626 Phil.

654

EN BANC

G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V.DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.

VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION
ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI AND
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, PETITIONERS,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M.

DRILON AND J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court
involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners
question their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of
new party leaders conducted by the respondents.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding

events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of

the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party's withdrawal of support for the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced
Drilon's move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his
party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly

discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly
proceeded to declare all positions in the LP's ruling body vacant and elected new
officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a
petition[1] with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections.
He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party's electing bodies, the
National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council
(NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the
amended LP Constitution,[2] party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term
that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP's NECO
and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new
officers on that occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP
majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also
said that the amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga
Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly
ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on
July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting

respondent Drilon's petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered
the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the
election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the
electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution.
But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly
ratified, Drilon's term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position
of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings.
On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution,[5] granting respondent
Drilon's petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through
the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership
dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a
consequence, respondent Drilon's term as LP president was to end only on
November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon's term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who
were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several
persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership
status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that
meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP
president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G.

Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez,
Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for
mandatory and prohibitory injunction[6] before the COMELEC against
respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary
general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of
the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the
NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the party's
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as
common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103
members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party
chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like
petitioner Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting.
Atienza's allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily
thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the
meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice
to Atienza's allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas' election as LP
president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution.
The party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining
the NECO members because supervening events changed the body's number
and composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had
gone on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their
re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to
serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also
became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became
NECO members upon respondent Drilon's nomination, a privilege granted the LP
president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO
membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening
circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners
Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election
of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006
NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain
NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their
party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May
2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying
petitioners Atienza, et al.'s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections
necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP
Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or
won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership.
Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president
was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.'s expulsion as LP members, the

COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to
disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an
internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution,

petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1.Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an
indispensable party; and

2.Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the

requisite legal standing to question Roxas' election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3.Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the
NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4.Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved
the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the
issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5.Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.'s

constitutional right to due process by the latter's expulsion from the party.

The Court's Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition
for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable
party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ
of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be
adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case.[7]

But petitioners Atienza, et al.'s causes of action in this case consist in

respondents Roxas, et al.'s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the
election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president.
Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of
"despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these
acts are Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO,
and respondent Drilon's "railroading" of election proceedings. Atienza, et al.
attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been
sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.'s
prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.'s acts and the reconvening of
the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.

Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have
no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they
are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having
joined other political parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the
outcome of the action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is

governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff's standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.'s lack of
standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court
hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.'s allegations that respondents

Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily
excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the
election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list
of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.'s allegations were correct, they would have
been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further,
they would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to the
holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To
this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election
would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court's decision in this case.
Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas' election as LP president, petitioners

Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election
should have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the
party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent
Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the
COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Court's
decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next
party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Court's ruling when they
removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECO's composition.[10]

But the list of NECO members appearing in the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections,
changes in the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the
amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir
program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO,
which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had
been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the
nature and character of the NECO membership.

Nothing in the Court's resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO
membership should be pegged to the party's 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.
There would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP
Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section
27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of
the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in
good standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with the national
and local elections taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the
NECO would have to yield to changes brought about by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership
had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their
offices had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away,
resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be expected to remain part of
the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In addition,
Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party
president to nominate "persons of national stature" to the NECO. Thus,
petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO
members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if
this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.'s way of ensuring their
election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act
under the amended LP Constitution.
The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP
Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at
the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.[12] The
explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of
the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court's resolution in the earlier cases
recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that
would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that
position violated the Court's resolution. But the Court's resolution in the earlier
cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections
29[13] and 46[14] of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove
him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised
its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve
into the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh
heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings
of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
over intra-party leadership disputes.[15]

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the
validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the
legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP
president. Given the COMELEC's finding as upheld by this Court that the
membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners
cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.

While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to
their faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their
numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of
its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the
individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did
Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported
by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from
the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent
Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate
such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et
al.'s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled within
the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienza's allies raised objections before the
NECO assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the
NECO proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose
composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.

Doctrine:

The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not

have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their
activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene
in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already

been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections[16] that the COMELEC's powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared
in another case[17] that the COMELEC's power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas' election as LP president is a leadership issue

that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP
president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates
for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize
other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local
elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official
standard bearer of the party.

The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that
will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal
obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through
their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant
in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.[19]
Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a
simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the
NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before
summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al.,
proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative
proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid
down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the

internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang
Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through
which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An
administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state
function."[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of
the state's powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state's powers are found in
Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which
guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process
under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state's powers in relation to the
rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens
against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private
individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs
from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens
and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.[23]

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up

as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private
organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political
party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of
the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to
be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if
any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members,
correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among
themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated
have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a
due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not
interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A
political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its
constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the
Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest
by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is
also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to
evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25]

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld
Roxas' election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et
al.'s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has
implications on the COMELEC's performance of its functions under Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining
to Atienza, et al.'s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an
issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution

of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP
08-001.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., in the result.
Carpio, J., concur but the comelec's jurisdiction over leadership dispute of
political parties is merely for purposes of determining whether they should be
registered.
Corona, J., no part.
09 Phil. 523

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203646, April 16, 2013

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ROMEO R. ROBISO, PEDRO T. DABU, JR., LOPE

E. FEBLE, NOEL T. TIAMPONG AND JOSE FLORO CRISOLOGO,
PETITIONERS,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JONATHAN DE LA CRUZ, ED VINCENT

ALBANO AND BENEDICT KATO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65

assailing the May 4, 2010[1]  and September 5, 2012 resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The assailed rulings (i) dismissed the
petition filed by Samson S. Alcantara, Romeo R. Robiso, Pedro T. Dabu, Jr.,
Lope E. Feble, Noel T. Tiampong and Jose Floro Crisologo
(collectively, petitioners) for the declaration of nullity of the Supreme
Assembly held on February 6, 2010 and (ii) denied the motion for reconsideration
the petitioners subsequently filed.

The petitioners are officials and members of Abakada Guro Partylist (ABAKADA):

Attys. Alcantara, Tiampong and Dabu (Alcantara et. al) are the founding
President, Vice President for the Visayas and Secretary, respectively,
of Abakada; while Robiso, Feble and Crisologo have been members of the party
since 2007.[2]

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Sometime between January and April 2003, Alcantara, et al., along with their
fellow law teachers, organized a party named Advocates and Adherents of
Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers. The party has a
constitution and by-laws (CBL) and a principal office at the same location as Atty.
Alcantara’s law office.[3]

On May 14, 2004, the party name was amended and changed to Abakada Guro
Party list. The change was duly approved by the COMELEC. In the May 2007
elections, where ABAKADA participated and won a seat, Jonathan de la Cruz
(De la Cruz), its first nominee, became the party’s sole representative in
Congress.[4]

In a May 5, 2009 letter separately addressed to the COMELEC and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, De la Cruz tendered his “irrevocable”
resignation effective December 31, 2009.[5] Despite the supposed effectivity of his
resignation however, De la Cruz refused to vacate his seat, prompting
Alcantara et. al to file a petition for quo warranto with the Supreme Court. This
petition was subsequently dismissed for being moot and academic.[6]

In several occasions between October and December 2009, De la Cruz

requested Alcantara in writing to convene the Supreme Assembly. He informed
Alcantara, too, of the nationwide party caucuses being held and of the common
sentiment among members that a party meeting should be called. Under
ABAKADA’s CBL, a Supreme Assembly meeting should be held at least once
every three years; since 2004, no Supreme Assembly had been called and held.

In his letter-response, Alcantara explained that the Supreme Assembly cannot be

held as requested because many of the members reside in the provinces; the
party lacked the funds to cover the necessary expenses. Instead, Alcantara
replied that it would be more “feasible to hold the [Supreme Assembly] early next
year, as may be determined by the [National Executive Board].”[7] Alcantara
added:

1. Approval of applications for membership in Abakada is a party matter, and

genuine devotion to the advancement of the welfare of the teachers and
other school personnel is a basic qualification for membership as
prescribed in our [CBL].

2. Membership identification cards have to be signed by the Secretary… and

the President of ABAKADA.

xxx

Incidentally, we have filed with the Comelec our Manifestation to

Participate on November 24, 2009.[8]
On December 15, 2009, an All Leaders Assembly was convened. While
Alcantara failed to attend the meeting, he sent Noel Tiampong in his stead. The
convening of a Supreme Assembly was proposed at the meeting, with the
agenda of amending the ABAKADA CBL, the election of new officers, and the
discussion of other election related matters. The proposal was to hold the
meeting sometime in February 2010.

Accordingly, in a letter dated January 23, 2010, Ed Vincent Albano (Albano),

acting as the party’s Secretary, notified the party’s chapters and members that
the party would hold its first Supreme Assembly on February 6, 2010 “pursuant to
the resolution adopted by the party during its First All Leaders Assembly held last
December 15, 2009.”[9] As scheduled, the respondents proceeded to hold
a Supreme Assembly that resulted in the approval and ratification of the revised
ABAKADA CBL; the ouster of Alcantara et. al from their positions; the expulsion
of the petitioners from the party; and the election of De la Cruz and Albano as
new President and Secretary-General, respectively.

This prompted the petitioners to file a petition with the COMELEC to (i) declare
the meeting held on February 6, 2010 void and (ii) restrain the respondents from
falsely representing themselves as the duly elected officers of ABAKADA.

In their petition, the petitioners alleged that the sending of notices and the holding
of a Supreme Assembly were contrary to the party’s CBL for not having been
authorized by the President and by the party’s National Executive Board. They
alleged that Albano has no authority to sign and send notices, much less call a
Supreme Assembly, since he is not the party’s Secretary. Likewise, the
membership status of several meeting participants have neither been approved
nor accepted in accordance with the party’s CBL.

The respondents defended the validity of the meeting in their comment to the
petition. They narrated that between September 2009 and February 2010, De la
Cruz made several communications to Alcantara to urge him to call a general
membership meeting and to inform him of the consultation meetings and party
caucuses being conducted at the respondents’ instance in preparation for the
May 2010 elections. The respondents added that since Alcantara’s letter-
response merely sought the deferment of the Supreme Assembly to “early next
year”[10] i.e., 2010, an All Leaders Assembly was convened on December 15,
2009, with prior notice to Alcantara, leading to the Supreme Assembly on
February 6, 2010.
COMELEC Rulings

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
holding of an assembly for purposes of electing party officers and the
amendment of the party’s CBL have long been overdue. Under the party’s CBL,
a Supreme Assembly must be convened every three years to elect officers and
to amend or revise the party’s CBL. Under Alcantara’s leadership, no Supreme
Assembly was convened since ABAKADA’s accreditation in 2004.

As members in good standing, therefore, the respondents had every right to ask
Alcantara to make a call for a Supreme Assembly; the respondents even notified
him of earlier meetings and caucuses being held by the party. Because of the
petitioners’ (particularly, Alcantara’s) failure, if not outright refusal, to heed the
respondents’ requests pursuant to the party’s CBL, the respondents had “good
cause” to initiate the holding of the meeting.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the ruling, mainly questioning

the COMELEC Second Division’s failure to address the issue of validity of
the Supreme Assembly based on the non-membership status of several
meeting participants. The COMELEC En Banc denied the petitioners’ motion
under the following terms:

We find this argument unavailing. While we agree with petitioners’ supposition

that only legitimate members of a party may move to determine its destiny, we
believe that petitioners have failed to prove their allegation that the Supreme
Assembly delegates are non-members of the party. [Petitioners] offer nothing to
corroborate such assertion except the words of Mr. Alcantara himself, which, to
our mind, is self serving, at best.

Moreover, we cannot accept their claim that only those one hundred eight (108)
individuals listed by them should be considered as legitimate members of
ABAKADA Guro. The “Member’s Personal Data Cards” that have been submitted
by petitioners to confirm the membership of these persons are dated either 2002
or 2003, or during the inception of the party as AASJS, which is at least seven (7)
years before the Supreme Assembly of 06 February 2010. At best, what these
documents only evince is that the people listed by petitioner are members of
AASJS or ABAKADA Guro as of 2003. They do not prove that the attendees in
the assailed Supreme Assembly are not legitimate members of the party, for it is
quite possible and highly probable that several more individuals have become
members of the party since 2002 and 2003. A party like ABAKADA Guro, which
was able to gain a seat in Congress following the 2007 elections, could not have
remained stagnant as petitioners would have us believe (sic).[11]

ARGUMENTS:

With their recourses at the COMELEC exhausted, the petitioners now come
before this Court on the present petition for certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Court.

THE PETITION

The petition alleged that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did
not consider Alcantara’s affidavit, the submitted list of party members, and the
attached individual applications for membership. Since the attendance sheets of
the participants in the Supreme Assembly were submitted to the COMELEC, it
could have simply compared the submitted lists to determine whether the
Supreme Assembly participants are legitimate party members.

Assuming arguendo that the participants in the Supreme Assembly were all party

members, the petition further alleged that the meeting was not convened in
accordance with the party’s CBL; thus, the COMELEC should have granted their
petition to declare the Supreme Assembly meeting void.

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT

The respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition, submitting that the general
membership is empowered to take the initiative and call for a Supreme Assembly
when the duly elected officials unjustifiably refused to do so. This was what the
respondents simply did. Only after sending several letters to petitioner Alcantara
and only after a consensus was reached in the All Leaders Assembly in
December 15, 2009 (that the Supreme Assembly be convened), all with prior
notices to petitioner Alcantara, did respondent Albano, acting as Secretary
General, sign and send notices to the chapter leaders who are the official
representatives of the general membership.

The respondents further posit that the petitioners cannot invoke ABAKADA’s CBL
in assailing the validity of the Supreme Assembly because their own refusal to
abide by the democratic provisions of the CBL (among others, on electing new
officers every three years) is the very violation that prompted the conduct of the
party proceeding now being assailed.

The respondents add that during the hearing on the registered party- list groups’
continuing compliance with Republic Act No. 7941 and the 1987 Constitution,
only respondent De la Cruz and the present ABAKADA composition participated
and submitted the necessary documentary and testimonial evidence proving the
party’s continuing existence and accomplishments for the purpose of party-list
accreditation.

OUR RULING

We dismiss the petition.

At the outset, the respondents informed the Court (and the Court takes judicial
notice) of the fact that Atty. Alcantara is now running for a seat in the Senate
under the group Social Justice Society. The respondents claim that by filing his
certificate of candidacy for the Senate under a different party, Alcantara
effectively abandoned any claim to the ABAKADA presidency - the position he
seeks to recover by asking for the nullity of the Supreme Assembly. They argue
that petitioner Alcantara’s claim to the presidency of ABAKADA, a marginalized
and underrepresented party-list group, is inconsistent with his act of waging an
expensive national campaign for the Philippine Senate.

We need not dwell at length on this development as this is not a matter that the
parties presented and argued before the COMELEC and which that tribunal
resolved; there is no ruling on the matter that is now before us for review.
Additionally, what the petitioners question is petitioner Alcantara’s expulsion as a
party president and as a member of the party when he questioned the legality of
the holding of the Supreme Assembly. This was the matter directly litigated
before the COMELEC and an issue that the tribunal directly ruled upon. We can
resolve this issue without need of considering the effect of petitioner Alcantara’s
Senate candidacy.

We additionally observe that the respondents merely informed us of the fact of

petitioner Alcantara’s Senate candidacy but did not at all attempt to show that by
running under another group, the Social Justice Society, Alcantara effectively
acted prejudicially or to the detriment of the interests that ABAKADA seeks to
advance. We have not been likewise directed to any provision in the ABAKADA’s
CBL that would support the respondents’ claim of inconsistency between
ABAKADA leadership and filing of a certificate of candidacy in the Senate.
Hence, petitioner Alcantara’s Senate candidacy is a non-issue in the present
case.

Valid reasons exist to oust

petitioner Alcantara from ABAKADA

Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties.

[12]
 More specifically, as part of its power to enforce and administer laws relative
to the conduct of an election, the COMELEC possesses the power to register
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions for purposes
of the party-list system of elections.[13] It is the party-list group’s registration
under the party-list system that confers juridical personality on the party-
list group for election related purposes.[14]

As a juridical entity, a party-list group can only validly act through its duly
authorized representative/s. In the exercise of its power to register parties,
the COMELEC necessarily possesses the power to pass upon the question
of who, among the legitimate officers of the party-list group, are entitled to
exercise the rights and privileges granted to a party-list group under the
law. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction on this point is well settled and is not here
disputed.

With clear jurisdictional authority to resolve the issue of party leadership and
party identity, this Court will only be justified in interfering with the COMELEC’s
action under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court if the petitioners can establish
that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is generally meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically
by reason of passion or personal hostility. Such abuse must be so patent
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[15]
 The petitioners failed to hurdle this barrier.

The petitioners opened their petition with the principle that only members of a
registered party can chart its destiny to the necessary exclusion of non-members.
The COMELEC correctly observed that while this may be true, all that the
petitioners established is the group’s membership as of 2003. The petitioners
failed to account for the group’s actual membership at least as of 2009, i.e., five
(5) years after ABAKADA was accredited and the year immediately prior to the
Supreme Assembly held in February 2010 and the party-list elections of May
2010.

What the petitioners presented are simply applications for membership with
ABAKADA as of November 3, 2003 during the party’s inceptive stage, and
Alcantara’s affidavit that denies the membership of most of those who attended
the 2010 Supreme Assembly. Alcantara alleged on this point that:

17. Nonetheless, Jonathan de la Cruz proceeded with the meeting, and in that
meeting they removed me and the other officers of the party allied with me. That
meeting was illegal because in so far as the participants therein are concerned, I
never signed and approved any written applications for membership. While they
may be party supporters or guests, they are not necessarily members of the
party. I am listing the names of the participants of that meeting here in an
alphabetical order for easy reference as follows:

xxx

18. These names were culled from the attendance sheets submitted by the group
of Jonathan de la Cruz before the Legal Department of [the COMELEC]. Except
for a few, they did not submit their applications for membership to me as
President of the Party; I did not approve their membership; neither the
National Executive Board, the policy making body of the party, had seen any
written application from any of them nor have approved of their membership into
the party.

The petitioners have not pointed out the basis for such broad claim of authority
by Alcantara. Under Article IV (Membership) of ABAKADA’s CBL,[16] however, the
President or the National Executive Board is not given the exclusive authority to
approve applications for party membership. Such applications are approved by
the membership council in the municipal, city, provincial or regional levels.[17] In
turn each municipal unit is entitled to two delegates to the Supreme Assembly
while each provincial or city unit is entitled to five delegates.[18]

Given ABAKADA’s membership structure, Alcantara’s own affidavit and the

approved membership applications during the ABAKADA’s earliest stage are
certainly not sufficient to support the petition’s opening legal principle. As the
party seeking to nullify the conduct of the Supreme Assembly, the petitioners
must first clearly substantiate their allegation on who the legitimate members of
ABAKADA were at the time Supreme Assembly was held. After this failure, the
COMELEC cannot be faulted, much less be charged with committing grave
abuse of discretion, in ruling that petitioners failed to discharge its burden of
proving that the attendees in the Supreme Assembly were not legitimate
members of the party.

We remind the petitioners that the findings of fact of the COMELEC are generally
binding on the Court, unless its factual conclusions are clearly shown to be
unsupported by substantial evidence.[19] The petitioners have not demonstrated
that its case fall within this narrow exception.

Even assuming that all participants in the 2010 Supreme Assembly are legitimate

members of the party, the petitioners claim that since the Supreme Assembly
meeting did not comply with the provisions of the party’s CBL, then the
COMELEC should have granted their petition to nullify the meeting.

Again, we disagree with the petitioners.

While ABAKADA is registered as a sectoral party, the general principles

applicable to political parties as a voluntary association apply to it. Political
parties constitute a basic element of our democratic institutional apparatus.
[20]
 Among others, political parties help stimulate public participation in the political
arena and translate the results of this participation into meaningful policies and
programs of government offered to the electorate. Once in government, they are
able to significantly contribute in forging linkages between the government and
the society by adjusting these policies with the varying and often conflicting
interests of the different segments of society. Should they belong to the minority,
they also provide a check to counterbalance those who are in power.

