Abstract

    The covid-19 global pandemic  many countries affects of covid-19, an our

environment, economics, and health crisis. Our country to facing that this

covid-19 pandemic to fighting, by safetying the people and experience the

lockdown on March 2020. In our government they strictly inspection to the

crossing borders by implementing travel authority requirements and healthy

protocols for shouldn't spread of covid-19. The crossing borders inspection to

the land, sea and air during covid-19, How the people do to travel if they want

to go home?, How the rules and policies strictly inspection implemented?, and

the guidelines of the safety health protocols implemented. The cross-border

activities potentially bring the illegal movement to both the people and the

goods. Should build border management and border control policies that able

to overcome those challenges with the Coordinated Border Management

(CBM) strategy. This examining with a analysis of government reports, journal

articles, or any related documents. This case study by collecting data through

internet or website's the internal and external aspects of border agencies,

especially the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), Local Government Unit's

(LGU's) and our government to thier following guidelines. This paper affirmed

that immigration and border control policy should be reassessed and updated

to comply with the rapid development of globalization.

            Keywords: borders, community,covid-19, inspection, travel

Introduction

       Borders and border institutions provide an illustrative and dynamic

context to examine resilience. In a year 2020 has showed that borders can

rapidly transform from open to closed, creating abrupt and exceptional

circumstances for border-landers and border crossers. In Finland, for

example, the guidelines on border-crossing have a anged every month since

March2020. Border and mobility regulations affect populations at large,

demonstrating that borderlanders are not only those who reside in proximity to

the border. A borderlander can be anyone who has connections to places

across borders in the form of property ownership or family or other personal or

professional connections. Us, as emphasized by Andersen and Prokkola

(2022), border studies have great potential in contributing to understanding of

social resilience.“

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory

syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first reported in Wuhan, China,

in late 2019. Thereafter, the disease rapidly spread worldwide via travelers,

and the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic on 11 March

2020. Most countries have adopted control measures to mitigate the

transmission of SARS-CoV-2, including border closures to prevent the entry of

infected travelers. The association between migratory movements and

COVID-19 outbreaks and SARS-CoV-2 in-flight transmission has been

reported in some studies. Nevertheless, the impact of border control in

containing the global spread of COVID-19 and the best approach to lift these
restrictions safely are still not established. One study found that screening of

travelers at entry and isolation of test-positive cases reduced the average

case importation by >90% and that the average reduction in secondary cases

was 88.2%–92.1%, whereas findings of another study suggested that 90%

travel restriction alone only modestly affected the epidemic trajectory. Other

studies have identified situations in which travel restrictions are considered

effective, such as countries with low COVID-19 incidence and large numbers

of arrivals from other countries. However, the existing evidence is based

exclusively on modeling studies.After the emergence of new variants of

SARS-CoV-2, such as VOC-202012/01 and 501Y.V2, many countries have

strengthened border control measures, including pretravel and posttravel

screening tests, to avoid importation of these variants. Considering the limited

capacity of screening tests, compared with the large number of travelers after

widespread reopening of international borders, a more precise assessment of

COVID-19 epidemiology and the high- and low-risk populations at airport and

port quarantine stations is urgently needed for prioritization. To inform policy-

making decisions regarding international travel restrictions and easing of

border control, we assessed the association between COVID-19 test positivity

on arrival and traveler characteristics, including the epidemic situation in the

countries of stay and the use of travel corridors between Japan and other

countries, an arrangement whereby the governments of 2 countries allow

people to travel directly between countries without observing some travel

restrictions.

Since the outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in late 2019, it

rapidly evolved and became a pandemic. As of 30th August 2021, there were
more than 216 million COVID-19 cases worldwide. The reported global

infection fatality rate was 0.15% in a systematic evaluations. To limit the scale

of local disease outbreak, many countries implemented travel restrictions to

countries experiencing COVID-19 countries despite the World Health

Organization (WHO)‘s advice to the contrary. Also, there is inadequate

scientific data to support border restriction as a public health measure and it’s

effectiveness in limiting local outbreak of an emerging infectious disease in

the presence of an established local transmission. Whether border restriction

can effectively limit local outbreak of COVID-19 is still debatable.

