Christianity

CHRISTIANITY
WORLD • POLITICS
J O U R N A L O F T H E C AT H O L I C S O C I A L T H O U G H T
The Institute of Political Science and Public Administration

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw
CHRISTIANITY
WORLD • POLITICS J O U R N A L O F T H E C AT H O L I C S O C I A L T H O U G H T
Scientific Advisory Board:

Professor Jane Adolphe, Ph.D. (Ave Maria School of Law – Florida USA)
Professor Chantal Delsol, Ph.D. (Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée)
Professor Aniela Dylus, Ph.D.
Professor Ingeborg Gabriel, Ph.D. (Universität Wien)
Professor Jan Grosfeld, Ph.D.
Professor Jakub Grygiel, Ph.D. (Catholic University of America)
Professor Milan Katuninec, Ph.D. (Trnavská Univerzita v Trnave)
Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D. (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw)
Professor Vittorio Possenti, Ph.D. (Università Cà Foscari di Venezia)
Editorial Board:
Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D. – Editor-in-Chief
Professor Michał Gierycz, Ph.D. – Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Rev. Piotr Burgoński, Ph.D.
Professor Ligia Castaldi, Ph.D. (Ave Maria School of Law – Florida USA)
Luisa Lodevole, Ph.D (Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata")
Grégor Puppinck, Ph.D. (European Centre for Law and Justice – Strasbourg)
Michał Kmieć
Mariusz Sulkowski, Ph.D. – Secretary
Subject editors: Mariusz Sulkowski, Ph.D., Michał Kmieć

Polish-Language Copyeditor: Editorial office
English-Language Copyeditor: Judyta Fiedlin, Steven Jones
Reviewers:
Professor Jane Adolphe, Ph.D. Professor Wiesław Lizak, Ph.D.
Monika Bartoszewicz, Ph.D. Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.
Federica Basaglia, Ph.D. Paweł Milcarek, Ph.D.
Professor Ligia Castaldi, Ph.D. Professor Sergiei Mudrov, Ph.D.
Rev. Professor Jean Baptiste Edart, Ph.D. Professor Wojciech Roszkowski, Ph.D.
Professor Dominic Farrell, Ph.D. Inese Runce, Ph.D.
Joseph Forte, Ph.D. Professor Mirosław Sadowski, Ph.D.
Professor Michał Gierycz, Ph.D. Professor Joseph Seifert, Ph.D.
Francois Gonon, Ph.D. Rev. Professor Marcin Składanowski, Ph.D.
Professor Leszek Graniszewski, Ph.D. Rev. Professor Cezary Smuniewski, Ph.D.
Professor Jan Grosfeld, Ph.D. Bianka Speidl, Ph.D.
Bishop Professor Jacek Grzybowski, Ph.D. Professor Aleksander Stępkowski, Ph.D.
Professor Milan Katuninec, Ph.D. Professor Stelios Virvidakis, Ph.D.
Oleh Kindyi, Ph.D. Rev. Professor Arkadiusz Wuwer, Ph.D.
Professor Joanna Kulska, Ph.D. Rev. Professor Sławomir Zych, Ph.D.
Publisher:
Chair of the Political Theory and Political Thought

