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D1.3 Profiling of PT Authorities & Operators and Analysis of their Needs: Typologies and
Parameters
Project CIPTEC
Acronym:
Project 636412
Number:
Call: H2020-MG-2014_TwoStages
Topic:
MG.5.3-2014
Type of Action:
RIA
Version: 4.0
Status: Final/definite
Author name(s): Mr. R. van der Ploeg, Mr. T. Geier, Mr. F. Bouma
D – Demonstrator O - Other
Disclaimer
This project has been carried out under a contract awarded by the European Commission. No part of
this report may be used, reproduced and/or disclosed in any form or by any means without the prior
written permission of the CIPTEC project partners. © 2015 – All rights reserved.
Table of contents
Table of contents ................................................................................................. 5
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... 6
List of Tables ....................................................................................................... 6
Abbreviations....................................................................................................... 7
List of Terms ........................................................................................................ 7
Preface ................................................................................................................. 8
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 9
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 10
1.1. Framework .......................................................................................................... 10
1.1.1. WP1 .......................................................................................................... 10
1.1.2. WP1, task 1.3 ............................................................................................ 10
1.1.3. Interrelations with other WPs ..................................................................... 11
1.1.4. Deliverable ................................................................................................ 12
1.2. Definition of „Typology‟ and „Parameter‟ .......................................................... 12
1.3. Definition of „Need‟ ............................................................................................. 13
1.4. Research Approach ............................................................................................ 14
List of Figures
Figure 1: Graphical presentation of the CIPTEC components showing how they interrelate . 11
Figure 2: EPTA project, May 2014: Interplay of Levels of Planning in PT. ............................ 16
Figure 3: Outcomes of EMTA survey questions on procurement and vehicle ownership ...... 38
Figure 4: Pyramid of customer needs in transport by Mark van Hagen, 2011 ....................... 42
Figure 5: Scheme Showing the Innovation Categories of PT from WP2. .............................. 48
List of Tables
Table 1: Risk allocation per contract types with examples. ................................................... 22
Table 2: Scheme showing overlap amongst typologies......................................................... 32
Table 3: Table showing links to INTERREG IVC EPTA Project ............................................ 33
Table 4: Relations between the two appointed typologies..................................................... 35
Table 5: Scheme showing application of typologies amongst EMTA members based on Metro
systems .................................................................................................................. 39
Table 6: Scheme showing application of typologies amongst EMTA members based on Bus
systems .................................................................................................................. 40
Table 7: List of Needs of the PT Supply Side ........................................................................ 46
Table 8: List of needs allocated to supply side stakeholders…………………………………... 47
Table 9: List of Needs of PT Supply Side in In Relation to WP2 Innovation Categories ........ 49
Abbreviations
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process PTO Public Transport Operator
PT Public Transport ToC Transport operating Company
PTA Public Transport Authority WP Work Package
List of Terms
Innovation All new or modified (existing) ideas, methods, products, services,
technologies that were (or still are being) developed consciously using the
latest insights with the aim of improving the status quo and that can be
applied to public transport with the main goal to attract more customers
(preferably at lower costs) (CIPTEC Consortium, 2015)
1
[online], retrieved on December 15, 2015, from: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/parameter
2
[online], retrieved on December 15, 2015, from: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/parameter
3
[online], retrieved on December 15, 2015, from: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/typology
4
[online], retrieved on December 15, 2015, from: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/typology
5
[online], retrieved on December 15, 2015, from: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/typology
Preface
To create a level playing field the European Commission defined framework rules concerning
the conditions of service contract award and rules for a fair award of grants and
compensation for public service provision. Public Service Obligation Regulation (COM
1370/2007) defines that competent local authorities in principle have the obligation to tender
and open their internal transport market to competition.
Moreover, laying down provisions for the procurement of service contracts and to separate
the role and responsibilities of operators from those of the competent local public transport
authority is one of the regulatory framework‘s main objectives.
By incorporating mandatory terms for transport planning, contracting and tendering as a
principle for granting public service contracts the competent local authority can choose to
implement incentives in the contract (i.e., to stimulate innovation). After 6 years of entering
into force one could argue that the Public Service Obligation Regulation (COM 1370/2007)
gradually managed to introduce clear rules for competition in public transport (PT) in Europe.
Urban mobility is primarily a competence of local, regional or national authorities. The EU-
Treaties provide no clear legal basis for EU intervention. On the other hand, urban transport
systems can be considered part of the EU Common Transport Policy: urban mobility is a
central component of long-distance transport, as most long-distance journeys start and end in
cities, and congestion in towns affects the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).
Moreover, EU-wide goals such as tackling climate change and increasing energy efficiency
cannot be achieved without tackling issues and challenges faced by urban transport.
Due the subsidiarity principle, EU action in the field of urban transport so far is mainly focused
on measures of ―soft policy‖. European policy‘s added value may take several forms, among
others: data collection and monitoring, offering financial support, encouraging research,
establishing harmonised standards (e.g. for emission and noise), dissemination of information
and of best innovative practices.
Abstract
To create a clear overview of the different organisational forms (typologies and parameters),
their needs and the way these forms/needs influence the way organisations deal with
innovations, research has been conducted. In addition to desk research, a survey was
devised and spread among the network of EMTA members and relevant CIPTEC partners
(i.e., partners directly related to the supply side) were asked to review and add to the desk
research output. As a result, a combination of theoretical and practical input was incorporated
in this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To create a clear overview of the different organisation forms existing in the sector, literature
review concerning existing typologies for the categorisation of organisation structures in
public transport (PT) has been conducted. A total of nine different typologies have been
identified of which four derive directly from literature study (i.e., market regime,
entrepreneurship, levels of planning, contract design), whilst five are emerging typologies and
their components based on categorisation by different parameters (i.e., the territorial scope of
PT Authorities (PTAs), the strategic decision-making process, the level of integration and the
scope of tasks of PTA, and the status of the operator (PTO).
In order to identify the real world application of these organisation concepts among larger
European PTAs, a survey questionnaire was elaborated and sent out to the members of
larger metropolitan authorities. This survey included questions on the subjective needs of
authorities, which were further investigated in task 3 (Needs of EU Public Transport
Authorities and Operators in the context of CIPTEC) of this work package. From this survey
the CIPTEC project expected to discover certain factors and correlations between the way an
urban transport authority carries out its key functions and responsibilities by giving licences or
grants to its operators either by a tendered or a directly award contract. The survey supports
the insight in the reality of occurring and most remarkable capacities of the authority in order
to assess what type of contracted responsibilities and financial risks between the authorities
and their operator could occur and exert a positive influence on the ability and propensity to
develop innovative solutions.
Next to that the survey has yielded some insight in key elements from the authorities‘
perspective that PTAs consider to represent their most significant needs (in terms of
objectives or basic requirements) to achieve better quality of service, higher customer
orientation and more planning efficiency. We have identified some recurring links in which
some key elements that are likely to mutually influence one another coincide as a standard
rule and that are most likely to occur within the circumstances in which these elements
appear in daily praxis.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Framework
1.1.1. WP1
WP1 is the basis of the CIPTEC project from which the results should be used in WP3 and
WP4, and possibly in WP2. The main stakeholders in the PT sector are represented by the
users (demand side), authorities and operators (provision side). This consideration runs
through the whole project structure from the beginning until the end. The analysis of customer
groups' and Public Transport authorities and operators' needs, as well as the overview of
the catalytic market and societal trends as described in WP1 is therefore the basis for further
research done in WP2, WP3 and WP4. WP1 will focus on understanding firstly the current
trends in society worldwide, and then investigating the needs of the involved parties. This
way, CIPTEC will define the opportunities, and the potential solutions, and concepts will
emerge in the following WPs after also taking into account the trends and choosing the key
points to address.
capacity to build on resources for researching behaviour and develop new tools and services
to answer to customer needs.
On top of this EMTA collects annual indicators on the performance of authorities and their
networks. This Barometer provides data on different features and performance indicators of
the EMTA members..
On the PTO side the collection of data is more diffuse; in some case the level of co-operation
with the transport authority shows a kind or interdependence that both the shares of the
municipal company and the data are owned by the public body, while in other cases
depending on historical positions and the ownership situation the legal position shows full
separation of responsibilities between authorities and the contracted operator. The partners
have agreed to check if they have operators and/or organisations of operators in their network,
and to estimate the efficiency and effectiveness of using the networks in reaching the
operators.
Figure 1: Graphical presentation of the CIPTEC components showing how they interrelate
In the figure above the main technical WPs of the CIPTEC proposal as well as their inter-
relation is presented. Task 1.3 resulting in the current deliverable, is noted by a discontinuous
red cyclic line. The work done in WP1 will be the basis of work done in subsequent work
packages. In the shorter term, the (preliminary) results of task 1.3 will be used in WP2.
1.1.4. Deliverable
The deliverable for this task (D1.3) is a Report on PT Authorities and Operators‘
mapping/typologies and Needs. It is due in month 10 (29 February 2016).
