SECTION 4 NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION, OR OF THE PRESS, OR OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE

PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GEOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. Prior Restraint & the Press
Near vs Minnesota Facts: In 1927, Jay M. Near, who has been described as "anti-Catholic,anti-Semitic, anti-black and antilabor" began publishing The Saturday Press in Minneapolis with Howard A. Guilford, a former mayoral candidate who had been convicted of criminal libel. The paper claimed that Jewish gangs were "practically ruling" the city along with the police chief, Frank W. Brunskill, who was accused of participation in graft. Among the paper's other targets were mayor George E. Leach, Hennepin County attorney and future three-term governor Floyd B. Olson, and the members of the grand jury of Hennepin County, who the paper claimed were either incompetent or willfully failing to investigate and prosecute known criminal activity. Olson filed a complaint against Near and Guilford under the Public Nuisance Law of 1925. Also known as the "Minnesota Gag Law", it provided permanent injunctions against those who created a "public nuisance," by publishing, selling, or distributing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper." Olson claimed that the allegations raised against him and the other named public officials in all nine issues published between September 24, 1927, and November 19, 1927, as well as the paper's overall anti-Semitic tone, constituted a violation of this law. On November 22, 1927, Judge Matthias Baldwin of the Hennepin County District Court issued a temporary injunction that barred the defendants from editing, publishing, or circulating The Saturday Press or any other publication containing similar material. This injunction was granted without notice to either defendant on an ex parte hearing between Olson and the judge, and was to extend until the hearing on the judge's order for the defendants to show cause as to why they should not be permanently enjoined from publishing their paper. The hearing was held December 9, and future Minneapolis mayor, Thomas Latimer, argued that the defendants' activities were protected by the U.S. and Minnesota constitutions and demurred to the complaint. Held: The U.S. Supreme Court held that, except in rare cases, censorship is unconstitutional. The fact that liberty of press may be abused does not make any less necessary the immunity of the press from prior restraint...a more serious evil would result if officials could determine which stories can be published..." New York Times vs United States Facts: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam (History of U.S Decision Making Process on Vietnam Policy). The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. Held: In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Burgos, Sr. vs Chief of Staff, AFP Facts: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were searched & printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature were seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Held: Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. Babst vs National Intelligence Board Facts: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they were summoned by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private lives. In addition, one of them was charged with libel by a General who sought to recover P10million in damages. They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning them & from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB. Held: The petition has become moot and academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp.

Prior Restraint, Movies & Electronic Media

Santiago vs Far East Broadcasting Facts: CA # 98 gave the Secretary of Interior power to censor all programs & to eliminate or cancel from the program such number or parts thereof as in his opinion are neither moral, educational nor entertaining, and prejudicial to public interest. Pursuant to this authorization, the Secretary of Interior issued a regulation requiring the submission of speeches twenty-four hours before broadcast time. Held: A speech that may endanger the public safety may be censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How could the censor verify the petitioners claim that the speeches he intended to broadcast offered no danger to public safety or public morality, if the petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or even the gist thereof? Far Eastern Broadcasting vs Dans, Jr. Facts: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner (Eastern Broadcasting Corporation) contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action.

The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. Held: The freedom of broadcast media is more pervasive in scope than the press and because of their accessibility to children. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Clear & Present Danger Rule (Schenk vs US): The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the (United States) Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. Gonzales vs Kalaw Katigbak Facts: The movie Kapit sa Patalim with certain changes & deletions was granted a permit to be exhibited under the classification For Adults Only. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Gonzales stating that the classification of the film For Adults Only was without basis. Held: The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. The vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes. Burstyn vs Wilson Facts: A highly controversial film, "The Miracle," produced in Italy and starring Anna Magnani, had been licensed for showing in New York and had been screened in the city for about eight weeks. Strongly negative public reaction caused the license to be withdrawn on the grounds that the movie was "sacrilegious." The distributor of the film filed suit challenging the restriction against sacriligious films. Held: Films are an important medium for communicating ideas in society, something not lessened by the fact that they are also designed to entertain. Expression by means of film thus deserves the same protections of liberty under the First Amendment as those for newspapers, books, magazines, etc. The idea that some form of expression can be banned because it is deemed "sacrilegious" was rejected for two reasons. First, the standard was too vague: In seeking to apply the broad and allinclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. Second, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any one or even all religious groups from views which they find to be distasteful. [F]rom the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of

those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures. Times Film Corp vs. Chicago Facts: Petitioner Times Film Corporation owned the exclusive right to exhibit the film Don Juan in Chicago. A Chicago city ordinance required that anybody who wished to publicly exhibit a film within city limits submit the film to the office of the commissioner of police and pay a license fee. The office of the commissioner of police was allowed to refuse to issue a permit to show the film if it determined that the film did not meet certain standards. A denial of a permit to show a film could be appealed to the mayor and the mayor's decision would then be final. Petitioner paid the license fee, but refused to submit the film Don Juan to the office of the commissioner of police for examination. After Petitioner was refused a permit to show the film, the corporation brought suit in federal court seeking to prevent the city from interfering with the exhibition of the film. Petitioner argued that the provision of the ordinance requiring submission of the film constitutes a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Held: A Chicago ordinance requiring films to be submitted & viewed by a board of censors prior to public exhibition was not unconstitutional on its face. The constitutional protection does not include complete & absolute freedom to exhibit at least once, any & every kind of motion pictureeven if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government Freedman vs Maryland Facts: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional. Held: The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period." Iglesia ni Kristo vs CA Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." Held: The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of

the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Media & Judicial Process

Secretary of Justice vs Sandiganbayan Facts: A petition to allow live television overage of the trial of former President Estrada. Held: Estes vs Texas - a case in which the United States Supreme Court overturned the swindling conviction of petitioner Billy Sol Estes, holding that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights had been violated by the publicity associated with the pretrial hearing, which had been carried live on both television and radio.

Held: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. Dennis vs US Facts: In 1948, the leaders of the Communist Party of America were arrested and charged with violating provisions of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction. Held: There was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences of an attempted putsch, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. American Communications Association vs Douds Facts: This case involved the constitutionality of Cold Warera anticommunist legislation Held: The Court did not rest its judgment on a threat to national security, but on a threat to interstate commerce. The majority found that the statute fell within the broad scope of Congress's commerce power because the Communist party could reasonably be expected to engage in political strikes that were disruptive of the national economy. The Court recognized that the statute had a chilling effect on political rights protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, it ruled that the First Amendment was not violated because that statute protected the public from harmful conductpolitical strikesnot harmful ideas. The Court then applied the clear and present danger test as a simple balancing test and concluded that Congress's interest in protecting the nation from political strikes outweighed the burden the act placed on the rights of union members.

