The Lawyer's Digest: Supreme Court Judgments passed in March 2021

A summary of Judgments passed by the Supreme Court in March, 2021.

Supreme Court Lawyers Digest

Sahil Tagotra
, 
Samith Sagaranahalli
, 
subhropm@gmail.com
, 
Rukmini Mukherjee

Published on : 21 Jun, 2021 , 8:23 am

The Lawyer's Digest is a collection of concise summaries of all the judgments passed by the
Supreme Court of India over the course of a month.

Topics have been sub-divided into areas of law including arbitration, criminal law, consumer
law, service and administrative law, etc. for ease of reading.

Here are the summaries of judgments passed in March 2021.

Arbitration
In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd., it was held that
the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation
Act 1963 and that the period of limitation would begin to run from the date of failure to appoint
an arbitrator. It was also observed that the Parliament may consider amending Section 11 of the
1996 Act to provide a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is
in consonance with the object of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings. It was further
held that in rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time barred, and it is
manifest that there is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference. [Key
Words: appointment of arbitrator][Coram: Indu Malhotra, J., Ajay Rastogi, J.]

In Secundarabad Cantonment Board vs M/s B. Ramachandraiah & Sons, the appellant was

aggrieved by the order and judgement of the High Court appointing an arbitrator under Section
11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (“A&C Act”). In disputes arising out of
construction contracts, the respondent having obtained final completion certificates on
26.03.2003. Thereafter, the respondent had issued various demands for escalation and finally
issued a letter dated 07.11.2006 to the appellant requesting the appointment of an arbitrator. The
respondent periodically wrote letters reiterating its claim and issued a legal notice dates
30.01.2010 stating that arbitration as under Section 21 of the A&C Act had commenced with the
letter dated 07.11.2006. After further letters calling for the appointment of an arbitrator, the
appellant rejected the request by letter dated 10.11.2010. After 3 more years on 06.11.2013, the
respondent filed the application under Section 11. The High Court allowed the application noting
that the prolonged silence on part of the appellant indicated a live dispute and the question of bar
on limitation was left open to be considered by the arbitrator. The Court noted its recent
judgment in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. delivered on  10.03.2021 where it reiterated that the
period of limitation for an application starts running after the passing of 30 days after the request
to appoint an arbitrator and it cannot be confused with the period of limitation applicable on the
substantive claims. The Court also recalled its judgment in Vidya Drolia (2021) 2 SCC 1 where it
noted that at the stage of Section 11, the restricted and limited review is to check and protect
parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-arbitrable. In the
present case, the Court noted that at the very latest, the time for an application under Section 11
began to run after 30 days of the request to appoint an arbitrator. A rejection of the request by the
appellant in 2010 would not give any fresh start to the limitation period. Thus, the Court held
that the application under Section 11 was hopelessly time-barred and set aside the judgment of
the High Court. [Key Words: Section 11 the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Limitation
Act 1963, Request for appointment of arbitrator] [Coram: R. F. Nariman, J., B.R. Gavai, J.]

In Government of Maharashtra vs M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., the
court was considering three appeals, of which two challenged the correctness of the decision in
N.V. International (2020) 2 SCC 109, while the third stated that there was a conflict between the
judgment in N.V. International and Consolidated Engg. (2008) 7 SCC 169 to hold that it was
open for the High Court to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963
(“Limitation Act”) in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
1996 (“Arbitration Act”). The Court referred to Consolidated Engg and stated that a conjoint
reading of Section 37 and Section 43 of the Arbitration Act makes it clear that the provisions of
Limitation Act apply to appeals filed under Section 37 and that the period of limitation will rest
on Articles 116 or 117 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act depending on the whether the
appeal is to a High Court or an intra-High Court appeal. The Court held that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable both by virtue of Section 43 of the Arbitration Act and Section 29
(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court further noted that upon application of the Commercial
Courts Act 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”), those appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act are governed by Articles 116 or 117 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act only when the
specified value under the Commercial Courts Act is less than Rs. 3 Lakhs, while in other cases,
Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act lays down a limitation of 60 days for appeals
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Considering the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the Court noted there is no specific bar on condonation of delay under Section 13
of the Commercial Courts Act as in the case of Section 16 of the same statute and therefore
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would continue to apply. On the correctness of N.V.
International, the Court noted that N.V. International does not notice Commercial Courts Act
and is therefore per incuriam and that bodily lifting of the last part of Section 34 (3) into Section
37 of the Arbitration Act is unwarranted. Consequently, the Court overruled N.V.International.
The Court went on to note that “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be
understood in the context of the objective of both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts
Act to achieve a speedy resolution and that delay should be condoned as an exception and not a
rule. The Court however observed that the High Court had erred in noting that there was a
conflict between N.V. International and Consolidated Engg, since Consolidated Engg deals with
Section 14 of the Limitation Act and not Section 5. [Key Words: Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996, Limitation, Articles 116 or 117 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
the Commercial Courts Act 2015, Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, Condonation
of Delay, Section 5 Limitation Act] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., B.R.Gavai, J., Hrishikesh Roy,
J.]

In M P Power Trading Co. Ltd. & Anr. vs Narmada Equipments Pvt Ltd., the appellant was
aggrieved by the order appointing an arbitrator passed by the High Court in the respondent’s
application under Section 11 of the A&C Act. The appellant objected to the appointment on the
grounds that under Section 86 (1) (f) of the Electricity Act 2003, the State Electricity
Commission was vested with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes between licensees
and power-generating companies. The Court referred to its decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Limited (2008) 4 SCC 755 where it was held that Section 86 (1) (f) of the Electricity Act,
2003 being a special provision would override Section 11 of the A&C Act, which is further
affirmed by the non-obstante provision in Section 174 of the Electricity Act, 2003. In Hindustan
Zinc Limited, the Court had specifically stated that inherent lack of jurisdiction cannot be
overcome even with the consent of parties. Thus, the fact that the appellant had agreed to the
appointment of arbitrators in an earlier round of litigation does not preclude it from raising the
plea of bar under Section 86 (1) (f) of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Court set aside the judgment
of the High Court appointing arbitrators. [Key Words: Section 86 (1) (f) of the Electricity Act
2003, Section 11 the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, special legislation, exclusive power
to adjudicate] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M R Shah, J.]

In Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Ravindranath Rao Sindhia and Anr., the appointment
of a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the
Delhi High Court, was challenged inter alia on the ground that the same related to an
international commercial arbitration, which was covered under Section 2(1)(f)(i), since the
respondents were habitually resident and nationals of the USA. It had been held by the High
Court that since the central management and control of body of individuals was exercised only in
India under Section 2(1)(f)(iii), the dispute was not an international commercial arbitration. The
Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court by stating that under Section 2 (1) (f), any
transaction between the parties, at least one of whom is either a foreign national in, or habitually
resident in, any country other than India, would categorize the arbitration as an international
commercial arbitration, irrespective of whether such individual, body corporate carries on
business in India through a business office set up in India. [Key Words: International commercial
arbitration, appointment of arbitrator, jurisdiction of High Court, Section 2(1)(f) of Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., B.R Gavai J.]

In Pravin Electricals Pvt. Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Pvt. Ltd. arose out of a petition
filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, for the appointment of a
sole arbitrator. The appellant contended that the Consultancy Agreement, containing the alleged
arbitration agreement, was a concocted agreement, and therefore, no arbitration clause was in
existence. The Court examined the provisions of Sections 8 and 11 of the Act, and referred inter
alia to Vidya Drolia (2021) 2 SCC 1, which read the ‘prima facie test’ into Section 11(6A) so as
to bring the provisions of Sections 8(1) and 11(6) read with 11(6A) on par. On facts, the Court
held, that it was unsafe to conclude one way or the other, that an arbitration agreement existed
between the parties. Relying on Vidya Drolia, the Court held that a deeper examination of
whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties must be left to the arbitrator.
Therefore, the Court upheld the order of the High Court appointing the Arbitrator, with a
direction that the issue as to the existence of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by him as
a preliminary issue. [Key Words: Section 11(6), Appointment of Sole Arbitrator, 2015
Amendment, existence of arbitration agreement, concluded contract, preliminary issue]
[Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., B.R. Gavai, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.]

In Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund (earlier known as
Kotak India Venture Limited) & Ors., the Court relied upon Vidya Drolia to hold that a dispute
would be non arbitrable when a proceeding is in rem and an IBC proceeding would be in
rem only when the petition is admitted. The Bench “…clarified that in any proceeding which is
pending before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 7 of IB Code, if such petition is
admitted upon the Adjudicating Authority recording the satisfaction with regard to the default
and the debt being due from the corporate debtor, any application under Section 8 of the Act,
1996 made thereafter will not be maintainable. In a situation where the petition under Section 7
of IB Code is yet to be admitted and, in such proceedings, if an application under Section 8 of
the Act, 1996 is filed, the Adjudicating Authority is duty bound to first decide the application
under Section 7 of the IB Code by recording a satisfaction with regard to there being default or
not, even if the application under Section 8 of Act, 1996 is kept along for consideration. In such
event, the natural consequence of the consideration made therein on Section 7 of IB Code
application would befall on the application under Section 8 of the Act, 1996.” Further, in view
that the nature of the issues involved being mainly with regard to the conversion of preference
shares into equity shares and the formula to be worked thereunder, the Bench held that the
consideration could be resolved by the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of same members but
separately constituted in respect of each agreement. [Key Words: erga omnes effect, composite
arbitration, insolvency, arbitration] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI., A.S. Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramanian, J.]

In Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. M/s Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd., the
Bench held that the period of limitation for filing objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996 would be calculated from the date on which the signed copy of the
award was made available to the parties. The Bench held that a dissenting Award must be
delivered on the same day as the majority award as the former cannot be made after the Tribunal
becomes functus officio. [Key Words: minority award, dissenting award, meaning of arbitration
award] [Coram: Indu Malhotra, J, Ajay Rastogi, J.]

Commercial Disputes
In Rapid MetroRail Gurgaon Limited Etc. v. Haryana Mass Rapid Transport Corporation
Limited and Ors, the Bench held that though High Court should ordinarily not invoke their
jurisdiction in disputes which are arbitrable, the High Court’s orders under Article 226 was
justified in the present case as not staying the termination notices would leave commuters
without the facility of metro rail in Gurugram - a public interest. The Bench further re-affirmed
that a consent decree is the product of the fusion of contract as also the Court’s command. [Key
Words: debt due, termination payment, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, public
interest] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah, J., Sanjiv Khanna, J.]

