Review: Contested Arenas: Recent Studies on Politics and Labor

Author(s): Roberto P. Korzeniewicz

Review by: Roberto P. Korzeniewicz
Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1993), pp. 206-220
Published by: Latin American Studies Association
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 CONTESTED ARENAS:
RecentStudies on Politicsand Labor

Roberto
P. Korzeniewicz
AlbionCollege

THE STATE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND THE LABOUR MOVEA4ENT IN

LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME I. Edited by Jean Carriere,Nigel Haworth,
and JacquelineRoddick. (New York:St. Martin's,1989.Pp. 319. $45.00.)
SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICALJUNCTURES,THE LABORMOVE-
MENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Ruth Berins
Collier and David Collier.(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1991. Pp. 877. $75.00 cloth,$19.95 paper.)
LABORAUTONOMY AND THE STATEIN LATINAMERICA. Edited by Edward
C. Epstein. (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Pp. 305. $44.95.)
TESTIMONIOS DE LA CRISIS: REESTRUCTURACION PRODUCTIVA Y CLASE
OBRERA. Edited by Esthela GutierrezGarza. (Mexico City: Siglo Vein-
tiuno, 1985. Pp. 198.)
ORGANIZACION Y LUCHAS DEL MOVIMIENTO OBRERO LATINOAMERICANO
(1978-1987). Edited by Mario TrujilloBolio. (Mexico City: Siglo Vein-
tiuno, 1988. Pp. 297.)

The fivebooks under review here adopt differentand sometimes

contradictory analyticalapproaches, yetmost ofthememphasize thecru-
cial politicalimpact of labor in shaping environmentswith an unstable
balance of social and political forces. Althoughthese studies focus pri-
marilyon organized labor and itsrelationshipsto politicalpartiesand the
state, they depart frommore traditionallabor studies in portrayingthe
relationshipbetween the labor movementand state elites as shaped by
ongoing and persistingconflictsover politicalcontroland autonomy.A
shared analyticalemphasis on the two centralconcepts of controland
autonomyappears to be definingwhatmightbe called a new institutional
approach to the studyoflabor movementsin LatinAmerica.
Threeoftheeditedcollectionsdeal withthelabormovementthrough-
out Latin America. Mario TrujilloBolio's collectionconsistsof essays dis-
cussing eleven case studies thatwere originallypresented at a 1986 con-
ferenceat the UniversidadNacional Autonomade Mexico in Mexico City.
The collectionedited by Jean Carriere,Nigel Haworth, and Jacqueline
Roddickis the firstin a series of fourvolumes thatadopt "a comparative

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 REVIEW ESSAYS

perspectivewhich does not assume the existenceof a historyor a logic of

conflictin advance of the historicaldata," focusinginstead on historical
processes of working-classformationor "self-creation"(p. 16). Epstein's
collectionmore consistentlypursues a commonanalyticalfocus in an ef-
fortto tietogethernine case studies(on Argentina,Chile, Colombia,Cuba,
Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay), bracketedby two brief
comparativeessays writtenby theeditor.
The modest goal of TrujilloBolio's Organizaciony luchasdel movi-
mientoobrero latinoamericano (1978-1987)was to review recenttransforma-
tions in the makeup of the workingclass and theirimpact on the labor
movement.For the mostpart,the essays providea schematicoverviewof
these changes but offerno substantialanalyticalinsights.A few essays
have theadvantage ofdealing withcases on whichlittleotherinformation
is available:TrujilloBolio on Nicaragua, Eliseo Ruiz on El Salvador,Arturo
SantamariaGomez on Latin Americanworkersin the United States, and
JorgeTurneron Panama. But thesecontributionsprovideonlyratherjour-
nalisticaccountsofrecentchanges. More interestingpoints are raised by
Oscar CastilloR. in discussingrecentorganizationaleffortsamong white-
collarworkersin Peru and by JoseMaria CalderonRodriguezon industrial
restructuringand its recent impact on the labor movement in Mexico.
Overall, the essays in Organizaciony luchas del movimniento obrerolatino-
americano will prove oflimiteduse to area specialists.
The collectionedited by Carriere,Haworth,and Roddick,TheState,
IndustrialRelations,and theLabourMovementin LatinAmerica:Volume1, is
moreambitiousin thatits essays (on Paraguay and thefiveAndean coun-
tries)are intendedto revisepast labor historiography by providinggreater
analyticalprecision on labor's trajectoryin Latin America. As a whole,
however,the case studies in this collectionare not innovativeenough to
meet these aims, and the studies largelyconfinethemselvesto a rather
superficialoverviewoftheirsubject. Nigel Haworthcontributesa compe-
tent review of the historicaltrajectoryof the labor movementin Peru,
arguingthatPeruviantradeunions began to operatefroma much stronger
positionafter1968. In contrast,labor in Chile was generallysuccessfulin
counteringits own structuralweakness througheffectivealliances with
politicalparties.JacquelineRoddick'slong historicalessay tracesthepolit-
ical impactof the "struggleforunity" led by labor rank and filein Chile
since the earlytwentiethcentury.She asserts that"by the 1920s, the fun-
damental characterof [the] labor movementwas formed. Still fragileat
thepointofproduction,itsgreatstrengthwas itsabilityto compensatefor
this vulnerabilitythrougha series of criss-crossingsocial and political
networkswhich existedoutside the factory"(p. 193). This politicalmobi-
lizationtranscendedsectoralcleavages, allowingworkersto recreatetheir
unityas a class. Accordingto Roddick, even afterthe 1973 coup, "forall
the determinationof governmentsand economiststo root out politiciza-