Media & Privacy

Ayer Productions vs Capulong Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB & other government agencies were consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Held: The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

The Constitutional Guarantee in Action: Seditious Speech

People vs Perez Facts: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Held: Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislative, & the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention & effect be seditious. We entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt w/firmly before it endangers the general peace. Doctrine: Dangerous Tendency Rule. People vs Feleo Facts: Speaking before a group of about a hundred or so, among whom were soldiers of the Phil. Constabulary, Feleo has made a special appeal to the soldiers in the crowd urging them to imitate the French soldiers, who shot their chiefs, to desert their ranks, & to join the Communists against the Americans, to get rid of their leaders & to take possession of the haciendas of the rich landlords.

Subsequent Punishment: Standards for Restraint (Dangerous Tendency Rule, Clear & Present Danger, Balancing of Interests Test)
Schenck vs US Facts: During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.

Held: Words of this kind are properly considered seditious bec. they tend to incite the people to take arms against the constituted authorities & to rise against the established government. Gitlow vs New York Facts: Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a State Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law. Held: A state may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished even if her speech created no danger at all. People vs Evangelista Facts: In a public mtg, Evangelista had read the constitution & by-laws of the Communist Party, had explained the advantages of the Russian form of govt., & had distributed pamphlets urging the seizure of the government. Held: It is not necessary that there should be any disturbance or breach of peace in order that the act may come under the sanction of the Penal Code. It is sufficient that it incites uprising or produces a feeling incompatible w/the permanency of the govt. Espuelas vs People Facts: Espuelas has his picture taken making it appear that he was hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree. He was, in fact, standing on a barrel. He then had this picture published in several papers of general circulation accompanied by a letter to his wife telling her that he committed suicide bec. he was unhappy of with the administration of President Roxas. He urged his wife to write to President Truman & Churchill & tell them that the Phil. Govt is infested w/many Hitlers & Mussolinis. He also told his wife to teach their children to burn pictures of Pres. Roxas. Held: Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the govt or to weaken the confidence of the people in the govt are against the public peace, & are criminal not only bec. they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself. Espiritu vs Lim Facts: Espiritu, in a gathering of drivers & sympathizers at the corner of Valencia St. & Magsaysay Blvd., said, among others: Bukas tuloy ang welga natinhanggang sa magkagulo na. He was then arrested w/out warrant, for inciting to sedition. Held: While people may differ as to the criminal character of the speech, whch at any rate will be decided in court, for purposes of the arrest, not for conviction, there was sufficient ground for the officer to believe that Espiritu was in the act of committing a crime.

Held: So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press. In Re Kelly Facts: Amzi B. Kelly, an American, had been previously found guilty of contempt. He was granted a rehearing &, pending final decision, he caused a letter to be published in The Independent, a Manila paper, in which he severely castigated the SC. Characterizing the initial decision as atrocious, arbitrary & arrogant & knowingly & maliciously perpetratedfor the purpose of terrorizing the people & intimidating the press, he accused members of the Court of arrogantly misusing imaginary judicial powers (to punish for contempt), of being made of mud, and of cowardly shielding themselves behind contempt proceedings. Held: Any publication pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., w/reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court & is punishable. The court found that Kellys letter constituted contempt bec. it manifested an intentional attempt to bring the SC & its members into contempt & ridicule & to lower their dignity, standing & prestige& to hinder & delay the due administration of justice. The publication tended directly to affect & influence the action of the SC. In Re Lozano and Quevedo Facts: On April 29, 1930, El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano, printed an account of an investigation of a Judge of 1st Instance notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind closed doors. The article was written by Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an employee in the office of the Judge under investigation. Held: The SC resolution requiring secrecy was intended as a protection against the practice of litigants & others making vindictive & malicious charges against lawyers & Judges of 1st Instance, which are ruinous to the reputations of the respondent lawyers & judges. From that, it was only one step to saying that Respect for the Judiciary cant be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes And disrespect, in the form of disregard of this resolution, prevents the Court from proceeding w/the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. In Re Abistado Facts: On October 20, 1932, Paz Luzan filed in this court charge of malpractice against Atty Ramon Sotelo, and attached to her complaint thirteen exhibits. On October 22, the court ordered Atty Sotelo answer the charges within ten days. On October 27th Ramon Sotelo called the attention of the court to the fact that there had been published in the weekly newspaper, the Union, on October 24th, a statement as to the filing of the charges, with the notice that in subsequent issues the complete charges and the exhibits attached thereto would be published. On Oct 31, Abistado published the charges against him in the Union under the heading Una Dama Acusa al Abogado Ramon Sotelo Held: That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be protected in its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense; that as important as is the maintenance of an ummuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary; that the courts must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their business in an orderly manner free from outside interfered obstructive of their constitutional functions.

Contempt of Court by Publication

El Hogar Filipino vs Prautch Facts: It is about the publication of an alleged libelous article in a monthly paper known as the Royal Credit. The article was an analysis of the legal force and effect of the mortgage made to the El Hogar Filipino, and its real purpose and intent was to show how and wherein the mortgage was null and void.

In Re Torres Facts: Torres was the editor of El Debate, a Manila paper which ran an article anticipatory of a SC decision. The article claimed knowledge of the actual decision already made, purported to name the writer of the decision, & even pointed out the probable distribution of the votes among the justices. Held: The proceedings of this court must remain confidential until decisions or orders have been properly promulgated. Reason: Civil case prior knowledge of the result would permit parties to compromise cases to the detriment of parties not so well informed. Criminal cases advance advice regarding the outcome would permit the accused to flee the jurisdiction of the court. People vs Alarcon Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein except one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Federico Manga has who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. A portion of the article reads: The workers and peasants seeing their abuses have entirely lost their confidence in the so-called courts of justice. Trials in court are farce and mockery f or them, and they come to look upon the courts and, judges as mere tools in the hands of the Government of the ruling class to oppress the workers and the poor." Held: Danegrous Tendency Test It is doubtful whether here a similar toleration of gross misuse of liberty of the press would, under our circumstances, result in no untoward consequences to our structure of democracy yet in the process of healthful development & growth. In Re Quirino Facts: To expedite the prosecution of the numerous treason cases which arose out of the war against Japan, a Peoples Court w/special jurisdiction over the crime of treason was established. A resolution of the th 5 division of this court denying bail to an accused was reversed by the SC. 3 days after the reversal, Judge Quirino of the 5th division openly criticized the action of the SC before a grp of newspapermen. Calling the decision the biggest blunder & claiming that it robbed the Peoples Court of its jurisdiction, he accused the SC of lacking intellectual leadership & of offering merely sentimental leadership. He characterized the decision as the result of intellectual dishonesty & of quantitative & not qualitative voting. His remarks were published in the local dailies at a time when, technically, the case was still pending before the SC. Held: After the criticism had been launched, it became a bit embarrassing for said majority members to expound that view in the full-dress opinion, bec the public might suspect they had receded somewhat from this stand, falsely represented as robbing the Peoples Court of its power to grant bail. Krivenko vs Register of Deeds Facts: Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to the SC. At this pt, Subido, editor

