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Vision and Virtue in

Psychoanalysis and Buddhism:
Anatta and Its Implications for
Social Responsibility
a
Jennifer Cantor Ph.D.
a
NYU Postdoctoral Program, Psychotherapy and
Psychoanalysis
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 Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 28:532–540, 2008
Copyright © Melvin Bornstein, Joseph Lichtenberg, Donald Silver
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DOI: 10.1080/07351690802228831

Vision and Virtue in Psychoanalysis

and Buddhism: Anatta and Its
Implications for Social Responsibility
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Jennifer Cantor, Ph.D.

Buddhism and psychoanalysis have long been accused of privileging internal trans-
formation over active social and political engagement. Yet, as representatives of
non-theistic and secular paths toward the realization of human potential, both tradi-
tions embody an important aspect of the Romantic quest for progress, that is, the
transcendence of internal and external division. Insight into the Buddhist notion of
self as ontologically interdependent and non-dualistic optimally yields not only per-
sonal transformation but also an expanded circle of identification, with important im-
plications for social responsibility. Erich Fromm, in interpreting the influential work
of D. T. Suzuki, represents a historical and philosophical link between the psychoan-
alytic legacy of social responsibility and the Buddhist concept of Enlightenment.

With dewdrops dripping,

I wish somehow I could wash
this perishing world.
—Basho (1643–1694)

The celebrated founder of the modern school of haiku, Basho is renowned for
evoking in his readers an experience of non-duality with the natural world. In the
poem above, “I” am poised to stand apart from the world, its inhabitants, and the
natural laws of which “I” am inextricably a part, calling into question, through
paradox, the nature of self. Am “I” not also perishing? Am “I” not a part of nature
and subject to its laws? Is the “I” of the poem Basho, alone? When you read the
poem to yourself, silently or aloud, do you not step into the identity of “I,” if only
for a moment, as if into someone else’s shadow? If any or all of us can be “I,” and
all of us (as constituents of a transient world) are perishing, am “I” self or other?

Jennifer Cantor, Ph.D., is a candidate in the NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psy-
choanalysis, and is in independent practice in New York City.
 VISION AND VIRTUE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BUDDHISM 533

Basho elegantly expands our identification process beyond the “boundaries of the
egoistic self” (Brassard, 2002, p. 71) to include an other that is at once separate
from and not separate from self, an idea that reverberates in psychoanalysis in con-
ceptions of the self as co-constructed and intersubjective, and in Buddhism in the
notions of emptiness and no-self (anatta). It is also a principle with important im-
plications for the health and stability of individuals and society (Sivaraksa, 2005).
In conjuring a world that is not only vanishing moment by moment but is also
damaged or distressed, Basho is expressing both the inexorability of the passage of
time as well as the unavoidability of suffering. Yet his tragic worldview is tem-
pered by a wish to take action to repair the world, a “healing and emancipating” vi-
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sion (Schafer, 1970, p. 294) common to many spiritual traditions, progressive poli-
tics, and the helping professions, including psychoanalysis. In this article, I briefly
compare the contemporary “engaged Buddhist”1 movement to recent psychoana-
lytic concerns with social justice before turning to the writings of D. T. Suzuki on
Zen Buddhism and their interpretation by his acquaintance and admirer, Erich
Fromm. Actively involved in the operation of the free clinics of early 20th century
Vienna (Danto, 2005), Fromm represents a historical and philosophical link be-
tween the psychoanalytic legacy of social responsibility and the Buddhist concept
of enlightenment.

