THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH The recent little book by W. W.

Rostow* had

the signal, perhaps unique honor of being published in summary by the English weekly The

Economist. He acquired some fame before appearing in bookstore windows. By its subtitle,

it manifests political intentions. That is to say that he immediately had, that he still has, in

the academic community, at least as many adversaries as parties without. The directive idea

of the essay is simple, it is today "in the air" and it has been formulated by many authors in

one way or another. The Soviet Union, through the voice of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev,

has never ceased to proclaim its desire “to catch up and surpass” the United States. These

two verbs suffice to indicate that, in the eyes of the Soviets, the socialist countries, from a

certain point of view, are on the same road as the capitalist countries and up to now less

advanced on this road than the most capitalist countries. prosperous. This path, as everyone

knows, is that of industrialization, or else, of global production per head of the population. If,

from this particular point of view, socialist and capitalist countries are comparable, it should

not be impossible to determine the phases of growth which all countries pass through,

whatever their regime, on this common path. WW Rostow distinguishes five of these phases,

which he calls the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to

maturity, the era of mass consumption , the take off, the drive to maturity, the age of high

mass-consumption]. The central idea of the essay—it is legitimate to discern the phases of
economic growth through which all societies undergoing industrialization, whatever their

regime—had to be accepted, in principle, by Westerners as by the Soviets, provided it is

used critically, not dogmatically. In other words, this idea must be, at the outset, considered

as a question and not as an affirmation: to what extent, to what extent, are the phases of

industrialization the same (or, at least, similar) in the Soviet regime and in the Western

regime? The conception of W. W. Rostow is implicit in the work of Colin Clark. Ranking

societies according to the value produced per capita of the population, the latter disregarded

differences in regime and made all societies, capitalist and socialist, appear to be on the same

path, with the United States leading the way. The concept of industrial society starts from the

same assumption as the theory of growth phases. It assumes, in fact, that many of the

essential phenomena of industrialization and modernization are common to all societies,

whether Soviet or Western. It would therefore be unreasonable to cry either genius or

scandal: the attempt at a comparison, never having been made in this form, was suggested by

the current theory of industrial society. Moreover, the first question posed by W. W.

Rostow's essay is the relationship between "the theory of industrial society" and "the theory

of the phases of growth". I call the theory of industrial society the theory for which Soviet

and Western societies are two species of the same genus, two versions of the same social

type, this genus or type being baptized industrial. This theory does not decree that the two

species are close to each other or that the differences between the two are insignificant, it

only posits that, compared to the social types of the past, all modern societies present well-

defined characteristics and that the species of modern societies have enough common traits

for them to appear as modalities of the same type. The same idea could be expressed in the

following terms: the various modern societies solve differently the fundamental problems of

the economic and political order, problems common to all kinds of modern societies.

However, between the “theory of growth phases” and the “theory of industrial society”, the

relationship is asymmetrical: the first implies the second, but the second can be true or

legitimate without the first being so. It is only possible to recognize the phases of growth on

the condition that the growth leads to at least similar results. For the phases of growth to be

the same, there must be industrial society at the end. However, this does not imply that there
is only one way to get there or that the steps on this way are the same. I consider it a

methodological error to begin with a theory of stages and not with a theory of society. This

objection can be reinforced by examining the difficulties involved in bringing together the

phases of growth. “Economic growth” was, in the eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth

century, the invention of an economic organization and a technique of production. It is today

the imitation of an organization, already realized elsewhere. It would be, it seems, as

important to seek the consequences of this opposition between invention and imitation as to

mark the similarities which, incontestably, must exist. Second, when the same phase of

growth occurs half a century apart, in two different countries, the lagging country introduces

the advanced technique of its time. Mao's China imitates and improves the Soviet model, it