For these reasons, particularly, for the role they play in the general political
process, political parties are generally free to conduct its internal affairs
pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association.[21]

This includes the determination of the individuals who shall constitute the
association and the officials who shall lead the party in attaining its goals.[22]

The political parties, through their members, are free to adopt their own
constitution and by-laws that contain the terms governing the group in pursuing
its goals. These terms, include the terms in choosing its leaders and members,
among others. To the group belongs the power to adopt a constitution; to them
likewise belongs the power to amend, modify or altogether scrap it.

The petitioners’ argument is contrary to these basic tenets. If the validity of the
Supreme Assembly would completely depend on the person who calls the
meeting and on the person who sends the notice of the meeting – who are
petitioners Alcantara and Dabu themselves – then the petitioners would be
able to perpetuate themselves in power in violation of the very constitution
whose violation they now cite. This kind of result would strike at the heart of
political parties as the “basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus.”
This potential irregularity is what the COMELEC correctly prevented in ruling for
the dismissal of the petition.

As the COMELEC correctly observed, ABAKADA’s constitution expressly

requires the convening of the Supreme Assembly once every three years for
purposes of (i) electing the members of the National Executive Board - the
governing body of ABAKADA - headed by petitioner Alcantara as President.[23] In
contravention of ABAKADA’s own constitution, no Supreme Assembly was ever
held since ABAKADA came into existence in 2003, prompting the respondents to
communicate with petitioner Alcantara to urge him “to call for and assemble the
leaders, as well as members of the party, for the coming May 2010 elections.”
This call, to our mind, is far from unreasonable and was in fact a practical
approach to a coming political exercise (May Election).

Unfortunately, all the respondents’ communications appear to have fallen on deaf

ears. Instead, the petitioners chose to cling to legal technicalities under the
party’s constitution over the provisions of the same constitution that promotes
democratic accountability within the party. As the COMELEC did, the Court
cannot certainly give primacy to matters of procedure over substance in
ABAKADA’s CBL especially after the general membership has spoken.

The COMELEC, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to resolve party leadership

disputes, has rendered its ruling. By failing to establish grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC, this Court can do no less than dismiss this petition
and allow ABAKADA as a sectoral party to determine its own affairs under its
present leadership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
Abad, J., took no part.
688 Phil. 293
EN BANC

G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, PETITIONER,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure,[1] in relation to Rules
64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolutions dated 26 October
2009 and 4 January 2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073
(PP).[2]

On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition

for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation
as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.[3] In the Petition,
MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV,
and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).[4] The Petition
was docketed as SPP No. 09-073 (PP) and raffled to the Second Division of the
COMELEC (COMELEC–Second Division).[5]

In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division directed

MAGDALO to cause the publication of the Petition for Registration and the said
Order in three daily newspapers of general circulation, and set the hearing
thereof on 3 September 2009.[6] In compliance therewith, MAGDALO caused the
publication of both documents in HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa
Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan).[7]

On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a)

established its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented
Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary evidence in support of its
Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence.[8]

On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution

denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.[9] The relevant portions
of the assailed Resolution read:

Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with

Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the
party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some
members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle
gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process
defying the laws of organized societies. x x x

x x x              x x x              x x x    

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)

On 3 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was

elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution.[11]

Meanwhile, on 27 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation of Intent to

Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010
Elections (Manifestation of Intent), in which it stated that its membership includes
“[f]ormer members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Anti-Corruption
Advocates, Reform-minded citizens.”[12] Thereafter, on 30 November 2009, it filed
its Amended Manifestation, which bore the following footnote: [13]

With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA SA

PAGBABAGO (“MAGDALO”) manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION is
being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and
subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Magdalo in SPP No. 09-073 (PP) from the Resolution dated 26 October 2009 of
the Second Division of the Honorable Commission denying its Petition for
Registration/Accreditation as a Political Party based in the National Capital
Region [NCR], which motion is still pending the (sic) Honorable Commission En
Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Honorable
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Party’s
participation in the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that
their Petition is approved.

Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution

dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10
May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.[14]

In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.[15]

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions
were not based on the record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions
preempted the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in which
several members of the military are being tried for their involvement in the siege
of the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly
renounced the use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to
achieve its goals.

Thus, MAGDALO prays for this Court to: (a) reverse and set aside the 26
October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition
for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to issue a Certificate of
Registration.[16] The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and/or Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow MAGDALO to participate
in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.[17] However, this Court denied
the issuance of a TRO in its Resolution dated 2 February 2010.[18]

To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the following
arguments:

The findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was
denied are based on pure speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the
alleged motives and/or intentions of the founders of petitioner Magdalo, which
claims are not based on evidence but on mere conjecture and pure baseless
presuppositions;

The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The
subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the
Magdalo “committed mutiny”, “held innocent civilian personnel as hostage”,
“employed violence” and “use[d] unlawful means” and “in the process defied the
laws of organized society” purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even
the court trying their case, [Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Makati City], Branch 148, has not yet decided the case against them;

– and –

The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor

of founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to [sic] due process of law.[19]

On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the
eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party.[20] It
contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing whether
MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence,
which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.[21]

However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC

has the authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the
latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.[22]

Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be discussed

whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the
10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it
specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes
of subsequent elections.[23]

Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections, this case nevertheless comes under the exceptions
to the rules on mootness, as explained in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:[24]

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
x x x              x x x              x x x   

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The
instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the
very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for
disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed
intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of
supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine
the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.

Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the
issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the
latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALO’s filing

anew of a Petition for Registration.

The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the

eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral
contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

x x x             x x x              x x x    

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x              x x x              x x x

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections

x x x              x x x              x x x

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

x x x              x x x              x x x    

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any
foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881),

otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:

Sec. 60. Political party. – “Political party” or “party,” when used in this Act, means
an organized group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideals or
platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. 

To acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and

to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political parties, a
political party shall first be duly registered with the Commission. Any
registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at
least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and
supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following its registration
shall, after notice and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a
registered political party in such constituency.

Sec. 61. Registration. – Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a

national or regional political party may file with the Commission a verified petition
attaching thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or program of
government and such other relevant information as may be required by the
Commission. The Commission shall after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within ten days from the date it is submitted for decision. No religious
sect shall be registered as a political party and no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, reads in part:

Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-
step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal
Party v. COMELEC:[26]

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x              x x x              x x x    

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization

or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a
request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to

ascertain the eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and
accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this
discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it
issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.

A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse

of discretion in taking judicial notice of the
Oakwood incident.

MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to
have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on
record, but on mere speculation and conjectures.[28] This argument cannot be
given any merit.

Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of
“public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration.”[29] Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative
agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly
acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts.[30] Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,[31] this Court
explained as follows:
The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context of judicial notice has
been explained as those facts that are “so commonly known in the community as
to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men.”[32]

This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual
circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff. [33] The incident involved over
300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted men – led by the founding
members of MAGDALO – who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee
hours of 27 July 2003. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive
devices around the building and within its vicinity. They aired their grievances
against the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former
President Arroyo), withdrew their support from the government, and called for her
resignation, as well as that of her cabinet members and of the top officials of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
After the ensuing negotiations for these military agents to lay down their
weapons, defuse the explosives and return to the barracks, the debacle came to
a close at 11:00 p.m. on the same day.[34] That the Oakwood incident was
widely known and extensively covered by the media which made it a proper
subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge,[35] and took
cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of
evidence thereon.

B. The COMELEC did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in finding
that MAGDALO uses violence or
unlawful means to achieve its goals.

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it
took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held
hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the
hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.[36] These arguments
present a very narrow interpretation of the concepts of violence and unlawful
means, and downplays the threat of violence displayed by the soldiers during the
takeover.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations
and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section
61 of B.P. 881, which provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its
goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the

accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury.[37] It also denotes physical
force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed
against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.[38] On the
other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a
crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.[39]

In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with
violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege,
their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of
former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and
the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state.[40] Ultimately, they wanted the
President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to
resign.[41] To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by
civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant
explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the
government constituted clear acts of violence.

The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was
fired[42] do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the
occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of
force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government[43] obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the
encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show
of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive
devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the
totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse
of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the
predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to
achieve its objectives.

C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve

its goals through violence or unlawful means did
not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal
Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues
its goals through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted
verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence.
[44]
 This argument cannot be sustained.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61
of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility
of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character.
[45]
 In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the
party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in
nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative
liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the
ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo[46] is nonetheless analogously applicable:

An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such

that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same
disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of
facts.  The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the
respondents have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial
evidence – the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The
requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure…that the proposed
witness should not appear to be the “most guilty” is obviously in line with the
character and purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards
observed in these cases. They are standards entirely different from those
applicable in administrative proceedings.[47] (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof

required for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:

As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence

at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the
lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
[48]
 (Emphasis omitted.)

In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant
to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections
as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is
applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil
its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not
required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited
only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications
and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its
assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial
evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging
members of MAGDALO with coup d’état following the events that took place
during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the
COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the
same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely separate
and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The
COMELEC correctly ruled thus:

It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent
findings of the Commission (Second Division) in the subject resolution did not
pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing the cases of the Magdalo
members. These are two different processes. The proceedings in the
Commission is [sic] a petition for registration of Magdalo as a political party and
the Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances relative to
this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the Magdalo
founders. Thus, the Second Division did not violate the right of the Magdalo
founders to be presumed innocent until proven guilty when it promulgated the
questioned resolution. There is likewise no violation of due process.
Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to
groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by law.[49]

It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO has not, as respondent
could not have, preempted Criminal Case No. 03-2784 or violated the right of
petitioner’s members to a presumption of innocence.

Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the

Military Personnel involved in the
Oakwood standoff

It must be clarified that the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC is based on the facts available
to it at the time it issued the assailed 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010
Resolutions. It is crucial to make this qualification, as this Court recognizes the
occurrence of supervening events that could have altered the COMELEC’s
evaluation of the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. The assessment of
the COMELEC could have changed, had these incidents taken place before the
opportunity to deny the Petition arose. In the same manner that this Court takes
cognizance of the facts surrounding the Oakwood incident, it also takes judicial
notice of the grant of amnesty in favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.

This Court, in People v. Patriarca,[50] explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other
high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.

x x x              x x x              x x x

In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is
given:

“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should
take judicial notice. x x x”[51] (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,[52] President Benigno S.

Aquino III issued on 24 November 2010 Proclamation No. 75,[53] which reads in
part:

GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES
PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR
AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE
MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT

WHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and former personnel of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
their supporters have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War and other laws in connection with, in
relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006
Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Pen Incident;

WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of society urging the President
to extend amnesty to said AFP personnel and their supporters;

WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the
President the power to grant amnesty;

WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel
of the AFP and PNP and their supporters will promote an atmosphere
conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduring peace
and is in line with the Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines,

by virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine
Constitution, do hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:

SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and

former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their supporters who have
or may have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
the Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or incident
to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off
and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor;
Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against
chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.

x x x              x x x              x x x 

SECTION 4. Effects. – (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall

extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident
or related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without
prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private
persons.

(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the

restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees that may
have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any executive,
administrative or criminal action or proceedings against the grantee in
connection with the subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic)
any form, if any.

(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of
up to Technical Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of up to Senior
Police Officer 3, whose applications for amnesty would be approved shall be
entitled to reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws and regulations.
However, they shall not be entitled to back pay during the time they have been
discharged or suspended from service or unable to perform their military or police
duties.

(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with the rank of
Master Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of at least Senior Police
Officer 4 whose application for amnesty will be approved shall not be entitled to
remain in the service, reintegration or reinstatement into the service nor back
pay.

(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not reintegrated or
reinstated shall be entitled to retirement and separation benefits, if qualified
under existing laws and regulation, as of the time [of] separation, unless they
have forfeited such retirement benefits for reasons other than the acts covered
by this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to their
retirement and separation benefit[s] upon their actual retirement. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted Concurrent

Resolution No. 4 on 13 and 14 December 2010, respectively.[54] Relevant
portions of the Resolution partly read:
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24
NOVEMBER 2010 ENTITLED “GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND
FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE
COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA
MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT

WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President
shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of Congress;

x x x              x x x              x x x

WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President that

in order to promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just,
comprehensive and enduing peace and in line with the Government’s
peace and reconciliation initiatives, there is a need to declare amnesty in
favor of the said active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and their
supporters;

WHEREAS, it is the sense of both House of Congress that it is imperative that an

amnesty partaking the nature proclaimed by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, is necessary for the general interest of the Philippines; xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)

In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of
its members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other
harmful means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise,
it would not be in accord with the express intention of both the Executive and the
Legislative branches, in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere
conducive to attaining peace in line with the government’s peace and
reconciliation initiatives.

Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC

as regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another
Petition for Registration, its officers must individually execute affidavits
renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives
of their organization. Further, it must also be underscored that the membership
of MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in
active service, as this act would run counter to the express provisions of the
Constitution:

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation
to uphold and defend this Constitution.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits
of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall
be insulated from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan

political activity, except to vote.

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government
including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the
subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events
that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as
acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party
registration.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4

January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for
Registration by MAGDALO.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,

Villarama, Jr., Perez,  Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., on official leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.

396 Phil. 419

EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781, October 06, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN, AND LUZON FARMERS PARTY, PETITIONERS,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP

AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-
UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG
LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- ALL BEING PARTY-LIST
PARTIES/ORGANIZATIONS -- AND HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 136786]

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO),
AND ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR,
PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,
AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 136795]

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL

CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), AND LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-
BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AND AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Prologue

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution

and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters.
These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list

congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of

two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of

votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified

party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions
must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The
poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no
power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to

implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent
them.

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of

parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified
by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel
questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical
formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications

for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction)
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998
Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in
Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution[3] of the
Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions
ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives
"to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any
national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the
Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House
of Representatives as regular members.[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes
for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list
representative.[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of

the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election"
of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.
Under this statute's policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible." (italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed
by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the
party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated
Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election
of party-list representatives through the party-list system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of
Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
Rene M.
1. APEC 503,487 5.5%
Silos
Melvyn D.
Eballe
Leonardo
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Q.  
Montemayor
Diogenes S.
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41%
Osabel
4. VETERANS Eduardo P.
304,802 3.33%
FEDERATION Pilapil
Joy A.G.
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79%  
Young
Ariel A.
6. AKO 239,042 2.61%
Zartiga
Gorgonio P.
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60%
Unde
Patricia M.
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57%
Sarenas
Loreta Ann
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54%
P. Rosales
Benjamin A.
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36%
Cruz
Renato B.
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13%
Magtubo
Cresente C.
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07%
Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters' Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having
garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was
proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with
the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only
25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives
who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective Motions for

Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting,
would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine
society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to
51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election
laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant
petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.

ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated

based on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations
and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:

1. SENIOR CITIZENS

2. AKAP

3. AKSYON

4. PINATUBO

5. NUPA

6. PRP

7. AMIN

8. PAG-ASA

9. MAHARLIKA

10. OCW-UNIFIL

11. FCL

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN

13. KAMPIL

14. BANTAY BAYAN

15. AFW

16. ANG LAKAS OCW

17. WOMENPOWER, INC.

18. FEJODAP
 19. CUP

20. VETERANS CARE

21. 4L

22. AWATU

23. PMP

24. ATUCP

25. NCWP

26. ALU

27. BIGAS

28. COPRA

29. GREEN

30. ANAKBAYAN

31. ARBA

32. MINFA

33. AYOS

34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN

36. KATIPUNAN

37. ONEWAY PRINT

38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as

provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping.
In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had
unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the
Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System."
Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every
two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It
apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list
solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However,
for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and
proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents.
[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for
the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11
(b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House
of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should
be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion
to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section
11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be
filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the
apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was:
Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1)
to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the
total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they
had not passed the two percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had
hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three
coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x.
Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and
object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-
thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring[11] and two
members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It,
however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote

requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and
circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with

prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.[13] In
the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively,
petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of
their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as
winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in
the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."

On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A.
Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for
petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino
Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor
NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation
of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted
as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any
party but also as a friend of the Court.

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their

respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]
The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives

mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the

additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be
granted additional seats.

First Issue:
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of

Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total
Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the

determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district
representatives
--------------------
x.20 =No. of party-list representatives
--------------
.80
This formulation[16] means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208
------------------
x .20 = 52
----------------
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is "No."

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list."

According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is

to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the
legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or
coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two
percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation
in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine
who and how many should represent them.

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily

conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As

said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to
require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain
at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could
have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore,
no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result
in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelec's, is not to find
fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as
practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by
the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must
be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue:
The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can
be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a
pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a
point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political
party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this
law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of
the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have
said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is
based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the
number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula
which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half
percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes
in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000
votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about
134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get
seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000.
In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to
avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is
our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a
reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and
should earn their seats within that system."[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under
a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.[21] But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable
of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.[23]

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and

encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to
avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x
x."[24]
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition.
"Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-
seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue:
Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of
determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained.
The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least
two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing
in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional
proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement
for the first seat.[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of
the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four
percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled
to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided
votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast;
Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats.
Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly
have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering
two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same
number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by
this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which
was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its
method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the
number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is
determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the
total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the
resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned
is entitled to. Thus:
No. of
remaining seats No. of
to be allocated additional seats
--------------------- No. of votes of of party
x =
------ party concerned concerned
Total no. of (Integer
votes of decimal)
qualified parties
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the
1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer
method would be as follows:
Number of GuaranteedAdditiona Extra
Party Votes Seats l Seats Seats Total
1. APEC  503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS
304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4  
8. ABANSE!
235,548 1 2.68 1 4
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11.
194,617 1 2.21 3
SANLAKAS
12. COOP-
189,802 1 2.16 3
NATCCO
13. COCOFED186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each
party, those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats.
Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled
to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous
proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application
in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the
Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them.
There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed
out by private respondents,[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by
party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because
German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941,
as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of
the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer
formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras

mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither
can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential
variances between the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm
which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and
logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party
is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list

congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of

two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of

votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified

party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional

representation" into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent
or amend the above-mentioned parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes
are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes
shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000
votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty
percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its
votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the
first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party
will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an
arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation.
An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties
and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such
constitutional contravention.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional

membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that
"no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will
this Court.  The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a
given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The
only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the
total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to
twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-
votes of first list system
party
----------------
=
--------------
Total votes
for party-list
system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to
or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall
have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all
the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast,
is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the
number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to
determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As
explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the
said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes
-- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second
party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation,
since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution,
therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving
six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three  The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
 ------------------
Total no. of
votes for party-
list system
Additional seats
--------------------- No. of additional seats allocated to the
for concerned = x
-- first party
party
No. of votes of
first party
------------------
Total no. of
  votes for party
list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats
--------------------- No. of additional seats allocated to the
for concerned = x
-- first party
party
No. of votes of
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes of
ABA
Additional seats
--------------------- No. of additional seats allocated to the
for concerned = x
-- first party
party (ABA)
No. of votes of
first party
(APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
321,646
Additional seats
--------------------- = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
for concerned = x1
-- rounding off is not to be applied
party (ABA)
503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to
be as follows:
Votes % age Initial
Additional
Organization Garnere of Total No. of Total
Seats
d Votes Seats
 
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
321,646 / 1 =
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 1
503,487 * 0.64
312,500 / 1 =
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 1
503,487 * 0.62
4. VETERANS 304,802 / 1 =
304,802 3.33% 1 1
FEDERATION 503,487 * 0.61
255,184 / 1 =
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 1
503,487 * 0.51
239,042 / 1 =
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 1
503,487 * 0.47
238,303 / 1 =
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 1
503,487 * 0.47
8. ABANSE! 321,646 / 1 =
235,548 2.57% 1 1  
PINAY 503,487 * 0.47
232,376 / 1 =
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 1
503,487 * 0.46
215,643 / 1 =
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 1
503,487 * 0.43
194,617 / 1 =
11. SANLAKAS194,617 2.13% 1 1  
503,487 * 0.39
12. COOP- 189,802 / 1 =
189,802 2.07% 1 1
NATCCO 503,487 * 0.38
186,388 / 1 =
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 1
503,487 * 0.37
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by
zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified
parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit
to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a
different formula and methodology.

