ED.

Chapter Six

CHAPTER SIX

MODELING CONDITIONS AND SEQUENCES OVER TIME

Paraphrasing Karl Marx (for the Nth time), the consolidators of democracy
may be making their own history, but not under conditions of their own choosing
or, we would add, at moments they would prefer. The list of factors that could

possibly influence -- even determine, some would say -- the choices they make is
virtually endless. We find it useful to distinguish between the relatively fixed

parameters that precede the change in regime and the more variable
opportunities and constraints that emerge with and during the transition. The

former could be thought of as establishing the context for these choices; the
latter of recognizing their contingency.1 Both combine in different ways –

spatially, functionally and temporally – to influence the institutional matrix that

may or may not lead to successful CoD in any particular polity.2 In this essay, we

will focus first (and briefly) on pre-existent “confining conditions” and then turn to

the more neglected topic of emerging co-incidents, sequences, timings and

tempos.

As we have seen, the literature on existing REDs tends to stress

"structural or cultural prerequisites" or, more recently, “facilitating conditions,”

such as the level of development, the rate of economic growth, the distribution of

wealth, the size of the middle class, the dynamism of the bourgeoisie, the

existence of private property rights, the level of literacy and mass education, the
presence of stable borders and national identities, the supportiveness of the
international system, the extent of linguistic or ethnic homogeneity, the

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predominance of proper civic attitudes, a "Western" culture and a Christian

(hopefully, Protestant) religion. Even such relatively idiosyncratic features as the

virtue of having been colonized by the British or been defeated and occupied by

the armed forces of a foreign democracy have been probabilistically associated

with successful democratization.
No one is likely to contest that having the above conditions have

contributed to CoD in the past and probably can facilitate it in the present.3 What
is less clear is whether those countries that do not score so well on them are

irrevocably condemned to failure. Nothing prevents them from trying to

democratize, but can they be successful at it? This is a very relevant question

since all the regime changes since 1974 have occurred in socio-economic-
cultural settings that lack several of these properties; some have virtually none of

them at the moment of transition. Probabilistically speaking, if past correlations

remain valid indicators of causality, successful CoD in these settings should be

unlikely. Possibilistically speaking, past correlations may no longer be valid and

actors may be capable of coming up with novel contingent solutions that alter
future outcomes. Following the latter line of reasoning, we begin with the

(optimistic and unproven) proposition that democracy is possible in any

structural, cultural or political context – if only the confining conditions can be

overcome or outflanked.4
The prerequisites approach also tells us nothing about what actors

actually had to do in order to match more benevolent conditions with appropriate

institutions. We do know that this usually took time and often failed on the first
try -- hence, the erratic course of democratization in even the most favorably
endowed settings. But we also have reason to suspect that today's NEDs may

not have to repeat all the trials and errors of their forerunners. There is the
(admittedly remote) possibility that late-comers might even have an advantage

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since they could presumably learn from the experience of their early or more

immediate predecessors. More significant is the likelihood that, instead of

following the gradualist and reformist trajectories set by previous waves of

democratization, they will attempt to acquire tout de suite et tout d'un coup all of
the trappings of the most advanced forms of "post-modern" RED. To the
cautious students of previous democratization, this sounds like a formula for

catastrophe and, yet, there may be some hidden advantages in “leapfrogging.”

In short, the choices that contemporary neo-democracies must make about rules

and institutions are not likely to be identical to those of their predecessors -- just
as the domestic and international conditions under which they are making these

choices will have changed. This does not necessarily make their task easier, nor
does it preclude their making errors. It just implies that today's "consolidators"

cannot rely exclusively on the lessons of the past. They will have to forge some
of their own.5

As we have hinted in the preceding chapter, the choice of institutions

involves an especially complex "nested game". First, some subset of
politicians/representatives must come up with rules and practices that they can

agree upon and live with. Subsequently, they must convince their followers and
fellow citizens that these are appropriate and justifiable ways of making public

decisions binding upon all. Moreover, as the policy outcomes of these internal
rules of competition and cooperation among actors begin to produce external

effects upon different categories of citizens, those disfavored by them are bound

to question the adequacy of the original choices. Under the procedural rules of
democracy they will be free to express this dissatisfaction with the form, as well
as the substance of politics.6 Choosing institutions that “fit” initially is certainly

important, but it is not definitive. They can be subsequently exploited to change

their rules as well as their beneficiaries.

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If, however, these processes of initial elite selection and subsequent

citizen acquiescence are successful, CoD will serve to keep both the politicians
and citizens within the realm of contingent consent and bounded uncertainty,

playing according to mutually acceptable rules. Conflict will focus on the

politicians in the game and their policies, i.e. on changing the government in
power or its actions, rather than changing the rules of the game, i.e. the nature of

the regime. In the event of a serious crisis, the response of a RED is more likely
to be a change in the type of democracy than in democracy itself.7

A major implication of this notion of "nestedness" is that the initial stages

of CoD will depend very much on the emergence of a distinctive subset of actors

who claim to represent various constituencies and gain access to political power
on that basis. It is this political stratum of varying composition and experience

that will select the critical institutions, presumably with one eye on assuring their
future careers as increasingly professional politicians and the other on satisfying

the interests of their putative constituencies -- all in a context of varying degrees

of uncertainty over who really represents whom and what really works to whose
benefit. Even if we assume that these proto-politicians are well informed about

the objective conditions of their country, and aware of how REDs have already
dealt with analogous interest cleavages, cultural norms and international

situations,8 there is still every reason to expect that they will have to be
particularly sensitive to the immediate context of the transition itself. In the

longer run, their choices may or may not "fit" adequately with the above-noted list

of structural conditions, but in the short to medium run, these politicians must act
individually and collectively in response to some very contingent circumstances.

Contextualizing the Process

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We must first confront one of the major paradoxes of democratization.

Most citizens support this form of political domination and accord it

legitimacy because they expect it to change the conditions in which they

live for the better – and during their life-time. More concretely, as de
Tocqueville recognized already in the 1830s, there will be many who expect to
use public power to redistribute material goods and symbolic satisfactions more

equally throughout the population. No democracy can afford to ignore this

passion for equality, if it wishes to reproduce itself over the long run.

In order to consolidate themselves in the short to medium run,

however, the institutions of democracy must reflect (or “fit”) existing

conditions -- conditions that are often highly unequally distributed. If this

were not already enough, these institutions cannot be based exclusively on the

democratic principle of numbers: one citizen, one vote. They must somehow
recognize that social groups, especially minorities that stand no chance of

winning an election or referendum, have varying intensities of interest (or

passion) on different issues. It is therefore prudent, as well as ethical, to ensure
that such voices be somehow "weighed" and not just "counted" in the political

process. It may even be desirable to protect these economic, social, ethnic or

cultural minorities by enshrining their preferences in formal rights, not just

informal agreements.
The selection of democratic institutions, therefore, takes place in a

property space defined by two radically divergent criteria: (1) promoting state

(public) action vs. protecting civil (private) society; and (2) counting
numbers vs. weighting intensities. As transitional politicians seek to define the
rules for which they will eventually ask the assent of the people, they are never

acting under conditions of their choice. All of the above-listed “pre-requisites-

cum-facilitating conditions” can influence their preference for one or another type

5
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of democracy, not to mention more conjunctural factors such as partisan

ideology, current political fashion, attractive foreign models or professional

training. Some of the participants in the transition, especially those left over from

the previous autocracy, may well prefer no democracy at all, but still play an
important role in making the choices about it. Whether they succeed depends
not just upon their being able to reach a consensus among themselves, but also

upon whether that agreement on the rules of the political game is adequate for
dealing with the cleavages and memories that are specific to that country. Or, to

use the expression in Chapter Four, these rules have to “fit” with existing social
structures and normative preferences – and yet be sufficiently flexible that they

will be able to change those structures and preferences in the future.

Dealing with the Political Legac

Let us begin by asking: What is the extent of continuity or discontinuity

with previous forms of democracy and autocracy? How long did these endure?
What memories and legacies did they leave in terms of loyalties, practices and
habits? What proportion of the citizenry still has direct experience of them?

It seems reasonable to assume that CoD is likely to be facilitated by the

following historical conditions:

(1) If the country had previously experienced democracy for a

lengthy period that is neither too remote nor too discredited in
the memory of the people; and

(2) If the country had only experienced autocracy for a relatively

short period; and

(3) If the legacy of that period was overwhelmingly negative and

fresh in people's minds; and

(4) If the previous autocracy was civilian in nature or had managed

to bring the military under relative civilian control; and

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(5) If the apparatus of national state authority, as well as its

boundaries, remains continuous, but also willing and able to
subordinate itself to a new and democratic set of rulers.9

Among the recent cases, alas, only Greece, Uruguay and, perhaps, the

Philippines seemed to fit the intrinsically favorable syndrome -- except for the last
item. Czechoslovakia presumably had the most favorable political legacy in

Eastern Europe, although it is sometimes astonishing to hear how the interwar

political experiences of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland can be

reinterpreted as democratic. Even Chile, with its lengthy democratic success

even through periods that defeated all of its neighbors (1931-1973), suffers from

the burden of negative memories of the last democratic government (1971-73)

and the relatively lengthy (1973-1989) duration of an authoritarian regime that,
with all its ups-and-downs, presided over a major transformation of the socio-

economic structure of the country.

All the other cases of recent democratization have to face a much heavier

historical legacy. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand

and Turkey have experienced intermittent versions of both generic types of

domination, without much recent success at either. Some have had no

democratic tradition of any sort to draw upon -- not even a brief and glorious
post-independence interlude, e.g. Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal,

Romania, Ukraine, Taiwan and, of course, Russia and “its” former republics in
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Others can at best invoke democratic

institutions and loyalties that were practiced before almost all of the present
population was born -- and which were not all that successful: Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

It is easier for neo-democracies to sustain pre-existing civilian control over
the military than to establish it ex novo. Spain, Mexico, Taiwan, all of Eastern

7
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USSR began with this advantage. Portugal found itself in the peculiar position of

having to "dis-establish" the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), a

movement of junior army officers who were responsible for its liberation from a

civilian autocracy. Elsewhere, the issue of extricating the armed forces from
power and subordinating them to elected representatives is co-incident with
democratization -- and this necessarily makes the choice of adequate institutions

more complicated as we shall see in Chapter Eight.