Typology
6
According to the Merriam Webster dictionary , a typology is ‗a system used for putting
things into groups according to how they are similar: the study of how things can be divided
into different types‘.
7
The Oxford dictionary :
Parameter
9
From the Oxford dictionary : (technical) A numerical or other measurable factor forming
one of a set that defines a system or sets the conditions of its operation.
10
The Cambridge dictionary defines the term as follows : a set of facts or a fixed limit that
establishes or limits how something can or must happen or be done
This would mean that in Task 1.3 the following need to be developed:
(a) a typology or set of typologies of PTAs, comprising several types (profiles/parameters)
of PTAs and
Therefore, in relation to WP1, parameters can be seen as features of/defining the system of
typologies. Typologies are systems to define and categorise in this case Public Transport
(PT) organisations (PTAs and PTOs).
6
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/typology
7
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/typology
8
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/typology
9
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/parameter
10
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/parameter
Linking the term ‗needs‘ to the supply side of PT appears to be much less obvious. In the
context of our project, transport authorities‘ needs are explained as objectives that the PTA is
striving for to reach a better outcome. What the specific factor framing the actual need is,
depends on the kind of activity that the organisation wants to enhance. In this phase of
research the need is not translated into an instrument but into a desire to obtain a capacity
that enables to fulfil the goal of the business model. That can vary from increasing ridership
or evenly spread of capacity in certain periods, to obtaining better information for the traveller.
The technical tool to fulfil the functional need is the way this need is in the end satisfied. In
11
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/need
12
―Funding the Public Transport Needs of an Aging population‖ (APTA, March 2010 in cooperation with
Nelson/Nygaard Consulting Associates).
13
Dr. M. Van Hagen (Dutch Railways): How to meet the need of train passengers? A successful
customer segmentation model for public transport (October 2009).
the interest of the identification of the needs, it is decided to consider a ‗need‘ as a broader
concept related to the achievement of the overall goals. For the fulfilment of all of these
‗needs‘ a certain (or several) instrument(s) or tool(s) become(s) necessary. These tools can
be considered as solutions at the level of the innovations which are inventoried and created in
the further workflow of the CIPTEC project. A supply side instigated ‗need‘ has to be primarily
defined as an objective or requirement of the local authority or of its operator described in
terms of a projected functionality, irrespective of the specific solution to fulfil an actual need.
In § 3.2, the concept of the ‗need‘ is further elaborated.
The hierarchical differentiation is a tool to describe the internal structuring of decision making
processes within a company or system and can be used as guideline to identify the principle-
agent relationships within firms and organisations whose size does not allow for
concentration of all decision making by the same individual (ISOTOPE Consortium 2000).
The denomination concept utilised here can be based on various theoretical definitions and
has been used and subsequently redeveloped in several scientific publications on the matter
(ISOTOPE Consortium, 2000). It describes three different levels of planning and control: The
strategic, tactical and operational level. The following concerns a short introduction into the
scope of the division aspects as well as the planning and controlling tasks of PT allocated
within these levels.
of sales staff and drivers as well as the management of infrastructure and vehicles based on
the objectives and restrictions of the tactical planning level (See van de Velde, 1999). Also
procedures for the monitoring of the service quality are included in this level. Depending on
the relationship between the PTA and PTO, the above identified functions will be under the
responsibility of PTA or PTO, respectively; in case the operation of PT service is contracted
by PTA, the PTO is in charge of the daily operation for service provision (management of
drivers and other resources) and the PTA is in charge of the control of quality performances
(see sections 2.1.4 and 2.2.2).
From the EPTA-project 14 this diagram shows different overlapping phases of involvement
from parties engaged in defining the transport policy (politicians, authorities and operators)
passing through different levels of decision making process abstraction between generic
setting of goals for the long term, the intermittent level of tactical levels and solutions and the
executive (instruments) level of work in the PTA core remit. The authority has to link the
strategic level with the operational level by translating political goals (‗what‘) and resources
(‗with what‘) via the tactical level of ‗how‘ to specify the plan to achieve these goals connected
to the operational level of deployment of the ‗means‘ to enable the actual production of
services.
14
Source: EPTA project ―Enhancing Public Transport Authorities‖ in a sustainable way. May 2014.
Transport organisational forms encountered in Europe were evolved during the passage of
time and they were categorised by van de Velde (2003) in the following grouping: (1) from
public management under authority initiative towards an involvement of the private sector, (2)
from public companies operating under market initiative towards a further involvement of the
private sector, (3) from public companies operating under market initiative towards authority
initiative with private involvement and at last (4) any reform of the existing regimes.
In addition, three emerging main models of PT authorities were presented in 2001 by EMTA
(S. Lecler). Particularly:
1) the model of authorities created ab nihilo [sic] by public authorities and responsible for the
strategic and tactical levels, mostly found in Spain, Germany and France,
2) the model of historic public operators turned gradually into PT authorities responsible for
the tactical level (e.g. Stockholm, Milan, London, Rome and Brussels): in this case entities
benefit from the already obtained knowhow regarding the operation of the PT system.
3) the model of public authorities in charge of several metropolitan issues, among which
transport is a primary one (e.g. Copenhagen, Helsinki).
According to EMTA (Lecler, 2001), there are three main systems in terms of who is
responsible for organising the PT: (1) areas where ordinary local authorities have the
competence, (2) areas where the operators have this responsibility and finally (3) areas with
a specific body engaged.
Finally, according to the study of Naniopoulos, et.al. (2012) three distinct scenarios of the
possible business models, in terms of the allocation and mixture of the potential tasks and
responsibilities, namely according to the core scope of a metropolitan Transport Authority,
were proposed. Particularly:
a) the Metropolitan Authority of Public Transport,
b) the Metropolitan Authority of Transport and Mobility,
c) the Metropolitan Authority of Transport, Mobility and Regional Development,
organisational forms may also exist when planning and tendering capacities are outsourced
to a third party at arm‘s length of the actual authority (See van de Velde, 1999).
In this organisational regime, the transport authority is either co-ordinating, planning and
producing the operational service by its own agency or by utilising an in-house operator. In-
house operators or publicly owned operators benefit from historical rights. The legal existence
of in-house operators are mostly derived from a legal regime granting exclusive rights or it
can be based on a temporary exclusive right granted to an operator who happens to be
publicly owned for historical or other reasons. In the first case, where the monopolistic
position is protected by law, so de jure, no entry threat of other operators legally exists, while
in the second, de facto situation, an entry threat theoretically exists at the moment the
exclusive rights to operate by contract have expired and need to be renewed.
The different legal status of the in-house operators may impact reforms or innovations and
changes in the provision of supply are being considered as the status determines the way in
which, and the ease with which, changes can be implemented.
In Delegated Management, the authority makes the assets required for operations available
to a private operator to whom the authority delegates the management of the network. The
infrastructure remains under control of the public entity. The planning on tactical level, like
network design, defining modes and vehicle capacity is carried out by the authority. In certain
operational aspects like vehicles input and depots the operator is limited, since the operator
works with the publicly provided infrastructure (vehicles, depots, etc.). The main contrast in
regime 3 (Central planning and tendering of production) in comparison to this practice is the
fact that infrastructure (mainly vehicles) necessary to carry out the services is not publicly
owned but provided by the operators themselves.
In this regime, the transport authority determines and designs the services to be carried out
and awards an operator with the production of these services. The operator has in this case
no tactical freedom, which means the initiative for the introduction of services lies entirely in
the hand of the authority.
Within this model, which is also known as the ―Scandinavian model‖ or ―London model‖ for its
occurrence in the Scandinavian capitals Stockholm and Copenhagen and the British capital,
an awarding procedure per line or per (sub-)network can be utilised.
This regime is very closely related to the aforementioned regime 3 (Central planning and
tendering of production). The authority takes the initiative to introduce a service, performs the
planning procedures of the tactical level and awards the operational tasks to an operator. The
difference lies in the design freedom of the operator in the exploitation phase. The operator is
granted the possibility to adjust and redesign certain service characteristics during the course
of the exploitation phase.
In comparison with the aforementioned regimes three (Central planning and tendering of
production) and four (Tendering of realisation with redesign possibilities), this regime gives
more tactical planning procedures and with it brings more design freedom to the operator.
The transport authority in this case defines and requests a set of minimum service standards.
The actual initiative for introducing a specific service therefore is in the hands of the operator,
since the operator defines where exactly the services are deployed, in compliance with the
minimum standards required by the authority. In this model, also known as the ‗French
model‘, several operators who define a service design concept and apply for the lot (or
market), the grants awarded is done by a competitive tendering procedure conducted by the
authority. The authority also exactly defines the level of service design freedom of the
operator by setting the minimum standards. These standards can, theoretically, define the
specifications of the entire service, which would render the service design freedom of the
operator into the margins.
