GO IT ALONE?

THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON ECONOMIC SANCTION REGIMES

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences at Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Policy in the Georgetown Public Policy Institute

By Jacqueline Roth Geis, M.P.P.

Washington, D.C. April 14, 2007

THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON ECONOMIC SANCTION REGIMES

By Jacqueline Roth Geis

Thesis Advisor: Robert Bednarzik ABSTRACT This study analyzes the effectiveness of international institution participation in sanction regimes. International organizations and economic sanctions have both suffered a lack of credibility, yet both are still utilized in foreign affairs policy. Currently, sanctions are threatened and implemented in three main ways: unilaterally, multilaterally with the support of international organizations, or multilaterally through ad hoc coalitions. Using new data, this paper supports previous analysis that the participation of international organizations increases the likelihood of sanction success and illustrates that regional organizations are more likely to be involved in successful sanction regimes than global organizations. Since regional organizations are more likely to be effective, states should look to these organizations to maximize the success rate of potential sanction policies.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my thanks to my advisor, Robert Bednarzik, and my GPPI colleagues who have provided me with invaluable support and guidance throughout this process.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MULTILATERAL VS. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS CHAPTER III: HYPOTHESIS, DATA SOURCE, & METHODOLOGY CHAPTER IV: LIMITATIONS CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS REGRESSION ANALYSIS CHAPTER VI: POLICY IMPLICATIONS CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION APPENDIX I REFERENCES

1 5 5 6 7 11 18 19 24 29 32 33 37

iii

INTRODUCTION The relevance and utility of international organizations is cyclically, if not continually, called into question in the United States. Recent discussions on international organizations -- including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund -- have centered on issues of reform, corruption, and effectiveness (Helms, 1996; Keohane, 1998). In these discussions on reform, particular attention has been paid to the weaknesses and defects of international organizations; little attention, however, has been paid to the added value and strengths of these organizations. The United States and other nations continue to seek the approval of international organizations despite reservations about the effectiveness and necessity of their role in the international system. As a look to the recent crises in Iran and North Korea suggests, international organizations have a prominent role in enforcing international norms and standards. One of the methods of enforcement employed by these organizations is sanctioning.1 Despite the general ambivalence surrounding the effectiveness of economic sanctions, their use and the threat of their use continue to be part of the international policy repertory. In fact, for the United Nations and other international institutions, sanctions are among the strongest possible enforcement measures. Sanctions, however, continue to be imposed not only by these institutions, but also by individual states or coalitions of states.

In this paper, the word sanction and its derivatives will mean economic sanction unless otherwise stated.

This paper will look at the use of economic sanctions in international affairs and analyze whether sanctions implemented with the strong backing and commitment of international organizations are more effective than sanctions imposed either unilaterally by a national government or multilaterally by an informal coalition of national governments. In addition, this paper will determine whether certain types of international organizations are more effective sanctioners. Both the threat and the imposition of sanctions will be included in the analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW International Organizations The struggle between state sovereignty and the developing international governance system is ongoing. It is important to note that international organizations have few, if any, independent powers. Unlike national governments, they do not have treasuries or standing militaries. International organizations are dependent on member states to provide them with financial, human, and military resources to accomplish tasks set before them. Their ability to secure these resources depends heavily on two interdependent factors: effectiveness and legitimacy. International organizations serve, among other functions, a convening function. They provide structured opportunities for their members to discuss events and goals. Given that these organizations often have charters or mandates that provide moral authority, they are more likely to be seen as working in the interest of the global order or good rather than national self-interest. States seek this moral authority when they request that international organizations take action when they have reason to believe that another member state is disrupting this order. Even when states are determined to act on their own against renegade states, they often seek approval from international organizations in order to validate their claims and their actions in other words, to supply legitimacy to their causes. Keohane (1998) argues that institutions whose members have shared values tend to be more effective. The nature of the institutional mandate is also a determining factor in its perceived effectiveness. Less controversial mandates, such as setting measurement 3

standards, tend to be more effective than mandates whose definitions are not well defined and touch at controversial or central value, such as human rights. Effective organizations with wide-reaching, controversial mandates are rare. Economic Sanctions Economic sanctions are most often defined as restrictions or limitations on intergovernmental trade intended to alter the political behavior of a given state. They are economic measures directed to political objectives and can be imposed by a single state or a group of states (Barber, 1979). The effectiveness and effects of sanctions have been the subject of extensive scholarly literature. The verdict has been almost uniformly negative. Sanctions were determined to be ineffective and, moreover, often had effects that were detrimental not to the sanction target, but to the general population of the sanctioned country. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN sanctions against Haiti from 1991 to 1994 were characterized by a large majority of countries as porous and ineffective; with respect to putting pressure on the Haitian government; however, these sanctions did have a negative economic impact on the country, particularly the rural poor (Gibbons and Garfield, 1999). The idea, and eventual use, of smart sanctions was developed in response to episodes such as the 1991-1994 Haiti sanctions. Smart sanctions seek to maximize the economic degradation of the regime being targeted by the sanctions while minimizing the amount of suffering that the sanctions impose on the countrys population (Cortright and Lopez, 2002). In essence, these sanctions try to hit the intended target through methods

such as freezing financial assets, arms embargoes, and restrictions on commercial trade. The sanctions recently implemented by the UN Security Council against North Korea and those implemented by the US against Taliban financial assets are examples of smart sanction activity. While this amended form of sanction addresses one of the concerns raised unintended suffering of the countrys population, Drezner argues that smart sanctions are not any more effective than those previously implemented (Drezner, 2003). The question remains the same. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policymakers continue to use them? Recent literature claims that the perceived ineffectiveness of sanctions that scholars have quantifiably found to be the case may be the partially caused by selection bias. That is, studies conducted prior to the late 1990s only included data from events where the sanctions had been implemented. T. Clifton Morgan (2003) has argued that these data must be augmented with data from events where sanctions were threatened, but not actually imposed. He argues that the exclusion of the data from threatened sanction events introduces bias into the results. In other words, implemented sanctions and threatened sanctions may have different impacts. Multilateral vs. Unilateral Sanctions Within the discussion about the forms that sanctions should take, there has also been debate about whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective. Unilateral action does provide the sanctioning state (or sender) with the ability to sanction a target state (or target) quickly and to deploy the type and breadth of sanctions that the state considers appropriate given the targets actions. Working unilaterally,

however, also subjects the sender to all of the costs, both economically and politically, of taking action against the target (Mansfield, 1995; Drezner, 2000). Furthermore, very few states have economies large enough to impose effective sanctions regimes against their targets (Drezner, 2000). Even for states that can impose effective sanctions regimes unilaterally, however, there are benefits of seeking multilateral action, including the sharing of both economic and political costs. The economic cost burden is spread across the governments and citizens of sender countries, which limits the impact of the sanction on the populations of the sanctioning countries. Moreover, the larger the multilateral coalition, the greater the economic cost to the target. The political cost burden is also shared, creating greater legitimacy and moral authority for the effort and thereby protecting senders from removing sanctions due to domestic political pressures (Mansfield, 1995; Drezner, 2000; Thompson 2006). There is a greater economic cost to the target the larger the multilateral coalition. While there are benefits, there are also costs to multilateral sanctions. Drezner breaks the costs down into three categories: bargaining between the sender and the target, bargaining between the initial (or primary) sender and subsequent senders, and enforcement. He argues that sender often seeks multilateral support for the most sensitive cases: when the stakes are high and there is a real possibility of long-term deadlock. In other words, multilateral action is often sought when unilateral action is not an option. Bargaining between potential senders in the international arena also tends to imply costs to the initial sender since the sender often has to compromise or offer 6

concessions in order to gain consensus. As the number of senders increases, enforcement also becomes more difficult. An increase in the number of senders leads to an increase in the number of possible defectors (Drezner, 2000; Thompson 2006). Even though policymakers continue to push for coalitions, the early quantitative evidence in the literature has shown that the benefits of multilateral action are not worth the costs. There has been substantial evidence that unilateral action is more effective than multilateral (Martin, 1993). At the beginning of the decade, however, other scholars began to look at the role of international organizations in multilateral sanctions efforts and making distinctions between ad hoc multilateral sanctions regimes and those structured under an international organization. Using this distinction, Drezner (2000) shows (1) that multilateral sanctions with an international organization as the sender are more likely to be effective than unilateral sanctions and (2) that multilateral sanctions without an international organization as the sender are less likely to be effective than unilateral sanctions. Mansfield (1995) argues that international institutions each have distinct characters and that some may implement more effective sanctions than others. There is a gap in the literature between Mansfields assertion and Drezners results that this paper seeks to address. There are various types of international organizations that implement sanctions regimes and the effectiveness of these organizations has not been studied. Furthermore, neither Drezner nor Mansfield included the effectiveness of the threat of sanctions into their analysis. This paper will seek to expand upon Drezners results of the importance of international organizations in light of

the new data and to test Mansfields assertion that distinguishing between international organizations is important.

HYPOTHESIS, DATA SOURCE, & METHODOLOGY This paper will examine whether sanctions threatened or implemented with the strong backing and commitment of international organizations are more effective than sanctions threatened or imposed either unilaterally by a national government or multilaterally by an informal coalition of national governments. It will further analyze whether certain types of international organizations are more effective in threatening or implementing sanctions. Five hypotheses will be tested: H1: Unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral sanctions. H2: Multilateral sanctions with international organization (IO) involvement are more effective than unilateral sanctions and multilateral sanctions without IO involvement. H3: Sanctions with the backing of a regional IO are more effective than those with the support of a global IO. H4: Sanctions with the support of a UN agency are more effective than sanctions with the support of another IO. H5: Economic international organizations implement more effective sanctions and sanction threats than political international organizations. The same dependent variable (FINALOUTCOME) will be used in each of the hypothesis test. It is defined as the success of the sanction case. The dependent variable 9