In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict.
We say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal
parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its
wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will
also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each
entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the

Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond
judicial review.[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused
their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related

laws,[30] cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds
of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the
law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its

provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a
law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners' prayer that they each be given additional seats
(for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply
violate the "proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the
requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We
should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in
the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the
defeated litigants should not despair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign
for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion
call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized
sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress
under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations
of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each
for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,

and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
 412 Phil. 308

EN BANC

G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (UNDER THE ACRONYM

OFW), REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA
DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT
WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION AND OTHERS
UNDER “ORGANIZATIONS/COALITIONS” OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION
NO. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; AND
OTHERS UNDER “POLITICAL PARTIES” OF OMNIBUS RESOLUTION
NO. 3785. RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 147613.  JUNE 26, 2001]

BAYAN MUNA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO
(PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; AND BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, RESPONDENTS.
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State’s
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-
list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785[1] issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According
to the Comelec, “[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the
last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of
the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a
result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes
observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10
February 2001.”[2]
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond
the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations)
of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

“We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system
of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and
enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.

“It will be noted that as defined, the ‘party-list system’ is a ‘mechanism of

proportional representation’ in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

“However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize
the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations
and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially
comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or
Oppositions.”[3]

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that “the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from
the ‘Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections’ and that
said certified list be accordingly amended.” It also asked, as an alternative, that
the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that
the latter’s nominees not be proclaimed.[4] On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and
Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.[5]

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,[6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.
  During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed
[7]

the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[8]

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition[9] before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,[10] the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
[11]

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
[12]
 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,[13] the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that
the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the
party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further
orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and,
on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.[15]

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address
the following issues:

“1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law?

“2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

“3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and

underrepresented’ sectors and organizations.

“4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.”[16]

The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.

First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is

improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law.[17] The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21
and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A[18]dated November 9, 2000.[19]

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus

Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as
it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed,
under both the Constitution[20] and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent

Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being
a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.[21]

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.[22] The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have
proven the urgency of petitioner’s action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet
formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its
position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[23] It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, “where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest
is involved, and in case of urgency.”[24] Indeed, the instant case is indubitably
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves
the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list

system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
“formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules.”[25]

Finally, procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage

of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.”[26]

Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that “the inclusion
of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution.”[27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of “major political parties.”[28] On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all “registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”[29]

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.”

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political

parties may be registered under the party-list system.

“Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall

be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in
this Constitution.

“Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-

list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.”[30]

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may “be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,[31] Magsasaka, or a
regional party in Mindanao."[32] This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:[33]

“MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian

ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido.”

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
[34]
 He explained: “The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system.”

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for “a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x.” Section 3 expressly states that a “party” is “either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” More to the point, the law defines
“political party” as “an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.”

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of

political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:

“x x x                                       x x x                                  x x x
“For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the
party-list system.

“x x x                                       x x x                                  x x x”

Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in
the party-list elections.

Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter --
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:

“(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to give “genuine power to our people” in Congress. Hence, when
the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: “On this first day of
August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history,
by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.”[35]
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like “in accordance with law” or “as may be provided
by law”; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:

“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.”

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
“enable” the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate

legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”

“Proportional representation” here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, “labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
[36]
 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.”

Finally, “lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit
of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
“marginalized and underrepresented” become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives.” Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms.[37]

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the

party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

“SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition
of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.”

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not

exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. [38]

The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor

General submits that RA No. 7941 “does not limit the participation in the party-list
system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.”[39] In fact, it
contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6[40]of RA
7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral
Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park
or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections.[41]

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to
enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to
be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that
the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even
the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG’s
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and
with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan[42] admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors.[43]

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality
is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one’s constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one’s bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our

midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized
and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban
poor, even those in the underground movement – to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The
State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this
social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system,[44] in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible.[45] Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the “simplest scheme possible” to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long
been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory “open house,” which by its nature
allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the “open house” is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-
list system is only for the “outsiders” who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who
already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the

remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to
the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit
of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to
the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the
Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug

and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the
framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the

primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
[46]
 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words
used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent
or purpose of the provision being construed.[47]

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[48] that “the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
‘are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.’
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding
thereof.”

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first.
Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to “enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x.” The criteria
for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to
constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any
event, the framers’ deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA

7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The
OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list
elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on

Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be
struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
  Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to
[49]

apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.[50]

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP,
NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073,
they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political
parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have
the “advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of
Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.” We note, however, that this accreditation
does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.

What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual

determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the
154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to
participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the
law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan

Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because “it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges.” This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.[51] It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening

Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for
the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply
with the requirements of the law.

In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines,
culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on
the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The
counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties
admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying

is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.”[52]

Third, in view of the objections[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay

Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented
in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:

“MR. OPLE. x x x

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition,
decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-
established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.”[54]
The following discussion is also pertinent:

“MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed “EXCEPT RELIGIOUS

GROUPS,” he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia
ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.”[55]

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that “religious denominations and sects

shall not be registered.”[56] The prohibition was explained by a member[57] of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: “[T]he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party.”[58]

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6

of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political

party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.”[59]
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for
violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws
include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to
“enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives.” A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal[60] and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to
the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

“SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.”

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens “who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.” Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political

constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee
proceedings that “the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x.”[61]

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: “to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.”

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice

principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The
party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less
in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power.
It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of
their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and
the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open
to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is

hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on
the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec “to refrain
from proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance
with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections’

receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,

concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but
before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political
agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-profit
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party
representing peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized
sectors. Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection with
the election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.

Petitioners brought these suits ¾ in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R.
No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus ¾ for the purpose of
seeking the annulment of the registration of the following parties classified as
“political parties” and “organizations/coalitions” by the Commission on Elections:

Political Parties:

Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples’ Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong

Organizations/Coalitions:

Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)

R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to
participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration
not later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law
requires that any party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with
the COMELEC should declare its intention to participate in the party-list system
90 days before the election.

In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon
the applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties,
organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of
parties, organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001
elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and coalitions were accredited,
including private respondents herein.

Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is
exclusively for the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors of the Philippine
society and that there is no way by which other sectors not so identified, much
less the major political parties, can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner
Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to the fact that seven of the respondent
political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN,
and LP) are actually the major political parties in the country today as determined
by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and charges
that the rest of private respondents are “pseudo party-list organizations” which
are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses.

Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem
of ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and enhance
direct people’s action and participation in the decision-making process to
counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of
Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list system of
respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose
because these parties do not represent “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors.[1] For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the five major political
parties from participating in the party-list system only in the May 1998 elections, it
leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.

On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:

[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they do
not prohibit, the participation of “registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations” to participate in the party-list system, whether or not said
parties or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society.[2]

It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector,
as proof that “marginalized” sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the
House of Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners’ recourse
is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization,
or coalition represents “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a question
of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a
matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based
on this ground, respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD,
CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.

THE ISSUES

The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:

(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and

(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for “marginalized and

underrepresented” sectors of society.

We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.

DISCUSSION

I.

While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the
disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases
were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and
there was doubt whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was
forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases
were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” within the meaning of Rule 65,
§§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified in resorting to the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal
resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press
statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not
representing “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, could participate in
the election for the party-list system — a fact confirmed by it in its comment and
memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting that petitioners
should have exhausted administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second
issue above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system
is limited to “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is answered in the
affirmative will it be necessary to determine the status of respondents.

II.

At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the
Constitution:

Art. VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law
except the religious sector.

To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List
System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.—The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the
party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

“The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed.”[3] The
text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
“registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,” not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the ratification of the
Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2)
provides no basis for petitioners’ contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive
representation for “marginalized sectors,” by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.

Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list

representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give those
who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district
elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis.
(In this sense, these groups are considered “marginalized and
underrepresented.”) Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from
multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the
“winner-take-all” single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9%
of the votes, he gets no seat.

Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in
order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the “winner-take-all”
single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures
parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their
public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented
sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of
Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these
sectors seats in the legislature.

This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the

problem of underrepresentation.

In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the “marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,” petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional
intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.

The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[4] as follows:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings

of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers’ understanding thereof.

It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role
of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could
discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that
is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding
force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document,
prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should
eavesdrop on theirs.[5]

Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

against petitioners’ reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the
Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to
proportional representation.

As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:

SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected from the sectors and party
list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty
percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a
population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.[6]

As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in

the House of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative
Department: one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner
Villacorta, and another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner
Monsod. The two are not the same. As Commissioner Monsod said in explaining
his proposal:

MR. MONSOD. . . .

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the
party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors
and who constitute the members of the sectors. . . . In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we
will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as
“sectoral representatives” to be represented in this Commission. The problem we
had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to
stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the
problem of who comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer
may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say “I am
a farmer” so he would be included in that sector.

. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. . . . This
can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or
a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the
farmers’ party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any
party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a
political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the
votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in
favor of a party, organization or coalition.

....

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.[7]
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase “shall be
elected from the sectors and party list” in §5 by replacing it with the following

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL

OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.[8]

Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it later
became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).

The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the
Committee would like to get some clarifications.

When the proponent speaks of “OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR

ORGANIZATIONS,” is he referring to any sector which the law may subsequently
define?

MR. MONSOD: . . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this
amendment is a system that opens up the list to any regional, national or sectoral
party. . . .

....

MS. AQUINO. The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not
necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?

MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right
of sectoral parties or organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral
parties or organizations.

MS. AQUINO. And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any
sector? In other words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the
capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system.[9]

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum
said:

MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this

amendment because it is possible that the labor sector will not be represented
considering that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other
words, the representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of the
Philippines, and that is not correct. My contention is that the sectoral
representative must be selected by his own constituents, and for that reason, I
am objecting to this amendment.[10]

On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in
the party-list system, the major political parties could gobble up the sectoral
parties. He said:

MR. TADEO. . . . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political
parties. Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor.[11]

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
[12]

Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not
solve the problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He
said:

For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at the
start of this century, our legislators were elected based on their promise that they
would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a few patriotic
legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today, members of the
National Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not
devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition of our
country’s poor and lower classes.

....

These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who can
best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming
from within their ranks.[13]
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them
effective representation:

MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST

SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS.

My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved
for the party list representatives will be reserved for the sectors.[14]

Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5 was
suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one
week, a compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to
the plenary session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase
“shall be elected from the sectors and the party list,” it was proposed that the
following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:

THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL

AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW.
THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.

However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of

sectoral representation were not satisfied that it would be allowed only for two
terms and only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list
representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following
amendment of §5:

ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,

REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED
BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE
TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN
AND YOUTH SECTORS

When put to vote, however, Aquino’s proposal was defeated with nineteen (19)
voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against.[15]

The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner

Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two
(32) commissioners against none.[16] As finally worded, the amendment reads:

SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION,

FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY
BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR

Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors referred
to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional
representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary
number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a
seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say
that “Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals
as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the
framework that the party-list system is for the ‘marginalized’ as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the ‘underrepresented’ as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he
defined as those which are ‘always third or fourth place in each of the
districts.’”[17]

Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do
not have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted
was permanent reserved seats for “marginalized sectors” by which they mean
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the
seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other
hand, the “third or fourth place(rs)” in district elections, for whom the party-list
system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but
nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the
House. They may include Villacorta’s “marginalized” or “underprivileged” sectors,
but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the
“marginalized sectors” one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the
same ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among
others, to the Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2),
namely, that certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House under the
party-list system; that the big parties might gobble up the sectoral parties; that
the party-list system will not solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
“underprivileged sectors.” These objections, however, did not carry the day, as
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod
proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to
overrule the Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the
existing “winner-take-all” one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of
voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions
were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This
Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners
contend without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in
Art. IX,C, §6 that “A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this
Article.”

Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that
the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner
Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:

In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban
and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of
the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to
many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will
be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation,
the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations
and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly
available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will
enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for
example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.[18]

With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list
system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:

SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC

may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized

for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Petitioners’ allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under
this provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing.
They are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.

On the other hand, the majority states:

The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.

....

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. . . . Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to “enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole . . .”

With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A.
No. 7941. The provision reads:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.

What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, “a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives” shall be guaranteed.
Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system is
intended “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation” to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it
says is that the policy of the law is “to promote proportional representation
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation” to win seats in the House.
For while the representation of “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors is a
basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim
of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the “winner-
take-all” district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily
limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can
possibly include other sectors.

Indeed, how can there be a “full, free and open party system” if the election for
the party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of
the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals? After all, what is provided for is “a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” each of
which is separately defined in §3 of the law.

That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of
the law:

SEC. 5. Registration. - Any organized group of persons may register as a party,

organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.

There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list
system is reserved for them.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be

dismissed.

604 Phil. 131

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND

TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), PETITIONER,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF

CANVASSERS), RESPONDENT.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, INTERVENOR.

AANGAT TAYO, INTERVENOR.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), INTERVENOR.

G.R. NO. 179295]

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH

ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS, INC., AND ABONO, PETITIONERS,VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The
COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before
the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus
and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July
2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of
each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the

Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271
and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties
under the Party-List System.[6]

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041
(PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."[7] There
were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
Muna, Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No.
07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of
Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million
two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National
and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the
National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list
votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already

15,283,659
canvassed/tabulated
ii. Total party-list votes remaining
uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass 1,337,032
deferred)
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on
100% outcome) from areas not yet
submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais 102,430
City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-
list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)

versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes,
stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have
been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered
at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462) votes are as follows:

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
RANK
COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all
the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are
therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of
representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the

Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY
PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan BUHAY

Yumabong
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against CIBAC
Corruption
4 Gabriela Women's Party GABRIELA
5 Association of APEC
Philippine Electric
Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms,
Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen's AKBAYAN
Action Party
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco COOP-NATCCO
Network Party
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural ARC
Concerns
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two
percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-
250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC's
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list
votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat
each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of

the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes,
as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but
not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum
votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected
maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total

number of votes
1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay)

obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance
with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen's Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the

party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat
may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by
the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of Proportion of votes

first party of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to
------ total votes for
Total votes for
party-list system
party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off)
shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes Additional

received seats
by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2)
additional seats
Equal to or greater One (1)
than 4% but less than additional seat
6%
Less than 4% No additional
seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following

percentage:

1,178,747
=
- - - - - - - - 0.07248
or 7.2%
16,261,36
9

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned No. of
party additional
Additional = ------------------- x seats
seats for allocated
to
a concerned No. of votes of first party
party first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN 1.65 1
MUNA
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP- 0.69 0
NATCO
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,

Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions
as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or

coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per
cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one
(1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to
one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution,

furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on
3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which
reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List

representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2%

threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it
should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to
be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats
corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast
in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of
those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine,
the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-
LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated
25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how
many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled
to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat
[sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of

Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for
party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall
be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9,

2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the
Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System
During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others
that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition
shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY
the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.[10]
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in
its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An
Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee
(with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided
in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the

same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of

Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional

representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in

allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates
the principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional

seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the
qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule

are different from those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine

party-list system as provided for under the same case
of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
 II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section

5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to

qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred
from participating in the party-list elections?[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list

election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of

two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of

votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party

is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the

Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of
the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-
list.

xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula
in Veterans, thus:

Number of
Number of seats
seats
available to
available to
x
party-list
.2
legislative districts representati
0
ves
=
____________________
____
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by
law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives,
there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

x.
220 20 55
=
_______________________ After prescribing the ratio of the
_ number of party-list representatives to
.80 the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left
the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to
the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits

Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the
total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula[21] as
an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating
the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following

procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The

COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas
to allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on

the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this
procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list
groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11
(1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be
55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list
groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from
their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be
allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the
maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with
Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote

requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis; (b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list
with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
allocation of seats."[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANAT's second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELEC's original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but
accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total
votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified
party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using
the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the
concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the
whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the
basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
BAYAN
2 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
COOP-
9 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
SENIOR
26 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
ABA
28 VFP 196,266 75 33,903
ILONGGO
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
ANG
31 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
AANGAT KA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
AGING
38 ANAK 141,817 85 16,729
PINOY
ABANSE!
39 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
BIYAYANG
40 PM 119,054 87 16,241
BUKID
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
BUKLOD
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 8,915
FILIPINA
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
AA-
45 ANC 99,636 92 8,406
KASOSYO
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20
party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of
votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.[28]

Votes
Garnered
Votes over Total Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Seat
Party-List, in
%
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
COOP-
9 409,883 2.57% 1
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least
2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified
party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
"entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners'
and intervenors' problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets
the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to
the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.

Doctrine:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

To illustrate:

There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of
the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
(since tanan sila na each kay tag 2% man). Thus, even if the maximum number
of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for
the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."[30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section

11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent

(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than

three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be

included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional
seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates.

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage
is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between
the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of
the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Ran Party Votes Votes Guarantee Additiona (B) Applyin

k Garnere Garnere d Seat l Seats plus g the
d d over (C), in three
Total (First (Second whole seat cap
Votes Round) Round) integer
for Party s
List, in (B) (C) (E)
%
(D)
(A)
1,169,23
1 BUHAY 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
4
BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
COOP-
9[31] 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
ANAKPAWI
13 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
S
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Tota
17 55
l
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there
are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All
55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of
three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all

political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited
to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates
for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we
are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or
not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political

parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo
is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On

that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that

answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have
the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to
make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of
these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations.
And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will
be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with
their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system
is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of
mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this
excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic
Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence
there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always
vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution
for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It
installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later
on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for
major political parties.

x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of

parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an

ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical

territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to

any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of

citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,

sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or
affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista
Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and
this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang
Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No.
7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-
list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"[34] as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or
she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-
list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot
allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling

in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the

Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as
well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-
list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be
in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin, JJ.,

concur.
Puno, C.J., see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., certify that J. Quisumbing joined the C.J. 's opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., join the C.J. in concurring opinion & dissenting
opinion.
707 Phil. 454

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203766, April 02, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. ALAN

IGOT, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NOS. 203818-19]

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 203922]

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),

REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT CONGRESSMAN PONCIANO D.
PAYUYO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 203936]

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, REPRESENTED BY ITS

PRESIDENT MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 203958]

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA),

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 203960]

1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE),

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 203976]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.

(ARARO), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 203981]

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP

(ARAL) PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY MS. LOURDES L.
AGUSTIN, THE PARTY’S SECRETARY GENERAL, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204002]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204094]

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), PETITIONER,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204100]

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI)

FORMERLY PGBI, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204122]

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS),

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC COMPOSED OF
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., CHAIRMAN, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
COMMISSIONER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, COMMISSIONER, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, COMMISSIONER, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, COMMISSIONER, AND
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, COMMISSIONER, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204125]

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL, RONALD D. MACARAIG,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204126]

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA

(KAP), FORMERLY KNOWN AS AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG
MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
GENERAL, LEO R. SAN BUENAVENTURA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204139]

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. BERTENI

CATALUÑA CAUSING, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204141]

BANTAY PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED BY MARIA EVANGELINA F.