There has been great debate on the border restriction policy in Hong Kong

since early 2020. On 23rd January 2020, Hong Kong confirmed its first

imported case of COVID-19 from Hubei. In the subsequent weeks, the

number of imported cases rapidly rose despite initiation of various public

health measures. Medical professionals and the general public repeatedly

urged the Hong Kong government to close the Hong Kong-mainland border to

stop further influx. However, some questioned the effectiveness of such

measure as there was already sign of local transmission in Hong Kong. They

believed that border restriction is not useful in the presence of established

local transmissions as the final disease burden might be primarily driven by

local transmission instead of importing of foreign cases. While the COVID-19

situation is well controlled in 2021, there has been an urge to re-open the

Hong Kong-mainland border to allow resumption of business activities. Yet,

the Hong Kong and mainland China governments are hesitant on this. Hong

Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China

and border control exists between the two regions. Owing to the tight
geographical and socio-economic ties, more than forty-million individuals

travelled from mainland China to Hong Kong annually. There were also more

than 200,000 Hong Kong citizens travelling daily to mainland China before the

COVID-19 pandemics. Implementing border restrictions between Hong Kong

and mainland China has significant implication in both social and economic

aspects. As such, there has been great debate on this policy since early 2020.

A cross-border health measure can be broadly defined as action taken to

control movement of people (travel) or trade across two or more jurisdictions

with the stated intent of achieving a health goal. During the COVID-19

(coronavirus disease) pandemic, the number of countries adopting and

impacted by cross-border health measures has been unprecedented. While

up to 25% of countries adopted such measures during previous disease

outbreaks, virtually all countries have done so during the COVID-19

pandemic. Moreover, countries have adopted a wider range of measures than

previously observed and have implemented them in highly varied ways. In

turn, studies of cross-border health measures apply diverse, and sometimes

inconsistent, terminology to describe these practices. This has reduced the

comparability and generalizability of research findings. Media reporting has

likewise applied varied and sometimes misleading terms such as ‘border

closures’ and ‘travel bans’ despite few jurisdictions actually closing their

borders or banning travel. More precisely, a variety of measures have been

applied and lifted over time for controlling who travels and under specific

conditions. Importantly, this lack of clear and consistent definition persists at a

time of substantial debate about the legality and effectiveness of cross-border

health measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper argues that more precise and agreed definition is a starting point

for understanding why and how cross-border health measures are used and

to what effect. We begin by providing a brief background on the use of these

measures during COVID-19, the existing lack of definitional clarity and/or

consistency, and the implications for research, policy and practice. To

address this gap, we propose six ways to categorize cross-border health

measures. We integrate these categories into a proposed typology that can

be used, not only to advance research, but to guide decision makers when

making choices about the intended purpose, target and implementation of

cross-border health measures. We conclude that clear and consistent

definition, alongside an agreed typology, is an important starting point for

producing generalizable findings, comparative analyses, and evidence-

informed responses across jurisdictions. This includes future efforts to revise

and improve compliance with the World Health Organization (WHO)

International Health Regulations (IHR).

After declaring COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International

Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020, the IHR Emergency Committee initially

recommended against “any travel or trade restriction based on the current

information available”. Some States Parties had already adopted travel-

related restrictions prior to this declaration. Many more then immediately

disregarded WHO’s recommendation, prompting international legal scholars

to criticize States Parties for alleged non-compliance with the IHR. Individuals

and groups adversely affected by the restrictions, such as the tourism sector
and frontline humanitarian and medical professionals responding to the

pandemic called on governments to ease restrictions. As the pandemic

worsened, others criticized governments for not applying cross-border health

measures earlier and/or more stringently or for easing them prematurely. By

March 2020, use of travel-related measures became near universal.

Implementation was highly uncoordinated and somewhat chaotic, with cross-

border health measures being adopted in highly varying forms, duration, and

scope across the world. The result has been “a dangerous process of trial and

error”.