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LatinAmnerican
ResearchReview

tionofthe labour force,witheveryresourceaffordedby the law, Chilean

workersremained membersof a set of politicalnetworks,organized at a
nationallevel, and capable ofmountinga general strike.No decree could
abolish the social institutionofthematrixitself"(p. 210).
TheState,Industrial Relations,and theLabourMovement in LatinAmer-
icaincludesfourotherarticles.Daniel Pecaut focuseson Colombianlabor,
arguing that "spread over many small factories,faced with employers
who refusedto countenance the formationof unions and lackinga trade
tradition,the industrialworkersput theirfaithin legislationand inter-
vention 'fromabove"' (p. 270). Pecaut also provides an overview of the
relationshipbetween competingfederations,patternsoflabor unrest,and
changes in the labor forcein the 1960s and 1970s. Andrew Nickson con-
tributesan adequate descriptivehistoryof organized labor in Paraguay,
concludingthat"by comparisonwithitscounterpartsin otherLatinAmeri-
can countries,the failureofthelabour movementin Paraguayto promote
progressivesocial change can be explained by itssmall size and thelimits
to its freedomof action imposed by the long-lived Stroessner regime"
(p. 95). This collectionalso includes sketchieressays by Charles Nurse on
Ecuador and by JacquelineRoddick and Nico van Niekerk on Bolivia.
Systematiccross-nationalcomparisonswill not be forthcominguntilthe
fourthand finalvolume ofthisseries is published.
In LaborAutonomy and theStatein LatinAmerica,Edward Epstein
seeks to develop the related concepts of autonomyand controlas a com-
mon analyticalthreadrunningthroughthe case studies in thiscollection.
Epstein contendsthatpoliticaldevelopmentsin LatinAmericahave been
shaped by a constantstrugglebetween labor and stateelites over control
and autonomy.This constantstrugglehelps explain shiftsin statepolicies
as well as changes in trade-unionstructuresand strategies.For Epstein,
"relativelaborautonomyresultswhen thosecontrolling thestateare either
politicallyweak or under strongchallenge fromgroups not sharingtheir
overallpolicypreference,and wheretheexistingclass-basedsocial cleavage
findsincreasinglyvisibleexpressionthroughpoliticizationof the question
of income distribution"(p. 285). Epstein's briefintroductionand conclu-
sion compare the case studies, seeking to provide measurements(strike
data) fora more rigorousassessment of the relativeautonomyof labor in
thecases coveredin LaborAutonomy and theStatein LatinAmerica.
The essays are intendedto corroboratethese arguments.Haworth
reappears to argue that1968was a watershedfororganized labor in Peru,
allowingworkersto gain politicalautonomyand overcometheirpast struc-
turalweakness. JaimeRuiz-Tagleexamines General Augusto Pinochet's
offensiveagainst organized labor in Chile after1973: coercive state pol-
icies were deployed against trade-unionleaders, but these measures un-
expectedlyenhanced new formsof mobilizationamong local unions and
the rank and filein the late 1970s and early1980s. Maria Helena Moreira

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 REVIEW ESSAYS

Alves examines new formsoflabor mobilizationin Brazil afterthe 1970s,

showingthattheyinvolvedinnovativeformsof collectiveactionthatdis-
ruptedexistinginstitutionalarrangements.The remainingcase studiesin
thiscollectionare morestandard.Epstein reviewsthedynamicsofPeron-
ism in Argentina,Rocio LondonioBotero addresses the shiftaway from
decentralizedbargainingby Colombian unions afterthe 1970s, and Fran-
cisco Zapata linksthestabilityofinstitutionalarrangementsamong labor,
employers,and thestatein Mexico to successfuleconomicgrowth.Martin
Gargiulo'sinformative essay reviewstherecenthistoryand currentpoliti-
cal alignmentsof labor in Uruguay. Linda Fuller contends thatlabor in
Cuba since the revolutionhas experienced growingorganizationalinde-
pendence, althoughshe acknowledges thatthe extentof effectiveauton-
omy and rank-and-file participationis hard to gauge. In her view, "there
can be absolutelyno doubt that maintainingand increasingproduction
continueto be primarytasks of the Cuban unions" (pp. 147-48). Finally,
Charles Davis and Kenneth Coleman focus on Venezuela, contending
thatdespiteinstitutionallinkagesto rulingelites,thelabor movementhas
been unable to generatemorefavorablestatepolicies.
The collectionedited by Esthela GutierrezGarza, Testimonios de la
crisis:reestructuracion
productivay claseobrera,addresses a different set of
issues. Its essays seek to establish a strictertheoreticalframeworkfor
studyingthe recenttransformations undergone by organized labor. The
studies by GutierrezGarza and Adrian Sotelo Valencia framea general
discussion ofthe labor movement(organizations,wages, strikes)in Mex-
ico withina materialistapproach thatemphasizes currentchanges as the
outcomeof a crisisof accumulationand regulation.Luis Gomez Sanchez
applies similarargumentsto a morespecificdiscussion ofrecenttrendsin
the electronicsindustry.The threeremainingessays are more interesting
in theirdetailing of changes in the labor process in specificindustrial
complexesin Mexico: JaimeRogerio Giron focuses on the cementindus-
try,ArnulfoArteaga on automobiles,and Laura Palomares and Leonard
Mertenson electronics.
Althoughall threecollectionscall formore innovativeapproaches
to studyinglaborin LatinAmerica,theyactuallypresentrathertraditional
labor studiesthatlack a consistentcomparativeframework.These contri-
butions demonstratethatlabor has played an importantrole in modern
politicaldevelopments,but they are less helpful in explaining or even
systematicallydescribingthe comparativedynamics of institutionalar-
rangementsbetween labor and the state. In ShapingthePoliticalArena:
CriticalJunctures,theLaborMovement,and RegimeDynamicsin LatinAmer-
ica,RuthBerinsCollierand David Collierhave undertaken"to constructa
model of political change and regime dynamics in Latin America that
builds upon an analysis of the dialecticalinterplaybetween labor control
and labor mobilization"(p. 745). Theirearlierwork (1978, 1979) began to