of the Manila Post, on information received from an official of the SC, published an article saying that the SC had already voted 8-3 gainst the right of aliens to acquire residential lands. SUbidos informant was one of the Justices of the SC. He had leaked out the info bec he was disturbed by the delay in the promulgation of the decision. Held: Although the info had been furnished by a member of the Court, it nonetheless was unauthorized & therefore constituted contempt. Newspapermen should restrain the desire to satisfy the publics yearn for news. In Re Parazo Facts: Angel Parazo, a reporter for the Star Reporter, had published an article alleging that the Bar Examination questions for 1948 had leaked out. The Court ordered Parazo to reveal the source of his info; Parazo refused and he was declared in contempt. Held: We have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the SC as representative of the Judicial Dept. to proper & adequate measures to preserve their integrity, & render possible & facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials & subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. In Re Sotto Facts: While the SC was reconsidering their decision in In Re Parazo, Sen. Vicente Sotto published an article in the Manila Times which read: As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. Held: Criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the SC in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated & may even enlighten the SC & contribute to the correction of an error. But to intimidate the members of this Court w/the presentation of a bill in the next Congress & to falsely charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders & injustices constitute contempt. Cabansag vs. Fernandez Facts: Cabansag, chafing at the long delay of his case before a Court of 1st Instance, wrote a letter asking for relief. The letter was addressed not to a court but to the Presidential Claims & Actions Committee (PCAC), an executive body. The lower court presented this recourse to an extrajudicial forum & declared Cabansag in contempt. Held: For expression to constitute contempt, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice, for the writer merely expressed his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance. In Re Contempt Proceedings Against Alfonso Ponce Enrile

Facts: The contempt proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile & his law partners arose out of a motion for reconsideration filed w/the SC. Held: Respondents were not made to suffer harsh & severe treatment but warning was given to the principal author of the motion that a repetition of this incident will be dealt with accordingly & a copy of the courts warning was ordered attached to the attorneys record. Austria vs Masaquel Facts: The Judge had asked Atty. Masaquel if he doubts the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide the case fairly & impartially bec the lawyer of the other party was the Judges former assistant. The Judge then told him to just answer the question. Under such encouragement, the lawyer acknowledged his doubt. Whereupon the Judge declared him in contempt. Held: Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. In the present case, the Court said that the lawyer simply expressed his sincere feeling under the circumstances. Matulina vs Buslon Facts: In Civil Case No. 384 of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, respondent judge issued an order, dated October 31, 1958, requiring petitioner Matutina to appear before the Court on November 5, 1958, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, "to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt of court for employing words derogatory to the dignity of the Court in his pleading dated October 30, 1958." On November 5, 1958, in response to the above order, petitioner filed a "Manifestation" wherein he respectfully asks to be informed what particular words, phrases or portions of his pleading dated October 30, 1958 are considered language derogatory to the dignity of the court, in order for him to intelligently put up his defense; & that the undersigned counsel, after he shall have been informed what constitutes derogatory language in said pleading, would like to request for three (3) days within which to submit his defense or explanation." On the same day, when petitioner did not appear, respondent judge issued an order for his arrest but id did not materialize since Matulina was bed-ridden at the time, sick with influenza Held: We are of the opinion that, under the circumstances obtaining here, the order of arrest issued by respondent judge was not justified. Petitioner had asked that he be informed as to the portions of his pleading dated October 30, 1958 which were supposedly derogatory to the dignity of the court, and for a period of three days thereafter to file his answer. Because of the length of the pleading, and because the expressions used therein were not blatantly offensive, since the petitioner's description of the Court's action as "vague, uncalled for and unjust" amounted to no more than saying that the order was erroneous and unjustified, it is really probable that petitioner was not sure, and, although he might have an inkling, he wanted to have something more definite than conjecture on which to base his contemplated explanation or answer. Until his motion was considered and passed upon and petitioner notified, the order of arrest was not warranted. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court; and it is not evident in this case. The fact that petitioner was not present in the morning session of November 5, 1958, did not make his actions contemptuous. As it turned out, Matutina was sick with "influenza", which was precisely why his arrest was postponed.

grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Held: Justice Fernando: clear & present danger Justice Castro: the balancing of interests test is more suitable Badoy Jr vs COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the lone district of North Cotabato; and pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132, he prays that Sec. 12(F) of the law be declared unconstitutional as the same denies: (1) individuals, who are not candidates, their freedom of speech and of the press; and (2) candidates the right to speak and write, discuss and debate in favor of their candidacies or against the candidacies of others. However, after the filing of the herein petitions, the Comelec had amended paragraph 6 of its Resolution No. RR-724 of September 8, 1970 by promulgating Resolution No. RR-739 on September 29, 1970, which limits the prohibition in said paragraph 6 of Resolution No. RR-724 to the publication of paid comments or paid articles without mentioning the names of all the other candidates with equal prominence; and the pertinent portion of paragraph 6 as thus amended merely restates the ban in Sec. 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132. Since the relevant portion of paragraph 6 of Resolution No. RR-724 as amended no longer prohibits the printing and publication of unpaid comments or unpaid articles without mentioning the names of all other candidates with equal prominence, which is the correct interpretation of Sec. 12 (F) of R.A. No. 6132, the same renders moot and academic the petition in G.R. No. L-32551. Held: The evident purpose of this limitation, on the freedom of the candidate or his sympathizer to spend his own money for his candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the candidacy of his opponents, it to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. While it is true that the mere mention of the poor opponent in the same advertisement or paid article does not by itself alone engender perfect equality of chances; at least the chance of the poor candidate for victory is improved because thereby his name will be exposed to the reading public in the same article as that of the wealthy candidate. National Press Club vs COMELEC Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates are being curtailed. Held: The equalizing, as far as practicable, of the situation of rich & poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. The provision on freedom of expression must be read in conjunction w/the power given to the COMELEC to supervise & regulate media during elections as well as with the various provisions in the Constitution which place a high premium on equalization of opportunities. Osmena vs COMELEC Facts: Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) prohibiting mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission on Elections is again challenged on the ground that events after the ruling in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections have called for its reexamination. Held: The term political "ad ban," when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print