In Tata Consultancy Services Limited v. Cyrus Investments Private Limited and Others, the
Bench held that while the NCLT had dealt with every issue, the NCLAT did not deal with many
of the issues and thus there was “no escape from the conclusion that NCLAT did not expressly
overturn the findings of facts recorded by NCLT”. Thus, even though the Supreme Court was not
permitted to interfere with a finding of fact in an appeal under Section 423 of the Companies Act
2013, it could do so if the NCLAT’s finding was wholly perverse. Deciding all question of law
in favour of the Tatas, the Supreme Court, inter alia,  held that:

i. The NCLAT’s was wrong in its view that the company’s affairs have been or are being
conducted in a manner prejudicial and oppressive to some members and that the facts otherwise
justify the winding up of the company on just and equitable ground. The Bench held that under a
petition under Section 241 Companies Act 2013, the NCLAT could not ask whether the removal
of a Director was legally valid and/or justified or not, but merely whether such removal
amounted to conduct oppressive or prejudicial to some members. The Bench further held that
there was never and there could never have been a relationship in the nature of a quasi
partnership between the Tata Group and S.P. Group.
ii. The Bench held that the NCLAT could not have directed the reinstatement of Cyrus Mistry
into the Board of Tata Sons and other Tata companies as the same was not in accordance with
the pleadings, reliefs sought and the NCLAT’s powers under Section 242(2) of the Companies
Act 2013. This was because Sections 241 and 242 did not permit the Tribunal to make an order
for reinstatement which is barred by Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 and the Principle
of Legality.

iii. Tata Sons (Private) Limited was a private company under Section 2(68) of the Companies
Act 2013.

[Key Words: Cyrus Mistry, Docomo, Tata, ‘corporate majority’, ‘Corporate democracy’,
‘corporate governance’, Oppression, Mismanagement and Unfair Prejudice, Bubble Act, joint
stock company, proportionate representation] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI., A.S. Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramanian, J.]

Criminal Law
In The State (GNCT of Delhi) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lokesh Chadha, the Bench held
that while suspending a sentence for a person convicted under the NDPS Act, the High Court
would be obliged to record reasons under Section 389(1) CrPC which “must have a bearing on
the public policy underlying the incorporation of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” [Key Words:
suspension of sentence] [Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In K. Prakash & Anr. vs. The State of Karnataka, the appellants were aggrieved by the
judgement and order of the High Court confirming their conviction and sentence under Section
344 (sentence one year) and Section 366 (sentence two years) read with Section 34 of the IPC.
The Court issued notice on the limited aspect of sentencing. The Court noted that many factors
which may not be relevant to determine the guilt must be seen with a human approach at the
stage of sentencing. That the complaint itself stated that the main accused was in love with the
victim. It is also the case of the appellants that PW1 is not a direct witness the alleged incident,
additionally the appellants have already served a sentence of three months and paid the fines.
The appellants have also pleaded that there is no one to take care of their minor son and old age
parents. The Court partly allowed the appeal and modified the sentence to time already
undergone. [Key Words: sentencing, factors in sentencing, Section 344 IPC, Section 366 IPC]
[Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subash Reddy, J.]

In Netaji Achyut Shinde (Patil) & Anr. vs State of Maharashtra, the appellants challenged the
common judgement of the High Court convicting them of committing offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The trial court had acquitted appellant no.s1 and 3
while convicting only the appellant no. 2. The High Court vide the impugned judgement had
reversed the acquittals while upholding appellant no.2’s conviction. After considering the entire
evidence on record, the Court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the convictions. The Court
said it is incorrect to suggest that the first information received by the police at 5.45 pm by phone
should be treated as the FIR and that the police had improved upon the case in registering the
FIR at 11.30 pm. The Court recalled its decision in TT Antony (2001) 6 SCC 181 that mere
message without clearly specifying the details of the offence or with incomplete information
cannot be treated as an FIR. The Court also rejected the trial court’s reasoning supported by the
appellants that no injury on the deceased was attributable specifically to the accused. The Court
relied on Ramaswami Ayaangar (1976) 3 SCC 779 to reiterate that to attract Section 34 of the
IPC, it is not necessary that each accused must assault the victim but they must have shared a
common intention with which they acted. The Court noted that the trial court had erred in
ignoring the ocular testimony establishing the role of the appellants in the commission of the
offence. The Court noted it’s judgment in Sawant Singh (1961) 3 SCR 129 regarding the powers
of the appellate court where the trial court has recorded acquittal to note that the High Court has
the power to review the evidence on which an order of acquittal is founded and stated that the
High Court had correctly reversed the acquittal of the appellants. [Key Words: FIR when
registered, incomplete message to Police not an FIR, Section 302 IPC, Section 34 IPC, common
intent] [Coram: L. Nageshwara Rao, J., Hemant Gupta, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

In State of Kerala vs. Mahesh, the appellant State was aggrieved by the order of the High Court
granting bail to the respondent-accused under Section 439, CrPC. The State submitted that the
accused had killed a female doctor at her clinic by repeatedly stabbing her in the presence of her
father and it could not be ruled out that the respondent could attempt to influence the prosecution
witnesses who all live in the same district. The Court allowed the appeal, accepting the
submissions of the State and also noting that the High Court had failed to apply its mind and had
not provided cogent reasons for the order, while the Sessions Court had rejected the application
for bail after recording detailed reasons. The Court relied on Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (2010) 14
SCC 496  wherein the Court has laid down the principles for examining the correctness of the
orders granting bail. The Court also cited Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar and Anr. (2020) 2 SCC
188 to state that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the correctness of bail order
are not restricted by the principles for cancellation of bail. The Court also noted that the High
Court had misinterpreted its order in In Re: Contagion of Covid-19 virus in prisons. The Court
clarified that it had directed the States to form High Powered Committees to consider the release
of prisoners accused of minor offences on parole or interim bail for an appropriate period and did
not direct indiscriminate release of persons accused of heinous crimes like the respondent. [Key
Words: principles for examining the correctness of the orders granting bail, Bail, Section 302
IPC] [Coram: Indira Banerjee, J., Krishna Murari, J.]

In Archana Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, an appeal was filed seeking the quashing of
chargesheet and proceedings under Sections 419, 420, 323, 504, and 506, IPC. The Court
reiterated that for an offence under Section 420 to be constituted, the accused must have
committed the offence of cheating under Section 415 and the person cheated must be dishonestly
induced to deliver property or to make, alter, or destroy valuable security or anything signed or
sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. The Court held that where the
allegations were made against the appellant’s husband and not her, the proceedings ought to be
quashed. [Key Words: Section 482 CrPC, quashing of proceedings, FIR, Prof RK Vijayasarathy
v. Sudha Seetharam (2019) 16 SCC 739][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, proceedings were initiated under Section
376, IPC. The Court, relying on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar,  the Court held that where the
original promise to marry was not false at the inception, proceedings under Section 376, IPC
were liable to be quashed. [Key Words: Section 482, 164 CrPC, Section 376 IPC, Discharge,
application for bail, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608]
[Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]
In Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, the dispute pertained to a Facebook by a journalist
about an assault on some youth. The Court held that the intention to cause disorder or incite
people to violence is sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A, IPC. The Court also held
that the prosecution had to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. The Court
clarified that strongly worded or isolated passages could not be used to prove a charge under
Section 153A and that the whole piece must be looked at. Relying on Bilal Ahmed
Kaloo and Ramesh v Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 668, the Court held that merely inciting
feelings of one community or group without reference to another community would not attract
Section 153A and that the alleged criminal speech should be judged from the standards of the
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous man. The Court relied on Pravasi Bhalai
Sangathan v. Union of India (2014) 11 SCC 477 and held that the interpretation of the word
‘hatred’ must be to interpret the speech objectively and ask whether a reasonable person aware of
the context would view the speech as exposing a protected group to hatred. The second test
would be to restrict interpretation of the term to extreme manifestations of detestation and
vilification. The third test would be to focus on the effect of the speech at issue. Based on these
principles, the Court ruled that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to incite
violence and thus the ingredients of Sections 153A and 505(1)(c) were not made out. [Key
Words: Section 482 CrPC, quashing of FIR, Sections 153A, 500, 505(1)(c) IPC, Facebook post,
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, meticulous process of inferential reasoning, Bilal Ahmed
Kaloo v. State of AP (1997) 7 SCC 431, the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus][Coram: L
Nageswara Rao, J., S Ravindra Bhat, J.]

In Dhirendra Singh @ Pappu v. State of Jharkhand, the Court held that merely because the
weapon used to commit the crime was not seized is not a ground to acquit the accused when his
presence, active participation, and use of firearm by him were established and proved. [Key
Words: Sections 302, 34, 307 IPC, Section 27 Arms Act][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR
Shah, J.]

In Rahul vs State of Haryana, the appellant challenged confirmation of his conviction under
Section 302 read with Section, 34 IPC and under Section 25 (1B) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959. The
Court confirmed the conviction and sentence noting that the prosecution had satisfied the tests
laid down in Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 to be applied in cases resting on circumstantial
evidence. The Court reiterated the well-settled proposition as stated in its judgment in Hari
Obula Reddy (1981) 3 SCC 675 to state that interested testimony can be considered provided that
it is corroborated with other evidence on record. The Court was of the view that the prosecution
had proven the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable evidence by leading cogent evidence.
[Key Words: Section 302 IPC, circumstantial evidence, interested testimony] [Coram: Ashok
Bhusan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.]

In Naveen Singh vs the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., the appellant was aggrieved by the order
of the High Court granting bail to the respondent no.2-accused. The accused was alleged to have
tampered with records of the court resulting in his acquittal in a case where he was accused
under Section 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC. The District Judge directed the record keeper to file a
complaint against the accused, and an FIR under Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 of the IPC was
registered against him. After investigation, the police also filed a chargesheet against the
accused. Considering the bail application moved by the accused, the High Court noted that since
the chargesheet had already been filed and the guilt of the accused was a matter of trial, and that
since the accused had undergone imprisonment of 18 months and granted bail to the accused.
Aggrieved, the original informant challenged the order granting bail, which was also supported
by the State. The Court noted that the High Court erred in noting that the maximum punishment
under 467 read with 471 of the IPC was imprisonment for life. The Court noted that even charges
have been framed against the accused, thus a prima facie case was found against the accused.
The Court noted that the High Court had not adverted to the seriousness of the offences alleged.
The Court also noted that in such a case where tampering of court documents is alleged, the
locus of the appellant is not important. The Court tallowed the appeal and set aside the order of
the High Court granting bail and directed the accused to surrender forthwith. [Key words:
forgery, tampering of court record, Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 of the IPC, bail, cancellation
of bail, gravity of offence] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M. R. Shah, J.]