Terminology used by government, media and other commentators to describe

this near universal and varied use of cross-border health measures has also

lacked clarity and/or consistency. Governments seeking to reassure their

domestic populations, that strong action is being taken to reduce the risk of

SARS-CoV-2 importation, have often used language suggestive of sealed

borders or prohibited traffic from high-risk areas. Given their significant social

and economic impacts, cross-border health measures have attracted

substantial media attention, with terms such as “border closure” and “travel

ban” frequently used. In practice, few if any countries sealed their borders or

banned travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. These terms are misnomers of

actual practice, namely, to restrict selected traffic and manage remaining

cross-border movements. They have also obscured the varied practices that

countries have followed to achieve this.

Lack of clarity and/or inconsistency in terminology has not helped the

increasingly fraught debates about the legality and effectiveness of cross-

border health measures. Amid what Kenwick and Simmons describe as

growing “border anxiety” during the pandemic, the IHR stipulates that

“scientific principles” based on evidence should guide policy decisions. While

there is international agreement that decisions about the use of cross-border

health measures need to be evidence-informed, systematic reviews conclude

that the evidentiary base is limited at best. Most of what was previously known

about cross-border health measures is based on studies of pandemic and

seasonal influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV-1) and

Ebola virus. SARS-CoV-2 combines several features that distinguish it from

these previous outbreaks including being a respiratory (versus vector borne)

pathogen, having a high reproductive rate (person-to-person transmissibility),

and causing many asymptomatic or low-level symptomatic cases. As such,

previously held beliefs about cross-border health measures have been

questioned in relation to SARS-CoV-2. One systematic review, to assess the

effectiveness of “travel-related control measures” during COVID-19 (25

studies), as well as, outbreaks of SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory

Syndrome (MERS) (11 studies), finds that such measures “may help to limit

the spread of disease across national borders”. However, “confidence in these

results is limited” given their derivation from assumptions used in modelling

studies rather than “real life data”; substantial variation in what measures

studies analysed; and the lack of peer review. Our systematic review of

domestic and international “travel measures” implemented during the early

stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (29 studies) finds that the adoption of

travel measures led to important changes in the dynamics of the early phases

of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, most of the identified studies

investigated the initial export of cases out of Wuhan, which was found to be

highly effective, but few studies investigated the effectiveness of measures

implemented in other contexts.

We conclude that “there is an urgent need to address important evidence

gaps” including the specific cross-border health measures applied, the forms

of mobility being controlled, and the context in which they are applied. Most

analysis, for example, focus on travel while there has been little study of

health-related trade flows during the pandemic. There are also few, if any,

comparative analyses of how cross-border health measures have been used

in different settings, what factors have influenced their effectiveness at

achieving public health goals, and what wider societal effects have resulted.

Efforts to improve the evidentiary base on cross-border health measures have

been hindered, in turn, by the lack of clear and/or consistent definition. For

example, a decision framework by Zlojutro et al., to optimize border controls

for global outbreak mitigation, limits the definition of a border control

mechanism to “passenger screening upon arrival at airports (entry

screening)”. Habibi et al. exclude screening at ports of entry and exit as

“travel restrictions” but include “de facto travel restrictions” notably when

“airlines stop flying to places”. Iacus et al. focus their analysis on “air traffic

suspension” in “analysing the impact of travel bans on the aviation sector”.

Russell et al. define travel restrictions as “any measure that completely or

almost completely prevents international arrivals from contributing to local

transmission, such as entry bans and compulsory 14-day facility-based

quarantines”. Finally, the term non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) is

widely used in public health research, with different researchers including or

excluding cross-border measures.

Ultimately, clear and agreed terminology and definition is a critical starting

point to advancing shared understandings, cumulative knowledge and

ultimately scientific principles on the effective and appropriate use of cross-

border health measures during a PHEIC. Outbreaks that involve novel

pathogens like SARS-CoV-2, by virtue of being novel, pose challenges for

evidence-informed decision making because of knowledge gaps.

Nevertheless, it is possible to review and structure best available evidence

from previous outbreaks and known pathogens in ways that can inform

decision making choices. This begins, once again, with agreed terminology

and definition.