BEYOND QUIETISM

Historically, Buddhists have been accused of pursuing their own spiritual advance-
ment at the expense of active engagement in the world. Based on an assumption of
the inevitability of suffering, many of the tradition’s fundamental tenets (such as
the concept of karma, or cause and effect) emerged out of the gross and seemingly
irreversible political, social, and economic inequities of India’s caste system, and
have implicitly promoted a Stoical acceptance of the status quo, or worse, complic-
ity with malignant government policies (see Hubbard and Swanson, 1997; Victo-
ria, 1997; and James, 2004, for critiques of institutional Buddhism).
Of course, Buddhists also have a long history of compassion for the poor and in-
firm and of supporting nonviolence. The heroic ideal in Mahayana Buddhism (the
dominant branch of Buddhism in North and East Asia) is the Boddhisattva, one
who, embodying wisdom and compassion, altruistically strives to achieve enlight-
enment for the sake of all sentient beings. Only in the past 10–15 years, however,

1The term “engaged Buddhism” was originally coined by the Vietnamese Buddhist teacher Thich

Nhat Hanh during the Vietnam War to refer to an application of the inner work of meditation to the ex-
ternal conditions giving rise to suffering. The engaged Buddhist movement now comprises several in-
ternational organizations devoted to social and political change, including the Buddhist Peace Fellow-
ship and the International Network of Engaged Buddhists.
 534 JENNIFER CANTOR

has the international movement of engaged Buddhism widely mobilized partici-

pants to apply the ideals of wisdom and compassion beyond the internal transfor-
mation of self and others, toward the amelioration of social, political, and environ-
mental conditions (Kraft, 1999). One prominent spiritual characteristic of the
engaged Buddhist movement is the cultivation of an identification with the outer
world, a sense of non-dualism and interdependence with all beings, “developed
and embodied through disciplines that facilitate the letting-go of ego-centered hab-
its and enable compassion to become spontaneous and self-sustaining” (Varela,
1999, p. 73, italics in original). Engaged Buddhists share a common conviction
that inner and outer transformation are reciprocally related.
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BEYOND THE CONSULTING ROOM

Like Buddhists, psychoanalysts have long been accused of privileging intra-psy-

chic processes above social and political realities, either disregarding the social
milieu entirely or analyzing away its impact on patients. At the same time, psycho-
analytic theory and praxis are perpetually engaged in a dynamic process of reflect-
ing, interpreting, and transforming the socio-political and cultural climates in
which they are embedded. Infused with the progressive ideals of early 20th century
Vienna, the first and second generations of analysts devoted at least a fifth of their
work to indigent patients (Danto, 2005), bequeathing a legacy of social responsi-
bility that subsequent generations of analysts have not always been personally or
historically situated to pursue or perpetuate.
A surge of psychoanalytic writing in recent years on society, politics, and cul-
ture reflects a strong sense of social responsibility among contemporary American
analysts as well as deepening helplessness and frustration with the current political
dis-order. Distressed by many of our government’s policies, and exquisitely at-
tuned to the insidiousness of our culture’s sexism, racism, exploitation, and com-
modification of self and other, many analysts are engaged politically and socially
outside of the consulting room, and struggle with how to bring their political and
social selves to bear in their clinical work without imposing their values on their
patients. At the same time, the prevalence of less arduous treatment modalities, the
dominance of the managed care industry, and fees that can’t keep apace with the
cost of living prevent many of us from doing the work we love with the frequency,
intensity, and duration that we believe to be optimal. Our eroding faith in the feasi-
bility and viability of psychoanalysis in the current social and economic climate
may very well feed the guilt or powerlessness that so many of us experience.
In his paper on the “Manic Society,” Altman (2005) wonders whether there’s a
place in psychoanalysis for understanding how people can come to care about the
welfare of others as much as their own. In response, Goldman (2005) proposes that
the “idea of the common good would have to include both how, through identifica-
 VISION AND VIRTUE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BUDDHISM 535

tion, every stranger is ultimately recognizable as just like me and also how the pos-
sibility of ‘we,’ of communality, is grounded in the fact that even the familiar is ul-
timately strange” (p. 393, italics mine). Note the parallel with the Buddhist aim of
an ever-expanding circle of identifications implied in Basho’s haiku. The alterna-
tive is the sense of alienation from others that fosters self-centeredness and social
apathy.