State capacity is a critical dimension that has been emphasized in the

work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.10 The earlier post-1974 transitions in
Southern Europe and Latin America took place within political units whose

national identity was constant,11 and whose administrative agents proved to be

willing to cooperate with the new democratic regime.12 Democratizations in Asia

more or less followed a similar pattern of continuous national identity and

administrative capacity, although not without serious regional challenges in

Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. African cases are more difficult to
assess because state capacities and national identities have been so weak both
before and after democratic interludes that it is difficult to assign culpability. One

thing that has become obvious is the extent to which the holding of competitive
elections can lead to an increase in ethnic awareness and mobilization which

does not bode well for eventual CoD. But it was the breakup of the two socialist
federations – Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union –that radically interjected the

simultaneous elements of state- and nation-building into the democratization

process. Despite dire predictions of impending failure, many of these new states
– the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Moldova – were not markedly less successful at CoD than their more continuous

neighbors. In Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the

transition descended into protracted violence over issues of sovereignty and

8
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identity, but once this was resolved, the democratization of institutions has

progressed and seems to have led to increases in state capacity – as witnessed

by their enhanced status as prospective members of the EU. Belarus, Russia,

the Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian “Stans”
performed less well – despite the absence of war – but one could argue that this
was due more to the strength of state capacity than to its weakness. All of these

were cases of transitions imposed by or from within the party-state apparatus of

the previous autocracy (or, better said, non-transitions in the cases of

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan) and it was

precisely this continuity in personnel and organization that impeded the formation

of any kind of democracy – at least, until the so-called “Colored Revolutions”

intervened later. No doubt that stateness and nationhood are important variables

that intervene between the initiation of some regime transition and eventual CoD,
but it would seem that one can have too much of both as well as not enough. 13

Inserting the Mode of Transition

But the main condition immediately and directly connecting context and

contingency and, therefore, affecting the choice of institutions is likely to be the

mode of transition, i.e. the specific circumstances that surround the demise of

the previous autocracy and condition the highly uncertain moment when a
replacement set of rulers take power.14 As we have seen in Chapter Three, the

improvisations, ad hoc agreements, ad hominem solutions, pragmatic

arrangements, interim governments, and even instinctive reactions during this

period can set precedents, shift actor incentives and unwittingly produce "birth
defects" that can have a lasting effect upon the subsequent outcome of

consolidation.15 This is not meant to denigrate the importance of antecedent

cultural propensities rooted in long-standing political practices or subsequent

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functional adjustments to evolving socio-economic conditions, just to suggest that

the immediate context and the often hurried, confused and un-reflexive actions of
actual agents of change cannot be ignored.

There are four general reasons why the MoT can have a significant and
enduring effect upon the outcome:

(1) The presence of differing degrees of uncertainty, specifically

about the likelihood of a regression to the statu quo ante, can
induce actors to make concessions (or, better said, not press as
hard for initial advantages) than under more normal conditions
of information and threat. Depending on the MoT, it may or may
not be possible to seize relatively quickly upon the initial
momentum and to negotiate fair and acceptable rules before
the contending groups know what their respective strengths will
be and before they feel free to engage in opportunistic behavior

(2) The circumstances during the regime change can play a

determinant role in selecting precisely which actors and what
resources are going to participate in defining future rules binding
on all. Especially crucial in this regard is their impact upon the
so-called "de facto powers" (poderes fácticos, in the Spanish
jargon). Distinctive MoTs offer very different possibilities for
such established groups as the armed forces, civil servants,
state enterprises, national bourgeoisies, religious authorities,
local notables and so forth, to defend their corporate interests.

(3) The decisions made during the MoT, usually in a great hurry
and without much prior knowledge about their impact, may be
initially regarded as temporary and expendable, but they serve
to form actor expectations, influence the structure of their
organizations, and can become increasingly difficult to modify.
They may even find their way into formally binding documents,
such as national constitutions.

(4) The change in regime invariably involves a change in

government, i.e. moving one set of persons out of positions of
authority and putting some others in their place. This can be
done without breaking the rhythm of office-holding or disrupting
legal continuity, but normally it involves some interim form of
governance that is not, itself, democratic. Provisional rulers
may use their decree powers during the transition to introduce

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major procedural or substantive modifications with a lasting

impact upon subsequent outcomes.16

Summarizing all four points, the MoT can affect the consensus, the
momentum, the scope and the provisional form of the democratization

process.

Coping with Cleavages and Capacities17

Democracy requires cleavages in the society and the dispersion of
political capacity among the citizenry. A polity without predictable and significant

sources of differentiation would find it very difficult to organize stable patterns of

electoral competition or associational bargaining. Personalities and factions

(based on "the most frivolous of human passions" in the opinion of James

Madison) would take over and the result would be random, cyclical or, ultimately,

self-defeating collective actions. A citizenry which did not have significant power
resources at its disposition based on property, income, education, access to

information, mobility, collective identity and/or ideology -- in addition to having

formal political equality -- would soon find itself manipulated and displaced by

those who did.

Which brings us to two major orienting hypotheses from the literature on

the political sociology of REDs:

(1) Whatever cleavages exist in a given society, they should be

distributed in such a way that their impact is not
cumulative. Ideally, each source of differentiation: class,
sector, age, gender, race, language, religion, etc. should cut
across all the others so that no group is permanently and
simultaneously disadvantaged in more than one dimension.
Since this is virtually impossible to accomplish, even in the most
"pluralist" of societies, the effect of cumulative discrimination
can be mitigated if individuals have a substantial possibility of
mobility across categories during their lifetime.18

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(2) Whatever the absolute level of resources in a given society,

no group -- private or public -- should have a monopoly or
even concentrated control over any of them.19 If this proves
impossible for reasons of economic efficiency, social prejudice
or historical accident, then, it is better that there be as many
levels and arenas of political aggregation as possible, that there
be as many resource bases as possible, and that the process of
converting them into political power or influence at any given
level should be as variable and incalculable as possible.20

With these general thoughts on cumulation and concentration to guide us,

we can now return briefly to the "prerequisites" literature to pick up (and modify)
some specific hypotheses about social, economic and cultural conditions that

might facilitate or make more difficult CoD.21

(1) The level of economic development and the rate of

economic growth may be less important than the effect of both upon the
distribution of income.22 Societies which appear to be under the
minimum level and growing relatively slowly may be better off with regard
to CoD that wealthier or fast-growing ones with sharply increased
inequalities.23

(2) A dynamic bourgeoisie may be an advantage, but only where

its social origins cut across traditionally privileged groups and where it
contributes to the growth of a large and heterogeneous middle class
which serves to attenuate previous economic and social disparities.

(3) A high level of literacy and general education would only

make a significant contribution if it led to greater access to information
about political choices and higher levels of individual self-confidence and
sense of political efficacy.

(4) Stable property rights for individuals and corporations are

advantageous for CoD to the extent that they serve to limit the arbitrary
power of the state, but only if they are not exploited to protect high
concentrations of private ownership and accumulated wealth.

(5) Ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity may not be such an

impediment to CoD if the state involved has stable national borders that
are recognized and accepted by all ethno-linguistic groups and provided
that the differentiation they produce cuts across other major lines of

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cleavage: class, sector, religion, generation -- alas, not easy criteria to

fill!24

This brief exploration of alleged prerequisites for stable democracy

suggests, not only that they are better conceptualized as facilitating than as

enabling conditions,25 but also that their causal effect is usually indirect. How
they impact CoD depends on actor choices and contingent factors.26 No one

would deny that it is helpful to have a high per capita income, a steady rate of
economic growth, a large middle class, a dynamic bourgeoisie, a firm set of
property rights, a population that is literate and well-educated, ethnically and/or

linguistically homogeneous and a recognized national territory and identity. It is

the fortuna of history that will determine whether they coincide or overlap, and

the virtù of politicians that will at least influence whether collective choices and
rules result in a dispersion or concentration of resources among the citizenry.

Three Probable Pre-Requisites

If there do exist genuine prerequisites, in the sense of conditions that

must be satisfied before democracy has any chance of consolidating itself, we

can only think of three probable candidates:

(1) The Rustow Condition: Prior consensus, rooted in obscure

historical events and memories, on national boundaries and
identity;27

(2) The Moore Condition: Absence of a dominant class of large

landowners, not producing primarily for the market, who require
coercion to sustain their respective labor forces;28

(3) The O'Donnell Condition: Absence of such substantial urban

inequalities in income, wealth and decent living standards that
privileged groups cannot conceive of the underprivileged as
"fellow citizens."29

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All the other enabling/disabling conditions can, ex hypothesi, be overcome

through the choice of adequate rules and practices.

Questioning the Cultural Barriers

The third essay in this collection expressed considerable skepticism about
the thesis that a "civic culture" was a necessary prerequisite for the consolidation

of democracy. Indeed, it was suggested that the inverse was more likely, i.e. that
successful consolidation of democracy would tend eventually to produce a civic

culture. Even if it did not, the practices of contingent consent and bounded
uncertainty were deemed sufficient for regime persistence -- whether or not

citizens trusted their government and each other, whether or not they professed
high affect for their institutions and leaders, whether or not they preferred

compromise over conflict, whether or not they expressed a moderate or tolerant

attitude toward political participation.30 Put differently, it is possible (and it may

be necessary) to make a democracy without (many) democrats.

But this by no means exhausts the issue of whether there exist predictable
cultural barriers to CoD. For some time, academic discussion centered on the

distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism -- with the former clearly

preferred on a probabilistic basis. This finding has met with some recent

disconfirmation since so many of the countries affected by the Fourth Wave have
strong Catholic cultures. Even more than that, the Roman Catholic Church (or,

at least, lay organizations associated with it) played an overt and committed role

in several of these transitions.31 One could, of course, save the original

hypothesis by claiming the Church since Vatican II (and, especially, since the
assaults of Liberation Theology) was no longer the culture it had been -- but that

would only further undermine the "culturist position" since national or religious

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culture is supposed to be a relative constant not such an easily manipulable

variable.
The fact that the current wave has had such a global reach has tended to

shift the focus to whether non-Western cultures are an impediment to successful

CoD. No one seems to doubt that there are large numbers of individuals in
Africa, Asia and the Middle East who would prefer democracy of some type, but

can these societies as a whole be entrusted with such a difficult task?32

Confucianism and Islam have been signaled out as particularly noxious: the

former presumably because of its emphasis on familism, respect for hierarchy

and exaltation of the society over the individual; the latter because of its rejection

of the separation between secular and sacred authority.33 Since we are not
specialists in these exotic cultures (and self-confessedly hostile to the “culturist”

approach in general), our skepticism before these assertions is bound to be

suspect, but we can remember that it was not so long ago that "culturists" were

arguing that Confucianism and Buddhism were antithetic to ... capitalism! The
subsequent development of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea,
Thailand and, now, China seems to have effectively and dramatically disproved

that hypothesis. Could it not be the same for democracy? That they would have
to invent new forms of representation, new systems of checks-and-balance, new

mechanisms of accountability, etc. almost goes without saying -- just as they did
invent new types of firms, market practices, business-state relations and trade

associations and unions when they adopted capitalism. Is it not time to stop

treating cultures, which are highly complex and variant from one site to another,
as if they were fixed in time and monolithic in content?34

Respecting Historical Time

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Regime change in general and democratization in particular are historical

processes. This means that each polity begins its sequence of changes and
makes its choices with distinctive legacies and memories from the past. The

outcome will depend on these conditions at the point of departure, but only to the
extent that they influence the contingent choices that individual and collective
actors have to make before, during and after the transition. And, given the high

degree of uncertainty that prevails at this moment, actor perceptions of what

these social, economic and cultural conditions are and how relevant they should

be are very likely to be divided and confused giving politicians, as we have

argued in Chapter Three, unusually wide degrees of freedom in making their

choices. Virtually by definition, a change from autocracy and democracy begins

at an awkward (and quite often unexpected) moment – even when its timing and

content are under the control of forces within the ancient régime. Pacted or
Reformed transitions tend to be more “pre-announced,” but they too can be full of

unwelcome co-incidences or unexpected consequences.