will be constructed by synthesizing the 10 possible final outcomes in the TIES database into four categories: (1) successful, (2) partially successful, (3) stalemate, and (4) unsuccessful. Regime success is defined by total acquiescence by the target or successful negotiations in either the threat or imposition stage. Partial success is when the target only agrees to some of the senders demands. A stalemate is when the sanction regime has not been lifted but neither side wants to back down. Failure, or an unsuccessful sanction regime, is defined as the removal of sanctions without gaining any concessions from the target. This categorization will allow for greater comparison across sanction cases. While it is usual when the dependent variable is an ordered measure of effectiveness (successful, partially successful, stalemate, and unsuccessful) to use an ordered probit regression model, in this instance running both the ordered probit model and the OLS regression model showed similar results. For ease of interpretation, the OLS results are used. The ordered probit results are appended in Appendix I. The model is based on completed studies by Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) and Whang (2006) and seeks to determine the success of sanction regimes. Data from the Threat and Implementation of Sanctions (TIES) database will be used in this study. The TIES database was released by Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat in October 2006. The database

10

EXHIBIT 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Definition The outcome of the sanction event: 1 = successful Final outcome 2 = partially successful 3 = stalemate 4= unsuccessful The anticipated costs to the target; higher costs to the target would increase the Target cost incentive to acquiesce; variable =1 when costs are moderate or high; =0 if costs are low The anticipated costs to the sender; Sender cost variable =1 when costs are moderate or high; =0 if costs are low If the issue at hand is of large consequence, political regime change for instance, then Issue this variable = 1; variable = 0 if the issue is limited in scope. If the sanction event was resolved in the Threat threat stage (no sanctions implemented) =1 Whether the USA is the sender; variable USA =1 when USA is sender VARIABLES OF INTEREST Regional IO If regional IOs are involved, variable =1 Global IO If global IOs are involved, variable =1 If multiple countries are involved, but no Multi international organizations, variable =1 If only one country and no international Unilateral organizations are involved, variable =1 Whether a UN organization was involved UN in the sanction event; constructed dummy variable; UN involvement = 1 If an IO serves a mainly political function, Political IO i.e. UN or Arab League involvement = 1 If an IO serve a mainly economic function, Economic IO i.e. WTO or OPEC involvement, =1 Variable Name Source Threat and Implementation of Sanctions (TIES) Database

TIES

TIES

TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES TIES

includes 888 sanction cases from 1971 to 2000. A sanction case is defined as a single sanction episode or a merged group of sanction episodes, regardless of whether the episode ended with a sanction threat or implementation. Sanction cases form the base unit of the data (Morgan et al, 2006).

11

Key factors in sanction regimes as determine by previous studies and theory are presented in Exhibit 1. The expected effects of each variable are summarized in Exhibit 2. The model is presented in Exhibit 3. EXHIBIT 2: HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS AND BACKGROUND OF SANCTION VARIABLES
Variable Name X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 Target cost Sender cost Issue USA Threat Regional IO Global IO Multi Unilateral UN Political IO Economic IO Description Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Prediction Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative Positive Rationale Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) Drury (1998), Drezner (2000); Whang (2006) Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995) Variable of interest, Mansfield (1995)

EXHIBIT 3: MAIN REGRESSION MODEL OUTCOME = 1Targetcost + 2Sendercost + 3Issue + 4Threat +5U SA + 6RegionalIO + 7GlobalIO +8Multi The TARGETCOST variable serves as a proxy for the strength of the proposed or implemented sanction. As the strength of the sanction increases, the costs to the target 12

are also likely to increase. Increased target costs will most likely increase the likelihood of the sanctions success. SENDERCOST is a proxy variable to determine the level of commitment of the sender. Its effect on sanctions success could be either positive or negative. Senders willing to incur high costs to sanction targets are more likely to have strong resolve to solve the conflict successfully, increasing the likelihood of sanction success. On the other hand, increased costs could raise political pressures to end the conflict sooner, potentially decreasing the likelihood of sanction success. The ISSUE variable is predicted to have a negative effect on sanction success. The larger or more complex the issue or set of issues that the senders have with the target, the more difficult it is for the target to agree to the demands or to negotiate with the senders (Whang, 2006). These larger, more complex issues, such as regime change, are often not in the best interests of the targeted states current rulers and, therefore, they have decreased incentives to back down from their current policies. As such, seminal issues, like regime change, lead to the decreased effectiveness of sanctions. The THREAT variable illustrates the effectiveness of sanction threats as opposed to sanction implementation. Threats provide warnings and that conflicts resolved in the threat stage show the initiative of both the sender and target to come to a solution prior to sanction implementation. It is predicted that threatening sanctions increases the likelihood of that sanction regimes success. The USA variable is included in the regressions where unilateral sanctions (UNI) are the reference regime category. Earlier studies separated out the effect of unilateral 13