In this regime, commercially viable services emerge autonomously out of a free market
process. For these, services obligations can be set as mandatory by the authority, which are
connected to the authorisation (See van de Velde, 1999). Such ―rules of the game‖ can
include obligations to operate the services registered and to carry passengers according to
published timetables and fares, an obligation for the usage of vehicles accessible for prams,
handicapped, etc. Next to these restrictions, the financial viability and professional capability
of the operator may impact the authorisation process, in order to guarantee a safe and
continuous operation. However, it needs to be taken into account that more obligations may
result in fewer services being commercially viable. Competition is not limited by these basic
service obligations if these are equally applicable to both, incumbents and entrants.
In addition to these profitable services, a transport authority can order and subsidise services
that are necessary to fulfil social or other policy goals. For these services, the authority
directly carries out the tactical planning tasks itself or requires minimum standards whilst
allowing operators to design the services, which are then competitively tendered. The
authority‘s budget limitations define the extent of these additional, public service obligations.
In this regime, a temporary exclusive right (de facto monopoly) to operate a route or (sub)
network is tendered amongst private operators. The entire tactical planning procedures and
therefore the specifics of the service design are in the hands of the operator. Some specific
obligations may be imposed in order to guarantee a safe and continuous service.
In this regime, commercially viable services appear autonomously out of a free market
process. Authorities, however, use subsidisation in the appearance of profitable services in
order to compensate fare rebates given to certain target groups, like students or elderly. Such
subsidy allows the realisation of social policy plans in a free market environment and may
result in more commercially viable routes, which stimulates the market to provide more
services. For these autonomously appearing services, as mentioned in regime 6
(Commercially viable deregulated market with tendering of non-commercial routes) the
authority can impose obligations in order to guarantee a fair competition as well as safe and
continuous services.
New contractual forms with strong revenue incentive structures exist, which are rather based
on fully variable payments without taking anticipated amounts and lump-sums into account,
as for a further distinction in contract forms (Stanley & van de Velde, 2008). The following
categorisation approach for contractual forms in urban PT has been described in 2008 and
entails seven different contract categories (See Stanley & van de Velde, 2008; ISOTOPE
Consortium, 2000).
In Management contracts, the operator is paid a management fee for running the service
while the production costs of the services and passenger revenues account to the authority.
Therefore, both production cost risks and the revenue risk are borne solely by the authority.
The remuneration received by the transport operator is independent on its level of
performance. The introduction of bonus/malus payments to a higher standard of operational
performance may incentivise the operator to deliver better quality of service.
In Gross cost contracts, the operator is responsible for all costs connected with the
production of the services and running the system. The revenue remains the responsibility of
the authority. An agreed fixed price will be paid for a fixed amount of service. The difference
between the actually realised production costs and anticipated production cost (which defines
the fixed payment amount) is for the account of the operator, while the difference between
anticipated revenues and actual achieved revenues is on account of the authority. The
introduction of bonus/malus payments to operational performance may incentivise the
operator to deliver improved operational quality. The most common incentive structure is
explained in contract regime 4 (Gross cost contracts with ridership incentive).
Shared production cost risk can be achieved by indexation clauses that transfer some risk on
the input price increases to the authority while the operator remains responsible for
production efficiency or by introduction of a specific level up to which the operator bares the
entire risk of production cost. Above that level, this risk, the authority takes over parts of the
risks. The revenue risk is fully with the authority.
Some authors argue that the focus should be on the type of contract and not so much on
the tendering process itself. A performance based contract could be just as effective for
performance improvement as public tendering while avoiding the transaction costs related
to the tendering procedure (Hensher, Stanley, 2002). Daniels ea. (2011) have observed a
trend towards more incentives and performance based contracts in public transport
provision. Hensher and Stanley (2008) also studied contracting processes in complex
public transport concessions. Because ex post (after the signing of the contract) involves
more coordination in complex concessions than for more straightforward concessions, they
believe a negotiated performance based contract could be a better alternative than
competitive tendering to achieve more value for money.
Source: Wijmenga N., Veeneman W, Contracting and Dutch urban public transport performances
The difference between anticipated total operation costs and anticipated revenues defines the
price of the tender, a lump-sum, which is to cover the expected deficit of operations and is
paid from the authority to the operator (or in the case of a fully profitable service, the operator
pays this sum as a franchise fee to the authority for the right to operate). The production cost
risk and the revenue risk lay on the side of the operator, since a produced difference between
costs and revenues that does not correspond to the anticipated difference between costs and
revenues is for the account of the operator. The operator bares the risk to produce too costly,
so that the production cost cannot be covered by the lump-sum payment and the revenues.
In this case, the operator carries the revenue risk up to a specific level of divergence with the
anticipated ridership that defined the lump-sum payment. After this threshold, the revenue
risk is shared between the authority and the operator. The production cost risk, however,
remains solely on the side of the operator.
The operator receives no lump-sum payments but only a variable payment fully dependent
upon specific performance, such as ridership, etc. In the case, both the production risk cost
and the revenue risk cost is borne by the operator.
In an environment where all main assumptions of perfect competition were fulfilled, free
competition would result in efficient market outcomes and welfare maximisation and state
intervention would be superfluous, if it was not for other social and political goals (see
ISOTOPE consortium, 2000). However, the complexity of the Urban PT market in general and
the following factors in particular, withdraw it from perfect competition models.
If the assumptions for perfect competition in markets are not fulfilled, markets become
inefficient and ―market failures‖ occur, which are traditionally tackled by state intervention
(see ISOTOPE consortium, 2000). In this case, it becomes important to consider, that this
kind of intervention is not connected with the accomplishment of social policy or
compensation of negative externalities but solely targets the prevention of market failures.
There are two kinds of state intervention: indirect and direct state intervention.
In indirect state intervention, the government does not determine market outcomes but
facilitates the efficient play of market forces by, for example, lowering of market entry
burdens, introduction of standards or imposition of effective rules of competition to the
market. Indirect state intervention policy is limited by the costs of such interventions in
comparisons to their advantages and is in some instances not powerful enough to solve
market failures. With direct intervention policy the government actively determines market
outcomes, which can be achieved by direct regulation of companies or their nationalisation,
but also by creating a competition for a market rather than within a market by means of
tendering (ISOTOPE consortium, 2000).
On the basis of different levels of state intervention, three general market regimes can be
identified in PT.
1) Regulated markets,
through competition of different operators for a market, where the operating rights for a
network or line are concession-based and tendered or based on a temporary authorisation. In
a deregulated, free market PT environment, a direct competition between different
autonomous operators on the same track or network is enabled and actually can take place
on the road. Even in this regime authority intervention is not fully absent. As a proof of the
professional level, the credit-worthiness and reliability a licence to grant access will usually be
required to warrant the minimum safety, professional ability and continuity of the operator‘s
business. Additional public services, that are considered socially necessary and therefore
government subsidised, can be provided by tendering additional contracts (ISOTOPE
consortium, 2000).
2.2.4. Entrepreneurship
2.2.4.1. Authority Initiative Regimes
Translated into the field of urban PT, the entrepreneur is the organisation within the particular
transport system that takes the initiative for the creation and supply of services, hereby takes
some form of risk and delineates at least the main characteristics of the services that will be
provided (see van de Velde, 1999). The initiative for the appearance of PT is strongly
correlated to the legal framework the system is set in and can evolve in the market or on the
side of the authorities, which then has a monopoly of initiative.
Market initiative regimes can subsequently be distinct into open entry regimes, which
represent free market conditions and regulated regimes based on authorisation. Open entry
regimes can in principle be based on various reference frameworks such as pure and perfect
competition, contestable markets or monopolistic competition. Authority intervention is
present in terms of licences as a proof of professional capability of the operator in order to
guarantee the safety and continuity of the service. The role of the authority in this
organisational form is described with the term ‗watchdog‘, since it is regulatory only,
controlling and restricting the actions of autonomous companies on the market (see van de
Velde, 1999).
Authorisation regimes consider systems where the market is also the initiator, but transport
companies require an authorisation before being able to provide services. This limits
competition on the market to an extent that is desirable to the relevant policy maker. In this
organisational form, the authority is not only controlling the actions of the operators on the
market but also limits the market entry by means of regulatory authorisation. Regulation can
for example state that entry is prohibited if it influences existing services or that it is only
allowed if it improves the existing level of service. A further distinction may be made into
regimes where autonomous private companies dominate the market and those forms where
publicly owned companies dominate the market (see van de Velde, 1999).
In the market initiative regimes, authorities can also have the role of a subsidiser and grant
fare reductions to specific target groups of users and subsidise transport companies by
transforming a number of unprofitable markets into profitable markets and thereby increase
the number of services that appear through market initiative. In limited cases it might occur,
that authorities create proper supply themselves in areas where the market does not come
forward with desired commercially non viable services by itself, for instance if these services
are needed to fulfil social policy goals.