A COMMON VISION
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The transcendence of duality and the emergence of a deeper sense of identification

with others originate not only in Buddhism but also within Judeo-Christian
thought. The Jewish concept of tikkun (repair) largely entails the cultivation of rec-
ognition of the divine in both self and other, bridging inner and outer division. Sim-
ilarly, the Christian mystical tradition “is based on the desire to have a closer rela-
tionship and contact with the Divine, and it explains all the malaises of mankind—
evil, immorality, suffering—in terms of estrangement, separation, and division”
(Kirschner, 1996, p. 159).
Buddhism and psychoanalysis represent, respectively, non-theistic and secular
paths toward the realization of human potential, in this way epitomizing an impor-
tant aspect of the Romantic vision. For Romantics, according to Kirschner (1996),
“The ultimate problems of existence no longer were conceived in terms of the
soul’s estrangement from God, but rather in terms of man’s estrangement from na-
ture. Man is estranged, so the narrative goes, both from those ‘natural’ (uncivi-
lized, instinctual) aspects of himself and perhaps even more crucially and funda-
mentally, from ‘nature’ as the entire world external to himself—the ‘object[s]’
from which he, the subject, has been severed” (p. 195; compare to Schafer, 1970,
and Strenger, 1989; see also Berlin, 1965).
Intended as a corrective to what was perceived as the spiritual impoverishment
of the Enlightenment era, Romanticism emerged out of an increasingly secular and
scientifically advanced society. And yet, according to Hulme (1924), Romantics
are nonetheless guilty of blurring the distinction between the human and the di-
vine, perceiving in humanity “an infinite reservoir of possibilities, and [believing
that] if you so rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order then the
possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress” (p. 116). The Romantic
quest for progress, defined here by the disciplined pursuit of transcendence of in-
ternal and external division, is passionately captured in Fromm’s writings on Zen.

EXPANDING CONSCIOUSNESS

As a response to the alienation from self, other, and nature induced by much of
contemporary culure, Fromm (1960) was drawn to Zen, as opposed to other spiri-
 536 JENNIFER CANTOR

tual traditions, in part because of its non-theism. Like Freud, he construed theistic
religions as promoting regressive subservience to authority and therefore as obsta-
cles to the maturity and freedom that are, for him, the ultimate goals of both psy-
choanalysis and spirituality. This is a prototypically Classic position, and yet in
some ways his work betrays his inheritance of a Romantic vision of reality, a secu-
larized and interiorized rendition of the age-old quest for reunion with the divine.
Fromm’s ideas about Zen were primarily influenced by the writings of D. T.
Suzuki (see Barrett, 1956; Suzuki, 1964, 1969, 2000), the prolific Japanese Bud-
dhist practitioner, writer, and scholar most responsible for importing Zen to the
West in the 1950s and ’60s. A member of the Rinzai branch of Zen, Suzuki
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downplayed the value of meditation and intellectual understanding for achieving

enlightenment (satori), instead extolling the sudden awakening made possible by
sufficiently deep insight into the essential nature of being.
Awakening requires constant effort and discipline, but unlike the common de-
piction of Zen as austere, for Suzuki Zen is the “art of living.” To live Zen is to
actualize the full capacity for freedom, creativity, joy, and benevolence lying
dormant within us, to which we are generally blind. Defying logic and reason,
the process of seeing into the nature of the mind is impossible to explain. For
this reason Suzuki claims to be decidedly anti-intellectual. His writings are filled
with mysterious anecdotes about Zen masters suddenly and inexplicably attain-
ing enlightenment, emphasizing repeatedly that logic and intellect are impedi-
ments to insight.
As analysts we know that intellectualization can constrict experience, and that
insight divorced from experiential knowing is insufficient for transformation.
From Suzuki’s (pre-globalization, modern) perspective, Westerners are tyrannized
by logic, so much so that they cannot conceive of the possibility or value of experi-
ence arrived at a-logically. We ceaselessly crave rational understanding, even of
art, beauty, and nature. Suzuki’s preferred vehicle for insight into life’s deepest
truths is the koan, a seemingly senseless and bewildering statement, sound, or ges-
ture that is presented by a master to a disciple as a problem to solve. Commonly,
disciples spend months or years contemplating a koan intellectually before achiev-
ing insight, if at all. Suzuki explains that intellectual understanding is superficial,
whereas the “answer lies deeply under the bedrock of our being. To split it open re-
quires the most basic tremor of the will. When this is felt the doors of perception
open and a new vista hitherto undreamed of is presented” (Fromm et al., 1960,
pp. 48–50).
Fromm’s (1960) distinction between Aristotelian and paradoxical logic sheds
some light on Suzuki’s dismissal of rational understanding. Aristotle announced
with utter certainty that it was “impossible for the same thing at the same time to
belong and not belong to the same thing and in the same respect” (p. 101). Contrast
this statement with one pronounced by Chuang-tze: “That which is one is one.
That which is not-one, is also one” (p. 102). Fromm explains that, as products of a
 VISION AND VIRTUE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BUDDHISM 537

