CASES IN CONTITUTIONAL LAW II

By Jose Edmund E. Guillen, LL.B., LL.M.

POLICE POWER
1. White Light Corporation et. al. vs. City of Manila, January 20, 2009
2. MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, December 16, 2009
3. Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. vs. CA, 329 scra 314
3.a. Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs. Sec. of the DSWD, etl al., Dec. 3, 2013

EMINENT DOMAIN
4. Association of Small Landowners In the Phils. vs. Sec. of the DAR, 175 scra 343
5. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, 244 scra 272
6. Forform Development Corporation vs. PNR, December 10, 2008
7. Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Cancio, January 30, 2009
8. LBP vs. Raymunda Martinez, July 31, 2008
9. Hon. Vicente Eusebio vs. Jovito M. Luis et. al., October 13, 2009
10. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macasangkit Sangkay, August 24, 2011
11. Anunciacion Vda. De Quana et. al. vs. Republic of the Phils., February 9, 2011
11.a. Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et. al., February 27, 2013
11.b. Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla, Feb. 13, 2013
11.c. Republic of the Phils. (DPWH) vs. Ortigas and Company, March 3, 2014
11.d. Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Samson-Tatad and Sps. Genato, April 17, 2013

DUE PROCESS
12. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et. al., January 21, 2015

ACTS:

The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two criminal complaints for plunder
against him. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings”
(“Request”).

Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c],
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada
and his co-respondents with plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the issuance of a new resolution
dismissing the charges against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the latter Order.

ISSUE:

What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

RULING:

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen.
Estrada in his Request.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation
is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 

Futhermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. 
13. Suyan vs. People of the Philippines, July 2, 2014
SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27
March 2009, which affirmed the Orders dated 31 March 2006[2] and 26 June 2006[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had
violated the conditions of his probation and thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The
instant petition likewise assails the Resolution dated 9 September 2009[4], which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision dated 27 March 2009.

The facts as found by the CA are summarized as follows:

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petitioner, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.[5] During arraignment, he pleaded
guilty to the charge. The RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he
filed his application for probation.

On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years.[6]

While on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on 2 September
and 20 October 1999[7] for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separate
Informations were filed against him, both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan City.
One of these cases was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43
case), and the other case as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.

On 1 December 1999, Atty. Simplicio A. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then the Chief Probation
and Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke). [8]
Atty. Navarro alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on
probation. The former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose
commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof.
Atty. Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the
conditions of the latter's probation, in view of his incarceration.[9]

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and
directing him to serve the sentence imposed upon him.[10] It denied[11] his Motion for
Reconsideration.[12]

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition[13] with the CA (first CA case),
[14] wherein he assailed the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was denied due
process as he was not furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was
heard, he was not represented by his counsel of record.[15]
On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision,[16] granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set
aside RTC's revocation of petitioner's probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not
complied with the Probation Law and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation
under the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:[17]

No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation Officer.

The Probation Office should have reported to respondent court the result of said investigation, if
any, upon its completion.

There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are enumerated
under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and seriousness
of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.

The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner with the right to counsel should have been informed of the
violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of
affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and
the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.
[18] On 17 February 2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 2006[19] was filed by the
Dagupan City Parole and Probation Office recommending the revocation of probation.[20] The
Violation Report provides in part:

D. CASE SUMMARY

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by
incurring absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his
supervising officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and
warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded
him by the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he
is unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.

On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification
dated 23 January 2006 (Certification),[21] issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman, was offered as
evidence to prove that petitioner had been convicted in the Branch 43 case (one of the two cases
subsequently filed against him, as stated earlier); and that he had served his sentence from 30
September 2000 until his release, by reason of the expiration of his maximum sentence on 8
September 2003. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Comment on the Formal Offer without disputing
the Certification.[22]

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order[23] revoking the probation. It ruled that it had
granted petitioner due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to
Revoke; but that instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a
violation report when his probation was first revoked.[24] The RTC further held that there was
positive testimony and documentary evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the
conditions of his probation. He never rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and
conviction therefor while on probation.[25] He filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[26] but it was
denied.[27]

Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA.[28] This time, he alleged that he had
been deprived of his constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked.
[29] He further alleged that he had not been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged
violations committed by him while on probation. The probation officer did not conduct a fact-
finding investigation of the alleged violations, and, consequently, petitioner was not furnished
any results. After considering the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations, the RTC did
not issue any warrant for his arrest, as he had not been afforded an opportunity to adduce
evidence in his favor with the assistance of his counsel.[30]

With regard to the specific grounds for revocation, petitioner claimed that the evidence adduced
against him did not refer to the grounds cited in the Motion to Revoke, but instead, the evidence
referred to alleged violations of Condition Nos. 3, 9 and 10 of the Probation Order.

The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed
Decision, it ruled that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted
precisely to allow him to refute the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It held further that
petitioner wasted this opportunity when, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the
Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of such a report when his probation was first
revoked. It added that the procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the
RTC conducted a hearing in accordance with the directive laid down in the First CA Case.

With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been
apprehended twice for the commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated one
of the conditions prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted to having served out his
sentence for those offenses.

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he
alleges that there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the
probation officer, and thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrant of arrest was
issued by the RTC. Neither was he afforded any opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with
the assistance of counsel.

On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his
conviction. In his first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the
charge. Thus, he was convicted and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges
that, of the two cases filed against him, one was ordered dismissed; he has already served his
sentence for the other. Since then, no derogatory information has been received either by the
probation office or the trial court. Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his ways and
is thus entitled to the grace of law. He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume
his probation pursuant to the positivist theory adopted in our criminal justice system.

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked.

THE COURT'S RULING

We rule that the probation of petitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do not subscribe to his contention that his right to due process
was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in
compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the
allegations contained in the Violation Report.

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard. [31] When the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to
be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these
chances, then his cry for due process must fail.[32]

We adopt the ruling of the CA in that petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of
any such report when his probation was first revoked.

On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another
offense is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,[33] and the effects are
clearly outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon
his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of
another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering
him to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the
terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege.[34] Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain
outside prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.[35] The Court's
discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.[36] Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.[37]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 27 March 2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are
both AFFIRMED.

14. Govt. of the USA vs. Guillermo Purganan, September 24, 2002
FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set
for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The
prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which
neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable
cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to
the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.
ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence
is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application
“only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.”

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States
is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before
the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the
context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.
Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the
extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail
would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage
him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition
proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
 That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The
doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature
of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in
the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence
of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-
blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond
reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of
the existence of a prima facie case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in
an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President
has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person

charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether
the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there;
and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his
return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

15. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. vs. COMELEC, April 29, 2010
FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its
resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8)
of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which
provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among
others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill
No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941,
as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot
stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that]
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC]
cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus,
[SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

15.a. Emilio Ramon Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections et. al., November 25, 2014

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

16. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, 289 scra 337
Constitutional Law:TELEBAP vs. COMELEC
TELEBAP vs. COMELEC

Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec
Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law
and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to
regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period.

Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is
thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of
radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions
had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the
Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not
only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully
informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations
give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that
government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of
views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose,
broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service.

17. People vs. Jalosjos, 324 scra 689

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue:

Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of
the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

Held:

While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence,
the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, December 7, 2010
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et. al., November 20, 2009
20.a. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. Department of Justice et. al., September 18, 2012
FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to
as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases.

In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and
South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.The Fact-Finding
Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that
GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for
manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo be
subjected to further investigation.The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case
No. 001-2011.

Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against

petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case
was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011. Thereafter, petitioners filed
before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to
the Comelec. The Comelec en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting
the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among
others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and
Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest which was duly served. GMA was
later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on
hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail
was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant
issued in another criminal case.

The Court denied the petitions and supplemental petitions of herein petitioners.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on
the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-
Comelec resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct
preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier
pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving
the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive
branch of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid

HELD: Yes.