Tariff integration seeks to avoid unjustified tariff differences in case of transfer. In classical
non-integrated systems, a transfer usually implies additional costs since each transfer or
change of vehicle/mode/operator results in a new, separately payable trip. In integrated tariff
systems, a ticket purchase enables the customer to utilise all modes and vehicle, also of
different operators of the system necessary to pursue his journey from origin to destination,
regardless the number of the interchange points.
Logical integration appears to be the most difficult to achieve and means that the system
should be perceived by users as one, with a unified set of concepts and language in its
communication towards the user (ISOTOPE Consortium, 2000).
2) A feeder model extended with direct services on busy relations (peak time express
services),
The physical integration aspect is very much influenced by the distribution of planning
procedures and the distribution of operation amongst several stakeholders, which makes it a
very complex reference for categorisation as it holds an immense potential for confusion
among possibilities. Therefore, these categorisations based on physical integration are not
elaborated in further detail.
For these complexity reasons, categories based on this aspect have not been further
developed and the aspect will not be further considered for the classification of stakeholders'
typologies.
In this regime a traveller after purchase of his ticket has no limits in the usage of PT. The
validity of the ticket is defined geographically (e.g. the borders of the city, a certain fare zone)
and the traveller is not limited in the usage of PT within this area of validity for the duration of
the journey or a certain time limit defined. The traveller can use every mode of PT present
and perform as many interchange procedures necessary to proceed to the destination of
choice.
This regime is very similar to the Integrated Fare System except that within this regime,
services occur which are not covered by the general, integrated fare but make a subsequent
payment for the usage of special services needed. Special services may for example be
express services or special peak hour service routes, which create an additional benefit to the
traveller. The subsequent payment can be introduced in form of a supplement, which needs
to be purchased upon the normal ticket or in the form of special tickets that have no
connection with the integrated fare.
In this regime, a traveller is after the purchase of the ticket limited to the services of a specific
transport operator and the modes this operator supplies. Transfer between the modes offered
by a single operator is possible. If the journey exceeds the services of the operator and
services of a different company need to be utilised in order to proceed to the destination of
choice, a separate ticket needs to be purchased for the services of the subsequent operator.
The fare practice in this regime allows travellers to utilise a certain mode network, for
example the underground/metro network and enables the traveller to make transfers within
this network without the need to purchase another ticket. However, if the traveller changes to
another mode, for example to the bus system, a subsequent ticket needs to be purchased.
Interchange procedures within the subsequent network are therefore possible, not taking into
account whether all connected services in the network are performed by the same ToC
(transport operating company).
In this regime, every trip made needs to be paid separately. Interchanges from one vehicle to
another even with the same operator are therefore mostly not included in a single ticket price.
An important evolution to rule out this concept however is the usage of payment systems that
allow a variable fare payment per trip, like smart cards or mobile applications. In these Pay-
as-You-Go systems the passenger pays a fare that varies based on the distance covered (for
example per kilometre or per zone). The traveller therefore does not need to buy a flat fare
ticket per trip, but pays exactly for the actual distance covered. Consequently, the fare system
appears integrated on the bases of distance payment, although a validation of the e-card or
smart card is needed on every stage of a journey.
2.3.4.6. Confusions
These five regimes represent a theoretical categorisation for the fare systems in PT.
However, real world applications might show characteristics of several of these regimes in
one and the same system. An example for this is the Oystercard fare payment system in
London. When using the underground service, a variable fare collection based on several
fare zones is utilised and interchange from one line to another in London metro network is
possible without additional payment. When changing on to the bus system, however,
passengers pay a flat fare with their Oystercard per trip, which means the fare is neither
variably based on the distance, nor does it allow transfer from one bus to another, since with
every bus boarding procedure the flat fare is due.
This regime describes an authority that is responsible for the administrative territory of the
city. Administrative bodies on local level are municipalities or cities; the territory of the
authority is therefore defined by the administrative boundary of the municipalities or cities.
This regime describes an authority that is responsible for the same administrative territory of
the regional political body. Political bodies on regional level are provinces, counties, districts,
etc. The territory of the authority is therefore defined by the administrative boundaries of that
regional political entity.
Public bodies that do not represent a territory similar to that of a single administrative entity
but for functional reasons are endowed with competences to commission public services
covering several administrative levels (municipalities, cities) within a highly urbanised area.
Their territory is defined by the boundaries of administrative entities organised co-operating in
the authority. The boundaries of the metropolitan authorities therefore do not match with an
administrative territory.
This authority structure is similar to the aforementioned metropolitan authority. It is also set up
to represent several administrative entities (i.e., municipalities, cities) and its territory does not
match with the boundaries of one administrative entity. Hence, in this typology the main city
of the conurbation is not represented by this authority and administers its own transport policy
body. This metropolitan authority encompasses the public transport connections between
municipalities in the agglomeration and with the central city, except for the steering of the
transport services within the central city itself.
This is the very basic form of a public transport authority (PTA), limiting its responsibilities to
PT. Other modes of the urban mobility market (car, bike, walking etc.) are represented by
different authorities or administrative public bodies.
In this case, the authority is not only responsible for the PT modalities and their infrastructure
present in the city (or region, or metropolitan region, depending on the territorial scope
described in the previous chapter), but also bundles activities for individual transport, such as
traffic management, parking and road infrastructure and the integration and seamlessness of
individual and PT in provisions like ‗park and ride‘ parking concepts.
2.3.6.3. Authority responsible for urban mobility and land use planning
This regime is similar to the aforementioned (authority responsibility for urban mobility) except
that the authority also impacts the general land use planning of the city or the metropolitan
region. The land use planning with its distribution of activities and places to fulfil the needs of
the city‘s inhabitants defines where future demand for transportation occurs. The
transportation authority may therefore be consulted in the creation of land use plans or may
even actively define the land use planning of the city in order to avert land use situations that
cannot be handled by the transport system of the city.
2.3.6.4. Authority responsible for urban mobility and other public services
This regime is similar to the aforementioned authority regimes but does not limit the
competence of the authority on mobility but integrates the provision of other public services
into the authority. Examples of such public services are waste disposal, energy supply,
management of public parks etc.
These following regimes represent a theoretical categorisation for the strategic decision
making in PT. However, real world applications might show characteristics of several of these
regimes. The possible influence of the authority on the decision making process on strategic
level is expected to decrease, with the first mentioned showing the greatest amount of
influence.
In this regime, the strategic decisions and policy are defined within the authority by an internal
board, which can also entail representatives from administrative bodies and other
stakeholders. The defined strategic policy goals and plans are then translated into day-to-day
tactical and operational practice.
In this case, strategic decisions are made within the administrative body with the same
territory that is represented by the authority and the authority is responsible for a translation
of these policy goals into tactical planning and a day-to-day operation (with the help of other,
public and private stakeholders, like operators or planners). The strategic planning and the
formation of political goals are therefore concentrated at the municipality or city council for
local authorities or at the provincial/ regional councils for regional authorities.
This regime corresponds to metropolitan authorities, where the political power of the territory
of the authority is not represented by one political body but by several municipalities or
regions. These municipalities together appoint a board that collectively decides on the
strategic decisions level of PT. The voting power of each municipality or region represented
by the authority may be based on the size of the municipality in terms of inhabitants, etc. The
authority itself does not decide on the goals and political aims at the strategic level but has
the sole responsibility for a translation of these policy goals into a tactical plan and a plan for
day-to-day operation (with the help of other, public and private stakeholders, like operators or
planners).
In this case, a management body with different stakeholders is specially formed in order to
collectively define the goals and strategic plans for the PT system. The authority itself,
translates these goals into a tactical plan and daily practice.
In this case, the general policy aims and the strategic level are not determined by the political
bodies directly represented by the municipality but by a higher level of governance. In these
cases both the PT goals and the strategic planning are defined by either a regional, national
or federal public entity, whose territorial responsibility overrules the area covered by the
authority responsibility. The authority itself translates these goals into a tactical plan and daily
practice.
Looking at standard parameters (transport mode, type or geographic level of service) private
bidders in the market will reshape themselves to local circumstances that are required by the
tendering authority. Therefore, in our view the way these elements would define a ToC is
basically the way the ToCs are mirroring what local and urban transport authorities carry
forward. The main distinction that can be made is if the company operating is publicly or
Knowing these circumstances and the fact that market variety is more international with less
new players to enter that market, categorising urban operators looking at the aforementioned
typologies and parameters is sometimes sensible by identifying a specific object of the
tender. The type of functions and adhering tasks or level of planning and control of a contract
are mostly congruent. Parameters like the size or turnover of private or public transport
companies or the scale of operation (local, national or international) is considered less
relevant for this study.
Taking the ownership as leading parameter for urban operators we can distinguish 4 main
types of operators:
2.5. Considerations on the links with the INTERREG IVC EPTA project
To be able to compare this research with prior projects the EPTA study comes into our view.
In EPTA the 10 primary functional areas of medium-sized and larger authorities in European
cities are defined. This diagram shows the main functions of a PTA with adhering sub-tasks.