PALPARAN, PRESIDENT, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204153]

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT

ROBERTO “KA OBET” MARTIN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204158]

ABROAD PARTY LIST, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V.
SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE,
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204174]

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT

SIMEON T. SILVA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204216]

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC.,

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204220]

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204236]

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204238]

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204239]

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF

MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204240]

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS

MOVEMENT (AGRI), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL,
MICHAEL RYAN A. ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204263]

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED FEDERATION OF FARMERS
AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204318]

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-

LIST, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204321]

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), REPRESENTED BY ITS

SECRETARY GENERAL JOSE C. POLICARPIO, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204323]

BAYANI PARTYLIST AS REPRESENTED BY HOMER BUENO, FITRYLIN

DALHANI, ISRAEL DE CASTRO, DANTE NAVARRO AND GUILING
MAMONDIONG, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, AND MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204341]

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM) PARTY-LIST,

REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT FATANI S. ABDUL MALIK,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204356]

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204358]

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING ADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL

PROGRESS (AAMA), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204359]

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND TRANSPARENCY
(SMART), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, CARLITO B. CUBELO,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204364]

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG- TAO, PARA SA LUPA,

PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), PETITIONER,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, AND MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS THEREOF,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204367]

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION (AKIN), PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204370]

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL,

RODOLFO T. TUAZON, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204374]

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA,

PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204379]

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FAYE

MAYBELLE LORENZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204394]

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,

DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 204402]

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, CLEMENTE

G. BAUTISTA, JR., AND SECRETARY GENERAL, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204408]

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH

ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204410]

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204421]

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN
BY ITS 1ST NOMINEE AND CHAIRMAN, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR.,
PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204425]

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF,
INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. NO. 204426]

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND

HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, AND MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS COMELEC CHAIRPERSON AND
COMMISSIONERS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 204428]

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL,

BERNARDO R. CORELLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204435]

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204436]

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTY PRESIDENT,

ROLEX T. SUPLICO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204455]

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204484]

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), REPRESENTED BY ITS

SECRETARY GENERAL, ROGER M. FEDERAZO, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204485]

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF

THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204486]

1ST KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1ST

KABAGIS), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 204490]

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and

Prohibition[1] filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of
their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13

November 2012,[2] 20 November 2012,[3] 27 November 2012,[4] 4 December 2012,
[5]
 11 December 2012,[6] and 19 February 2013.[7]

The Facts

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration of the following
groups and organizations:

                                                                                                                    
G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012[8]
1 204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining - The “artists” sector is
(ASIN) not considered
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
 - Failure of the
nominees to qualify
under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 2012[9]
2 204455 12-041 (PLM) Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings
Savings and Loan and loan association
Association, Inc. cannot be considered
(Manila Teachers) marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not
teachers by profession.
3 204426 12-011 (PLM) Association of Local - Failure to show that its
Athletics Entrepreneurs members belong to the
and Hobbyists, Inc. marginalized; and
(ALA-EH) - Failure of the
nominees to qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 [10]

4 204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance - Failure of the

Advocating Autonomy nominees to qualify:
Party (1AAAP) although registering as
a regional political
party, two of the
nominees are not
residents of the region;
and four of the five
nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 [11]

5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan - Failure of the group to

(AKIN), Inc. show that its nominees
belong to the urban
poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 2012 [12]

6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB) - Failure to represent a

marginalized sector of
society, despite the
formation of a sectoral
 wing for the benefit of
farmers of Region 8;
- Constituency has
district representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants
and farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[13]
7 204436 12-009 (PP), 12- Abyan Ilonggo Party - Failure to show that
165 (PLM) (AI) the party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector, as the Province
of Iloilo has district
representatives;
- Untruthful statements
in the memorandum;
and
- Withdrawal of three of
its five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[14]
8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish
Organizations, that the group can
Networks and represent 14 sectors;
Associations of the - The sectors of
Philippines, Inc. homeowners’
(ALONA) associations,
entrepreneurs and
cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration of
the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups and
organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[15]
9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag - Failure to prove track
(ALAM)
Resolution dated 7 November 2012
record as an
organization;
- Failure to show that
the group actually
represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish
that the group can
represent all sectors it
seeks to represent.
[16]

10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an

(KALIKASAN)
Resolution dated 14 November 2012
advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector
which the group claims
to represent.
[17]

11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, - Failure to prove

Utility Helper, Aider, membership base and
Rider, Driver/Domestic track record;
Helper, Janitor, Agent - Failure to present
and Nanny of the activities that
Philippines, Inc. sufficiently benefited its
(GUARDJAN) intended constituency;
and
- The nominees do not
belong to any of the
 sectors which the group
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 5 December 2012[18]
12 204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy - Failure to show that
(PPP) the group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector, as Region 12
has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a
track record of
undertaking programs
for the welfare of the
sector the group seeks
to represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,[19] the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the

COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections because PBB does not represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks
to uplift the lives of the “marginalized and underrepresented.”[20]

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI,
ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to
secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January
2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,[21] and excluded the names of these 13
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

Pursuant to paragraph 2[22] of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En

Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups
and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC[23] (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
 G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
No.
Resolution dated 10 October 2012[24]
1 203818- 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party Retained registration
19 12-177 (PLM) (AKB) and accreditation as a
political party, but
denied participation in
the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent
any marginalized and
underrepresented
sector;
- The Bicol region
already has
representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012[25]
2 203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. Cancelled registration
(Atong Paglaum) and accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sectors
which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file
its Statement of
Contributions and
Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 (PLM) Association for Cancelled registration
Righteousness and accreditation
Advocacy on Leadership - Failure to comply,
(ARAL) and for violation of
election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors
which the party
represents; and
 - There is doubt that
the party is organized
for religious purposes.
4 204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Cancelled registration
Concerns (ARC) and accreditation
- Failure of the
nominees to qualify;
and
- Failure of the party to
prove that majority of
its members belong to
the sectors it seeks to
represent.
5 204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Cancelled registration
Against Drugs and accreditation
Foundation (UNIMAD) - The sectors of drug
counsellors and
lecturers, veterans and
the youth, are not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish
track record; and
- Failure of the
nominees to qualify as
representatives of the
youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 2012[26]
6 204100 12-196 (PLM) 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
Guardians Brotherhood, - Failure to define the
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) sector it seeks to
represent; and
- The nominees do not
belong to a
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector.
7 204122 12-223 (PLM) 1 Guardians Nationalist Cancelled registration
Philippines, Inc. - The party is a military
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) fraternity;
 - The sector of
community volunteer
workers is too broad to
allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not
appear to belong to the
sector of community
volunteer workers.
8 204263 12-257 (PLM) Blessed Federation of Cancelled registration
Farmers and Fishermen - Three of the seven
International, Inc. (A nominees do not
BLESSED Party-List) belong to the sector of
farmers and fishermen,
the sector sought to be
represented; and
- None of the
nominees are
registered voters of
Region XI, the region
sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 [27]

9 203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance Cancelled registration

for Rural Energy, Inc. (1- - The sector of rural
CARE) energy consumers is
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The party’s track
record is related to
electric cooperatives
and not rural energy
consumers; and
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector of
rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 [28]

10 203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Cancelled registration

Electric Cooperatives and accreditation
(APEC) - Failure to represent a
 marginalized and
underrepresented
sector; and
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector
that the party claims to
represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 2012[29]
11 204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Cancelled registration
Party (AT) and accreditation
- The incumbent
representative in
Congress failed to
author or sponsor bills
that are beneficial to
the sectors that the
party represents
(women, elderly, youth,
urban poor); and
- The nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012[30]
12 203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Cancelled registration
Agrarian Reconstruction, and accreditation
Inc. (ARARO) - The interests of the
peasant and urban
poor sectors that the
party represents differ;
- The nominees do not
belong to the sectors
that the party seeks to
represent;
- Failure to show that
three of the nominees
are bona fide party
members; and
- Lack of a Board
resolution to participate
 in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012[31]
13 204240 12-279 (PLM) Agri-Agra na Reporma Cancelled registration
Para sa Magsasaka ng - The party ceased to
Pilipinas Movement exist for more than a
(AGRI) year immediately after
the May 2010
elections;
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector of
peasants and farmers
that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees
were submitted to the
COMELEC; and
- Failure to show
meaningful activities
for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka- Cancelled registration
Partido Tinig ng Masa - Failure to show that
(AKMA-PTM) majority of its members
are marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
four of its nine
nominees actually
belong to the farmers
sector; and
- Failure to show that
five of its nine
nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 (PLM) Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
Nagkakaisang Agilang - The Manifestation of
Pilipinong Magsasaka Intent and Certificate of
(KAP) Nomination were not
signed by an
appropriate officer of
 the party;
- Failure to show track
record for the farmers
and peasants sector;
and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually
belong to the sector, or
that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 (PLM) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Cancelled registration
Ordinaryong Tao Para - Failure to show that
sa Lupa, Pabahay, nominees actually
Hanapbuhay at belong to the sector, or
Kaunlaran (AKO- that they have
BAHAY) undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
17 204141 12-229 (PLM) The True Marcos Cancelled registration
Loyalist (for God, - Failure to show that
Country and People) majority of its members
Association of the are marginalized and
Philippines, Inc. underrepresented; and
(BANTAY) - Failure to prove that
two of its nominees
actually belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 (PLM) Pilipino Association for Cancelled registration
Country – Urban Poor - Change of sector
Youth Advancement and (from urban poor youth
Welfare (PACYAW) to urban poor)
necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track
record for the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members
and officers are from
the urban poor sector;
 and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban
poor sector.
19 204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
Nationwide Party - The party represents
(PASANG MASDA) drivers and operators,
who may have
conflicting interests;
and
- Nominees are either
operators or former
operators.
20 203958 12-015 (PLM) Kapatiran ng mga Cancelled registration
Nakulong na Walang - Failure to prove that
Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA) majority of its officers
and members belong
to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in
Congress failed to
author or sponsor bills
that are beneficial to
the sector that the
party represents
(persons imprisoned
without proof of guilt
beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track
record for the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 2012[32]
21 204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) Cancelled registration
and accreditation
 - Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track
record for the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[33]
22 204094 12-185 (PLM) Alliance for Nationalism Cancelled registration
and Democracy (ANAD) and accreditation
- Failure to represent
an identifiable
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector;
- Only three nominees
were submitted to the
COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of
Contribution and
Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 2012 [34]

23 204239 12-060 (PLM) Green Force for the Cancelled registration

Environment Sons and and accreditation
Daughters of Mother - The party is an
Earth (GREENFORCE) advocacy group and
does not represent the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with
the track record
requirement; and
 - The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 (PLM) Firm 24-K Association, Cancelled registration
Inc. (FIRM 24-K) and accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector
that the party seeks to
represent (urban poor
and peasants of the
National Capital
Region);
- Only two of its
nominees reside in the
National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with
the track record
requirement.
25 204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Cancelled registration
Indigenous Masses and accreditation
(ALIM) - Failure to establish
that its nominees are
members of the
indigenous people in
the Mindanao and
Cordilleras sector that
the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the
party’s nominees
reside in the Mindanao
and Cordilleras; and
- Three of the
nominees do not
appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[35]
26 204358 12-204 (PLM) Alliance of Advocates in Cancelled registration
Mining Advancement for - The sector it
National Progress represents is a
(AAMA) specifically defined
 group which may not
be allowed registration
under the party-list
system; and
- Failure to establish
that the nominees
actually belong to the
sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[36]
27 204359 12-272 (PLM) Social Movement for Cancelled registration
Active Reform and - The nominees are
Transparency (SMART) disqualified from
representing the
sectors that the party
represents;
- Failure to comply with
the track record
requirement; and
- There is doubt as to
whether majority of its
members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[37]
28 204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Cancelled registration
Party (ABP) and accreditation
- Defective registration
and accreditation
dating back to 2010;
- Failure to represent
any sector; and
- Failure to establish
that the nominees are
employed in the
construction industry,
the sector it claims to
represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 [38]

29 204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List Cancelled registration

(BAYANI) and accreditation
- Failure to prove a
 track record of trying to
uplift the marginalized
and underrepresented
sector of professionals;
and
- One nominee was
declared unqualified to
represent the sector of
professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[39]
30 204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Cancelled registration
Isulong (AANI) and accreditation
- Failure to establish a
track record of
enhancing the lives of
the marginalized and
underrepresented
farmers which it claims
to represent; and
- More than a majority
of the party’s nominees
do not belong to the
farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[40]
31 204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Cancelled registration
Peoples Rights Alliance, and accreditation
Inc. (A-IPRA) - Failure to prove that
its five nominees are
members of the
indigenous people
sector;
- Failure to prove that
its five nominees
actively participated in
the undertakings of the
party; and
- Failure to prove that
its five nominees are
bona fide members.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[41]
32 204216 12-202 (PLM) Philippine Coconut Cancelled registration
 Producers Federation, and accreditation
Inc. (COCOFED) - The party is affiliated
with private and
government agencies
and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted
by the government in
various projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the
marginalized sector of
coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[42]
33 204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party- Cancelled registration
List (ABANG LINGKOD) - Failure to establish a
track record of
continuously
representing the
peasant farmers
sector;
- Failure to show that
its members actually
belong to the peasant
farmers sector; and
- Failure to show that
its nominees are
marginalized and
underrepresented,
have actively
participated in
programs for the
advancement of
farmers, and adhere to
its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012[43]
34 204158 12-158 (PLM) Action Brotherhood for Cancelled registration
Active Dreamers, Inc. and accreditation
(ABROAD) - Failure to show that
the party is actually
 able to represent all of
the sectors it claims to
represent;
- Failure to show a
complete track record
of its activities since its
registration; and
- The nominees are not
part of any of the
sectors which the party
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012[44]
35 204374 12-228 (PLM) Binhi-Partido ng mga Cancelled registration
Magsasaka Para sa mga and accreditation
Magsasaka (BINHI) - The party receives
assistance from the
government through
the Department of
Agriculture; and
- Failure to prove that
the group is
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012[45]
36 204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party Cancelled registration
(BUTIL) and accreditation
- Failure to establish
that the agriculture and
cooperative sectors
are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to
belong to the sectors
they seek to represent,
nor to have actively
participated in the
undertakings of the
party.
Resolution dated 3 December 2012[46]
37 204486 12-194 (PLM) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Cancelled registration
 Ginhawang and accreditation
Sangkatauhan (1st - Declaration of
KABAGIS) untruthful statements;
- Failure to exist for at
least one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban
poor indigenous
cultural communities
sectors which it seeks
to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[47]
38 204410 12-198 (PLM) 1-United Transport Cancelled
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) accreditation
- The party represents
drivers and operators,
who may have
conflicting interests;
and
- The party’s nominees
do not belong to any
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[48]
39 204421, 12-157 (PLM), 12- Coalition of Senior Cancelled registration
204425 191 (PLM) Citizens in the - The party violated
Philippines, Inc. election laws because
(SENIOR CITIZENS) its nominees had a
term-sharing
agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO,
AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA,
KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP,
BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI,
BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that
were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
12-177 (PLM)
203981 12-187 (PLM) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC)
203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 (PLM) Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 (PLM) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD)
204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 (PLM) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 (PLM) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country and
People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 (PLM) Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 (PLM) Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)
204158 12-158 (PLM) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 (PLM) 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 (PLM) Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
204126 12-263 (PLM) Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 (PLM) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 (PLM) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
204239 12-060 (PLM) Green Force for the Environment Sons and
Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
204358 12-204 (PLM) Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 (PLM) Social Movement for Active Reform and
Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 (PLM) Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 (PLM) Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 (PLM) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 (PLM) Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 (PLM) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 (PLM) 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
204421, 12-157 (PLM) Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 12-191 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165 (PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL)
Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues:

first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections[49] (BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the
Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning
the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system,
and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.[50] The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice.  The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall

be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in
this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-

list system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards
of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However,
they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that “the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation.”[51] The constitutional provisions on the party-list
system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the
party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of
choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the
proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely
cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In
effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors
would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would
sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector
because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the
farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that
were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation
in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should
be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we
make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we
make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration.
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called
“hyphenated citizens.” A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say “I am a farmer”
so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral
representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes
and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do
the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What
party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly?
And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that
have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list.
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen
can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the
votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does
not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party —
and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had
been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the
250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50.
That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15.
When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to
submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum
qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when
the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10
percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2
1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency
of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the
justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any
district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that
has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group,
should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If
each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent
of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we

speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring
to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we
do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in
the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or

proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties?
Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for
the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they
will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the

party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or
not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political

parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo
is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On

that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that

answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an

inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO
fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is
verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals
who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to
give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to
present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or
to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or
parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be
summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter
are final and unappealable.[52]  (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system
to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.  The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.”[53]

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the
party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice
Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2),
of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed
by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total
seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the
difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would
stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the
unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be
like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the
party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting
19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down.
The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance
of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.[54]  (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
[55]
 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for
sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be
the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these
non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the
party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.” The commas after the words “national[,]” and “regional[,]”
separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same
time sectoral, they would have stated “national and regional sectoral parties.” 
They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-
list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups,
and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of
Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties
are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, “one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.” This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for
two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating
the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing
the “marginalized and underrepresented.” Second, the reservation of one-half of
the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first “three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,” clearly making
the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the
party-list system.

doctrine:

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained
in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of

parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an

ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical

territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to

any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of

citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,

sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. 
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from
a sectoral party.  Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government.” 
On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.”  R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system.  How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot
win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the party-list system?  To exclude them from the party-list system
is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart
from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is

clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that “the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.”[56]  The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily “marginalized and underrepresented.” For sure, “professionals” are
not by definition “marginalized and underrepresented,” not even the elderly,
women, and the youth.  However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may “lack well-defined political constituencies,” and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and
concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that
the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral
parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse
or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized

for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-

representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented.”

The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” appears only once in R.A.

No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.[57] Section 2 seeks “to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system,” which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies,” to become
members of the House of Representatives.  While the policy declaration in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to “marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties,” the specific implementing provisions of R.A.
No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must
be “marginalized and underrepresented.” On the contrary, to even interpret that
all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are “marginalized and underrepresented”
would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?

The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the

sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically “marginalized
and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong
to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. 

Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one
must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.”  It is sufficient that one, or his or
her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
“marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.[58]

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be “marginalized and
underrepresented” will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society,
will give the “marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to likewise win
seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those “marginalized and
underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.  This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as “wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even as they
attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.(lol)

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative
district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they neither lack “well-defined political constituencies” nor
represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do
not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies,” giving them the opportunity to have members
in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the

accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that “while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’ ”
However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that
“the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,”
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been
compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in
the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections.[59]  Thus, major political parties can participate
in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited
only to the 1988 party-list elections.  However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The
participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political constituencies” as
members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined
political constituencies,” giving them a voice in law-making.  Thus, to
participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in
the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority
of whom must belong to the sector represented.  The sectoral wing is in itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that “component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.”

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees.

This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the
youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated

as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization

which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be
a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang

Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for
qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x
x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA

7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized
for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.”
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
“SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.”
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x
x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation

and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
(Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong

Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political
parties from participating in party-list elections,[60] abandoning even the lip-
service (lol) that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can
participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority
expressed that “[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.”[61] The
experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion
and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an
end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC
could not have committed grave abuse of discretion.  However, for the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the
party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in
the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which
followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however,
the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.  Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord
with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in  Ang
Bagong Bayani  and  BANAT  in determining who are qualified to
participate  in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose,
we suspend our rule[62] that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or
orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who
may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do

not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and
is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and

underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
 underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that

represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list

elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional,
and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Petitioners may
have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented.” Also, petitioners' nominees who do not
belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to
any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more
of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and
their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations
contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions,

which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory
injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted
mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ. concur.

Sereno, C.J., I dissent; And Bagong Bayani should be upheld, not reversed. see
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part due to relative's participation in party list election.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur and also with the additional grounds cites in
Justices Brion's concurring opinion for revisiting the Ang bagong Bayani ruling
and his erudite analysis of the aim of the Party-list system under the Constitution
and law and its implications on political parties, party-list registration and
nominee.
Brion, J., see separate opinion.
Peralta, and Abad, JJ., joins the separate opinion of J. Brion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but there was a grave abuse of discussion but
only with respect to the disqualification of nominees separate from the party
organization.
Reyes, J., with separate, concurring and dissenting opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion and dissenting opinion.
[1]
 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 1079-1080.
[3]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), pp. 176-177.
[4]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 145-148.
[5]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), unpaginated.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), pp. 26-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
[8]

and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert

S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204455), pp. 38-55; rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 127-144.