The Omicron variant (BA. 1 and its sister lineage BA. 2, formerly B. 1.1. 529.1

and B. 1.1. 529.2) was designated by the World Health Organization (WHO)

as a variant of concern (VOC) on 26 November 2021 (World Health

Organization 2021b) as it contains a large number of novel mutations, which

may enhance its transmissibility, immune escape, partial resistance to

vaccines, and severity profile (Torjesen 2021). Preliminary evidence also

suggests an increased risk of reinfection (World Health Organization 2021b).

Where monitored, Omicron has spread extremely quickly (eg, South Africa,

Botswana, and Ghana). In South Africa, Omicron was first detected on

November 8, 2021, yet it constituted 73% of November genome sequencing

data (National Institute for Communicable Diseases 2021). As of December

7th, Omicron has been detected in 57 countries worldwide (GISAID 2021).

Travel restrictions need to be implemented based on science (World Health

Organization 2021c), and decisions that are not assessed through an

evidence-informed approach will divide the international community,

undermining global information sharing and solidarity, making the pandemic

more harmful for all nations. Given these shortcomings, it is important to

evaluate which specific actions provide the best balance between benefits

and costs, and when the implementation of travel restrictions to reduce the

spread of the Omicron variant is necessary and beneficial. Here we offer a

summary of the considerations and a decision tree to help guide this

assessment.

 
Objectives

        This study of the travelers on borders inspection in how the PNP

personnel inspect the basics requirements to travellers to entry borders by:

      1. To identify and inspection the travel authority requirements to entry

borders.

      2. To prevent and control crimes, to maintain peace and order in every

borders.

      3. To inspect  the health protocols to the travelers in entry borders.

Materials and methods

      As a criminology intern as a part of mandate, we are not allowed to out

and gathering information or observations to the different agency or institution.

So, we just gather and collect a vital data from internet, all information are

internet based or web browsing or web archiving.

Results and discussion

  This study of the crossings borders inspection in how to develop and

implemented as results of the crossings borders. It is mportant to inspect

during COVID-19 pandemic in every borders it will not able to spread a covid-

19 and to prevent  crimes.

     A. Analysis

1. MINIMUM PUBLIC HEALTH STANDARDS, which include physical

distancing, hand hygiene, cough etiquette, and wearing of face masks and

face shields among others, SHALL BE STRICTLY IMPLEMENTED across all

settings.

2. Clinical and exposure assessment shall be strictly implemented in all ports

of entry and exit to ensure that only asymptomatic, non-close contact

individuals are allowed to travel or enter the local government unit of

destination. Health assessment of passengers, supervised by medical

doctors, shall be mandatory upon entry in the port/terminal and exit at point of

destination.

3. TESTING SHALL NOT BE MANDATORY FOR TRAVELER, except if the

LGU of destination (province, HUC, or ICC) will require testing as a

requirement prior to travel, and such shall be limited to RT-PCR.

4. NO TRAVELER SHALL BE REQUIRED TO UNDERGO QUARANTINE,

unless they exhibit symptoms upon arrival at the LGU of destination. TRAVEL

AUTHORITY issued by Joint Task Force COVID Shield AND HEALTH

CERTIFICATE SHALL NO LONGER BE REQUIRED.

5. Authorized Persons Outside of Residence (APORs) from national

government agencies and their attached agencies must provide their

identification card, travel order, and travel itinerary, and must pass symptom-

screening at ports of entry and exit pursuant to IATF Resolution No. 98-A

issued on 04 February 2021.

6. The Safe, Swift, and Smart Passage (S-PaSS) Travel Management System

of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) shall be

institutionalized as the one-stop-shop application/communication for travelers.

For this purpose, a focal person from the province with respect to their

municipalities and component cities, and from highly urbanized cities and

independent component cities shall be assigned.

7.. The StaySafe.ph System shall be utilized as the primary contact tracing

system. Traze App for airports, and such other existing contact tracing

applications must be integrated with the StaySafe.ph System following IATF

Resolution No. 85 issued on 25 November 2020.

8.All terminals must have assigned SUFFICIENT QUARANTINE/ISOLATION

FACILITIES.

