Co-ownership

Prescription as against the other co-owner/s:

General rule, one co-owner cannot acquire the whole property as against the other co-owners if all the co-owners
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (Coronel v. CA, 205 SCRA)

The problem may occur when a co-owner may become the exclusive owner of the whole property in co-
ownership. How is this possible?

Answer:
The following conditions may occur, namely:
The co-owners must make known to the other co-owners that he is definitely repudiating the co-ownership and
that he is claiming complete ownership over the entire property.

The evidence of repudiation and knowledge on the part of the others must be clear and convincing. How is this
manifested: The co-owners must verbally or in writing repudiate the co-ownership by asserting his sole ownership
over the property. Aside from this, he occupies or possess the property in the concept of an owner.

The other requirements of prescription — continuous, open, peaceful, public, adverse possession for the period of
time required under the law must be present.

The period of prescription shall start to run only from such repudiation of co-ownership. (Castillo v. Court of
Appeals, L-18046, Mar. 31, 1964).

So if you are asked does prescription run against a co-heir or a co-owner?

Generally, prescription does not adversely affect a co-owner or a co-heir. However, under certain conditions, the
co-ownership or the co-heirship may be repudiated; from this moment of repudiation, prescription begins to run.
A co-owner cannot acquire the rights of his co-owners by prescription if he
does not clearly repudiate the co-ownership and duly communicate such repudiation to his co-owners.

The following are not sufficient acts of repudiation:

01. The record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation and communication contemplated by
law.
02. Neither may a co-owner’s possession of the premises militate against his co-owner’s claim. Note: co-owners
are entitled to be in possession of the premises.
03. Mere receiving of rents or profits, payment of land taxes, and the construction of fences and buildings will not
be considered sufficient proof of exclusive or adverse possession because a co-owner as such usually does these.
There must indeed be a definite repudiation.
04. A co-owner’s registration of the properties in his name does not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-
ownership.

Partition:

Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property implying that an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.

WHEN A CO-OWNER MAY NOT SUCCESSFULLY DEMAND PARTITION

1. If by agreement, for a period not exceeding 10 years, partition is prohibited.
2. When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator, for a period not exceeding 20 years
3. When partition is prohibited by law
4. When a physical partition would render the property unserviceable but in this case, the property may be allotted
to one of the co-owners
5. When the legal nature of the common property doesn't allow partition

In the exercise of the right of redemption by one of the co-owners, remember that the right of redemption should
be from 1 year from the time of the registration of the certificate of sale in case the property is foreclosed. After
the period of redemption and one of the co-owners purchased the property from the bank, the property so bought
has become the exclusive property of the co-owner who purchased the property.

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title. (392)
CO-OWNERSHIP
 State where an undivided thing or right belongs to two or more persons Right of common dominion which 2 or
more persons have over a spiritual, ideal part of a thing which is not physically divided
SOURCES OF CO-OWNERSHIP
1. By law2. By contract3. By chance4. By occupation or occupancy5. By succession or will
CHARACTERISTICS OF CO-OWNERSHIP
 There must be more than one subject or owner There is one physical whole divioded into ideal shares Each
ideal share is definite in amount but is not physically segregated from the rest Regarding the physical whole, each
co-owner must respect each other in the common use, enjoyment, or preservation of the physical whole
Regarding the ideal share, each co-owner holds almost absolute control over the same It is not a juridical person
There is no mutual agency There is no extinguishment upon the death of any co-owner A co-owner is in a sense
a trustee for the other co-owners
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-
owners in the co-ownership shall be presume
d equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a)
SHARES IN BENEFITS OR CHARGES
 Share is proportional to the interest of each Contrary stipulation is void Each co-owner shares proportionately
in the accretion or alluvium of the property
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement,
express or implied. (394a)
EACH CO-OWNER HAS THE RIGHT TO USE THE PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED
 The interest of the co-ownership must be impaired or prejudiced And the co-owners must not be prevented
from using it
Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. (395a)
EXPENSES FOR PRESERVATION
 A co-owner has a right to compel the others to share in the expenses of preservation, even if incurred without
prior notification to them but he must notify if practicable Covers only necessary expenses
A CO-OWNER MAY EXEMPT HIMSELF
 By renouncing so much of his undivided share as may be equivalent to the share of the expenses and taxes
Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first
notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided
upon by a majority as determined in Article 492. (n)
CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
1. ACTS OF PRESERVATION—no consent requirement2. ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION—financial majority3. ACTS OF
ALTERATION—all must consent
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not
specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on
the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of
all theowners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door,
common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata;(3)
The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall bemaintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with
theexception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the firstto the second story shall be preserved at the
expense of all, exceptthe owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; andso on successively. (396)
PERPENDICULAR OWNERSHIP Different stories belong to different owners
 
