the RD an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens
at the back of the OCT on the ground that they have filed with the land
registration court a motion to declare to OCT’s void. RD denied. SC agrees.
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain
a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where
the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens
should also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title of
the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its registered
owner. Here, the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint
upon which this office will base its action. Also, the heirs here were mere
movants, and not original parties, in the land registration proceedings. As
they are not parties, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the RD.
VERGEL v. CA
In order to have the general order of default lifted, the movant as
intervenor-oppositor must show that his failure to timely file an opposition
is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. There must be an
express finding of fact of the FAME by the trial court or court of appeals.
Failure to read the publication in the official gazette or in the newspaper
may in itself not be considered as excusable neglect. The CA arbitrarily set
aside the TC’s order of general default without making a specific finding of
fraud, accident, or excusable neglect that prevented the respondent from
timely opposing the application.
YABUT LEE v. PUNZALAN
a petition for review under the Act 496 may be filed at any time after the
rendition of the Court's Decision and before the expiration of one year from
the entry of the final decree of registration. In the case at bar, no judgment
has as yet been rendered by the lower Court, and much less has any decree
of registration been issued. The fixing of a Petition for Reopening and/or
Review by appellant, therefore, is decidedly premature. Indeed, in the
absence of any decision and/or decree, there is nothing to be reviewed or
reopened.
GONZAGA v. CA
Although petitioners title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that
petitioners title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square
meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City, Cadastral
Case No. 34, while private respondents title was derived from OCT No. 994
issued on April 19, 1917. In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, this
Court ruled that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction in an
earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null
and void.
It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from
TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3,
1917. Upon the other hand, private respondents title was derived from the
same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917. Where two certificates (of title)
purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under
the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder
of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of
priority of issuance, private respondents title prevails over that of
petitioner MWSS.
IGNACIO v. CA
Generally an issue properly ligitable in an ordinary civil action under the
general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court should not be resolved in a
land registration proceeding. However in this jurisdiction, the Regional
Trial Court also functions as a land registration court. If the parties
acquiesced in submitting the issue for determination in the land
registration proceeding and they were given full opportunity to present
their respective sides and evidence, then the defendants are placed in
estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the said court to pass upon the issue
(Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740 [1980]. Indeed, a Regional Trial
Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and whether a particular issue
should be resolved by it in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration
court is not a jurisdictional question. It is a procedural question involving
a mode of practice which may be waived (Santos v. Ganayo, 116 SCRA 431
[1982].
PNB v. INTL. CORPORATE BANK
Under Section 2 of The Property Registration Decree, RTCs acting as land
registration courts now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. In the same case, the
Court further noted that even under Act 496 (Land Registration Act),
specifically Section 110 thereof, the court of first instance, sitting as a land
registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive evidence,
and decide controversial matters with a view to determining whether or
not the filed notice of adverse claim is valid.
REPUBLIC v. CA
Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land
registration cases and as such, he alone may withdraw the Government's
appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be furnished
copies of all court orders, notices and decisions and as held the
reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the
time the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised of the order of denial. Thus,
representatives of the OSG in the case at bar had no power to decide
whether an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter
to the OSG and without copies of court orders, notices and decisions, having
been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to
the OSG, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.
REPUBLIC v. CA and LAPIÑA - Supra
SANTIAGO v. SBMA
With the promulgation of PD 892 in Feb of 1976, Spanish titles can no
longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. If a land
registration proceeding is filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the
applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence
his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property
was in his actual possession. However, this does not bar holders of Spanish
titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, such
as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree or the Public
Land Act.
LABURADA v. LRA
Sps. Laburada applied for registration but LRA refused because it said it
might result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land. Sps.
Laburada filed a petition for Mandamus. SC said Mandamus will not lie.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of
land already decreed in the name of another. A second decree would be
void. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function
of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through
Mandamus. 

NAVARRO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
If the case already is barred by prior judgement, the issue as to the
application of the Public Land Law as amended by RA 1942 is unnecessary.