Political Law- Power of the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute

cases

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the
Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations
of election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the
constitutionality of Section 43of RA 9369 had already been raised by petitioners
therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative
enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore,
under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec

Resolution No. 3467 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated
August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were
promulgated by the Comelec.

It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265
of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011
as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733and 9057mentioned in the assailed
decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity
of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election
offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy.

In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing

deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to
supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant
to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment,
the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new
mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the
Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise
the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses
shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of
the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution.

20.b. Republic vs. Daisy Yahon, June 16, 2014

Facts:

Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[3] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt.

Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in
January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not
have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in... partner.

On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO

, as follows:

To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.

To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent's retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and
other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON

Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused
to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of
livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate o... n keeping their
house),... the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal
support in the amount of P4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits
which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,[6] as follows:

Economically, petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of
the court directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00.
S/Sgt. CHARLES A. YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON... the amount
of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.

S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits
and other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner... shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits and claims and be given
directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.

Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC)

AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order
Against the AFP)[8] dated

November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special appearance, petitioner
manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management
Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008,...
requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum
(MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the
Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for legal...
opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the
RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon's check representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for
payment by the AFPFC, but to date said check has not been claimed by respondent.

Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and
hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally,... petitioner contended
that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the
RTC on the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it
was not afforded due process and it was thus improper to... issue execution against the AFPFC.
Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply
with the TPO without violating its right to procedural due process.

In its Order[9] dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been
filed out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become... final and executory.

After due hearing, the CA's Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution[11] granting
respondent's application, viz:

While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been...
given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned
retirement benefits has not yet been released to him. It appears that the release of such pension
could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue

enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents,
representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension
that may be due... to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.

Issues:

whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's lawful
wife as spousal support in... compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to
R.A. No. 9262.

Ruling:

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or
BPO, to wit:

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the...
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure
to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child
without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for... indirect
contempt of court;

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic deduction of
50% from S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation... of
military personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,[15] which states:

Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be
assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[16] we held that a court order directing the
Philippine National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to
deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as... the latter's conjugal share is illegal
and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement
benefits from execution.

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:... x x x x
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the
later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will.[17] Statutes
must be so construed and harmonized with other... statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[18] However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield
to the later enactment.

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a...
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt.
Yahon's retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds

We disagree.

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers,... whether private or
government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation.

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women economic abuse.

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women
who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to
their personal safety and security.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

20.b. Raul H. Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, March 26, 2014
FACTS:  Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000 with
PhilFinance, with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation
of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note (DMC PN No. 2731), the Certificate of
Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the Note with notation that said security was in the
custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and
America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds.  Philfinance delivered to petitioner Denominated Custodian Receipt
(DCR).
Petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent Pilipinas, and handed her a
demand letter informing the bank that his placement with Philfinance in the amount reflected in the
DCR had remained unpaid and outstanding, and that he in effect was asking for the physical delivery
of the underlying promissory note. Petitioner then examined the original of the DMC PN No. 2731
and found: that the security had been issued on 10 April 1980; that it would mature on 6 April 1981;
that it had a face value of P2,300,833.33, with the Philfinance as “payee” and private respondent
Delta Motors Corporation (“Delta”) as “maker;” and that on face of the promissory note was stamped
“NON NEGOTIABLE.”  Pilipinas did not deliver the Note, nor any certificate of participation in respect
thereof, to petitioner.

Petitioner later made similar demand letters again asking private respondent Pilipinas for physical
delivery of the original of DMC PN No. 2731.

Petitioner also made a written demand upon private respondent Delta for the partial satisfaction of
DMC PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had assigned to him said Note to
the extent of P307,933.33. Delta, however, denied any liability to petitioner on the promissory note.

As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an action for damages
against private respondents Delta and Pilipinas.

ISSUE: WON DMC PN No. 2731 marked as non-negotiable may be assigned?

HELD: YES. Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may
be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone where the
negotiable instrument is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument may, however, instead of being
negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation as distinguished
from assignment of a negotiable instrument are, of course, different. A non-negotiable instrument
may, obviously, not be negotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express
prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument:
The words “not negotiable,” stamped on the face of the bill of lading, did not destroy its assignability,
but the sole effect was to exempt the bill from the statutory provisions relative thereto, and a bill,
though not negotiable, may be transferred by assignment; the assignee taking subject to the equities
between the original parties. 12 (Emphasis added)
DMC PN No. 2731, while marked “non-negotiable,” was not at the same time stamped “non-
transferable” or “non-assignable.” It contained no stipulation which prohibited Philfinance from
assigning or transferring, in whole or in part, that Note.

20.c. Lim vs. Felix, 194 scra 292

20.d. People vs. Edano, July 7, 2014
BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-
02-111200 and Q-02-112104.

The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits
followed.

The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police
Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe. The appellant, Siochi and Ruben Forteza took the witness stand for
the defense.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of
the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3
Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant, went to the
parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain
alias "Nato."[4]

At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi.[5] The
informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the
informant waved at PO3 Corbe.[6] When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter
went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the
appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground.
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant's right hand, while
PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant's waist. The other members of the police
arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the
police station for investigation.[7]

P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the Western Police District Crime
Laboratory, examined the seized items and found them positive for the presence of shabu.[8]

The appellant, for his part, testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi
on the phone, and informed him that the motorbike starter the latter needed was already
available.[9] On the same day, Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and asked for the
directions to McDonalds, West Avenue.[10] At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and Ruben arrived at
the gate of Philam Homes on board a space wagon. The appellant met them at the subdivision
gate, and showed the starter to Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called on the appellant's cellular
phone. The appellant then boarded the vehicle, and told Siochi that he would just talk to a
person at McDonalds.[11] When the space wagon arrived at McDonalds, the appellant alighted
from the vehicle and proceeded towards the restaurant's entrance. Afterwards, Vanessa called
him from inside a parked car. The appellant approached Vanessa who, for her part, alighted
from the car. Vanessa told the appellant to get inside the car's rear. The appellant did as
instructed; Vanessa went to the front passenger seat, beside a male driver.[12] Immediately
after, the male driver alighted from the vehicle and entered the car's rear. The appellant went out
of the car, but the male driver followed him and grabbed his hand. The appellant resisted, and
wrestled with the driver along West Avenue. During this commotion, the appellant heard a
gunfire; four (4) persons approached him, and then tied his hands with a masking tape.[13] The
police placed him on board a pick-up truck, and then brought him to Bicutan. In Bicutan, the
police brought him to the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed a plastic on
his head.[14]

In its joint decision dated April 22, 2004, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine.

The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA found PO3 Corbe to be a credible
witness. The CA also found the appellant's warrantless arrest to be valid; it explained that the
appellant's act of running when PO3 Corbe was approaching him reinforced the latter's suspicion
that "something was amiss."[15]

The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not
required as long as the integrity of the seized item had been ensured. It further held that the
police officers were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.

Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal
possession of shabu.

The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution
dated December 23, 2008.

In his brief[16] and supplemental brief,[17] the appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbe's
testimony was "vague and equivocal;"[18] it lacked details on how the appellant was lured to sell
shabu to the informant, and how the entrapment operation had been planned. The appellant also
argued that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing any crime when the
police arrested him. He also claimed that the police did not mark and photograph the seized
items, and that there was a broken chain of custody over the confiscated drugs.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the testimony of PO3
Corbe was clear and convincing; the inconsistencies in his court testimony pertained only to
minor details. It also claimed that the appellant's arrest was valid, and the seized shabu was
admissible in evidence. Finally, the OSG maintained that there was no break in the chain of
custody over the seized plastic bag containing shabu.[19]

THE COURT'S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant.