[9]

Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V.

Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting;
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco also concurred except for Ala-Eh.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), pp. 47-55. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[10]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian

Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204367), pp. 30-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[11]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian

Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), pp. 37-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[12]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian

Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204436), pp. 45-57. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[13]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian

Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204485), pp. 42-49. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[14]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian

Robert S. Lim with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph
dissenting. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204139), pp. 505-512. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[15]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C.

Velasco. Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim also voted
in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), pp. 22-33. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[16]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204394), pp. 59-62. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[17]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204490), pp. 71-78. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
[18]

Jr. and Commissioners Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian

Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Rene V. Sarmiento
concurred but took no part in Ang Ating Damayan. Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204484), pp. 42-45. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
[19]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca.

 PBB’s petition is docketed as G.R. No. 204484 before this Court, and as SPP
[20]

No. 11-002 before the COMELEC.

 In the Matter of Clarifying the Inclusion in the Party-List Raffle of New Groups
[21]

Denied Accreditation but were Able to Obtain a Status Quo Ante Order from the
Supreme Court.

 (2) To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc,

[22]

for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of

R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if non-
compliant, cancel the registration of the following:

(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited
and will participate in the May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission
En Banc has not passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for
Registration; and

(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of
Registered  Party-List Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April
2012, and which have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate
in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
(Boldface and italics in the original)
[23]
 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 83-87. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.

[24]

Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,

Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), pp. 75-99; rollo (G.R. No. 203981), pp. 47-
[25]

70; rollo (G.R. No. 204002), pp. 53-76; (G.R. No. 204318), pp. 23-46. Signed by
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando
C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
took no part.

 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204100), pp. 52-67; rollo (G.R. No. 204122), pp. 36-51; rollo
[26]

(G.R. No. 204263), pp. 28-43. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco.
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 203960), pp. 61-68. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[27]

Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R.

Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but did not sign.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no
part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 203922), pp. 92-101. Signed by Commissioners Rene V.

[28]

Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and

Christian Robert S. Lim. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned a Separate
Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), pp. 158-164. Signed by Commissioners Rene V.

[29]

Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph.

Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but did not sign. Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned an extended opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 203976), pp. 21-37. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[30]

Jr. and  Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in
favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204240), pp. 47-69; rollo (G.R. No. 203936), pp. 128-

[31]

150; rollo (G.R. No. 204126), pp. 51-73; rollo (G.R. No. 204364), pp. 34-56; rollo
(G.R. No. 204141), pp. 31-53; rollo (G.R. No. 204408), pp. 46-68; rollo (G.R. No.
204153), pp. 24-46; rollo (G.R. No. 203958), pp.  26-48. Signed by Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N.
Tagle. Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor.
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but inhibited in KAKUSA.
Commissioner  Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204428), pp. 35-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[32]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C.

Velasco. Commissioner Christian Robert  S. Lim also concurred but did not sign.
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor but was on official business at
the time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), pp. 30-40. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[33]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.

 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204239), pp. 25-42; rollo (G.R. No. 204236), pp. 57-
[34]

74; rollo (G.R. No. 204341), pp. 29-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,
and Christian Robert S.  Lim. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official
business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204358), pp. 140-148. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[35]

Jr. and  Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

Christian Robert S.  Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business. .
  Rollo (G.R. No. 204359), pp. 42-50. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
[36]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but was on official business at the time of signing. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204238), pp. 54-58. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[37]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[38]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204321), pp. 43-51. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[39]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204125), pp. 44-48. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[40]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official
business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204216), pp. 23-28. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[41]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim
penned a separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was
on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204220), pp. 39-44. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[42]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,

and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204158), pp. 59-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[43]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
  Rollo (G.R. No. 204374), pp. 36-41. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
[44]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204356), pp. 56-64. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[45]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.

Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204486), pp. 42-47. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[46]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R.

Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204410), pp. 63-67. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,

[47]

Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian

Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle penned a Dissenting Opinion
and joined by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph. Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
took no part.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 204421), pp. 43-50; rollo (G.R. No. 204425), pp. 21-28.

[48]

Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V.

Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph,
dissenting.
[49]
 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
[50]
 II Record, Constitutional Commission 566-567 (1 August 1986).
[51]
 II Record, Constitutional Commission 85-86 (22 July 1986).

 II Record, Constitutional Commission 85-86 (22 July 1986), 256-257 (25 July
[52]

1986).
[53]
 II Record, Constitutional Commission 257 (25 July 1986).
[54]
 412 Phil. 347, 350 (2001).

 Party-List System: The Philippine Experience, Fritzie Palma Tangkia and Ma.
[55]

Araceli Basco Habaradas, Ateneo School of Government and Friedrich Ebert

Stiftung (FES), Philippine Office,  April 2001,
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50076.pdf (accessed 30 March
2013).

 Section 5. Registration. – Any organized group of persons may register as a

[56]

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a  coalition
of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas  workers,
and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not
later than sixty (60) days before  election.

 Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional

[57]

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives

through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,  organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme
possible. (Emphasis supplied)

 The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSDB) classifies the population

[58]

into three income groups: the high income, the middle income, and the low
income group. See Table 2. Annual Family Income of the Low, Middle, and High
Income Classes: 1997,  http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/papers/contributed
%20papers/cps-12/cps12-01.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).
[59]
 Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 provides in part:
x x x For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at
the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.

x x x.

 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258 citing
[60]

Constitution, Art. XIII,  Sec. 1.

[61]
 Id. at 251.
[62]
 Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, C.J.:

The party-list system is primarily a

tool for social justice.

I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already

marginalized and underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political
plurality, it allows national and regional parties or organizations to invade what is
and should be constitutionally and statutorily protected space. What
the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list system under the 1987
Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere political plurality,
but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.

The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was
not done in a vacuum. It comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has
been and still is struggling to come to terms with much social injustice that has
been perpetrated over centuries against a majority of its people by foreign
invaders and even by its own governments.

This injustice is the fertile ground for·the seeds which, watered by the blood
spilled during the Martial Law years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from
this ferment that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987
Constitution must be appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose.
As stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented
or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make
the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
[1]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is
appropos since it is a document that not only recognizes but tries to heal the
wounds of history. To harken to the words of Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, President of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

THE PRESIDENT: My distinguished collt agues in this Assembly:

xxx    xxx     xxx

My colleagues, in all humility, but with profoimd pride, I vote in favor of the
Constitution drafted by this Constitutional Commission because I believe that the
document is a worthy and inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino
people of today, tomorrow, and for posterity.

The reasons I will give have been given by most of the Members of this
Constitutional Commission this evening.  But permit me to restate them just to
stress the reasons why I am voting in favor.

For the first time in the history of constitution- making in our country, we
set forth in clear and positive terms in the Preamble which is the beacon
light of the new Charter, the noble goal to establish a just and humane
society.  This must be so because at present we have to admit that there are so
few with so much so many with so little.  We uphold the Rule of Law where no
man is above the law, and we adhere to the principles of truth, justice, freedom,
equality, love and peace.  Yes, for the first time and possibly this is the first
Constitution where "love" is enshrined. This is most significant at this period in
our national life when the nation is bleeding under the forces of hatred and
violence, brothers fighting against brothers, Filipinos torturing and killing their
own countrymen. Without love, there can be no peace.

The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of government with

three branches each independent and coequal of each other affording a check
and balanee of powers. Sovereignty resides in the people.

xxx    xxx    xxx

For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only Constitution which
provides for the creation of a Commission on Human Rights entrusted with the
grave responsibility of investigating violations of civil and political rights by any
party or groups and recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter also sets
forth quite lengthily provisions on economic, social and cultural rights spread out
in separate articles such as the Articles on Social Justice, Education and
Declaration of Principles. It is a document which in clear and in unmistakable
terms reaches out to the underprivileged, the paupers, the sick, the elderly,
disabled, veterans and other sectors of society. It is a document which
opens an expanded improved way of life for the farmers, the workers,
fishermen, the rank and file of those in service in the government. And that
is why I say that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of the new
Charter.[2] (Emphasis supplied)

That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good."[3] As explained by this Court:

Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool ofeffective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest
against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote
social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.... [T]here
is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executivrv branches but also on
the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
cunception may at least be approximated.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

That is also why the 1987 Constitution is replete with other social justice
provisions, including Sections 9, 10, 13, 14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of
Article V, Section 5 (1) (2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of
Article XII, and Article XIII.  As aptly pointed out by Commissioner Guingona in
his sponsorship speech for the approval ofthe entire draft of the 1987
Constitution, social justice was the underlying philosophy of the drafters when
crafting the provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:

MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines.

Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution which is reflective

of the spirit of our time -a spirit of nationalism, a spirit of liberation, a spirit of
rising expectations.

On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and women from
different walks of life with diverse backgrounds and orientations, even with
conflicting convictions, but all sharing the same earnest desire to serve the
people and to help draft a Constitution which will establish a government that the
people can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that guarantees
individual rights and serves as a barrier against excesses of those in authority.

xxx    xxx     xxx

A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its authenticity and
anthority from the sovereign will; the power of the people precedes it. As such, it
should reflect the norms, the values, the modes of thought of our society,
preserve its heritage, promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished
liberties and guard against the encroachments of would-be  dictators. These
objectives have served as the framework in the work of drafting the 1986
Constitution.

xxx    xxx     xxx

A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is concerned, refers

to the composition of the members of the House of Representatives. R
presentation in the Lower House has been broadened to embrace various
sectors of society; in effect, enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted
by members who shall be elected in the traditional manner, representing political
districts, as well as by members who·shall be elected through the party list
system.

xxx    xxx     xxx

The institutions through which the sovereign people rule themselves are
essential for the effective operation of government. But these are not enough in
order that the body politic may evolve and progress. There is need for an
underlying sucio-economic philosophy which would direct these political
structures and serve as the mainspring for development. So it is that the
draft Constitution contains separate Articles on Social Justice and National
Economy and Patrimony.

Talk of people's freedom and legal equality would be empty rhetoric as long as
they continue to live in destitution and misery, without land, without employment,
without hope. But in helping to bring about transformation, in helping the common
man break away from the bondage of traditional society, in helping restore to him
his dignity and worth, the right to individual initiative and to property shall be
respected.

The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission President, the

Honorable Cecilia Munoz Palma, refers to as the "heart of the Constitution,"
provides that Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that would reduce social, economic and political
inequalities. The same article addresses the problems of (1) labor—local and
overseas, organized and unorganized—recognizing the rights of all workers in
the private as well as in the public sector, the rank and  and the supervisory, to
self-organization, collective bargaining and peaceful and concerted activities
including the right to strike in accordance with law; (2) the farmers, the farm
workers, the subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers, through agrarian and
natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centers and resettlement areas, through urban land reform and housing; (4) the
health of the people, through an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development; (5) the women, by eusuring the fundamental equality of
women and men before the law, and (6) people's organizations, by facilitating the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

xxx    xxx     xxx

These are some of the provisions which we have constitutionalized.  These are
some of the innovations that we have introduced.  These are the ideas, values
and institutions which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national transformation and
development, the driving force for what we pray would be our irreversible march
to progress.  In brief, this is what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission have drafted under the able, firm and dedicated leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muñoz Palma.

The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument suited to the

circumstances of our time. It is also a Constitution that does not limit its
usefulness to present needs; one which, in the words of U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Marshall, and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to come
and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."  
As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our efforts would
pave the way towards the establishment of a renewed constitutional government
which we were deprived of since 1972, that these efforts would ensure that the
triumph at EDSA so deservingly won by the people shall continue to be enjoyed
by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts would result in the drafting
of a democratic Constitution —a Constitution which is the repository of the
people's inalienable rights; a Constitution that enshrines people's power and the
rule of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair land a
community characterized by moral regeneration, social progress, political
stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and concern for one another; a
Constitution that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure for the
people a better life founded on liberty and welfare for all.

Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commission's Sponsorship Committee, I

have the honor to move for the approval of the draft Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines on Second Reading.[5]

It is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in the
1987 Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the
context of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made
clear.[6]
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it
provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena. [7]

The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:

First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is
that representatives should be selected to 'mirror' the characteristics of those bt
ing represented - in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics
judged to be socially relevant.  This idea has been advocated most notably in
some recent democratic debates  focused on the need or special
representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social groups
within democratic assemblies.  The applicability of this idea of 'mirror'
representation is not confined to debates about representing marginalized
minorities within nation states; Iris Young further applies this model of
representation to global politics, arguing that global representation should be
based on representation of the various 'peoples' of the world, each of which
embodies its own distinctive ic'entity and 'perspective'.  In practice, special
representation for certain social groups within a 'mirror' framework can be
combined with election mechanisms in various ways - such as by according
quotas of elected representatives to designated social groups.  But since
the selection of these 'social groups' for special representation would
nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting
legitimate representatives, occurring  prior to the electoral process, such
'mirror' representation is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for
selecting representative agents.[8] (Emphasis supplied)

Two months after their initial debates on the form and structure of government
that would best promote equality, the Commission broke ground on the
promotion of political equality and provided for sectoral representation in the
party-list system of the legislature. Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates
on the party-list system.[9]

MR. VILLACORTA: ... On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher
in a new chapter in our national history by giving genuine power to our people in
the legislature...
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system
sought to address:[10]

MR. TADEO: ... Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people's power. Kaya kami
naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil sa people's power—nasa amin ang people, wala sa
amin ang power. Ganito ito kahalaga.
....

The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the needs and

aspirations of the Filipino people.

Ganoon kahalaga ang National Assembly kaya't napakahalaga noong Section 5

and Section 31 ng ating Constitution.  Our experience, however, has shown that
legislation has tended to benefit more the propertied class who constitutioes a
small minority in our society them the impoverished majority, 70 percent of whom
live below the poverty line. This has come about because the rich have managed
to dominate and control the legislature, while the basic sectors have been left out
of it.  So, the critical question is, how do we ensure ample repr.esentation of
basic sectors in the legislature so that laws reflect their needs and aspirations?

RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987

Constitution. Not only is it a "social justice tool", as held in Ang Bagong Bayani.
[11]
 but it is primarily so.  This is not mere semantics but a matter of legal and
historical accuracy with material consequences in the realm of statutory
interpretation.

The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in

determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections. I shall discuss below my position in relation to the second,
fourth atld sixth parameter enunciated in the ponencia.

"Marginalized and u derrepresented"

under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies
national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.

Under the second parameter, "[n]ational parties or organizations and regional

parties or org tions do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented'' sector." In a nutshell,
the ponencia interprets "marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA
7941 to qualify only sectoral parties or organizations, and not national and
regional parties or organizations.

I dissent for the following reasons.

First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard
of "marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to
qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.  To argue
otherwise is to divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the
primary objective of attaining social justice, which objective surrounds,
permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and
RA 7941.

Second, Section '2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives." On its face, it  is apparent that "marginalized and
underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations" and "parties".

Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent,. in terms of statutory

construction, the import of "social justice" that has developed in various decisions
is that when the law is clear and valid, it simply must be applied; but when the
law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that . favors the
underprivileged must be favored.[12]

Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party list
system is a countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to
overcome the preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well
established political parties. To quote:·

MR. OPLE: So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a
party list system is that it is a countervailing means for the
weaker segments of our society, if they want to seek seats in
the legislature, to overcome the preponderant advantages of
the more entrenched and well-established political parties,
but he is concerned that the mechanics might be inadequate at
this time.
MR. Not only that; talking about labor, for example -I think
MONSOD: Commissioner Tadeo said there are 10 to 12 million laborers and
I understand that organized labor is about 4.8 million or 4.5 million
- if the laborers get together, they can have seats. With 4 million
votes, they would have 10 seats under the party list system.
MR. OPLE: So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open
to all and. would not agree to a party list system which seeks to
accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral groups that are
predominantly workers and peasants?
MR.MONSOD:If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within
the 50, and I assuming that maybe there are just two major
parties or three at the most, then it is already a form of opening it
up for other groups to come in. All we are asking is that they
produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The whole purpose of the
 system is precisely to give room for those who have a
national constituency who may never be able to win a seat
on a legislative district basis. But they must have a
constituency of at least 400.000 in order to claim a voice in the
National Assembly.[13]
[emphasis supplied]

However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well
established political parties and organizations to compete with the weaker
segments of society, which is the very evil sought to be guarded against.

The ponencia's second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among

others.

First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941,
and the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable
intent to allow national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations to
participate in the party-list system. To require national and regional parties and
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented makes them
effectively sectoral parties and organizations· and violates this intent.

The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations the same by requiring that they represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," they become the same. By analogy,
people can be treated similarly but that does not make them identical.

Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, only 50% of the seats are allocated during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution to
representatives from the labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows
that the other 50% would be allocated to representatives from sectors which are
nonmarginalized and underrepresented.

The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the
former is true.  This is not so since the latter 50% can very well include
representatives from other non-enumerated sectors, or even national or regional
parties and organizations, all of which can be "marginalized and
underrepresented."

Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and causeoriented

parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, from participating in the
party-list system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties
are necessarily non-marginalized or underrepresented, which would in turn
depend on how "marginalization and underrepresentation" is defined.
The ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived notion that
"marginalized and underrepresented" refers only to those "economically"
marginalized.

However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized
and underrepresented," primarily because it already constitutes sufficient
legislative standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the
exercise of its discretion to determine the qualification of a party-list group.

As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the

COMELEC must be upheld.  This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those
Filipinos that are 'marginalized and underrepresented' become members of the
Congress under the party-list system."

For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, and that
these regulations are germane to the objects and purposes of the law and not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then
the standard may be deemed sufficient.[14]

We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those
who are margipalized and underrepresented today may no longer be one later
on. Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever evolving concept, created
to address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of
our Constitution.[15] Confining its definition to the present context may unduly
restrict the COMELEC of its quasi-legislative powers which enables it to issue
rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.[16]

Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution,
because the Jegislature is certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect.[17]  The growing
complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of
the theory of separ tion of governmental powers is largely responsible in
empowering the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also
promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
[18]
 This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in People v.
Rosenthal[19] and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission.[20]
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role
of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized
and underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list
system."

Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to

represent the marginalized and underrepresented is not a ground for the
COMELEC to refuse or cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.

The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if
the party "violates or fails to omply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be
correct, it must be first established that "marginalization and
underrepresentation" is not a requirement. of the law, which is exactly what is at
issue here.

Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of

"marginalization and underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.

The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to
carry sufficient legal significance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in
the nature of a legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative powers. This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to
be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole.[21]  Consequently, we have held that "public
welfare"[22] and "public interest"[23] are examples of such sufficient standards.
Therefore, that it appears only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a
standard could even be an implied one.

National, regional and

sectoral parties or
organizations must both
represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and
lack "welldefined political
constituencies".

The fourth parameter in the ponencia states:

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector.  The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented"
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communites,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.

I dissent for the following reasons.

First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a well-defined political

constituency" as a requirement along with "marginalization and
underrepresentation." They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus,
sectoral parties and organizations intending to run in the party-list elections must
meet both.

Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of

what it means to be "marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well
defined political constituency." For reasons discussed above, the exact content of
these legislative standards should be left to the COMELEC. They are ever
evolving concepts, created to address social disparities, to be able to give life to
the "social justice" policy of our Constitution.

The disqualification of a
nommee should not
disqualify the party-list group
provided that: (1) it meets
Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang
Bagong Bayani (alternately,
on the basis of the new
parameters set in
the ponencia, that they validly
qualify as national, regional
or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3)
nominees remains qualified.

I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However,

I would like to explain my position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in
the ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified
if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the
disqualification of its nominee is only reasonable if based on material
misrepresentations regarding the nominee's qualifications. Otherwise, the
disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group
provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong
Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia,
that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons
explained below.

The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
Consistent therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve proportional
representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups'
"chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature."[24] Because of this
policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No.
7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power
to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single
nominee.