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LatinAmericanResearchReview

outlinethe contoursof such a model, and area specialists have been ea-
gerlyanticipatingpublicationofthis ambitiousstudyforthe past decade.
Collier and Collier thus have taken up the challenge of reshaping the
analyticaland methodologicalbasis forcomparativestudyofdictatorship,
democracy,and politicalcyclesin LatinAmerica.The intellectualscope of
thiseffortalone warrantsa detailedreview oftheireffort.
The fundamentalpremise of ShapingthePoliticalArena is that at
different "criticaljunctures"in thetwentiethcentury,theeightLatinAmer-
ican countriesincluded in thisstudy(Argentina,Brazil,Chile, Colombia,
Mexico,Peru, Uruguay,and Venezuela) have all experienceda qualitative
transitionfromexclusionto incorporationoflabor.Priorto incorporation,
repressionwas theprimaryresponse ofstateelitesto challengesby work-
ers and the labor movement.Moving away fromthis coercive strategy,
elites initiatedincorporationin "the firstsustained and at least partially
successful attemptby the state to legitimateand shape an institutional-
ized labor movement"(p. 783). Incorporationencompassed state regula-
tion of capital-laborrelationsas well as state effortsto regulate labor's
presencein thepoliticalarena via controlor mobilizationorboth.Although
elitesadopted "different strategiesofcontroland mobilizationofthepop-
ular sectors"in response to actual or potentialworking-classmilitancy,no
systematicrelationshipexistedbetween the strengthoflabor movements
and theemergenceofpopulism (p. 161). Forexample,thelabor movement
was strongin Argentinaand Mexico, but countrieslike Venezuela and
Uruguayexperiencedincorporationdespitetheweakness ofexistingtrade
unions.
ShapingthePoliticalArenacontends that "initialincorporationoc-
curs in relativelywell-definedpolicy periods" (p. 783). Incorporationis
notintendedas a generaltheoreticalconceptbut as a time-bounded"defi-
nitionoftheinitialincorporationperiod . . . groundedin specificissues of
[a] particularhistoricaltransition"(p. 784). The political processes and
types of organizationthatcharacterizedthese well-definedperiods have
involveddistinctpatternsor differencesand similaritiesamong the eight
case studies. These patternslatershaped nationalpoliticaldynamics,the
authorsexplain, because "to understandthe heritageof state incorpora-
tion,itis usefulto considerthe generalizationthatin LatinAmerica,labor
movementstend to become politicized,and if,under stateincorporation,
this politicizationis not promotedby the state duringthe incorporation
period, ittendsto occurlaterfromwithinsocietyin a way thatmayreadily
escape statecontrol"(p. 750).
Collins and Collins distinguishamong fourtypesofincorporation.
The primarydistinctioninvolves whetherincorporationwas led by the
state(as in Chile and Brazil) or by politicalmovementsor parties.In turn,
party-ledincorporationinvolvesthreevariants:electoralmobilizationby
the traditionalparties (Uruguay and Colombia); labor populism (Argen-