Warrantless arrest invalid;

seized items inadmissible
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
known an arrest in flagrante delicto.[20]

"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."[21]

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.
In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other
when he approached them. For clarity and certainty, we reproduce PO3 Corbe's court testimony
dated February 21, 2003, thus:

ATTY. RENATO SARMIENTO:

Q:
You and the informant were not able to approach Nato because he sense[d] that you are (sic) a
policeman?
PO3 CORBE:
A:
Our informant first approached Renato Edano[,] and they talked but when he (sic) called me,
Renato run (sic), sir.
Q:
You said tinawag ka[,] who was that that call (sic) you?
A:
Team informant, sir.
xxxx
Q:
How did she call you?
A:
She waived (sic) her had (sic), sir.
Q:
What was she doing?
A:
She was talking to Alias Nato[,] sir.
Q:
Did you hear what they are talking? (sic)
A:
I was still in the car[.] I was not able to hear[,] sir.
Q:
How would you know that they are talking, Mr. Witness? (sic)
A:
I could see them, sir.
Q:
What did you see?
A:
They were talking, sir.
Q:
They were not exchanging stuff and money, Mr. witness?
A:
Not yet, sir.
Q:
While talking[,] the female informant call[ed] you, Mr. Witness?
A:
Yes, sir.[22] (emphases ours)

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each
other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it
is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-
arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also
admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a
prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge
that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:[23]

Furthermore, appellant's act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including
fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of
being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant's attempt to run away from PO3
de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could
likewise signify innocence.[24]

In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without
more, cannot be evidence of guilt.

Considering that the appellant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and
seizure.

Corpus delicti not proved with moral certainty

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the appellant's warrantless arrest was valid, the
latter's acquittal is still in order due to the prosecution's failure to establish the evidence of the
corpus delicti with moral certainty.

We stress that "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the
crimes."[25] Thus, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable
doubt.

In the present case, the various lapses enumerated and discussed below committed by the police
in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.

First, we find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark
the drugs seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves. To directly quote from the
records:

ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q:
This item was not marked at the place allegedly where you apprehended the suspect at
McDonald's, West Avenue, Quezon City, am I correct to say that?
PO3 CORBE:
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
You are also required not only to mark it but to put your initial to it, my question did you place
your initial in this evidence? (sic)
A:
No, sir.
Q:
You did not, Mr. Witness?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
You were also required to put the date of apprehension, being the arresting officer, did you put
the date in this evidence, Mr. Witness?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Why did you not do that, Mr. Witness?
A:
What I remembered there is an initial of the accused, sir.
Q:
Who put the initial, Mr. Witness?
A:
He was the one, sir.
Q:
At your station?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
You did not put your initial?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Why did you not put your initial?
A:
I was not able to put sir.[26] (emphases ours)

Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation."[27] The
Court clarified in People v. Resurreccion[28] that marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.

Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the marking should be
done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant's participation in the marking
procedure should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly
baffles us.

We also point out that per the testimony of P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer, the
police forwarded two (2) plastic bags containing white crystalline substances to the crime
laboratory for examination one marked with the initials "OR" and the other marked with "GS."
Both plastic bags were used as evidence against the appellant. The records, however, did not
indicate who marked the plastic bag with "GS," who witnessed this marking, and when this
marking had been made. As with the bag that had been marked "OR," we express doubts on
whether the plastic bag containing white crystalline substances marked as "GS" was the same
plastic bag taken from the appellant's co-accused, Siochi.

Second, the police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the place of
confiscation or at the police station. These omissions were admitted by the prosecution during
pre-trial.[29]

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof[.] [emphases ours]

This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.] [emphasis ours]

To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving
clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.[30]

These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to
offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and
safekeeping of the seized items. "We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under
Section 21[a] of R.A. No. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so."[31]
The Court cannot simply presume what these justifications are.

Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No.
9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is
gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No. 9165),
serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of
the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official
duties.[32]

In sum, we hold that the appellant's acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from
him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily,
the prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the
chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to
the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008
decision and the December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01142. Appellant Oliver Renato Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

21. Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 scra 400

Manalili vs. People
G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997

Facts: The policemen conducted surveillance because of information that drug addicts were roaming
the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen chanced upon a male person in front
of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes
and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. They then asked the male person
what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist but later showed his wallet where a
crushed marijuana residue was found inside. 

Held: The policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was
actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on
information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.

21.a. People of the Philippines vs. Nazareno Villareal, March 18, 2013
22. People of the Philippines vs. Edison Sucro, March 18, 1991
Facts: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan)
to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date,
Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C.
Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel.
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which
turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the
chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi
instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M.,
Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. At that point, the team of P/Lt.
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.
P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante
threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When
confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant
(Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks
and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante, The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory
Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive
of marijuana.

Issue: Whether the police officer can arrest the accused without any arrest and search
warrant when the latter committed the crime in front of the former.

Held:  Yes, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that arrest
without warrant, when lawful. Is when a peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person (a)When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; When an offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof.

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo Street to
monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at
a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado’s house. Fulgencio, within a distance of two
meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go
inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three
times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-
going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
23. People vs. Abe Valdes, September 5, 2000
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused
was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and
cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all
member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector
Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut.
PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a
positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing
marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to
the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that
the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1)  Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time
to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo
to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence.
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was
error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have
relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

24. People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 scra 432

Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed,
the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID
and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by
holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his
bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but
still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with
his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu.
CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed
to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend.
Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to
the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the
judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause
impelling the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in
the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in
this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous
weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search
may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of
a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process
cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

25. People vs. Tangliben, 184 scra 220

26. People vs. Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000

Constitutional Law: PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON

PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
 Facts:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession more than 500 grams of shabu
when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something hard
in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent,
packets of shabu were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that her constitutional
rights were infringed when such search was conducted.

Issue: WON a valid search was made.

Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)               when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b)               when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and…
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited,
hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. [18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.  Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.  With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports.  Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans.  Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are.  There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure.  These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein.  Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise
without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person  in flagrante
delicto.

27. People vs. Malmstedt, 198 scra 401

 Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command
(NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
            In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist
to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched
bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative
of marijuana.

            Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The
officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the
accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each,
upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue:

            Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against

unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the
placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time
to obtain a search warrant.

28. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 scra 211

FACTS:

As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

ISSUES:

1. What constitutes a reasonable search?

2. Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

RULING:

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
 search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle,  or flashes a light therein,  these
do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security

measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.

29. People vs. De Gracia, 233 scra 716

FACTS:

Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d’état on December
1989 against the Government.
Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC .
Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied
by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.
Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group
of five men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car.
Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, the five men
drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver.
Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
Thereafter, the search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles
of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.
Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the
door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano,
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.

ISSUE/S:
WON appellant is guilty of illegal possession of firearms
WON there were a valid search and seizure in this case.

HELD:

1. YES. There is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed
several firearms, explosives, and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety
due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which
criminal acts have resulted in the loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of
the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional
government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which
tend to disturb public peace and order.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management.

Moreover, When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.

The Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar
Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding
the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about
the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent
material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

2. YES. It is a valid search and seizure.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place,
the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with.

30. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al., November 3, 2008
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
(1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a
crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

 SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results.  x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test.  x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

            xxx                   xxx                   xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace.  Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx                   xxx                   xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II.    THE ISSUES

1.    Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2.    Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus
permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1.    YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.
 In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications
laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected
as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken.  Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,

effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution.  As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed
as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.”  Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES,
paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering  students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education

of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court
deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students
and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so

holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require,
as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. 
To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering  officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees—
and students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth,
or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the
law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the
more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals
in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis; that the “drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results.”  Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug
testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied
by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part
of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable
and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.  And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to
the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering   persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a crime
with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment.  The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case
of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out
and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.  To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

31. Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et. al., October 18, 2011

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of
an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team
and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

 
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined
by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17
diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman,
such power pertaining solely to the court.
 

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the
charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the
prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.
 

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by
the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition.

Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling
 
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful
and did not violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi
 

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.

 
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”.   Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso,
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
 
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not
lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause
nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008,
570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169),recognized the
fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized
by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer
reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571
SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which
the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

WRIT OF AMPARO
32. Sec. of DND et. al. vs. Raymund Manalo, et. al., October 7, 2008
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several
days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as
members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they
were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist
insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing
University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also
suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months
of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape
and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing
laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian
sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is
directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to
the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to
protect,” is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights
abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist
insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful
remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that
has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.

(This digest is not meant for Constitutional law. Rather, this is written in fulfillment of
an assignment in Legal Philosophy.) 

33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009

Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were charged of the
crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued Hold Departure Order in the interest of
national security and public safety.

On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against the petitioner
and 17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused civilians were arrested
because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the
2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of the
crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold
Departure List. This happens every time he left for abroad.

Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD:
No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private person or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats thereof.

Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities he has been
endowed by his Creator.

Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.

In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner;s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious violation of
his right to life, liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy.

33-A. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et. al., November 15, 2011

FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti

Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP).

Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the
state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances.

On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get
inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45
caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he
is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they
reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine
Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then
pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he
is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several
documents to declare that he is a surenderree.

On September 17, 2009,  Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted
to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.

Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went
inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to
stop them.

On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking

men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.

On December 7, Rodriguez filed  a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt.
Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan.

Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.

Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her

immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).

Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the
Court of Appeals to hear the petition.

CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino,
Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.  As to Calog and
Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was
dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.

ISSUE:
 1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential
immunity from suit
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas
data cases.
HELD:

(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits
only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not
beyond.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed
during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the
search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.”

Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s
immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to
shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.”

(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights.

Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility.

“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the
respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the
other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No.
191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo
and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his
rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial
evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.”

SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with
respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Marlou C. Chan et. al., July 24, 2012
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that
her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which
she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
writ of habeas data must be denied.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
35. Felipe Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, August 26, 1999
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications

(Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

3. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the
offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must
be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must
be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly
proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the
 scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the
latter.

36. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 scra 590

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and
holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of
the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.
 

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,”
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator. The unambiguity
of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

37. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 scra 699

Facts: 
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin
is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries,
cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his
alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers
for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring
him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 ofMartin’s Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

38. Waterous Drugs Corporation vs. NLRC, October 16, 1997

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to
YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320
per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.  YSP sent a check payable to
Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her.
Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check
for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC:
Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible,
by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

39. Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001

FACTS: Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order from
Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera. The
Ombudsman wanted to conduct such in camera inspection on the accounts based on a trail of
manager’s checks by a certain Trivinio who purchased 51 managers checks for a total amount of
P272M. Marquez agreed to the inspection.
Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the accounts in question cannot readily be
identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The Ombudsman replied that the Bank
should have preserved records despite the accounts being dormant.

Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents due to the
unjustified delay by the Bank since the in camera inspection had already been extended twice.

Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the bank secrecy law

ISSUE/S: Whether the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to the bank
secrecy law? NO

RULING: The in camera inspection is not allowed. There being no pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction.
An exception to the bank secrecy law is when the money deposited is the subject matter of a
litigation.

Therefore, it may be allowed on the ground of a pending case when:

o The case is pending in court of competent jurisdiction
o The account must be clearly identified
o Inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case
o The Bank personnel and account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
o Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

The order for in camera inspection is based on a pending investigation of the Ombudsman for
violations of RA 3019, Sec 3(e)(g). Clearly, there is no pending litigation yet before a court of
competent authority. It is only an investigation by the Ombudsman.

40. Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998

Fact: The petitioner seek the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the right
to privacy, Petitioner prays that the court  invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
privacy.adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issue: Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy
enshrined in the constitution?adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Held:  Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the
“right to be let alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O.
No. 308 cannot be underplayed. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights
of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources —
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.  In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves
on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308
gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting
citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the
disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of
his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the
society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the
dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
41. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, supra
42. ABS-CBN Broadcasting vs. COMELEC, January 28, 2000

43. Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, may 5, 2001

605 Phil. 926

Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without
any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other
pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and
1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to
support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed
on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.

Issue: Whether COMELEC restriction on survey during the Election period constitute a
violation of the Freedom of Expression.

Held: Yes, the court hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.

This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation
and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press with little protection. For
anyone who can bring a plausible justification forward can easily show a rational
connection between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose.

In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social

values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts
expression, the court laid the basis for what has been called the “balancing-of-interests”,
the “balancing” test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.

In the actual application of the “balancing-of-interests” test, the crucial question is: how
much deference should be given to the legislative judgment?

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power
restricting the individual’s freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom
so restricted, “are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions,” a wide
range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium.
Among these are:

(a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect of the particular
freedom restricted by the legislation;
(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is
direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are few;

(c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by
the legislation — the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil
which Congress seeks to prevent;

(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably

appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and

(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may
be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected
freedom.

44. A.M. 10-4-03 SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan, June 21, 2001
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against the Former
President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against the
Former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC

Nature: Motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.

Keywords:  Live telecast of President Estrada’s Plunder Case, right to information,

MENDOZA, J

Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting
this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other
than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public
concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.

However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President
Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public
concern be given more weight  than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ratio: The petition is denied.

               

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information.  It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that
such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish
to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.  In
the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public
to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-
visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment
except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live
broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases
against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.

45. Newsounds Broadcasting Networks, Inc. vs. Hon. Cesar Dy, April 2, 2009

Newsounds Broadcasting vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270, April 2,

2009

Newsounds Broadcasting vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270, April 2, 2009

Nature: Petition for Review emanated from a petition for mandamus

Keywords: Prior restraint, Permit to operate, Agricultural land to Commercial

Summary: RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for mandamus. The RTC upheld all the
arguments of the respondents, including their right to deny the sought after mayors permit unless they
were duly satisfied that the subject property has been classified as commercial in nature. The Decision
made no reference to the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory injunction.

TINGA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station,
and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996,
Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on
propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning
and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be
constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a
“commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-
Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not
able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land.
Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In
the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal
recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order.
Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it
was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City
Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an
order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent
Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed
them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the
issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend
or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit
was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires
an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR,
showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from
agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are
also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also,
petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without
objections raised by the respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial
character of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the
courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but
petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official
especially to those which are irregular.

Issue: WON there is prior restraint against DZNC

Ratio: YES.

Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free
speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo
Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have
favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondent Ceasar Dy is the
brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in
2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival
AM radio station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise
direct our attention to a 20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is
quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM.

The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one opinion or the
other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter of free expression is neutral as to
personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to enforce constitutional order are
expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral shelter.

The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are authorized by
law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local
authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may
be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all.
These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations
under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of
government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary
school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these
cases.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents,
we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as
an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court
bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of
respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition
of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression
must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of
behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of
speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of
validity that inheres in every legislation.

At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between  a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well defined standards; and a content-based  restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more
suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of
expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are
subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has
been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since
such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the
LGU.

However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-
based restraint.
35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The closure
comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. Such timing
emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.

In their Answer with Comment to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that petitioners had
made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature and truthfulness of such
reports. They conceded that the Philippine Daily Inquirer story reported that Dy said he planned to file
disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM. While respondents assert that there are other AM
radio stations in Isabela, they do not specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by the Dy family,
or that DZNC and DWDY are the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan.

Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government requirements
for the operation of their stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent
Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose these new requirements
substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the
2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela
that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.[52]
Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004
elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and
ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be the brother
of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City
government are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local governments
throughout the Philippines.

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut
down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme Court generally
treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First
Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law
professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated.

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict
scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-
based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that
the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do
not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in
the absence of any compelling reason,[55] the burden lies with the government to establish
such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant
petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners
zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners

Notes: Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears upon to close down a
private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech infringement cannot be minimized, no matter the
legal justifications offered for the closure. In many respects, the present petitions offer a textbook
example of how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, expression and of the press may be
unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower courts involved in this case failed to recognize or assert the
fundamental dimensions, and it is our duty to reverse, and to affirm the Constitution and the most sacred
rights it guarantees.

46. Hector C. Villanueva vs. PDI, March 15, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decision[1] dated May 25, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54134, reversing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. 206-B, which
had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents' false reporting.