BALDOZ v. PAPA
A final decree of registration issued pursuant to registration proceedings
is reviewable only within one year from the entry of the decree of
registration and upon the ground of actual fraud. Further, any petition to
set aside the decree of registration and reopen the registration proceedings
must be filed in the form of a motion in the same registration proceeding
where the decree was issued, and not in the form of a separate action like
the present.
CAL JR. ZOSA
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual or extrinsic fraud
is recognized by law under Section 32 of PD 1529. For fraud to justify a
review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
CRISOLO v. CA
An oppositor in a land registration case, after having abandoned his
opposition thereto and a decision and a decree had been issued in the case
is not entitled to a reopening of the decree of registration by means of a
petition for review based on fraud under Section 38 of Act 496.
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT v. TRONO
RTC has the authority to act, not only on applications for original
registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the original
registration of title. Thus, it has the authority and power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the RTC, Branch 255, Las
Pias City has no jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the ground that
the land subject of respondents application for registration was already
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City.
ALMARZA v. ARGUELLES
Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, which is, in
effect, an action to quiet title against the plaintiff therein who is in
possession of the land in question. As lawful possessor and owner of the
Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect,
seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. If ever
prescription may be invoked, it may be said to have commenced to run only
from the time the possessor was made aware of a claim adverse to his own.
In the case at bar, petitioner was made aware of such adverse claim only
upon service on her of the summons in Civil Case No. 11051. As her action
for reconveyance, or to quiet title was contained in her counterclaim, the
same cannot be said to have already prescribed.
BAUTISTA-BORJA v. BAUTISTA
An action for declaration of the nullity of the deeds of sale made after 20
years it commenced has not prescribed, being based on a void contract.
From the allegations in Natividad’s complaint, it is clear that her action
is one for declaration of the nullity of the Deeds of Sale which she
claims to be either falsified—because at the time of the execution
thereof, Pablo was already gravely ill and bedridden, hence he could not
have gone and appeared before the Notary Public, much less understood
the significance and legal deeds—and/or because there was no
consideration therefor. Clearly, following Article 1410 of the Civil Code,
petitioner’s action is imprescriptible.
ESCONDE v. BARLONGAY
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to
the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter
to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The prevailing rule in this
jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or
erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action,
after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the
property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-
open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner
thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set
aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer
open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered
owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto,
nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of
said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be
claimed had long expired.
HEIRS OF LABISTE v. HEIRS OF LABISTE
For acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust it
must be shown that:
a. The trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
b. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust, and
c. The evidence thereon is clear and conclusive
It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property
held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on
the registration. The rule requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly
communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that can be construed as
repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in
October 1993. And since petitioners filed their complaint in January 1995,
their cause of action has not yet prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to
them.
JOAQUIN v. COJUANGCO
The action for reconveyance on the theory of trust might prosper, if at all,
as against the trustees and provided they still hold the properties, but not
as against third persons who do not occupy the same fiduciary position.
KHEMANI v. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD
An aggrieved party may file an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property provided that the
property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.
LOPEZ v. CA
The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription. An action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.
This period is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. Since such issuance
operates as a constructive notice to the whole world, the discovery of the
fraud is deemed to have taken place at that time.
MARCOPPER MINING CORP. v. GARCIA
Petitioner contends that since the title over the land was obtained by the
private respondent through fraud, then the law creates what is called a
"constructive trust" in its favor as the defrauded party and grants it the
right to vindicate the property. Wrong. There is nothing in the records to
support the contention of the petitioner. Aside from the fact that the
petitioner and its predecessor-in-interest never applied for a free patent
although the petitioner claims that it was entitled to the same, it also did
not allege the existence of any relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, with
the respondent which may justify the creation of an implied trust. The
respondent, therefore, could not have committed fraud against the
petitioner or its predecessor-in-interest. Besides, the petitioner's failure to
file any opposition to the registration of the land in the respondent's favor
and its filing of an action for reconveyance only after almost six years from
the date of said registration cast doubt on the petitioner's right over the
property.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS v. CA
While an inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be cancelled
even after proof of its defect, the law nevertheless safeguards the rightful
party's interest in the titled land from fraud and improper use of
technicalities by allowing such party, in appropriate cases, to judicially
seek reconveyance to him of whatever he has been deprived of as long as
the land has not been transferred or conveyed to a purchaser in good faith.