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tina and Peru); and radical populism (Venezuela and Mexico). Each of
thesefourpatternsled to distinctinstitutionalarrangementsthatvariedin
stabilityand degree of politicalintegration.An integrativepartysystem
emerged in Mexico and Venezuela but not in Brazil and Chile, where
incorporationresulted in a multipartypolarizing system. Uruguay and
Colombiadeveloped relativeelectoralstabilitybut growingsocial conflict,
while Peru and Argentinamoved towardstalematedpartysystems. The
dynamicsof this typologycan best be illustratedby reviewingthe two
polar opposites: the populist model of Mexico and Venezuela and the
state-incorporation model seen in Brazil and Chile.
The distinctinstitutionalarrangementsthataccompanied each of
thesetwo models shaped postwarpolitics.In Mexico and Venezuela, po-
liticalelitessuccessfullyincorporatedlabor intoa populist alliance. Popu-
lisminvolveda bargainbetween forcesfromabove (stateelites)and forces
frombelow (laborand thepeasantry),and "thetermsofexchangebetween
theactorsreflecteddifferential power relations"(p. 169). The legacyofthis
model ofincorporationwas
a party-political
systemthatwas integrative,notpolarizing;thatwas one-party
dominantor two-party withcentripetal tendencies,not multipartywithcen-
tendencies;thatinstitutionalized
trifugal something approachinga "coalitionof
thewhole,"notfractionalized,
unstablecoalitions;and thatembodiedimportant
mechanisms
conflict-limiting permitting theformation ofconsistentpolicywith
somegradual,pendularswings,notaccelerating zero-sumconflict thatled to
and immobilism.
policy-vacillation (P.571)
In Brazil and Chile, in contrast,state elites pursued no stable populist
bargain. Their actionswere aimed instead at creatingcorporatecontrols
thatrestrictedlabor's politicalparticipation.This model resultedin a lack
ofeffective mechanismsforconflictresolution,and the absence ofinstitu-
tional linkages between labor and political parties led to electoralfrac-
tionalizationand "polarizing,ratherthan integrative"partysystems.
Patternsof incorporationdiverged primarilyas an outcome of the
relativestrengthoftraditionaloligarchies.Braziland Chile bothhad strong
oligarchiesand entrenchedclientelisticcontrolofruralareas. Urban mid-
dle sectors,dissident elites, and militarygroups eventuallychallenged
thisoligarchichegemonyin offensivesthatculminatedin the1920election
ofJorgeAlessandriin Chile and the 1930 coup of GetuilioVargasin Brazil.
Buteven underthesenew regimes,theoligarchyremainedstrongenough
to limitthescope ofreformsand preventthepoliticalmobilizationoflabor
by stateelites. Workermobilizationwas significantenough thatlabor was
perceived by elites as a potentiallyserious threat,but organized labor
remained too weak to demand greaterpoliticalparticipationeffectively.
In theirlatteryears, the Vargas and Alessandri-Iba'inezregimes assailed
oligarchicdominationand introducedmore substantialreforms,but state
elites continuedto avoid labor mobilization,maintainingthe corporatist

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LatinAmericanResearchReview

and repressiveaspects of theirbehavior.Populist alliances in Brazil and

Chile were adopted only fleetingly,"forelectoralpurposes, but not for
governingpurposes" (p. 379).
The oligarchywas considerablyweaker in Mexico and Venezuela,
where land concentrationgenerated tensions thatdisrupted clientelistic
ties with the peasantry.Unstable oligarchicrule was followed by cen-
tralized dictatorships(under PorfirioDiaz in Mexico and Juan Vicente
Gomez in Venezuela), which accentuatedopposition fromboth the peas-
antryand contestingelites. Althoughinternalconflictsamong the domi-
nant class were more pronounced than in Brazil and Chile, elites in Mex-
ico and Venezuela had the abilityto mobilize labor and the peasantryas
politicalresources(p. 196). Hence effortsto promoteelectoraldemocracy
had a different meaning in Brazil and Chile than theydid in Mexico and
Venezuela. Accordingto Collier and Collier,in Brazil and Chile, "liber-
alism and electoralpoliticshad been the politicalinstitutionsofoligarchic
domination"(p. 117). But in Mexico and Venezuela, electoraldemocracy
was perceived as a directchallenge to oligarchicdomination.These fea-
tures defined Mexico and Venezuela as "the two cases in which at the
onset of the incorporationperiod a populist, as opposed to an accom-
modationist,alliance was mostclearlya viable alternative"(p. 124).
These differingpatternsof incorporationdeterminedthe future
stabilityof politicalarrangements.State-ledincorporationin Brazil and
Chile produced (among the eightcountriesin this study) "the most frac-
tionalized partysystems,the least cohesive politicalcenters,sharp epi-
sodes of polarization,and substantialpolicy immobilismin the heritage
period" (p. 507). The absence ofeffectivepoliticalrepresentationofwork-
ers led to the politicizationof labor by the left,the politicalreactivationof
the workingclass as an autonomousforce,and the disintegrationof offi-
cial unionism. Withminorvariationsin timingand politicalcharacteris-
tics,the lack of strongand stable institutionalties between labor and the
state in Brazil and Chile led to "a multiparty, polarizing regime," with
parties "unable to serve as instrumentsof controlover the popular sec-
tors"(pp. 526-27).
In Mexico and Venezuela, in contrast,incorporationled to the de-
velopment of what Collier and Collier term a "hegemonic, integrative
partysystem,"which allowed politicalchallengesto be absorbed through
existinginstitutions.In Mexico politicalconflictsand economicinstability
delayed fullinstitutionalizing of politicalparticipationby labor until the
1930s, when PresidentLazaro Cardenas relied on labor support to gain
greaterautonomyfromthe army,internationaland domesticcapital, and
other political leaders. Cardenas's radical populism was followed by a
conservativeshift,however,when state elites established more effective
labor controlsto restrict"autonomous mobilizationfrombelow" and en-
hance "controlledmobilizationfromabove" (p. 197). Thereafter, Mexican

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tradeunionsbecame "a vehicleforsupportmobilizationas well as control.