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The original version of the Journal is the English-language printed version.
ISSN 1896-9038
© Copyright 2019 by Chair of the Political Theory and Political Thought
The Institute of Political Science and Public Administration, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw
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J O U R N A L O F T H E C AT H O L I C S O C I A L T H O U G H T WORLD • POLITICS
From Editors
The current issue of our journal entitled: „Migration policy and human rights”
is mainly devoted to issues related to migration phenomenon. As the right to
remain in a country and the right to return safely to one’s homeland is more
primary than the right to migrate, we begin with Ewelina Ochab’s text discussing
the refugees’ right to return in the context of indigenous communities living in
the Nineveh Plain. For the return of refugees to be possible, the international
community must provide returnees with security, restitution of property, restora-
tion of justice and reconstruction of the country, including the provision of jobs.
Rev. Bruno-Marie Duffe addresses the ethical and theological aspects of migra-
tion in his text, including the theological justification of the duty of hospitality.
Gérard – François Dumont analyzes Angela Merkel’s approach to illegal migra-
tion popularly known as willkommen Politik. He cites the rationales behind this
approach, some of which predate the 2015 migration crisis itself. One of them is the
ongoing demographic crisis in Germany, negatively affecting the economy. He also
analyzes the consequences arising from the cultural differences between newcom-
ers and Germans, especially the differences in attitudes towards the law. He also
presents alternative scenarios of solving the migration problem available at that
time. Łukasz Kaczmarczyk reflects on economic aspects of migration policy. He
notes the existence of a black market in smuggling of migrants, which is difficult
to combat due to «mutual benefits of the participants of transactions concluded
on the market of services supporting migration». Raising human rights standards
during the migration process increases the demand for smuggling services, while
tightening migration policies may lower the standards of these services. Piotr
Ślusarczyk analyses the notion of Islamophobia and the way it is used in social,
political, and scientific discourse. He draws attention to the risk of ideologizing
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this term in the political space. Mariusz Sulkowski takes up a similar issue. In
the context of St. Augustine›s concept of two states, he describes Sajjid Qutba›s
idea of jāhiliyyah. However, while St. Augustine’s idea separated the divine and
the imperial, in Qutba’s vision these two orders are closely connected, remaining
in inevitable conflict.
The next two texts are devoted to the thought of the recently deceased German
philosopher and jurist Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. Rev. Peter Schallenberg
analyzes the question of the role of the state in aligning the freedom of citizens
with their duty to pursue the good. Sławomir Sowiński deals with the so-called
Böckenförde’s paradox, referring to the indispensability of religious justifications
of values necessary from the political point of view. As Sowiński notes, nowadays
we observe a risky tendency to abolish the tension between religion and politics
either by their identification or complete separation.
The remaining articles belong to miscellanea. Tamás Nyirkos analyzes the issue of
so-called secular religions. Using Carl Schmitt’s terminology, he notes the develop-
ment of political ideologies that resemble religious belief systems. According to
the author, calling them secular religions, because of the fundamental difference
between religions referring to the transcendent Being and inner-world ideologies,
obscures rather than clarifies the debate. Jarosław Macała takes up the issue of
religion as an element of geopolitical research. In connection with the growing
role of religion in contemporary global politics, he postulates the emergence of
an independent discipline of geopolitics of religion. Jerzy Ciechański reflects on
the attitude of the Catholic Church to the category of progress. He does so in the
context of the human rights debate in the Council of Europe. Rosita Garškaitė
attempts to answer the question why Catholics support the process of European
integration. She notes that the essential arguments, available within the framework
of interpretivism, escape positivist analysis.
Laura Chamberland and Hernan Tesler-Mabé reflect on the lack of significant

signs of Jewish presence in the reconstructed Warsaw district of Muranów and
in Majdanek. They call the reconstruction of the post-World War II structure of
the Muranów district, which was completely reduced to rubble by the German
Nazis, with the omission of essential elements of the past “a historical uncanny”.
Aniela Dylus reflects on the place and role of the principle of subsidiarity in
the concept of a social market economy. She notes that a sensible reflection
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on this issue is possible only after accepting two ethical principles: freedom
and justice.
Dominique Vermersch reflects on the task of the Catholic university in the modern
world. He states that in scientific research today human reason has been reduced
to utilitarian and positivistic reason. Consequently, human cognition is cut off
from transcendence, and science from the concept of objective truth. Thus, the
mission of a Catholic university is to restore the original unity of faith and reason.
Wojciech Roszkowski presents the beginnings of the Catholic Church in the

English colonies in North America. He points out that Catholics had a very impor-
tant influence on the formation of the American tradition of religious tolerance,
which was later taken up by the Founding Fathers of the United States.
Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.
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Table of Contents
Migration policy and human rights

Ewelina U. Ochab
Christian Minorities Returning to Their Homes in Post-Daesh Iraq
– Challenges to The Right to Return 13
Rev. Bruno-Marie Duffe