In Sartaj Singh vs the State of Haryana, the appellant was the original informant who alleged
that he was attacked by a group of men including the private respondents in the matter. Based on
his statement naming the accused, including the private respondents, an FIR for offences under
Section 149, 341, 323, 324,307 and 506 of the IPC was filed. Thereafter, the chargesheet was
filed against several accused but not the private respondents. During the course of the trial, after
examination of the appellant as PW-1 and several other witnesses, the appellant filed an
application under Section 319, CrPC for summoning of the private respondents. The trial court
after examining the material on record, allowed the application and summoned the private
witnesses. Aggrieved, the private respondents moved revision petitions against the order of the
trial court before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the order
under Section 319, CrPC, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court referred to
its detailed judgment in Hardeep Singh (2014) 3 SCC 92 to reiterate that the Court can exercise
the power under Section 319, CrPC on the basis of the statement made in examination in chief
and need not wait till such statement is cross-examined, provided that on the basis of the material
before the Court. including the statement made in examination in chief, it appears that such
person can be tried along with the accused facing trial. The Court noted that the High Court had
erred in appreciating the deposition of the eyewitness at this stage as what is required to be
considered was whether there was a prima facie case and not whether on the basis of the material
the proposed accused is likely to be convicted. The Court allowed the petition and set aside the
judgment and order of the High Court. [Key Words: Section 319 CrPC, power and ambit of,
meaning of evidence under Section 319 CrPC] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In The State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police v. Tr N Seenivasagan, the

Court held that if it appeared to the Court that the evidence of a person who is sought to be
recalled is essential to the just decision of a case, the Court could do so under Section 311, CrPC.
Relying on Manju Devi v. State of Rajasthan (2019) 6 SCC 203,  the Court reiterated that an
application under Section 311, CrPC could not be rejected solely on the ground that the case had
been pending for an inordinate amount of time and allowed the application of the prosecution
seeking recall of two witnesses. [Key Words: Sections 7, 12, 13(2), 13(1)(d) Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988, Section 173(2), 311 CrPC, ][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Kapil Agarwal and others v. Sanjay Sharma and others, the Court held that in a complaint
case, merely because on the same facts and allegations a complaint has been filed, there is no bar
on lodging an FIR with the police station. However, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an
abuse of the process of law or has been lodged to harass the accused, it can be quashed in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in the exercise of powers under
Section 482, CrPC. The Court held that on facts, the impugned FIR was an abuse of process of
law and was filed with a view to harass the appellants, and thus allowed the appeal and quashed
the FIR. [Key Words: Article 226 Constitution of India, Sections 420, 406 IPC, Section 156(3),
210 CrPC, ][Coram: MR Shah, J., DY Chandrachud, J.]

In Krishna Lal Chawla and Ors. v. State of UP and Anr., the question, inter alia, before the
Court was to consider the validity of a private complaint filed after an earlier information was
also filed as NCR No. 158/2012 by the same party, against the same accused, in relation to the
same incident. This was done after a chargesheet had already been filed after taking due
permission of the Magistrate. The Court held that the Trial Judge has a duty under the
Constitution and the CrPC, to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by
exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him, and should not
have issued process against the appellants on the basis of such a private complaint. The Court
used its powers under Article 142 to quash all the litigations between the parties arising out of
the incident. [Key Words: private complaint, issue of process, curbing frivolous litigation, non-
cognizable offence] [Coram: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J., R. Subhash Reddy J.]

In Union of India v. Prateek Shukla, the appeal arose from a judgment of a Single Judge
granting bail to the respondent, who was alleged to be involved in the commission of offences
punishable under 8, 9A, 25A, 23 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.
1985 (“NDPS”). The High Court had not commented on the merits of the matter and had only
granted bail considering the clean past of the Respondent and by stating that given the
respondent’s level of education, he might not commit any offence in the future as well. The
Court allowed the Appeal by stating that the High Court has misapplied the law to the facts in
arriving at a decision for the grant of bail to the Respondent as it had not considered the legal
norms to be considered under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court further stated that there
was no application of mind by the High Court as the assumption that an educated person “may
not commit any offence” is an extraneous circumstance which ought not to have weighed with
the High Court in the grant of bail for an offence under the NDPS Act. [Key Words: Section 8,
9A, 25A, 23 and 29 NDPS Act, bail, cancellation of bail, legal norms under Section 37 NDPS
Act, clean antecedents, level of education] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

In V.N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar and Ors., the daughter of the appellant had died an
unnatural death while residing with the Respondents who were facing trial under Sections 498A,
304B, 302 read with Section 34, IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961. The trial itself was at the end of its closure when an application was filed by the Public
Prosecutor under Section 173(5) read with Section 311 of CrPC for summoning the witnesses
along with the concerned documents to adduce their evidence in connection with the second
post-mortem conducted on the body of the deceased. The order allowing the application by the
Trial Court was set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High
Court by stating that High Court had not adverted to the factual matrix noticed by the Trial Judge
and set aside the same, summarily, without assigning any reasons, which could not facilitate the
Court to understand the reason behind such reversal. [Key Words: Sections 498A, 304B, 302
read with Section 34 IPC, Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 196, Section 173(5)
read with Section 311 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, second post- mortem] [Coram: Indu
Malhotra, J., Ajay Rastogi J.]
In Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, the Bench held that in view of the facts that
there were no marks on the body suggesting violence o struggle, the medical expert ruling out
possibility of suicidal death, the post-mortem report stating the cause of death as ‘asphyxia due
to hanging’, the Trial Court as well as the High Court erred in holding that the death was
homicidal. The Bench reiterated some important laws:

i. On the interplay of the “last seen theory” and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the
Bench held that it was settled that Section 106 did not “absolve the prosecution of discharging
its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt” and it was only
when the “prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which
makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of
proof would lie upon the accused.”

ii. Under Section 313, CrPC, “false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an
additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to
no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused” and the same “…cannot be used as a link to
complete the chain.”

iii. Though in a case of direct evidence, the motive would not be relevant, in a case of
circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

[Key Words: circumstantial evidence] [Coram: RF Nariman, J., B.R. Gavai, J.]

In Priti Saraf and Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., the Bench reversed the decision of the
High Court where the latter had exercised its powers under Section 482, CrPC. The Bench held
that even though the facts narrated in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet revealed a commercial
transaction, but that was no reason for holding that the offence of cheating was not made out
especially when “many a times, offence of cheating is committed in the course of commercial
transactions”. [Key Words: Bhajan Lal case, civil case] [Coram: Indu Malhotra, J., Ajay
Rastogi, J.]

In  Girraj v. Kiranpal and Anr. Etc., a batch of five petitions were filed challenging the granting
of bail to 5 Respondent- Accused by the Allahabad High Court in relation to offences under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 326, 341 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. One co-
accused, Narendra, who was not a party in the present case was granted bail by the High Court in
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 14060 of 2020 by an order dated August 5, 2020.
All the respondents accused had relied on the same and were granted bail. However, vide order
dated 11.12.2020, the order granting bail to Narendra was set aside by the Supreme Court. The
Court held that since the only basis for claiming bail in the present batch of cases was by placing
reliance on the order granting bail to the co-accused Narendra, the same had to be cancelled.
However, in order to ensure fairness, the Court allowed them an opportunity to apply for bail
before the High Court, after surrendering. [Key Words: bail, Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323,
326, 341 and 506 IPC, cancellation, surrender] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

In State of Rajasthan v. Love Kush Meena, the question before the Court was whether an
acquittal based on the benefit of doubt given to the Respondent charged under Sections 302, 323,
341 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] is a bar for the respondent to join as a
constable in the Rajasthan Police service. The Court allowed the appeal by holding that the mere
fact of an acquittal would not suffice, and it would depend on whether it is a clean acquittal
based on total absence of evidence or only on the basis of a benefit of doubt. The Court relied on
its judgment in Avtar Singh (2016) 8 SCC 471 to state that where in respect of a heinous or
serious nature of crime the acquittal is based purely on the basis of benefit of reasonable doubt,
the same would not make the Respondent eligible for appointment. [Key Words: acquittal based
on benefit of reasonable doubt, Sections 302,323,341/34 IPC, Rajasthan Police service]
[Coram: SK Kaul, J., R. Subhash Reddy J.]

In Nagabhushan v. State of Karnataka, the challenge was to the order of conviction passed by
the High Court of Karnataka, reversing the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The
Appellant was charged under Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
The Appellant argued inter alia that there were material contradictions in the two dying
declarations made by the deceased and the second one should not have been relied upon by the
High Court. Dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the High Court had given cogent reasons
for relying on the second dying declaration in light of the medical evidence and injuries
sustained by the deceased, as evident from the post-mortem report. The Court further held that
after pouring kerosene on the deceased and thereafter setting her ablaze, merely because the
Accused might have tried to extinguish the fire will not take the case out of the clutches of clause
fourthly of Section 300 of the IPC. [Key Words: multiple dying declarations, contradiction,
Section 498A, 302 read with Section 34 IPC, medical evidence, corroboration of post-mortem
report] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

In Rajendra @ Rajappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, the Bench held that:

1. The Supreme Court has circumscribed the scope of appeal under Section 378, CrPC where
appeal is preferred against acquittal recorded by trial courts, and that unless the view taken by
the trial court was not a possible view, normally the High Court should not interfere with the
acquittal recorded by the trial court. Thus, there could not be any “straightjacket formula to
apply readily for the cases in appeals arising out of acquittal recorded by the trial court”.

2. Only material contradictions could be a ground to discredit witnesses.

3. In the case before it, the intestine of the deceased was full of faecal matter, proving that death
must have occurred between 3 to 12 hours prior to the postmortem examination- supporting the
case of the prosecution. Thus, reliance on ocular testimony stating that there was undigested food
in the stomach could be disregarded.

[Key Words: family members, close relatives, rustic, murder] [Coram: Sanjay Kishan Kaul,
J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.]

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jail Superintendent (Ropar) & Ors., the Bench held as follows:

i. The petition before it under Article 32 of the Constitution was maintainable under Section 406,
CrPC as the Uttar Pradesh State Government was certainly a “party interested” as per Section
406, CrPC.

ii. The relief sought in the accompanying petition could not be granted under Section 406, CrPC
as the case was at the stage of investigation in Punjab.
iii. The Bench was invoking its powers under Article 142 to direct the Punjab Authorities to
transfer the accused/Respondent No. 3 (Mukhtar Ansari) to Uttar Pradesh.

iv. The concerned Jail Superintendent of Uttar Pradesh was instructed to extend all medical
facilities to the accused as per the Jail Manual.

Though not ruling on the contention by the Petitioner that the accused Mukhtar Ansari had
deliberately conspired to have a FIR lodged through his proxies in order to attract Punjab’s
jurisdiction, the Bench found it suspicious that the accused had not applied for default bail. It
noted that there was 10 cases pending against the accused in Uttar Pradesh and the UP courts had
already issued production warrants on 26 occasions, all of which were rejected by Punjab on
“trivial” medical grounds. [Key Words: Section 267, 269 CrPC, Special Court for MPs/MLAs,
The Transfer of Prisoners Act 1950] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.]

In Bhima Razu Prasad v. State, rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, the primary
question was whether Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC bars lodging of case by the investigating
agency under Section 193, IPC in respect of offence of giving false evidence which is committed
at the stage of the investigation, prior to production of such evidence before the Trial Court. The
Court relied, inter alia, upon Sachida Nand Singh (1998) 2 SCC 493, as affirmed by the
Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370, which held that Section 195(1)(b)
(ii) read with Section 340(1), CrPC will only apply in respect of offences which are committed
during the time when the document concerned was custodia legis or in the custody of the court.
Holding that the provision in Section 195(1)(b)(i) was analogous to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), the
Court held that Section 195(1)(b)(i) will not bar prosecution by the investigating agency for the
offence punishable under Section 193 IPC which is committed during the stage of investigation.
[Key Words: custodia legis, false evidence, perjury, offences against the administration of
justice, reasonably close nexus] [Coram: MM Shantanagoudar, J., Vineet Saran, J.]

In Satpal vs. State of Haryana, the Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the judgement
and order of the High Court confirming the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC
and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. The Court held that the
trial court and the High Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record, including the dying
declaration of the victim before a Judicial Magistrate, that the appellant had poured kerosene
over her and set her on fire. The Court stated that merely because the deceased’s relatives were
present at the Hospital at the time of recording of the dying declaration, it could not be inferred
that such a declaration was tutored. The Court also took into consideration that although the
appellant stated in his statement under 313, CrPC that several people from the village came to
house at the time of the incident, no such person was examined in support of the defense. [Key
Words: Dying Declaration, admissibility, Sectio 302 IPC] [Coram: Ashok Bhusan, J., R. Subash
Reddy, J.]

In Ramesh Alias Dapinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the appellant was acquitted by
the Bench under Section 302, IPC as the overt acts were attributed to the principal accused and
not the appellant i.e. the person accompanying the principal accused. [Key Words: vicarious
criminal liability, Section 34 IPC, common intention, “in furtherance”] [Coram: UU Lalit, J.,
KM Joseph, J.]
In Swaati Nirkhi & Ors. V. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., the Court held that as most of the
prosecution witnesses were situated in Delhi, the petition seeking transfer to Allahabad could not
be allowed. [Key Words: Transfer Petition, Section 406 CRPC, Sections 34, 389 IPC][Coram:
Ashok Bhushan, J., Indu Malhotra, J.]

In Naresh Kumar v. Kalawati, an appeal had been filed challenging the acquittal of the
respondents in charges under Sections 498A and 302 read with Section 34, IPC. The Court
reiterated that though its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution was
vide, it would not interfere with concurrent findings of facts arrived at by two courts, unless there
was a complete misappreciation of evidence, gross perversity in arriving at the findings, causing
serious miscarriage of justice. The Court held that while a dying declaration can form the basis
of conviction if made voluntarily and inspires confidence, in this case, the deceased’s dying
declaration had no reference to either the respondent or dowry demand, was not signed by
anyone, the doctor to whom the statement was made was not examined, as the witness who
recorded the declaration did not state that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Therefore, the
Court held that the veracity and truthfulness of the dying declaration remained suspect and the
probable defence could not be rejected. [Key Words: appeal challenging acquittal, dowry death,
evidence, dying declaration][Coram: Navin Sinha, J., Krishna Murari, J.]

In Sumeti Vij v. M/s Paramount Tech Fab Industries, the Court ruled that the standard of proof
for rebutting the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was
‘preponderance of probabilities’ as was held in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441,  that
proceedings under Section 138 NI Act are quasi criminal in nature. In this case, as the
complainant was able to prove that the appellant had ordered goods and that such goods were
delivered and that the cheque was issued in lieu of this transaction, and that the appellant failed
to record evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 139. Therefore, the Court did not
interfere with the High Court’s finding that the appellant was guilty under Section 138 NI Act.
[Key Words: Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, Section 313 CrPC, ][Coram: Indu
Malhotra, J., Rastogi, J.]

In Aparna Bhat & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., the Bench criticised the Madhya
Pradesh High Court’s Single Judge for granting bail to a man accused of sexual assault in lieu of
accepting a rakhi from the survivor. The Bench held that “…using rakhi tying as a condition for
bail, transforms a molester into a brother, by a judicial mandate” which was “wholly
unacceptable”. The Bench passed a slew of directions for all courts in the country which are as
follows:

a) Bail conditions should not mandate, require, or permit contact between the accused and the
victim. Such conditions should seek to protect the complainant from any further harassment by
the accused;

b) Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there might be a potential threat of
harassment of the victim, or upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from the
police, the nature of protection shall be separately considered and appropriate order made, in
addition to a direction to the accused not to make any contact with the victim;

c) In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should immediately be informed that the
accused has been granted bail and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within two days;
d) Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal notions about
women and their place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the requirements of
the Cr. PC. In other words, discussion about the dress, behaviour, or past “conduct” or
“morals” of the prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail;

e) The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related crimes, should not suggest or
entertain any notions (or encourage any steps) towards compromises between the prosecutrix
and the accused to get married, suggest or mandate mediation between the accused and the
survivor, or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and jurisdiction;

f) Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who should ensure that there is no
traumatization of the prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during the
arguments, and

g) Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or written, that would undermine or
shake the confidence of the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court.

The Bench cautioned judges from following certain stereotypes about women when passing
orders. [Key Words: Canadian Commentaries on Judicial Conduct, Henrik Ibsen, “irrelevant,
freaky or illegal bail conditions”, “such other conditions court considers necessary” and “as it
may think fit”, compromise between the survivor and accused, gender equality and gender
sensitization, Bangkok General Guidance for Judges on Applying a Gender Perspective in South
East Asia, sexual violence, CEDAW, DEVAW, judicial stereotyping] [Coram: A.M.
Khanwilkar, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

Family Law
In Aman Lohia v. Kiran Lohia, the Court held that an application filed by the respondent under
Section 151, CPC could not be regarded as a substantive petition required to be filed under
Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The Court held that the Family Court does not
have plenary powers to waive mandatory procedural requirements and that the nature of inquiry
before the Family Court is adjudicatory. The Court held that the Family Court was required to
inform the appellant about making alternative arrangements where his counsel was discharged.
Where there was no mention about the service of various orders, the Court held that there could
be no legal presumption that the appellant had abandoned proceedings. [Key Words:
guardianship and custody of minor child, CPC, Section 7(g) of the Family Courts Act 1984 ]
[Coram: AM Khanwilkar, J., BR Gavai. J., Krishna Murari, J.]

Land Acquisition
In Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. v. West Bengal Mineral Development and Trading Corporation
Ltd., the Court affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and held that
from the date of insertion of Section 10B in the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1947, the State was on notice that the premises would have to be
released before 15.08.1998 and that the state had 11.5 years to act and acquire the premises.
Therefore, the State issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act without
invoking the urgency provision and after the expiry of the requisition period would not wash
away the lethargy of the State in initiating acquisition proceedings. The Court also held that the
compensation for illegal occupation of premises cannot be assessed by the District Judge under
Section 11(1)(b) of the West Bengal Act as the section refers to compensation during the period
of requisition and not after the property continues to remain with the State without any authority
of law after the expiry of the requisition period. [Key Words: West Bengal Premises Requisition
and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1947, Land Acquisition Act 1894][Coram: RF
Nariman, J., BR Gavai, J.]

In UP Awas Evam Vikash Parishad vs Asha Ram (D) The LRs & Ors., the Court considered 51
appeals in all wherein the High Court by the impugned judgment had determined the
compensation of Rs. 297 per sq. yard to be paid to the respondents. The proceedings arose out of
land acquired by the petitioner vide a notification dated 26.06.1982 under Section 28 of the U.P
Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam 1965 (the “Act”) and subsequently under Section 32 of
the Act. In 1989, the Special Land Acquisition Officer determined the compensation of Rs. 50
per sq. yard and Rs. 35 per sq. yard for parcels larger than 8 acres. Aggrieved the respondents
sought a Reference for determination of the market value. The Additional District Judge awarded
a compensation of Rs.120/- per sq. yard. Dissatisfied with the compensation the respondents
appealed before the High Court. The High Court confirmed the compensation. In the SLP against
the judgment of the High Court, the Court remitted the matters back to the High Court with a
direction to consider additional documents filed by the respondents. The High Court
reconsidered the matters and awarded a sum of Rs. 297/- per sq. yard. Hearing the appeals
against the common judgment, the Court referred to its judgments including, Smt. Tribeni Devi
& Ors. (1972) 1 SCC 480 to list the methods of valuation to be adopted to ascertain the market
value of land, including opinion of experts and price paid by bonafide purchasers of lands
adjacent to lands acquired at a time reasonably close to the notification of acquisition. The Court
noted that the respondents had failed to adduce the additional documents before the High Court
and moreover, some of sale instances referred to were much later in time and could not be
considered. The Court also noted that there was nothing on record to show the potentiality of the
lands acquired or that there was industrial development in the area. The Court observed that the
Reference Court had determined the compensation after taking relevant factors into
consideration including the size of the lands being acquired. The Court allowed the appeals and
restored the compensation awarded by the Reference Court at Rs. 120 per sq. yard. [Key Words:
U.P Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam 1965, Land acquisition, determination of market
value, compensation,] [Coram: U.U. Lalit, J., Hemant Gupta, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

Service Law
In Jagmohan Singh Dhillon Etc. Etc. v. Satwant Singh & Ors., the Bench upheld the Division
Bench’s judgment and disagreed with the Single Judge as the appellant was found to be not
entitled to claim the benefit of military service for the purpose of seniority for appointment to the
Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch) since the benefit of Rule 4(1) of 1972 Rules was not
continued in 1982 Rules, and that the appellant’s seniority was to be governed by the statutory
rules applicable after the enforcement of the 1982 Rules. This was so because seniority and
appointment were completely different concepts. [Key Words: Article 309 of the Constitution,
seniority] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., S. Abdul Nazeer, J., Hemant Gupta, J.]