The basic facts in this case are uncomplicated.

Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992
elections.

On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by
the COMELEC.[3]

Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing
Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of
Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority
and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor's office of Bais City.[4]
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI)
also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for
mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of
authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayor's office in the
city.
The Comelec upheld the recommendation of the Comelec office in Bais City, stressing that
Villanueva's conviction in the administrative cases barred him from seeking any elective office.

The Comelec cited Section 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that
among those who are disqualified from running for any elective position are "those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case."

Villanueva was appointed Bais City OIC on April 18, 1986 by then Local Government Minister
Aquilino Pimentel. Sometime during the same year, three administrative cases were instituted
against Villanueva before the Department of Local Government upon complaint of Rebecco V.
Fernandez and Dr. Harte C. Fuentes.

Sometime in May 1987, the ministry found Villanueva "guilty as charged" and ordered him
removed from his position as OIC of the city government, which decision was approved by
Minister Jaime Ferrer.

In the same month, Francisco G. Villanueva was appointed OIC Mayor to replace Hector
Villanueva who had been removed from office.

The poll body also stated that insofar as the penalty of the removal is concerned, this cannot be
reversed anymore, and consequently cannot be the subject matter of an appeal.

The indefinite term as OIC to which respondent was appointed in 1986 already lapsed, with the
holding of the 1988 local elections and the assumption of office of those elected therein.[5]
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came
out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.

Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner
sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages
before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were "maliciously timed" to defeat him.
He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news
items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual damages of
P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an
unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorney's fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.[6]

Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they
did not know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the
stories were privileged in nature.[7]

According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story during a COMELEC
commissioner's press briefing. He, however, came in late and only a fellow reporter told him that
the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. He did not bother to get a confirmation
from anyone as he had a deadline to beat.[8]
PDI political section editor Carlos Hidalgo, on the other hand, said that he got the story from a
press release. He claimed that he found the press release on his desk the day Manila Bulletin
published the same story. The press release bore COMELEC's letterhead and was signed by one
Sonia Dimasupil, a former Malaya newspaper editor who was in-charge of COMELEC press
releases. He tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was also
published in the Manila Bulletin, he felt confident the press release was authentic. He however
failed to produce the press release in court.[9]

On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, this Court holds that defendants Philippine Daily
Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers
are liable [for] damages to plaintiff in the following manner:
As moral damages, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila [Daily] Bulletin
Publishing Corporation are ordered to pay P1,000,000.00 each to plaintiff;
Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay an exemplary damage in the amount of P500,000.00
each;
To pay plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00;
And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The trial court found the news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner's reputation and
candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published
and held respondents liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co., Inc.[11]
The trial court also ruled that because the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not
privileged communications.

On appeal by respondents, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. It explained that
although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof they were obtained from a
press conference or release, respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There
was also no proof that petitioner's supporters junked him due to the reports. Neither was there
any proof he would win, making his action unfounded.

Before us, petitioner raises the lone issue of whether:

[THE] HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ... GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO UTTER LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
UNILATERALLY, UNPROCEDURALLY AND ARBITRARILY CHANGED THE
PLEADING-BORNE AND PRE-TRIAL ORDER DELINEATED THEORY OF QUASI-
DELICT OF APPELLEE, THEREBY DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO
EVIDENCE AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE OF ITS IMPOSED IRRELEVANT THEORY.[12]
Simply stated, we are asked to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is required to prove malice
to be entitled to damages.

Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-delict which only requires proof of
fault or negligence, not proof of malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal
prosecution for libel. He argues that the case is entirely different and separate from an
independent civil action arising from libel under Article 100[13] of the Revised Penal Code. He
claims he proffered proofs sustaining his claim for damages under quasi-delict, not under the law
on libel, as malice is hard to prove. He stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention
libel, and nothing in his complaint shows that his cause of action had some shade of libel as
defined in the Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal proceeding for
libel.[14]

PDI and its officers argue that petitioner's complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising from
libel as it highlights malice underlying the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the
appellate court committed no error in characterizing the case as one arising from libel.[15]For
their part, Manila Bulletin and its officers claim that petitioner changed his theory, which must
be disallowed as it violates respondents' right to due process. Although petitioner's claim for
damages before the trial court hinged on the erroneous publications, which he alleged were
maliciously timed, he claims in his petition before this Court that his cause of action is actually
one for quasi-delict or tort. They stress that the prayer and allegations in petitioner's complaint,
which never alleged quasi-delict or tort but malicious publication as basis for the claim for
damages, control his case theory. Thus, it may not be altered unless there was an amendment of
the complaint to change the cause of action. They claim that petitioner's initiatory pleading and
the trial court's pre-trial order and decision reveal that his cause of action for damages arose from
the publications of the "malicious" articles; hence, he should have proved actual malice to be
entitled to any award of damages. They added that the appellate court correctly ruled that the
articles were not published with actual malice.[16]

We rule in favor of the respondents.

Basic is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[17]
The nature of a pleading is determined by allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same. The ground
chosen or the rationale adopted by the court in resolving the case does not determine or change
the real nature thereof.

The complaint was denominated as one for "damages", and a perusal of its content reveals that
the factual allegations constituted a complaint for damages based on malicious publication. It
specifically pointed out that petitioner lost the election because of the bad publicity created by
the malicious publication of respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin. It is alleged numerous times
that the action for damages stemmed from respondents' malicious publication. Petitioner sought
that respondents be declared guilty of irresponsible and malicious publication and be made liable
for damages. The fact that petitioner later on changed his theory to quasi-delict does not change
the nature of petitioner's complaint and convert petitioner's action into quasi-delict. The
complaint remains to be one for damages based on malicious publication.

Consequently, as the issue of malice was raised, it was incumbent on petitioner to prove the
same. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.[18]
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, while the questioned news item was found to be
untrue, this does not necessarily render the same malicious.
To fully appreciate the import of the complaint alleging malice and damages, we must recall the
essence of libel.

Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead."[19] Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious.[20] The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.[21]
We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true
reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354
is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander.[22] The rule on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete,[23] this Court ruled that publications
which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech.[24]

In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public
interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into
account the very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates. As one of
the candidates, petitioner consequently assumed the status of a public figure within the purview
of Ayers Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong.[25]

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily follow
that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance, if and
when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in
some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect
and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.[26]

In any event, having been OIC-Mayor of Bais City after the People Power Revolution, petitioner
in this case as early as 1992 was already a well-known official and public figure.

However, it must be stressed that the fact that a communication or publication is privileged does
not mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character simply does away with the
presumption of malice, which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.[27] That proof in a civil
case must of course be based on preponderance of evidence. This, however, petitioner failed to
do in this case.

Under the current state of our jurisprudence, to be considered malicious, the libelous statement
must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in
reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not"
means that the author or publisher entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or
that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.[28]

In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were
written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not.
According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter
who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. PDI, on the other
hand, said that they got the story from a press release the very same day the Manila Bulletin
published the same story. PDI claims that the press release bore COMELEC's letterhead, signed
by one Sonia Dimasupil, who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried to
contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already published in the
Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was authentic. Following the narration of
events narrated by respondents, it cannot be said that the publications, were published with
reckless disregard of what is false or not.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and
reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement
of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.[29]

A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events
and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being
hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or damages, i.e.
libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility
prevailing within the general community.[30]