To Receive the Other, to Receive God, to Receive God in the Other.
A theological and ethical approach to mutual hospitality 25
Gérard-François Dumont
Germany. Geopolitics of Migration: The Chancellor Merkel’s
Tragedy in Five Acts 34
Łukasz Kaczmarczyk
The “ free market” of migrant smuggling and its implications
for EU migration policy 50
Piotr Ślusarczyk
Language in the service of ideological and political struggle.
Instrumentalization of the term Islamophobia 68
Mariusz Sulkowski
Two Cities and Two Orders – jāhiliyyah by Sayyid Qutb in the context
of Saint Augustine’s thought 92
Peter Schallenberg
The requirement of the state. About the legacy
of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde 108
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Miscellanea
Sławomir Sowiński
Creative tension between religion and politics, and espistemological
temptations to reduce it on the basis of political science 120
Tamás Nyirkos
Secular religions and the religious/secular divide 143
Jarosław Macała
Religion as an element of geopolitical research 155
Jerzy Ciechański
“Progress” and the Church in the Context of Human Rights:
A Council of Europe Experience 170
Rosita Garškaitė
Catholicism and the Support for European Integration:
A Critique of the Methodological Underpinnings 191
Laura Chamberland and Hernan Tesler-Mabé

Horrific Pasts and Mundane Presents: Living among the Jewish
Ghosts of Warsaw and Lublin 200
Aniela Dylus
Subsidiarity in the conceptual framework of a social market economy 214
Dominique Vermersch
The Catholic university faced with the challenge of the waste of reason 229
Wojciech Roszkowski
The beginnings of the Catholic Church in the English colonies
in North America 236
Reviews and discussions

Maria Szymborska
Sprawozdanie z seminarium naukowego. Jak uchwycić racjonalnie to,
co nieracjonalne? 251
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Edward Balawajder
Recenzja książki: Stefan Wyszyński, Chrześcijańska doktryna społeczna.
Redakcja: Marek Wódka, Stanisław Fel, Wydawnictwo KUL,
Lublin 2020, ss. 201. 256
Mariusz Sulkowski
O islamie w perspektywie apologetycznej.
Recenzja książki Abbé Guy Pagès pt. Prawdziwe oblicze islamu,
tł. P. Włodyga OSB, Wydawnictwo AA, Kraków 2020, ss. 528. 262
Biographical note 266
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Migration policy
and human rights
10 . 2 16 9 7/ C S P. 2 0 2 1. 2 5 .1. 0 1
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Ewelina U. Ochab
University of Kent, UK
ORCID: 0000-0001-7930-7598
Christian Minorities Returning

to Their Homes in Post-Daesh Iraq
– Challenges to The Right to Return
Abstract: The Daesh reign began to come to an end when the Global Coalition
against Daesh launched a successful campaign. After the liberation of many parts
of the Nineveh Plains in late 2016, some communities indigenous to the region
expressed their wish to return to their homes. And indeed, these communities
have the right to do so. However, this right to return may not mean anything
if the numerous challenges facing their situation in the area are not effectively
addressed. The paper discusses some of the practicalities of the right to return
and scrutinises the main challenges faced by religious minorities preventing
them from exercising their right to return. Firstly, the paper considers the law
and policy pertaining to the right to return, looking at the international and
domestic standards. Secondly, the paper explores the several challenges that the
returnees have been facing and that may prevent them from returning unless
they are adequately addressed, including the issue of reconstruction, security,
and justice. The paper considers the case of Christian minorities in Iraq only,
although many of the challenges discussed here will be shared by other religious
minorities wishing to return to their homes after conflict-related displacement.
Keywords: Islamic State, human rights, Nineveh Plain, refugees, internally
displaced persons
Abstrakt: Rządy Państwa Islamskiego zaczęły się kończyć, gdy Globalna Koalicja
przeciwko Państwu Islamskiemu rozpoczęła udaną kampanię. Po wyzwoleniu
wielu części równin Niniwy pod koniec 2016 r. niektóre rdzenne społeczności
regionu wyraziły chęć powrotu do swoich. To prawo do powrotu może jednak nic
nie znaczyć, jeśli kilka wyzwań związanych z ich sytuacją w regionie nie zostanie
skutecznie rozwiązanych. Artykuł omawia niektóre z praktycznych aspektów
i analizuje główne wyzwania, przed którymi stoją mniejszości religijne, uniemoż-
liwiając im skorzystanie z prawa do powrotu. Po pierwsze, w artykule rozważono
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prawo i politykę dotyczącą możliwości powrotu, uwzględniając międzynarodowe