Art. 1456, NCC – where the land is decreed in the name of a person
through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the
property comes.
Here the land in dispute is held by Norma in trust for the Municipality of
Victorias, it is logical to conclude that the Municipality can neither be
deprived of its possession nor be made to pay rentals thereof.
NAVAL v. CA
Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered
under Torrens System. Here, the law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344,
which provides for the registration of all instruments on land neither
covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this
law, registration by the first buyer is constructive notice to the second
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith; it binds third
person who may subsequently deal with the same property.
“[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where
the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the
same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in
such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner
is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.” Since the properties
in question are unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers
thereof did so at their peril.
REMENTIZO v. HEIRS OF VDA. DE MADARIETA
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful
owner or to one with a better right. The person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee. Nevertheless, the right to seek
reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to
extinctive prescription. The 10-year prescriptive period is reckoned from
the date of issuance of the certificate of title.
There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action
for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff or complainant (Madarieta or
respondents in this case) is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, and
the registered owner was never in possession of the disputed property. In
the instant case, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which
should apply. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property, which operates as a constructive notice to the whole
world
SALAO v. SALAO
In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary
relation of the parties must be clear and convincing.
Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting
it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary
with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A
trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon
vague and inconclusive proof.
SPOUSES SANTOS v. HEIRS OF LUSTRE
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the
declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. An action for
reconveyance will not prosper when the property to be reconveyed is in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
PINO v. CA
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an
innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring
an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or were
instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now well-settled
that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
Title over the property.
CAÑERO v. UP
Petitioner's reconstituted title is his basis for filing the action to quiet title
against respondent UP. The reconstituted title and the proceedings
from which it hailed from are, however, void. Judicial reconstitution
of title partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, notice of the
proceedings must be given in the manner set forth by the letter of the law.
A cursory perusal of the petition for reconstitution filed by petitioner,
clearly reveals that the adjoining property owners were never mentioned
and, hence, not notified. Respondent UP owns the entirety of the land
surrounding the lot in issue; yet it was not notified of the reconstitution
proceedings. It is hoary doctrine that defects in the notices required under
the law to be sent to interested parties, deprive the court of jurisdiction.
The petitioner’s action to quiet title had already prescribed because he was
never [or was not able to show] in possession over the disputed lot. On the
other hand, UP was able to prove possession through the buildings and
structures which it controls and maintains.
FAJA v. CA
It is an established rule that an action to quiet title to property in the
possession of plaintiff is inprescriptible. One who is in actual possession of
a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to the seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE v. IAC
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly
speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v.
McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421
[1948]). The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this
Court's final determination of G.R. No. L-46953 – a case involving the
validity of the compromise agreement between the parties in this case.
SPOUSES MAMADSUAL v. MOSON
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession
of the property. The rule is that the plaintiffs may wait until their
possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps
to vindicate their right. The statute of limitation is not available as a
defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in possession
of the petitioners.
The trial court held that in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff "must" have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. It interpreted legal title to mean registered
ownership and equitable title to mean beneficial ownership. Wrong. It is
not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered
owner of the property in question. "Title" to property does not necessarily
mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive
prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed, one
who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an
action to quiet title under the law.
SPS. RUMARATE v. HERNANDEZ
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) The plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) The deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
PAJOMAYO v. MANIPON
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title
are issued to different persons covering the same parcel of land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties,
and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is
issued over the land, the person holding under the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
certificate. Here, Pajomayo’s OCT was issued in 1931 and Manipon OCT
only in 1957, hence Pajomayo OCT, and TCT thereafter prevails.
REPUBLIC v. CA (1996)
It is settled that once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands will no
longer have either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the
basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one
which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of
issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529.However, as held
in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State
may still bring an action under the Public Land Act for the reversion to the
public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.
REPUBLIC v. CA (1997)
If a person is able to register land which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the land because it is timber land, the grantee does not, by virtue of
the certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally
registered. The patent or title issued is void since the officer who issued it
had no authority to do so.
Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefore.