The approach adopted in this collection of essays is skeptical of attempts
to advance "trans-temporal" and "trans-spatial" verities -- either those based on

statistical manipulations of aggregate data or those derived from stylized games

of rational choice. Whether a given institution is adequate or not varies more

according to the sequence in which it is adopted and the connections it has with
other institutions that with its intrinsic capacities for channeling demands,

resolving conflicts and gaining legitimacy. Whether a given agreement has a

convincing micro-foundation in terms of fixed individual preferences may be

much less important than whether it is successful in changing those preferences.
In short, as we have argued in the previous essay, the same rule, strategy or

institution can have radically different (and, often, unintended) consequences in

different temporal and/or spatial settings.

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ED.Chapter Six

It is possible to distill from the literature on past successful

democratizations some ‘rules of prudence’ with regard to timing and sequence in

the choice of institutions. Whether these are still valid, or can be circumvented,

or even can be reversed is disputable, but we will insert them nevertheless:

1. Take maximum advantage of the initial momentum for regime change

since political forces are likely to be momentarily unified and will very soon
become more fragmented.

2. But beware of holding elections immediately, since this is likely to benefit

political organizations of the ancient régime that already exist at the
expense of new or not-yet-existing ones.

3. If at all possible, make the choice of rules in different institutional domains

sequentially rather than simultaneously, and space out the interval
between these choices as much as possible.

4. Choose the ‘core’ institutions, especially those that are likely to be most
controversial because they relate to exogenous socio-economic and
cultural conditions, before choosing the ‘peripheral’ ones that are designed
to govern endogenous relationships between political actors.

5. Although be wary of the need for attending to short-term conditions

affecting the survival of key political actors (including those inherited from
the previous regime), before investing too much time and effort in those
that will yield only long-term, delayed pay-offs.

6. Make the choices about macro-level (national) rules first and apply them
before turning to solutions at the meso-level (regional) or micro-level
(local) – even if this means continued toleration of un-democratic practices
in peripheral areas.

7. Rely as much as possible on the recuperation, revision or re-baptizing of

pre-existing institutions rather than generating novel ones – provided that
this syncretism does not interfere with the application of basic democratic
principles.

8. If pre-existing formal institutions are too antithetic or non-existent and it

becomes necessary to borrow from foreign REDs, be wary of
presumptions about the impact of single institutions that seem to have
worked well elsewhere, and do whatever is possible to disguise their origin
and to modify them according to native traditions.

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9. Grasp at events or moments that seem to indicate passing thresholds of

irreversibility and use the notion that there is no turning back to leverage
subsequent decisions about more intractable rules or practices.

10. Do not worry immediately about the inconsistency or complementarity of

the institutions chosen since the ensuing practice of politics will eventually
make them more coherent and convergent.

11. If in a “wave” of democratizations, it should be possible to take advantage

of visible institutional successes taken previously in adjacent “comparable”
regimes.

12. And, above all maxims, seek to incorporate as many potentially disruptive
actors into a consensus supporting the choice of rules – even if this
means over-representing momentarily weak participants.

None of these maxims from the past seem to be invariantly true in the present

-- even such an obvious one as giving priority to national over sub-national

institutions. In Yugoslavia, its violation seems to have played an important role in

promoting the break-up into independent republics, but Russia did the same and

remained a federation – albeit an increasingly centralized one. All observers of

the fate of post-Communist democracies predicted that the simultaneity of

transitions – to a capitalist economy, to democratic polity, to greater social

inequality, to new international alliances and, in several cases, even to new

national identities and borders – would produce a much more difficult, even

ungovernable and logically impossible situation. In eventual fact, the transitions

in many of them were more thorough and the consolidation of a new regime

more rapid than in the allegedly easier “sequential” cases of Southern Europe

and Latin America.35 Even constitutions that were jammed through with only a

minimum winning majority and not subsequently ratified by referendum proved

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reasonably successful – albeit in the Portuguese case with very substantial

subsequent modification.

Sequencing the Partial Regimes

As we have noted, the consolidation of democracy takes place through

choices of partial regimes and these are spaced out in time. They are also pro

tempore, in the sense that their political role is limited in time and/or dependent
upon renewal by citizen approval.36 The logic of regime change itself imposes

certain priorities. For example, the convocation of fair and free elections of
unknown outcome -- "founding elections", they have been termed37 -- is usually

the turning point in the transition. This invariably involves the prior instauration of
some kind of electoral system (however imposed or transient it may seem
initially) and it provokes the formation of a party system (even if political parties

played little or no role in bringing about the demise of the ancien régime). Some
changes are virtually mandated by the generic nature of democracy, e.g. a

regime institutionalizing civilian control over the military or an arrangement for

collective bargaining between capital and labor, but may not be implemented

until later out of prudence for the powerful group interests that would be affected

in the short run. In still other realms, the change of regime may leave pre-
existing partial regimes unchanged, e.g. the formal territorial division of state

authority or the informal clientelist norms linking local notables to national politics.
These differences in the sequence with which distinctive sets of

institutions are being created (or left untouched) can be crucial for understanding
the eventual outcome. Timing and rhythm are also basic elements for

understanding what the outcome will be. When something occurs, especially in
relation to something else, and how long it takes to produce its intended (or
unintended) effect may be as important as whether, how or why it occurs.

19
ED.Chapter Six

For the partial components of regime change have different rhythms,

timings and periods of maturation. Introducing an electoral system can be

accomplished fairly rapidly and; if successful, will impose a common rhythm of

activity upon both politicians and citizens – regular if the choice is presidential or
semi-presidential, potentially more erratic if it is parliamentary.38 However, getting
citizens to settle into a reasonably stable set of partisan identities or voting

preferences depends not only how these elections are held, but also on the much
less predictable correspondence between party labels and programs and social

and cultural cleavages – which are themselves likely to change as the result of
democratization. Establishing a proper civil-military regime by subordinating

military officers to the control of elected officials is rarely a simple matter of

issuing new formal rules, but involves the gradual accretion of informal practices

of recruitment and socialization of norms over an unpredictable period of time –

which is why it is so advantageous when this has already been accomplished by

the outgoing autocracy. Developing a supportive "civic culture" with norms of

tolerance, moderation, compromise and respect for the will of the majority can
only emerge after democratic institutions of cooperation and competition have

been consolidated -- and experienced by the citizenry -- for some time. Trying to
attain these political goals while simultaneously transforming the property

system, the price structure, the productive apparatus of the country, the
international alliances, and even the national boundaries and identity of the

country -- as is being attempted in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union --

can be positively "dysrhythmic," but not necessarily “dysfunctional.”

Understanding the Rhythm

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ED.Chapter Six

“The formal process of constitutional reform takes six

months; a general sense that things are moving up as
a result of economic reform is unlikely to spread
before six years have passed; the third condition of
the road to freedom is to provide the social
foundations which transform the constitution and the
economy from fair-weather to all-weather institutions
which can withstand the storms generated within and
without, and sixty years are barely enough to lay
these foundations”
Ralf Dahrendorf (1990: 92-93)

By rhythm, we mean quite simply the rapidity or rate of speed at which

patterns of contingency and improvisation characteristic of the transition can be

expected to turn into structures of regular and valued interaction that characterize
a consolidated democracy. The (scarce) literature on democratization that

preceded transitology tended to be "glacial" in its root assumptions. Established

liberal democracies were seen as the outcome of a very slow process of gradual

accretion and marginal displacement. Previously subordinate groups were

enfranchised or allowed to organize only after a long period of resistance and

only after they had signaled their willingness to play according to existing rules.

Previously dominant groups were said to have been slowly marginalized by

demographic or socio-economic processes and, even then, they had to be

convinced on grounds of prudence to accept new players into the democratic

game. Socialization to new rules and institutions was considered to depend on

lengthy and unbroken chains of intergenerational transmission. Needless to say,

since not very many polities managed to survive such a delicate and protracted
historical process, it was presumed that only a select few of the world's polities

could expect to attain such an exalted status. For the remaining imprudent,
unwise or impatient countries, perpetual instability and frequent "undemocracy"
were the expected outcomes.39

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ED.Chapter Six

Ironically, since the locus classicus for this perspective has always been the

example of England, the single most apposite historical monograph on the

subject: J. H. Plumb's The Growth of Political Stability in England (1967)

advances a quite different argument. Plumb puts his central thesis quite simply
and dramatically: "the acceptance by society of its political institutions and, of
those classes of men or officials who control them ... comes quite quickly ... as

suddenly as water becomes ice" (1967: xvi-xvii). He admits that the possibility
of such an outcome depends on a number of long-term factors (he calls them

"tidal forces"), but argues that contemporaries are usually unaware of what these
are. The actuality of regime stability is determined by the actions of conscious

and calculating human beings creating new arrangements and organizations in

response to quite specific events and challenges. Making the right choices may

require "political genius", but once in place they can have a rapid effect on both
behavior ("the rage of party gave way to the pursuit of place"), and values (the

new practices acquired "an aura of inevitability" and became "the object of
veneration").
Now admittedly, the political stability that Plumb found developing so suddenly

in Eighteenth Century England was not exactly democratic. Indeed, it took the
form of oligarchic parliamentarism as an alternative to popular democracy: "the

evolution of political stability had gone hand in hand with the diminution and close
control of the electorate and a more thorough exploitation of patronage, but also

with the evolution of single party government and the proscription of a political

opposition."40 Even if his stimulating essay cannot be exploited directly in the

construction of a contemporary heuristic model, his central point about the tempo
of consolidation is worth retaining.

Another way of putting this temporal observation is that the rhythm of

regime consolidation may depend less on lengthy and complex processes of

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ED.Chapter Six

intergenerational learning and cultural accomodation by mass populations than

upon rather immediate and simple efforts to trap (piéger is the better French
expression) representatives and rulers into competing with each other according

to mutually acceptable rules and, in the process, rendering themselves

accountable to the citizenry at large. Finding rules as quickly as possible that
elites will respect and citizens will regard as legitimate becomes the key to

success. The rest: the “civic culture,” the “diffuse support,” the “party
identification,” the “pursuit of place,” the “aura of invulnerability,” the “all-weather

capability,” and so forth, will follow -- provided politicians remain loyal to the
rules that initially trapped them into playing competitive politics.