i krajowe standardy. Po drugie, w dokumencie przeanalizowano kilka wyzwań,
przed którymi stanęli powracający, które mogą uniemożliwić im powrót, chyba
że problemy zostaną odpowiednio rozwiązane, w tym m.in. kwestia odbudowy,
bezpieczeństwa i sprawiedliwości. W artykule analizuje się przypadek mniejszości
chrześcijańskich tylko w Iraku, jednak wiele omawianych tu wyzwań zostanie
podzielonych przez inne mniejszości religijne, które chcą wrócić do swoich
domów po wysiedleniu w wyniku konfliktu.
Słowa kluczowe: Państwo Islamskie, prawa człowieka, Równina Niniwy, uchodź-
cy, uchodźcy wewnętrzni
Introduction
In 2014, Daesh (also known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISL, IS) began to establish
a self-proclaimed caliphate in many parts of Syria and Iraq. In order to establish
a purely “Islamic state”, Daesh unleashed a campaign of terror against religious
minorities in the area [UN Human Rights Council 2016]. One of the regions that
Daesh managed to conquer in August 2014 was the predominately Christians
region of the Nineveh Plains in Iraq, having forced thousands of Christians to
flee overnight. Indeed, as Daesh was invading the Nineveh Plains, over 120,000
people were forcibly displaced, predominately to neighbouring Kurdistan. Many
of them have subsequently travelled to other countries in pursuit of a safe haven.
Daesh maintained its grip over the area for two years. During that time, Daesh
plundered houses, churches, shops, and destroyed the infrastructure in the region.
The patterns of destruction, and especially the targeted attacks on churches and
places of worship, sent a very clear message that Daesh wanted to destroy every
sign of Christians and Christianity ever being present in the area. Daesh did not
leave any stone unturned, destroyed crosses and statutes of Holy Mary, burned
Bibles and other religious books, set churches on fire, desecrated graveyards and
anything that Christians considered of religious significance.
However, the Daesh reign began to come to an end when the Global Coalition
against Daesh launched a successful campaign against them and recovered signifi-
cant parts of the region. After the liberation of many parts of the Nineveh Plains
in late 2016, some communities indigenous to the region expressed their wish to
return to their homes [Nineveh Plains Reconstruction Committee 2017]. And
indeed, these communities have the right to do so. However, this right to return
may not mean anything if the numerous challenges facing their situation in the
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area are not effectively addressed. The paper discusses some of the practicalities of
the right to return and scrutinises the main challenges faced by religious minorities
preventing them from exercising their right to return. Firstly, the paper considers
the law and policy pertaining to the right to return, looking at the international
and domestic standards. Secondly, the paper explores the several challenges that
the returnees have been facing and that may prevent them from returning unless
they are adequately addressed, including the issue of reconstruction, security, and
justice. The paper considers the case of Christian minorities in Iraq only, although
many of the challenges discussed here will be shared by other religious minorities
wishing to return to their homes after conflict-related displacement.
1. The Right to Return

The right to return is protected under international and domestic laws [Hannum
1987; Vasak, Liskofsky 1976]. The rationale behind it is to ensure that people can
return to their countries and/or homes after the conflict that forced them to flee
has ceased. Under international human rights law, the right to return is protected
in two main human rights treaties, in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR)1 and Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)2, both of which are binding upon Iraq. While the
international human rights provisions recognise the right of an individual outside
their national territory to return to their country, there are two main issues that
need to be considered here. Firstly, this may not cover the individuals who are
displaced internally (IDPs), and secondly, the right to return does not refer to
groups but individuals only.
Concerning the issue whether the international human rights provisions provide
IDPs with the right to return, Kälin claims that:
there is no general rule in present human right law that explicitly affirms
the right of internally displaced persons to return to their original place
of residence or to move to another safe place of their choice within their
own country. However, such a right can be deduced from the right
to the liberty of movement and the right to choose one’s residence as
1
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country.”
2
ICCPR indicates: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”
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embodied in Article 12 ICCPR, which, however, can be limited under