In Sachin Kumar & Ors.vs Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board (DSSSB) & Ors., a
batch of 12 appeals arose from the judgment and order of the High Court upholding the judgment
and order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, (“Tribunal”) by which the Tribunal had set
aside the order DSSSB and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi
(“GNCTD”) cancelling the recruitment process conducted for the post of Head Clerk but limited
the benefit of the judgment only to the 6 applicants who had approached the Tribunal (while
requiring them to retake the tier II exam). Against the judgment of the High Court, DSSSB and
the GNCTD filed appeal seeking to uphold their order, whereas other appellants included other
candidates who were otherwise successful but were excluded for not having approached the
Tribunal and the 6 applicants who were aggrieved by the requirement to sit for the tier II exam.
The issue arose out the recruitment conducted by DSSSB for the post of Head Clerk, for which it
had issued advertisement in 2009 attracting over 60 thousand applicants, but conducted the tier I
examination only in 2014, for which about 8214 people appeared, of which 2415 candidates
wrote the tier II examination. During this time, considering complaints of irregularity in the
conduct of the exam, GNCTD constituted a committee, which pointed out several issues in the
process including delay in conduct of the exam, issuing admit cards only through online mode
when that was not specified in the advertisement, lack of randomization in seating arrangement
leading to close relatives being seated in the same rooms, that over 50% of those appearing in the
tier the court exam were from only 22 pin codes out of 609 pin codes from which applications
were sent. Thereafter, GNCTD further directed DSSSB to verify the credentials of the candidates
within the zone of consideration. Upon verification, irregularity was discovered with respect to 9
candidates out 290, including possibility of impersonation. Considering the circumstances,
GNCTD recommended the cancellation of the selection process after providing suitable age
relaxation to eligible candidates in the fresh exams, leading the DSSSB to cancel the selection
process. The Court referred to several judgments including Chairman, Railway Recruitment
Board (2010) 6 SCC 614 and Kalamani 2019 SCC Online 1002 to emphasize that a recruiting
authority is entitled to take a bona fide view based on the material before it that the entire process
stands vitiated necessitating a fresh selection process and such a considered decision should not
be lightly interfered in exercise of powers of judicial review unless such a decision fails tests of
reasonableness or proportionality. The Court considering the reports of the committees pointing
to various lacunae in the conduct of the selection process, held that DSSSB and GNCTD were
entitled to cancel the selection process. The Court thus allowed DSSSB’ and GNCTD’s appeal
setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal. The Court dismissed the appeals
of the candidates. [Key Words: Recruitment Process, Article 14, Article 16, Sanctity of
recruitment process, irregularity, corrupt practices, Cancellation of entire process when
permissible] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In Chairman Administrative Committee UP Milk Union & Dairy Federation Centralized

Services v. Jagpal Singh, the issue related to an order where the respondent was ordered to be
reverted to the minimum pay scale and the period of suspension was to be considered as a period
spent by the employee in service. The respondent employee was penalized for having a hidden
chamber of milk In the tanker which caused financial losses to the Federation. The Court ruled
that Section 122 of the Act and Rule 389-A of the Rules empower the State to constitute an
authority for recruitment, training and disciplinary control of the employees of Co-Operative
Societies. Under Rule 15 of the Dairy Service Rules, the Chairman of the Administrative
Committee was the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority. The Court held that Rule 15 does not
contemplate the Chairman to have prior concurrence of any authority. [Key Words: Uttar
Pradesh Co-Operative Societies Act 1965, Uttar Pradesh Co-Operative Societies Rules 1968,
Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Dairy Federation and Milk Union Centralised Service Rules
1984, Chandra Pal Singh v. State of UP Writ-A 45263 of 2011,  ][Coram: UU Lalit, J., Hemant
Gupta, J., S Ravindra Bhat, J.]
In University of Delhi v. Delhi University Contract Employees Union, where contract
employees sought regularization in terms of paragraph 53 of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1, the Court ruled that the High Court’s decision to reject was correct
as the judgment in Umadevi  applied to employees who had put in more than 10 years of service
while the employees in this case had only put in 3-4 years of service. However, the Court ruled
that while they could not avail the benefit of regularization, they must be given a window of
opportunity to compete with available taken through public advertisement and agreed with the
modality proposed by the University. [Key Words: UGC ban on filling up of non-teaching posts,
Recruitment Rules (Non-Teaching Employees) 2008][Coram: UU Lalit, J., KM Joseph, J.]

In Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Bench adopted the purposive rule of
interpretation in holding that as per the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, the State could promote sub-
inspectors to inspectors if the former had eight years’ approved service to their credit, atleast 5
years being as sub-inspectors. This was because “…for promotion to Sub-Inspector to selection
grade eight years’ approved service was contemplated which was with intent that sufficient
experience is gained by Police personnel to be considered for promotion to Inspector who is to
man a Police Station and has to discharge other important functions.” [Key Words: direct
appointment, selection grades, promotional scale, Rules 14.13, 13.14 and 13.15 of Punjab Police
Rules 1934 [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.]

In Union of India v. P. Balasubrahmanayam, the respondent had been issued a charge memo by
the Disciplinary Authority, Department of Posts under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which related to both procedural lapses in
discharge of his duties as well as alleged illegal gratification by way of bribes. An adverse report
was issued against the Respondent on culmination of the departmental proceedings where no
charges of bribery were made out against the respondent but all charges relating to procedural
lapses were held to have been proved. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad(“CAT”)
held the conclusion to be just and proper, but reduced the penalty imposed on the respondent.
The High Court set aside the order of the CAT and directed the reinstatement of the respondent
by holding that since the charges had a vigilance angle, the same could not been issued without
prior approval of the Chief Vigilance Officer as mandated by a circular dated 18.01.2005 of the
Department of Posts, Ministry of Communication and I.T. The Supreme Court set aside the order
passed by the High Court by stating that since negligence of the respondent in performing his
duties had been proved, it was not appropriate for the High Court to give the respondent a clean
chit as a consequence of the Circular not being followed, as the same would not have been done
if the charges had only been pertaining to procedural lapses and not bribery. [Key Words: Rule
14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965, Central
Vigilance Officer, disciplinary authority, illegal gratification, procedural lapses] [Coram: SK
Kaul, J., Hrishikesh Roy J.]

In The State of Tamil Nadu v. K Shobana, the Court held that the word ‘first’ in Section 27(F)
of the TN Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act did not pertain to the general
candidates’ list/ vacancies and that Section 27 would apply only when the reservation principle
began, after filing up the seats on merit. The Court held that in the given facts, first the merit list
was to be filled in, then the backlog vacancies of the particular reserved category to be thereafter
filled in ‘first’, and then the remaining reserved vacancies for the current year to be filled
thereafter. [Key Words: direct recruitment to the post of Post Graduate Assistants and Physical
Education Directors, Grade – I, reservation for Most Backward Class (MBC) and Denotified
Community (DNC) candidates, Section 27(f) of Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions
of Service) Act 2016][Coram: SK Kaul, J., Dinesh Maheshwari, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.]

Constitutional Law
In Lt Col Nitisha v. Union of India, the Court held that the process of evaluating WSSCOs for
the grant of PC was by a belated application of general policy which did not redress the harms of
gendered discrimination that the Court had identified in Babita Puniya (2020) 7 SCC 469 and
such a belated and formal application caused indirect discrimination. The Court also held that the
benchmarking criterion of comparing female candidates with the last male counterparts from the
corresponding batch was required only when the number of eligible female officers exceeded the
cap of 250 officers who would be granted PC annually. Importantly, the Court held that it has to
look at the effect of the concerned criteria, not at the intent underlying its adoption. Since such a
pattern of evaluation would exclude from the grant of PC on grounds beyond their control, it was
indirectly discriminatory against WSSCOs. The Court ruled that all women officers who have
fulfilled the cut-off grade of 60 per cent in the Special No 5 Selection Board in September 2020
shall be entitled to the grant of PC, subject to their meeting the medical criteria. For the purpose
of determining medical criteria, it shall be at the time of 5th year of service or at 10th year of
service as the case may be. [Key Words: systemic discrimination, substantive equality, indirect
discrimination, competitive merit][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra, the challenge arose from the order passed by the High
Court which had dismissed a writ petition challenging a notice issued by the Police Inspector
calling for the personal presence of the appellant before the investigating officer of the Anti
Corruption Bureau, Nagpur to give his statement in an open enquiry in respect of the property
owned by him. It was argued by the appellant that such notice had no statutory force and was
also hit by Article 20 (3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The question before the court was
to assess whether such an enquiry at the pre-FIR stage would be legal and permissible. The Court
relied on Lalita Kumari (2014) 2 SCC 1 and P Sirajuddin (1970) 1 SCC 595 to hold that an
enquiry at pre-FIR stage was permissible and even desirable, particularly in cases where the
allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice in acquiring the assets/properties. The Court
further held that such a preliminary enquiry would be permissible only to ascertain the disclosure
of cognizable offences, cannot be a fishing or roving enquiry, cannot be treated as a confessional
statement but only as an opportunity to the appellant to clarify the allegations made against him.
[Key Words: pre-FIR enquiry, preliminary enquiry, open enquiry, scope and extent, personal
presence, corrupt practice] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

In Union Public Service Commission v. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi, the Supreme Court criticized
the High Court of Orissa for cutting, copying, and pasting from the judgment of the Central
Administrative Tribunal instead of employing substantive reasoning. As the High Court did not
reason, as it was required to do so under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court set
aside the impugned judgment and restored the matter to the High Court. [Key Words: Central
Administrative Tribunal, UPSC, Article 226 of the Constitution, promotion to IAS, DOPT
Guidelines, Departmental Promotion Committees][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]
IBC
In A Navinchandra Steels Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited, the Court held
that in a conflict, the provisions of the IBC would prevail over the Companies Act. Further, the
Court held that once a winding up petition was admitted, it should trump any subsequent attempt
at revival of the company through petitions under Sections 7 or 9 IBC and that a petition under
Section 7 IBC was an independent proceeding which must be tried on its own merits. [Key
Words: winding up petition, NCLT, NCLAT, IBC, Sections 13(2), 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act]
[Coram: RF Nariman, J., BR Gavai, J.]

In Arun Kumar Jagtramka vs Jindal Steel and Power Ltd and Anr. the Court was considering
two appeals and a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India wherein the appellants
were aggrieved by the judgments of the National Companies Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”)
holding that promoters who are ineligible to propose a resolution plan under Section 29A of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”) were also not eligible to file an application for
compromise and arrangement under Section 230 to 232 of the Companies Act 2013, where the
liquidation has been initiated under the IBC. The Petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution
challenged the constitutional validity of the Regulation 2B of the the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations 2016 (“Liquidation Regulations”), which after
the amendment in 2020 states that a person ineligible to submit a resolution plan cannot be a
party to a compromise or arrangement. The Court referred to its decisions in Chitra Sharma
(2018) 18 SCC 575, ArcelorMittal (2019) 2 SCC 1 to state that Section 29A of the IBC has to be
interpreted purposively to exclude persons whose misconduct has contributed to the defaults on
part of the debtor from participating in the resolution process. The Court also referred to Swiss
Ribbons (2019) 4 SCC 17 where the Court had held that the norm underlying Section 29A of the
IBC would permeate Section 35 (1) (f) as well, i.e. to liquidation as well. The Court went on to
state that liquidation under Chapter III of the IBC and subsequent revival of the debtor under
Section 230 of the Companies Act forms a statutory continuum. Whereas Section 230 of the
Companies Act has wider ambit, it has to be read harmoniously with the IBC when it is invoked
in the statutory scheme under the IBC. In such context, the ineligibilities attaching under Section
35 (1) (f) read with 29A of IBC would apply. The Court also clearly distinguished
withdrawal simplicitor under Section 12A of the IBC from the approval of resolution plan under
Section 31 of the IBC or Scheme of compromise sanctioned under Section 230 of Companies
Act both in terms of statutory context and consequences. The Court also upheld the validity of
the Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Regulations, as being only clarificatory in nature and
satisfying the requirements under Section 240 (1) of the IBC, i.e., of being consistent with the
IBC and being made to carry out the provisions of the IBC. Consequently, the Court dismissed
the appeals and the petition under Article 32. [Key Words: Section 29A of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016, Section 230 to 232 of the Companies Act 2013, Regulation 2B of the the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations 2016, promoters’
eligibility to participate in compromise and arrangement] [ Coram: D.Y Chandrachud, J., M. R.
Shah, J.]