particular culture, we take for granted that the rules governing our thought pro-
cesses are natural and universal. It is then extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
open ourselves to experiences that contradict the logic to which we are accus-
tomed. Fromm lauds Freud’s transcendence of the “conventional rationalistic
mode of thinking of the Western world” (p. 83) in his emphasis on free association,
and also provides Freud’s concept of ambivalence as an example of paradoxical
logic.
Why does Suzuki focus so much on logic? Because an ability to suspend our
typical logical processes and to experience non-dualism leads, in increments, to in-
sight into the essential nature of the self, that is emptiness. The concept of empti-
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ness, according to Engler (2002), refers to the lack of “inherent or substantial exis-
tence” of all things (pp. 76–77). Everything that we perceive as existing does
indeed exist, but only in relation to a set of causes and conditions that arise and in-
variably pass away. Our experience of self is composed of an aggregate of pro-
cesses, including physical form, bodily feelings, emotions, perceptions, memories,
and thoughts, all of which are in flux at every moment and depend entirely on the
experiences, however gross or subtle, that immediately precede them. When we try
to identify a core, discrete entity comprising the self, we are unable to find one, al-
though we recognize a continuous stream of narrative or consciousness that we
mistake for a solid self. Varela (1999) compares the functioning of the self to an in-
sect colony, “a coherent global pattern that emerges from the activity of simple, lo-
cal components, which seems to be centrally located, but is nowhere to be found,
and yet is essential as a level of interaction for the behavior of the whole” (p. 61).
That the psychological self is not a discrete center of activity but is engaged
with the environment from birth (or prior) in an ongoing process of mutual regula-
tion is a concept that is becoming increasingly understood and supported in psy-
choanalysis. Similarly, the concepts of mutuality and intersubjectivity are perme-
ating the theoretical literature and transforming our understanding of the analytic
encounter. Still, these concepts refer to the psychological, rather than ontological,
self. Even with psychological maturity there is inevitable clinging to the notion of
a separate self, and it is this clinging that forms the basis of suffering because it is
based on the delusion of duality. With satori comes an experience-based, intuitive
understanding of the empty nature of self, that is, non-duality and interdepen-
dence, a self that “both is and is not” (Engler, 2002, p. 78, italics in original), and
with this realization, according to Suzuki, one achieves complete freedom from the
tyranny of circumstance, joy and peace.
Suzuki focuses relatively scant attention on the ethics or social responsibility
resulting from satori. Indeed, he has been criticized for promoting “a strongly na-
tionalistic conception of Zen in tune with the nationalistic sentiments of the time in
his home country” (James, 2004, p. 26), and for seeming to relish the relationship
between Zen and the sword (Victoria, 1997). The limits of Suzuki’s personal expe-
rience of satori raise questions about his stage of enlightenment as well as the pos-
 538 JENNIFER CANTOR