The action cannot be barred by prior judgment of the land registration
court since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Even granting that the Director of Lands was negligent in failing to oppose
the registration, it is a well-settled rule that the Republic is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Consequently, the State may still seek cancellation of the title issued as
such has not become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked
against the State.
HEIRS OF LAZURIAGA v. REPUBLIC
Publication is a condition sine qua non for the RTC acting as a cadastral
court to acquire jurisdiction. Due publication is required to give notice to
all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property to be
surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area cannot be
included by amendment without new publication. But where the identity
of the land and area of the claimed property is not the subject of the
amendment but other collateral matters, new publication is not needed.
REPUBLIC v. VERA
A Cadastral proceeding is in rem. Parties are precluded from re-litigating
the same issues already determined by final judgment. One of the main
purposes of a cadastral proceeding is to settle titles to lands. Anyone
claiming ownership of any land so affected should lay claim. Failure to do
so authorizes the court to declare the land public.
SPS. VERANGA v. REPUBLIC
No publication, then the decision is void for having beenrendered without
jurisdiction. Cadastral proceedings, like ordinary registration proceedings,
are proceedings in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice,
procedure and evidence. A cadastral decree and a certificate of title are
issued only after the applicants prove all the requisite jurisdictional facts:
that they are entitled to the claimed lot; that all parties are heard; and that
evidence is considered. Publication is a step essential to the protection of
persons interested in the property which is intended to be included and
heard.
DURAN v. OLIVIA
A piece of land, registered through a homestead patent under the Land
Registration Act cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and
any title issued thereon is null and void. Cadastral court has no jurisdiction
over registered land.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Jurisdiction of Cadastral Court is limited to:
1. Technical errors in the description of the lands provided they
do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner and
cannot operate to deprive the registered owner of his title.
2. Determine between 2 parties who has a better right over the
property or which of the conflicting titles should prevail
3. Upon request of the registered owner, the cadastral court can
issue new title.
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land,
already issued in the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting
the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making
of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial rights.
CAMPILLO v. CA
A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or
of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective against third
persons only from the date of its registration. Under the Torrens System,
registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land. A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at
an auction sale acquires good title as against a prior transferee of same
property if such prior transfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction
sale.
HEIRS OF MARASIGAN v. IAC
A prior deed of sale registered only after the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens will not defeat the right of the plaintiff, who caused the annotation
of the annotation of the notice, who subsequently obtains a favorable
judgment. The first buyer who is late in registering the sale is bound by
the outcome of the litigation since registration is operative act which
creates constructive notice to the whole world. Prior to the registration of
the sale, it did not bind third persons.
GARCIA v. CA
The general rule is that in case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the later certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in
the earlier certificate. And in successive registration, the person claiming
under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest. The maxim
prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in
rights) is followed in land registration matters.
In cases of involuntary registration, an entry in the day book [primary
entry book] is a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title is not presented. In case of voluntary registration of
documents, an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner and the holder of the certificate of title, the moment he
presents a notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the
day book and at the same time the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is
presented or surrendered, and pays the fees.
MINGOA v. LRA
The date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp or registry receipt,
of an instrument to the RD for purposes of registration should be
considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the RD. It is this date
that should be entered in the primary entry book of the RD, which shall be
regarded as the date of its registration.
RODRIGUEZ v. CA
The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage is a voluntary instrument
and as such registration is the operative act to convey and affect the land.
Section 55 of PD 1529 requires the presentation of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary instrument.
The reason for requiring the production of the owner’s duplicate is that,
being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is
interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender his
duplicate in order to accomplish such registration.
However, where the owner refuses to surrender the duplicate, the
grantee may file an adverse claim in the RD. The annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over real
property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the law and serves notice and warning to third parties.
Here, no effort was made to secure the duplicate from the mortgagee who
was in possession of the TCT. And moreover since the instrument is a
registerable instrument and no justifiable reason was shown why the deed
could not be registered, the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for
registration.
SPOUSES CHU v. BENELDA ESTATE DEV’T. CORP.