 
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of theothers, make alterations in the thing owned in
common, eventhough benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if thewithholding of the consent by one or
more of the co-owners isclearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may affordadequate relief. (397a)
ALTERATIONS1. Change which is more or less permanent2. Which changes the use of the thing3. Which prejudices
the condition of the thing or its enjoyment byothersArt. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the
thingowned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-ownersshall be binding.There shall be no
majority unless the resolution is approved by theco-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of
the co-ownership.Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of themajority be seriously prejudicial to
those interested in the propertyowned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party,shall order
such measures as it may deem proper, including theappointment of an administrator.Whenever a part of the thing
belongs exclusively to one of the coowners,and the remainder is owned in common, the precedingprovision shall
apply only to the part owned in common. (398)NOTE: An act of administration pertains to management and useful
expenses
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his partand of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he maytherefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substituteanother person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights areinvolved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, withrespect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which maybe alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the
coownership.(399)
RIGHT WITH RESPECT TO THE IDEAL OR PROPORTIONATE SHARE Deals nto with the right to the whole property
but only with theright to the IDEAL or metaphysical share of each co-ownerRULES REGARDING THE IDEAL SHARE1.
Each co-owner must have full ownership of his part and his shareof the fruits and benefits2. He may alienate,
assign or mortgage his ideal share but of coursewithout prejudice to the exercise of the others of their right oflegal
redemption3. He may even substitute another person for the enjoyment exceptwhen personal rights are involved
4. He may exempt himself from necessary expenses and taxes byrenouncing part of his interest in the co-
ownership
 
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership.Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition ofthe thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
thing undivided for acertain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. Thisterm may be extended by a
new agreement.A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shallnot exceed twenty years.Neither
shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
againsthis co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedlyrecognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
WHEN A CO-OWNER MAY NOT SUCCESSFULLY DEMAND APARTITION1. If by agreement, for a period not exceeding
10 years, partition isprohibited2. When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator, for a periodnot exceeding
20 years3. When partition is prohibited by law4. When a physical partition would render the property
unserviceablebut in this case, the property may be allotted to one of the coowners5. When the legal nature of the
common property doesn't allowpartition
PROHIBITION TO PARTITION BECAUSE OF AN AGREEMENT1. Period must not extend more than 10 years2. If it
exceeds 10 years, the stipulation is valid insofar as the first10 years is concerned3. There can be an extension but
only after the original period hasended4. After the first extension, there can be another, and so onindefinitely, as
long as for each extension, the period of 10 yearsis not exceeded
 
PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OF A CO-OWNER AGAINST THE OTHERCO-OWNERS1. Clear and unequivocal act of
repudiation of the co-ownership2. Act of repudiation must be made known3. Clear and convincing evidence4.
Other requirements of prescription—open, continuous, exclusive,notorious, adverse, public possession in the
concept of owner
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article,the co-owners cannot demand a physical division
of the thingowned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable forthe use for which it is intended. But
the co-ownership may beterminated in accordance with Article 498. (401a)
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the partiesor by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be
governed by the Rulesof Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402)
PARTITION MAY BE MADE EXTRAJUDICIALLY OR JUDICIALLY. IFTHERE IS NO AGREEMENT, ONE CAN FILE FOR
PARTITION. THECOURT WILL ASCERTAIN THE FOLLOWING:1. Is there co-ownership?2. Are they the co-owners?3.
What are their respective shares?4. What would be the allocation?
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take partin the division of the thing owned in common
and object to itsbeing effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugnany partition already executed,
unless there has been fraud, or incase it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented toprevent it,
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignorto maintain its validity. (403)
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coownerscannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shallindemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.(404)
JURIDICAL DISSOLUTION1. First, give the whole to one of the co-owners who will now berequired to indemnify the
rest2. If this is not agreed upon, there must be a sale
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall notprejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of
mortgage,servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights
pertaining to third personsagainst the co-ownership shall also remain in force,notwithstanding the partition. (405)
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting forbenefits received and reimbursements for expenses
made.Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason ofhis negligence or fraud. (n)
EFFECTS OF PARTITION1. Mutual accounting for benefits2. Mutual reimbursement for expenses3. Indemnity for
damages in case of negligence or fraud4. Reciprocal warranty for defects of title or quality5. Each former co-owner
is deemed to have had exclusive possessionof his part allotted to him for the entire period during which theco-
possession lasted
Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defectsof title and quality of the portion assigned to
each of the other coowners.(n)Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right ofredemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of anyof them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation isgrossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonableone.Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the
right ofredemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share theymay respectively have in the thing owned
in common. (1522a)
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not beexercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing bythe prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. Thedeed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property,unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has givenwritten
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoiningowners. (1524a)
Art. 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property,the following persons cannot constitute the same
without properauthority: the husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal realestate, the father or guardian as
to the property of the minor orward, and the manager without special power. (1548a)
Art. 1648. Every lease of real estate may be recorded in theRegistry of Property. Unless a lease is recorded, it shall
not bebinding upon third persons. (1549a)
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in thefollowing cases:(1) To make such payments as are not
usually considered asacts of administration;(2) To effect novations which put an end to obligations alreadyin
existence at the time the agency was constituted;(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to
renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objectionsto the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription alreadyacquired;(4) To waive any obligation gratuitously;(5) To enter into any contract by which the
ownership of animmovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for avaluable consideration;(6) To
make gifts, except customary ones for charity or thosemade to employees in the business managed by the agent;
(7) To loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgentand indispensable for the preservation of the things
which areunder administration;(8) To lease any real property to another person for more thanone year;(9) To bind
the principal to render some service withoutcompensation;(10) To bind the principal in a contract of partnership;
(11) To obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety;
(12) To create or convey real rights over immovable property;(13) To accept or repudiate an inheritance;(14) To
ratify or recognize obligations contracted before theagency;(15) Any other act of strict dominion. (n)
What happens when a co-owner sells the whole property as his?
The sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Note: A sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void but affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common (Paulmitan vs. CA, GR No. 51584, Nov. 25, 1992.)
RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPENSES
What are the expenses which the co-owners can be compelled to contribute?
Only necessary expenses. Useful expenses and those for pure luxury are not included.
What are those acts which require the majority consent of the co-owners?
a. Management
b. Enjoyment
c. Improvement or embellishment
What is the remedy in case the minority opposes the decision of the majority in co-ownership?
Minority may appeal to the court against the majority’s decision if the same is seriously prejudicial.
Q.  Why is it that even only one co-owner may bring an action for ejectment?
A. Because co-ownership has no juridical personality and that each co-owner is a trustee of the other co-owners.
 
 
Q.  In a co-ownership, one calls his share as ideal share or undivided interest over the thing.  In a condominium it is
called interest
 
Q.  A, B & C are heirs of D.  Subsequently D died.  Later on A died as well.  How would you discuss the rights of the
parties.
 
In the same problem, B, titled the land for himself and after 30 years, C demanded for partition. Solve.
 
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title. (392)
Co-ownership
•
 The right of common dominion w/c 2 or more persons have in a spiritual or ideal part of a thing w/c is not
physically divided (S.Roman).
•
Not a juridical person, nor is it granted any form of juridical personality, thus, it cannot sue in court. Co-owners can
sue in their individual capacities.
•
Possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall notbe regarded as adverse to the other co-
owners but in fact asbeneficial to all of them.
•
No co-ownership when different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and
identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
•
A co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Thus, a co-owner does not lose his
part ownership
of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner w/o his knowledge and consent.
What governs co-ownership?
1.contracts2.special legal provisions3.provisions of the Title on co-ownership
Sources of co-ownership
1.law – Art. 1442.contract3.chance – commixtion, confusion, hidden treasure4.occupation or occupancy – catching
of wild beast (seems erroneous,since it is also by implied agreement or contract)
5.
succession/will – the exercise of legal redemption – use the rule onco-heirs; after partition of hereditary estate, the
rule on co-ownersapply.
Kinds of co-ownershipSubject MatterSourceRights of co-owners
1.undividedthing2.undividedright1.contract2.non-contract1.tenancy in common (commonownership)2.joint
tenancy (joint ownership)
1
 
Characteristics of co-ownership (7)
1.More than 1 subject or owner
2.1 physical whole divided into ideal (undivided) shares
3.Each ideal share is definite in amount but is not 
physicallysegregated from the rest
4.Each co-owner holds almost absolute control over ideal share.
5.Each co-owner must respect each other in the common use,enjoyment, or preservation of the physical whole.
6.Not a juridical person, no juridical personality.
7.Co-owner a trustee for the other co-owners. Thus, he may not
ordinarily acquire exclusive ownership of the property 
held incommon thru prescription.

 Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well

asin the charges, shall be proportional to their respectiveinterests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary
shall bevoid 
(to do so would be to run against the nature of co-ownership)
.
 
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownershipshall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proved. (393a)
•
Each co-owner shares proportionately in the accretion oralluvium of the property because the increase in area
benefits all.
•
A co-owner can compel others to pay the taxes he has paid.
 Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for whichit is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied. (394a) Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action inejectment. (n)
Reason:
the presumption is that the case is instituted in behalf of all,after all, co-owner owns and possesses the whole and
ejectment casesare urgent and summary in character.

Ejectment
covers (6): 1) forcible entry; 2) unlawful detainer; 3) accionpubliciana;4) accion reinvindicatoria; 5) quieting of title;
6) replevin-only issue in ejectment is physical or material possessionof property-BP 129 suggest that inferior courts
are now conditionallyvested w/ adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownershipraised in ejectment-As a
general rule, the main issue in an ejectment suit
ispossession de facto not possession de jure; the only issue isphysical or material possession
  
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one
of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may beeq
uivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No suchwaiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.(395a)
•
A co-owner has the right to compel the others to share in the
necessary expenses of preservation
even if incurred w/o prior notification to them.
•
A co-owner may exempt himself from this duty byRENOUNCING so much of his undivided share as may be = to his
share of the expenses and taxes (does not necessarily renouncing his entire interest and not prejudicial)
•
I.E. of prejudicial = house on verge of collapse, Y contracted to repair, can compel X to pay, X cannot renounce if Y
has no money to shoulder all expenses
•
Reimbursement can be had from the estate of a deceased co-owner provided no renunciation has been made.
•
Renunciation cannot be implied by mere refusal to payproportionate share. If there is refusal but no renunciation >
creditor can still collect from delinquent co-owner (other co-ownercannot intervene for they are not the ones
prejudiced).
Requisites of Renouncement
1.If in favor of creditor – creditor must give his consent (for this wouldbe a case of adjudication en pago or dation
in solutum, where adebtor gives something else in payment of his debt)

If in favor of other co-owners > co-owner agrees (in the form

of substitution of debtor > datio en pago); and provided creditoragrees (novation or change of debtor)
 Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable
(something canbe done as oppose to practical = useful)
 , first notify his co-
ownersof the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a maj
ority asdetermined in Article 492. (n)
Number of co-owners to give consent
1.repairs, ejectment action = 12.alterations or acts of ownership
= ALL3.All others (useful improvements, luxurious embellishments,admin & better enjoyment –
FINANCIAL MAJORITY (not numerical)If repair was made w/o notice (even if notice is practicable)? Co-ownerstill
liable, however, may invoke that if repair is too expensive, the firstco-owner should shoulder the difference

PERPENDICULAR CO-OWNERHSIP
 Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong todifferent owners, if the titles of ownership do not
specify theterms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on
the subject, thefollowing rules shall be observed:(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other thingsused in
common, shall be preserved at the expense of all theowners in proportion to the value of the story belonging
toeach;(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door,
common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at theexpense of all the owners pro rata;(3)
The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall bemaintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with
theexception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from thefirst to the second story shall be preserved at the
expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of thefirst story; and so on successively. (396)
 
Article 147 states:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.When only one of the parties to a void
marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies when a man and woman can get legally married but for one reason or
another, have not done soArticle 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. Article 147 creates a co-ownership
with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. Even if one of the parties did not work or
contribute in the acquisition of property, the care and maintenance of the family household is considered as a
contribution.The Supreme Court held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term “capacitated” in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any “male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38” of the Code. (Emphasis by boldfacing supplied)Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household.”
 