9. All ports and terminals shall put in place a REFERRAL SYSTEM WHEREIN

TRAVELERS WHO BECOME SYMPTOMATIC SHALL BE TRANSFERRED

TO QUARANTINE/ISOLATION FACILITIES to enable the Bureau of

Quarantine for airports, or local health officials in case of LGUs, to take over.

10. For the National Capital Region (NCR), ALL BUSES BOUND FOR

PROVINCES SHALL BE REQUIRED TO USE THE INTEGRATED

TERMINAL EXCHANGE as the central hub for transportation. No bus

company or public transport shall be allowed use of their private terminals.

11. At their option, LGUs MAY PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR ALL

TRAVELERS WHO ARE TRANSITING FROM ONE LGU TO ANOTHER in

cases of arrivals at air and seaports to their end-point destinations.

12. The PNP shall enforce the law, prevent and control crimes, maintain

peace and order, and ensure public safety and internal security with the active

support of the community.

  B. Findings/Solution

  •. For unvaccinated and partially vaccinated, a negative RT-PCR or saliva

RT-PCR test result taken 3 days prior to travel. Children aged 11 and below

are exempted from this requirement. Negative RT-PCR test result taken within

72 hours before arrival or a negative antigen test result taken within 48 hours

prior to arrival or a negative saliva test result taken within 48 hours before

arrival.(Kelley Lee, Karen A. Grépin, …Mingqi Song.2021)

•Identification Card showing residence/proof of residence. LGU Certification

stating the essential travel of the non-APOR who must return immediately

within 24-hours upon issuance of said certification. Negative RT-PCR result, if

the resident non-APOR failed to return within 24-hours.

•To the documents are the S-pass, the result of your RT-PCR test (should be

negative, of course), the letter of acceptance from the LGU of the town, and a

health declaration required by the provinces of the Philippines for all travelers

passing through. Add to that a photostat copy of your government-issued ID

or Vali-Id. Preparing those documents need time. For one, the test for

COVID-19 should be taken 72 hours before the intended arrival. It is only

after you get the negative result that you can start applying for the S-Pass (go

to the S-Pass website and create an account).The next step is to coordinate

with the LGU of your destination to get the “notice of acceptance.” Needed for
this is the result of your RT-PCR test. An added requirement in my case was

the health declaration from the Philippines and returning provinces. I had to

go to the website to apply for the “Online health declaration card.” With the

two documents, you now go back to the S-Pass website to submit the

documents. When approved, you will get your S-Pass with the QR code.

(Kelley Lee, Karen A. Grépin, …Mingqi Song(2021)

• To the every crossing borders inspection it should to control crimes, law

enforcement, maintain peace and order. To check the healthy protocols to the

travellers in entering the provinces or cities  if there's proper wearing face

mask and  face shield. Also the travel requirements in every crossing borders

it should be a strictly checking or to inspect.

 Recommendations

      As a criminology intern the travelers on borders inspection, I recommend

this following:

•To the LGUs shall be allow to the community for the non-resident individuals

and to the travelers with indispensable and/or essential travels as well as non-

resident APORs who are not working/assigned in the Philippines and the

provinces, but, on official business to enter provide that they will be able to

present their S-PASS, Vaccination Card and negative test results.

•To the PNP shall be the border control checkpoints located at the land

crossing borders, sea, and Airport (collect called Border control checkpoints

Inspection) shall ramain, but it's function s shall be for purpose of clinical and

exposure assessment and to ensure that only asymptomatic, non-close

contact individuals are allowed to travel or enter the Philippines and also

returning provinces. The border control checkpoints shall continue and strictly

implement the use of the non-APORs, Valid-Id, Negative RT-PCR test, and

SAFE, SWIFT,and SMART Passage (S-PASS). Travel management system

in order to facilitate the contract tracing efforts for government. The Border

control checkpoints staff shall make a daily reporting to the LGUs concerned

and inform them of the travelers and/or individuals that are bound to thier

respective territorial jurisdiction for proper monitoring if they develop covid-19

symptoms.

• To the community should be know the travel authority requirements and the

healthy protocols by mandated to the LGUs, IATF and our government.

• To the travellers should be followed the mandated healthy safety protocols

for our government.

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