certain conditions (see Article 12(3) ICCPR) [Kälin 2008: 126].
However, others such as Leckie, take a more inclusive approach and suggest that
the right to return within these provisions is to be understood not only as a right
to return after crossing the borders of one’s country (for example, refugees) but
should also benefit the IDPs as well [Leckie 2005: 3]. Furthermore, international
humanitarian law follows such a broader approach. For example, Article 49 of
the Geneva Convention IV, while prohibits deportations and forcible transfers of
populations, recognises that in the cases of evacuations, those evacuated “shall
be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question
have ceased.”
The right to return under international human rights law is the right to be asserted
by individuals and not groups. Indeed, Jagerskiold suggests that the right to return
in Article 12(4) “does not deal with those issues and cannot be invoked to support
a right to ‘return’. These claims will require international political solutions on
a large scale” [ibid.]. Similarly, Hannum claims that “the expulsion or flight of large
numbers of persons from disputed territory is more appropriately viewed as an
issue related to self-determination or national sovereignty, rather than forced into
the constraints of the much more narrow question of whether or not there exists
a right of entry or return” [Hannum 1987: 59]. Indeed, in cases like those internally
displaced by Daesh, such a “significant population displacement… must be resolved
as a matter of group rather than individual rights” [Rosand 1998]. Furthermore, the
international humanitarian law recognises that “displaced persons have a right to
voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as
the reasons for their displacement cease to exist” Rule 132].
This right to return is also protected under Iraqi domestic law – for example, in
Article 44 of the Iraqi Constitution [2005], which states that: “1. Each Iraqi has
freedom of movement, travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq; 2. No Iraqi
may be exiled, displaced, or deprived from returning to the homeland.”
Despite the above discussed provisions, it is crucial to recognise that having the
right to return does not equate to being able to return. Indeed, in a post-conflict
situation, there may be several challenges that prevent individuals from exercising
their right to return. As the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs.
Sadako Ogata [1993], has stated:
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refugees have fled their homes and their homelands for compelling
reasons, which include violence and human rights abuses. For them to
return home safely and voluntarily, there must be a significant change
in the conditions which caused their flight…. Assuring these requires
a comprehensive approach that addresses the political, security, human
rights, humanitarian and development aspects of the problem.
Such steps are crucial as the right to return is paramount to human dignity. The
desire to return home is considered to be “innate in human nature to yearn to be
back home” [Nsereko 1981].
In order to assist in turning the right to return, including of the IDPs, into
a meaningful one, the UN produced several guidance documents to assist with
this arduous task, including two documents focused specifically on the IDPS,
namely, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (the Guiding Principle)
and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for
Internally Displaced Persons (the IASC Framework).
The Guiding Principles [GP]3 is a document that complies and reaffirms the human
rights and humanitarian legal provisions that are relevant to IDPs. Despite not
being legally binding, it is authoritative and has gained international recognition
and acceptance [Cohen 2004: 459-480]. Among others, the Guiding Principles
identify the principles relating to return, resettlement and reintegration. Principle
28 established the main preconditions on durable solutions for IDPs including,
placing the “primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as
provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily,
in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to
resettle voluntarily in another part of the country” [GP 28.1].
The second relevant document, the IASC Framework was produced after the
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons launched an in-depth study and consultation into the needs
of IDPs. The IASC Framework identifies rights-based principles and processes
needed to provide a durable solution to internal displacement. Among others, the
IASC Framework [2010: A4] recognises several criteria as identifications of durable
solutions, including, long-term safety, security and freedom of movement, access
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

3
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to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide
them with compensation, but also an adequate standard of living, including access
to adequate food, water, housing, health care, basic education, employment and
means of earning a living. Further indicators may include participation in public
affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population and effective
remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, repara-
tions and information about the causes of such violations [ibid.].
The IASC Framework emphasises that “exercising the right to choose a durable
solution requires that different options (return, local integration, resettlement
elsewhere) are available” [ibid.: 12].
The below analysis takes into consideration that some of the Iraqi Christians who
fled Daesh are to be considered as refugees and some as IDPs. Nonetheless, the
solutions sought should be able to address the challenges faced by them indepen-
dently of their legal status.
2. Addressing the Challenges Faced by Christian Minorities in Iraq