sibility of ever achieving a state of mind that is irreversibly and absolutely free of
conflict or self-interest (Rubin, 1998). Still, Suzuki is not without social con-
sciousness, and believes greed to be the root of all social ills. He emphasizes the
importance of humility as insight is achieved, and criticizes the falseness and ego-
ism of those who perform ethical deeds with the expectation of reward.
It is Fromm who makes a more explicit connection between awakening and so-
cial responsibility.2 Like Freud, he believes that knowledge and insight lead to
transformation. For him, satori represents the ultimate capacity to tolerate reality,
the final aim of making the unconscious conscious. Satori transcends ethical trans-
formation, but is not attainable without an inner revolution in which the illusion of
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a separate ego is renounced and responsiveness to the world is deepened and ex-
panded. Fromm explains that “to live in Zen ‘means to treat yourself and the world
in the most appreciative and reverential frame of mind,’ an attitude which is the ba-
sis of ‘secret virtue,’ a very characteristic feature of Zen discipline. It means not to
waste natural resources; it means to make full use, economic and moral, of every-
thing that comes your way” (p. 121).
For Fromm, well-being means overcoming alienation and duality in perceiving
the world and always includes an ethical aim. The path is long and arduous, and
Fromm recognizes that the effort required exceeds that which can be realistically
expected from most people. Still, he is buoyed by the knowledge that there are
many stages of enlightenment preceding satori, all of which yield important bene-
fits. In our effort to help our patients lead more open, productive, socially respon-
sive lives, “Zen thought will deepen and widen the horizon of the psychoanalyst
and help him to arrive at a more radical concept of the grasp of reality as the ulti-
mate aim of full, conscious awareness” (p. 140).

CONCLUSION

The world is weary of the past,

Oh, might it die or rest at last!
(Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1792–1822)

Psychoanalysis teaches us, of course, that the past permeates the very fiber of our
beings, dwelling not only in our physicality, innate predispositions, unconscious
conflicts, internalized self and object representations, and adaptation to the exter-
nal environment, but also in our memories, dreams, fantasies, creative impulses,
capacity for joy, and vision of reality. An arduous and costly process, psychoana-

2Fromm’s emphasis on social responsibility emerged out of his long-standing immersion in Juda-
ism, not Buddhism, a point expressed most persuasively by Lewis Aron (personal communication,
March 14, 2006).
 VISION AND VIRTUE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BUDDHISM 539

lytic scrutiny within the context of a caring professional relationship offers the
possibility of (though cannot guarantee) enhanced maturity, objectivity, and integ-
rity; an increased sense of freedom, autonomy, and responsibility; and a deepened
capacity for relatedness and concern for others. We may come to terms with our
pasts, but only, according to Schafer (1970), by seeing “that which we are most
powerfully disinclined to see” (p. 291).
As analysts we are in a unique position to appreciate the tragic in a past that in-
sistently creeps up from behind as the future, moment by moment, shrinks before
us. For Buddhists, the reality of anatta is equally self-evident and at least as dis-
comfiting. Although sharing with psychoanalysis an element of the tragic, experi-
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ence-based insight into the paradoxical nature of the self as simultaneously exist-
ing and lacking inherent, substantial existence radically alters the personal and
interpersonal landscape, allowing for unparalleled equanimity, freedom, joy, and
compassion. For engaged Buddhists, insight into anatta also contains within it the
rare seed of social change.
In our culturally fueled fixation on material acquisition and security, our national
tension over extreme, competitive individualism and anxious conformity (Fromm,
1955), we flee from the hunger, sickness, aging, and death that define the lives of bil-
lions of our contemporaries, and propelled the historical Buddha’s quest for a perma-
nent end to suffering. The long, disciplined path toward enlightenment offers a sub-
stantive, more mature and courageous alternative to the cloistered belle indifférence
of our contemporary age. Like the disenchanted young idealists of post-revolution-
ary Romanticism, we may yearn to temper our sense of the tragic with hope of re-
demption in the form of social progress and a conviction that internal transformation
is desirable not only as an end unto itself but insofar as it “effect[s] larger, ‘external’
civilizational changes” (Kirschner, 1996, p. 163). I close with a rhetorical question
posed matter-of-factly, without a trace of self-deprecation or conceit, by Shantideva,
the 8th century Buddhist sage: “When both they and I are the same in wanting joy and
not desiring pain, what is so special about me?” (Batchelor, 2000, p. 34).

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