One hypothesis is that the process of consolidation begins seriously with

the first seating of a freely elected parliament and should be over by the end of

its third term when, presumably, most of the framework legislation setting out the
constitutional format for executive power, the mode for conducting elections, the

system of collective bargaining, the compétences of different branches of

government, the internal organization of the legislature, the territorial division of
state authority, etc. will have been decided and ratified.41 This implies, as a rule

of thumb, that consolidation should take about twelve years on the average.
That may seem a rather long time to turn "water into ice," but by Plumb's

calculation it took the English between forty and fifty years to accomplish the feat
definitively!42

Robert Dahl has come up with a second benchmark figure for evaluating

the rhythm of democratization. He observed that, purely as a matter of empirics,

“In countries where the institutions of polyarchy have existed for as long as
twenty years or more, the breakdown of democracy and its replacement

with an authoritarian regime is extraordinarily rare”43 -- presumably, TSilva! 5/5/14 2:01 PM

Comment [1]: The book has by, instead of with
excluding those who were forced to do so by the fortunes of war.44

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ED.Chapter Six

So, at least hypothetically, the outcome should be decided within the first
twelve years -- depending on whether the politicians manage to produce mutually

acceptable rules for competing and cooperating with each other, and manage to
convince the citizens that these rules ensure a sufficient degree of accountability.
Historically, the odds have been against their succeeding, but evidence is

accumulating that during the latest wave these odds have improved
dramatically.45 If they do make it over this threshold, they still have another eight

years to go until they can be fully confident that democracy will, indeed, remain
“the only game in town.46. Habituation, as Dankwert Rustow called it, will have

settled in and politics will be largely conducted according to the tempos imposed
by routine cycles of voting, bargaining and policy-making. 47

Which, again, is not to argue that political history will have ended and
clocks will have replaced clouds. How long this “punctuated equilibrium” around

a specific set of rights and rules will persist is another matter. Its deconsolidation
is always a possibility, but when it comes it is much more likely to involve
demands for a different degree or type of democracy, rather than for a renewal of

autocracy.

Exploiting the Momentum

The one factor of overarching importance is that steps toward choosing

core democratic institutions begin as soon as possible after the regime has

changed – which means before initiating major economic, social or cultural

reforms. A usual precondition for this is the election of president or
parliamentary representatives and the convocation of a legislative (or constituent)

assembly that is empowered to make binding (and, hopefully, lasting) decisions

about other rules, although one can imagine situations where self-constituted,

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ED.Chapter Six

pre-electoral alliances can already engage in bargaining with representatives of

an out-going authoritarian regime about such key institutions as the electoral

code and conditions for the recognition of political parties. Key components of

consolidation can even precede transition, although that would certainly be the
exception rather than the rule. Chile provides an interesting example of this.
When Chilean opposition leaders accepted Gen. Pinochet's "offer" to participate

in the Plebiscite of 1988 after having negotiated with his representatives to obtain
what they regarded as fair conditions for its being held, they in effect began

consolidating the institutions of a possible future democracy along lines (and

deadlines) dictated by the 1980 Constitution “granted” by Pinochet. Even before

they could possibly have known that they would win the plebiscite and, thereby,
trigger a genuine transition, they were establishing the rules and practices that

would subsequently limit their own behavior. Admittedly, after the December
1989 elections and even before formally taking power in March 1990, they began

efforts to slice away some of the more egregiously undemocratic aspects of the
constitution they had de facto approved, but there remained a great deal more to
be accomplished before Chile could be said to have democratic institutions that

are "reliably known, regularly practiced and [especially] generally accepted."

The Portuguese case exemplifies yet another variation on the speed and

timing of regime change. Its transition and consolidation literally began within 24
hours of each other. The day after seizing power, the Armed Forces Movement

announced a pre-commitment to holding open and free elections within one year.

Despite some hesitation and resistance in the tumultuous months that followed,
successive governments stuck to this promise and the results of the founding
election of April 1975 strongly affected the subsequent course of events.

Admittedly, it took some time before Portugal's politicians managed to undo

much of what was accomplished by the decrees of six provisional governments

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ED.Chapter Six

and enshrined in the constitution, but that instantaneous “pre-commitment” made

all the difference.

There seem to be three generic reasons why rapid attention to

consolidation issues is desirable:

(1) It is important to seize the Momentum of Legitimacy which the

transition gives to popular and elite perceptions of change.
Relying on the inflated expectations, even the euphoria, that
accompanies the downfall of tyrants is one way to overcome
resistances which are bound to arise later when the costs and
difficulties are bound to become more apparent. Moreover,
changes that are immediately imperative in a core partial regime
can be exploited via package-deals to induce less urgent (and,
perhaps, more controversial) changes in other domains.

(2) In the early stages of the MoT actors are enveloped

spontaneously in a Veil of Ignorance about their identities,
interests, allies and, most of all, probabilities of winning or losing
under the uncertain conditions of the new political situation. As
John Rawls has argued speculatively, this places them in a real
context that enhances the likelihood of arriving at relatively "fair"
agreements since those entering into them cannot be sure how
they will personally be affected by these rules and practices.48

(3) Transitions are usually followed in short order by major declines

in economic and social performance – even when they are
strictly confined to political choices and more so if not.
Increased criminality, lower rates of growth, absolute declines in
production and shortfalls in state revenue are not uncommon,
so it is important that temporally legitimized democratizers make
rapid progress on institutions that can reduce the uncertainty
about who is governing and, thereby, the depth or breadth of
this unavoidable Valley of Tears.

Once again, we find the modes of transition potentially influencing the

outcome. Imposed ones have much less momentum to begin with and the more

entrenched legacies of autocracy poke gaping holes in the veil of ignorance.

Pacted ones are most likely to start consolidating even before the actual demise
of the ancien régime, which takes away some of the momentum but allows for

26
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greater continuity and more package-dealing. The veil of ignorance, however,

may be quite transparent under these conditions. In reformist transitions, actors

are more uncertain about their future prospects and the greater degree of

popular mobilization generates more uncertainty about economic and social

performance, but also provides more momentum to be exploited – if only a stable
winning coalition can be put together quickly enough. Revolutions offer the most

opportunities on all three scores, but are unlikely to exploit them for the purpose
of democratic consolidation for reasons suggested in Chapter Three.

Regarding the Timing

Concerning timing, the central issue is the occurrence of democratic

consolidation in one country relative to the nature of political domination in other

countries regarded somehow as analogous. This tends to be perceived as a

"regional" phenomenon since the appropriateness and desirability of institutions

is often restricted to some subset of units within which interactions and ideas
circulate with particular intensity. One can, of course, speak of "epochs"
affecting a large number of countries during which political expectations are

especially uniform. The decade after World War Two was certainly one of these.
Many dictatorships frozen into power by the war itself were overthrow in its

immediate aftermath, although Portugal and Spain testify to the possibility that
such contagious or faddish behavior could have been successfully resisted at the

time. With respect to Western Europe, we may be in such a democratic epoch at

the present moment. Not only is there a diffuse expectation that some form of
democracy is the natural, the "civilized", way of ruling this part of the world, but
there are also regional organizations and networks of solidarity (and

subsidization) that back up those who promote such an outcome and threaten
those who do not. Whether this Zeitgeist extends to Latin America could be of

27
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major importance for processes of democratic consolidation there. It would seem

that Africa and the Middle East (from which Israel and Turkey are excluded) have
not been subjected to the same internationalized norms and sanctions.

Of special relevance may be the timing of regime change from one polity
to another within the same region. The experiences and experiments of
earlier-going neighboring countries tend to be regarded as lessons -- positive and

negative -- by those coming later. Plumb, for example, points out that the
English outcome was significantly influenced by the reaction of key actors to

contemporary French absolutism. They had to compete with the seemingly

greater stability and efficiency (not to mention, glory) of the French monarchy; at

the same time, they sought to avoid the political displacement of the local gentry
this earlier experience had entailed. 49 Analogous learning effects may now be

going on within Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Hence, it
is claimed that the unexpectedly rapid (and, for a moment, seemingly

revolutionary) transition in Portugal helps to explain why the Spaniards moved so

cautiously after Franco's death, or that the disappointing results of the
nationalization policy of the French socialists taught the Spanish socialists "what

not to do" when they came to power. Inversely, the successive democratizations
of Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina in the 1980s were said to be putting

pressure on Chile to conform to the new regional norm – without much

immediate effect. This suggests that, just because countries are adjacent and

share certain traits, they do not necessarily form a "region" in the strict sense.

Indeed, the historical patterns of colonialism and the contemporary dependencies

upon globalized capitalism may link each of them much more closely to
extra-regional "central" powers than to each other, either in the realm of

socio-economic exchanges or that of normative-ideological standards. Often the

28
ED.Chapter Six

signals and rewards coming from these farther removed patrons are much more

significant than those coming from next door.

Respecting the Perfect Sequence

It is not difficult to come up with an optimal sequence in which the
processes and events of the transition should take place -- even if it may difficult

to find a real-world case that corresponds to it. There are two guiding principles:

(1) As much as possible should be accomplished in other domains

before the political transition begins; and

(2) Actors should be able, as much as possible, to concentrate

exclusively on the design, selection and implementation of political
institutions during the period of transition.

As we have argued above, the optimal sequences are serial or

segmental, not simultaneous. They would allow a diverse set of politicians to

consolidate their respective partial regimes without having to devote attention

and resources to other problems at the same time. Moreover, one of their key

tasks is precisely to come up with broader party programs that justify taking

experiences from successful cases of early problem-solving and applying them to

subsequent social and economic issues. Parties, associations and movements

also have to appeal to collective identities in order to gain the support of citizens,
but these identities may be divided, uncertain or subject to transformation during

the transition. Moving slowly and incrementally should help to alleviate these

linkage problems. This has been part of common political wisdom for some time.
It undoubtedly underlies the reputation of the British for being particularly able to

cope with large-scale political change gradually and without violence (although
only after more than a century of turmoil, civil war and regicide). Unfortunately,
the consolidators of today’s neo-democracies do not have +200 years at their

29
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disposition -- and their citizens are much more mobilized, better informed and

impatient than were their British predecessors.

The recipe for the ideal historical sequence would look something like the

following:

(1) Take the following ingredients: formation of national identity and

boundaries, creation of an effective state bureaucracy,
establishment of rule of law, protection of property rights,
subordination of armed forces to civilian control, development of
national economy capable of competing effectively in the world
economy, liberalization of individual political rights,
accountability of government to a competitively elected
parliament, gradual extension of electoral franchise ≥
concession of freedom of association and other participation
rights to the adult population.

(2) Enter them sequentially into the unit;

(3) Stir very slowly until all the ingredients are blended into a
consensual whole; and

(4) Wait for at least 100 years before consuming its full benefits!