Unions and union leaders played a verycomplicatedgame ofintermedia-
tion between the state and the working class." Charrismo,the institu-
tionalsystemoflaborcontrolthatprevailedin Mexico,existed"as a model
ofdisciplinewithoutrepresentation and ofcoercionwithoutsupportmobil-
ization,"but merelyas "a malfunctionofthehegemonicpattern"(p. 585).
Ultimately,the patternsof incorporationin Mexico resulted in "a party
thatembraceda coalitionofthewhole and enjoyeda numberofhegemonic
resources:it embodied a progressiveideology,it held the partisanloyal-
ties of the popular sectors,and it bound the functionalorganizationsof
thepopular sectorsto a conservativestate"(p. 574).
In Venezuela populist incorporationfollowedthe death of Gomez
in 1935. Despite an ambiguous transitionunder Eleazar Lopez Contreras
(1935-1941)and Isaias Medina Angarita(1941-1945),stateelites success-
fullymobilized labor by 1948. As in Mexico, radical populism was fol-
lowed by a conservativeshift,with a repressivecrackdownon labor be-
tween 1948 and 1950. PresidentMarcos Perez Jimenezcontinuedto rely
on repressionas the main means of controllinglabor afterhe failed to
emulateJuanPeron in foundinga sympatheticlabor movement.But al-
though the Perez Jimenez dictatorshipgenerated a broad opposition,
politicalconflictsin thelate 1950swere notaccompaniedby growingpolar-
ization.Instead,Venezuela'stwo mainpoliticalparties,AccionDemocraitica
and COPEI (Comisio6nde Organizacion PoliticaElectoralIndependiente),
moved towardthecenterand "became multiclasspartieswithconverging
social bases ofsupport,"whilelaborunions remainedsubordinatedto the
leadershipoftheseparties(pp. 615-17).
Accordingto Collier and Collier,these contrastinglegacies deter-
mined the relativeabilityof state elites to implementtheirpolicies suc-
cessfullyas well as the long-termresilienceof civilianrule. In Brazil and
Chile, growingpolarizationand thestrongpoliticalimpactofsocial forces
constrainedand underminedstate policies. During the 1950s and 1960s,
"politicsbecame increasinglyzero-sum, [and therewas] policyvacillation
due to the center'sinabilityto finda stable coalitionas a basis forconsis-
tentpolicy-making"(p. 528). This structuralinstabilitypreventedthe im-
plementationof successful stabilizationpolicies and eventuallybrought
the end of the regimesof Joao Goulart and Salvador Allende by military
coups in "parallel,but notidentical,processes" (p. 541).
In contrast,state elites in Mexico and Venezuela possessed the
politicalresources"to achieve price stability"and "to sustain themselves
in thefaceofthechallengesofnew leftistpartiesand politicalmovements
in the 1950's and 1960's" (pp. 527,591). Accordingto Collier and Collier,
such resourcesincluded politicallyincorporatinglabor and popular sec-
tors(but not the left)into rulingcoalitions,using consensus ratherthan
coercionas a means of elicitingpopular support, and deployingeffective

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mechanisms of controlover labor and other popular organizations. In

Mexico the PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional(PRI) co-opted labor and
the peasantry via patronage and benefits,while ideological resources
played a centripetalrolein allowingstateelitesto manipulatethesymbols
of a social revolutionin theirclaim to legitimacy.Finally,state elites in
Mexico and Venezuela exhibitedgreateradaptive skills in respondingto
periods of unrestby periodicallyadjusting state institutionsto enhance
thegovernment'sabilityto channel popular demands.
In thefourremainingcases presentedin ShapingthePoliticalArena,
the incorporationof the labor movementwas carriedout by politicalpar-
ties ratherthan by authoritarianregimes,but the legacy of incorporation
was politicalinstability. As elsewhere,initialincorporationin these coun-
trieswas followedby a period ofconservativeopposition (oftenpromoted
or supported by sectorsof the dominantclass), geared towardeitherde-
mobilizinglabor or halting social reforms.Yet subsequent institutional
arrangementsfailed to develop the stabilityand adaptabilityof those in
Mexico and Venezuela. In Uruguay and Colombia, centristpoliticalpar-
ties developed a stable electoralmajority,but the lack of stronginstitu-
tionalties to labor underminedthese governments'abilityto channel and
controlpopular pressures. Institutionalties between politicalpartiesand
labor were strongerand more effectivein Argentinaand Peru, and these
countriesdeveloped a "stalematedpartysystem"ratherthan stable elec-
toralmajorities.In all fourcountries(in contrastwithMexico and Venezu-
ela), labor tended to be leftout ofrulingcoalitions.
In Uruguayand Colombia,in Collierand Collier'sanalysis,no close
linkageswere developed between labor and eitherthe stateor traditional
politicalparties,leading to a pluralistlabor movementthatwas likelyto be
more confrontational and less restrained(or subject to effectivemecha-
nisms of control)than the movementsin Mexico and Venezuela. In Uru-
guay incorporationwas initiatedbetween 1903 and 1907 underJoseBatlle
y Ordo6nez,who was nonethelessunwilling to sacrificethe unityof the
Colorado party in pursuit of strongerties with labor (inroads into the
labor movementwere also prevented by the anarchistopposition). By
1916 a conservativeshiftunder the Feliciano Viera regime ended these
policies, but theyleftan enduringlegacy. Stabilitycharacterizedthe pe-
riod from1942to 1958,when labor activitieswere geared towardpressing
managementthroughstrikesand to promotingindirectgains by pressur-
ing the Colorado party.This strategycollapsed, however,fromthe com-
bined impact of an economic crisis and rationalizationeffortsbetween
1959 and 1973. Furthermore,although Uruguayan politicalparties con-
tinuedto dominateelections,theirinabilityto channel pressure fromthe
popular sectorsled to growingunrestand conflictthatculminatedin the
1973coup.
Colombia experiencedgreaterinstabilitythanUruguaypriorto the

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late 1950s, but thereaftertraditionalparties showed greaterendurance.

Incorporationbegan in 1930 and was tied to the reformsinitiatedby the
Liberalparty.The initialperiod of incorporationended with a Conserva-
tivebacklashagainstlaboraftertheresignationofAlfonsoLopez Pumarejo
in 1945 and was followed by violence, social polarization,and political
instabilityuntil the end of the regime of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla
in 1957 With the establishmentof a bipartisancoalition governmentin
1957-58, Collier and Collier perceive a gradual "removal of potentially
conflictualissues fromthe political agenda," leading to a "bureaucratic
and technicalapproach to nationalproblems" (p. 463). In theprocess, ties
between labor and politicalparties were weakened, thus enhancing the
autonomyoftradeunions and encouraginglabor to adopt a moreconfron-
tationalstance towardstateelites. Yetthepoliticalsystemwas neverchal-
lenged as it was in Uruguay,partlydue to the weakness and fragmenta-
tion of the Colombian labor movement. More important,this situation
reflectedthe specificdynamicsof the Colombian partysystem,in which
unrestwas ignored as long as it did not translateinto a significantelec-
toralchallenge and the "arrangementof decision-makingpower made it
difficultfornew politicalmovementsto break into the system" (p. 679).
Throughoutthe 1980s, Colombian state elites successfullydrew on this
institutionalstabilityto implementstabilizationpolicies.
An integrativepartysystemalso failedto develop in Peru and Ar-
gentina,accordingto Collierand Collier.Althoughthesecountriesdid not
experiencea labor shiftto the left(as occurredin Brazil and Chile) due to
thepoliticalintegrationoftradeunions under APRA and Peronism,insti-
tutionalarrangementscollapsed soon afterthe period of incorporation.
Electoralrestrictions on APRA and Peronismcaused politicsto become "a
difficultgame" in Peru and an "impossible game" in Argentina. Strong
personal leadership played parallel roles in the two countries,creating
politicalcohesion in the earlystages of incorporationbut maximizingthe
difficultiesoffindingaccommodationin the aftermathofthe conservative
shift.Politicalinstabilityin both countriesled to endemic policy failures.
Politicalbans played different roles, however: in Argentina,theyhelped
Peronmaintainhis dominance over a movementwith solidifiedbonds to
labor; but in Peru, such bans led APRA towardgrowingconservatismand
weakened its ties to labor. In both countries,coups in 1962 were followed
by electionsin 1963 thatwere won by middle-classparties,but theirrule
was underminedby the militancyof the labor movement.Again in both
countries,the militarybecame concerned about ensuringinternalsecur-
ity and sought to promotenational development and eliminate the in-
stabilityof the institutionalpartysystem. Growing labor unrestled to a
crisisofsocial domination,culminatingin a coup in Argentinain 1966and
anotherin Peru in 1968.
Collierand Collierthusoffera complexportrayaloftheroleoflabor

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LatinAmericanResearchReview

underpopulistregimes,depictingpopulism as entailinga bargainingpro-

cess thatrendersthe politicalarena a fieldof conflictamong state elites,
dominanteconomicelites,and popular sectors.It is truethattradeunions
in populist regimesoftensurrenderedsignificantautonomyin exchange
forstatefavorsand materialgains. But populist reformsinvolvednotjust
co-optationbut a substantialredistributionof power that strengthened
theabilityoflabor (and sometimesthepeasantry)to make demands effec-
tively.Althoughstate elites in populist regimessought to regulatelabor
mobilizationand subordinateit to theirown politicalagenda, mobiliza-
tionquicklyacquired a dynamicof its own. For these reasons, dominant
economicsectorsregularlychallenged populist arrangements,accentuat-
ing the political tensions that accompanied the emergence of these re-
gimes. In short,"genuine populism . . . was not a staticor equilibrium
conditionbut contained within it a political dynamic and contradiction
thatmade itmostunstable" (p. 197).
Collierand Collieralso emphasize the"relativeautonomy"ofpolit-
ical processes, arguingthatmost analystshave overemphasized the role
of socioeconomic transformations in the region (p. 768). Socioeconomic
factorslikeurbanizationmayhave played a crucialrolein shaping political
developmentsat the turnof the century,but institutionalarrangements
likepopulism were essentiallypoliticalartifactsproduced by politicalen-
trepreneurs(like Cardenas in Mexico or Peron in Argentina).Likewise,
thelegacyof incorporationvaried accordingto the relativesuccess of po-
liticalelitesin constructing a politicalsystemthatcould legitimately shield
the statefromthe potentialravages of labor,popular mobilization,or so-
cial polarization.Thus in Collier and Collier'sview, institutionalstability
in Mexico or Venezuela can be understood betteras an outcomeof com-
parativepolitical advantages ratherthan as a product of the wealth de-
rivedfromeconomicresources.
Given thisemphasis, itcomes as no major surprisethatCollierand
Collier analyze the labor movementprimarilyin termsof its institutional
politicalimpact.ShapingthePoliticalArenastrivesto detailexhaustivelythe
factionalconflictsand politicalevents thatfollowedlabor movementsas
theyoscillatedperiodicallybetween weakness and strength,acquiescence
and unruliness,unityand disarray.In turn,Collier and Collieroftenem-
ploy theseexamplesoflaborshiftsto explaintheconstraintsand opportun-
itiesfacedby stateelitesin different stages in theirpoliticaltrajectories.For
example,labor mobilizationand unrestare cited as importantvariablesin
explainingtheendorsementofAlessandriby theChilean electoralcollege
in 1920 (p. 112), the rise of Cardenas in Mexico in 1935 (p. 237), and en-
dorsementof theAD-COPEI coalitionin Venezuela in 1961 (p. 434). Else-
wheretheinabilityoflabormovementsto mobilizeat crucialturningpoints
is used to explain the end ofthe trienioin Venezuela, the subsequent con-