In Alok Kaushik vs Mrs. Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and others, the appellant was the
registered valuer appointed by the Interim Resolution Professional-respondent no. 1 for
conducting valuation of the plant and machinery of the Corporate Debtor. The COC approved
the fees payable to the appellant as Rs. 7.5 lakhs plus expense. The appellant was in the process
of the conducting such valuations, when the NCLAT set-aside the initiation of the Insolvency
Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor and remitted the matter to NCLT for
determination of costs of CIRP. The IRP-respondent no. 1 informed the appellant that the fees
paid could not be paid and paid only Rs.50,000. The appellant being aggrieved, filed an
application before the NCLT under Section 60 (5) of the IBC challenging the non-payment of
fees. The NCLT declined to entertain the application stating that it had been rendered functus
officio. NCLAT dismissed the appeal, resulting in the present appeal under Section 62 of the
IBC. The Court relied on its recent decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 194  where it has clarified that the jurisdiction of NCLT under Section 60 (5)(c) of
the IBC has the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes which arise solely from or relate to the
insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The Court noted that the present case would fall within such
jurisdiction and the NCLT had erred in stating that it had become functus offico. The Court also
noted that the availability of a grievance redressal mechanism before the IBBI under Section 217
of the IBC does not divest the NCLT of jurisdiction under Section 60 (5) (c) of the IBC. The
Court set aside the impugned the judgement and remitted the matter to NCLT for determination
of costs payable to the appellant. [Key Words: Costs of Interim Resolution Professional, Fees
payable to registered valuer, Section 60 (5)(c) of the IBC, disputes relating to insolvency]
[Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M R Shah, J.]

In N. Subramanian vs. M/s Aruna Hotels & Anr., the appellant being a retired employee of the
Respondent, had moved an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
2016 (“IBC”) before the National Company Law Tribunal(“NCLT”), on account of salary due to
him amounting to Rs. 1.87 Crores from the year 1998 till his retirement in 2013. The NCLT
admitted the appellant’s application on account of Rs. 1.06 Crores being admitted as being due
vide a letter of acknowledgement and initiated moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC.
Considering the Respondent’s appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal set aside
the order of NCLT stating that the appellant’s application was time barred since he failed to
explain the delay in making a claim for arrears since 1998 and that the Respondent had raised a
dispute of such liability. The Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the NCLT after
noticing that the Respondent Company had in fact issued a letter acknowledging the dues on
30.09.2014, which was in any case within 3 years of the date of the application and that NCLAT
had erred in its conclusion that there was a pending dispute when there was a clear
acknowledgement of the dues. [Key Words: Section 9 IBC, Acknowledgement, Limitation]
[Coram: R. F. Nariman, J., B.R. Gavai, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.]

In P Mohanraj & Ors. V. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt Ltd., the question before the Court was
whether proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act were hit by Section 14 IBC. The
Court held that the exception in Section 14(3) to moratorium included transactions evidencing a
debt or a liability, as was clear from the language of Sections 96(3), 101(3), and 14(3)(a)/(b)
IBC. The Court also held that the word ‘or’ in Section 14(1)(a) in “the institution of
suits or continuation of pending suits” must be read conjunctively. The Court also held that since
the word proceedings is widened by the phrasing of “any judgment, decree or order” and “any
court of law, tribunal…” and thus criminal proceedings under the CrPC would also be
prohibited. When asked to use the noscitur a sociis rule of interpretation, the Court ruled that
where a residuary phrase is used as a catch-all expression to take within its scope what may
reasonably be comprehended by a provision, noscitur a sociis could not be used to colour an
otherwise wide expression. The Court also reiterated that the purpose of the moratorium would
be chipped away if quasi criminal proceedings which would deplete the assets of the corporate
debtor were permitted. The Court ruled that a quasi-criminal proceeding under Chapter XVII of
the NI Act would be a proceeding under Section 14(1)(a) and the moratorium would attach to
such proceeding. Further, the Court ruled that such moratorium would only prohibit proceedings
against the corporate debtor and proceedings under Section 141 NI Act could be continued
against persons, such as the Director of the corporate debtor. [Key Words: Sections 138, 141 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, Section 8 IBC, interpretation of statutes, nature of
proceedings under the NI Act 1881][Coram: RF Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., KM Sinha, J.]

In Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v. NBCC (India)
Ltd. & Ors., the issue related to the resolution plan in the corporate insolvency resolution process
under the IBC concerning the corporate debtor, Jaypee Infratech Limited. In summary, the Court
held as follows:

i. The Adjudicating Authority has limited jurisdiction in the matter of approval of a resolution
plan, which is circumscribed by Sections 30(2) and 31 of the Code. In the adjudicatory process
concerning a resolution plan under IBC, there is no scope for interference with the commercial
aspects of the decision of the Committee of Creditors (CoC). In case of any legitimate
shortcoming, it could only send the resolution plan back to the CoC, for re-submission.

ii. The approval of the resolution plan of NBCC is not vitiated because of simultaneous
consideration and voting over two resolution plans by the CoC.

iii. Re. the stipulations in the resolution plan which had not been approved, the only correct
course for the Adjudicating Authority was to send the plan back to the CoC for reconsideration.

iv. The Adjudicating Authority has not erred in disapproving the proposed treatment of
dissenting financial creditor like ICICI Bank in the resolution plan; but has erred in modifying
the related terms of the resolution plan itself;

v. The homebuyers as a class having assented to the resolution plan of NBCC, any individual
homebuyer or any association of homebuyers cannot maintain a challenge to the resolution plan
and cannot be treated as a dissenting financial creditor or an aggrieved person; when the
resolution plan comprehensively deals with all the assets and liabilities of the corporate debtor,
no housing project of the corporate debtor could be segregated merely for the reason that same
has been completed or is nearing completion.

vi. Clause 23 of Schedule 3 of the resolution plan, providing for extinguishment of security
interest of the lenders could not have been approved by the Adjudicating Authority, particularly
in relation to the security interest that has not been discharged.

vii. As regards possession/control over the project sites/lands, it was left open for the resolution
applicant to take recourse to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, whenever
occasion so arose.

viii. The Appellate Authority was not justified in providing for an Interim Monitoring Committee
for implementation of the resolution plan in question during the pendency of appeals. The
impugned order dated 22.04.2020 passed by NCLAT is set aside.
Exercising its power under Article 142, in order to do complete justice between the parties, the
Court extended the time period by 45 days from the date of the judgment for submission of the
modified / fresh resolution plans by the resolution applicants, for their consideration by CoC and
for submission of report by IRP to Adjudicating Authority.

[Key Words: Jaypee Infratech Limited, CIRP, resolution plan, resolution applicants, extension of
time, Article 142, complete justice between the parties, Committee of Creditors, NBCC India,
Sections 30, 31, 60(5) IBC, RERA, homebuyers] [Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., Dinesh
Maheshwari, J., Sanjiv Khanna, J.]

In  Kridhan Infrastructure Pvt Ltd (now known as Krish Steel and Trading Pvt Ltd) v.
Venkatesan Sankaranarayan & Ors, an appeal had been filed against an order of the NCLAT.
In this dispute, the appellant had failed to implement its resolution plan for over eight months .
The Court held that as the appellant had not complied with orders and had been granted
sufficient opportunities to raise its concerns, and held that the forfeiture of rupees 20 crores as
ordered was valid. [Key Words: NCLAT, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Rule 11
of the NCLAT Rules 2016, ][Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd and Anr., the
Bench held Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 does not make it mandatory to file an
application in writing before relief can be granted. Advocating for a purposive interpretation of
Section 14 of the Limitation 1963 instead of a narrow and pedantic one, the Bench held that the
provisions of the Limitation Act would apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC in
the NCLT/NCLAT. It further noted that in view of the ambit of the proceedings under the IBC
before NCLT/NCLAT, the expression “court” in Section 14(2) would be deemed to be any
forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act. It
was further noted that Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act were not mutually exclusive and
even in cases where Section 14 did not strictly apply, the principles of Section 14 could be
invoked to grant relief to an applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by purposively
construing ‘sufficient cause’ as it was settled that omission to refer to the correct section of a
statute does not vitiate an order. [Key Words: “sufficient cause”, incorporation, reference, “as far
as may be”] [Coram: Indira Banerjee, J., Hemant Gupta, J.]

In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors., the challenge was to the judgment
by the NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC, upholding the NCLT’s stay on the termination by
the Appellant of its Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with one Astonfield Solar (Gujarat) Pvt.
Ltd. Two issues arose. The first was, whether the NCLT/NCLAT could exercise jurisdiction
under the IBC over disputes arising from a PPA, and the second was whether the appellant’s
right to terminate the PPA under the Agreement was regulated by the IBC. The Court held that
the NCLT/NCLAT could have exercised jurisdiction under section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to stay
the termination of the PPA by the appellant, since the appellant sought to terminate the PPA
under Article 9.2.1(e) only on account of the CIRP being initiated against the Corporate Debtor.
The Court further held that the NCLT/NCLAT correctly stayed the termination of the PPA by
the appellant, since allowing it to terminate the PPA would certainly result in the corporate death
of the Corporate Debtor due to the PPA being its sole contract. The Court left the broader
question of the validity/invalidity of ipso facto clauses in contracts open for legislative
intervention [Key Words: Power Purchase Agreement, termination, arising out of, in relation
to, ipso facto clauses, CIRP, IBC, corporate death] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah
J.]

In Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India and Anr., the Bench held that in accordance with
the provisions of the IBC and Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the status of the
guarantor, who is a corporate person, “metamorphoses” into the corporate debtor, the moment
the principal borrower (regardless of not being a corporate person) commits default in payment
of debt which had become “due and payable”. The Bench rejected the Appellant’s argument that
“since the loan was offered to a proprietary firm (not a corporate person), action under Section
7 of the Code cannot be initiated against the corporate person even though it had offered
guarantee in respect of that transaction”. Secondly, the Bench held that acknowledgment of the
liability by the principal borrower within the limitation period, does not absolve the guarantor of
its liability even if the latter had not acknowledged. The Bench found the liability within the
period of limitation as per Section 238A of the IBC, Section 18 read with Article 137 of the
Limitation Act 1963. [Editor Note: Paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 of Laxi Pat Surana were relied
upon by the Supreme Court in its judgment dated 15 April 2021 in Asset Reconstruction
Company v. Bishal Jaiswal Civil Appeal No. 323 of 2021] [Key Words: Section 3 of the
Limitation Act 1963, complete code, debt, corporate debtor, corporate person, guarantor and
guarantee, financial debt] [Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., B.R. Gavai, J., Krishna Murari, J.]

In Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr., the Bench held as
follows:

i. The respondent’s appeals before NCLAT were not time barred and Section 14 of the
Limitation Act 1963 saved the appeals because in the facts before the Bench, the Respondent
filed its writ before the Bombay High Court immediately after NCLT pronounced its judgment
and before the certified copy could be made available on the “principal ground, that the
procedure followed by NCLT was in breach of principles of natural justice” and that “such a
ground could be legitimately pursued before a writ court”. Hence, it was not a proceeding before
the wrong court at all. Moreover, the High Court had dismissed the writ on the basis on of
alternate and equally efficacious remedy.

ii. The Bench held that there was no waiver and acquiescence by the Respondent stopping it
from challenging the Appellant’s participation. This was not a pure commercial contract and it
would be wrong to suggest that the Resolution Professional and Application had equal
bargaining power.

iii. The NCLAT was incorrect in law in interfering with the business decision of the Committee
of Creditors. This was because Section 31 of the IBC mandated that its role be confined to
verifying whether the Resolution Plan provided:

a) provided for the payment of insolvency resolution process costs in a specified manner in
priority to the repayment of other debts of the corporate debtor,

b) provided for the repayment of the debts of operational creditors in prescribed manner,

c) provided for the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor,

d) provided for the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan,

e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force,

f) conformed to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board.

[Key Words: waiver, estoppel, acquiescence, limitation, commercial wisdom, bargaining power,
dotted line, consent, meaningful choice] [Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., B.R. Gavai, J., Krishna
Murari, J.]

Election
In  Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., the challenge, inter alia, was to
Section 12(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samits Act, 1961, as ultra
vires the provisions of Articles 243-D and 243-T, as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India. The validity of two Notifications issued by the State Election Commission providing for
reservation exceeding 50 per cent qua Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis was also
questioned. The petitioners sought to rely upon the Constitution Bench judgment in K. Krishna
Murthy (2010) 7 SCC 202, to argue that it was no longer open to the respondents to reserve more
than 50 per cent (aggregate) seats in the concerned local bodies by providing reservation for
SC/ST/OBCs. After a detailed analysis of the judgment of the Constitution Bench, though the
Court negatived the challenge to the validity of Section 12(2)(c), it read down the provision to
mean that reservation in favour of OBCs in the concerned local bodies can be notified to the
extent that it does not exceed aggregate 50 per cent of the total seats reserved in favour of
SC/ST/OCBs taken together. [Key Words: State Election Commission, constitutional challenge,
reservation exceeding 50%, equality clause, ultra vires, local self-government, SC/ST/OBCs,
reading down, ‘shall be’ and ‘may be’] [Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., Indu Malhotra, J., Ajay
Rastogi, J.]

In Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court
refused to stay the issuance of electoral bonds by way of an interim measure. The reason was that
the Bench was not convinced that the Electoral Bond Scheme 2018 enabled “…complete
anonymity in the financing of political parties by corporate houses, both in India and abroad…”
as “…the purchase of the bonds as well as their encashment could happen only through banking
channels and if purchase of bonds are allowed only to customers who fulfill KYC norms, the
information about the purchaser will certainly be available with the SBI which alone is
authorised to issue and encash the bonds as per the Scheme”. The Bench further noted that “…
any expenditure incurred by anyone in purchasing the bonds through banking channels, will
have to be accounted as an expenditure in his books of accounts” and such “…trial balance,
cash flow statement, profit and loss account and balance sheet of companies which purchase
Electoral Bonds will have to necessarily reflect the amount spent by way of expenditure in the
purchase of Electoral Bonds” as per provisions of the Companies Act 2013. [Key Words:
Electoral Bond Scheme 2018, Sections 128, 129, 133, 137 of the Companies Act 2013] [Coram:
S.A. Bobde, CJI., A.S. Bopanna, J., V. Ramasubramanian, J.]

In State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh and Anr., the issue related to the bar to interference by
courts in electoral matters relating to delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such
constituencies, specifically in the context of municipal elections. The Supreme Court laid down
the following principles of law:

i. Under Article 243ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an
election petition presented to a Tribunal. This would mean that from the date of notification of
the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-
obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles 226 and 227
from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar
operates only during this period.

ii. If, however, the assistance of a writ court is required in subserving the progress of the election
and facilitating its completion, the writ court may issue orders provided that the election process,
once begun, cannot be postponed or protracted in any manner.

iii. The non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG does not operate as a bar after the
election tribunal decides an election dispute before it.

iv. Under Article 243ZA(1), the SEC is in overall charge of the superintendence, direction and
control of the preparation of electoral rolls, and the conduct of all municipal elections. In
extraordinary cases, the SEC may conduct elections after such term is over, only for good reason.

v. Judicial review of a State Election Commission’s order is available on grounds of review of

administrative orders. Here again, the writ court must adopt a hands-off policy while the election
process is on and interfere either before the process commences or after such process is
completed unless interfering with such order subserves and facilitates the progress of the
election.

vi. Article 243ZA(2) makes it clear that the law made by the legislature of a State relating to or
in connection with elections to municipalities, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
and in particular Article 243T, which deals with reservation of seats.

vii. The bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates that there be a judicial hands-off of the writ
court or any court in questioning the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituency
or allotment of seats to such constituency made or purporting to be made under Article 243ZA.

viii. Any challenge to orders relating to delimitation or allotment of seats including preparation
of electoral rolls, not being part of the election process, can also be challenged under the
statutory provisions dealing with delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such
constituencies.

ix. The Constitutional bar of Article 243ZG(a) applies only to courts and not the State Election
Commission, which is to supervise, direct and control preparation of electoral rolls and conduct
elections to municipalities.

x. It is the duty of the SEC to countermand illegal orders made by any authority including the
State Government which delimit constituencies or allot seats to such constituencies.
Further, on facts, it was held that the Law Secretary of the State could not be said to be an
independent State Election Commissioner.

[Key Words: State Election Commission, delimitation of constituencies, election tribunal,

municipal elections, concession by counsel, constitutional bar, Goa Municipalities Act, judicial
hands-off approach] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., B.R. Gavai, J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.]

Tax
In Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited v. The Commissioner of
Income Tax & Anr., the Bench held that though the transaction was the software “’licensed’ by
the foreign, non-resident supplier to the distributor and resold to the resident end-user, or directly
supplied to the resident end-user”, the “real nature of transaction” was the “sale of the sale of a
physical object which contains an embedded computer programme, and is therefore, a sale of
goods”. In an elaborate 226-page judgment, on the facts, the Bench held as follows:,

i. In light of the definition of “royalties” contained in Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA, it

was clear that there was no obligation on the persons mentioned in Section 195 of the Income
Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases
did not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use
of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (Section 9(1)
(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial
to the assessees, would have no application in the facts of these cases.

ii. The amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software
manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through
EULAs/distribution agreements, was not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the
computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a
result of which the persons referred to in Section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to
deduct any TDS under Section 195 of the Income Tax Act.

On an analysis of various judgments, the Bench clarified the law relating to copyright at
paragraph 117, which is reproduced as below:

i. Copyright is an exclusive right, which is negative in nature, being a right to restrict others
from doing certain acts.

ii. Copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right, in the nature of a privilege, which is quite
independent of any material substance. Ownership of copyright in a work is different from the
ownership of the physical material in which the copyrighted work may happen to be embodied.
An obvious example is the purchaser of a book or a CD/DVD, who becomes the owner of the
physical article, but does not become the owner of the copyright inherent in the work, such
copyright remaining exclusively with the owner.

iii. Parting with copyright entails parting with the right to do any of the acts mentioned in
section 14 of the Copyright Act. The transfer of the material substance does not, of itself, serve
to transfer the copyright therein. The transfer of the ownership of the physical substance, in
which copyright subsists, gives the purchaser the right to do with it whatever he pleases, except
the right to reproduce the same and issue it to the public, unless such copies are already in
circulation, and the other acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act.

iv. A licence from a copyright owner, conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, does not
entail parting with any copyright, and is different from a licence issued under section 30 of the
Copyright Act, which is a licence which grants the licensee an interest in the rights mentioned in
section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. Where the core of a transaction is to authorize the
end-user to have access to and make use of the “licensed” computer software product over
which the licensee has no exclusive rights, no copyright is parted with and consequently, no
infringement takes place, as is recognized by section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. It makes no
difference whether the end-user is enabled to use computer software that is customised to its
specifications or otherwise.

v. A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence, merely enabling the use of a copyrighted product,

is in the nature of restrictive conditions which are ancillary to such use, and cannot be
construed as a licence to enjoy all or any of the enumerated rights mentioned in section 14 of the
Copyright Act, or create any interest in any such rights so as to attract section 30 of the
Copyright Act.

vi. The right to reproduce and the right to use computer software are distinct and separate
rights, as has been recognized in SBI v. Collector of Customs, 2000 (1) SCC 727 (see paragraph
21), the former amounting to parting with copyright and the latter, in the context of non-
exclusive EULAs, not being so.

[Key Words: royalty, sale of copyrighted material, sale of copyright, principle of first sale,
Copyright Act, DTAA, double taxation, “in respect of”, impotentia excusat legem, lex non cogit
ad impossibilia, doctrine of first sale/principle of exhaustion, OECD Commentary] [Coram: RF
Nariman, J., Hemant Gupta, J., B.R. Gavai, J.]

In M/s Canon India Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, the issue before the Court
was whether after clearance of cameras on the basis that they were exempt from levy of basic
Customs duty, proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence for recovery of
duty under Section 28(4) Customs Act, 1962 were valid in law. The Court held that the use of the
article ‘the’ in Section 28(4) of the Act was with the intention to designate the proper officer who
had assessed the goods at the time of the clearance, and that the proper officer need not be the
same officer who cleared the goods but could be an officer authorized to exercise the powers
within the same office. Since the re-assessment and recovery was to be done by the same
authority, therefore, the Additional Director General of DRI was not the proper officer to initiate
recovery proceedings. The Court also held that under Section 6 of the Customs Act, the officers
of the DRI were not customs officers and thus the notice issued by them was invalid. [Key
Words: Sections 2(2)(c), 130E Customs Act 1962, Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate
Tribunal, CESTAT, Notification 25/2005, Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board (1980) 3
SCC 358][Coram: SA Bobde, CJI, J., AS Bopanna, J., V Ramasubramanian, J.]

In The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Appellant U.P., Lucknow v. S/s Rujhan Studio , the
Bench held that under the AP VAT Act 2008, the commodity, being an “embroidered ladies suit”
which is unstitched, would fall under residuary entry under Schedule V. The Bench criticised the
High Court and Tribunal’s findings as being contrary to plain meaning of the UP VAT Act 2008.
[Key Words: textiles, manufacturing] [Coram: DY Chandrachud, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Westinghouse Saxby Farmer Ltd v. Commr. of Central Excise Calcutta, an appeal was filed
under Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act 1944, against the dismissal of the appeal by the
Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (“CESTAT”). The appellant company was
engaged in the manufacturing of ‘Relays’ which could be classified as electrical equipment and
signalling equipment, falling under Tariff Item No. 8536.90 and Item no. 8608 respectively. The
question before the Court was to ascertain the correct tariff classification of ‘Relays’ and also to
determine whether the show cause demand notices issued by the Department from time to time
were barred under Section 11 A of the Central Excise Act 1944. Allowing the appeal, it was
noted by the Court that since the competent authority had already approved the classification of
Relays under Item No. 8608, it was not proper for the authorities to now invoke Note 2 (f) of
Section XVII of the Chapter laying down tariff rates. The Court further held that the attempt to
undo the effect of the approval of the classification done on 27.08.1993, was time barred, even if
some of the individual statutory notices, were issued within the period of limitation as the
invocation of Section 11 A itself was time barred. [Key Words: Section 35 L (b), 11A Central
Excise Act 1944, classification of items, Note 2 (f) of Section XVII, general rules of
interpretation, barred by limitation] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI., A.S Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramaniam J.]