It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election
laws as a disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be
considered a violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and
willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for the
rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a
party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee must be based on a
material misrepresentation regarding that nominee's qualifications. This also
finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers declaring
"untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.

As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should

have at least one qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to· be
allowed to participate in the elections. This is because if all of its top three
nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus
allowed to participate in the elections, and should it obtain the required number of
votes to win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it, because the law
does not allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee through substitution.
This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation to Section 8
of R.A. No. 7941.

Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the

COMELEC based on "the list of names submitted by the respective parties x x x
according to their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a party-list group's
nominees is determined by the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the
last paragraph of which reads:

x x x No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed

after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list.

Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-
list group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted.
The ranking of the nominees is changed through substitution, which according to
Section 8 is done by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In
this case, all the names that come after the now vacant slot will move up the list.
After substitution takes effect, the new list with the new ranking will be used by
COMELEC to determine who among the nominees of the party-list group shall be
proclaimed, from the first to the last, in accordance with Section 13.

If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed.

Thus, their ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the
COMELEC in determining the one/s that will repres.ent the winning partylist
group in Congress. This means that if the first nominee is disql,lalified, and the
party-list group is able to join the elections and becomes entitled to one
representative, the second cannot take the first nominee's place and represent
the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets enough votes to be
entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can.represent it.

Allowing a party-list roup, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5
of Ang Bagong Bayani[25] (alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the
ponencia, that it qmilifies as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization)
and has established the qualification of at least one (1) of its top three (3)
nominees, to participate in the elections is a better interpretation of the law.  It is
fully consistent with the policy of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and
open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the
House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature"[26] while providing sufficient disincentives for
party-list groups to flood the COMELEC with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 only requires that they submit not less than five (5).

It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system
introduced in BANAT v. COMELEC,[27] will allow more party-list groups to be
represented in Congress.

Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.

The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT.  It

assumes the following facts: (1) 35 party-list groups participated in the elections;
(2) 20 million votes were cast for the party-fist system; and (3) there are 50 seats
in Congress reserved for the party-list representatives.

The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to

distribute the 50 seats reserved in the House of Representatives given the
foregoing facts and the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 party-list
groups.

Rank Party-list Votes % 1st Round  (guaranteed 2nd Round Total #

group Garnered seats)   (additional of seats
seats)
1 AAA 1,466,000 7.33% 1 2 3
2 BBB 1,228,000 6.14% 1 2 3
3 CCC 1,040,000 4.74% 1 1 2
4 DDD 1,020,000 3.89% 1 1 2
5 EEE 998,000 3.88% 1 1 2
6 FFF 960,000 3.07% 1 1 2
7 GGG 942,000 2.92% 1 1 2
8 HHH 926,000 2.65% 1 1 2
9 III 910,000 2.57% 1 1 2
10 JJJ 796,000 2.57% 1 1 2
11 KKK 750,000 2.42% 1 1 2
12 LLL 738,000 2.35% 1 1 2
13 MMM 718,000 2.32% 1 1 2
14 NNN 698,000 2.13% 1 1 2
15 OOO 678,000 2.12% 1 1 2
16 PPP 658,000 2.06% 1 1 2
17 QQQ 598,000 2.02% 1 1 2
18 RRR 482,000 1.95% 1 1
19 SSS 378,000 1.89% 1 1
20 TTT 318,000 1.54% 1 1
21 UUU 294,000 1.47% 1 1
22 VVV 292,000 1.44% 1 1
23 WWW 290,000 1.43% 1 1
24 XXX   1.37% 1 1
280,000
25 YYY 274,000 1.37% 1 1
26 ZZZ 268,000 1.34% 1 1
27 1-A 256,000 1.24% 1 1
28 1-B 248,000 1.23% 1 1
29 1-C 238,000 1.18% 1 1
30 1-D 222,000 1.11% 1 1
31 1-E 214,000 1 .07 1 1
%
32 1-F 212,000 1.06%
33 1-G 210,000 1.05%
34 1-H 206,000 1.03%
35 1-I 194,000 1.02%
20,000,00 17 33 50

We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section II(b) of R.A. 7941

guarantees a seat to the party-list groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system." In our hypothetical scenario, the
partylist groups ranked 1st to 17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes cast
for the party-list system.  In effect, all 17 of them were given guaranteed seats.
The distribution of these so-called guaranteed seats to the "two percenters" is
what BANATcalls the "first round of seat allocation."

From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats
allocated to the two percenters will be subtracted from "20% of the members of
the House of Representatives" reserved y the Constitution for party-list
representatives, which in this hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17
of the two percenters were able to establish the qualification of their first
nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in what BANAT termed as the
"second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the
distribution/allocation of these seats arc fairly simple. If a party-list group's
percentage is multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is
no less than 2, then that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to
keep in line with the 3-seat limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown by
the table above, only the top two party-list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2
additional seats.  Assuming, again, that the 2nd and 3rd nominees of both AAA
and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left for distribution.

In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of
votes cast in favor of the remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this
stage, the only thing that matters is the group's ranking. The party-list group that
comes after BBB will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one seat
per party-list group, per rank, continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the
second round of seat allocation stops at this point. In the table above, the
50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list group that ranked 31st in the election.

In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified.
What happens if one or some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the
proposed method, if one or two of the party-list groups with guaranteed seats
have a disqualified first nominee, their second nominee, if qualified, can still
represent them in Congress based on the second round of seat allocation.

In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groups—whether or not

entitled to guaranteed seats—are disqualified, then those party-list groups, which
without the disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled to a seat,
would now have a higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.

If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its
guaranteed seat and the additional seats for distribution in the se ond round will
be increased by 1. With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a
seat in its favor, assuming that its first nominee is qualified. If I-E's first nominee
is disquali tied, then we will proceed to the party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. 
This method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.

If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list
groups represented in Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.

This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this
time using a "non-two percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed
to garner at least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of seat
allocation, it was granted 1 seat. To be able to send a representative in
Congress, RRR's first nominee should be qualified to sit. Assuming that its first
nominee was disqualified, its second or third nominee cannot occupy said seat;
instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will now go to I-E. Again, this method
is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.

In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in

the elections despite the disqualification of some of its nominees, providej that
there remains a qualified nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not only
is this the better policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by law.

Only nine of the petitions should be remanded.

Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand

of all petitions to the COMELEC for reasons to be discussed below.

The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz:

x x x Thus, the present petitionshould be remanded to the COMELEC not

because COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed
by this Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencia's guidelines focus mainly on two

(2) grounds used by the COMELEC to caricel registration: (1) the standard of
marginalized and underrepresented as applied to national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations; and (2) the qualification of nominees. From such
examination, we can conclude that, in relation to the other grounds used by
COMELEC to cancel registration (other than those two grounds mentioned
above), the doctrines remain unchanged. Thus, a remand of those petitions is
unnecessary, considering that the acts of the COMELEC pertaining to their
petitions ate upheld.  The ponencia even admits that COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners.

Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose
registration was cancelled on the basis of applying the standard of "marginalized
and underrepresented" and the qualification of nominees wherein the "new
parameters" apply. If other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those
with "new parameters,"—say, for example, failure to prove track i record, a
remand would be uncalled for because the doctrine pertaining to the other
grounds remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9)
petitions should be ordered remanded to the COMELEC.  In these nine (9)
petitions, the COMELEC cancelled the registration of the party-list groups solely
on the ground that their nominees are disqualified.  In making; such a
pronouncement, the COMELEC merely used as yardstick whether the pominees
actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented, and not whether they
could qualify as advocates, and for this reason, I recommend that the following
cases be REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:

1. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reonstruction, Inc. (ARARQ

2. Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
3. Aangat Tayo (AT)
4. A Blessed Party-List (a.k:a Blessed Federation of Farmers Fishermen
International, Inc.) [A BLESSED]
5. Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6. Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7. Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO BAHAY)
8. Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9. I-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)

Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponecia's take that the
phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies only sectoral parties, still,
a remand of all the petitions remain uncalled for.  Out of the 52 petitions, there
are only 11 party-list groups which are classified as national or regional parties.
[28]
  Thus, if we were to strictly apply the ponencia's guidelines, only 20  petitions
ought to be remanded.

The COMELEC did not violate

Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section
3, Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires a prior motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC can decide election cases en banc.  To
recall, the Resolution allows the COMELEC en banc, without a motion for
reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic review of a decision of a COMELEC
division granting a petition for registration of a party-list group or organization;
and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for those already accredited and which
have manifested their intent to participate in the 2013 national and local elections
for the purpose of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements
of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani[29] guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers
which can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the
conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of
COMELEC's administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for
reconsideration in Section 3 is not required.

It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section
2 (5) is not quasi-judicial but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the
true distinction between the two.  In a number of cases, this Court has had the
·opportunity to distinguish quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus,
in Limkaichong v COMELEC,[30] we held that:

The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially

management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. This is to be distinguished from "quasi-judicial
function", a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. [emphasis supplied]

However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary

investigation before the public prosecutor, that also entail the "opportunity to be
heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution
thereon," but are not considered quasi-judicial in the proper sense of the term. 
As held in Bautista v CA:[31]

Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation

performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of
Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v.
Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct prelhninary
investigation is quasi-judicial in natureBut this statement holds true only in
the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is
where the similarity ends.

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from

other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as
"an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."
xxxx

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare
his complaint or information.  It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probahle cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof.  While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its
decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.  Since the ORSP has the power to resolve
appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of
petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense
in the trial ofthe case. (emphasis supplied)

While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision
or resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the exercise of the former
has for its purpose the adjudication of rights with finality.[32] This makes it akin to
judicial power which has for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[33]

Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for
reconsideration is to look at it through the lens of an election case. The phrase
"all such election cases" in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of
Article IX-C, viz:

What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section
2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

xxxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the

elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
of officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts oflimitedjurisdiction.[34]

As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the
penumbra of election as follows:

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-

election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.

xxxx

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over cnntests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defmed as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario.  In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would
have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file
an election protest.This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by S!ction
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. (Emphasis supplied)
[35]

In Panlilio v Commission on Elections,[36] it was also held that the primary

purpose of an election case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by
the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an
election case. Since the national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May
2013, the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under
the Resolutton No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior
motion for reconsideration under Section 3 is not required.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-

IPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The
Petitions of all the other Petitioners should be dismissed.

[1]
 G.R. No. 83896, 83815, 22 February 1991.
[2]
 Vol. V, R.C.C No. 106, 12 October 1986.
[3]
 Emphasis supplied.

 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.

[4]

148208, 15 December 2004.

[5]
 VOL V, R.C.C No. 106, 12 October 1986.
[6]
 See Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012.

 CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO, EQUAL DIGNITY & RESPECT: THE

[7]

SUBSTANCE OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2012), 265

(hereinafter, PUNO).

 TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER

[8]

AND REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES(2008), at 166-167.

[9]
 Puno, 265.
[10]
 Id.
[11]
 G.R. No. 1 47589, 26 June 2001.

 See Perez-Rosario v. CA, G.R. No. 140796, 30 Jtin 2006; BERNAS, PRIMER

[12]

ON THE 1987 CONSTITUTION (2006), 488.

[13]
 Volume II, R.C.C., 258-259, 25 July 1986.
[14]
 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, 18 October 1988.
[15]
 Gandara Mill Supply v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126703, 29 December 1998.
[16]
 Bedolv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, 3 December2009.

 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, 21

[17]

April 1995.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 G.R. No. 46076, 46077, 12 June 1939.
[20]
 G.R. No. 47065, 26 June 1940.
[21]
 Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Ople, G.R. L-67573, 19 June 1985.
[22]
 Calalang v Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940).
[23]
 People v Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (1939).
[24]
 Section 2, epublic Act No. 7941.
[25]
 Supra.
[26]
 Section 2, Republic Act. No. 7941
[27]
 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009.

 The national parties are Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD),
[28]

Bantay Party-List (BATAY), and Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP).  On the other
hand, the regional parties are Ako Bicol Political ftarty (AKB), Akyson Magsasaka
- Partido Tining ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), Ako an Bisaya (AAB), Kalikasan Party-
List (KALIKASAN), 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), Abyan
Ilonggo Party (AI), Partio ng Bayan and Bida (PBB), and Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy
(PPP).
[29]
 G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001.
[30]
 G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, 1 79240-41,1 April 2009.
[31]
 G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001.
[32]
 Dole Philippines v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30 November 2006.
[33]
 1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1.
[34]
 Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191084, 25 March 2010.
[35]
 Tecson v.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004.
[36]
 G.R. No. 181478, 15 July 2009.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views on the various questions

submitted to the Court through consolidated petitions before us.

For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out
under the following structure:

I. The Case and the Issues

II. Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions

A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.

1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani

2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System

B. Nominees
C. On the observation of the Chief Justice
D. Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion

III. Preliminary Matters

A. The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of jurisdictional error

that warrants reviewing COMELEC’s action

B. COMELEC’s power to register and to cancel registration of a

party-list group is an exercise of its administrative powers

IV. Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions

 A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System

a. The Constitutional Text.

b. Constitutional text summarized
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation

B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act

C. Jurisprudential Developments

a. Ang Bagong Bayani

b. Banat

D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and

RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors

a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System

a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.

a.2. From the statutory perspective

b. Party participation under the party-list system

b.1. Impact on political parties

c. The parties and their nominees

c.1. Refusal or cancellation of registration due to

nominee problems
c.2. party nominee relationship

E. Chief Justice Sereno’s Reflections

F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for COMELEC Action

I.A  The Cases

The Court resolves fifty-three (53) consolidated

petitions for certiorari/prohibition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by
various party-list groups and organizations. They commonly assail the Comelec’s
resolutions, either cancelling their existing registrations and accreditations, or
denying their new petitions for party-list registration.

Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by new party-list

applicants under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 9366
(dated February 21, 2012).  These petitions were denied by the Comelec En
Banc upon its review of the Comelec Division’s resolutions.

The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought by previously registered

and accredited party-list organizations whose registrations/accreditations
have been cancelled.  These petitioners participated in previous elections and
cannot participate in the May 2013 election if the cancellation of their
registration/accreditation would stand.

The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the Comelec and the disregard of the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and RA No. 7941, variously questioned –

a. the Comelec En Banc’s authority under Comelec Resolution No. 9513 to

conduct an automatic review of its Division’s rulings despite the absence of
motions for reconsideration, in disregard of Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure;

b. with respect to the cancellation of previous registration/accreditation of

party-list groups or organizations,  the denial of due process and the
violation of the principle of res adjudicata; further, the Comelec’s
cancellation of their existing registration/accreditation is claimed to be an
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC Division, not the
Comelec En Banc, can exercise at the first instance;

c. the Comelec En Banc’s appreciation of facts and its application of the

guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani, which either addressed defects or
deficiencies on the part of the parties or of their nominees and which
resulted in the refusal or cancellation of registration/accreditation.

I.B.  The Issues

Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court’s consideration may be
condensed as follows:
 1. Whether the Comelec En Banc may automatically review the decision of
the COMELEC Division without the requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration under the Comelec Rules of Procedure; and

2. Whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in denying or

cancelling the registration/accreditation of the petitioners, mainly relying on
the eight point guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.

II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS

II.A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC’s[1] intrinsically flawed

interpretation of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions is the main
source of the present controversy. Its constricted interpretation of the statutory
phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” has invited more questions than
answers that the framers of the 1987 Constitution in fact sought to avoid.

II.A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani.

I take the position that it is time to re-visit this oft-cited ruling before the
party-list system is further led astray.

First, the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the
constitutional framers’ intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by
giving marginal and underrepresented parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the
legislative district elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the
constituency to elect themselves there, but who – nationally  – may generate
votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district election would garner)
the chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the
House of Representatives through a system other than the legislative district
elections.

Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text and made a slanted

reading of the intent of the framers of the Constitution.  By these means, it
erroneously concluded that the party-list system is primarily intended as a social
justice tool, and was not principally driven by intent to reform electoral system.
Thus, under its First Guideline, Ang Bagong Bayani solely viewed the party-
list system from the prism of social justice, and not from the prism of
electoral reform as the framers of the Constitution originally intended.
Second.  In the constitutional deliberations, the proponents of the electoral
reform concept were opposed by those who wanted a party-list system
open only to sectoral representation, particularly to sectoral groups with social
justice orientation.

The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents nevertheless opened the
system to sectoral representation and in fact gave the social justice groups a
head-start by providing for their representation through selection in the first three
elections.

In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution made a textual

commitment to open the party-list system to registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations. The Article on the Commission on
Election also pointedly provided that there shall be a “free and open party
system,” and votes for parties, organizations or coalitions shall only be
recognized in the party-list system.

II.A.2.  Effects on the Components of the Party-list System

Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties may run in the party-list
elections but maintains under its Second Guideline that they must qualify as
marginal and underrepresented as this phrase is understood in the social
justice context. This is totally incorrect.

Based on the reasons discussed above and further expounded below, even
major political parties can participate in party-list elections because the party-
list system is open to all registered political, national, regional, sectoral
organizations and parties, subject only to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution and by law. Further, both political and sectoral parties have equal
roles and participation in the party-list system; again, they are subject to the
same limitations imposed by law (the Constitution and RA No. 7941) and are
separately burdened only by the limitations intrinsic to their respective natures. 
To summarize:

a) For political parties (whether national or regional): to be classified as

political parties, they must advocate an ideology or platform, principles
and policies, for the general conduct of government. The application of
the further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate
means of securing the adoption of their principles of governance, they
must regularly nominate and support their leaders and members as
candidates for public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances
of the party.
 The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in the
legislative district elections) and lack of constituency requirements fully
apply, but there is no reason not to presume compliance with these
requirements if political parties are not participants in any legislative
district elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form
a coalition with party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list
elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the
party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in both electoral
arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a
coalition. No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that
they can form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for
the party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal
alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-list elections.
b) For sectoral parties and organizations, they must belong to the
sectors enumerated in Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice
characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or characteristics
specific to their sectors although they do not require or need to identify
with any social justice characteristic. In either case, they are subject to
the “marginalized and under-represented” and the “constituency”
requirements of the law through a showing, supported by evidence, that
they belong to a sector that is actually characterized as marginal and
under-represented.
These parties and organizations are additionally subject to the general
overriding requirement of electoral marginalization and under-
representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but
there is no reason why compliance with these requirements cannot be
presumed if they are not participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Compliance with COMELEC Rules. To justify their existence, all party-
list groups must comply with the requirements of law, their own internal
rules on membership, and with the Comelec’s Rules of Procedure. They
must submit to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) their
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require.[2]

To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the party-list system –

as principally espoused by Commissioner Christian Monsod and duly
approved by the Commission’s vote – maintained its electoral reform objectives
while significantly contributing to the social justice thrust of the Constitution.

It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Reflections, that this
Separate Opinion is not “appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the
1987 Constitution] arose.” I recognize the social justice content of the party-list
provisions in the Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these provisions
the primacy that both the framers of the Constitution and Congress did not see
fit to accord.

B. On Nominees

Third. Considering the Constitution’s solicitous concern for the marginalized and
under-represented sectors as understood in the social justice context, and RA
7941’s requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the party-list
group, a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the party-list group but proves to
be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee.

This classification of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties

and organizations which are marginalized and underrepresented in the social
justice sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics. To
be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a
majority of the members of the party must actually belong to the sector
represented, while nominees must be a member of the sectoral party or
organization.

Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of

government, bona fide membership, in accordance with the political party’s
constitution and by-laws, would suffice.

In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most

tangible link of the nominees to their respective parties and to the party-list
system.

Subject to the above, the disqualification of the nominee does not necessarily

mean the disqualification of the party since all the grounds for cancellation or
refusal of registration pertain to the party itself.

I make the qualification that the law’s[3] requirement of the submission of a list

containing at least five (qualified) nominees is mandatory, and a party’s
inexcusable failure to comply with this requirement warrants the refusal or
cancellation of its registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C. On the Observations of the Chief Justice

As my fourth and final point, the “textualist” approach that the Chief Justice
objects to, has been driven, and is fully justified, by the above reading of the
Constitution and the law.