This table below describes the connections between the functions coming forward from the
EPTA study with the typologies that are defined in this document.
Primary Functional
Areas of PTA from Typology from CIPTEC 1.3 Incorporating this Function Chapter
EPTA
Categorisation Based on the Level of Planning 2.2.1
Organisational 2.3.6
Area of Responsibility of Authority
2.2.2
Financial Categorisation Based on Contract Design
2.3.4
Fares Tariff integration
2.2.4
Intervention Entrepreneurship
It is considered that particularly this information, the division of responsibilities in planning and
operation and the substitute goals, is important for the further project work flow of CIPTEC,
since this information defines, which stakeholder is interested in which sort of innovation.
Therefore, it was decided to appoint the two typologies ‗Categorisation Based on Level of
Planning‘ and ‗Contract Design‘ for the further utilisation within CIPTEC.
The graphic below indicates the different parameters of these typologies and their
interrelation.
Management Contract
Gross Cost Contract
Gross Cost Contract with Ridership Incentive
Public Service Obligation with Public Operator
Net Cost Contract
Net Cost Contract with Shared Revenue Risk
Super Incentive Contract
Private Concessions Including Infrastructure Management Contract
Management Contract
Gross Cost Contract
Gross Cost Contract with Shared Production Risk
Central Planning and Tendering of Production
Gross Cost Contract with Ridership Incentive
Net Cost Contract
Net Cost Contract with Shared Revenue Risk
Management Contract
Gross Cost Contract
Gross Cost Contract with Shared Production Risk
Tendering of Realisation with Redesign Possibilities Gross Cost Contract with Ridership Incentive
Net Cost Contract
Net Cost Contract with Shared Revenue Risk
Super Incentive Contract
Gross Cost Contract
Gross Cost Contract with Shared Production Risk
Gross Cost Contract with Ridership Incentive
Tendering of Network Design and Realisation
Net Cost Contract
Net Cost Contract with Shared Revenue Risk
Super Incentive Contract
Gross Cost Contract
Gross Cost Contract with Shared Production Risk
Deregulated Market for Commercially Viable Routes and Gross Cost Contract with Ridership Incentive
Tendering of Non Commercial Routes Net Cost Contract
Net Cost Contract with Shared Revenue Risk
Super Incentive Contract
Tendered Authorization for Exploitation of Commercially viable
No Cost related contracting
routes
Free competition with Light Touch Regulation No Cost related contracting
Deregulated Free Market No Cost related contracting
The organisational set-up of transport authorities, their ownership structure and internal
governance, decision making and procurement processes, contracting practice award;
Main features and characteristics of metropolitan authorities and cities that could be
emblematic for possible incentives and needs towards innovation;
Main challenges that drive forward innovation in public transport supply.
From consolidating the survey results the following points of interest come forward (please
refer to the appendix of this document for the questionnaire of the survey):
- Geographical area:
The size of the PTAs‘ geographical area varies from 401 km2 (Vilnius) to over 30,000 km2
(Berlin-Brandenburg). The average surface of 25 metropolitan areas amounts to 5,425
km2.
- Inhabitants:
The size in terms of the number of inhabitants varies from 540,000 for the smallest
(Vilnius) to 12 million for the most populated metropolitan area (Ile de France); the
average size of cities is 1,56 million and 3,3 million for the whole PTA area.
- Administrative scope:
15 out of 25 cover metropolitan areas; from the other 10 there are 9 covering an
administrative region or county (Madrid, Ile de France, Stockholm County, Barcelona
Metropolitan area, Region of Bilbao, Regione Piemonte (It), Rhein-Main, Copenhagen
Region, Vienna (Ost Region) and one is local (Vilnius).
- Funding:
Thirteen out of 25 PTAs receive its main funding from the central or from regional state
government. The members from France (Lyon, IdF) have income mainly from passenger
ticket sales and on top from versement de transport (national transport tax imposed on
companies). Only for Montreal (Canada) goes that funding comes mainly from gas tax
and car ownership fees. Remarkable is that some PTAs like in Oslo and Helsinki depend
for over 50% on passenger revenues. Oslo, Stockholm and London retrieve budget from
toll ring levy and congestion charging as well.
- Governance:
The functional areal scope of 14 (of 25) metropolitan PTAs coincides with the scope of
responsibility for its local / regional government. So 11 public entities have a scope of
deviation from the administrative borders of the city or region.
Tariff specification: On the question of ―what is a passenger with a single ticket in the city
allowed to do?‖ answers widely deviate: in 9 city networks a single ticket allows for valid
title to one trip per mode. In two of those cities the single ticket does not allow an
interchange by the same mode. In 5 of the EMTA networks access to all services by the
same operator is enabled with one single ticket payment, and in 4 others a passenger is
entitled to use as many services as needed but in a designated zone of the network. Only
in 6 cities a single ticket allows access to all services in the entire regional or urban
network area (i.e., Vienna, Prague, Helsinki, Rhine-Main, Piemonte Torino, Oslo
Akershus).
Other fields in the scope of metropolitan PTAs covered by a regional or metropolitan transport
authority that were mentioned were ‗urban mobility‘ (i.e., taxi, traffic management, congestion
charging) and 7 PTAs noted alternative tasks (Budapest, Vilnius, Barcelona, Metropolitan
Region Rotterdam-The Hague, Stuttgart, London and Birmingham). Region Stuttgart
discerned a most exceptional scope of tasks with parks and land use planning.
On the question if the PTA is exploring ways to introduce innovation and changes in their
core business, almost all PTAs gave a range of answers. Most recurring: new information
technology, new ways of fare setting and fare integration and new ways of marketing and
communication. Inquiring for the degree of autonomy that any authority has to pursue
innovation 70% filled out that it is deemed large, with Copenhagen and Metropolitan Region
The Hague stated as very large. Considering the number of issues that were mentioned as
ways to innovate no less than 8 cities checked in to all the optional innovation items that they
could select from.
On the question what type of barriers are needed to overcome (or reduce) to stimulate your
organisation's propensity for implementing innovation the most frequently given answers are:
―will we be able to afford the implementation of innovation?‖ and secondly ―will the innovation
be accepted by politicians and will citizens vote in favour of it?‖. Doubts that were expressed
further relate to ―will we be able to introduce the measure smoothly?‖ and ―will the measure
solve the problem that it is supposed to solve?‖ With regard to this aspect most remarkable
was the connotation of Torino-Piemonte: ―We do not test innovations just for research
purposes, innovations are adopted only if they are capable of problem solving and they bring
benefits to the public transport users.‖
On the final question if the PTA in question has any idea on the priority needs of its local
operator to innovate, only 7 authorities (Prague, Paris, Stuttgart, Budapest, Piemonte region,
Vilnius and Madrid) answered positively. All other PTAs had to admit that they do not know.
The two aspects mentioned most often are: operators are assumed to have the need to
primarily reduce the cost of operations and operators want to get a better grip on preferences
of their travellers. The creation of new integrated offer of services to specific groups of
customers was mentioned by 70% as a driver for their operator‘s need to innovate.
In the survey, the EMTA members were furthermore asked to indicate specific characteristics
of their transportation system based on the modes of public transport occurring in their area.
This included aspects like the procurement procedure, with which the transportation services
are ordered, the way how the services are planned, how the different planning tasks are
allocated to authorities and operators and aspects on the vehicle ownership per mode. The
following graphs present the outcomes of the questions about the procurement procedure
and the vehicle ownership based on the modes ‗Metro‘ and ‗Bus‘, presenting a very capital
intensive mode and a rather cheaply to employ mode of transport.
15
Please note that these schemes present a brief reflection of the outcome of the EMTA survey.
Additional information on the profile of EMTA members scope, missions and performances in supply
and demand can be found in the EMTA Barometer 2014 (March 1, 2016), available at:
http://emta.com/IMG/pdf/2014_barometer_brochure.pdf
© CIPTEC consortium
Lyon;
Tendering of Realisation with Redesign Possibilities Piemonte
region;
Stockholm
Deregulated Market for Commercially Viable Routes and Tendering of Non Commercial
Routes
www.ciptec.eu
Gross Net Cost
Cost
Cost Contract
Contract Super No cost-
Manageme Gross Cost Contract Net Cost with
with Incentive based
nt Contract Contract with Contract Shared
Shared Contract contracting
Ridership Revenue
Productio
Incentive Risk
n Risk
Page 39 of 55
Table 5: Scheme showing application of typologies amongst EMTA members based on Metro systems
D1.3 Profiling of PT Authorities & Operators and Analysis of their Needs: Typologies and
Paris;
Public Service Obligation with Public Operator Prague; Madrid; Berlin;
Vilnius; R'dam-The Piemonte
Barcelona Hague region
Parameters
© CIPTEC consortium
Budapest Lyon
www.ciptec.eu
Manageme Gross Cost Net Cost with No cost-based
Shared with Incentive
nt Contract Contract Contract Shared contracting
Production Ridership Contract
Revenue
Risk Incentive
Risk
Page 40 of 55
Table 6: Scheme showing application of typologies amongst EMTA members based on Bus systems
D1.3 Profiling of PT Authorities & Operators and Analysis of their Needs: Typologies and
D1.3 Profiling of PT Authorities & Operators and Analysis of their Needs: Typologies and
Parameters
The literature study has been carried out but did not produce considerable results. During the
literature review, it turned out that scientific literature is rather limited on the matter and
predominantly focusing on the direct performance tasks and responsibilities of the supply side
of PT. However, these studies hardly consider the instruments necessary to fulfil these tasks,
so the needs of these stakeholders.