United States sanctions to isolate the effect that being a superpower has on sanctions success. The United States, as a hegemonic power, may have sway over targets that other states and potential senders do not have. U.S. involvement is expected to increase the effectiveness and success of sanction regimes. Sanction regime variables are included to determine the effects of multilateral and international organization (IO) involvement in sanction cases. The international organization variables are broken down into various categories to determine whether certain international organizations are more successful with sanctions policies than others. There are three sets of dummy indicator variables used (1) REGIONAL IO, GLOBAL IO, MULTI, UNI; (2) POLITICAL IO, ECONOMIC IO, MULTI, UNI and (3) UN, OTHER IO, MULTI, UNI. Each of these dummy indicator variables was created from raw descriptive data on country and organization involvement found in the TIES database. To compare the likely success of sanctions with regional organization involvement, sanctions with global organization involvement, multilateral sanctions without organization involvement, and unilateral sanctions, the first set of variables (REGIONAL IO, GLOBAL IO, MULTI, UNI) is used in the regression. To identify whether international organizations with a primarily political mandate, like the UN and the Arab League, are more or less likely than economic institutions, like the WTO and OPEC, to increase the success of sanctions, a second set of variables was created (POLITICAL IO, ECONOMIC IO, MULTI, UNI). Another set of variables will be used to determine whether the UN is more effective than other international organizations 14

(UN, OTHER IO, MULTI, UNI). In each regression, one category in the set serves as a reference group to which the three remaining groups are compared. The international organizational variables are predicted to increase the likelihood of success for the sanction regime. The tests intend to show that different types of institutions increase the likelihood of success to varying degrees. Using Keohanes (1998) logic that larger, more complex institutions are less effective, global institutions should show to be less effective at sanction implementation than regional institutions. As for political and economic organizations, economic institutions have more ready tools at their disposal (trade sanctions, embargoes, etc.) than political organizations and should show to be more effective than their political counterparts. The third set takes the UN system as a separate dummy variable. Given the UNs size and complexity, it should show to be less effective than other international institutions as a sanctioner.

15

LIMITATIONS This model has limitations. Sanction events are partially formed by a set of strategic decisions. The sender and target respond to the others last move. A regression does not capture the effects of this decision-making on sanction outcomes. The regression allows a focus on the impact that international organizations may have in determining the success of a sanction case (Whang, 2006). There are many other factors that can impact a sanction case or cause a state to seek a multilateral sanctions approach. For example, the time that it takes to achieve consensus within an international organization is not measured in these data, but is included in the effects of having an international institution as a sender. Limitations also arise from the data collection. The TIES database was created from normative sources2 and asked its coders to use judgment when entering the data. There is no way to determine the personal biases of each of these coders. It is not feasible to think that each viewed every sanction case in the same light and it may very well be the case that sanction success was determined differently by coders on the margins.

The TIES Database collected material from many sources including Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File, Keesings Record of Contemporary Events, and the indices of The New York Times and London Times (Morgan et al, 2006).

16

ANALYSIS The data show that the majority of sanction cases are implemented unilaterally. In fact, in the TIES dataset, approximately 71 percent or 627 cases are unilateral sanction cases. Frequency of the use of a particular type of sanction, however, does not imply the greater effectiveness of that type. What frequency does imply, however, is that unilateral sanctions were the implementation method of choice for sanctions during the period of 1971-2000. The general question that this study hopes to answer is whether this preferred method of implementing sanctions is the one that yields the largest likelihood of success. Previous studies (Drezner, 2000) have shown that there are other types of sanctions that have a greater likelihood for success than unilateral sanctions, namely multilateral sanctions with the involvement of international organizations. As depicted in Chart 1, the data analyzed for this study has 259 non-unilateral sanction cases (approximately 29 percent of the sample). Of these 259 cases, the overwhelming majority (232) included the involvement of an international institution. As Chart 2 illustrates, without accounting for other factors, the TIES data seem to support Drezners theory that multilateral sanctions with international organization involvement have the highest success rate and call the relative effectiveness of unilateral sanctions into question. Nearly half of the successes or partial successes involved an international organization. This higher success rate for IO sanctions is particularly notable since states are more likely to seek international organizations assistance when facing tougher, more complex situations (Drezner, 2000; Thompson 2006). 17

CHART 1: THE FREQUENCY OF UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS (1971-2000)

70.6% (627)

26.1% (232)

2.0% (18)

1.2% (11)

Unilateral

Multilateral w/ IO

Other Multilateral

Missing

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=888.

States are more likely to turn to some international organizations than others. Chart 3 provides an overview of the international organizations represented in the data. A cursory look at the chart illustrates that when an international institution is involved in a sanction regime, it is more likely to be a regional (or selected membership)3 organization than a global organization. In fact, 77.6 percent of the 232 observations that cited involvement of an international organization cited the involvement of a regional organization such as the European Union or the Arab League.
3

For ease of reference, the phrase regional international organization will be used to represent all select membership organizations, even when selection is determined based on characteristics other than geography. OPEC would be an example.