As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this

Court (and of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the
Constitution and the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and
Congress (through RA No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed
through the words of the Constitution and the law, and through the intents the
framers; both were considered and cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is
properly read and understood.  The whole Judiciary, including this Court, can
only apply these policies in the course of their assigned task of adjudication
without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the words only in case of
ambiguity.

This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for
social justice or for any ideology for that matter, as advocacy is not the
task assigned to us by the Constitution.  To play the role of advocates, or to
formulate policies that fall within the role of the Legislative Branch of
government, would be a violation of our sworn duty.

D. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion 

As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court
suspended the Rules of Court in considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in
light of the clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the
Majority unanimously found.

Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I
vote to VACATE the ruling of the COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in
light of our finding of patent violation of the Constitution after revisiting and
overturning the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.

Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my view that a grave abuse of
discretion exists.

Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases – namely, the petitioners
and the COMELEC – relied upon and were all guided by the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling. However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its
standards, in light of what the text and intents of the Constitution and RA No.
7491 provide, yield a result different from what Ang Bagong Bayani reached.

As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong

considerations were used in ruling on the consolidated petitions, resulting in
gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the Constitution.  This
is grave abuse of discretion that taints a decision maker’s action,[4] infinitely
made worse in this case because the Constitution itself is involved.

An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion pertains specifically to

the COMELEC’s refusal or cancellation of registration of the party-list group
based, solely or partly, on the disqualification of the nominee. As discussed
below, this action and any refusal or cancellation of registration is
completely devoid of basis in fact and in law and in this sense constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC
in accordance with the terms of this Separate Opinion.

III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 

A. The existence of jurisdictional error that

warrants reviewing COMELEC’s action

Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or
quasi-judicial powers, on the other hand, the judicial remedy available to an
aggrieved party is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65.
Court action under this rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law, the
COMELEC en banc decision is final and executory and should stand unless
nullified by this Court through a writ of certiorari.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the
tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite
grave abuse of discretion is in keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its
function is to keep the tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction under the
Constitution and law.

The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition, generally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[5]
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC
merely complied with the prevailing jurisprudence (in particular. with the Court’s
pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and Banat v. COMELEC),
then it could not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with
grave abuse of discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when the
respondent is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the
present case.

This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound as the gross

misinterpretation and misapplication of the Constitution cannot be allowed by this
Court in its role and duty as guardian of the Constitution.  Where a
misinterpretation or misapplication of the Constitution occurs, the result is a
constitutional violation that this Court cannot be prevented from addressing
through the exercise of its powers through the available medium of review under
the Rules of Court.  To hold otherwise is to countenance a violation of the
Constitution – a lapse that cannot and should not happen under our legal system.

Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application
of a prevailing rule or doctrine negates a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in
spite of a glaring error in the doctrine’s interpretation of the Constitution,
then the Court would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying down
a new doctrine that would operate prospectively but at the same time dismissing
the petition for failure to show grave abuse of discretion.  To be sure, this is a
course of action the Court cannot take if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn
duty to hold the Constitution inviolate.  For the Court, action under these
circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed to be heard about its right
and duty to act.

It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional

dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign
supreme. The Court’s previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the
resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly
bind the Court in its future actions. As the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy,
the Court cannot tie its hands through its past actions, particularly when the
Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate authority to rule according to
what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution.[6]

Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in
stone and do not remain un-erased and applicable for all times under all
circumstances. The Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a sense a
continuing one as these are made and refined in the cases before the Court,
taking into account what it has said on the similar points in the past. This is the
principle of stare decisis that fosters the stability of rulings and decisions. This
principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies even if an incisive
examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a faithful
interpretation of the Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation.  In
this excluded circumstance, both the rule of reason and the commands of the
Constitution itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need be,
overturned.[7] Indeed, if the act done is contrary to the Constitution, then the
existence of grave abuse of discretion cannot be doubted.[8]

As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong

Bayani ruling does not rest on firm constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted
reading of the text of the constitution and its myopic view of constitutional intent
led it to a grave error never envisioned by the framers of our constitution.

By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to
act in accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court – i.e.,  allowing
political parties to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving
that they are “marginalized and under-represented” (as this term is understood
in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral
party or organization may be validly included in the list of nominees – the Court
would not be violating the principle of prospectivity.[9]

The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity – both in the application of law
and of judicial decisions enunciating new doctrines – is the protection of vested
rights and the obligation of contracts.  When a new ruling overrules a prior ruling,
the prospective application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have
relied in good faith on the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.

Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application in this case, for, a
ruling overturning Ang Bagong Bayani broadens the base of participation
in the party-list system of election based on the text and intent of the
Constitution. Thus, no one can claim that the application of this ruling in the
upcoming 2013 election would operate to the prejudice of parties who relied on
the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized and under-represented sectors
(as the term in understood in Ang Bagong Bayani) continue to be eligible to
participate in the party-list elections, subject to the determination of parties’
individual circumstances by the COMELEC.

B. COMELEC power to register and to cancel

registration of a party-list group is an exercise
of its administrative powers
The COMELEC En Banc’s authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513
– i.e., to conduct summary hearings for the purpose of determining the registered
parties’ continuing compliance with the law and the regulations and to review the
COMELEC Division’s ruling granting a petition for registration – is appropriately
an exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative power rather than its quasi-
judicial power. In the exercise of this authority, the Comelec may automatically
review the decision of its Divisions, without need for a motion to reconsider the
grant of a petition for registration; it may also conduct summary hearings when
previously registered party-list groups file their manifestation of intent to
participate in the coming elections.

The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al.[10] already provides us ample

guidance and insights into what distinguishes administrative and quasi-judicial
powers from one another. On the issue of whether the remedy
of certiorari (which can only be invoked when the respondent exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial functions) would lie against a public school committee whose
function was to determine the ranking of selected honor students for its
graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and said:

From the [foregoing], it will be gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or officer
may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law
is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial
functions.[11]  (citation omitted; emphases ours)

In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for
registration or the determination of a registered party’s continuing compliance
with existing laws, rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a right or the
presence of a conflict of rights.  In a registration or compliance proceeding, an
applicant simply attempts to prove its possession or continued possession of the
requisite qualifications for the purpose of availing the privilege of participating in
an electoral exercise.  Thus, no real adjudication entailing the exercise of quasi-
judicial powers actually takes place.

Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata in these registration

proceedings necessarily weakens any claim that adjudication, done in the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions, is involved. Each election period is sui
generis - a class in itself, and any registration or accreditation by a party-list
group is only for the purpose of the coming election; it does not grant any
registered party-list group any mantle of immunity from the COMELEC’s power of
review as an incident of its power to register.  To hold otherwise would
emasculate the COMELEC as an independent constitutional commission, and
weaken the crucial role it plays in our republican democracy.

IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS

I take the firm position that this Court should now revisit its ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani before our party-list system drifts any farther from the text and
spirit of the constitutional and statutory commands.

These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting this approach and my
conclusions.

A. The Constitutional Provisions

on the Party-list System

a. The Constitutional Text.

The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with the party-list system of
election are Section 5(1) and (2) of Article VI, and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

The cited Article VI section reads:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.  [emphasis, underscores and italics ours]

Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, is the article on the
COMELEC, and the cited sections quoted below are its provisions related to the
party-list system.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxxx

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. x x x

xxxx
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according
to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or

coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system
as provided in this Constitution.  [emphases and italics ours]

These provisions are specifically mentioned and shall be cited throughout this
Separate Opinion as they are the essential take-off points in considering,
appreciating and implementing the party-list system.

b. The Constitutional Text Summarized

Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the Constitution relating to the party-
list system essentially provide that:

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected

from legislative districts, and those who are elected through a party-
list system.

2. The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list

system are those who are elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly
leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation.
 3. The members under the system shall be elected through registered
national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, thus, textually
identifying the recognized component groupings in the party-list system;
they must all register with the COMELEC to be able to participate.

4. To be voted under the party-list system are the component political

parties, organizations and coalitions, in contrast with the individual
candidates voted upon in legislative district elections.

5. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the

total number of representatives, including those in the party-list.

6. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-

half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

7. The Constitution allows a free and open party system that shall evolve
according to the free choice of the people, within the limits of the
Constitution.

c.  Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation

Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general in their
terms.  However, they are not, in fact, as bare as they would seem, as the words
used carry meanings and intents[12] expressed during the deliberations and the
voting that took place to determine what the Constitution would exactly provide.[13]

Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent that led to the

modification of the system of legislative district elections that the country has
used even before the 1935 Constitution.

The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative district system that

remains described in the Constitution as election by district “apportioned among
the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.”[14]

The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list

system in terms of its purpose, as follows:[15]
The purpose of this is to open the system.  In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide,
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.  [italics, emphases and underscores ours]

These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the Commissioner’s

subsequent statement when he said —

The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who have a
national constituency who may never be able to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. But they must have a constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a
voice in the National Assembly.[16]

thus, leaving no doubt on what the party-list system conceptually is and why

it was established.

B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act

Following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon Aquino

appointed representatives of the sectors mentioned in the Constitution, namely:
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth,
who acted as the party-list representatives for the first three (3) elections under
this Constitution.

In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as
the law that would implement the party-list election scheduled for May 1998.  The
law at the same time fleshed out the mechanics for party-list elections, in
accordance with the terms of the Constitution.  The law specifically provided for:

a. a declaration of the policy behind the law;

b. a definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national,
political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their coalitions;
c. the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal
and cancellation of registration; and the certified list of registered
parties;
d. the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives;
e. the manner of voting;
 f. the number and procedure for the allocation of party-list
representatives; and
g. the proclamation of the winning party-list representatives, their
term of office; the limitation on their change of affiliation; their rights;
and the provisions in case of vacancy.

Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the party-list system as:

a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives

to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.[17]  (emphases and italics ours)

and clarified the State’s policy, objectives and means, as follows:

a.  the promotion of proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof;

b. with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives; and

c. for the development and guarantee of a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature under the simplest scheme possible.[18]

RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly defined the component groupings

recognized by law in the party-list system, as follows:

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of

parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating

an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical

territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of

the sectors enumerated [labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals] whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups

of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,

sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.[19] 
(emphases and italics ours)

Notably, the definitions carried no significant qualifications, preferences,

exclusions or limitations by law on what the recognized party-list groupings
should be, although Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined the grounds
for disqualification.

C. Jurisprudential Developments

a. The Ang Bagong Bayani Case

In 2001, the first judicial test in the implementation of the party-list system came
through the Ang Bagong Bayani case where the petitioners sought the
disqualification of the private respondents, among whom were major political
parties.  The Court resolved, among others, the following issues:

1. whether political parties may participate in party-list elections; and

2. whether the party-list system is exclusive to “marginalized and

underrepresented” sectors and organizations.

The majority ruling held that political parties may participate in party-list

elections, provided that the requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the Constitution and RA No. 7941.  The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies, identifying them, non-exclusively, as
the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.  The party-list nominees, as well, must be Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties.

Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the guidelines for the party-list
system, summarized below:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent

the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of
RA 7941.  In other words, it must show – through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record – that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the
ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.  x x x

xxxx

Third, [by an] express constitutional provision[,] the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.  x x x

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6

of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification[.]

xxxx

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project

organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.  By the very
nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government.  x x x

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 [contains the
qualifications of party-list nominees, with special age-related terms for youth
sector candidates].

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent

marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x
x [U]nder Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."  x x x

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation

and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.[20] 
(italics and emphases ours)

b. BANAT Case

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.

Commission on Elections[21] is essentially a case on the computation of the
allocation of seats based on the party-list votes.  Despite the Ang Bagong Bayani
ruling, the question of whether the Constitution prohibits political parties
from participating in the party-list elections remained a live issue in this case.

By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to disallow major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly; thus, effectively
reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major political parties may
participate in the party-list system, provided they represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.  Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno cited two reasons for
disallowing the participation of major political parties:

1. Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major
political parties from participating in the election of their representatives are
aligned with the constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political
inequalities and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.

2. Allowing major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral

process will suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty,
and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.

The minority view[22] took the position that neither the Constitution nor RA No.
7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.  It
maintained that, on the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended
the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings, and this Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from party-list elections,
in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties
are allowed to coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes.  The other major political parties can thus organize or affiliate with their
chosen sector or sectors, provided that their nominees belong to their respective
sectors.  Nor is it necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in
poverty, destitution, and infirmity,” as there is no financial status or educational
requirement in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors; that is, if the nominee
represents the fisherfolk, he must be a fisherfolk, if the nominee represents the
senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.

D.  The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA 7941:

Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors

I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of the Constitution and of
the law to stress these terms for later comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani.  In
this manner, Ang Bagong Bayani’s slanted reading of the Constitution and the
laws can be seen in bold relief. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of
the constitutional intent, based on the statements of a constitutional
commissioner that were quoted out of context, to justify its reading of the
constitutional intent.[23]  Specifically, it relied on the statements of
Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral representation, and glossed
over those of Commissioner Monsod and the results of the deliberations, as
reflected in the resulting words of the Constitution.[24]  Thus, its conclusion is not
truly reflective of the intent of the framers of the Constitution.  This error is fatal
as its conclusion was then used to justify his interpretation of the statute, leading
to a bias for the social justice view.

a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System 

a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective. 

The aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is
principally to reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system
of electing the members of the House of Representatives.  The innovation is a
party-list system that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to
allow those who could not win in the legislative district elections a fair chance to
enter the House of Representatives other than through the district election
system.

Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral reform - not to provide a

social justice mechanism that would guarantee that sectors (described in social
justice context by its constitutional deliberation proponents as “marginalized”)
would exclusively occupy, or have reserved, seats in the House of
Representatives under the party-list system.  This is one glaring error that is
evident right from the opening statement of Ang Bagong Bayani when it
described the party-list system as “a social justice tool.”  While the party-list
system can indeed serve the ends of social justice by providing the opportunity –
through an open, multi-party system – for the social justice sector groups that
have no chance to win in legislative district elections, the party-list system was
not established primarily for this purpose.

The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution
itself which do not provide for exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral
groups in the party-list system.  If at all, the constitutional text only provided a
guarantee of 50% participation for specified sectoral groups, but the guarantee
was only for the first three (3) elections after the ratification of the
Constitution.[25]

The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted
confirm the primacy of electoral reform as against social justice objectives.  The
electoral reform view was espoused by the author of the provision,
Commissioner Monsod, and his proposed amendment[26] met vigorous objections
from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum and Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then
sought to have guaranteed or reserved seats for the “marginalized” sectors in
order to prevent their “political massacre” should the Monsod amendment be
allowed.[27]

When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized

sector won. Eventually, what was conceded to the latter was what the
Constitution, as worded now, provides - i.e., “For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from”
the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of “marginalized” would be applied to the party-list
system, the term should apply to the national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations that cannot win in the traditional legislative district
elections (following the explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily
to those claiming marginalization in the social justice context or because of their
special interests or characteristics.  The term, of course, can very well be
applicable to the latter if they indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional
legislative district elections.  These aspects of the case are further discussed and
explained below.

a.2.  From the Statutory Perspective.

Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system
innovation does not vary or depart from the basic constitutional intents. The
objective continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the promotion of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.[28]

It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words “marginalized
and underrepresented” made their formal appearance in the party-list system.  It
was used in the context of defining one of the aims of the system, i.e., to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives.

This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory
recognition that accommodates the sectoral (in the special interest or concern
or social justice senses) character into the party-list system (i.e., in addition to the
primary electoral reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution), but
nevertheless does not render sectoral groups the exclusive participants in party-
list elections.  As already mentioned, this conclusion is not justified by the
wording, aims and intents of the party-list system as established by the
Constitution and under RA No. 9741.

Nor does the use of the term “marginalized and underrepresented” (understood
in the narrow sectoral context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a
party, group or organization for participation in the party-list election, except for
those in the sectoral groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or
organizations necessarily are subject to this requirement.  For all parties, sectors,
organizations or coalition, however, the absolute overriding requirement – as
justified by the principal aim of the system – remains to be a party, group or
organization’s inability to participate in the legislative district elections with
a fair chance of winning.  To clearly express the logical implication of this
statement, a party, group or organization already participating in the legislative
district elections is presumed to have assessed for itself a fair chance of winning
and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections.

b. Party Participation under the Party-list System 

The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list

system are those who would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly
leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are likewise
constitutionally identified as the registered national, regional, sectoral parties
and organizations, and are the party-list groupings to be voted under the party-
list system under a free and open party system that should be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people within the limits of the
Constitution.[29]

From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully
foster proportional representation that would lead to the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-
defined constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. 
The key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized
and underrepresented,” and “lack of well-defined constituencies.”

The term “marginalized and underrepresented” has been partly discussed above
and would merit further discussion below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC,[30] on the other hand, defined the term “proportional
representation” in this manner:

[I]t refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as

exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.[31]

As well, the case defined the phrase “who lack well-defined political

constituency" to mean:
refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented.[32]

Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term

“marginalized and underrepresented,” clearly showing how, in its view, the party-
list system is bound to this descriptive term.  As discussed above, Ang Bagong
Bayani’s use of the term is not exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of
the party-list system.  This error becomes more glaring as the case applies it to
the phrases “proportional representation” and “lack of political constituency.”

For clarity, Section 2 – the only provision where the term “marginalized and
underrepresented” appears – reads in full:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a

sectoral party, or a coalition of parties (Section 3[b] of RA No. 7941). As
distinguished from sectoral parties or organizations – which generally advocate
“interests or concerns” – a political party is one which advocates “an ideology or
platform, principles and policies” of the government.  In short, its
identification is with or through its program of governance.

Under the verba legis or plain terms rule of statutory interpretation[33] and the

maxim ut magis valeat quam pereat,[34] a combined reading of Section 2 and
Section 3 shows that the status of being “marginalized and underrepresented” is
not limited merely to sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the
law. The law itself recognizes that the same status can apply as well to “political
parties.”
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the
party-list system comes to mind as it provides a ready and very useful answer
dealing with the relationship and inter-action between sectoral representation and
the party-list system as a whole:

We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system.

Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say,
laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district.
That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization
or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be
attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered
with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At
the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been
garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a
political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the
votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in
favor of a party, organization or coalition.

xxxx

It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification
for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any
district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group
that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest
group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that,
let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a
group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they
are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really
have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are
the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.

xxxx

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we

speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring
to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list
system, we do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors
would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties
within the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much.[35]  (emphases and underscores

supplied)

These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the discussion on the
party-list system of election resumed on July 25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod
proposed an amendment[36] (that substantially became Section 5[1], Article VI of
1987 Constitution) that further clarified what this innovative system is.

Thus, the words “marginalized” and “underrepresented” should be understood in

the electoral sense,[37] i.e., those who cannot win in the traditional district
elections and who, while they may have a national presence, lacked “well-
defined political constituency” within a district sufficient for them to win.  For
emphasis, sectoral representation of those perceived in the narrow sectoral
(including social justice) sense as “marginalized” in society is encapsulated within
the broader multiparty (party-list system) envisioned by the framers.

This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the

concerns of the marginalized sector (in the narrow sectoral sense) but also the
concerns of those “underrepresented” (in the legislative district) as a result of the
winner-take-all system prevailing in district elections – a system that ineluctably
“disenfranchises” those groups or mass of people who voted for the second, third
or fourth placer in the district elections and even those who are passive holders
of Filipino citizenship.

RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of “underrepresented” when it used a
broad qualitative requirement in defining “political parties” as ideology or policy-
based groups and, “sectoral parties” as those whose principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of identified sectors.

Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that – contrary once

again to what Ang Bagong Bayani holds – proportional representation refers
to the representation of different political parties, sectoral parties and
organizations in the House of Representatives in proportion to the number
of their national constituency or voters, consistent with the constitutional
policy to allow an “open and free party system” to evolve.