On the basis of this unexpected low amount of scientific information, it was decided to
approach the research on the needs of the supply side of PT in a more practical manner and
based on the assumption that the needs are aspects that directly relate to the achievement of
the goals of the supply side stakeholders.
On the basis of this assumption, a more targeted literature review has been carried out to
create a list of needs of the supply side of PT. Contributions of several consortium partners
has been incorporated in this list, which then formed the basis for a targeted brainstorm
session held with the consortium partners allocated with the first work package of the project.
This brainstorm session created the final list of needs of the supply side of PT.
In order to facilitate the investigation and identification of the needs and aspects necessary
for the achievement of the above-identified goals, research has been carried out on the
different features and dimensions of these goals. The list of needs of the PT supply side is
structured on the basis of these dimensions, which are explained in further detail in the
following chapter.
The identified dimensions of each of the goals enabled a more targeted research on the
aspects necessary to fulfil these multidimensional goals. Next to information from this
targeted review of literature, input provided in a contribution paper by consortium partners
MemEx and Tiemme has been incorporated into the list of needs of the PT supplying
stakeholders. The contributions have been revised on the basis of the general assumption
that the needs of a PTA and a PTO refer to the general goals of these organisations.
This input has been incorporated into the list of needs of the supplying stakeholders. The
goals defined and the investigated list of needs was later validated by the consortium
partners allocated with the first work package and representing the supply side of public
transport in a meeting of consortium partners working on WP1 and particularly task 1.3. This
validated list has been utilised as basis for a targeted brainstorm session which took place
during the same meeting and which created the final list of needs of the supply side in urban
PT.
The pyramid of customer needs in transport, that has been developed on the basis of
Maslow‘s need pyramid (hierarchy of needs) reflects the perception of the service offered.
The base of the pyramid reflects safety and reliability, two aspects that are to be considered
the basic needs and the ground for the customer‘s trust towards the PT system. Speed in the
sense of travel time can be considered the principle customer need which leads to a certain
travel choice and the Ease aspect describes the convenience or hassle the customer
connects with the travel. The two remaining aspects atop the pyramid, the comfort and
experience factor, relate to the perceived travel as satisfiers, which makes these two aspects
the only factors where an actual increase of customer satisfaction can be achieved, which
makes these particularly vital for the achievement of the higher customer satisfaction goal
(see Van Haagen, 2011),
The four previously mentioned base aspects, safety, reliability, speed and ease, are to be
considered dissatisfiers; a service that does not fulfil these aspects is perceived to be
dissatisfying, which will lead to a movement of customers away from this service. However, a
service that scores particularly well on these four aspects but not on the satisfier aspects of
comfort and experience is not likely to lead to higher customer satisfaction. The six aspects
mentioned in the pyramid of customer needs in transport define the six dimensions connected
to the higher customer satisfaction goal.
The second goal, the increase of customers, is strongly correlated to the perceived quality of
the service, which makes the two satisfier aspects of comfort and experience dimensions of
the second goal, the customer increase as well. Additionally, the positioning of the services
on the market and the appearance of the services in terms of marketing are combined in the
dimension Promotion, which is vital to the customer increase goal.
In order to achieve the two mentioned goals, increase in numbers of customers and higher
customer satisfaction, in an efficient, cost effective or even profitable manner, working
procedures within the organisations are to be strongly connected with the actual performance
of the services in order to foster efficiency. Furthermore, the undertakings within the
organisation should be connected to and create a benefit for the customers. In the interest of
achieving and sustaining high efficiency and customer-oriented working, it becomes vital to
create a great understanding for changing customer needs and evolving market situations.
These aspects form three dimensions related to the third goal of the supply side of public
transport, goal oriented and efficient organisation, namely performance orientation, customer
orientation and the adaptability to evolving markets and customer needs.
Security
Safety
and
High Level of Perceived Safety
satisfaction
Measuring, metering and analysis of customer experience data
(subjective)
Adaptive-ness to evolving
More flexible, demand oriented service possibilities (Input from
Consortium Partner MemEx/Tiemme)
Framework for regulation of new supply forms and new market
driven entries (e.g. Uber, Car-sharing, etc.)
Measures to influence transport demand (Input from Consortium
Partner MemEx/Tiemme)
Equitable revenue distribution systems amongst an increasing
amount of stakeholders in the system
Table 7: List of Needs of the PT Supply Side
The colour code of the scheme above can be found in the following table, in which the Needs
inventoried during work package one are put in relation with the shown classification
categories of innovations applied in WP2. The classification of the Needs of the PT supply
side on the basis of the categories used to categorise the innovations inventoried in WP2
enables the project consortium to identify the gaps and discrepancies between the needs of
the PT supply side, which define the demand for solutions and innovations, and the
innovative supply that could be identified in WP2. This identified gap between demand for
innovation and innovative supply available can be considered one of the major challenges of
the CIPTEC project which tries to overcome this gap with the creation of new, innovative
concepts and solutions.
For the description of the creation of the innovation categories, please refer to WP2
Guidelines deliverable D2.1 and for the actual long-list and shortlist of inventoried
innovations, categorised by the described classification aspects, please refer to WP2
deliverables D2.2 and D2.3. The following table presents the List of Needs of the supply side
of PT with regard to the innovation categories of WP2, shown by the colour code in the right
column. Needs for which several colours are indicated on the right, may be considered
suitable for categorisation in both indicated classification categories.
In co-operation with consortium partners allocated with task 1.3 of the project, a more
practically oriented and applied research approach has been chosen. The main aspect of this
new approach was the orientation based on the goal of the PT supply side. In this stage of
the research it was particularly chosen for considering the supply side as a whole and divide
the identified needs amongst the PTA and PTOs, respectively.
The main assumption made in this approach, stating that the needs directly contribute to the
three mentioned major goals of the supply side as well as the defined three major goals were
validated by the consortium partners working on work package one (WP1) in a brainstorm
session and allowed a more targeted research towards the different dimensions of these
goals, which also allowed a targeted research and later on brainstorm on the needs that the
supply side faces in order to fulfil all these goal dimensions.
Therefore, the approach is considered a very practical manner for the identification of needs,
directly making use of the specific knowledge fields of the consortium partners working on the
task. The strongest point of this approach is the mix foundation on literature research and
practical expert opinion even if it is not possible to further allocate the needs between PTA
and PTO in very much detail, since the actual need of a specific stakeholder in a specific
transport system is most dependent on the set-up of the system in terms of task
responsibilities and contract design. The open approach, however, leaves the possibility to
further investigate this matter in later work packages of the project, which concern the
creation of a toolbox and the content of this tool. The open approach also allows to continue
inventorying and validating needs of the supply side.
Undeniably, the trend to expand the fields of responsibilities of public bodies entrusted with
competences and tasks that exceed the purely PT related pillars of their functions is gaining
ground. Awareness tends to rise that PT, however important as a mean to shape mobility and
accessibility, needs to be integrated into a broader scope of social-economic policy
encompassing other fields of interest that interact with both private and public transport.
Integration of functions for PTAs is becoming an indispensable requirement to conduct an
effective strategy to combat negative impacts of growing private car use. In some countries
metropolitan PTAs are gradually endowed with more capacities and by governmental ruling
entrusted with legal capacities and roles. More and more authorities are expected to deploy a
coherent strategy, combined with scaling of their geographical area of competence into the
surrounding metropolitan areas.
One of the main goals of this task 1.3 was to identify correlations between particular
regulatory and contractual settings of a PTA and its ability to foster new concepts and
innovative services. In that respect it cannot come as a surprise that in the contracts with net
costs and ridership incentives the authorities granting these contracts steer the contracted
operator towards a higher quality of service and increase of passenger numbers. In transport,
contracts operators are rewarded partially by what they manage to achieve in terms of more
than a minimum level of revenue or bear the full risk of production cost and revenues.
Additionally, a bonus/malus system incentivises a quality impetus from doing better than
needed (i.e., on customer satisfaction rate).
In spite of multiple efforts and asking a European stakeholder platform, relevant literature on
the needs of authorities, even more so regarding the needs of the operators, turned out to be
scarce. What could be articulated is that research gives evidence that even more than the
legal framework - or rules for market initiatives in certain urban areas - the requirements of a
contract that a PTA negotiates with an operator after tender determine warrants to perform
better and (more) customer orientation. In negotiated contracts offering a certain level of
16
The Thatcher Government launched the Transport Act 1985 put into force on 26 October 1986. This Act
ordained deregulation of bus services in England, Scotland and Wales. Deregulation did not apply to London
Buses. The Act abolished road service licensing and allowed for competition on local buses.