Consumer Law
In Narbada Devi & Ors. v. H.P. State Forest Corporation, the Bench declined to interfere with
the impugned order. It stated that death resulting from “asphyxiation caused by alcohol
consumption and regurgitation of food into larynx” did not amount to an accident under the Janta
Personal Accident Insurance Scheme. [Key Words: death, alcohol, insurance, natural death,
accidental death] [Coram: Mohan M. Shantagoudar, J., Vineet Saran, J.]

In Neena Aneja & Anr. V. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., the consumer case was instituted on
18.06.2020 under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Meanwhile, the material
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 were notified to come into force on 20.7.2020
and 24.07.2020. The NCDRC dismissed the consumer case on the ground that after the
enforcement of the 2019 Act, its pecuniary jurisdiction has been enhanced from rupees one crore
to ten crores. The Court, after a detailed consideration of the law on change of forum, set aside
the NCDRC order, and held that all the proceedings instituted before 20.07.2020 under the 1986
Act shall continue to be heard by the fora corresponding to those designated under the 1986 Act,
and not be transferred in terms of the new pecuniary limits established under the 2019 Act. In
arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court also took note of the financial hardship to the
consumer and the delay that may accrue on account of transfer of pending cases to the
lower fora. [Key Words: Consumer Protection Act, 2019, NCDRC, pecuniary jurisdiction,
change of forum, statement of objects and reasons] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah
J.]

In NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Shri Ram Trivedi, one of the terms of allotment of the flat envisaged
that the appellant would ‘endeavour to’ hand over the possession within two and a half years
from the date of allotment letter. In January 2017, the respondent instituted a consumer
complaint in NCDRC since possession had not been handed over since four and a half years. The
Court held that even though the expression ‘endeavour to’ does not mean an absolute
commitment to hand over possession on or before a specified date, it could not be construed as
leaving the date for handing over possession indefinite and at the absolute discretion of the
developer. The burden would lie on the developer to explain the steps taken to comply with the
contractual stipulation. However, the Supreme Court set aside the grant of compensation of Rs.
2,00,000/- by the NCDRC towards loss of rent, on the ground that once interest had been
awarded, there would be no justification to award an additional amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. [Key
Words: NCDRC, delay in possession, compensation, interest, burden of proof, force majeure,
loss of rent] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

CPC
In Mallanaguoda and Ors. v. Ninganagouda and Ors., the dispute arose from the allotment of 8
acres, 13 guntas of land in Block No.5 in a suit for partition and separate possession, to the
Respondent by the High Court. In doing so, the High Court had set aside the judgment of the
Trial Court as well as final decree proceedings and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court
to reconsider allotment of shares to each one of the parties in Block No.5, on the basis of the
same having non-agricultural potentiality, without substantiating the same. It was argued by the
appellants that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC in setting
aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court when the First Appellate Court had specifically
held that the convenience of the parties to cultivate the land is of prime importance which would
be inconvenienced if Block No.5 was partitioned equally between the parties. Setting aside the
judgment passed by the High Court, the Court held that the First Appellate Court is the final
court on facts whose judgment should not be interfered with unless there is a substantial question
of law, which was not present in this case. [Key Words: suit for partition, separate possession,
non-agricultural potentiality of land, Section 100 CPC, substantial question of law, final court on
facts] [Coram: L. Nageswara Rao, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

In Subodh Kumar vs Shamim Ahmed, the appellant-landlord had filed a suit for possession, rent
and mesne profit against the respondent-tenet in 1994. The trial court after affording several
opportunities to the tenant to file a written statement, decreed the suit ex-parte in favour of the
landlord. The tenant’s application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside the ex-
parte decree was dismissed and as also the application seeking the review of such rejection. The
tenant respondent then approached the High Court under its writ jurisdiction against both these
orders. The High Court allowed the tenant’s Write Petition, setting aside the rejection of the
application under Order 9 Rule 13 and remanded the application to be considered afresh. The
landlord’s application seeking review of the High Court’s judgment was also rejected, leading to
the present petition before the Supreme Court. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the
judgment of the High Court noting that the trial court had rightly rejected the application under
Order 9 Rule 13 since the application had failed to meet the requirement set out in proviso to
Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887, requiring an applicant seeking setting
aside of an ex-parte order to deposit the complete decretal amount along with such an
application. The Court relied on Kedarnath (2002) 2 SCC 16 to state that the compliance of the
proviso under Section 17 to be mandatory in nature. The Court further held that even on merits,
the trial court was correct to reject the application noting that the tenant had been given several
opportunities to file a written statement. The Court also noted that the tenant’s submission
regarding deposit of the rent under Section 30 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 during the pendency of the suit was also liable to be
rejected since the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 was
not applicable on the subject-property and additionally, the rents deposited still fell short of the
decretal amount to be deposited. [Key Words: Tenancy, Order 9, Rule 13 CPC, ex-parte decree,
Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887] [ Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R.
Subash Reddy, J.]

Miscellaneous
In Alka Khandu Avhad v. Amar Syamprasad Mishra and Anr., the challenge was to the
decision of the High Court which had refused to quash the complaint filed against the appellant
for offences punishable under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’). The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the
High Court of Bombay, by holding that since the appellant was not a signatory to the
dishonoured cheque and neither was the same drawn from a joint account, there cannot be any
joint liability of the Appellant under Section 138 or 141 of the NI Act, even if there is a joint
liability to pay. [Key Words: Section 138, 148, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, signatory, joint
liability, joint account] [Coram: D.Y. Chandrachud, J., M.R. Shah J.]

In Small Scale Industrial Manufactures Association (Regd.) vs Union of India & Ors. a wide
range of petitioners approached the Court under Article 32 claiming reliefs which are broadly as
follows:

I. a complete waiver of interest or interest on interest during the moratorium period;

II. there shall be sectorwise relief packages to be offered by the Union of India and/or the RBI
and/or the Lenders;

III. moratorium to be permitted for all accounts instead of being at the discretion of the Lenders;

IV. extension of moratorium beyond 31.08.2020;

V. whatever the relief packages are offered by the Central Government and/or the RBI and/or the
Lenders are not sufficient looking to the impact due to Covid19 Pandemic and during the
lockdown period due to Covid19 Pandemic;

VI. the last date for invocation of the resolution mechanism, namely, 31.12.2020 provided under
the 6.8.2020 circular should be extended.

The Court relied on a catena of judgments including Peerless General Finance (1992) 2 SCC
343, Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566, and Arun Kumar Agrawal (2013) 7 SCC 1 to state that
the Courts should be circumspect in impugning on matters of economic policy under its powers
of judicial review. The Court dismissed most of the petitions stating that the reliefs prayed for
were matters of policy to be decided by the Government and expert bodies such as the Reserve
Bank of India.

The Court rejected the submission that the Union of India had failed to formulate a National Plan
under Section 11 of the Disaster Management Act 2005 stating that the National Disaster
Management Authority (“NDMA”) had constituted empowered groups and considering the
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, various ministries were participating in the relief measures.
The Court also considered Section 13 of the Disaster Management Act 2005 to state that the use
of the word “may” in the provision denotes that the NDMA may recommend such measures as
relaxation in repayment of loans only when it is satisfied that by the reliefs already announced.
Additionally. The NDMA sent its views and recommendations to RBI by its O.M. dated
28.08.2020. Therefore, it could not be said that the NDMC had not performed its duty under
Section 13 of the Disaster Management Act 2005.

In regard to the charging of interest on interest for the period of moratorium and the eligibility
criteria set by the Central Government (loans upto Rs. 2 Crores for notified categories), the Court
held that the cap of loans upto Rs 2 Crores was arbitrary and discriminatory. The Court also
stated that interest on interest was payable by wilful defaulters during the moratorium period and
as such default during the moratorium period could not be said to willful and charging of interest
on interest as penal interest is unjustified. Therefore, the Court directed that there shall by no
interest on interest for the period of moratorium. [Key Words: Covid-19 Pandemic, relief
measures, waiver of interest, moratorium on repayment of loans, economic policy, National Plan
under Section 11 of the Disaster Management Act 2005, interest on interest] [Coram: Ashok
Bhushan, J., R. Subahs Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In Madan Mohan Singh v. Ved Prakash Arya, the matter pertained to an order of eviction under
the Public Premises Act. The Court relied on CM Beena  and held that the conduct of parties
before and after the creation of a relationship was relevant for finding out the intention of parties.
The Court held that where there is no evidence for taking premises on rent and the defendant had
admitted that he had not maintained any record of accounts of payment of rent, there was no
basis to held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. The Court also held that where
the allotment letter prohibits the hirer from subletting the premises or any part thereof, the
decision of the Chief Administrator shall be binding on the parties. [Key Words: Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, CM Beena v. PN Ramachandra Rao, 2004 (3) SCC
595, ][Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R Subhash Reddy, J.]

In Suman Devi & Ors. v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors., the Court held that if Section 87 of the
UP Reorganisation Act, 2000 only obliged the State and Courts to enforce existing laws to the
extent they were modified within two years of commencement of the Act, it would have had a
disastrous effect of creating a vacuum in regard to laws not specifically mentioned. The Court
also held that the omission to mention relevant qualifications in the advertisement did not relieve
the State from its obligation to follow existing rules. [Key Words: Indian Nursing Council Act
1947, Uttar Pradesh Department of Medical Health and Family Welfare Health Worker and
Health Supervisor (Male and Female) Service Rules 1997][Coram: L Nageswara Rao, J. S
Ravindra Bhat, J.]

Reservation
In Pramod Kumar Singh and Ors. v. State of UP and Ors., a petition was filed seeking, inter
alia, a direction to the respondents to consider the petitioners for appointment to the post of
Constable PAC and Fireman seats meant for General Category Male Candidates in PAC and
Fireman Posts which remained unfilled till date. It was alleged that certain candidates coming
from ‘Reserved Categories’, who were initially selected against Reserved Categories’ seats, were
now shown against the ‘open category' in the list published on 11.11.2019 which prejudiced the
chances of ‘open category’ candidates. Dismissing the Petition, the Court held that the selection
in respect of the posts were in accordance with the directions issued by the Court and if the
candidates who were already selected against reserved posts were entitled to be considered
against open category posts, that exercise cannot be termed as illegal or invalid on any count.
[Key Words: reserved category, open category, shifting of candidates, PAC & Fireman Posts]
[Coram: U.U Lalit, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J., Hrishikesh Roy J.]

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