Presumably, any country which had prepared such a meal for itself would

be in a good position subsequently to experiment with further "substantive"

ingredients of democracy such as social citizenship via the welfare state,
equalization of income through progressive taxation, worker participation in

management, collective ownership of major industries and services, and so

forth.50
Exploring Some Imperfect Sequences

No contemporary country can possibly imitate this trajectory -- least of all,

the time it took to accomplish it. For that matter, most of the REDs in Western
Europe took quite different routes to democracy and had them interrupted by

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various and sundry "events" such as revolutions, insurrections, regicides, defeats

in war, dictatorships, etc.

Among the neo-democracies, those in Southern Europe, Southern and

Central America have the relative good fortune of having had secure national
borders and identities, although Spain and, to a much lesser extent, Portugal
demonstrate that the transition can bring out latent demands for regional

autonomy and even secession.

Spain and Portugal also stand out because civilian control over the military

seemed secure beforehand, although the manner of the Portuguese transition

undid that control and the Spaniards still had to suppress a golpe by the Guardia

Civil and elements of the army. The Eastern European and Balkan countries and
ex-Soviet Republics seem to have had that initial advantage, as have Taiwan,

Mexico, Sénégal and (perhaps) South Africa.

Several neo-democracies have undergone an extensive prior

modernization and liberalization of the economy so that their price and productive
structures were internationally competitive at the point of departure: Spain, Chile,
Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Hungary and South Africa. While there always

remains a good deal to accomplish in order to rid their respective systems of

statist distortions imposed by the previous autocracies, politicians in these

countries have the relative advantage of being able to concentrate initially on

institutional choices without having simultaneously to deal with major economic

readjustment crises.

Elsewhere, simultaneity is a -- if not the -- major problem. In a few very

inauspicious cases, it involves literally the full range of possible macro-
transformations: (1) nation-building; (2) state-formation; (3) market-creation via

dismantling central planning and comprehensive state ownership or market-

recreation via deregulation and privatization; (4) civilian control over the military;

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and (5), last but not least, democratization. For these countries, e.g. ex-republics

of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, not to mention such post-conflict
cases as Angola, Somalia, Eritrea and Mozambique, one could not even begin to

think about, much less act upon CoD until the identity, boundaries and territorial
format of the state was somehow settled (usually as the result of organized
violence and/or international intervention) and fundamental security issues were

resolved.51 How can one expect their politicians and citizens to make long-term
binding choices about rules until they know who is expected to play by these

rules?
Elsewhere, the core problems of simultaneity focus on the timing,

sequence and rhythm of marketization (or economic liberalization) and

democratization -- with occasional additional complications stemming from the

absence of civilian control over the military. Needless to say, the former is
most acute in those cases where it is a question of creating the basic institutions

of a capitalist economy: property rights, private firms, banks, stock exchanges,

insurance companies, labor markets, commodity exchanges, accounting
systems, tax codes, convertibility of currency, international trading arrangements,

collective bargaining, pension and unemployment funds, and more! Liberalizing

the prices, subsidies, protections and ownership mechanisms of an already

established, if highly inefficient, capitalist economy is already difficult enough, but

nothing compared to the volume of choices that are needed to get one started de

novo.

Sequencing Economic and Political Choices

Ideally speaking, we have seen, the consolidation of the basic institutions
of a vigorous, competitive capitalism should be preceded (and subsequently be

modified) by those of democracy.52 Practically speaking, most defunct

autocracies leave behind an economic mess of protected and inefficient

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industries, indebtedness, exhausted foreign reserves, budgetary imbalances,

bloated military expenditures, distorted prices, overmanned bureaucracies and

sheer corruption. Post-Communist transitions inherited all of the above, plus the

absence of basic institutions upon which to build a recovery.

If one's purpose is to maximize the likelihood of CoD, irrespective of the
mode of transition or the type of democracy, the most desirable course of action

is clear: concentrate, first and foremost, on choosing and reaching

consensus on the core institutions of representation and decision-making -

- even if that means introducing economic and social reforms more

belatedly and gradually, running the risk that they will be incompletely

implemented and less efficient. Putting these highly visible “national focal
points” in place early and successfully, e.g. parliamentary and/or presidential

elections, legislative and/or constituent assemblies, high executive officials, and,

of course, a constitution, should make it easier to reach later agreement on less

salient ones at the national level, and set precedents for the choices that will
eventually have to be made in less propitious regional or local settings.53
Granted this often means making compromises with economic, administrative

and clientelistic elements that benefitted from the previous autocracy and almost
always means tolerating social groups that can be expected to oppose further

economic liberalization and social equality; nevertheless, the alternative seems

definitely inferior.54

First, it is dubious that according absolute priority to market efficiency will

work -- least of all, by decreeing massive "shock treatments" that simultaneously

remove price controls and subsidies, lower trade barriers, institute austerity
measures, deregulate the labor market, allow the currency to float and begin the

privatization of state enterprises. There is little evidence to suggest that this will
lead to necessary foreign investment and export competitiveness (which depend

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on the strategic responses of other, more developed economies) and much to

suggest that it will increase the incentives for financial speculation, burgeoning
imports and outright corruption.

Second, and more to the political point, the greater immediate social costs
of this policy when combined with the absence of reliable mechanisms of
representation, could well trigger a strong negative reaction, not just to the

popularity of the government in power, but to the legitimacy of democracy itself.

It is wise to keep in mind that choices about democratic institutions are

much less "reversible" than are choices about capitalist practices. Markets,
especially in this era of international interdependence, are intrinsically dynamic;

politics are still more confined within protected national borders and are more
entropic since politicians have both the motives and the means to prevent

changes in the rules which have brought them to power.

***

But our discussion has become excessively "academic". In most cases,

actors are not in a position to select the sequence and set the timing of these
transformation mechanisms. For example, in the present context, there are very

powerful international pressures to put economic liberalization first and to leave

the consolidation of democracy to a later date -- if not to the Greek Calendar.

Once they have engaged in such momentous changes, the "fog of transition"
descends upon the scene and it becomes increasingly difficult to know what is

going on, much less to be able to control the agenda. Given the different

rhythms of the electoral and business cycles -- not to mention, the probability that
random events and exogenous shocks will occur -- all sorts of coincidences can
emerge. Elections happen at the wrong time with regard to exchange rate

changes or the removal of price controls; privatization in one country clashes with

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that in another; party platforms are out-of-date before they can be printed; strikes

bear no relationship to labor market conditions.

What determines the outcome is less the grand strategies and options

than the micro-sequences between bits and pieces of different transformative

processes and the timing of discrete events. Napoleon is said to have replied,
when asked how he won battles: "Je m'engage et puis je vois" -- "I engage (the

enemy) and then I wait to see what happens". So it is with the consolidation of
democracy -- even if there is rarely anyone with the authority of Napoleon either

to get things started or evaluate how they are progressing. Which need not
prevent us academics from trying to peer through that "fog of battle" and try to

make more sense of what is happening than the actors could possibly do
themselves.

Trying to ‘Model’ the Process

We have accumulated the basic elements that may now permit us to

'model' -- admittedly, only in a heuristic fashion -- the whole process of the
consolidation of democracy. The emergent stratum of politicians, influenced by

the nature and duration of the country's previous regimes, attentive to existing
cleavages of interest and distributions of power, acting within a particular mode

of transition, and trying to cope with differences in timing, sequence and rhythm
are going to select the institutions that they hope will satisfy the aspirations of

their followers and (not coincidentally) ensure their future as elected leaders.

These choices will be made more-or-less consciously, more-or-less

consensually, more-or-less hurriedly, more-or-less freely -- and, once they have
been made and are producing effects, they will prove to be more-or-less “fitting.”

But, what will they choose? The simplistic, "political science," answer is
that politicians will choose that type of democracy which best reflects --

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even which reproduces -- the relations of power currently existing among

them. Unfortunately, that does not tell us very much, in part, because we do not
know how to measure power relations well enough to derive a predictable

outcome; in part, because the power resources which actors bring to the political
arena during the uncertain period of transition are unusually fluid and contingent.
Another way of putting the latter point is that the power that any individual or

group can bring to bear on CoD depends very much on the temporal and spatial
context in which it is exercised. While it seems safe to presume that most

transitional politicians will have a preference for remaining in office and seek to
promote rules that will favor this, this is a much less reliable assumption than

under situations of normal politics. Not only are many of them amateurs that
intend to return to private life and leave an admirable legacy behind them, but the

sheer lack of experience and confusion surrounding the choice of institutions

makes it very difficult to calculate the effect that they will eventually produce. In

other words, the history of CoD is littered with politicians who chose the wrong
rules and lost because of it.
Which brings up a novel aspect of timing in post-1974 democratizations:

the rapidity with which the initial rulers after the demise of autocracy have been
displaced from office. In the past, these “national liberators” or “freedom fighters”

could look forward to a comfortable and lengthy tenure in power – whether

ratified by subsequent re-elections by a grateful citizenry or prolonged by their

conversion into autocratic rulers. The rule has now become that the timing of a

first turnover in office will come sooner rather than later – and that second
turnover may not be far off. Presumably, this is due in part to the fact that so few
MoTs have been revolutionary or even reformist, but it must also be due to the

presence of more educated and critical citizens who become more quickly
disillusioned with their new rulers. Whatever the cause, the shortness of term in

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executive office – real and anticipated – must have some impact on CoD.

Optimistically, it could encourage cross-party compromise since the sort of

hegemony exemplified by the Sinn Fein in Ireland, the Christian Democrats in

Italy and West Germany, the Liberal Democrats in Japan or the Labor Party in
Israel seems no longer possible. Pessimistically, it could encourage a “grab-and-
run” mentality without regard for long-term institution-building. Our impression is

that, so far, the former has prevailed – at least in Southern and Eastern Europe
and South America.

In the few, privileged cases where the autocracy was short-lived and
manifestly unsuccessful and where the previous democracy was relatively fresh

in people's minds and not too dis-credited, the process of selecting institutions
will be easier. Actors will seek to restore the statu quo ante by returning to the

previous constitution and set of partial regimes, perhaps, with minor

modifications to correct recognized defects or to pay off (or punish) specific

persons or parties. Greece and Uruguay are the best examples of this, although
in the former case a plebiscite was held specifically on the issue of the monarchy
and some new provisions strengthening the office of the president were

subsequently retracted. In both polities, CoD was established in relative short

order and no major groups are currently contesting the rules of the game.55

In most countries, however, the "democratic tradition" is more ambiguous

or non-existent. Representatives of different groups in the population are very

likely to prefer different mixes of partial regimes or types of democracy. Whether

one dominant group or coalition emerges which can impose "its" institutional
preferences depends in large part on the MoT. In the case of strongly and
consistently imposed transitions, they will have been "pre-selected" by the

poderes fácticos of the previous authoritarian regime and may differ only
marginally from the statu quo ante. Brazil and Taiwan, before constitutional

37
ED.Chapter Six

revisions, would be prominent examples. Chile's would-be consolidators have

had to labor under an especially heavy burden of imposed anti-democratic rules.

In retrospect, most of the post-communist cases seemed to have had “imposed”

transitions in which some fragment of the previous Communist Party declared

themselves nationalists or social democrats and chose their timing and content of
the change in regime. In some places, e.g. the three Baltic Republics, Georgia

and Armenia, this elite continuity was initially disguised by a subsequent “popular
uprising” against Soviet rule and/or by the victory of non-communists in the

“founding elections”, e. g. Estonia (1992), Romania (1990), Moldova (1994). In

Albania and Bulgaria, prominent communists won outright – even if they did not

remain in power for long. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, the “Stans” of Central Asia, not
only did they win but they or their descendants are still in power!56

In pacted transitions, institutions are more likely to emerge out of what

were originally temporary compromises and pragmatic expediencies involving a

range of elites and may not even resemble anything that the actors preferred in
the first place. Spain is a particularly interesting case where the Left abandoned
its previous opposition to monarchy, the Right agreed to the legalization of the

Communist Party and eventually conceded the devolution of authority to the

regional and municipal levels, and the present set of institutions has come to be

accepted by virtually all groups, except Basque nationalists.

Reformist transitions are also likely to produce compromised outcomes,

but engage a more heterogenous range of groups less respectful of established

interests from the previous autocracy. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the clearest
example in this category. Its uneasy compromise between an ambiguous (and
indirectly elected) presidency and a dualist system of national representation

proved unsuccessful, although there are signs that both the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic have moved ahead to CoD without each other.

38
ED.Chapter Six

Revolutions, needless to say, offer the widest field for choice and

experimentation, but seem to have singular difficulties in the self-limitation of

executive power. Nicaragua offers a particularly interesting example since it did

make a protracted effort to constitutionalize its regime some seven years after
the demise of a personalistic autocracy, without much success.
These examples suggest that politicians will not always be successful in

establishing a “fitting” type of democracy, i.e. one that is appropriate for

prevailing socio-economic conditions and acceptable to them and the citizenry.

In the worst scenario, they will fail to do so before the inevitable desencanto
(disenchantment) sets in or a populist electoral backlash wipes out their

accomplishments. But, as we have argued several times above, that does not
necessary condemn the polity to regress to the autocratic statu quo ante. It is

much more likely that democracy in its most generic sense will persist, but
not be consolidated into a specific and reliable set of rules or practices or

be only partially consolidated in some kind of hybrid regime. Many countries

seem "condemned" for the foreseeable future to remain at least nominally
democratic only because no feasible alternative mode of domination is

(presently) available.

What Constitutes the Core?

[PLACE FIGURE 6-1 HERE]

39
ED.Chapter Six

The core of the model proposed in Figure 6-1 consists of a series of

successive transformations in political patterns and structures at the level of

national state regimes. Put simply, the primary (but by no means exclusive)
determinant of the extent of consolidation and type of democracy is the

mode of transition. This, in turn, is linked backwards to the type of previous

authoritarian regime, which is related to the nature of previous democracy (if
any). Another way of putting these assumptions is that there is relatively

40
ED.Chapter Six

autonomous, endogenous political trajectory which forms the core of the change

process. It is propelled forward (or backward, as the case may be) by

cooperative and conflictual interactions around a series of critical decisions and

events -- the outcome of which is determined by relative power relations and, to a

lesser extent, by common norms and habits.
Surrounding that core are the five processes whose occurrence we have

argued in Chapter Four are necessary if democracy is to be consolidated, but

whose relative timing helps to determine the specific type of democracy that will

emerge from the process:

1. The drafting, revising or reviving of a democratic constitution by

widespread consensus;

2. The effective assertion of civilian control over the military;

3. The holding of ‘founding elections’ under inclusive and

consensual rules;

4. The formation of a viable set of competing political parties;

5. The selection of a legislative-executive format by consensus;

6. The selection and effective application of a formula for territorial

government, again, by consensus.

These are the ‘classical’ institutions of all REDs and few observers would

doubt their primacy. Variations of them are frequently used to identify different

types of REDs. However, two other partial regimes have grown in importance

and deserve equivalent status. Moreover, in the present context, they are often

among the most controversial to consolidate:

7. The establishment of rules concerning the formation and

operation of organizations in civil society (associations and
movement.

41
ED.Chapter Six

8. The agreement of all political forces on the rules governing the

ownership and access to mass media.

Under normal circumstances, Items 5 & 6 will be prominently included in the

constitution which sometimes may also formalize the rules under which elections

are to be held (Item 3). Holding ‘founding elections’ under consensual and

inclusive rules is likely to contribute to the formation of a viable (if not popular) set

of political parties (Item 4). Virtually all constitutions also enshrine a roughly

similar list of civic and human rights, including freedom of assembly, association

and petition (viz. Items 7 & 8). What is, however, essential for the consolidation

process is not just the nominal fulfillment of these tasks, but the widespread

consensus among rulers and citizens concerning the institutions that make this

possible. And this consensus must be extended to crucial aspects of “enabling

legislation” and “standard operating procedures” that can affect their

effectiveness. For example, it is one thing to formally declare “freedom of

speech” and quite another to determine who has access to media, how public

messages may be censored, what social movements can say and do without fear

of retribution, when trade unions can use strikes and demonstrations to back up

their demands or how associations can raise and spend money – not to mention

how governments can use discretion in distributing subsidies and exemptions to

them.

REDs differ considerably in the specifics of how they fulfilled these seven

processes, hence, the notion of types of democracy based on different

combinations of them. They also differ in the extent to which their politicians and

citizens are satisfied with the results produced by these partial regimes – and

42
ED.Chapter Six

may even be actively seeking to change them. As we have seen, this is not

necessarily a sign of “un- or de-consolidation” – providing that these actors

respect the limits and conform to the norms of existing partial regimes in their

efforts to change them.

Other political transformations intrinsic to the democratization process are of

secondary or derived importance, according to our conception of CoD. From the

institutional-behavioral approach elaborated in the previous essay, we assume

that if a widespread consensual agreement can be reached about these partial

regimes (whatever the content of that agreement) and if this consensus can be

effectively applied (if necessary, against the resistance of dissenting minorities),

the polity will have (minimally) consolidated its core institutions and passed an

(irrevocable) threshold which makes it highly likely that other (often highly

desirable) transformations will follow. Some of these have been given

considerable prominence in discussions of CoD by other scholars and even been

used as defining characteristics of it:

1. The formation of a system of political parties with which citizens

identify and that they support and trust.

2. The reduction of volatility in voting behavior.

3. The elimination of non-democratic players from the political game.

4. The installation of a system of “horizontal accountability” between

independent institutions of government

5. The conformity of all levels of government to similar democratic

norms.

6. The recognition by most citizens that their governments are

legitimately democratic.

43
ED.Chapter Six

7. The attainment of a stable “class compromise” between capital and

labor.

8. The accession to executive office by an opposing candidate or party.

9. The effective application of the rule of law and the protection of

human rights.

10. The creation of an effective and ‘neutral’ apparatus of state

administration.

11. The formation of a supportive political culture.

Theories of “ideal-potentially-existing democracy” would lengthen the list

further to include an even wider range of desirable outcomes that citizens may

expect from “government by the people.” Most of them have yet to be delivered

by REDs, but they are still worth striving for:

1. The channeling of all social conflicts through established public

institutions and their peaceful resolution.

2. The reduction of social and economic inequalities.

3. The elimination of all forms of corruption by public officials.

4. The reduction of executive domination over policy-making.

5. The elimination of poverty.

6. The equalization of treatment and benefits between men and women.

7. The elimination of all forms of racial and religious discrimination.

8. The elimination of all neo-patrimonial and clientelist practices.

9. The equal weighting of all votes, regardless of constituency.

10. The elimination of collusion between political parties in the electoral

process.

11. The punishment of past officials for offenses against human rights.

12. The attainment of social justice.

44
ED.Chapter Six

In the real world of injustice, imperfection, compromise, conflicting priorities

and incommensurate values, newly emerging, potential REDs will be fortunate if

they can initially satisfy the first eight minimalist criteria and then get started on

the subsequent eleven attainable ones. The last twelve maximalist ones may

have to wait for some time.

In Figure 6-1 above, the minimalist core of institutions is depicted as involving

a set of possible policies that may be taken by politicians trying to CoD. None of

them are necessary, but any of them could alter significantly the eventual

outcome – for better or for worse.

1. The formation of provisional government(s);

2. The imposition of major structural changes in property

rights or the distribution of income;

3. The revision of internal territorial boundaries or distribution

of state authority;

4. The negotiation of military, political, economic or social

pacts.

What Surrounds the Core?

45
ED.Chapter Six

46
ED.Chapter Six

The core political trajectory is not purely endogenous. The actors who make the

crucial choices depend upon exogenous sources of support and inspiration.

Hence, the trajectory can be altered once in place and deflected in new

directions by changes in those "facilitating conditions" that were discussed

above:

(1) Socio-economic trends: different rates of regional developmental,

increased disparities in the distributive impact of policies, evolution in
the mode of insertion into the international system and/or demographic
changes affecting ethno-linguistic cleavages;

(2) Unexpected intrusions: war, armed invasion or threat by foreigners,

natural disasters and/or, more recently, terrorist attacks;

(3) Cyclical disturbances: trade depressions, crises in foreign

indebtedness, massive unemployment, product obsolescence and/or
the downturn of "long waves";

(4) Shifts at the international system: in norms, military alliances,

political allegiances and/or regional arrangements.

Knowing (or better, strongly suspecting) that something exogenous can

affect CoD is not the same thing as knowing how it does so or in what direction
its impact will be felt. For example, the advent of a guerrilla or terrorist

movement using violence against an embryonic democracy accused of having

betrayed the ideals of the struggle against the previous autocracy can even have
a beneficial impact upon consolidation (Venezuela in the early 1960s; perhaps,

contemporary Spain with the Basques) or it can undermine it quite significantly

(Argentina after 1973). Some international interventions and even foreign

occupations seem to have contributed substantially to a democratic outcome

(Italy, Western Germany, Japan, Austria); others have left a quite different legacy
(Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, South Korea, the
Philippines, Panama). Conspiracies by the military or other armed groups to

47
ED.Chapter Six

seize power by coup during a consolidation, where unsuccessful or disarmed

early enough (Portugal in 1974 and 1975; Spain in 1981; Argentina in 1985) can
lead to a rallying-around the nascent regime. Otherwise, they may simply be

successful in deposing it (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Thailand,

Nigeria on numerous occasions; Turkey at regular ten-year intervals).
Nor can we be so sure a priori about the impact of the trends indicated in

Figure 6.1. Even that "favorite" of development theory -- economic growth -- has
long been questioned57 and further examined in the case of Latin America.58 J.