Requisites for Article 147 to applyThus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
must be capacitated to marry each other;
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
Article 148 of the Family Code applies to situations where the parties are not legally capacitated to marry each
otherArticle 148 applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, “only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...” Proof of actual contribution is required, unlike in situations covered by Article 147. In the absence
of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share are presumed to be equal.Under Article 148,
the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of
the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.In the cases
of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by
the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, the Supreme Court ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the
petitioners who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to
substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that even if the controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship, it is not sufficient proof of co-ownership without evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.The case of Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10,
2003 illustrates how the Supreme Court applied Article 148:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. Their cohabitation was not blessed with any
children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel “Saguid Brothers.” Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship
with Jacinto’s relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioner’s
relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end their 9-year cohabitation. On January 9, 1997, private
respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a
month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house.
Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances,
pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her
earnings in her savings account with First Allied Development Bank. Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995,
she had a balance of P21,046.08. She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 share in the joint account
deposit which she and the petitioner maintained with the same bank. Gina declared that said deposits were spent
for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.In his answer to the
complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his
income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondent’s meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to
her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner
further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month
duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did
not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her
parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of
which was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was
spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated
to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with
the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime,
“only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual
contribution is required.In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148
of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such
relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.In the
case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name
for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of
P11,413.00. On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal
properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount
of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner.
Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.

A disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal
properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share
of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit
of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches.

Heirs of Protacio G., Sr. vs. Servacio

Fact: This case falls on 2 parcels of land affirmed under oath by Prostacio Go Jr to have been purchased by his
Father Prostacio Sr. Upon the death of Marta Go, wife of Protacio Sr, Rito Go and Protacio Sr sold a portion of the
property to Servacio, the respondent.

Issue: Won the sale of the undivided property is valid?

Held: RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and
Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta;
that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the
legal presumption.

Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: As long as the portion sold,
alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it
plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid.

This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal of the conjugal
property without the required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity so long
as they do not exceed the portion which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse
who made the contract.

The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et
al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.

In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the
Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid,
because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and
that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of
was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

Held:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated
in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the
lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements,
a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.

Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:

Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary
application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]

It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are
governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between
Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation.[16] The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to wit:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (399)

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of
the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or
abstract quota in Martas share.[18] Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.[19]
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.[20] This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest).[21]

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the
conjugal partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration
prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property
subject of the sale.

In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already received a certain allotted
portion at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by
them. However, they did not present any public document on the allocation among her heirs, including
themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already
been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale,
and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be
properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial
partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,[23] to wit:

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only
the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the
thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in
a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx[24]

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this
result, viz:

xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving
spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal
assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or
mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the
wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these
can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving
spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the
surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of
course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the
property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs,
the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez,
Baloloy).

Lacbayan vs. Samoy

Facts: Petitioner and respondent had an illicit affair and during their illicit relationship, they, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired
during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent's names, ostensibly as husband and wife.

Petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City.
Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in
Don Enrique Heights.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways and, both parties agreed to
divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.
Respondent agreed to petitioner's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned
to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner
wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.

During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991,
respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.[18] Petitioner likewise claimed
that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent
established.

Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends,
allowances and commissions. He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with
petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the
possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler. Respondent added that he
also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or
construction of a new building.

Issue: Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;

Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and

Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.

Held:

CA Ruling:

Appellant's harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least,
misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the
record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties - itself an issue
correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of
action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies
only to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in
litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the
admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties' name as husband and wife.

The same dearth of merit permeates appellant's imputation of reversible error against the trial court for
supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving
ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or
defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the
property sought to be partitioned and, second - assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first - the issue
of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially
settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property
without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership
is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial
court did when it discounted the merit in appellant's claim of co-ownership.[26]

Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:

Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.

The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondent's interest as to the
existence of co-ownership between the parties.

An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-
serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute.

A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondent's self-serving
assertion to the contrary.

The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry.

Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the
decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on
the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that
questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:

The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition.
Thus:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order.

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed
by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for
the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question.

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real
estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the
complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over
the subject properties.[31]
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,[32] but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.[33]
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.[34] Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with
the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.[35]

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof
of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property,
but may be the best evidence thereof.

Finally, as to whether respondent's assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against
interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and
petitioner, we rule in the negative.

An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for
which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by
Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c)
be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter's interests, otherwise it would be self-
serving and inadmissible.[39]

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves
matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the
parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner's
argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to
waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to
amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court's view that respondent is entitled
to attorney's fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondent's predicament. The trial court
ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to
entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent
himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondent's
act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and
escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the
consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.

Cruz vs. Catapang

Facts: Said lot in question was co owned by Cruz and Maligaya. Maligaya knew and had consent on the petitioner’s
house built on the said lot and upon Cruz’s knowledge of such, he filed a case of forcible entry a against the
possessor by tolerance.

Issue:
whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-
owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property?