18

CHART 2: OUTCOMES OF UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS, 1971-2000

37.5%

27.8%

22.2% 20.3% 20.1% 16.7% 16.7% 15.1%

10.8% 7.5% 8.5%

3.4%

Successful

Partially Successful Unilateral Multilateral w/IO

Stalemate Other Multilateral

Unsucessful

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=888

Here again, the frequency of regional organizational involvement does not provide sufficient information about the success of the sanction. In this instance, the preliminary data do not illuminate any patterns either. It does illustrate that sanctions threatened or implemented with the assistance of UN organizations can be expected to be less successful than those implemented by other international organizations. Nearly 40 percent of sanctions involving UN organizations ended in failure or a stalemate.

19

CHART 3: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SANCTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT , 1971-2000

EEC 30.2% EU 26.3%

UN Organizations 15.9%

Arab League 9.5%

Other 8.6%

WTO/GATT 4.3%

OPEC 5.2%

Organization Key: UN = Any organization in the United Nations System; WTO/GATT = World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Taxes; EEC = European Economic Community; OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; EU = European Union

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=232

This preliminary outcome poses a question regarding the tradeoffs of working with an international organization. Is there an organizational size, or character, or composition at which the benefits of working with a international organization minimized costs, fewer political and economic risks are outweighed by the political costs and time needed to reach consensus, causing international organization-endorsed sanctions to lose their effectiveness edge over unilateral sanctions? The preliminary data are inconclusive on this point.

20

CHART 4: OUTCOMES OF SANCTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT, 1971-2000

40.0% 36.1%

35.1%

29.7% 26.0%

16.0% 13.5% 11.7% 10.0% 8.1% 6.0% 2.8%

Successful

Partially Successful Global IOs Regional IOs

Stalemate UN

Unsucessful

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=232.

Regression Analysis Regression analysis provides more conclusive answers to this question. From the base regression outlined in Exhibit 3, five regressions are run to test the five hypotheses.4

The TIES data set does not include effectiveness data for 356 of its observed sanction threats and sanction events. The vast majority of these 356 observations are for unilateral sanction threats or events. The reason for this low rate of unilateral effectiveness rates could be that news services may have lost interest in long-running sanction threats or events and did not report the results. Given that the data for the 356 missing effective observations may skew the results toward underreporting the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, the results reported in this paper include only the 532 observations that have effectiveness data. Ramsey RESET test shows model misspecification when using all 888 of the TIES observations, while it showed no model misspecification when using the 532 observations that had outcome data.

21

Each of the regressions utilizes one of the three sets of sanction regime variables described in the Hypothesis, Data Source, & Methodology section. A note detailing which sanction regime set is used included with each model. The first, bolded variable marks the regime reference group for the model. In addition to the five analyses displayed in this section, regressions were run to determine whether uniqueness of the European Union as a multinational regional actor did not skew the results. To determine this, several regressions were run with the EU as a unilateral actor and as a regional actor. In all instances, the results were similar and since the EU is still a group of national governments, the entity is characterized as a regional organization for the purposes of this paper. Hypothesis 1: Unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral sanctions. Model 1 does not support the hypothesis that unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral sanctions. In fact, the model shows that multilateral sanctions that include international organization involvement are more likely to be successful than unilateral sanctions. The model does not support any findings on the likelihood for success of multilateral sanctions without organization involvement. The two international organization sanction variables were both significant and positive, providing evidence that sanction threats and sanctions backed by international organizations are more likely to be effective than those implemented unilaterally. This model leads to the conclusion that including either regional or global international organizations in sanction events increases the likelihood that the sanction events will be

22

MODEL 1: MAIN REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)

SANCTION REGIME SET: Unilateral, Global IO, Region IO, Multilateral Coefficients (Standard Error) Target Cost -.004 (.003) Sender Cost -.002 (.003) Issue .101 (.205) USA .244 (.117)*** Global IO .519 (.196)*** Region IO .780 (.140)*** Multi .118 (.290) Threat .748 (.258)*** Number of Observations 532 F (Prob >F) 5.94 (0.0000) Adjusted R2 0.07 Ramsey RESET Test F(3,520) =0.53

PROB>F = 0.66
*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

effective. This conclusion will be dissected further in other models to see if it can be determined what type of international organizations are the most effective to include in sanction situations. The other two predictors that were significant in Model 1 were U.S. involvement and whether the sanction was resolved in the threat stage. Other factors were not found to be statistically significant at any level. Both of these predictors were positively related to sanction outcomes. Given the size of its economy and its political power, this result reflects the common perception that the U.S. is more likely than other nations to be successful at implementing unilateral sanctions. The results also show that situations in which sanctions are resolved in the threat stage are more likely to be effective than those events in which sanctions need to be implemented. This bolsters two points in the previous literature: (1) sanction events than are resolved in the threat stage are more