Likewise, in our view respondents' failure to counter-check their report or present their informant
should not be a reason to hold them liable. While substantiation of the facts supplied is an
important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source
although itreflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a "high
degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity."[31] Petitioner, in this case, presented no proof that
respondents entertained such awareness. Failure to present respondents' informant before the
court should not be taken against them.[32]Worth stressing, jurisprudence instructs us that a
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds for malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law
throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.[33]
Further, worthy of note, before the filing of the complaint, respondents herein received no word
of protest, exception or objection from petitioner. Had the error in the news reports in question
been pointed out by interested parties to the respondents, their publishers and editors could have
promptly made a rectification through print and broadcast media just before and during the
election day deflecting thereby any prejudice to petitioner's political or personal interest.As aptly
observed in Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.:[34]
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider
that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable
them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.[35] [Emphasis
supplied.]
We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege,
growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We cannot punish journalists
including publishers for an honest endeavor to serve the public when moved by a sense of civic
duty and prodded by their sense of responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to
be a genuine report.Media men are always reminded of their responsibilities as such. This time,
there is also a need to remind public figures of the consequences of being one. Fittingly, as held
in Time, Inc. v. Hill,[36] one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an
attendant loss of privacy.
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a
primary value on freedom of speech and of press. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its
historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."[37]
On petitioner's claim for damages, we find no evidence to support their award. Indeed, it cannot
be said that respondents published the questioned articles for the sole purpose of harassing
petitioner. Proof and motive that the publication was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate petitioner has not been clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the petitioner
to damages. There remains unfulfilled the need to prove that the publications were made with
actual malice - that is, with the knowledge of the publications' falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether they were false or not.[38]Thus, from American jurisprudence as amplified in Lopez
v. Court of Appeals:
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with `actual malice'-- that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The United States Supreme Court went
further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,[39] where such immunity, was held as covering
statements concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials.
Why there should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed
by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can be
more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a
commentator: "Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the
men involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public
officials, one cannot but agree that the Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times[40] rule to
all public figures."[41] [Emphasis supplied.]
Furthermore, the guarantee of press freedom has also come to ensure that claims for damages
arising from the utilization of the freedom be not unreasonable or exorbitant as to practically
cause a chilling effect on the exercise thereof. Damages, in our view, could not simply arise from
an inaccurate or false statement without irrefutable proof of actual malice as element of the
assailed publication.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Amended Decision dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54134 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

47. GSIS & Winston Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza et. al., July 27, 2010
48. Soriano vs. MTRCB, March 15, 2010
49. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010
CASE DIGEST: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC. and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. v. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 178554; G.R. No. 178581; G.R. No.

178890; G.R. No. 179157; G.R. No. 179461

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Should the petition prosper?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for

certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity

how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four

exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or
legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must

show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected

"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close
security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices
monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been
branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet
to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and the
implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial
notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing,
the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under
the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be oneof common and general knowledge; (2) it must bewell and
authoritatively settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to
be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial
notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no
specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three
years after its effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail
to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would
result in direct injury to their organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration
would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the
present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA
9372.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens
has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It
bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being

tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy,
the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized, lie beyond
judicial review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible

standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes

that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are
not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA
9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it

unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a

credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis
of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

49.a. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec & Majarucon, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
 The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutionalorgan infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that

the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the

subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this

court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account .
. . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

50. Bayan, Karapatan et. al. vs, Ermita et. al., April 25, 2006

51. IBP vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, February 24, 2010

Facts:

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through its National President Jose
Anselmo Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of an application for a permit to rally at the
foot of Mendiola Bridge. Mayor Atienza granted the permit but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as
the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved, Cadiz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the permit for being violative of their right to freedom of expression.

Meanwhile, the IBP pushed through with the rally at the Mendiola Bridge. Thus, the Manila Police
District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a
rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. 

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Cadiz prayed for the suspension of the criminal case against him
on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal
case.

Issue:

Can the court motu proprio suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question? 

Held: 

Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend
proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor, the latter
cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed.
Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency
of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before
this Court in an appeal from the civil action. (IBP vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)

52. Batas Pambansa Bilang 880

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY
TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
 

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of
the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the
rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

 (a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or
protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or
petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in
strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the
people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit
shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by
law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by
law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8
hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
 (d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of
the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse
to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-
four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately
executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so
that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit.
These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the
public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in
the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly
interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably
to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement
agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently
on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum
tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but
may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks,
boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence,
or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to
prevent any possible disturbance;
 (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly
warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should
not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of
time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision
of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public assembly
shall not constitute a group for dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without
a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out
in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable
for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of
this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application
for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any
person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of
activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,

bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

 3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by

the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined
in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one
day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months
and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No.
1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by

imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after
the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their
respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
53. Estrada vs. Excritor, June 22, 2006

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality

approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

54. Soriano vs. Laguardia, April 29, 2009

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in
Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment
of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from
the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of
a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of
serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language.

55. Pastor Austria vs. NLRC, August 16, 1999

Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
Austria v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely
secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all establishments,
whether religious or not.
Facts:

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications
form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his
district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat
and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be
able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as
grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and,
as such, involves the separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed
by petitioner against the SDA.

Held/Ratio:

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is
purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The
grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was
expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.

56. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phils. vs. Exec. Sec., 405 scra 497
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF PHILIPPINES v. OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 153888, 2003-07-09
Facts:
petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration
of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents
Office of the Executive
Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.
operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, is
a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim com... on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal
and also due to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules
and procedures based on the Qur'an[3] and the Sunnah[4] for the analysis of food,
inspection thereof and issuance of halal certifications.
designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation.
OMA warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification
since... those without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and
therefore could contain pork or its derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food
manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate
EO 46 and RA
4109.[6] As a result, petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it.
petition for prohibition.
According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even
consulting Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became effective.
Issues:
subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
Ruling:
We grant the petition.
OMA deals with the... societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in
mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude... into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment
clause and the "free exercise of religion"... classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By
giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim... organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption... task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an... and Sunnah on halal food.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.[11] If the government fails to
show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is... constitutionally
unacceptable.
we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal,... The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products
released in the... market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2001, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same.

57. Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, 428 scra 283

FACTS:

SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional

provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or
urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

“x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion
to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their
Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli
Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the
Petition.  All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a
cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy.  They were ordered to submit a
pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the
Motions to Dismiss.  Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo moved to reconsider the denial.  His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for
extension to file memorandum.  Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by
submitting his Memorandum.

The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Velarde,
Villanueva and Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in
the motions to dismiss.
The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because “in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Constitution, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law.” It then proceeded
to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state –
even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle.  Through its discourse,
the court a quo opined at some point that the “endorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.”

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in
its assailed Decision.  Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration
which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

ISSUE:

What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenged Decision comply with the aforesaid
form?

RULING:

No. The challenged Decision did not comply with the proper form of a Decision.

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:

(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court
ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion.  The ponentemay also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as
an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition.  Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. 
Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the
constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. Indeed, the RTC’s
Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it
was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
58. Taruc et. al. vs. Bishop De La Cruz, March 10, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao
del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish
priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc,
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their
request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political
party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy
a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their expulsion was
illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

RULING:

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter

best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights.  Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil
court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property.”

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
59. Executive Order NO. 464 (Executive Privilege)

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 464

ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE
TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the Constitution guarantees the separate of powers of the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches of the government:

WHEREAS, Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution provides that heads of departments may, with
the prior consent of the President, appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any
matter pertaining to their departments and, when the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, such appearance shall be conducted in executive
session;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the rule of executive privilege, the President and those who assist her must
be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions since this is
fundamental to the operation of the government and is rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution;

WHEREAS, Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution mandates that the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate or House of Representatives shall be
respected;

WHEREAS, recent events, particularly with respect to the invitation of a member of the Cabinet by
the Senate as well as various heads of offices, civilian and military, have highlighted the need to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive
privilege and respect for the rights of persons appearing in such inquiries in aid of legislation and
due regard to constitutional mandate;

WHEREAS, there is a need to prevent such inquires in aid of legislation from being used for partisan
political purposes, disrupting diplomatic relations with foreign government, and weakening the
stability of the State, thereby impeding the efforts of the government to generate and attract foreign
investments;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides that public official and employees shall not use or divulge
confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public to prejudice the public interest;

WHEREAS, Article 229 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits any public officer from revealing any
secret known to him by reason of his official capacity or wrongfully delivering papers or copies
thereof which he may have charge and which should not be published;

WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide that the President
shall have control of all government departments, bureaus and offices and shall ensure that all the
laws be faithfully executed.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. - In accordance with Article
VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. -

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is

fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act
No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides that public officials and employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

i. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998).

iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties

and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission

on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. - The following are covered by this executive order:

i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department

heads are covered by the executive privilege;

ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege;
 iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege;

iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. - All public officials enumerated
in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to
the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in
aid of legislation.

SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. - All executive issuances, orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provision of this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

SECTION 5. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this executive order shall be
declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provision not affected thereby shall remain
in full force and effect.

SECTION 6. Effectivity. - This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 26th day of September in the Year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Five.

59.a. Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 scra 744

60. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later,
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These
two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the
JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that
the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the
certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an
investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure
of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed
or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain,
natural resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750
hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged
areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the
actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be
incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain,
waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore
and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of
the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the
law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

61. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested
his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

62. Center for People Empowerment vs. COMELEC, September 21, 2010
The source code is the “human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do.”
It is the master blueprint that reveals and determines how the machine will behave. These are
analogous to the procedures provided to election workers. The review of the source code that any
interested political party or group may conduct is for security reasons and must be conducted “under a
controlled environment” to determine the presence of any error and claims of fraud. Section 12 of R.A.
No. 9369 states that, “once an Automated Election System (AES) technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.” The only
excusable reason not to comply with the said requirement is that the said source code was not yet
available when an interested party asked for it (Center for People Empowerment in Governance v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189546, 21 September 2010).

LIBERTY OF ABODE
62.a. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo, July 22, 2014
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP v. JESSIE ROBREDO, GR No. 200903, 2014-
07-22

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from evicting
the individual petitioners as well as the petitioner-associations' members from their dwellings in
the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon without any court... order, and to compel the
respondents to afford them judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279
(RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing

Act, which authorizes evictions and demolitions under certain circumstances without any court
order.

members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus

Homeowners' Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta
Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land
owned by and... located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon

These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and... construction of
infrastructure projects... in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order
when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,...
parks, and playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before
the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public
respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court... prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

They also posit that the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional. They likewise insist that
they stand to be directly injured by the respondents' threats of evictions and demolitions. In the
alternative, they contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues... raised in this
case clothes them with legal standing.

The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to
due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. They point
out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the... impairment of
liberty of abode unless there is a court order. Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279.

The Mayor argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and
demolitions to be conducted even without a court order provided they are done in accordance
with the law and in a just and humane manner. According to him, RA 7279 is precisely the law...
referred to by Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the successful eviction of some of the
petitioners in Pinaglabanan, Corazon de Jesus, San Juan.

faithful implementation of RA 7279, which the legislature enacted in the exercise of police
power, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

(1)

Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and

(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;

(b) Whether the petitioners correctly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus;

(2)

Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

We dismiss the petition.

The petitioners violated the principle... of hierarchy of courts when they directly... filed the
petition before the Court.

The petitioners wrongly availed... themselves of a petition for prohibition... and mandamus.

a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person's exercise
of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

We issue a writ of prohibition to afford the... aggrieved party a relief against the respondent's
usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.

a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes... another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It
will not control a public officer's exercise of discretion as... where the law imposes upon him the
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act precisely
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the court

Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:

(a)

When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;

(b)

When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c)

When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have discretion when
their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions... shall be performed.

Consequently, the time when the public respondents shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions
under Section 28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial, judicial
or quasi-judicial. The duty is discretionary if the law imposes a duty upon a... public officer and
gives him the right to decide when the duty shall be performed.

In contrast, a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his... own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done

The resolution of the constitutionality... of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279... is not the lis mota
of the case.

Save for the petition pertaining to the City of Quezon's threat of eviction and demolition, this
case no longer presents a justiciable controversy with respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San
Juan. We take note of the Comments of these Mayors who alleged that they had... already
successfully evicted the concerned petitioners in their respective cities at the time of the filing of
the petition.

What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that
this issue is not the lis mota of this case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or
action"; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is... thus merely an offshoot of
the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches
of the government.

This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question
that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the court may... rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided.

Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,... speculative or argumentative.

We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the necessity
of examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1
and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall
not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions... and
demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities
occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph
2, Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the following
prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders

Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely
abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely
imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments... in their
pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.

the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of discretion was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, this petition must necessarily... fail.

Principles:

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is... thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.

Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

63. In Re: Edillon, 84 scra 554
n re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978
FACTS: 

The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s
constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution; he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him. The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.” 

ISSUES 

Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership
fee is void. Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid. 

HELD: 

1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s

constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers. But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to
be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. 2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article
X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed
to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power
and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. 

DECISION 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

64. Malabanan vs. Ramento 129 scra 359

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with
other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball
Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby.
At such gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the university authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they should not
be held liable for holding an assembly.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the constitutional rights of
freedom of assembly and free speech?

Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and
place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in
violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

65. United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, March 25, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on

March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of
the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its
petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under
the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.

Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III,
§8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.

ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are
managerial employees and

(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from

forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution.

HELD: YES and NO

As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top
management; (2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line Management [also
called supervisors].

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at which

individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-
level management. First-line managers direct operating employees only; they
do not supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are the
“foreman” or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical
supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in a large
office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.

MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to more

than one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of
other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle
managers’ principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement
their organizations’ policies and to balance the demands of their superiors
with the capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics
firm is an example of a middle manager.

TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of executives,

top management is responsible for the overall management of the
organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization’s
interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief
executive officer,” “president,” and “senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary
from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to
membership in the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle
managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are
carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level
managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file
employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such
rank-and-file employees.

“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct

categories: the “managers” per se, who compose the former group described
above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter group.

#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous
determinations by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in accordance
with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.

To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the

exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the
Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are not controlling.
As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they
are managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s
Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov.
13, 1991)

This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition
for Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route
Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees concerned are
managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212.

At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination

compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers
are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to
show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is
indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route
managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called
“Route Manager Position Description,” the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve
this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these
functions — managing your job and managing your people — you are
accountable to your District Manager for the execution and completion of
various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your
sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart
from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct
operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers
are responsible for the success of the company’s main line of business through
management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily
involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual
teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.

The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors

because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple
direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set
by those above them.

While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people
(the evidence shows that they only “recommended” or “endorsed” the taking
of disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because thisis a
function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.

# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245

Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No.
6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace
Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715
provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial” and “supervisory
employees,” as follows:

Art. 212. Definitions. . . .

(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives
to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.

The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management
policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring
that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the
present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m),
it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the
Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line
19, which is to insert between the words “people” and “to” the following:
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS.
In other words, the section will now read as follows: “The right of the people
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS
to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.”

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban

against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art.
III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not
contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations.

PETITION is DISMISSED.

66. Acosta vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 2000

Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in metro manila. On various dates in September and
October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers
at the liwasang bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. On the basis of
reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused
to comply with the return-to-work order issued September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the
department of education, culture and sports (DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer the charges. Secretary Cariño found petitioners
guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Is hereby meted out the penalty of six (6)
months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed that respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it
affirmed the assailed resolutions of CSC.
Issues:
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed resolutions of the civil service
commission that wrongly penalized petitioners whose only “offense” was to exercise their consitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances?
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed resolutions of the civil service
commission that wrongly denied petitioners their right to backwages?
Decision: No. Petition denied. In Bangalisan v. Court of appeals, petitioners, are being penalized not because they
exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education they
are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, punishable under the civil service law, rules and regulations.as aptly stated by the solicitor general, “it is not
the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable assemble that was punished, but the manner
in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in metro manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other
than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. While
there recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is later
ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in citing bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel
the Court to rule otherwise.

NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
67. Pacific Wide Realty and Devt. Corp. vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., November 25, 2009
68. Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resource, Inc., December 3, 2009
69. Renato v. Diaz vs. Sec. Of Finance and the Comm. Of BIR, July 19, 2011
RENATO V. DIAZ v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GR No. 193007, 2011-07-19
Facts:
petitioners... filed this petition for declaratory relief... assailing the validity of the impending
imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the
collections of... tollway operators.
Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll fees, they have an
interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action. Additionally, Diaz claims that
he sponsored the approval of
EVAT Law... and... the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code... at the House of
Representatives.  Timbol, on the other hand, claims that she served as Assistant Secretary
of the Department of Trade and Industry and consultant of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB)
in... the past administration.
Petitioners allege that the BIR attempted during the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to impose VAT on toll fees. The imposition was deferred, however, in
view of the consistent opposition of Diaz and other sectors to such move. But, upon
President Benigno C.
Aquino III's assumption of office in 2010, the BIR revived the idea and would impose the
challenged tax on toll fees beginning August 16, 2010 unless judicially enjoined.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC, intend to include
toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a
"user's tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a... tax
on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll
fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a
TRO... enjoining the implementation of the VAT.
The Court required the government, represented by respondents Cesar V. Purisima,
Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Kim S. Jacinto-Henares, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, to comment on the petition within 10 days from notice.
Later, the Court issued another resolution treating the petition as one for prohibition.
The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise
grantees, including tollway operations, except where the law provides... otherwise; that the
Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words used in the statute; and
that the imposition of VAT on tollway operations has been the subject as early as 2003 of
several BIR rulings and circulars.
The government also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of
contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements... between the government and tollway operators.
Finally, the government contends that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric formula for
computing toll rates cannot exempt tollway operators from VAT.
Issues:
Whether or not the imposition of VAT on tollway operators... is not administratively feasible
and cannot be... implemented.
Ruling:
Administrative feasibility is one of the canons of a sound tax system. It simply means that
the tax system should be capable of being effectively administered and enforced with the
least inconvenience to the taxpayer. Non-observance of the canon, however, will not render
a tax... imposition invalid "except to the extent that specific constitutional or statutory
limitations are impaired."
Thus, even if the imposition of VAT on tollway operations may seem burdensome to
implement, it is not necessarily invalid unless some aspect... of it is shown to violate any law
or the Constitution.
Here, it remains to be seen how the taxing authority will actually implement the VAT on
tollway operations. Any declaration by the Court that the manner of its implementation is
illegal or unconstitutional would be premature. Although the transcript of the August 12,
2010 Senate... hearing provides some clue as to how the BIR intends to go about it,... the
facts pertaining to the matter are not sufficiently established for the Court to pass judgment
on. Besides, any concern about how the VAT on tollway operations will be enforced... must
first be addressed to the BIR on whom the task of implementing tax laws primarily and
exclusively rests. The Court cannot preempt the BIR's discretion on the matter, absent any
clear violation of law or the Constitution.
In fine, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not usurp legislative prerogative or
expand the VAT law's coverage when she sought to impose VAT on tollway operations. 
Section 108(A) of the Code clearly states that services of all other franchise grantees are
subject to
VAT, except as may be provided under Section 119 of the Code. Tollway operators are not
among the franchise grantees subject to franchise tax under the latter provision. Neither are
their services among the VAT-exempt transactions under Section 109 of the Code.
If the legislative intent was to exempt tollway operations from VAT, as petitioners so
strongly allege, then it would have been well for the law to clearly say so.  Tax exemptions
must be justified by clear statutory grant and based on language in the law too plain to be...
mistaken.
But as the law is written, no such exemption obtains for tollway operators.

FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

70. RE: Request of the National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Clients from Paying Filing,
Docket and other Fees, August 28, 2009

FACTS:
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the IBP’s
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.

ISSUE:

Should indigent litigants be exempted from paying docket fees?

RULING:

YES. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to
adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of
IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the
service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
71. UN Convention Against Torture
72. Republic Act No. 9745, Anti-Torture Act of 2009
73. Republic Act No. 7438
74. New Rules on Inquest, Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993
75. People vs. Galit, March 20, 1985
76. People vs. Ordoo, June 29, 2000
77. People vs. Lugod, February 21, 2001
78. People vs. Edralin Taboga, Febraury 6, 2002
79. People vs. Baloloy, 381 scra 31
RIGHT TO BAIL
80. Govt. of the USA vs. Purganan, supra.

FACTS:

    Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”.  The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.  But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  On
May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate
arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.  Before the RTC
could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion”
praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.  After the hearing, as required by
the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.  Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.  The court
ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash.  After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty.  

    Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still  no local jurisprudence
to guide lower court.
    
ISSUES: 
i.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii.    Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.  Regional Trial Court of
  Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it. 

i.    YES. 

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make
a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.  The prima facie
existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.  The silence of the Law and
the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.  It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice
of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended.

    Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   To determine probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
    Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a)    they are sufficient in form and substance
b)    they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)    the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no
prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.  On the
other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.  

ii.    Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.  Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.  The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”   

    That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case.  Extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.  He should apply for bail before the
courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

    Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case.  Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing
1)    that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty
in extradition cases therein

    Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. 

    It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. 
Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the
extradition case.  Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.    

    Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch
out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.   Extradition proceedings should
be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,  delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
    
    That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution
of the Petition for Extradition.
    
iii.    NO.

    Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  The
doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard.   A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.  He will be given full opportunity to
be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to
enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

    It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country.  He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1)    Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of 
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.  We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.

2)    The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the  Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal
case therein.

3)    The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a)    It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused.  His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b)    An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial.
c)    In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond
reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case”
d)    Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4)    Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty.  Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5)    There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)    leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and 
b)    remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.  Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

81. Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, March 17, 2000

OSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No.

134504, March 17, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his
wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for
reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest.
Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and
trial. Thereafter, he filed an ‗Urgent Ex-Parte‘ to allow him to Post Bail‘. The Public
Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It
was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the
hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her
‗Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail‘ private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case.
Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and
after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.
Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.
Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no
hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion
by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the
application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what
he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before
whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character
of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of
the trial judge in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for
doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the court‘s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him

82. Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, January 27, 1993

Facts:
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she
filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her
arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving
for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she
argues that her right to travel is impaired. 

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired. 

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he
every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of
action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent
power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused. 

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all
times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country
during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
83. Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, July 20, 2001
84. People vs. Bato, January 16, 1998
85. People vs. Ronaldo De Guzman, March 26, 2010

RIGHT TO BE HEARD
86. People vs. Magsi, 124 scra 64
87. People vs. Rivera, July 31, 2001
88. People vs. Alcanzado, 428 scra 681

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
89. People vs. Rodrigo Bayya, March 10, 2000
90. People vs. Malansing, 378 scra 685
91. People vs. Alvarado, 379 scra 475
92. Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, December 17, 2004

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

93. Republic Act No. 8493, Speedy Trial Act
94. Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001
94-A. Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of t he Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan, et. al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

95. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals, June 6, 2001
96. People vs. Ong, June 21, 2004
97. People vs. Ricardo Bohol, June 28, 2008

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS

98. People vs. Chua, April 4, 2001

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

99. People vs. Malimit, 264 scra 167
100. People vs. Rondero, 320 scra 383
101. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, January 26, 1999
102. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 scra 767
103. People vs. Gallarde, February 17, 2000
104. COMELEC vs. Tagle, 397 scra 618
104.a. De La Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, July 23, 2014

RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

105. Republic Act No. 9745, Anti-Torture Act of 2009
106. People v. Echegaray, February 7, 1997
107. People vs. Mercado, November 29, 2000

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

108. Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 289 scra 159
109. Almario vs. Court of Appeals, 355 scra 1
110. Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 scra 387
111. People vs. Feliciano, October 10, 2001
112. Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 scra 345
113. Potot vs. People, 383 scra 449
114. People vs. Astudillo, 401 scra 723

RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

115. Bayot vs, Sandiganbayan, March 23, 1984
116. People vs. Ferrer, December 27, 1972
117. Republic of the Philippines vs. Katigbak, December 22, 1989
118. Wright vs. Court of Appeals, August 15, 1994
119. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, January 20, 1999