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 REVIEW ESSAYS

solidationoftheAD governmentthere(p. 434), and theconservativeshift

undertheGomez regimein Colombia (p. 458).
But in all these instances, ShapingthePoliticalArenaprovides little
causal explanationor inquiryinto the structures,ideas, and forcesthat
allowed labor to engage in mobilizationor prevented it fromdoing so.
Collier and Collier tend to treatlabor as a nebulous homogenous entity
thatmaterializesonce in a while to vote,followa strike,or acquiesce with
passivity,withoutany substantialexplanationof these changing behav-
iors. Althoughsuch actionsare recognized sporadicallyas significantby
Collierand Collier,theyneverthelessleave manyquestions unanswered.
What were the major shiftsover time in the type of organizationsthat
served as vehicles forlabor demands? Did any major shiftstake place in
the relationshipbetween the rank and fileand the leadership of existing
trade unions? Why were calls for general strikessuccessful in some in-
stances but not in others?How did the politicalperceptionsof workers
change overtime?Did significantvariationsoccurin all theseareas among
differentsectors of the labor force?It may appear that these questions
begin to pose unfairlyan alternativeresearchagenda thatfallsoutsidethe
scope ofthepresentstudy.Afterall, at almostnine hundredpages, Shap-
ing thePoliticalArenais already pushing the boundaries of what can be
accomplishedwithina singlevolume. Yetthe problemis thatin failingto
addressthesequestions systematically, Collierand Collier'sstudytends to
eliminatelabor as an actorand an agency of change. As a consequence,
the dynamicsof politicalchange tend to become teleologicallyexplained
-the politicalterrainshapes thepoliticalterrain.
One mightargue thatgiven past tendenciesto representpolitical
dynamicsas an epiphenomenaof socioeconomiccausation,restorationof
autonomyto politicalprocesses is essential fora betterunderstandingof
change. Butmirroringtheprevious reductionism,such an effortto assert
the primacyof (institutional)politicalprocesses over socioeconomiccau-
sationagain tends to forcecomplexand interactingprocesses throughthe
analyticalsieve of a singlediscipline,as ifhistoricalforcesactuallyaligned
themselvesaccordingto the strictmatrixdictatedby disciplinarybound-
aries in thesocial sciences.
ShapingthePoliticalArenaalso fails at times to be consistentlyrig-
orous in analyzingcausal relationships.For example, the rise of populist
regimesis explainedlargelyas an outcomeoftherelativestabilityofprop-
ertyrelationsin ruralareas, but no comparativedata are providedto eval-
uate the extentto which ruralrelationswere disruptedamong the differ-
ent nationsin the study.For this reason, when Collier and Collier argue
that Mexico and Venezuela prior to incorporationconstitutedthe most
viable environmentsforpopulism, the readerhas littlebasis on which to
assess the accuracyof this statementempirically.Why was Venezuela in

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LatinAmericanResearchReview

1935morefertileterrainforpopulism than Chile in 1930 or Brazilin 1935?

How can researcherstest the inherenthypotheses, with eitherquanti-
tativeor qualitativedata? In the absence of such analyses, explanations
tend to revertto a tautologicalmode: the patternsfollowedby each coun-
tryare explainedby thepatternswithwhich theystarted.
Along the same lines, how can one be certainthat incorporation
took place under Batlle in Uruguay but not under Hipolito Yrigoyenin
Argentina-or even under Guillermo Billinghurstin Peru? Collier and
Collierargue thatBatllefavoredthe rightof workersto strike,oftensup-
portedlabor demands, and introduceda solid body oflegislationmandat-
ing an eight-hourday,a six-dayworkweek,protectivelaws forchildren
and pregnantwomen, old-age pensions, and freepublic education. But
the differencein legislativeregulationbetween Yrigoyenand Batlle was
one ofdegreeratherthanqualitative,and manyofBatlle'sattitudestoward
strikesand labor unrestwere also characteristic ofYrigoyen.It is truethat
Yrigoyenopposed tradeunions restricting the "freedomto work,"but so
did Batlle. In the absence of a more rigorouscomparisonof these cases,
the veryconcept of time-boundedincorporationeventuallylacks a satis-
factorymeans ofempiricalverification.
Thus Collier and Collier's model creates furtherreservations.Ac-
cordingto theirmodel, incorporationinvolvedclearperiods and patterns,
all entailingdistinctsubsequent trajectories.But countryspecialistswill
be likelyto objectthatShapingthePoliticalArenatendsto artificiallyimpose
analyticalboundaries on situationsand trendsthatwere actuallycharac-
terizedby greaterdiversityand ambiguities.Furthermore, themodeltends
to abstractthesepoliticalsequences fromthe discretehistoricalperiods in
which they took place. For example, within the model, the 1906-1914
period ofincorporation in Uruguayis treatedas comparablewiththe1930-
1935 period in Colombia. Such bracketingis likelyto raise objectionsbe-
cause ittendsto minimizetheinteractivecharacteristics oftheseprocesses
of change. But did politicalmodels in different countriesinfluenceeach
otherin theirsuccess or failure?Did timinginfluencethechoices available
to elitesand popular sectors?Did thetwo world wars and theaftermath of
each have a similarimpactthroughoutthe region?And if so, then why?
AlthoughCollier and Collier touch on some of these issues, the very na-
tureoftheirmodel discourages a systematicanalysis of such topics.
Despite these reservations,ShapingthePoliticalTerrain
representsa
major contributionto the field. Less than a decade ago, Ian Roxborough
(1984) called forthe developmentof a model of change in Latin America
thatwould make a sustained effortto accountforthe role of subordinate
classes in shaping politicaldynamics. Collierand Collierhave attempted
to constructsuch a model in a studythatundertakesto providea system-
aticcomparisonof the dynamicsbetween labor movementsand the state
across a wide spectrumofLatin Americancountries.Theirmodel is likely