23

likely to be satisfactorily that those that implement sanctions and (2) threatening sanctions strengthen the effectiveness of sanctions in general. Both of these points are based on the likelihood that events that are resolved in the threat stage likely include more cooperation between the target state(s) and the senders to come to a jointly agreeable conclusion during the sanction threat. Hypothesis 2: Multilateral sanctions with international organization (IO) involvement are more effective than unilateral sanctions and multilateral sanctions without IO involvement. Model 2 partially supports the hypothesis. The results do not support the literature that multilateral sanction events without international organization support are less effective than unilateral sanction events. However, they do support the hypothesis that multilateral sanctions with the involvement of international organizations are more MODEL 2: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS WITHOUT IO INVOLVEMENT (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)
SANCTION REGIME SET: Multilateral, Unilateral, Global IO, Region IO Target Cost Sender Cost Issue Unilateral Global IO Region IO Threat Number of Observations F (Prob >F) Adjusted R2 Ramsey RESET Test

Coefficients (Standard Error) -.004 (.003) -.002 (.003) .073 (.205) .308 (.216) .659 (.272)** .912 (.235)*** .734 (.324)*** 532 6.44 (0.0000) 0.07 F(3,521) =0.17 PROB>F = 0.92

`*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

24

likely to be effective than those multilateral sanctions that do not have international organization involvement. Both international organization variables are significant in this model and correspond positively with the success of sanction regimes. Here again, the inclusion of a regional or global institution increases the chances of the sanction regimes success. The results also provide further basis for the claim that sanction events ending in the threat stage are more likely to be effective than those involving the implementation of sanctions. Indeed, all of the models in this paper bolster this theory. Hypothesis 3: Sanctions with the backing of a regional IO are more effective than those with the support of a global IO. MODEL 3: REGIONAL VS. GLOBAL IOS: OLS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)
SANCTION REGIME SET: Global IO, Unilateral, Region IO, Multilateral Target Cost Sender Cost Issue Unilateral Region IO Multi Threat UN Number of Observations F (Prob >F) Adjusted R2 Ramsey RESET Test

Coefficients (Standard Error) -.004 (.003) -.002 (.003) .179 (.204) -.111 (.163) .488 (.182)*** -.142 (.316) .752 (.260)*** NA 532 5.57 (0.0000) 0.06 F(3,521) =0.44 PROB>F = 0.72

Coefficients (Standard Error) -.004 (.003) -.002 (.003) .150 (.215) -.048 (.222) .551 (236)** -.084 (.346) .757 (.260) .126 (.302) 532 4.89 0.06 F(3, 520) = 0.57 PROB>F = 0.63

*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

25

The results for Model 3 depict that hypothesis 3 was supported. That is, it is more likely for a sanction episode involving a regional international organization to be effective that one involving a global international organization. This relationship remains the same even when the UN is pulled out from the general global IO grouping. The results appear to be marking a line, albeit not a very clear one, where the chaos of multiple players begins to outweigh the economic and political benefits of multiple senders. Regional organizations tend to form around a similar ideal or a joint concern, meaning there is greater consensus from the beginning an easier environment in which to deliberate and determine a course of action in a sanction event. Global organizations are formed to instill a sense of order, which makes for a more difficult starting ground upon which to build consensus. Hypothesis 4: Sanctions with the support of a UN agency are more effective than sanctions with the support of another IO. MODEL 4: UN EFFECTIVENESS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)
SANCTION REGIME SET: Other IO, UN, Unilateral, Multilateral Target Cost Sender Cost Issue UN Unilateral Multilateral Threat Number of Observations F (Prob >F) Adjusted R2 Ramsey RESET Test

Coefficients (Standard Error) -.003 (.003) -.002 (.003) .161 (.216) -.324 (.164) -.497 (.112)*** -.495 (.299)* .738 (.261)*** 532 4.77 (0.0000) 0.04 F(3,521) =0.77 PROB>F = 0.51 26

`*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

Model 4 does not show support for the hypothesis that UN agencies are more effective than other agencies at sanctions. The results show that UN involvement does not necessarily lead to a sanctions episode success. The results show a negative correlation between unilateral and multilateral involvement and successful sanctions outcomes. This implies that IO support boosts effectiveness, further supporting the findings of Model 1. The results also provide further evidence for the effectiveness of threats. Hypothesis 5: Economic international organizations implement more effective sanctions and sanction threats than political international organizations Model 5 provides the test results for whether the involvement of economic IOs increases the likelihood of effectiveness of sanction regimes as compared to political IOs. MODEL 5: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OLS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)
SANCTION REGIME SET: Political IO, Unilateral, Economic IO, Multilateral Target Cost Sender Cost Issue Unilateral Economic Organizations Multilateral Threat Number of Observations F (Prob >F) Adjusted R2 Ramsey RESET Test

Coefficients (Standard Error) -.003 (.003) -.003 (.003) .055 (.198) -.380 (.120)*** .223 (.191) -.372 (.303) .764 (.261)*** 532 4.68 (0.0000) 0.05 F(3,521) =1.17 PROB>F = 0.32

`*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

27

This hypothesis is not supported. However, the results continue to illustrate the likely ineffectiveness of unilateral sanction regimes as compared to regimes with the involvement of a political international institution and the effectiveness of threats.

28

POLICY IMPLICATIONS State governments have options when it comes to threatening or imposing sanctions. It is in the interest of each sender to maximize the sanctions likelihood of success while minimizing its economic and political risk. Like many things in politics, sanction regimes are about striking the right balance. Given that there is risk associated with threatening or implementing a sanction regime, potential senders should use caution when deciding their course of action. Preliminary evidence from cross-tabs reveals that states should collaborate and involve international organizations in their proposed sanction regimes. In particular, cross-tabs indicate that regional IO involvement in sanction regimes decreases the likelihood of failure most significantly, while maintaining a high success rate. The regression results support these findings, inclusion of an international organization in a sanction regime increases that regimes likelihood for effectiveness. These results provide a strong case that it is in the self-interest of the potential sender state to seek the consensus of a regional body and seek to jointly threaten or impose sanctions. The governments of potential senders would then be able to not only lessen their political and economic risk, but limit the amount of sanction management that would need to be done by the states bureaucrats. This could lead in a shift in the prevailing policies in sanctions. There are mitigating factors to this shift. The time that it takes to build consensus varies by international organization and, in some instances, this time lag may prevent the potential sender state from seeking consensus. By attempting to quantify which types of 29

international organizations are most effective at threatening and imposing sanctions, potential senders can better determine which organizations to engage in various circumstances. The results form Model 3 may illustrate the trade off between effectiveness and timeliness. These results show that regional organizations are more likely to be effective sanctioners than global organizations. Members of regional organizations as organizations formed around a specific collective interest tend to have more common interests than members of global organizations, making their decisions more prompt and, as the data show, effective. However, the results for the hypotheses about the effectiveness of political and economic organizations and the UN did not provide additional support for determining certain types of international organization sanctioners. The RAND Cooperation recently published a report on the success of UN and U.S. peacekeeping missions since World War II showing that the UN had a comparative advantage over the U.S. in peacekeeping (Dobbins et al, 2005 and 2003). The comparison is particularly relevant since international peacekeeping missions face similar time lag problems in consensus-building as sanctions do. In the past decade, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of UN peacekeeping missions deployed (Dobbins et al, 2005). A similar shift should happen in the realm of sanctions, since international organizations are shown to have a comparative advantage in threatening and imposing sanctions. Determining that international organizations, particularly regional organizations, have a comparative advantage over unilateral or ad hoc multilateral efforts provides new 30

relevance to the international governance regime. Qualitative and quantitative assessments illustrating the successes of international organizations should give opponents of international organizations pause and cause them to rethink the overarching negativity they associate with these institutions. Continuing to decipher where international organizations work better than individual states will begin to mitigate the tension between the international governance regime and states about sovereignty. Once international organizations are seen as partners and not as rivals to states, consensus may be easier to achieve. Moreover, the comparative advantages of using international organizations as part of a states foreign policy toolkit may also increase. Most importantly, however, determining where international organizations are most useful to states will only help in securing their future and preventing their demise.

31

CONCLUSION The presented analysis is not intended to answer the question whether sanctions are a good policy decision. The analysis starts from the point that sanctions continue to be a primary element of foreign policy and, as such, the most effective way to implement sanctions should be determined. The data provide strong support for seeking international institution support for sanction regimes as opposed to pushing sanctions unilaterally or with an ad hoc group. There is also support for using regional institutions instead of global institutions to strengthen sanction effectiveness, when such a policy is politically feasible. The strong coalitions that make up international organizations provide steady administrative and political support for sanctions. Sanctions remain an imperfect foreign policy instrument. However, by seeking the participation of international organizations, and especially regional organizations, these imperfections can be softened and the likelihood for success increased.

32

APPENDIX I

ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)

Unsuccessful Targetcost Sendercost Issue USA UN GlobalIO RegionIO Multi Threat SenderComm -.185 (.034) .168 (.053) -.033 (.076) -.080 (.043) .296 (.152) -.246 (.061) -.210 (.393) .014 (.106) .042 (.038) -.0003 (.0004) Stalemate -.023 (.006) .021 (.008) -.005 (.012) -.010 (.006) -.001 (.018) -.065 (.028) -.041 (.012) .001 (.011) .005 (.005) -.00004 (.00006) Partially Successful .091 (.020) -.082 (.028) .015 (.033) .038 (.021) -.180 (.101) .028 (.043) .068 (.014) -.007 (.054) -.020 (.019) .0001 (.0002) Successful .117 (.022) -.106 (.034) .022 (.055) .052 (.029) -.115 (.036) .283 (.125) .184 (.047) -.008 (.063) -.026 (.024) .0003 (.0003) Sign of Probit Coefficient + + +** +** + -** +

Reported values are the dy/dx values provided by the ordered probit regression * = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at 1% level LINKTEST RESULTS COEFFICIENT _hat 1.10 _hatsq -.142

SE .313 .374

P >|Z|

3.53 -0.38

0.000 0.704

The link test shows that the ordered probit model is correctly specified.