Held: A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned
property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement,
express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one
or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on
the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the
property in accordance with their rights.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-
owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned
in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of
dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all
co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the
builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest
upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification through strategy or stealth.

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property was not
through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our
imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner
could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom
respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the
other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondents act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can
in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such,
respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year period for filing the
complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is
counted from the time the petitioner learned about it. Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made
demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint
on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
CA’s decision was reversed.

Sanchez v. CA 404 SCRA 540 (2003)

Facts: Lot in question was co owned by 6 Sanchez’ heirs including the Petitioner who has built her house occupying
a portion thereof. Said lot was executed on a deed of sale in favor of Maligaya upon which only 5 of the co owners
affixed their signature. Upon the procedural lapse by the Petitioner’s counsel, CA then ordered demolition on said
house.

Issue: Won CA erred in not giving credence to the ownership?

Held: This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings
from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownershipwas not sufficiently dealt with.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private
right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject
to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element
which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of
the co-owners.

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do
any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee
for the others.

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
thing.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently
of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not
been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-
owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to
her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to
the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
Petition is GRANTED. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED. The Deed of Absolute Sale by the
other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is
concerned.

a mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of
buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession
which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.

TERMINATION/EXTINGUISHMENT

Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs. Tamayo, 298 SCRA 313

Facts: The lot in question has been inherited by the five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad
as surviving heirs of Agustin Dizon upon which hereditary rights of Eduardo and Gaudencion were sold to Salud.
Upon the death of Gaudencio, the said heirs executed a judicial division on the said lot upon which Valenta
opposed division on the merit that a portion of such where her house stand was donated to her by her father.

Issue:

Fact: It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take effect as a
donation unless embodied in a public document.

The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a public document. Moreover, the
document which was presented by respondent in support of her claim that her father donated the subject parcel
of land to her was a mere private document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother,

Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly satisfy the requirements of the rule
on ancient documents on accounts of unexplained alterations.

An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of
suspicion.

To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and
alterations.

In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still
claim ownership over the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may
ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive
right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.

Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the property. It is undeniable that petitioners and
respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a
form of a trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded
as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to
the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the
property.

In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to state that a mere silent possession by a co-owner,
his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of
trees thereon and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by
clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.

The elements in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-
owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to ouster cestui que trust or
other co-owners (2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal acts of repudiation, she cannot
acquire ownership over said property through acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely
allowed her sister Valenta to build a house on the lot is pure hearsay as respondent herself could have testified on
the matter but chose not to.

Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent who pays
realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or
realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned lot, the parties should be guided by
Article 500 of the Civil Code which states that: Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits
received and reimbursements for expenses made.

Heirs of Restar vs. Heirs of Cichon, 475 SCRA 731

Facts: When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate
succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January
21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and
cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither
title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed
ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse
claim.
Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in
accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.

Issue:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION ON
THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF
FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-
IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]

Held: Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire
ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners
are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good
faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners claim that the
requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met.

The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval.
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as
his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested
the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It was admitted by the parties during the
pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores
Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first
concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back
in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on
September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the
inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar,
considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and
participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against him from
1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on
January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when
the tax declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to run from this
date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land
considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the
action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs. [25]
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight[26] and can be the
basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.[27]
As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land, it was correctly
discredited by the trial court.
[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot be
sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping.
One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation
and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share of the produce would total two cavans, six
gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan.[28]

Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of facts which must, as a matter of
judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect, they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered
any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration
certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he
is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees
without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its
produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to immediately take legal action to protect
their rights forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support
their childrens education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of
respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?
The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in
open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been
questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he
and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept
on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

Assignment on co-ownership

A, B, C, D & E are co-owners of a parcel of land, 2,000 sq. meter more or less, situated in Manila by hereditary
succession. They are all residents of the United States. Incidentally, all the heirs except E, 10 years old, are of legal
age.
Problem I.
In the above facts, A, the eldest, came back to Manila and obtained the loan from the bank using as collateral the
2,000 square meter lot and the loan proceeds thereof was used to construct a mid-rise condominium project.
Upon full construction of the condominium, he then proceeded to sell the units.

Was the loan and the mortgage of the land valid? If so, what are the requirements to make the loan and mortgage
of the land valid?

Yes, co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share and a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the
thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy].

The appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION.