Ensuring that the communities can return to their homes post-conflict is
a massive project requiring substantial financial resources as well as requiring
changes to the legal and political climate. Indeed, ensuring that the right to return
is a meaningful one does not only involve the physical reconstruction of homes
and infrastructure but also, as identified in the previous section, ensuring safety
in the fragile post-conflict environment, combating impunity for the atrocities
and strengthening the protection afforded to those targeted. These aspects require
further consideration. In this section, I explain the challenges faced by Christian
minorities and that ultimately affect their right to return, and try to answer the
question of what needs to be done to ensure that religious minorities can return
to their homes and preserve their future in the region.
2.1. The Issue of Property Restitution and Reconstruction

In order to be able to return to their homes, the refugees or IDPs would have to be
able to re-gain access to (and sometimes also ownership over) their homes and land
[Leckie 2007]. This is complicated by the fact that the homes were destroyed by
Daesh during their reign in the Nineveh Plains. Indeed, a 2017 report by Aid to the
Church in Need, a pontifical organisation providing assistance to the persecuted
Church around the world, estimated the cost of rebuilding the destroyed houses
in nine villages in the Nineveh Plains in excess of $200 million Nineveh Plains
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Reconstruction Committee 2017]. The assessment made by Aid to the Church

in Need and the Nineveh Reconstruction Committee identified that over 14,035
homes (including 1,040 totally destroyed, 3,292 burnt, 9,703 partially destroyed
homes), 363 churches and associated properties, and 140 public properties were
destroyed by Daesh and needed to be rebuilt [ibid.].
In order to ensure that the refugees or IDPs can return to their homes, their houses
need to be rebuilt. Despite the level of destruction in the area, reconstruction
commenced shortly after the area was liberated. In August [2019], the Nineveh
Reconstruction Committee reported that close to 55% (7,681) of all damaged
houses have been restored. It further reported that 46.54% (9,230) of families
have returned to the Nineveh Plains [ibid.]. The reported data suggests that the
progress is slow but steady. The reconstruction project has benefited greatly from
the assistance of organisations such as Aid to the Church in Needs as well as from
states that identified the reconstruction as a priority to preserve Christianity in
the region, including the US, Hungary and Poland. Nonetheless, the road toward
reconstruction is long. Furthermore, over the years, other issues have emerged that
affect the progress of reconstruction, including the issue of corruption.4 Indeed,
this was one of the reasons why the US changed its approach to providing financial
assistance to the region.
2.2. Long Term Safety and Security

In order to ensure that religious minorities may return to the region once plundered
by Daesh, the area must be safe and secure. Despite Iraqi Christian communities
returning to the region, security continues to constitute a serious challenge that
remains unaddressed and Daesh (and other similar groups) continue to pose
a threat.
Despite the fact that the Iraqi government announced that Daesh had been
defeated in Iraq [Government of Iraq 2017], the statement refers predominately
to the territorial victory over Daesh. Indeed, it is crucial to emphasise that there are
still some hotspots of Daesh fighters in Iraq. Furthermore, the territorial victory
over Daesh does not change the fact that the ideology that poised Daesh to commit
genocidal atrocities continues to rage on. Therefore, the issue of security remains
a hot topic that requires further attention.
See: [Rasche 2017].

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Apart from the threat posed by Daesh, the security in the area is significantly
affected by the ongoing dispute between Baghdad and Erbil. As long as the parties
continue to claim the so-called “disputed territories” that include the Nineveh
Plains, it will remain a fragile region at risk of falling victims of the dispute
[Christian Solidarity Worldwide 2017]. Indeed, October 2017 has seen this risk
materialise when the parties clashed outside of Teleskuf, Iraq, forcing Christians
who has returned to the village to flee again [ibid.].
One of the proposals to address the issue of security is to ensure that the area is
autonomous and protected by its own security apparatus, consisting of individuals
belonging to the minority groups living in the area [Adaktusson 2017]. Indeed,
religious minorities must have a say and stake in their own security. This is a crucial
consideration especially in light of the allegations of Peshmerga fighters, who were
meant to protect Yazidis, yet left them unprotected in Sinjar despite knowing that
Daesh was coming after them [UN Human Rights Council ONZ 2016: A / HRC /
32 / CRP.2]. Indeed, as per the Guiding Principle discussed above, “special efforts
should be made to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons in
the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration”
[GP 28.2].
2.3. Access to Justice