Source: National Audit Office (1995): The Sale of London Transport's Bus Operating Companies.
freedom and interplay for marketing tools, like price offers and fares, the operator will appear
stronger inclined to raise quality and benefit that will be conducive to its business. Improving
the perceived quality of service is one of the tools that operators resort to in order to pave the
way to continue the contract with a PTA and possibly to prolong the contract after expiring.
Despite all of this there is not one specific way to assess what needs are in particular fitting
the daily business of operators, without the risk of stating the obvious. Therefore, we found
that when looking at what type of needs PTOs would be inclined to search for, they are often
reflecting the need-scope of their organising authorities that have as a primary responsibility
keeping the regular customers satisfied.
The survey conducted among metropolitan authorities has enabled us to mirror the typologies
we discerned in chapter 2 with actual organisation of transport systems in a real-world of
metropolitan authorities. Although carried out on a limited scale of larger metropolitan areas it
has delivered an interesting impression as to how in very different regimes from market
initiative and deregulated to strong governmental interference in closed markets the functions
of the supply are organised, ruling is administered and the award of public service contracts
by modes is working in practice. The overview of how on a range of strategic and tactical
aspects production cost and revenue risks are re-distributed makes the understanding of
what level of freedom operators are able to bear much more clear. Some urban PTAs
originate in cultures in which they have to cope with scrutiny of politics and involvement of the
public. Overall, the EMTA survey showed that cities in North-Western Europe seem to be
relatively more poised to push for innovations than others. It seems to depend on their
objectives and their need perceived to better serve their users. It also indicates what types of
concerns stand in the way of innovation; over 80% of the authorities selected mentioned
having to cope with doubts as to the affordability (of the costs) of developing and deploying
innovations. The survey outcome also learnt that the propensity to innovate depends on the
assessment of how a particular innovation would be supported by the general public and by
the politicians.
The common denominator of needs shared by authorities and operators is to have more
knowledge on how customers use the system, controlling the cost of operations and
excluding risks of service disruption. EMTA authorities were asked if their board authority
explores ways to introduce innovations/changes in their core network. New information
technology (improved road and line management, use of big data), integration of different
modes of collective and individual transport, and exploring new ways to communicate with
users17 are perceived as highly important.
The needs research defined the major fields in which change is considered necessary by the
supply side, and defined - on the basis of these dimensions - a list of direct needs that
correspond to the goals of the supply side of PT. These needs basically define the areas in
which innovative solutions and tools are to be found during the project workflow. For a clearer
allocation of the needs towards the different stakeholders in a specific system, it is
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Some of these, such as integration of different modes of transport (i.e., Mobility as a Service
equivalent in WP2), use of big data, ICT solutiuons, seem to correspond to the needs of customers
groups as identified in WP1, task 1.2 and the innovations that were selected/ researched in WP2, D2.2
and D2.3.
recommended to further put the typology research and the need research in context of the
expected outcome for each transport typology.
Overlooking this all, it is possible for us to recommend the following use of this document in
the further project workflow. The typology research and especially the chosen typologies
based on the planning responsibilities and contract design, enables us to categorise the
supply side of PT in a way that already through the classification helps us to identify the major
characteristics of the needs that drive forward the ability to innovate production, processes
and organisation of the urban public transport systems.
5. Reference List
Beck, A., van Elburg, J. C., & van de Velde, D. (2008, January). Contracting in Urban Public
Transport. Amsterdam: European Commission - DG TREN.
ISOTOPE Consortium, & EU Commission (2000). Improved structure and organization for
urban transport operations of passengers in Europe: Isotope (transport research).
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Lecler, S. (2001), What role for public transport authorities in the European Metropolitan
Areas?, Association for European Transport (EMTA).
Naniopoulos A., Genitsaris E., Balampekou I. (2012), The Metropolitan Transport Authority in
Europe. Towards a methodology for defining objectives, responsibilities and tasks, Procedia -
Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 48, 2012, Pages 2804–2815, Transport Research
Arena 2012, doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.06.1249
Pucher, J., Korattyswaroopam, N., & Ittyerah, N. (2004). The crisis of public transport in India:
Overwhelming needs but limited resources. Journal of Public Transportation, 7(3), 95–113.
Stanley, J., & van de Velde, D. (2008). Risk and reward in public transport contracting.
Research in Transportation Economics, 22(1), 20–25.
UITP Europe. (2014). Organization and Major Players of Short-Distance Public Transport.
Brussels: International Association of Public Transport.
Van de Velde, D.M. (2003), Regulation and competition in the European land transport
industry: some recent evolutions, 8th Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land
Passenger Transport, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, 14-18.09.03.
Weber, E., Fellow, V., Arpi, E., & EMBARQ. (2011). A creative guide to making public
transport the way to go from here to tHere. Retrieved December 2, 2015, from:
http://www.wrirosscities.org/sites/default/files/EMB2011_From_Here_to_There_web.pdf
Wright, S. (2015). A European model for public transport authorities in small and medium
urban areas. Journal of Public Transportation, 18(2), 45–60. doi:10.5038/2375-0901.18.2.4
Wright, S. (2015). A European model for public transport authorities in small and medium
urban areas. Journal of Public Transportation, 18(2), 45–60.
Yetisen, A. K., Yun, S. H., & al, et (2015). Entrepreneurship. Retrieved December 2, 2015,
from http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2015/lc/c5lc00577a#!divAbstract
Introduction
EMTA is as consortium partner involved in the Horizon2020 CIPTEC (Collective Innovation for
Public Transport in European Cities) project (see www.ciptec.eu for more information). EMTA
assumes a number of tasks in the first Work Package of the project related to the supply side.
One of the main issues is the mapping and profiling of urban transport authorities at the
European level. In order to do this we are hereby kindly asking you to help us by filling in this
survey. Answering this query should take you about 12 to 15 minutes, depending on your
authority’s situation.
Mapping and Profiling European Public Transport Authorities: typologies and parameters
We have researched a typology taking into account various parameters, such as network scope,
transport modes, ownership, and the division of responsibilities regarding fares, revenues,
marketing, network design and timetable. The needs of Public Transport authorities and urban
operators in terms of their potential to innovate have to be analysed in order to clarify significant
discrepancies in their mechanisms to steer towards innovations.
This analysis should enable us to better match the supply to users’ demands and the needs of
the sector.
The goal of this task is to produce an inventory of the supply side of urban transport that is
composed of authorities and operators. We aim to verify to which level the organisational forms,
contract types and level of design freedom enable the authorities in urban areas to innovate
services and their procedures and business cases. To verify different profiles defined by the
typology that we developed with CIPTEC partners, your expertise is required.
By responding to the questions in this survey you will be supportive of gathering useful
knowledge on categorising the types of contracts and the division of responsibilities concerning
planning, coordination, tendering and managing contracts for Public Transport in your city
(region) or metropolitan area.
Furthermore, we included some questions to assess as to what level, in your opinion, your
authority is prone to implement innovations[1] in your transport networks.
On behalf of the partners in CIPTEC we would like to thank you for your help by answering the
questions in this survey. We would appreciate if you were to fill in the form no later than January
6, 2016.
1
(1) The CIPTEC definition of innovation (and the definition to be used in answering the relevant
questions in the survey:
all new or modified (existing) ideas, methods, products, services, technologies that were (or still
are being) developed consciously using the latest insights with the aim of improving the status
quo and that can be applied to public transport with the main goal to attract more customers
(preferably at lower costs).
2
Survey EMTA
General
* What is the Surface size and the Population of your City, Region or Metropolitan Area?
km²
Inhabitants
3
Survey EMTA
General
Metropolitan area
* In order understand the nature of your authority within the local or regional government, does the scope
of responsibility of your public authority coincide with the areal scope of your regional or city government
administration?
Yes, the authority’s responsibility covers the same scope as that of the local (or regional) government administration
No, the areal scope of the transport authority’s responsibility deviates as it is broader than our local (or regional) government
administration
No, the areal scope of the transport authority’s responsibility deviates as it is more limited than our local (or regional)
government administration.
4
Survey EMTA
General
* Is decision making on public transport in your area of competence carried out by:
5
Survey EMTA
General
Please note: if you ticked one of the boxes corresponding to the main transport modes in your network you
will be guided along a range of questions pertaining to the contracting and dealing with that specific mode
(e.g. suburban railways). Be aware that at the end of this series of questions you will be asked (again) if you
have other (additional) modes in your transport system. If you then tick the box of metro, or tram or bus, you
are requested to pass the same line questions pertaining to that other (additional) mode until you have
followed up on these. So please don’t stop by thinking that your answers got lost. They are not, the survey
systems demands that you continue this drill for every separate mode. It can deliver different answers for
contracts, incentives, freedom of design
Suburban Railway
Metro/Underground
Tram/Lightrail
Bus
6
Survey EMTA
Suburban Railway
Which of the following methods of contract granting is applicable to the Suburban Railway Network?