Purifying the Electoral Process

Gonzales vs COMELEC Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional

space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. There is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution. The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates. The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. ABS-CBN vs COMELEC Facts: The COMELEC allegedly received an info from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections & to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President & Vice-President, results if which shall be broadcast immediately. COMELEC believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the official quick count of the NAMFREL. It also noted that it has not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Held: The holding of exit polls & the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech & of the press. Hence, the COMELEC cant ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly & credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls properly conducted & publicizedcan be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing & fraud. Social Weather Station vs COMELEC Facts: SWS brought action for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the Fair Election Act which provided that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election Surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before an election. Held: The SC saw the law as a form of prior restraint & therefore presumed to be invalid.

advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review. Held: The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms. Central Hudson Gas vs Public Service Commission Facts: In 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered all electric companies to stop advertising the use of electricity. The state determined that it did not have enough fuel to last the winter and needed citizens to conserve. Once the shortage was over, the PSC polled the public to decide whether to continue the ban on the electric companies. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed this ban on First Amendment constitutional grounds. Held: Although energy conservation is important, it does not justify a total ban on all advertisements promoting the use of electric devices or services. The government has the burden to prove that there is a substantial interest that the regulation protects. It is not appropriate to continue a ban to curb consumption of the electric utility. Requirements for the protection of commercial speech: 1. The speech must not be false or misleading or proposing an illegal activity 2. The governmental interest sought to be served by the regulation must be substantial 3. The regulation must directly advance the govt interest 4. The regulation must not be overboard. Pharmaceutical vs Secretary of Health Facts: About an absolute ban on advertising breast milk substitutes; E.O 51 (Milk Code) Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 2 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. Held: The ban is unduly restrictive & as more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants & young children.

Commercial Speech
Valentine vs Chrestensen Facts: Involves an ordinance banning distribution in the streets of printed handbills bearing commercial advertising material. Held: Ban was upheld. It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was w/the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the provision of the ordinance. If that evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the laws command. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy vs Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Facts: Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to

Unprotected Speech: Libel

Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire Facts: Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "God-damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace. Held: Some forms of expression--among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection. In this case, Chaplinsky uttered fighting words, i.e., words that "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." U.S vs Sedano Facts: About an article criticizing Rafael Palma, incumbent delegate to the Phil Assembly and, at the time of the publication, a candidate for re-election. The publication impeached the honesty, virtue & reputation of Palma & tended to expose him to public

hatred, contempt, & ridicule by publishing to the world his alleged mental, moral, & physical defects. Held: Such comment or criticism, if defamatory in its nature, constitutes a criminal libel if it appears that it was actuated by actual or express malice; that from the very nature of the privilege claimed the freedom of such criticismis necessarily limited to fair comment. US vs Contreras Facts: A libelous article directed to the Governor of the province of Ambos Camarines appeared in the Camarinense, a newspaper published in the said province. Held: Men have the right to attack, rightly or wrongly, the policy of a public official with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. They may show, by argument good or bad, such policy to be injurious to the individual and to society. They may demonstrate, by logic true or false, that it is destructive of human freedom and will result in the overthrow of the nation itself. But the law does not permit men falsely to impeach the motives, attack the honesty, blacken the virtue, or injure the reputation of that official. They may destroy, by fair means or foul, the whole fabric of his statesmanship, but the law does not permit them to attack the man himself. They may falsely charge that his policies are bad, but they may not falsely allege that he is bad. U.S vs Lerma Facts: Lerma (defendant) has been convicted in the trial court of publishing a libel upon J. H. Goldman. The supposed libel is contained in a writing in the form of a petition, signed by the Lerma and addressed to the justice of the peace of the pueblo of Pilar, Bataan. This writing was sent by the defendant, enclosed in a sealed envelope, to the justice of the peace. Several criminal prosecutions were at this time pending against the defendant before the justice, and when the petition was delivered the preliminary investigation was being held in one of these cases. The petition states that it is rumored that a plan has been formed to prosecute the petitioner for the purpose of discrediting his candidacy for the governorship of the province, and in general to injure his reputation. He attributed the rumored prosecutions to the malicious machinations of certain provincial officials naming especially the governor & the provincial fiscal. Held: The circumstances of the case showed quite conclusively that the sole motive of the defendant in presenting the petition was to defend himself against those charges. Looking to Sec 3 of the Libel Law, the Court saw in the rule that whether the imputations made were true or untrue, the existence of justifiable motives was an absolute defense. U.S vs Bustos Facts: A prosecution for a written statement made to the Sec of Justice impeaching the honesty & reputation of (Fiscal) Vicente Singson Encarnacion & Judge Dionisio Chanco. Buscos admitted that the letter was defamatory in content but he claimed that the communication was privileged bec it was done in good faith. Held: When malice in fact is shown to exist the publisher cant be relieved from liability by a pretense of justifiable motives. The Cuort found that there was malice in fact bec during the trial, Bustos admitted that he has personally made no investigation w/reference to the truth of the statements made in said communication. Policarpio vs Manila Times Publishing Co. Facts: Policarpio was Executive Secretary of the UNESCO. In that capacity, she worked under the Executive Office of the Philippine govt. An article was published in the Sunday Mirror imputing various acts of dishonesty to her, much of which were untrue. Held: Libel by negligence If the publisher was aware of the facts suppressed, there was malice; if unaware, when, under the facts, the truth could have been verified, the publisher was guilty of negligence & was

liable under Article 2176, 2194, 2208, & 2219 of the CC. Lopez vs CA Facts: In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1995 Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers when referring to the abovementioned incident. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 18, 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file ,in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were inadvertently switched. Held: While a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes owing to pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet, and no occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine. A retraction published to correct the mistake does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the libelous photograph or article, although it may and should mitigate it. New York Times vs Sullivan Facts: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed

him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. Held: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Curtis Publishing Co. vs Butts Facts: This concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Held: Criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. Rosenbloom vs Metromedia Facts: In 1963, Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Metromediaradio station, which broadcast news reports every half hour, broadcast news stories of petitioner Rosenblooms arrest for possession of obscene literature and the police seizure of "obscene books," and stories concerning petitioner's lawsuit against certain officials alleging that the magazines he distributed were not obscene and seeking injunctive relief from police interference with his business. These latter stories did not mention petitioner Rosenblooms name, but used the terms "smut literature racket" and "girlie-book peddlers." Following petitioner's acquittal of criminal obscenity charges, he filed this action seeking damages under Pennsylvania's libel law. Held: The actual malice standard applies. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. The present case illustrates the point. Gertz vs Welch, Inc. Facts: Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz lost his libel suit because a lower court found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan Held: The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York

Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However, continued Powell, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving ordinary citizens as he advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by citizens suing for libel. Borjal vs CA Facts: Brojal worte a series of articles in his column Jaywalker about alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying Francisco Wenceslao.. The articles were published in The Philippine Star on different dates & Wenceslao reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns. Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but is must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. Moreover, the Court said that even assuming that the contents of these articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. Jalandoni vs Drilon Facts: On July 15, 1992, Jaime Ledesma, filed an administrative complaint for violation of the Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioner with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). On the two succeeding days, July 16 and July 17, 1992, news articles thereon appeared in various daily newspapers. A full-page paid advertisement was caused to be published on July 16, 1992 by Robert Coyiuto, Jr., Jaime Ledesma, Ramon Garcia, Amparo Barcelon, Antonio Ozaeta, and Carlos Dyhongpo. The advertisements were published in five (5) major daily newspapers, to wit: The Manila Chronicle, Business World, Malaya, Philippine Daily Globe, and The Manila Times. Exactly a year thereafter or on July 16, 1993, petitioner Jalandoni filed a complaint for the crime of libel before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal against officials/directors of Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corporation (OPMC), namely, Coyiuto, Jr., Ledesma, Garcia, Barcelon, Ozaeta, and Dyhongpo. The publication in question was the July 16, 1992 full-page advertisements simultaneously published in five major dailies. These advertisements contained allegations naming herein petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts, and other wrongdoings constituting graft and corruption, relative to the dacion en pago financing arrangement entered into by Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. Held: In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or not. Here petitioner

failed to prove actual malice on the part of the private respondents. Nor are we of the opinion that the same was written to cast aspersion on the good name of the petitioner. In our view, the paid advertisement 16 merely served as a vehicle to inform the stockholders of the going-ons in the business world and only exposed the irregularities surrounding the PCGG and RCBC deal and the parties involved. The statements embodied in the advertisement and the open letter are protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 17 This carries the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official. Tulfo vs People Facts: That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 11, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT" (Pinakamayaman sa Customs.) Held: The article of a columnist was not consistent w/good faith & reasonable care. The writer had abandoned his responsibility to verify his story.

Held: Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of the at kind are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of art but profit would commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and the case of art only of secondary or minor importance. People vs Padan Facts: The four accused where charged with obscenity. The accused were arrested after they prepared a show entitled "fighting fish" wherein a man and a woman had open sexual intercourse before a crowd. They were all convicted. In this case, two of the accused appealed; one was the woman performer who sought to lower her penalty, while the other claimed to be a mere bystander and not the manager. Held: The accused were found guilty. This case is a clear showing of showing obscene or indecent acts. Regarding the womans appeal, her penalty was drastically reduced by the lower court already. Regarding the other accused, there is ample evidence to show that he was the manager; e.g., he was at the entrance gathering the tickets, he was the one who asked the audience who the latter would want to have sex. Roth vs US Facts: Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. Held: The Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Regina vs Hicklin Facts: A number of copies of a pamphlet entitled, "The Confessional Unmasked; shewing the depravity of the Roman priesthood, the iniquity of the Confessional, and the questions put to females in confession," were seized in Henry Scotts house and ordered by justices of a borough to be destroyed as obscene books. On appeal, the following facts were found. The pamphlet consisted of extracts taken from the writings of theologians on the doctrine and discipline of the Roman Church and particularly on the practice of auricular confession. On one side of the page were passages in the original Latin, and opposite to each passage was a free translation in English. The pamphlet also contained a preface and notes condemnatory of the tenets and principles of the writers. About half of the pamphlet related to controversial questions, but the latter half of the pamphlet was grossly obscene, as relating to impure and filthy acts, words, and ideas. The appellant sold the pamphlets at the price he gave for them to any one who applied for them. He did not keep the pamphlets to sell for profit or gain, nor for the purpose of prejudicing good morals, though the indiscriminate sale and circulation of them was calculated to have that effect; but he kept and sold them for the purpose of exposing what he deemed to be the errors of the church of Rome, and particularly the immorality of the confessional.

Unprotected Speech: Obscenity

People vs Kottinger Facts: Accused Kottinger's camera businessstore was raided. Among the materials confiscated were some pictures that show Filipino inhabitants in their native dress. Using these items, he was charged of violating section 12 of Act No. 277, the Philippine Libel Law. His pictures were being used as postcards of the nonChristian natives of the country. Held: Although Philippine laws do not define what obscenity means, the Court defined obscene or obscenity as "something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy."There are two tests whether something is obscene: (1) whether it corrupts the mind ofthe viewers to such immoral influences, or (2) it shocks the ordinary and common sense ofmen as an indecency. In the case at bar, the pictures merely portrayed the inhabitants in their native dress as testified by a UP Professor. Moreover, there are pictures of similar nature which are imported and circulated in the Philippines, such as a book about the Ifugaos. As such, the pictures were not obscene within the meaning of the law. People vs Go Pin Facts: Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large number of one-real 16-millimeter films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. At first, he pleaded not guilty of the information but later was allowed by the court to change his plea to that of guilty which he did. Not content with the plea of guilty the trial court had the films in question projected and were viewed by it in order to evaluate the same from the standpoint of decency and morality. Thereafter, and considering the plea of guilty entered by the accused, and the fact that after viewing the films the trial court noted only a slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality in them, it sentenced the appellant to 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He is now appealing from the decision.