33

OLS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME) Coefficients (SE) Targetcost -.004 (.003) Sendercost -.003 (.003) Issue .197 (.214) USA .237 (.117)** UN -.553 (.375) GlobalIO .858 (.324)*** RegionIO .750 (.142)*** Multi -.001 (.290) Threat -.917 (.306)*** SenderComm .001 (.001) Number of Observations 532 F (Prob >F) 5.11 (0.0000) Adjusted R2 0.07
` *** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level

The OLS results are comparable to the ordered probit results, which led to the use of the OLS results in analyzing the hypotheses in the paper.

34

CHART 8: SCATTER PLOT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (OUTCOME) RESIDUALS

2 -2 2 -1 Residuals 0 1

2.5

Fitted values

3.5

The scatter plot shows that within the four outcome possibilities (see page 11), the results within each category are distributed randomly.

35

SIMPLE CORRELATIONS outcome 1.00000 0.04023 0.2311 1.00000 -0.03513 0.2956 1.00000 -0.12316 0.0002 1.00000 -0.10514 0.0017 1.00000 -0.17097 <.0001 0.42928 <.0001 0.01844 0.5833 38 36 0.04641 0.1670 -0.41343 <.0001 0.00411 0.9025 0.85364 <.0001 -0.20029 <.0001 0.35870 <.0001 0.04764 0.1560 -0.10514 0.0017 -0.41343 <.0001 -0.17097 <.0001 1.00000 -0.12797 0.0001 0.12483 0.0002 -0.05265 0.1169 -0.02999 0.3720 -0.11794 0.0004 -0.03041 0.3653 -0.06964 0.0380 -0.12316 0.0002 0.85364 <.0001 -0.20029 <.0001 0.35870 <.0001 0.00411 0.9025 0.42928 <.0001 -0.12797 0.0001 1.00000 -0.06080 0.0701 0.15055 <.0001 0.10420 0.0019 0.10575 0.0016 0.05216 0.1204 0.13740 <.0001 0.17140 <.0001 -0.03513 0.2956 -0.05265 0.1169 -0.02999 0.3720 -0.11794 0.0004 -0.03041 0.3653 0.04023 0.2311 0.15055 <.0001 0.10420 0.0019 0.10575 0.0016 0.05216 0.1204 0.13740 <.0001 0.17140 <.0001 -0.06964 0.0380 0.04764 0.1560 0.01844 0.5833 0.04641 0.1670 0.12483 0.0002 -0.06080 0.0701 1.00000 multi globalIO regionIO UN USA issue threat

outcome

multi

globalIO

regionIO

36

UN

USA

issue

threat

REFERENCES Barber, James (1979). Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. International Affairs, 55(3), 367-384. The Carter Center. (1996) Notes from the Meeting on the Viability of International Economic Sanctions. Retrieved on November 29, 2006, from http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1218.pdf. Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Davis, Patricia, & Radcliff, Benjamin. (1997). On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 608-618. Dobbins, James et al. (2003). Americas Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. RAND Corporation. Dobbins, James et al. (2005). The UNs Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq. RAND Corporation. Drezner, Daniel W. (2000). Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive? International Organization, 54(1), 73-102. Drury, A. Cooper. (1998). Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research, 35(4), 497-509. Eaton, Jonathan & Engers, Maxim. (1999). Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics. The American Economic Review, 89(2), 409-414. Fearon, James D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization, 52(2), 269-305. Helms, Jesse. (1996). Saving the U.N.: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General. Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996, 2-6. Keohane, Robert. (1998). International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? Foreign Policy, 110, 82-97. Mansfield, Edward D. (1995). International Institutions and Economic Sanctions. World Politics, 47(4), 575-605.

37

Martin, Lisa L. (1993). Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics, 45(3), 406-432. McLean, Elena V. & Whang, Taehee. (2006). International Cooperation and the Success of Economic Sanctions. Retrieved on November 27, 2006 from http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~twng/TaeheeWhang-Writing3.pdf. Morgan, T. Clifton & Bapat, Navin. (2003). Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion. International Studies Review, 5(4), 65-79. Morgan, T. Clifton, Bapat, Navin, Krustev, Valentin, & Vonnahme, Greg (2004). When Enough Is Enough: Ending Economic Sanctions. Retrieved on October 10, 2006, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74274_index.html. Morgan, T. Clifton, Krustev, Valentin, Bapat, Navin (2006). Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data Users Manual Case Level Data. Retrieved on October 10, 2006, from http://www.personal.psu.edu/nab12/TIESUSERSMANUAL.pdf. Rowat, Colin. (2006). Written Evidence: the Impact of Economic Sanctions. Submission to the UK Parliament. Retrieved on December 1, 2006 from www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/EA296%20CRowat.pdf. Thompson, Alexander. (2006). Coercion Through IOs: THe Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. International Organization, 60, 1-34. Whang, Taehee. (2006). Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic Sanctions Outcomes. Retrieved on December 1, 2006 from troi.cc.rochester.edu/~twng/TaeheeWhangWriting2.pdf.

3838 38