BALL.B. – Sem.

VII
Interpretation of Statute
Lecture: Legislative Intention

Dr. Kavitha Chalakkal

Kindly send your Q? to: kavithachalakkal@lloydlawcollege.edu.in
Unit 1 Introductory-

Introductory principles;
Meaning;
Purpose and Scope of Interpretation of Statutes;
Nature of statutes and their classification

Interpretation is relative to the document interpreted and

Divergent interpretation is natural
S.C. Advocates-on Record Association v. Union of India
1993 (4) SCC 441

Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying
the same value at all times and in all contexts.

They do not come in standard shapes and sizes like coins from the
mint, nor do they go forth with a degree to all the world that they
shall mean only so much, no more and no less.

Through its own particular personality each word has a penumbra

of meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away. It refuses to
be used as a mathematical symbol.
A principle of statutory interpretation embodies the policy of the law, which is in
turn is based on public policy;

The court presumes, unless the contrary intention appears, that the legislator
intended to conform to this legal policy;

A principle of statutory interpretation can therefore be described as a principle of

legal policy formulated as a guide to legislative intention.

In the process of identifying the true meaning of the Act, the courts have evolved the
principles of legal interpretation;

Normally, intent of legislature is the principle of interpretation, in case of possibility

of more than one interpretation, the interpretation which will support the legislature
intention will be accepted. Intention accepted from the language used
Intention of legislature
It may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to
speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although
there has been an omission to enact it;

In a court of law, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only
be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words
or by reasonable and necessary implication.

It is expected that the legislative language will leave little room for interpretation or
construction.

However, lot of ambiguous words and expressions and resolving inconsistencies;

After enactment legislature becomes functus officio, i.e it cannot interpret it itself.
 In one aspect, it carries the concept of meaning, ie
what the words mean and in another aspect, it
conveys the concept of purpose and object or the
reason and spirit of the law.
 Intention of the legislature to be identified from the
language used.
 Intention of the legislature
 The duty is to act upon the true intention of the legislative body.
Mens or sententia legis
 Core meaning and penumeral meanings are the referents
 Intention must be found in the words used by the legislature
itself.
 In case of difference of opinion – object, purpose, reason spirit etc.
Keshavji Raviji & Co. v. CIT 1990(2) SCC 231

The rules of interpretation are not rules of law: they are mere aids to
construction and constitute some broad pointers.

The interpretative criteria apposite in a given situation may, by themselves,

be mutually irreconcilable.

It is the task of the court to decide which one, in the light to all relevant
circumstances, ought to prevail.

The rules of interpretation are useful servants but quite often tend to
become difficult masters
State of Gujarat v. Justice R.A Mehta, AIR 2013 SC 693,

it reiterated its observation in Keshav Mills Co Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax,
AIR 1965 SC 1636

When the court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Art 141,
binding on all courts within the territory of India, so, it must be the constant
endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of
certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country.

Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the
ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more
reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion
which must be consistently avoided.
 Preliminary concepts

1. A statute represents the will of the legislature

A court hast to adopt a purely judicial approach.

The Constitution and the Rule of Law are the only supreme powers in
any democracy and no higher duty rests upon this court, than to enforce,
by its decree, the will of the Legislature, as expressed in a statute, unless
such statute is plainly and unmistakably in violation of the Constitution
or Rule of Law.
K.B Nagur v Union of India AIR 2012 SC 1774
2. The intention of the legislature has to be
elicited from the actual words used in the statute

Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC1493

Whether there is a power of amendment under Article 368 as to take away or

abridge Fundamental Rights?

Question will depend upon the language of Art. 368 and width and scope of the
power of amendment under Art 368.
 ● Noscitur a Sociis

Words must be construed in conjunction with the

other words and phrases used in the text. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions;
Ejusdem Generis

Where a statute describes things of particular class or

kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic words will usually be limited to things of a
kindred nature with those particularly enumerated,
unless there be something in the context of the statute
to repel such influence.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusion Alterius The express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Dissimilum Dissimilisest Ratio The courts may distinguish when

there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.
 Casus Omissus, Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object,

or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to

have been omitted intentionally.

 Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

 Redeendo Singular Singulis Referring each to each; let each be put in

its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively.