EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No.

115863 March 31, 1995

FACTS: .
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.
Then Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I,
Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to
effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the
Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO
Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: 
WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: 
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974 . It cannot be disputed, therefore, that
as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all
the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said
Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under
its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program
coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec. 17, Article XII
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments were revoked.
Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions
with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, the SC ruled
that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission G.R. No. 192935 • December 7, 2010
FACTS:
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
Biraogo, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails EO No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. A special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition was likewise filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,et al. as incumbent members of the
House of Representatives.
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.
Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an
authorization vested in him by law.
Similarly, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with
the executive branch of government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the
performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.
RULING:
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant
of all powers inherent in them.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of
the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition,
even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC
was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
ELISEO A. SINON vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992
Facts
Respondent Juana Banan was then incumbent Agricultural Officer (MAO) in Region II while petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupies
the position of Fisheries Extension Specialist in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources in the same region. However,
the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food into the Department of Agriculture included petitioner but
excluded respondent as MAO in the list prepared by the Placement Committee. Thus, respondent filed an appeal for re-
evaluation with DARAB. DARAB then released a resolution, as approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, where respondent is
now included in the list, excluding now petitioner. However, petitioner received an appointment as MAO by the Regional
Director based on the first evaluation made by the Placement Committee. Thus, Sinon filed an appeal which was later
granted. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she pitted her qualifications against petitioner; and
pointing out that allowing the findings of the Placement Office to supersede DARAB Resolution would be tantamount to
giving precedence to the Committee over the head of the agency. The CSC granted such motion. Petitioner finally filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was then denied. Thus this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the qualification of the petitioner
Ruling:
No. Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, we do not find any evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CSC when it issued Resolution which in effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon. The fact
that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committed only to find that Sinon is not qualified
should not be taken as a grave abuse of discretion. We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public
respondent CSC had disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings of the Placement
Committee findings were reevaluated and the report after such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.
The petition is hereby denied. Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the law. Section 4 or R.A. 6656 mandates that officers
and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions in the
approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges generally
accorded to them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never confirmed
completely. There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern is most comparable to the MAO in the
new staffing pattern.
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs

G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

Facts:
President Aquino III issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA, more particularly to its
newly-established IAD. Finance Secretary Purisima filed a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the LWUA, as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, which
arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their
respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct." is already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function through and E.O.
and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

Ruling:
No, because the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. The law grants
the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the
manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own
office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Domingo v. Zamora  G.R. No. 142283 | February 6, 2003
FACTS: 
This  is  a  petition  for  certiorari  and  prohibition  seeking  to  nullify  EO  No.  811 and DECS Memoranda.  Pres.  Estrada 
issued  the  assailed  EO  which  transferred  the  sports  development  programs  and  activities  of  the  DECS3  to  the  PSC.
DECS  Sec.  Gonzales  then  issued  the  DECS  Memoranda  which  reassigned  all  remaining  BPESS5  personnel  (people 
who  were  not  transferred  to  the  PSC) to other offices within the DECS. 
Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports
Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports Memoranda Nos. 01592 to 94 Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (now called Department of Education) Philippine Sports Commission 5 Bureau of Physical Education and
School Sports.
ISSUE:    W/N the EO constitutes undue legislation by the President. NO
RULING: 
The  SC  dismissed  the  petition  for  being moot and academic because of  the  enactment  of  RA  No.  9155,  but  they 
nonetheless  explained  that  the  EO was valid.
EO  No.  2927 expressly  grants  the  President  continuing  authority  to  reorganize  the  Office  of  the  President8  to 
achieve  simplicity,  economy  and efficiency. 
Under  EO  292,  the  DECS  is  indisputably  a  Department  of  the  Executive  Branch;  but  even  if  the  DECS  is  not  part  of 
the  Office  of  the  President,  Sec.  31  (2)  and  (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer 
Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001 Administrative Code of 1987 8 Sec. 31 of EO No. 292 provides that the President
may take any of the following actions: 1. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; 2. Transfer any function under the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments and Agencies; 3. and Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies any   function 
or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. 
On the  other  hand,  the  charter of PSC provides that it’s attached to the Office of  the  President. 
Hence,  the  President  has  the  authority  to  transfer  the  functions,  programs  and  activities  of  DECS  related  to  sports 
development  to  the  PSC,  thus  making  EO  No.  81  a  valid  presidential  issuance. The  Office  of  the  President  is  the 
nerve  center  of  the  Executive  Branch. 
To  remain  effective  and  efficient,  the  Office  of  the  President  must  be  capable  of  being  shaped  and  reshaped  by 
the President  in  the  manner  he  deems  fit  to  carry  out  his  directives  and  policies.  After  all,  the Office  of the
President is the command post of the President.  
Dario v. Mison GR 81954; August 8, 1989
Facts:
President Aquino promulgated EO 127 which provided for the reorganization of the BOC and prescribed a new staffing
pattern therefor. Pursuant to the EO, Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of “Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders,” prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that by February 1988,
all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President on
reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered another position in the same department or
agency, or c) informed of their termination.  The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394
Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.
Issue: Is the reorganization valid?
Ruling:
No. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing
else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds.
DOMINGO vs DBP GR NO. 93355; April 7, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status. Executive Order
No 81 was passed authorizing the reorganization of DBP including the adoption of new staffing pattern to suit the reduced
operations envisioned.
3. Subsequently DBP issued a Board Resolution No. 304-87 allowing the issuance of temporary appointments for a max of 12
months to all DBP personnel in order to fully implement the reorganization. While on temporary status, they will be assessed
on the basis of the results of their evaluation.
4. DBP undertook the evaluation and comparative assessment of all its personnel under the CSC approved New Performance
Appraisal System, a peer and control rating process which served as an assessment tool of DBP's screening process.
5. Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment, which was renewed for another period.
6. Thereafter, in a memorandum issued by the Final Review Committee, petitioner got a performance rating of "below
average," by reason of which his appointment was "made to lapse."
7. Consequently, petitioner, together with a certain Evangeline Javier, filed with the CSC a joint verified complaint against
DBP for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the reorganization implemented by the DBP is valid - YES
Ruling:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. The facts of this
case, particularly the evaluation process adopted by DBP, bear out the existence of good faith in the course of
reorganization. Herein petitioner was evaluated and comparatively assessed under this approved rating system.
Quintessentially, the reorganization having been conducted in accordance with the mandate of Dario, it can safely be
concluded that indeed the reorganization was attended by good faith, ergo, valid. The dismissal of herein petitioner is a
removal for cause which, therefore, does not violate his security of tenure.