Absent proof to the contrary, a buyer relying on an apparently valid TCT
is presumed to be innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. For a
cause of action to be sufficient against the buyer, the complaint must allege
that the buyer was aware of the defect in the title. Failure to prove bad
faith on said purchaser who has acquired a title in his favor would make it
impossible for the court to render a valid judgment thereon due to the
indefeasibility and conclusiveness of his title. The conclusiveness of the
new title in Cunanan’s name is binding on the whole world, including the
spouses.
DBP v. ACTING RD OF NUEVA ECIJA
Entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent
solely on the register of deeds. Therefore, without necessarily holding that
annotation of a primary entry on the original of the certificate of title may
be deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said entry,
the Court rules that in the particular situation here obtaining, annotation
of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of
title to which it refers is entirely proper and justified. To hold said entry
"ineffective," as does the appealed resolution amounts to declaring that it
did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or
transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the
rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is
a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of
Section 56 of PD 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms.
DELA MERCED v. GSIS
When a judgment calls for the issuance of a new title in favor of the winning
party (as in the instant case), it logically follows that the judgment also
requires the losing party to surrender its title for cancellation. It is the only
sensible way by which the decision may be enforced. To this end,
petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the registered owner to
surrender the same and directing the entry of a new certificate of title in
petitioners’ favor. GSIS’s objection that these orders cannot be enforced
because they do not literally appear in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is
unreasonable. GSIS would have the Court spell out the wheres, whys, and
hows of the execution. GSIS wants a dispositive portion that is a step-by-
step detailed description of what needs to be done for purposes of execution.
This expectation is unreasonable and absurd.
EGAO v. CA
The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to
Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free
Patent based on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties. Although the
petitioners denied the validity of the Deed of Sale the court held that it was
notarized and a notarial document has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the
OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are
not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA.
A private individual cannot bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have an effect of canceling a free patent and the certificate of
title issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form part again
of the public domain. Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds
of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year
period are null and void thus the Egaos have no title to pass to Marfori and
nobody can dispose that which does not belong to him. The respondents are
not innocent purchasers for value with no standing to question the rights
of the petitioners over the land and to file an action to quiet the title. The
petitioners remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain in
physical possession of the disputed property.
FULE v. LEGARE
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without
notice that some other persons has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another.
POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORP. v. CA
The alleged “failure” of respondent spouses to eject the lessees is not
substantial breach. The presence of lessees does not constitute an
encumbrance of the land, nor does it deprive petitioner of its control
thereof. We note, however, that petitioner’s deprivation of ownership and
control finally occurred when it failed and/or discontinued paying the
amortizations on the mortgage, causing the lot to be foreclosed and sold at
public auction. But this deprivation is due to petitioner’s fault, and
not to any act attributable to the vendor-spouses.
REPUBLIC v. CA (1997) - Supra
SAJONAS v. CA
The cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and continue
as a lien on the property. The reason why the law provides for a hearing
where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the
adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the
propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the
purpose of determine the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising
from such adverse claim. This is in line with the effect that no second
adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant after cancellation.
DIAZ-DUARTE v. ONG
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be
conducted. The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the
propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim.7 Petitioner was unlawfully
denied this opportunity when the Registrar of Deeds automatically
cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of her
adverse claim is ineffective. Respondents cannot invoke good faith. The
adverse claim of petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte was annotated in
Corregidor's title as early as October 17, 1979. It was existing when
Corregidor sold the property to respondents Ong on February 28, 1981.
Hence, respondent spouses cannot be considered innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith.
HEIRS OF MARASIGAN v. IAC
A prior deed of sale registered only after the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens will not defeat the right of the plaintiff, who caused the annotation
of the annotation of the notice, who subsequently obtains a favorable
judgment. The first buyer who is late in registering the sale is bound by
the outcome of the litigation since registration is operative act which
creates constructive notice to the whole world. Prior to the registration of
the sale, it did not bind third persons.
VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION CORP. v. MAULIT
Petitioner contends that the absence of the property's technical description
in either the notice of lis pendens or the Complaint is not a sufficient
ground for rejecting its application, because a copy of TCT No. (S-17992)
12473-A specifically describing the property was attached to and made an
integral part of both documents. SC agrees. We stress that the main
purpose of the requirement that the notice should contain a technical
description of the property is to ensure that the same can be distinguished
and readily identified. In this case, we agree with petitioner that there was
substantial compliance with this requirement.