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this
result, viz:

[I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse,
then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets
then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged
belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then
that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be
determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse
is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving
spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as
to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that
could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs, the cestui que
trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches ( Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez)

Assume that B did not want to loan the property and to construct a condominium project on the said property,
may he validly object considering that the project redounded for the benefit of the co-ownership?
Notwithstanding B’s objection, can the other co-owners proceed with the loan and mortgage and the construction
of the condominium project?

Yes, B can validly object as stated in Article 49, none of the con owners shall without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the things owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom.

Yes, the other co-owners may proceed with the loan and mortgage and construction of the condominium project.

Assume that E, the minor, was thrilled with the idea of his other siblings and consented to the acts of A, may he
validly do so? If yes, under what circumstances? If no, why?

A, as a minor may validly do because as a co owner he has the right to:

a) Full ownership of his part and of his share of the fruits and benefits.
b) Right to substitute another person its enjoyment, EXCEPT when personal rights are involved.
c) Right to alienate, dispose or encumber.
d) Right to renounce part of his interest to reimburse necessary expenses incurred by another co- owner.
e) Transactions entered into by each co-owner only affect his ideal share.

Except that transactions be made under guardianship.

Assume that the mortgage debt was not paid and the bank now goes after the property, may the bank validly do so
considering that B did not consent to the actions of his siblings and considering further that E is a minor?

Yes, the bank may go after the property but B, as a defense may seek protest against seriously prejudicial decisions
of the majority. Transactions entered into by each co-owner only affect his ideal share, B’s interest must not be
prejudiced.
Assume that all the siblings all agreed to secure a loan and constructed the Condominium project? May partition
still be made prior to the sale of the units to the public?

Yes, co-ownership cease to exist upon the sale of property co-owned. Before the sale, co-ownership still exists,
hence, partition is still available.

Assume that the sale to the public had all been done, may partition still be done among the heirs.

No, partition is demandable by any of the co- owners as a matter of right at any time.

EXCEPTIONS:
1) When there is a stipulation against it; but not to exceed 10 years.
2) When the condition of indivision is imposed by the donor or testator; but not to exceed 20 years.
3) When the legal nature of the community prevents partition.
4) When partition would render the thing unserviceable.
5) When partition is prohibited by law.
6) When another co-owner has possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to acquire it by
prescription.

FRIDAY ASSIGNMENT

X is a riparian owner of a registered land with a land area of 10,000 square meters. Over time, due to the action of
the river, the land of X increased by 500 square meter. Because of the increase, X then employed Y as laborer to
plant fruit bearing trees and vegetables and other root crops on the additional land area. Y, then constructed a
house made of mixed materials on the property, where he and his family lived. For 10 years, unknown to X, Y paid
taxes on the additional land from part of the wages he got from X, who forgot to register the additional land under
his name. During his occupation of the property, he also built several nipa huts in the property. On the 16th year, X
decided to eject Y and his family, who then refused to vacate the property. Y contended that he had acquired
acquisitive prescription on the property. X however contended that the property is his by right of accretion. X also
claims the structures constructed therein as well as the plants, trees and fruits therein.

Who may validly claim 500 sq meter area? Why?

X may validly claim the accretion brought about by the gradual deposit of soil on his land because of the rule on
alluvion. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion to which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

What are the rights of the parties insofar as the fruits are concerned?

Y is a possessor in bad faith because he knew he does not own the land, he will lose the three huts he built in bad
faith and make an accounting of the fruits he has gathered, he has the right to deduct from the value of the fruits
the expenses for production, gathering and preservation of the fruits (Art 443, NCC).

He may also ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are charges on the land owned by X.

A person, whether in good faith or bad faith, is entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses of preservation.
Art. 443 of the gathered fruits which the owner of the land is entitled to recover. In the case of pending fruits, Art.
449 would be applicable and would deny such right of reimbursement to a sower in bad faith.

Would your answer be the same if Y was merely tolerated to occupy the property?
Yes, the answer will still be the same because acts merely tolerated do not affect possession.

II. In good faith, Pedro constructed a five-door commercial building on the land of Pablo who was also in good
faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he opted to appropriate the building by paying Pedro the cost
thereof. However, Pedro insists that he should be paid the current market value of the building, which was much
higher because of inflation.

Who is correct? -- Pablo is correct. Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provides that the builder in good faith
is entitled to a reimbursement of the useful and necessary expenses or the increase in the value of the land due to
the improvement made at the option of the landowner and not the current market value.

In the meantime that Pedro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of the building, Pedro or Pablo? – Pedro
should retain the rentals which after deducting the reasonable cost of repair and maintenance, must apply to the
indemnity payable to him.