“takes off” in the atomic age. The Chinese take-off cannot but be profoundly influenced by
available production. These remarks do not prohibit the comparison of the Chinese takeoff

and the earlier takeoffs, American and Russian, but this comparison should be careful to mark

the differences as much as the similarities. Third, the stages seem to me less distinct, less

easily recognizable than Rostow's essay suggests. Let us first take the so-called traditional

society phase. This society is defined, so to speak, by the sole fact that it is not modern or

that it is not industrial, therefore that it does not include a regular increase in production and

productivity, therefore that the distribution of an almost constant mass of wealth between

individuals, classes and nations was the decisive problem, the main stake of social conflicts

and wars. But, supposing that all traditional societies presented this characteristic (of not

being "progressive" on the economic level), they comprise so many diversities from all other

points of view that the very concept of traditional society seems to me of questionable

usefulness. Growth from traditional Chinese or Indian society must be different from growth

from traditional Central African tribal society. With regard to the following two phases,

preconditions for takeoff and takeoff, the uncertainty is different: depending on the case, the

creation of preconditions (social, intellectual, administrative) lasts for decades before takeoff

or, contrary, is accomplished at the same time as take-off. The second stage, that of the

preconditions, was long in Western Europe, which was inventing the industrial society.

Perhaps this phase did not exist in the case of the “free-born” Anglo-Saxon countries, to use
Rostow's expression. This phase, according to our author, includes both social aspects

(intellectual, political) and strictly economic aspects (infrastructure, capital). Here again,

what is striking is the diversity of situations and methods. Depending on whether the modern

elements penetrate African tribes, a Muslim society or eighteenth-century France, the

fulfillment of the preconditions will be quite different. With regard to the following two

phases, take-off and momentum towards maturity, the main difficulty seems to me to

differentiate them clearly. There is a take-off from the moment when growth becomes

regular, normal, which requires three conditions (p. 39): an increase in the rate of productive

investments, from 5% or less of the gross national product to 10% or any further ; the

development of at least one processing industry sector, having a high growth rate; the

constitution of an institutional, political and social framework, thanks to which the impulse
towards modernization is maintained, channeled, diffused. As for the fourth phase, the

impetus towards maturity, it is defined as the period during which society has effectively

applied modern technology (of the time) to the bulk of its resources. For France, the take-off

period would be 1830-1860, for the United States 1843-1860, for Great Britain 1783-1802,

for Russia 1890-1914, for Argentina 1935-..., for India 1952-..., for China 1952-.... I am not

sure that in the case of France the period 1830-1860 is clearly distinguishable either from the

previous decades or from the following decades: preconditions, take-off, diffusion of

modernity were slow processes, both prompted and slowed down by society itself. The

comparison between France 1830-1860 and China 1952-... would above all highlight the

radical differences. It goes without saying that this remark is not an objection to the book.

Rostow knows these differences better than I do, and the comparison is not intended to deny

or conceal them. But the similarities that remain are likely, from a certain point, to be

insignificant: certainly take-off requires a certain percentage of investments, a rapidly

growing industrial sector, an institutional framework, but the Chinese method of 1952 is

hardly enlightened, even in contrasts, by the French method of 1830. There is more. The

take-off phase is defined rather quantitatively, the maturity phase qualitatively. The first

requires access to continuous growth, the second the diffusion of modernity through society.

Also the distinction between these two phases is presented differently depending on the case,
according to the gap between the modern sector and the traditional sector, according to the

methods of growth and diffusion. If maturity is reached in France in 1910, the take-off

having been around 1830 1860, half a century has passed between these two periods. In

Russia, these same two dates are respectively 1890-1914 and 1950: I find it hard to see

similarities between the two periods of drive to maturity. Certainly, in France as in the Soviet

Union, there has been, in the years under consideration, the creation of new industries, the

growth of the national product, the diffusion of modern technology throughout the social

body. But these periods were from so many other points of view so profoundly different that

it is difficult to find even a vague similarity. Once the level of investment and technology

necessary for continued growth has been reached, multiple possibilities arise: the gap

between the modernized sector and the traditional sector narrows or, on the contrary, widens,
growth is obtained by a rapid and massive change in the distribution of the workforce or by a

more balanced modernization of all sectors, etc. Finally, from maturity (Great Britain 1850,

United States 1900, Germany 1910, France 1910, Sweden 1930, Japan 1940, Russia 1950,

Canada 1950), the time and the paths necessary to reach the high mass- consumption have

also been oddly diverse. Why did it take Britain a century or so to go from maturity to high

mass consumption? In quantitative terms, the growth rate per capita of the population has not

marked such oscillations. In fact, many factors must be taken into account: the diffusion of

modernity throughout society (in this respect, Britain was probably ahead), the distribution of

income (before 1914, the British distribution was exceptionally unequal), creation of social

legislation, creation of industries producing durable consumer goods, violence and duration

of crises, etc. I have no doubt that Rostow is willing to admit all these remarks (many of

which are taken from the book itself). But I wonder if they don't question the trial method.