H. Plumb makes the ironic observation that in Seventeenth Century England,

political instability was endemic while social stability was exceptionally high. In

the following century, political stability was attained -- precisely when social
instability had greatly increased. He makes an effort to explain the apparent

paradox by suggesting, on the one hand, that socio-economic experimentation

and growth is fostered by the climate of relatively stable expectations produced

by a well-established polity and, on the other, that human beings have a certain
capacity for expressive action which they may shift from one domain to
another -- from that of socio-economic self-advancement to that of political

self-promotion (and vice-versa) -- depending on external, even accidental,

incentives.59 Might not the same sort of dialectical effect be at work in linking a

country's "mode & extent of insertion in the international economic system" to its
"type & extent of democratic consolidation", pace orthodox "dependency theory"

that postulates a linear, asymmetric and negative relationship between the two?

As for the trade, product, indebtedness and employment cycles sketched

at the bottom of Figure 6.1, it is easier to hypothesize about their relationship to
CoD. When they are on the downswing -- and especially when they co-vary to

produce a full-fledged, multi-dimensional crisis -- these factors certainly

complicate the consolidation process.60 Authoritarian regimes typically leave a

48
ED.Chapter Six

very difficult economic legacy to their successors, but to some extent, the timing

of consolidation bears a fortuitous relation to these cycles which are largely

determined by other forces. In the case of those mysterious Kondratiev, 50 year

“long waves," some countries may be just lucky enough to democratize on their
upswing and others will have to cope with the downswing – but the former does
not guarantee success nor does the latter guarantee failure.

In Figure 6.1 the attentive reader will find an error variable in the upper
right hand corner. It has been labeled: virtù and fortuna. Machiavelli thought

50% of the variance in outcomes could be explained by the latter and placed a
great deal of emphasis on the former in explaining the rest. Euphemistically

called "leadership" in some analyses and misleadingly labeled "charisma" in

others, we have assigned a residual status to the competence, imagination and

audacity of individual leaders. Leonardo Morlino has suggested that they

deserve more explicit attention than our structural and collectivist bias has

assigned to them, and certainly in some recent cases, a populist-plebiscitary

component centering on a single person has been in evidence.61 It is has
become abundantly clear, however, that these concentrations of personal power

are not conducive to the consolidation of democratic institutions.

Conclusion
Finally, Figure 6-1 suggests that, once CoD has been reached, we should

concentrate our attention on explaining two dependent variables or macro-

outcomes:

(1) The Type of Democracy, i.e. the usual "empirical" one of

whether the emergent mix of partial regimes manages to
coalesce into a stable Gestalt regarded as legitimately
democratic, or whether it merely persists as an incoherent or

49
ED.Chapter Six

hybrid aggregation of core and ancillary practices contested by

various participants;

(2) The Quality of Democracy, i.e. the more unusual "normative"

one of trying to assess whether consolidation has been
accomplished in such a way that it precludes further extensions
of the citizenship principle -- or whether it opens up the
probability that the mechanisms of accountability via equality of
rights, obligations and conditions will expand to cover new
arenas, issues and institutions.

De Tocqueville is famous for his view that democratic equality could not

be granted in some domains and denied in others, that it was an "irresistible

force", a fact "which a government can claim to regulate, but not to stop".62 With

hindsight, this telos seems less compelling. Unsuspected compatibilities

between different forms of inequality have been discovered and unanticipated
compromises between different interests have been established.63 The rules and
institutions of consolidated democracy have not infrequently been used against,

rather than in favor of, further extensions of the citizenship principle into
economic and social domains.

Nevertheless, as we shall discuss in Chapter Twenty, outcomes in NEDs

should be evaluated not just according to how long these regimes are expected
to last, but also how likely they are to hold rulers accountable, to diminish existing

social inequalities, to tackle the problem of concentrations of private economic

power, to be accessible to new political issues and groups and, in general, to

extend the realm of civic equality, tolerance and deliberation throughout the

society. In short, the consolidation of democracy should be understood as

representing the beginning, not the end of politics.

* ENDNOTES: CHAPTER SIX *

50
ED.Chapter Six

1
A better term than contextuality might have been conditionality, but this
has already been appropriated in practice by the IMF in its economic version and
the EU in its political version.
2
Another way of putting this is to stress the inter-dependent, non-linear and
non-additive nature of causality in such situations and, hence, the utter
inappropriateness of quantitative analyses that rely on tools of statistical
estimation that make the opposite assumptions, namely, bi-variant or multi-
variant regressions. Much more appropriate are those that take into account
“conjunctural causation”and are capable of following different trajectories and co-
incidents, such as QCA.
3
Although it should be noted that the past "advantage" of British
imperialism seems to have diminished -- if one excludes the mini-island-states of
the Caribbean and South Pacific. Not much of its democratic heritage seems to
rubbed off on Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman and so forth. In Africa, the ex-
British colonies have been no less likely to adopt some form of autocracy;
indeed, most of the recent movement towards the holding of national conventions
and the demise of personalistic dictatorships has been taking place in the ex-
French colonies. The alleged "virtue" of occupation by a victorious democratic
army was always based on a selective sample (Germany, Japan, Austria, Italy
and the Dominican Republic) and conveniently overlooked some less successful
cases (Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, South Korea and the Philippines). Presently, the
difficulty of consolidating democracy in Panama should raise some question
about what kind of rule is likely to follow invasion by the United States.
4
Which is not to say that the institutions and rules they choose have to be
identical to those of already consolidated REDs. What counts are effective
mechanisms that citizens and their representatives can reliably use to hold rulers
accountable. How far these can deviate from those already in use (but often
already in decay) in REDs is a disputable matter, hence, the proliferation of
negative adjectives that seek to demean or even dis-qualify neo-democracies:
pseudo-, partial-, defective, illiberal, delegative and so forth. We invite these
present-day guardians of democratic purity to reflect back on the history of their
respective REDs and recall the amount of corruption, malapportionment,
electoral fraud, vote buying, social exclusion, ethnic discrimination, class bias,
executive privilege, etc. that had to be overcome during their formative years.
Of course, to attain the strictly nominal status of RED today, all that counts is
being admitted to the club by meeting some rather vague procedural niceties. It
also seems to help if the polity in question has a particularly strategic location or
material resource that is prized by REDs.
5
One of the major weaknesses affecting contemporary democratizers is
decline of faith in ideologies, especially of utopian ones, by mass publics. In part,
this is the side-product of the absence of “revolutionary” modes of transition since
1974. These MoTs have tended to rely heavily on an all-embracing, future-

51
ED.Chapter Six

oriented set of beliefs to drive the choice (and mis-choice) of their institutions.
But it is also due to a more general decline in the plausibility of such
comprehensive visions of a “radiant future”. Unable to conjure up such a
mesmerizing image, contemporary CoD tends to be more afflicted with the dark
shadow of the autocratic past. This, in turn, may help to explain why post-1974
democracies have introduced so few institutional innovations. The dominant
sentiment seems to be to produce a “normal present” which means to imitate as
closely as possible the institutions of pre-existing democracies – precisely at the
moment when these institutions have been declining in support and legitimacy.
We shall return to this theme in the concluding chapter .
6
Which is one reason why exclusively “elitist” theories of democratization
are so incomplete. Elites may come up with a consensus among themselves
during the transition and they may even succeed in getting it formally ratified, but
unless citizens subsequently accept these intra-elite rules as a legitimate
expression of what they think is appropriately democratic for their society, regime
consolidation will not occur.. Higley, J., Wesołowski, W., & Pakulski, J. (Eds.).
Postcommunist elites and democracy in Eastern Europe. (London: St. Martin's
Press, 1998.)
7
Consolidated democracies, by definition, are expected to survive – even if
that entails changing their institutions – but surviving democracies may not be
consolidated. However defective or hybrid, they may persist due to the absence
of a plausible alternative or to just plain good fortune.
8
Exiles, needless to say, pose a special problem depending on the length
of their stay outside the country and the extent of socio-economic change that
has occurred since their departure. It was said of the royalist exiles from the
French Revolution that, when they returned after the defeat of Napoleon, “ils
n’ont rien oublié et rien appris.” However, such an experience could also "de-
parochialize" its victims. They may even return with some new solutions to old
national problems -- especially if they spent their time abroad in an innovative
and successful democracy.
9
The reader will note that we have not included on the list: (6) If the
preceding autocracy was not soviet-communist. It is virtually an act of faith
among former Sovietologists that this constitutes a major impediment to CoD.
For our discussion (and rejection) of this assumption, see the excursus at the
end of Chapter Four and Chapter Fifteen.
10
Stepan, A. C., & Linz, J. J.,”Toward consolidated democracies,” Journal of
Democracy, 7(2), (1996), pp. 14-33.
11
Although violently contested in the case of the Basque country in Spain.

52
ED.Chapter Six

12
Portugal is an interesting partial exception in that very soon in the
transition major territorial changes occurred through the loss of its African and
Asian colonies, and also a relatively large number of civil servants were
dismissed or retired early. Its “Revolução” gave the momentary impression of a
thorough-going collapse of the Portuguese state, even if this subsequently
proved illusory. A rather similar illusion occurred as the result of the initially
chaotic situation in Romania.
13
We shall take up this issue of “stateness” and “state capacity” again in
Chapter Seventeen.
14
To use a currently fashionable notion, regime transitions virtually by
definition are “critical junctures” which not only bring to bear a distinctive
combination of causal factors but are capable of producing outcomes that were
previously unimaginable and yet durable. Collier, R. B., & Collier, D., Shaping
the political arena: critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics
in Latin America. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
15
It should be noted that these birth defects can be "genetic" in the sense
that they are deeply rooted in the country's past, or they can be "obstetric" in the
sense that they are created by decisions taken during the transition itself.
16
See Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, "The Role of Interim Government",
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 73-89, where the
problems associated with such transitional features are discussed in detail.
17
In this segment of the argument, we will discuss exclusively the domestic
bases of cleavage and capacity. The impact of international conditions upon
CoD deserves a separate treatment which the reader will find in Chapter Seven.
18
We associate this idea, that democracy requires social cleavages, with
Seymour Martin Lipset, especially his Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday &
Co., 1960). Also S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter
Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).
19
The exception would be the state's monopoly over the legitimate exercise
of violence, as well as certain representational and security functions in the
international system.
20
Our inspiration for this hypothesis was probably Robert Dahl, Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971),
although James Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, may have been the first to
express it.
21
Although they are rarely mentioned in the pre-requisites literature, size
and geographic location are fairly consistently associated with the acquisition of

53
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RED status. Small countries seem to do better – even when they lack many
other attributes – as testified by so many of the island parliamentary
democracies in the Caribbean and Pacific, not to mention the early under-
developed European successes in Scandinavia and Switzerland. More recently,
location seems to have been a factor in the markedly rapid and thorough CoDs of
those post-Communist polities that are closest to Bruxelles and, hence, were
more plausible candidates for membership in the EU.
22
Note that we are referring to the consolidation, not the persistence of
democracy. Growth may contribute to a reputation for effectiveness that may
help with survival, but that may not be translated into legitimacy for the
institutions and practices that emerge from the transition. Moreover, growth is
likely to be ephemeral and highly contingent on external factors beyond the
control of domestic politicians. What counts in the longer run is precisely
whether citizens remain loyal to the rules and trust the institutions they establish,
even when the regime is not performing well. Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F.,
“Political regimes and economic growth”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
7(3), 1993, pp. 51-69. Chubb, J. E., “Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics
of state elections.” American Political Science Review, 82(01), (1988), pp. 133-
154.)
23
A more subtle hypothesis would link the likelihood of democratization, not
to the level or rate of economic growth, but to "product cycles" in the
development of capitalism. James Kurth has argued that textiles brought
democracy to early industrializers, just as heavy industry brought authoritarian
rule with later industrializers. "Industrial Change and Political Change: A
European Perspective," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I 979), pp. 318-62. The problem
with this provocative idea is that, in the contemporary period, it is not so easy to
determine what the leading industrial sector is for many economies and it is not
yet clear what the impact upon regime type will be for such sectors as micro-
electronics, bio-technology or "post-industrial" services.
24
As we shall see in Chapter Twelve.
25
This has been recognized in more recent treatments. See, for example,
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in
Developing Countries, 4 vols. (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1988-90).