ALFREDO v. BORRAS
When ownership or title passes to the buyer, the seller ceases to have any
title to transfer to any third person. If the seller sells the same land to
another, the second buyer who has actual or constructive knowledge of the
prior sale cannot be a registrant in Good Faith. Such second buyer in BF
cannot defeat the first buyer’s title. In case a title is issued to the second
buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the
sale. Here, the adverse claim on the land was registered on Feb 8. And the
sale, as shown on the deeds of sale, was dated Feb 22. Hence the 2nd buyers
are charged with constructive notice of the adverse claim and the defect in
the title of the sellers.
ARRAZOLA v. BERNAS
An adverse claimant must be one who claims any right or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the
original registration. That interest is registerable as an adverse claim if no
other provision is made for its registration. The claim of a person that she
has hereditary rights in the land fraudulently registered in her sister’s
name because the land belonged to their mother, whose estate is pending
settlement in a special proceeding, is a registerable as an adverse claim.
And even though the will is yet pending probate. The purpose of annotating
the adverse claim on the title to the disputed land is to apprise third
persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to
preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction
regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
CHING v. ENRILE
An adverse claim remains effective even after the lapse of the 30-day period
as long as it isn’t cancelled. Where a party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest, which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same
land, his knowledge of that prior interest has the effect of registration as
to him.
Here, petitioner’s adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title coupled
with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed property. These
circumstances should have put Enrile on guard and required him to
ascertain the property being offered to hem has already been sold to
another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. A purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was
no defect in the title of the vendor. Moreover, regardless of the non-
registration of the deed of sale and the 30-day effectivity of the adverse
claim, Enrile was constructively notified of the prior sale because the
adverse claim was readily perceivable as an annotation on the dorsal part
on Memorandum of Encumbrances.
LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA
An adverse claim does toll the running of the prescriptive period to demand
for specific performance based on a contract of sale. The procedure for
registration of voluntary instruments is provided for by law. But where the
vendor refuses to deliver to the vendee the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, which title must be presented in order that the deed of conveyance
may be registered and the corresponding TCT may be issued, the vendee
may file an adverse claim.
The adverse claim here was ineffective because for an adverse claim to be
valid it must be shown that a demand was made on the vendor and that he
refused to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
SAJONAS v. CA - Supra
CABUHAT v. CA
Just as an innocent purchaser for value, a mortgagee may rely on what
appears on the face of the Torrens title. And when an innocent mortgagee
acquires rights over the mortgaged property, the court cannot disregard
such rights which must be respected and protected. A mortgagee has a
right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the
property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse
suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence,
even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid
title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is nonetheless
entitled to protection.
CLEMENTE v. RAZO
Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title,
in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the
certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the
certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims
as are annotated on the title.
However, when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when
the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or
of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything
which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on
the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither
be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.
ESTATE OF OLAGUER v. ONGJOCO
According to the provisions of Art. 1874 of the civil code, when the sale of
a piece of land or any interest therein is made through an agent, the
authority of the latter shall be in writing. Absent this requirement, the sale
shall be void. Also under Art 1878, a SPA is necessary in order for an agent
to enter into a contract by which ownership of an immovable is transmitted
or acquired, either gratuitously or for value. Here, the good faith of Ongjoco
hinges on the existence of the written power of attorney.
While the law requires a SPA, the GPA was sufficient as the agent was
expressly empowered to sell any of the principal’s properties. Even if a
document is designated as GPA, the requirement of SPA is met if there is
a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the
performance of the act. The SPA can be included in the general power when
the act or transaction for which the special power is required is specified
therein.
ESTATE OF YUJUICO v. REPUBLIC
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in
this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent purchasers for value
and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time. Where the title of an innocent purchaser for
value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be
cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we ruled
that it is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to innocent
purchasers for value. While the general rule is that an action to recover
lands of the public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by
laches or estoppel. Section 32, PD 1529 recognizes rights of innocent
purchasers over and above the interests of the government.
GUARANTEED HOMES v. HEIRS OF VALDEZ
It is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go
beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest.