Tender based on a mix of economically viable services and non economically sevices
Free market
7
Survey EMTA
Suburban A
Owned by the authority and made available to the operator for operation of services
Fares
Ticketing
Routes
Timetables
Vehicle (Type)
Image/Marketing
Does the operator have redesign possibilities once the concession is awarded?
No
Yes, in Fares
Yes, in Route
Yes, in Timetable
Yes, Image/Marketing
8
Which stakeholder is responsible for the following aspects of operational planning?
Authority only, Role/Responsibility Operator only,
Operator very Authority majority, Authority & Operator majority, authority very
limited to none Operator minority Operator balanced Authority minority limited to none
Sales
Information
Infrastructure Mgnt.
Vehicle Rostering
Personnel Mgnt.
The operator bears the production risk up to a fixed level; above this level, the authority takes over production risk (e.g. with
rising energy prices, etc.)
The Authority
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues. The risk of higher or lower revenues than forecasted is
fully with the operator
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues and bears the risk of lower revenues than anticipated up
to a certain defined level
The Operator: revenue is based on e.g. ticket sales, vehicle kilometres etc. (a socalled ‘superincentive contract’: the
operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
No
Yes, supplementation (contract whereby the financial compensation of the operator depends fully on the earnings from
ridership revenues)
Yes, superincentive (contract whereby the operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
9
Survey EMTA
Suburban B
No
Does the Authority provide compensation for fare rebates granted to certain user groups?
No
Yes
* Does the Authority Incentivise certain services and thereby influences the market outcome?
No
Yes
10
Survey EMTA
Metro
Which of the following methods of contract granting is applicable to the Metro/Underground Network?
Tender based on a mix of economically viable services and non economically sevices
Free market
11
Survey EMTA
Metro A
Fares
Ticketing
Routes
Timetables
Vehicle (Type)
Image/Marketing
Does the operator have redesign possibilities once the concession is awarded?
No
Yes, in Fares
Yes, in Route
Yes, in Timetable
Yes, Image/Marketing
12
Which stakeholder is responsible for the following aspects of operational planning?
Authority only, Role/Responsibility Operator only,
Operator very Authority majority, Authority & Operator majority, authority very
limited to none Operator minority Operator balanced Authority minority limited to none
Sales
Information
Infrastructure Mgnt.
Vehicle Rostering
Personnel Mgnt.
The operator bears the production risk to a certain level, above this level, the authority takes over production risk (e.g. in
connection with energy price development etc.)
The Authority
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues. The risk of higher or lower revenues than forecasted is
fully with the operator
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues and bears the risk of lower revenues than anticipated up
to a certain defined level
The Operator: revenue is based on e.g. ticket sales, vehicle kilometres etc. (a socalled ‘superincentive contract’: the
operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
No
Yes, supplementation (contract whereby the financial compensation of the operator depends fully on the earnings from
ridership revenues)
Yes, superincentive (contract whereby the operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
13
Survey EMTA
Metro B
No
Does the Authority provide compensation for fare rebates granted to certain user groups?
No
Yes
* Does the Authority Incentivise certain services and thereby influences the market outcome?
No
Yes
14
Survey EMTA
Tram
Which of the following methods of contract granting is applicable to the Tram/Lightrail Network?
Tender based on a mix of economically viable services and non economically sevices
Free market
15
Survey EMTA
Tram A
Owned by the authority and made available to the operator for operation of services
Fares
Ticketing
Routes
Timetables
Vehicle (Type)
Image/Marketing
Does the operator have redesign possibilities once the concession is awarded?
No
Yes, in Fares
Yes, in Route
Yes, in Timetable
Yes, Image/Marketing
16
Which stakeholder is responsible for the following aspects of operational planning?
Authority only, Role/Responsibility Operator only,
Operator very Authority majority, Authority & Operator majority, authority very
limited to none Operator minority Operator balanced Authority minority limited to none
Sales
Information
Infrastructure Mgnt.
Vehicle Rostering
Personnel Mgnt.
The operator bears the production risk up to a fixed level; above this level, the authority takes over production risk (e.g. with
rising energy prices, etc.)
The Authority
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues. The risk of higher or lower revenues than forecasted is
fully with the operator
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues and bears the risk of lower revenues than anticipated up
to a certain defined level
The Operator: revenue is based on e.g. ticket sales, vehicle kilometres etc. (a socalled ‘superincentive contract’: the
operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
No
Yes, supplementation (contract whereby the financial compensation of the operator depends fully on the earnings from
ridership revenues)
Yes, superincentive (contract whereby the operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
17
Survey EMTA
Tram B
No
Does the Authority provide compensation for fare rebates granted to certain user groups?
No
Yes
* Does the Authority Incentivise certain services and thereby influences the market outcome?
No
Yes
18
Survey EMTA
Bus
Which of the following methods of contract granting is applicable to the Bus Network?
Tender based on a mix of economically viable services and non economically sevices
Free market
19
Survey EMTA
Bus A
Owned by the authority and made available to the operator for operation of services
Fares
Ticketing
Routes
Timetables
Vehicle (Type)
Image/Marketing
Does the operator have redesign possibilities once the concession is awarded?
No
Yes, in Fares
Yes, in Route
Yes, in Timetable
Yes, Image/Marketing
20
Which stakeholder is responsible for the following aspects of operational planning?
Authority only, Role/Responsibility Operator only,
Operator very Authority majority, Authority & Operator majority, authority very
limited to none Operator minority Operator balanced Authority minority limited to none
Sales
Information
Infrastructure Mgnt.
Vehicle Rostering
Personnel Mgnt.
The Operator bears the production risk to a certain level, above this level, the authority takes over production risk (e.g. in
connection with energy price development etc.)
The Authority
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues. The risk of higher or lower revenues than forecasted is
fully with the operator
The Operator: receives a lump sum based on forecasted revenues and bears the risk of lower revenues than anticipated up
to a certain defined level
The Operator: revenue is based on e.g. ticket sales, vehicle kilometres etc. (a socalled ‘superincentive contract’: the
operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
No
Yes, supplementation (contract whereby the financial compensation of the operator depends fully on the earnings from
ridership revenues)
Yes, superincentive (contract whereby the operator bears the full risk of both production costs and of revenues)
21
Survey EMTA
Bus B
No
Does the Authority provide compensation for fare rebates granted to certain user groups?
No
Yes
* Does the Authority incentivise certain services and thereby influences the market outcome?
No
Yes
22
Survey EMTA
Additional modes
* Apart from the previous answered questions on modality, does your transport system consist of other
(additional) modes of transport?
Yes, you will be sent back to the page where you can select the next mode (please note that the mode you chose before is
still visible on that page. Please select another mode and you will be directed to the relevant pages)
23
Survey EMTA
Finalization
Please finish the sentence below with the applicable statement describing the fare system
A purchased single ticket allows a passenger to…
make one trip on one mode without interchange (Check-in and Check-out procedures are included in this option)
make as many trips as needed on the same mode (e.g. bus only) to reach his destination
access all services offered by the same specific operator (with a time or distance limit)
access all services in a designated area or corridor with exception of special services (e.g. express services to work locations
or airports)
Which fields of the following are covered by your city or metropolitan transport authority
Public Transportation
Urban Mobility (incl. all modes, taxi, congestion charging, parking, traffic management)
Waste management
Parks
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Is your authority exploring ways to introduce innovations/changes in your core business?
No
Yes, the efficacy of the service delivery (e.g. process, planning, coordination)
Yes, new information technology (e.g. improved road and line management systems, use of big data, network planning)
Yes, improving the physical access of customers to the network (e.g. stations, stops in the network)
Yes, new ways of marketing and communication (e.g. promotion of the service, branding, loyalty schemes, customer care)
Rank
What type of barriers do you need to overcome (or reduce) to stimulate your organisation’s propensity for
implementing innovations?
capacity: is our expertise sufficient to push the preferred type of innovation forward?
political: will the measure be accepted by politicians, and will citizens vote in favor of it?
effectiveness: will the measure solve the problems that it is supposed to solve?
implementation: will we be able to introduce the measure smoothly, without delays or extra costs?
Is your authority’s main staff management (CEO’s, managing officers) selected or appointed
in accordance with the mandate of the elected political leadership in your city or area?
Yes
No
25
Do you have insight in the priority needs of your local operator(s) to innovations?
No
Yes, reduce the operational costs of driving and/or the cost of indirect staff
26
Survey EMTA
Thank you
You have now concluded the survey. Thank you very much for your time. You will automatically
be sent to the EMTA homepage.
Should you have any more comments/queries, please do not hesitate to post them here:
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