26
Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible why such utterly improbable
cases as Albania, Mongolia and Papua-New Guinea did not revert to autocracy
some time ago.
27
Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics, Vol.
2, (1970), pp. 337-363.

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ED.Chapter Six

28
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Moore, in this same work, proposed two other
historical prerequisites: (1) “No revolution, no bourgeoisie;” and (2) “No
bourgeoisie, no democracy,” pp. 418-419, 423-425. In the contemporary world,
we would not accept either as inevitably necessary conditions for CoD – unless
globalization or regionalization has made it possible to borrow someone else’s
revolution and/or bourgeoisie.
29
Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy?" Working Paper, No. 173,
Helen Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame (March 1992), for an early
version; and Guillermo O’Donnell, "On the State: Democratization and Some
Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some
Postcommunist Countries", World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1993),
pp. 1355-1370, for a later statement.

30
According to the data reported in The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965), Italy certainly did not have a civic culture in the early
1960s when the pioneering comparative survey was made. This clearly alarmed
the co-authors, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, and they inferred that Italian
democracy was precarious. (For that matter, the data on West Germany was not
all that comforting). Nevertheless, despite its cynical, alienated "uncivic" culture,
Italy managed to consolidate its regime successfully. See the retort by Giacomo
Sani in the follow-up volume: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic
Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), pp. .
31
Samuel Huntington in his The Third Wave (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 77-85 has stressed the change in the role of
Catholics with regard to democracy, but in a rather bizarre cultural twist he
attributes the liberation of Latin America from authoritarian rule to -- the Catholic
Church of the United States!
32
Samuel Huntington has exposed the root assumptions with characteristic
bluntness: "A profoundly antidemocratic culture would impede the spread of
democratic norms in the society, deny legitimacy to democratic institutions, and
thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and effective functioning of
those institutions." In “Democracy's third wave,” Journal of Democracy, 2(2),
1991, pp. .
33
There are also those who would question that any non-Western culture is
incapable of sustaining democracy, including the various versions of Eastern
Orthodoxy: Serbian, Rumanian, Russian, Ukrainian, and so forth.
34
Needless to say, this argument applies even more insistently to superficial
and over-generalized arguments about “civilizations” such as are advanced in

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ED.Chapter Six

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World

Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
35
Schneider, C. Q., & Schmitter, P. C. (2004). „Liberalization, transition and
consolidation: Measuring the components of democratization.” Democratization,
11(5), (2004), pp. 59-90.
36
Although most REDs also have within their institutional matrix some non-
or a-democratic institutions with participants whose term in office may not be not
formally limited or contingent upon popular approval: judges in supreme or
constitutional courts, military officers in general staffs, officials in central banks,
technocrats in independent regulatory agencies.
37
O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, p. 57-64.
38
Presidential and semi-presidential democracies tend to impose a fixed
rhythm upon the political process according to term in office and conditions for
re-election. Nevertheless, mid-term elections can disrupt this rhythm, as can the
results of public opinion polls, and produce interim, “lame-duck,” weaknesses.
Parliamentary regimes would appear to have more flexible schedules, but this
too may vary considerably if the dissolution of an existing government depends
on a “constructive vote-of-no-confidence.” Germany, for example, pioneered in
this institutional innovation and has subsequently had national elections at a
rhythm that hardly differs from most presidential ones. What is not clear is the
effect that these different executive arrangements have upon the calculations by
opposing politicians that it is prudent to stay in the democratic game, rather than
try to overthrow it.
39
. This viewpoint seems deeply imbedded in the North American literature on
political development and democratic theory. Two representative examples are
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven:
Yale University Press.) and Pennock, James Roland. Democratic political theory.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.). Based on this logic, the former
solemnly predicted in 1984 that no more democracies were likely to emerge!
“Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99, pp.
193-218).
40
Plumb, J. H., The Growth of Political Stability in England (London:
Macmillan, 1967, p.172)
41
. One can, of course, imagine situations where opposition forces engage in
bargaining with representatives of the authoritarian regime about such key
institutions as the electoral code and conditions for recognition of political parties
-- before elections are held and the first legislature meets. At the extreme,
consolidation might even precede transition, although that would certainly be the
exception rather than the rule. Chile provides an interesting example of this.

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ED.Chapter Six

When Chilean opposition leaders accepted Gen. Pinochet's "offer" to participate

in the plebiscite of 1988, after having negotiated with his representatives to
obtain what they regarded as fair conditions for its being held, they in effect
began consolidating the institutions of a possible future democracy along lines
(and deadlines) dictated by the 1980 constitution octroyée by the authoritarian
regime. Even before they could possibly have known that they would win the
plebiscite and, thereby, trigger a genuine transition, they were establishing the
rules and practices that would subsequently limit their own behavior. Admittedly,
after the December 1989 elections and even before formally taking power in
March 1990, they began efforts to slice away some of the more egregiously
undemocratic aspects of the constitution they had de facto approved, but there
remains a great deal more to be accomplished before Chile can be said to have
democratic institutions that are "reliably known, regularly practiced and
[especially] generally accepted."
42
. Completely independently of this speculation and using a radically
different methodology (statistical analysis of aggregate data), two scholars have
come to almost the same conclusion (Gasiorowski and Power, 1996). They found
in their data set (composed of all attempts at democratization from 1948 to 1992)
that the percentage of those remaining democratic was marked lower during the
first twelve post-transition years, but that “after twelve years the percentages fell
much more slowly.” They subsequently used “Twelve Year Duration” as the best
of their three indicators for consolidation.
In his quantitative exploration of the duration of different types of regimes,
Ted Robert Gurr inductively comes up with the finding that until fifteen years
almost any outcome is possible, but thereafter persistence becomes markedly
more likely (Gurr, 1974).
43
Dahl R., Democracy and its Critics, New Haven : Yale University Press,
1989: p.315.
44
. Just in case this rule of thumb makes contemporary democratizers
overconfident, they should ponder the fate of Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s --
both of which had enjoyed many decades of relatively well-consolidated
democracy before it was overthrown by their own military. The current travails of
Venezuela, Colombia and India also encourage sobriety in this regard.
Since writing this, we have come across an article by Harry Eckstein in
which he concludes on the basis of observations from Western Europe: “Thus a
plan to democratize fully should probably cover some twenty-five years -- more
or less, depending on local conditions” (N.D.: 27).
45
. According to Gasiorowski & Power, the odds were slightly less than 2:1
against democracy’s succeeding in the first 12 years for the entire 1948-1992
period. Of the 48 cases for which twelve years of data were available,
democracy broke down in 30 and survived in 18.

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ED.Chapter Six

46
Linz and Stepan, 1996a and b
47
Rustow, Dankwart A. "Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic
model." Comparative politics (1970): 337-363.
48
A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
49
Plumb J. H., The Growth of Political Stability in England (London:
Macmillan, 1967, pp.11-16)
50
Grosso modo, this sequence follows that outlined in T. H. Marshall,
Citizenship and Social Class (London: Cambridge University Press, 1950) which
is hardly an accident given the "exemplary" status of Great Britain in most of the
literature.
51
Democracy cannot be used to determine the boundaries or identity of the
political unit that is to be democratized. Nor can it be used to terminate armed
conflict or to establish basic security. These parameters are the product of
complex, historical and usually violent processes – not to mention marriage,
fertility and sheer accident. Where democracy can be very useful is in the
subsequent strengthening of borders and identities, as well as providing
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of further conflicts.
52
If one leaves aside the odd case of Switzerland whose antique forms of
direct democracy in the mountains and patrician oligarchy in the plains
anteceded capitalism -- and subsequently proved astonishingly compatible with it
(after some major modifications in the 1870s).
53
On the role of “focal points” in bringing about agreement in complex and
conflictual situations, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p 57.
54
Even manifestly un-democratic institutions may provide a focal institution
that can facilitate other institutional choices, especially if it has firm links to the
past. The role of monarchy is an obvious case-in-point – although relatively few
countries have one that enjoys the requisite legitimacy.
55
More controversial is the notion that certain regions of the world have
developed a habit for adopting a specific type of democracy, presumably
because it has worked well in "model cases" within the region, if not in the
country specifically concerned. Presidentialism, for example, is an alleged Latin
American habit. Except for the historical case of Great Britain and the recent
experience of the French Fifth Republic, we doubt that any European RED -- new
or old -- could refuse to adopt some form of proportional representation for its
parliamentary elections.

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ED.Chapter Six

56
Except for Tajikistan where a popular “colored” uprising displaced the
former Communist dictator in 20??.
57
Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic- Authoritarianism,
(Berkeley: University of California Institute for International Studies, 1973) and
Guillermo O'Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina in Comparative
Perspective, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
58
Collier, David (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
59
Plumb, J.H., Growth of Political Stability in England: 1675-1725, (London:
Macmillan, 1967).
60
But they do not necessarily impede it. See Karen Remmer "Democracy
and Economic Crisis: the Latin American Experience", World Politics, 42 (April
1990), pp. 315-335, for a very convincing argument that neo-democracies are not
less competent at implementing austerity and structural readjustment programs
than entrenched autocracies.
61
Morlino, Leonardo, "Consolidamento democratico: alcuni ipotesi
esplicative," Revista Italiana di Scienza Politica, (Vol. XVI, 1986), pp. 197-238.
62
See the discussion of this aspect of Tocqueville's work in J. T. Schleifer,
The Making of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 263-264).
63
No one is better at finding these than Adam Przeworski in his Democracy
and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin
America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

59