Since "the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned,” it follows that where there is
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the
ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.
It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest certificate of title
which in this case was issued in the name of the immediate transferor, the
spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but
only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased
the property.
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery,
the Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that
although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no
title, there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become
the root of a valid title. And one such instance is where the certificate of
title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger,
and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what
appeared in the certificate.
SAN ROQUE v. REPUBLIC
The adverse claim of the Republic by virtue of the expropriation
proceedings will not defeat the rights of San Roque which acquired the
subject lot for value and free from any lien and without knowledge of the
Republic’s adverse claim. The Republic’s claim may have given San Roque’s
predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject properties.
However, prior to the acquisition by San Roque, the lot had been
subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequent transferees.
These titles, which includes the subject properties, have not been voided at
the time of the sale to San Roque. As such San Roque acquired good title,
having purchased them in good faith and for value and without notice of
the seller’s defect of title, if any.
ABAD v. GUIMBA
The law requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner
does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one
who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for one to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in the
capacity to transfer the land. The same rule applies to mortgagees.
Here, Abad the mortgagee failed to inquire into the authority of dela Cruz
to mortgage the property. And even if dela Cruz pretended to be Guimba,
Abad failed to inquire into the identity of the person he was dealing with.
Abad is in Bad Faith.
(Note: To be considered as an IPV, the seller must be the registered owner
himself.)
CORONEL v. IAC
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System,
does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system,
which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered
under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included. The buyer does not own
the land mistakenly included in the TCT issued to him.
ERENA v. QUERRER-KAUFFMAN
Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of
title of the mortgagor of the property given as security and in the absence
of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the
mortgagee in good faith is nonetheless entitled to protection.
This doctrine presupposes, however, that the mortgagor, who is not the
rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded in obtaining a
Torrens title over the property in his name and that, after obtaining the
said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on
what appears on the said title. The innocent purchaser (mortgagee in this
case) for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue
of a deed executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as
the law expressly states.
Such is not the situation of petitioner, who has been the victim of impostors
pretending to be the registered owners but who are not said owners. The
doctrine of mortgagee in good faith does not apply to a situation where the
title is still in the name of the rightful owner and the mortgagor is a
different person pretending to be the owner. In such a case, the mortgagee
is not an innocent mortgagee for value and the registered owner will
generally not lose his title.
EXPRESSCREDIT FINANCING v. VELASCO
To fulfill the requirement of good faith, it is imperative for a mortgagee of
the land, in the possession of persons not the mortgagor, to inquire and
investigate into the rights or title of those in possession. It is true that a
person dealing with the owner of registered land is not bound to go beyond
the certificate of title. He may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on
the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any
annotation. However, we note that the Garcia spouses are unlike other
mortgagors. They are in the business of constructing and selling
townhouses and are past masters in real estate transactions. Further,
petitioner is in the business of extending credit to the public, including real
estate loans. In both these businesses, it devolves upon both, greater
charge than ordinary buyers or encumbrancers for value, who are not in
such venture. It is standard in their business, as a matter of due diligence
required of banks and financing companies, to ascertain whether the
property being offered as security for the debt has already been sold to
another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. They also have the
resources to ascertain any encumbrances over the properties they are
dealing with. Here, EFC through its agents who made an ocular inspection
were already informed of the previous sale of the land to Velasco’s but
despite knowledge of the unregistered sale still accepted the mortgage.
EFC was a mortgagee and purchaser in bad faith.
FRANCISCO v. CA [153 SCRA 330]
There were in a word sufficiently strong indications to impel a closer
inquiry into the location, boundaries and condition of the two (2) smaller
lots embraced in the purchase on the part of Casimiro Espiritu and his co-
vendees. That inquiry is in truth dictated by common sense, expected of a
man of ordinary prudence. "The earth," it has been said, is "that universal
manuscript open to the eyes of all. When a man proposes to buy or deal
with realty his first duty is to read this public manuscript, that is, to look
and see who is there upon it, and what are his rights.