Should we start with a comparison of growth phases? Was it necessary to determine at the

starting point five stages of growth, as if all societies passed through the same stages, as if

analogous stages had the same characteristics in all societies? All modern societies are

progressive and industrial, they take the increase in the total national product and per capita

as normal, they obtain this growth by the transfer of part of the labor force traditionally

occupied in agriculture towards agriculture. industry and services. Whatever their regime,
modern societies build the same factories and produce according to similar techniques. It is

therefore not illegitimate to compare certain periods of economic history in the Soviet Union

and the United States because, half a century apart, American and Russian industries reached

the same level of production. But the study itself tends rather to reduce the scope of similar

phenomena (what do the French maturity of 1910 and the Russian maturity of 1950 have in

common?) and to cast doubt on the existence of phases that are sufficiently defined and

distinct for the observer to be able to find them in all circumstances. Let us now come to the

second aspect of the book, that illustrated by the subtitle: a non-communist manifesto. The

meaning of the phrase is clear: it is not an anti-communist manifesto but a non-communist

manifesto. Soviet Marxism proclaims the radical difference between industrial societies,

depending on whether they are 'socialist' or 'capitalist'. It announces the inevitable

destruction of capitalist societies, the inevitable triumph of socialist societies. The Rostow

manifesto is not anti-communist, in the sense that it does not reverse the forecast and does not

announce the inevitable disappearance of socialist societies, it endeavors to demonstrate that

capitalist societies are not such as the describes the Marxist manifesto (proletarianization,

impoverishment, more and more serious crises, fatal imperialism), it highlights the inevitable

words of growth, common to capitalist and socialist methods. Finally, in conclusion, it

invites societies that claim Marxism to recognize their kinship and compatibility with

capitalist societies. As a non-Communist manifesto, Rostow's book is representative of a

widespread opinion in the West. Even those of the Westerners who detest the Soviet regime

the most do not believe that what is at stake in the conflict between the two regimes justifies a

war, or that one of the regimes should win and the other die. Unfortunately, in this regard,

the two universes are asymmetrical. The Marxist universe is based on an ideology according

to which, in the long run, one of the two regimes is doomed to disappear. The thesis of

kinship and the compatibility of regimes is therefore anti-communist according to

communists, although it is not so in the eyes of non-communists. It is true that the official

ideology of the Soviet Union does not necessarily express the genuine convictions of its

citizens. The thesis of the Rostow Manifesto is admitted semi-clandestinely by many

scholars and economists on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But these secret adherents of
the non-Communist manifesto, or at least many of them, having subscribed to the central

thesis, will regret that the comparison-discussion is not pushed further. They will be inclined

to say: of course, capitalist and socialist societies are both industrial societies and they must

pass through analogous phases of growth. But which diet has been the most effective so far?

From what point of view is one preferable? Westerners and Soviets will ask still other

questions. If it is a question of the political regime, of class relations, of the propensity to

war, what is the influence of each of the phases of growth on the one hand, of each regime on

the other? Rostow outlines an interesting analysis of the relationship between maturity and

imperialism (or temptation to imperialism). He too leads to the question that I had borrowed

from Auguste Comte: are industrial societies peaceful or not? They have not been so up to

now, will they be so in the future for fear of thermonuclear war? No one in the West is in a
position to answer such questions. Here again, the asymmetry appears: a non-Communist

manifesto can neither announce the future nor determine the political or intellectual regime

which will be the expression of industrial society a generation or a century from now. He

cannot because the claim to be capable of it proves ignorance or fanaticism. For many

obvious reasons, the future of humanity in the industrial age is unknown to us. So I would

have liked Rostow not to call his suggestive essay, a starting point for necessary

investigations, "a non-Communist manifesto." Non-communists cannot write a manifesto

comparable to that of the communists. In public, the Communist spokesmen will believe

themselves obliged to refute it, in private, they will let it be understood that the historical

question arises beyond the findings and comparisons of Rostow. One of the two regimes

having for him justice or (and) force or (and) the future.