Held: The publication of such an obscene pamphlet was a misdemeanor, and was not justified or excused by the appellant's innocent motives or object; he must be taken to have intended the natural consequences of his act. Hicklin Test (Lord Cockburn) Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences." If yes, then such was declared to be obscene. Also, the Hicklin Rule looked at the content in question not as a whole, but only in part. In other words, it did not consider the questionable material in relation to whole content. Butler vs Michigan Facts: Appellant was charged with the violation of the provisions 343 of the Michigan Penal Code for selling to a police officer what the trial judge characterized as "a book containing obscene, immoral, lewd, lascivious language, or descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." Appellant moved to dismiss the proceeding on the claim that application of 343 unduly restricted freedom of speech as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute (1) prohibited distribution of a book to the general public on the basis of the undesirable influence it may have upon youth; (2) damned a book and proscribed its sale merely because of some isolated passages that appeared objectionable when divorced from the book as a whole; and (3) failed to provide a sufficiently definite standard of guilt. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge denied the motion, and, in an oral opinion, held that ". . . the defendant is guilty because he sold a book in the City of Detroit containing this language [the passages deemed offensive], and also because the Court feels that even viewing the book as a whole, it [the objectionable language] was not necessary to the proper development of the theme of the book nor of the conflict expressed therein." Appellant was fined $100. Pressing his federal claims, appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan. Although the State consented to the granting of the application "because the issues involved in this case are of great public interest, and because it appears that further clarification of the language of . . . [the statute] is necessary," leave to appeal was denied. In view of this denial, the appeal is here from the Recorder's Court of Detroit. We noted probable jurisdiction. Held: The statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the conviction is reversed. Section 343 of the Michigan Penal Code, in effect, makes it a misdemeanor to sell or make available to the general reading public any book containing obscene language "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." Ginsberg vs New York Facts: Appellant and his wife operate "Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines including some so-called "girlie" magazines. Appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old boy two "girlie" magazines on each of two dates in October 1965, in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on both counts. The judge found (1) that the magazines contained pictures which depicted female "nudity" in a manner defined in subsection 1 (b), that is "the showing of . . . female . . . buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple . . .," and (2) that the pictures were "harmful to minors" in that they had, within the meaning of subsection 1 (f "that quality of . . . representation . . . of nudity . . . [which] . . . (i)

predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." He held that both sales to the 16-year-old boy therefore constituted the violation under 484-h of "knowingly to sell . . . to a minor" under 17 of "(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors," and "(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. Held: The magazines here involved are not obscene for adults and appellant is not barred from selling them to persons 17 years of age or older. Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press, and there is no issue here of the obscenity of the material involved as appellant does not argue that the magazines are not "harmful to minors." It is not constitutionally impermissible for New York, under this statute, to accord minors under 17 years of age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read and see. Ginzburg vs U.S Facts: Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari. Held: The Court held that although circulars themselves may not be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for prurient appeal, it shall be deemed "pornographic" communication that lies beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or understanding. Memoirs vs Massachusetts Facts: A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an "obscene" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene. Held: The Court held that the Massachusetts courts erred in finding Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure to be obscene. The Court, applying the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States, held that the book was not "utterly without redeeming social value." The Court reaffirmed that books could not be deemed obscene unless they were unqualifiedly worthless, even if the books possessed prurient appeal and were "patently offensive." Miller vs California Facts: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.

Held: The Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision. Reno vs American Civil Liberties Union Facts: Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Held: The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

Miscellany on Freedom of Expression

Sotto vs Ruiz Facts: Vicente Sotto is the proprietor of the weekly periodical, The Independent. Juan Ruiz was, on February 10, 1921, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Posts. The latter refused to forward as registered mail, a copy of The Independent, on the ground that it contained libelous matter. Held: The action of the Director of Posts in disbarring from the mails copies of a periodical on the ground that they contained matter of a libelous character was clearly wrong. The Director of Posts is vested with authority to determine what mail matter is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, or libelous. The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character. In excluding any publication from the mails, the object should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the people. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. The performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his action. The courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong.

Mortera vs Court of Industrial Relations Facts: On Feb 21, 1947, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order w/regards to case No. 44 V(1), entitled Bisig ng Canlubang (NLU) vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate," and of all the proceedings taken therein. The dispositive part of the order sought to be annulled is as follows: In view of the foregoing considerations, his Court orders: (1) That all laborers, whether they belong to the Bisig ng Canlubang (NLU), or to the new union Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO), should return to their respective work immediately, but not later than 6 o'clock a.m., on February 24, 1947, with the admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose any concession that may be considered by this Court in the main case, but that the respondent company, upon its petition, is hereby authorized to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report at the above stated hour and date. Beginning Sunday, February 23, 1947, at 6 o'clock a.m., picketing under any guise or form, is hereby entirely prohibited. (2) That for the maintenance of peace and order in Canlubang Sugar Estate, to protect the property of the respondent Company, and also to protect those laborers who may report to work in accordance with this order, the request for assistance of the Military Police, or any other law-enforcing agency, is hereby granted, and government police agencies are hereby requested to extend such help and protection. Upon its request, the respondent company is hereby authorized to reopen on Sunday, February 23, 1947. However, to allow all the workers to be notified of this order, the Court has fixed 6 o'clock Monday morning, February 24, 1947, as the dead line for them to report, in other words, those who fail to report can be substituted in order to enable the respondent company to operate. The parties are hereby notified of this Order in open court. Petitioners contend that this order, requiring the laborers to return to their work, and, upon failure to do so, authorizing the Canlubang Sugar Estate to employ new laborers to take their place, and prohibiting picketing under any guise or form, is contrary to law and has been issued without and/or in excess of the jurisdiction of he Court of Industrial Relations. They also complain that notwithstanding the fact that the Canlubang Worker's Union (CLO) or its members are not party to the case and were not given the opportunity to answer and defend the charges against them or to be heard in connection therewith, the members of said motion were likewise ordered to return to work and to desist from exercising their right to picket. The CIR answered, alleging that it has the authority and jurisdiction to issue the order of February 21, 1947, by virtue of the provisions of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103; that said jurisdiction is merely incident to the jurisdiction acquired by the court in case No. 44-V, Bisig ng Canlubang vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate, in virtue of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended, that said order is only complementary to the order of the same tribunal dated December 11, 1946; that both orders were issued only in order to maintain the status quo of the parties in case No. 44-V which was pending decision by the court, and they were of interlocutory character; that Hermogenes Mortera and the signatories and the members of the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) were members of the Bisig ng Canlubang at the time the court issued the orders of December 10 and 11, 1946, in case No. 44-V and therefore were parties in said case; that the information and organization of the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) by Hermogenes Mortera while case No. 44-V was pending, did not have the effect of