In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself

notably anchored on the “open and free party system” mandated by Article IX-C
of the Constitution.  For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never noted this part
of Section 2 and its significance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional
anchor provided by Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution.  It appears to
have simply and conveniently focused on the first sentence of the Section and
its constricted view of the term “marginalized and underrepresented,” while
wholly fixated on a social justice orientation.  Thus, it opened its ruling, as
follows:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law
to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them
to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy.[38] (emphasis supplied)

Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood

statement that offers little opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely
and exclusively can be misleading. To begin with, the creation of an avenue by
which “sectoral parties or organizations” can meaningfully join an electoral
exercise is, in and by itself, a social justice mechanism but it served other
purposes that the framers of the Constitution were addressing. Looking back, the
appeal to the social justice concept to make the party-list elections an exclusive
affair of the “marginalized and underrepresented sector” (as defined in Ang
Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-system is
antithetical to sectoral representation. This was effectively the argument of the
proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in the constitutional
party-list debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-
determination of the sectors’ political massacre. This issue, however, has been
laid to rest in the constitutional debates and should not now be revived and
resurrected by coursing it through the Judiciary.
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was
a multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation.  Both sectoral
representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are concepts
that comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system.  Thus,
both the text and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of
exclusive sectoral representation under the party-list system; what was provided
was an avenue for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate
in the electoral system – it is an invitation for these sectors to join and take a
chance on what democracy and republicanism can offer.

Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and
exchange of ideas, philosophies and interests within a broader context. By
allowing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the numbers,
to participate together with other political parties and interest groups that we have
characterized, under the simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-
list we have today, the framers clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse
among the greater portion of the society and hoped to create a better citizenry
and nation.

b.1.  Impact on Political  Parties 

To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political

parties are not only “not excluded” from the party-list system; they are, in fact,
expressly allowed by law to participate.  This participation is not impaired by any
“marginalized and underrepresented” limitation understood in the Ang Bagong
Bayani sense.

As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral

sense, i.e., they are parties espousing their unique and “marginalized” principles
of governance and who must operate in the party-list system because they only
have a “marginal” chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This
definition assumes that the political party is not also a participant in the
legislative district elections as the basic concept and purpose of the party-
list innovation negate the possibility of playing in both legislative district
and party-list arenas.

Thus, parties – whether national, regional or sectoral – with legislative district

election presence anywhere in the country can no longer participate as the party-
list system is national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral systems
can be allowed anywhere.

c. The Parties and Their Nominees

c.1.  Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party
Registration Due to Nominee Problems

The COMELEC’s refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of

parties based on Section 6 of RA No. 7941 is a sore point when applied to
parties based on the defects or deficiencies attributable to the nominees.  On this
point, I maintain the view that essential distinctions exist between the parties
and their nominees that cannot be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of
Positions, however, the need to make a distinction between the two types of
nominees is relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations.

The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners

on the ground that their nominees are not qualified implies that the COMELEC
viewed the nominees and their party-list groups as one and the same
entity; hence, the disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the
disqualification of his/her party.

Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal reality that the party-list
group, not the nominee, is the candidate in the party-list election, and at the
same time blurs the distinction between a party-list representative and a district
representative.

c.2.  The Party-Nominee Relationship 

That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is
not a disputed point. Our essential holding, however, is that a party-list group, in
order to be entitled to participate in the elections, must satisfy the following
express statutory requirements:

1. must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties;
2. has no well-defined political constituencies; and
3. must be capable of contributing to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the House of

Representatives are those who are elected from legislative districts, and those
who are elected through a party-list system (Section 5[1], Article VI) where the
votes are in favor of a political party, organization or coalition (Section 6, Article
IX-C).

These requirements embody the concept behind the party-list system and
demonstrate that it is a system completely different from the legislative district
representation.  From the point of view of the nominee, he or she is not the
candidate, the party is the entity voted for.  This is in far contrast from the
legislative district system where the candidate is directly voted for in a personal
electoral struggle among candidates in a district.  Thus, the nominee in the
party-list system is effectively merely an agent of the party.[39] It is the party-
list group for whom the right of suffrage[40] is exercised by the national electorate
with the divined intent of casting a vote for a party-list group in order that the
particular ideology, advocacy and concern represented by the group may be
heard and given attention in the halls of the legislature.

This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the infirmities of the nominee
that do not go into the qualifications of the party itself should prejudice the party.
In fact, the law does not expressly provide that the disqualification of the nominee
results in the disqualification of a party-list group from participating in the
elections.  In this regard, Section 6 of RA No. 7941 reads:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may

motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized

for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be
correctly applied, the law, rules and regulations that the party violated under
Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant refusal or
cancellation of registration.

To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a party’s

failure to submit its list of five qualified candidates, after being notified of its
nominees’ disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of registration may be
warranted. Indeed, if the party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this
simple requirement of the law (Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration
deserves to be denied or an existing one cancelled as this omission, by itself,
demonstrates that it cannot then be expected to “contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation.”[41]

The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list
group to which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes
and ideals of the party-list group. However, unlike the political parties’ official
candidates - who can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run as
an independent candidate - the linkage between a nominee and his party-list
group is actually a one-way mirror relationship. The nominee can only see
(and therefore run) through the party-list group[42] but the party-list group can
see beyond the nominee-member.

While the nominee is the entity “elected” to Congress, a companion idea that
cannot be glossed over is that he only carried this out because of the nomination
made by the party to which he belongs and only through the unique party-list
system.  Note in this regard that the registration with the COMELEC confers
personality (for purposes of election) on the party-list group itself – and to no
other. Note, too, that what the Constitution and the law envision is proportional
representation through the group and the latter, not the nominee, is the one
voted for in the elections. Even the manner of his nomination and the duties his
official relation to his party entails are matters that are primarily determined by
the party’s governing constitution and by-laws. To be sure, political dynamics
take place within the party itself prior to or after the period of registration that
transcend the nominee’s status as a representative. These realities render
indisputable that a party has the right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee who
fails to keep his bona fide membership in the party – i.e., keeping true to the
causes of the party - even while the nominee is serving in Congress.

The preceding discussions show that the COMELEC’s action of apparently

treating the nominee and his party as one and the same is clearly and plainly
unwarranted and could only proceed from its commission of grave abuse of
discretion, correctible under Rule 65.

These distinctions do not discount at all the position or the role of the party-list
nominee; it is from the list of nominees submitted by the party that party-list
representatives are chosen should the party obtain the required number of
votes.  In fact, once the party-list group submits the list of its nominees, the law
provides specific grounds for the change of nominees or for the alteration of their
order of nomination. While the nominee may withdraw his nomination, we ruled it
invalid to allow the party to withdraw the nomination it made[43] in order “to save
the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his
name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the
capriciousness of the party-list organizations.”[44]

We also recognize the importance of informing the public who the nominees of
the party-list groups are as these nominees may eventually be in Congress.[45] 
For the nominees themselves, the law requires that:

1. he has given his written consent to be a nominee;

2. he must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
3. he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
4. he must be able to read and to write;
5. he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election; and
6. he must be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link between the party and its
nominee is only the latter’s bona fide membership in the party that wishes
to participate in the party-list system of election.  Because of this
relationship, membership is a fact that the COMELEC must be able to
confirm as it is the link between the party the electorate votes for and the
representation that the nominee subsequently undertakes in the House of
Representatives. To illustrate, if a sectoral party’s nominee, who does not
“actually share the attribute or characteristic” of the sector he seeks to represent,
fails to prove that he is a genuine advocate of this sector, then the presence of
bona fide membership cannot be maintained.

To automatically disqualify a party without affording it opportunity to meet the

challenge on the eligibility of its nominee or to undertake rectifications deprives
the party itself of the legal recognition of its own personality that registration
actually seeks.

The qualifications of a nominee at the same time that it determines whether

registration shall be granted.[46]  When under the COMELEC’s lights, the shadow
cast by the party-list nominee is not truly reflective of the group he/she is
supposed to represent, what the COMELEC must do is to give the party the
opportunity to field in the five qualified candidates.  The COMELEC acts with
grave abuse of discretion when it immediately cancels or refuses the registration
of a party without affording it the opportunity to comply.

In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral representation, the law provides
that a nominee-representative who changes his affiliation during his term forfeits
his seat. Likewise, in providing for the rule in case of vacancy for seats reserved
for party-list representatives, the reason for the vacancy is broad enough to
include not only the valid causes provided for in the party’s constitution and by-
laws (such as the non-possession of the necessary qualifications), but likewise
includes the situation where the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
finds that the nominee-representative unqualified for failure to measure up to the
necessary statutory and other legal requirements.[47]  If these can be remedied
without affecting the status of the party itself, no reason exists why the
registration of a party-list group should automatically be cancelled or refused by
reason of individual failures imputable and affecting only the nominee.

Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its
nominees cannot be wholly considered as one identifiable entity, with the fault
attributable and affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on the
otherwise qualified collective merit of the party. If their identification with one
another can be considered at all, it is in the ideal constitutional sense that one
ought to be a reflection of the other – i.e., the party-list group acts in Congress
through its nominee/s and the nominee in so acting represents the causes of the
party in whose behalf it is there for.

E. Observations on Chief Justice Sereno’s Reflections.

Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not

need to be further discussed at this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious.
One point, however, that needs to be answered squarely is the statement that
this Separate Opinion is not “appropriately sensitive to the context from which it
[the 1987 Constitution] arose.” The Reflections asserted that the heart of the
1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice,” citing, in justification, the
statements endorsing the approval of the 1987 Constitution, particularly those of
Commissioner Cecilia Munoz Palma, the President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission; President Munoz Palma described the Constitution as reaching out
to the social justice sectors.

These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a

whole and did not focus solely on the electoral reform provisions. As must be
evident in the discussions above, I have no problem in accepting the social
justice thrust of the 1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole, shows
special concern for social justice compared with the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution.  The Reflections, however, apparently misunderstood the
thrust of my Separate Opinion as already fully explained above.

This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in
the present case are the Constitution’s electoral provisions, specifically the
elections for the House of Representatives and the nation’s basic electoral
policies (expressed in the Article on the Commission on Elections) that the
constitutional framers wanted to reform.

What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral

reform, was to “open up” the electoral system by giving more participation to
those who could not otherwise participate under the then existing system – those
who were marginalized in the legislative district elections because they could not
be elected in the past for lack of the required votes and specific constituency in
the winner-take-all legislative district contest, and who, by the number of votes
they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district elections, showed that nationally,
they had the equivalent of what the winner in the legislative district would garner. 
This was the concept of “marginalized and underrepresented” and the “lack of
political constituency” that came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to
the present wordings of the Constitution.  RA No. 7941 subsequently faithfully
reflected these intents.

Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those
belonging to specifically-named sectors (i.e., the marginalized and
underrepresented in the social justice sense) should be given a head-start – a
“push” so to speak – in the first three (3) elections so that their representatives
were simply to be selected as party-list representatives in these initial elections.

Read in this manner, the party-list system as defined in the Constitution cannot
but be one that is “primarily” grounded on electoral reform and one that was
principally driven by electoral objectives.  As written, it admits of national and
regional political parties (which may be based on ideology, e.g. the Socialist
Party of the Philippines), with or without social justice orientation.  At the same
time, the system shows its open embrace of social justice through the preference
it gave to the social justice sectors (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector) in the first three elections after ratification of
the Constitution, and to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals, in the RA No. 7941 definition of sectoral party.

The objection regarding the “textualist” approach has been fully discussed in the
Summary of Positions and need not be repeated here.
F.  The Eleven-Point Parameters for the COMELEC

I close this Opinion by outlining the eleven-point parameters that should guide

the COMELEC in the exercise of its power to register parties under the party-list
system of elections.  For ease of application, these parameters refer back to
the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines, particularly on what points in these
guidelines should be discarded and what remains intact and effective.

In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on Elections (disqualifying

political parties from participating in the party-list elections), the petitioners
understandably attempted to demonstrate, in one way or another, that they
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as the term is
understood in Bagong Bayani. As discussed in this Separate Opinion, however,
the requirement of being marginalized and underrepresented should be
understood, not only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also in the broader
electoral sense.

We likewise take note of the fact that this is the first time that the Court ever
attempted to make a categorical definition and characterization of the term
“marginalized and under-represented,” a phrase that, correctly understood, must
primarily be interpreted in the electoral sense and, in case of sectoral parties and
organizations, also partly in the special interests and social justice contexts. The
COMELEC understandably has not been given parameters under the present
pronouncements either in evaluating the petitions for registration filed before it,
on one hand, or in determining whether existing party-list groups should be
allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Hence, the need for the following
parameters as we order a remand of all these consolidated petitions to the
COMELEC.

1. Purpose and Objective of Party-list System. The primary objective and

purpose of the party-list system (established under the Constitution and
RA 7941 is electoral reform by giving marginalized and under-
represented parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the legislative district
elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency
to elect themselves there, but who – nationally  – may generate the
following and votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district
election would garner), the chance to participate in the electoral exercise
and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a system
other than the legislative district elections.

At the same time, the party-list system recognizes sectoral representation

through sectoral organizations (that, as defined did not require or identify
any social justice characteristic but were still subject to the “marginalized
 and underrepresented” and the “constituency” requirements of the law),
and through sectors identified by their common “social justice”
characteristics (but which must likewise comply with the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and “constituency” requirements of the law).

2. For political parties (whether national or regional): a) to be classified as

political parties, they must advocate an ideology or platform, principles and
policies, for the general conduct of government.  The application of the
further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most immediate
means of securing the adoption of their principles of governance, they
must regularly nominate and support their leaders and members as
candidates for public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances
of the party.

b) The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e.,

in the legislative district elections) and the lack of constituency
requirements fully apply to political parties, but there is no reason not to
presume compliance with these requirements if political parties are not
participants in any legislative district elections.

c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party-list Elections. Major political

parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot
participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with
party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list elections.

A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the

party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in both electoral arenas),
the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a coalition.

No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they can

form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for the party-list
elections. The party-list component of these informal alliances is not
prohibited from running in the party-list elections.

The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of the political party

evidently render the first and second Ang Bagong Bayani guideline
invalid, and significantly affects the fourth guideline. To stress,
political parties are not only “not excluded” from the party-list system; they
are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate without being limited by
the “marginalized and underrepresented” requirement, as narrowly
understood in Ang Bagong Bayani
3. Sectoral parties, groups and organizations must belong to the sectors
enumerated in Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section
5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice characteristics; or
must have interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their sectors
although they do not require or need to identify with any social justice
characteristic.

In either case, they are subject to the “marginalized and under-

represented” and the “constituency” requirements of the law through a
showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is
actually characterized as marginal and under-represented.

Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are additionally subject to the

general overriding requirement of electoral marginalization and under-
representation and the constituency requirements of the law, but there
is no reason why compliance with these requirements cannot be presumed
if they are not participants in any legislative district elections.

4. Registration with the COMELEC.

Political parties (whether national or regional, already registered with the

COMELEC as regular political parties but not under the party-list system)
must register under the party-list system to participate in the party-list
elections.  For party-list registration purposes, they must submit to the
COMELEC their constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government,
list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information that the
COMELEC may require.[48]

Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or organizations already registered

under the general COMELEC rules for registration of political parties (but
not under the party-list system), must register under the party-list system to
be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, and must likewise submit
relevant documentation that the COMELEC shall require.

Political and sectoral parties, groups or organizations already

previously registered and/or accredited under the party-list system,
shall maintain their previous registration and/or accreditation and shall be
allowed to participate in the party-list elections unless there are grounds for
cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation under Section 6, RA
7941.

5. Submission of Relevant Documents. The statutory requirement on the

submission of relevant documentary evidence to the COMELEC is not an
 empty and formal ceremony. The eighth (8th) Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline relating to the ability of the party-list group (not just the
nominee but directly through the nominee or indirectly through the group)
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation remains wholly relevant and should be complied
with through the required submissions the COMELEC shall require.

The platform or program of government, among others, is very important

considering the significant role the party-list group itself, as a collective
body, plays in the party-list system dynamics even as its nominee or
nominees is the one who is considered “Member” of the House of
Representatives. The statutory recognition of an “appropriate legislation”
beneficial to the nation injects the meaningful democracy that the party-list
system seeks to add stimulus into.

6. Party Disqualification. Political parties and sectoral parties and

organizations alike must not possess any of the disqualifying grounds
under Section 6, RA 7941 to be able to participate in the party-list
elections.

Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani guideline merely reiterates the

first ground for cancellation or refusal of registration under Section 6, RA
7941 – that the party-list group is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for religious purpose – and the
same ground is retained under these parameters.

7. Compliance with Substantive Requirements. To justify their existence,

all party-list groups must comply with the substantive requirements of the
law specific to their own group, their own internal rules on membership,
and with the Comelec’s Rules of Procedure.

8. Prohibited Assistance from Government. The party or organization

must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by the government. It must be independent of the government.
This is the fifth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline. While this requirement
only contemplated of the marginalized and underrepresented sector in the
narrow sense in Ang Bagong Bayani, no reason exists not to extend this
requirement even to political parties participating in the party-list elections.

To emphasize, the general overriding requirement in the party-list elections

is inability to participate in the legislative district elections with a fair
chance of winning. If a political party at the very least obtains the
assistance of the government, whether financially or otherwise, then its
 participation in the party-list system defeats the broad electoral sense in
which the term “marginalized” and “underrepresented” is understood as
applied to political parties.

9. Qualification of Party-list Nominee. The sixth Ang Bagong Bayani

guideline, being a mere faithful reiteration of Section 9 of RA 7941
(qualification of a party-list nomine), should remain. In addition, the party-
list nominee must comply with the proviso in Section 15 of RA 7941.

10. Party and Nominee Membership.  For sectoral parties and

organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong Bayani guideline – i.e., that the
nominees must also represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors – refers not only to the actual possession of the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the sectoral party or organization
but also to one who genuinely advocates the interest or concern of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector represented by the sectoral
party or organization.

To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the

framers, majority of the members of the sectoral party or organization
must actually belong to the sector represented.

For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona fide member
of the group they represent.

11. Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The disqualification of a

nominee (on the ground that he is not a bona fide member of the political
party; or that he does not possess the actual status or characteristic or that
he is not a genuine advocate of the sector represented) does not
automatically result in the disqualification of the party since all the grounds
for cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the party itself.

The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the finding
of disqualification of its nominee or to fill in a qualified nominee before
cancellation or refusal of registration is ordered. Consistent with Section 6
(5) and Section 8 of RA 7941, the party-list group must submit a list
containing at least five nominees to the COMELEC. If a party-list group
endeavors to participate in the party-list elections on the theoretical
assumption that it has a national constituency (as against district
constituency), then compliance with the clear requirement of the law on the
number of nominees must all the more be strictly complied with by the
party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured
a Status Quo Ante Order (instead of mandatory injunction that would secure their
inclusion in the ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the remand of their
petitions is only for the academic purpose of determining their entitlement to
registration under the party-list system but not anymore for the purpose of
participating in the 2013 elections.

Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40

petitions[49] that obtain the number of votes required to obtain a seat in the House
of Representatives would still be subject to the determination by the COMELEC
of their qualifications based on the parameters and rationale expressed in this
Separate Opinion.

626 Phil. 346

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, PETITIONER, PRESENT: VS. THE
HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ AND AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 189506]

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO
LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA
CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES AND JOSELITO USTAREZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of

the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C.

Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case
07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being
the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost
her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An
Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had
already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list
organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly
and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although
she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with
him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It
was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and
not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as
against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.[1] The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied
the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting Abayon to file the present petition
for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of

the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members
of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito
Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee,
petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights
violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person
since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and
assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he
was just Bantay's nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as
first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought,
he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition
against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of
the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the
Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparan's qualifications.[3] Palparan moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10,
2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their
consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of

qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.)
7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list
seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and
Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective
organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women
sector. For Palparan, Bantay's personality is so inseparable and intertwined with
his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo
warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the
"members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:

"members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x
x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected"
into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected,
however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized
and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the
organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of
the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a
vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent."[7]

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of

a nominee--the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization--in the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat
Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented
interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to
determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the
fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.[8] But where
an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and
allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in
the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position,
the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner
Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve
the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution[9] provides that

the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.[10]

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions

and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated
September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178
dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona and Nachura, JJ., no part.