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 REVIEW ESSAYS

to become stronglyinfluentialin the field,regardlessofwhetherscholars

tryto corroborateor challenge its findings.Moreover,in Collier and Col-
lier'seffortto demonstratetheeffectivenessoftheircomparativemodel in
accountingforpoliticalevents, cycles, and trends,theirstudyhas incor-
porated considerablehistoricaldetail fromthe secondaryliterature.This
accomplishmentalone will ensure thatShapingthePoliticalArenabecomes
a major referencework forspecialists and social scientists.In sum, their
study has advanced a new theoreticalsynthesisforfuturecomparative
inquiryin LatinAmerica.
Taken as a whole, these fivebooks stimulatea few finalobserva-
tions about the studyof labor in Latin America. In the new approach to
theinstitutional politicsoflabor,a tensionbetween controland autonomy
is emphasized as shaping the tradeunions' relationshipswith stateelites
and withpoliticalparties.Most often,labor's subordinatepositionwithin
a regime(or rulingcoalition)is emphasized by highlightingtheabsence of
autonomousmobilizationand the effortsmade by labor to regain auton-
omy.This tensionregardinglabor autonomytended to be treatedin recent
labor studiesas a constantfeatureofinstitutionalarrangements.Butusu-
ally neitherautonomynor controlis developed conceptuallyor opera-
tionalizedsystematically. For example, in Collier and Collier's study,one
can findno definitionsofautonomyand controlin theconceptualglossary
at theend ofthebook. What does controlrepresent?Throughwhat orga-
nizationalor institutional mechanismsdo stateelitesachievecontrol?How
do these mechanismsdifferfromthose allowing autonomy?How do we
know an autonomouslabor movementwhen we see one? Withoutgreater
conceptualand operationalclarification of these terms,labor movements
tend to be presented as constantlystrugglingforcontroland pursuing
autonomyin a portrayalthatbegins to recall the older image of labor as
involvedin a heroicmarchonward.
It is also strikingthatrecentlabor studies originatingin the social
sciences (as opposed to the humanities)have paid littleattentionto the
social constructionof political symbols, discourse, and identity-issues
thathave been addressed more directlyby historians.Populism, forex-
ample, tends to be portrayedin the social sciences as an institutional
compromiseinvolvingthe projects generated by state elites fromabove
and the pressures raised by popular sectorsfrombelow. But the political
identitiesofelitesand popular sectorsappear as alreadyconstituted,with
the dynamicsof populism involvingsectoraland factionalalliances and
negotiationsratherthan a problematicreformulationof these identities.
This formalapproach tends to portrayprocesses of "incorporation"as an
outcomeof institutionalconstraintsratherthan as changing and socially
negotiatedboundariesofacceptable and unacceptablebehavior.
The absence of identityand discourse as fields of analysis is also
directlyrelatedto otherdimensions missingfromrecentlabor studies on

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LatinAmericanResearchReview

LatinAmerica(in thiscase, primarilyin the social sciences but also in the

humanities).Forthemostpart,these studieslack any treatmentofgender
and race as crucial mechanisms of stratification, political identity,and
social change (forexample, the huge Collier and Collier studymentions
women only marginallyin five paragraphs). Such lacunae suggest that
manyofthesebooks have chosen to address themajordebatesthatshaped
our disciplines in the 1970s but not the intellectualagenda that should
shape labor studiesin Latin Americaduringthe 1990s.

REFERENCES

COLLIER, RUTH BERINS, AND DAVID COLLIER

1978 "Who Does What, To Whom, and How: Towarda ComparativeAnalysis of Latin
American Corporatism." In Authoritarianism and Corporatismnin Latin America,
edited by JamesMalloy.Pittsburgh,Pa.: UniversityofPittsburghPress.
1979 "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism.'" American
PoliticalScienice
Review73, no. 4:967-86.
ROXBOROUGH, IAN
1984 "Unityand Diversityin Latin AmericanHistory."Journal
ofLatinlAmericanl
Studies
16, pt. 1 (May):1-26.

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