excluding said Hermogenes Mortera and the signatories and members of the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) from the effect of said orders. The Canlubang Sugar Estate alleged in its answer that the order complied of by petitioners was issued by the Court of Industrial Relations in virtue of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103; that the order against picketing is authorized by said section; that petitioners became parties in the case when they appeared in case No. 44-V after receipt of notice of the hearing and copy of the urgent motion giving rise to the order, when they asked for postponement of the hearing of the case, when they cross-examined witnesses in the trial which was instigated by the members of the petitioning union and offered evidence in their defense in connection with the urgent motion Held: The prohibition contained in the order of Feb 21, 1947 should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs Cloribel Facts: Picketed by PAFLU was Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, METBANK for short, located at the ground floor of the Wellington Building. Wellington complained, however, that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees, clients and customers; that besides giving the disconcerting impression that a strike had been declared against it or any of the aforementioned occupants of the second to the sixth floors of the building, the picketing of the passageway in question placed it in an embarrassing position as the same occupants, mostly affected business firms, demanded protection of their peaceful enjoyment of and free access to and from, the premises respectively leased by them; and that by reason of the picket it sustained damages in the amount of P15,000.00, plus P2,000.00 attorney's fees, and would continue to sustain damages unless the picketers were restrained from carrying on their harassing acts. Thus this litigation started with Wellington charging in court the picketing PAFLU and some twenty-four named individuals and twenty-five John Does, who were employees of neither the corporation nor any of its tenants occupying the second to the sixth floors of the building, of undue interference not only with its enjoyment of its property and business of leasing and administering the same but also with the businesses of said neutral tenants. Held: Picketing that blocked the common passageway of a bldg, the only ingress & egress used by all the occupants of the bldg, some of whom were innocent bystanders in the dispute, could be regulated. The doctrine, however, is now clear that the constitutional right embraced in freedom of expression precludes any blanket prohibition against picketing. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Facts: A letter of management to striking employees containing promises of benefits in order to entice them to return to work & another letter containing threats to obtain replacements if they did not return to work were characterized as unfair labor practice not protected by the free speech clause. Revelations made by a union man, however, about the finances of the company were justified by the free speech clause. Held: In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man & one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were

justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution. Liwayway Publishing, Inc., et al. vs PCGG Facts: PCGG had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986. On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc. (hereafter HMH&M). Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which would virtually shut down its publications. The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the Commission's then Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention. On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez, modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time. On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned. Held: PCGG may not lawfully intervene & participate in the management & operations of a private mass media to maintain its freedom & independence as guaranteed by the Cosntitution. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Facts: The Philippine Press Institute challenged the provision in the Value Added Tax Law, R.A 7716, which withdrew its VAT exemption. Before R.A # 7716, among the transactions exempted fr VAT were: (f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books & any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals w/fixed prices for subscription & sale & which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements. The Philippine Press Institute didnt claim immunity fr general laws; but it claimed that the deletion of the provision had singled out the press for discriminatory treatment bec broadcast media still enjoyed exemption. Held: If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not bec it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only bec of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base & the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates is w/out merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media & broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing & publication, which are different fr the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification. Churchill vs Rafferty Facts: The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant, James J. Rafferty of the Collector of Internal Revenue and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property an annual tax and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight Held: The police power cant interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But we are of the opinion, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well recognized principle to further application.

the constitution and laws of the United States, contrary to the form of the statute. Held: A charge that the defendants conspired to injure certain persons of African descent, being citizens of the United States, thereby to prevent them from exercising their rights as citizens, such as the right to peaceably assemble, to bear arms, etc., unless accompanied with an averment that the injury was committed by reason of the race, color, or previous condition of servitude of the person conspired against, is not sustainable in the courts of the United States. The thirteenth amendment confers upon congress full power to legislate on the subject of slavery, and to pass all laws it may deem proper for its entire eradication in every form. The civil rights act of 1866 was within this power. That act was intended to give to the colored race the rights of citizenship, and to protect them, as a race, or class, from unfriendly state legislation and from lawless combinations. An injury to a colored person, therefore, is not cognizable by the United States courts under that act, unless inflicted by reason of his race, color or previous condition of servitude. An ordinary crime against a colored person, without having that characteristic, is cognizable only in the state courts. De Jonge vs Oregon Facts: On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De Jonge addressed the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a maritime strike in progress in Portland. While the meeting was in progress, police raided it. De Jonge was arrested and charged with violating the State's criminal syndicalism statute. The law defines criminal syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution." After being convicted, De Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction. Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court distinguished that the indictment did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization, society and group called by the Communist Party, which was unlawfully teaching and advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage. Held: The Court held that the Oregon statute, as applied, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the record, the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned that to preserve the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly - principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the auspices under which a meeting is held, but the purpose of the meeting and whether the speakers' remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined, which had not occurred in De Jonge's case. U.S vs Apurado Facts: Some 500 men spontaneously assembled at the chamber of the Municipal Council to ask/demand for the ouster of the municipal treasurer on account of religious differences. No permit was involved. Held: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, bec on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, & the greater the grievance & the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followersIf instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out & punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly conduct & seditious conduct &

Assembly & Petition

U.S vs Cruikshank Facts: On the 13th day of April, 1873, at Grant parish, in the state of Louisiana, William J. Cruikshank & company unlawfully and feloniously did band together with the unlawful and felonious intent and purpose to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate one Levi Nelson and one Alexander Tillman, being citizens of the United States of African descent, and persons of color, and in the peace of the state and the United States, with the unlawful and felonious intent thereby to hinder and prevent them in their free exercise and enjoyment of their lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the United States for a peaceable and lawful purpose, the same being a right and privilege granted or secured to them in common with all other good citizens of the United States, by