Doctrine of State of Necessity: What is the difference between Scenario 1 and 2, if any insofar as the application of
the doctrine of state of necessity is concerned.

Scenario 1. B is drunk. B is walking home and singing ―. B passes J‘s house. J has a Doberman. The Doberman
attacks B. B stabs the Doberman with a Swiss army knife. Doberman dies.

Scenario 2. B sees Doberman sleeping. B starts shouting at the Doberman. B kicks the dog. Dog attacks B. B stabs
the Doberman with a Swiss army knife. Doberman dies. 

In the first scenario, the “state of necessity” is a justifying circumstance. Under the doctrine, the accused does not
commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. There is no obligation to
indemnify J for the damage caused. Doctrine of state of necessity is when the law permits injury or destruction of
things owned by another person provided that it is necessary to avert a greater danger (with right to indemnity –
vs. principle of unjust enrichment).

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

In the second scenario, the act entitles the owner to the indemnity because B himself made the provocation and
was responsible for his own injury.

A donated a parcel of land to B with a stipulation in the deed of donation that B must be able to graduate from law
school and ultimately become a lawyer. B, then a 4th year law student, succeeded in having the deed of donation
registered and the title to the property was transferred in his name. Unfortunately, due to a tragic vehicular
accident, he was not able to graduate and did not pursue his studies anymore after the accident. B however
became a successful businessman. If you are a lawyer and A’s heirs come to you for help regarding the non-
fulfillment of the condition in the donation, what, if any, will you advise your clients?

– The heirs of A may demand to nullify the said donation because the donation made was an onerous one. In
onerous donations, law on contracts apply and the non fulfillment of the condition is a valid ground to revoke the
said donation.
 A, B, C, D & E are co-owners of a 5 storey old building ,which they inherited from their parents, the title of which,
is under their names. Being an old building, lots of repairs are needed. E does not want to share the apartment
repair expenses but wants to receive the monthly rental income collection only.

1. What would be the rights of the other siblings who would be willing to share the repair expenses?

-- If co-owner E refuses to contribute to the cost and maintenance of the property owned in common, the other
co-owner may proceed to advance the necessary amount to be used in the preservation of the property and
demand payment or reimbursement from the other co-owner. If E refuses, they may exempt him from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his/her undivided interest as may be equivalent to his/her share of the
expenses and taxes in favor of the other co-owner/s who shouldered the expenses.

What would be the consequence to sibling E who does not want or did not share in the repair expenses of the old
building owned in common by the siblings. Likewise, the siblings own an ancestral residential house under their
names. Sibling E lives in that house with his family and does everything like construct high wall division from the
other sibling’s house, changing or adding rooms, etc., without consulting or advising the other siblings. The
situation has created some frictions amongst the siblings. -- E cannot demand reimbursement. Repainting of the
building is an improvement expense, hence majority of the controlling interest of the co-owners is requirement.

What is/are the consequences of E’s action on the co-ownership?

-- As regards the ancestral home, the changing or alteration of the walls or partitions of the thing or property
owned in common requires the consent of all other co-owners. Thus, it is clear that the alterations of the walls and
rooms made by sibling E are contrary to law.

Are A, B, C & D, without any recourse? Support your answer?

-- What A, B, C & D should do is to join together and agree on the manner by which the property owned in
common be managed and administered. The decision or resolution by the majority of the co-owners as regards to
the subject property shall be binding upon all co-owners. If this fails, the only other option is to go to the court of
law in order to compel the recalcitrant co-owner(s) to respect the rights of the other co-owners and/or to demand
for the partition or division of the things owned in common and thus terminate the co-ownership.

X, a litigation lawyer, after having been stressed out in his long practice of law, decided he wanted to retire as a
farmer. He then purchased a farm lot from Y and forthwith a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between X & Y.
Thereafter, despite his intention to retire, Atty. X continued in his practice of law. In the meantime, Y, realizing that
the property remained unoccupied sold the property to A, who physically possessed the property by constructing
thereon his residential house and planting rootcrops and vegetables therein. There was also a Deed of Sale
executed between A & Y. Atty. X came back and checked on the property and saw that the same is now occupied
by A. Who has a better right of possession and why?

-– X has a better right of possession because between two existing titles, it must favor the first one with the
absolute deed of sale. In the case of A, provided he is not aware of the existence of the first title be deemed a
possessor in good faith and be entitled of the rights vested in Art 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code.