Had that inquiry been made, the adverse claim of Candido Francisco over
the two (2) small lots would have immediately come to light, and the
controversy would have died a-borning The Espiritus failure to undertake
such an inquiry precludes their successful invocation of the character of
purchasers in good faith. "A want to caution and diligence which an honest
man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases
is, in contemplation of law, a want of good faith." The buyer who could not
have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse
possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith, such knowledge being
equivalent to registration.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED v. DUMYUNG
A certificate of title is void when covers property of the public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on
non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for
value, shall be cancelled. A transferee can set up the defense of IPV but the
applicant himself cannot.
ORDUNA v. FUENTEBELLA
Basic is the rule that a buyer of a piece of land which is in the actual
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. When
a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public
manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights
are. A want of caution and diligence which an honest man of ordinary
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to
know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of
another is a buyer in bad faith. Here, the subsequent purchasers failed to
make any inquiries into the possession of Orduna, which if they did they
would have discovered the adverse claim of Orduna. They cannot be
considered purchasers in good faith.
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT v. CA
Concededly, a person, be he a buyer or mortgagee, dealing with a titled
property, as the exterior lot is, is not required to go beyond what appears
on the face of the covering title itself. Unfortunately for petitioner PDCP,
however, the aforementioned rule does not apply to banks.
Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even
with registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one
affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their
depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act
of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be
denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act 496, extended
only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of
the same character and description.
SANCHEZ v. QUINIO [463 SCRA 471]
It is a settled rule that when two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than one
certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent
certificate.
As between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent
of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of
registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible
rights.
SARMIENTO v. CA [470 SCRA 99]
Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser may be considered a purchaser
in good faith when he has examined the latest certificate of title. An
exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title
and to investigate those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a
person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for
value.
Where, as in this case, the land sold is in the possession of a person other
than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the certificate of
title to make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual
possessor. Failure to do so would make him a purchaser in bad faith.
SPOUSES ABRIGO v. DE VERA
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the
Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first registrant
in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the
buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however,
does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.
Since the land was already registered under the Torrens System, the
registration of the sale to Abrigo under Act 3344 was not effective to bind
the land for purposes of Double Sales. Registration must be done in the
proper registry to bing the land.
On the other hand, the registration of De Vera under the Torrens system
should prevail over that of Abrigo considering the registration was done in
good faith. Double Sales requires the second buyer to acquired the - Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank vs Villalva, 48
immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Constructive notice SCRA 31
to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 [which governs - Walstrom vs. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431
the registration of all instruments of land neither covered by the Spanish - Torres vs CA, 186 SCRA 672
Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System] does not apply if the property is - Baltazar vs. CA, 168 SCRA 354;
registered under the Torrens. - Cabuhat vs CA, 366 SCRA 176;
- Legarda vs CA, 280 SCRA 642;
TIO v. ABAYATA [556 SCRA 175] - Tomas vs. Tomas, 98 SCRA280;
The rule has always been that every person dealing with registered land - Torres vs CA, 186 SCRA672
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor - Traders Royal Bank vs. CA, 315 SCRA 190
and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to - Angeles vs Sec of Justice G. R. No. 142549
determine the condition of the property. - Garcia vs CA, 95 SCRA 380
- Calalang vs Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88
However, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than - De Santos vs IAC, 157 SCRA 295
the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make - Mathay vs CA, 295 SCRA 556
inquiries concerning the actual possessor. A buyer of real property which - Francisco vs. Puno 108 SCRA 427
is in possession of another must be wary and investigate the rights of the - Serna vs. Fontanilla 307 SCRA
latter. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be in - Villanueva-Mijares vs. CA 330 SCRA
good faith and cannot have any right over the property.

Tio were without actual knowledge of the claim of Abayata, which was not
discoverable by them, after examining the title, its annotations and after
an inspection of the property. The Bank led them to believe that the
possessors were mere squatters on the land. Tio is entitled to the status as
innocent purchasers for value.

TORRES v.CA
Moreover, even if we grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the
doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may
become the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still
holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in
a realty. The doctrine would apply rather when the forger thru insidious
means obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his
name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent
holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the
owner (Sec. 55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a
valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against
the whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. ‘Prior tempore potior
jure.’

- Adille vs. CA, 157 SCRA 672

- Pajarillo vs IAC, 176 SCRA 340