between an essentially peaceable assembly & a tumultuous uprising. Evangelista vs Earnshaw Facts: Evangelista, a Communist leader, had requested permission to hold a mtg in Plaza Moriones in Manila. The mtg was to be followed by a parade & the delivery to the Governor-General of a message from labor. Earnshaw, the city Mayor, refused permission & prohibited all Communist mtgs. Previous to this, mtgs have been had w/prior permission in which seditious speeches were made urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the present government, & stirring up enmity against the insular & local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of the laborers & as tools of the capitalists & imperialists for oppressing said laborers. Held: It must be considered that the respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, did only the right thing under the circumstances Instead of being condemned or criticized, the respondent mayor should be praised & commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, & firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, & by the seditious speeches & utterances of its members. Primicias vs Fugoso Facts: The case was a petition for mandamus instituted by Cipriano Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against Mayor Valeriano Fugoso of Manila to compel him to issue a permit for the holding of a public mtg at PlazaMiranda. The mtg was to be an indignation rally in protest against the alleged fraud committed by the Liberal Party in the recent elections. In refusing the permit, the Mayor had given as his reason the fact that there was a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances & upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remain bitter & high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith & confidence of the people in their government, & in the duly constituted authorities which might threaten breaches of the peace & a disruption of public order. Held: The right of the applicant to a permit was subject only to the Mayors reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, w/a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets & public places by others, & to provide adequate & proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. Whitney vs California, concurring opinon of Justice Brandeis To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Whitney vs California Facts: Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change." Held: The Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court argued "that a State. . .may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances. . .tending to. . .endanger

the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means" and was not open to question. The decision is most notable for the concurring opinion written by Justice Brandeis, in which he argued that only clear, present, and imminent threats of "serious evils" could justify suppression of speech. Ignacio vs Ela Facts: The members of Jehovahs Witnesses had asked for a permit to hold a mtg at the Kiosk in the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. The mayor granted permission for the use only of the northwestern part of the plaza. Held: It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance fr the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace & order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of mtg of its membersIt cant therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order & public safety. This is especially true, considering that the tenets of petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in denying his request. Navarro vs Villegas Facts: The case arose out of the intensified student demonstrations of 1969-1970. Student leader Navarro had asked Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas for a permit to hold a rally on a week-day at Plaza Miranda. Against the background of recent student sponsored rallies which had degenerated into some violence & disorder, the Mayor was willing to allow a rally at Plaza Miranda on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday; but for a week-day rally the Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens as an alternative location. Navarro went to the SC for an order to Villegas to allow a Plaza Miranda rally. Held: Primicias vs Fugoso - The Mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, w/a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets & public places by others, & to provide adequate & proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. Cox vs Louisiana Facts: On the morning of December 15, 1961, Elton Cox led a some 2000 students on an antidiscrimination march that ended in a large assembly before the Baton Rouge, Louisiana, courthouse building. Following police instructions, the demonstrators confined themselves to the west side of the street so as not to interfere with traffic. As the lunch hour neared, Cox encouraged the demonstrators to seek service at any one of several near-by segregated lunch counters. Upon hearing this, the police urged the crowd to disband and began pushing them away from the courthouse. When the demonstrators resisted, police showered them with tear gas and chased them away. The following day, Louisiana police arrested and charged Cox with "disturbing the peace." On appeal from the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Cox certiorari. Held: The Court began by noting that none of the demonstrators' activities acceded those that would be expected at any peaceable assembly. Cheering, clapping, and singing do not in themselves constitute a breach of the peace. With respect to Cox's urging the demonstrators to engage in activities which could potentially result in violence, such as demanding service at segregated lunch counters, the Court held that these could not sustain a breach of the peace conviction either. The constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly could not be denied because of hostility to their assertion or exercise. The Court

noted that free speech protections serve perhaps their best purpose when they invite dispute, induce conditions of unrest, and even stir people to anger over prejudicial preconceptions. Any statute that is so broadly written as to stifle these freedoms shall be stuck down as repugnant to the Constitution. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Facts: Phil Blooming Mills Employees Org (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Phil Blooming Mills Co., Inc (PBMC).& petitioners Benjamin Pagcu & Rodulfo Munsod are officers petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration & stated the the demonstration or rally cant be cancelled bec it has already been agreed upon in the mtg. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do w/the Company bec the Union has no quarrel or dispute w/Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, bec such failure is a violation of the existing CBA &, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Bec the petitioners & their members numbering about 400 proceeded w/the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the 1st shift workers should not be required to participate in nd rd the demonstration & that the workers in the 2 & 3 shifts should be utilized for the demonstration fr 6am2pm on March 4, 1969. PBMC filed a charge against petitioners & other employees who composed the 1st shift, for a violation of R.A # 875 (Industrial Peace Act), & of the CBA providing for No Strike & No Lockout. Petitioners were held guilty by the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) for bargaining in bad faith. Held: A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of

human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by onethird, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. UNIDO vs COMELEC Facts: In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL Marcos Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Resolutions 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws. The Resolutions are: (1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for 'equal opportunity' on public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on April 7, 1981; (2) Resolution No.1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio and television) in the plebiscite campaign"; and (3) Resolution No.1469 providing for "equal spaceon the use of the prin t media in the 1981 plebiscite of April 7, 1981 Held: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free airtime as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense. PCIB vs PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES Facts: On April 3, 1967, defendant Philnabank Employees' Association (PEMA), a labor organization

composed of the rank and file employees of the Philippine National Bank, declared a strike. During the said strike, which lasted up to the following day, members of the (PEMA) paraded and displayed placards in front of the PNB building at Escolta, Manila, one of which contained the following words: "PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNBNIDC?" Plaintiff considered the above "defamatory and libelous per se for at the very least [it] amounts to an "act tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a juridical person. The allegation of its being libelous was denied by defendants on the ground that such placards "containing the alleged writing were displayed during the strike on April 3 and April 4,1967 as a fair, legal labor strategy denouncing the lack of business foresight, incompetence, mismanagement, arbitrary and despotic acts of the Management to heed the legal and legitimate demands of the defendants, as a striking union, and against whom a strike was declared against the management of the Philippine National Bank & that moreover, "defendants, during the strike on April 3 to April 4, 1967, against the management of the Philippine National Bank, were only moved by good intention and justifiable motives and did not intend to injure any party not connected with the strike;"constituting part "of their legal and fair labor strategy to enforce their demands" and to bolster their imputation of incompetence and arbitrariness of the Philippine National Bank management. Held: This Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as in the United States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite. Such being the case. there is no affront either to reason or to the law in the complaint for libel being dismissed. Privileged communication yields to proof of malice & that pleadings in court, to be privileged, must be relevant to the case. Bayan vs Ermita Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also cosponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution & the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights & other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression

clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation bec it covers all rallies. Held: Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.