Furthermore, in order to provide a durable solution, the refugees and IDPs who
once had to flee for their lives from the sword of Daesh must see justice being done
during their lifetimes. In order to combat the growing atmosphere of impunity,
Daesh fighters and any other complicit actors must be brought to justice. This
means prosecuting the Daesh fighters for a litany of atrocities that they have
perpetrated or were complicit in, whether murder, torture, abuse, slavery, rape and
sexual abuse, forced displacement and much more, or for international crimes like
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. However, such prosecutions of
Daesh fighters continue to be rare and even the conducted prosecutions fall short
of ensuring justice for the victims.
It is considered that the Iraqi courts have been trying Daesh fighters. However,
reportedly, such prosecutions are conducted for terrorism-related offences only
and not for any other offences like murder, torture, rape, sexual violence, or inter-
national crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes). The trials are
further surrounded by controversy as they last for several minutes only, victims
are not involved or even asked for testimonies, and the Daesh fighters are handed
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death sentences [Coker, Hassan 2018]. And while the domestic prosecutions
cannot satisfy the due process requirement and ensure justice for the victims,
currently, there is no other viable options on the international level that could
assist with prosecutions.
Indeed, currently, there is no international tribunal that would have the jurisdic-
tion to prosecute the crimes of Daesh fighters in Iraq. Iraq is not a party to the
Rome Statute, and hence, the only permanent international tribunal in existence,
the International Criminal Court (ICC), does not have the mandate to engage. The
other methods of engaging the ICC, either by way of Iraq voluntarily accepting the
jurisdiction of the ICC [Rome Statute 12] or the UN Security Council referring the
situation in Iraq to the ICC [ibid.: 13 b)], are very unlikely at this stage. Another
option would be for the UN Security Council to establish an ad-hoc tribunal to
prosecute the perpetrators, as in the case of Bosnia [1993: ONZ S / RES / 827] or
Rwanda [1994: ONZ S / RES / 955]. While this option has not been taken yet, some
of the recent developments may suggest that such an ad-hoc tribunal could be
established in the future. Indeed, on 21 September 2017, the UN Security Council
unanimously passed a resolution establishing an investigative team to collect and
prepare the evidence of Daesh atrocities for future prosecutions [2017: ONZ S /
RES / 2379]. The new mechanism resembles the bodies established by the UN
Security Council in the cases of Bosnia Bośni [1992: ONZ S / RES / 780 (1992), 2]
or Rwanda [1994: ONZ S / RES / 935] to collect and analyse the evidence of the
atrocities perpetrated there. The next logical step would be for the UN Security
Council to establish an ad-hoc tribunal, and so mirror the approach taken in
relation to the crimes perpetrated in Bosnia or Rwanda. As more states are looking
into the option of establishing an international tribunal to prosecute Daesh fight-
ers, this option remains open.
2.4. Protecting the Rights of Minorities

Lastly, in order to guarantee the future of minorities in the region, it is crucial that
their rights are comprehensively protected in law and adequately implemented
and enforced. Unfortunately, this is not the case and minorities continue to face
several legal challenges that do not give much hope for their future in Iraq. Some
of these challenges pre-date the Daesh genocidal campaign.
Indeed, it is crucial to recognise that religious minorities have faced discrimina-

tion and persecution for years before the Daesh established its presence in the
Middle East. Such acts have been widely reported after the fall of Saddam Hussein
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and only increased in frequency over the subsequent years. Because of the long-
standing discrimination and persecution of religious minorities, it is crucial to
ensure that religious minorities are adequately protected under the law, and in
accordance with the minimum standards under international law, as per Article
18 of the UDHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, minorities should
benefit from the protections enshrined in Article 27 of the ICCPR. The law must
accommodate these protections adequately.
However, and equally, more needs to be done to ensure that the protections are
then implemented and enforced. In order to do so, Iraq may need to introduce
new oversight mechanisms that would help to monitor the situation, identify the
red-flags and respond to prevent the situation from escalating. Furthermore,
Iraq could follow in the footsteps of other states and introduce a new mechanism
of a special rapporteurs or special advisors on freedom of religion or belief. Its
mandate could incorporate monitoring the situation in Iraq and working with
international partners on sustainable change. Ensuring better protection of the
rights of religious minorities in Iraq, and their affective implementation and
enforcement, is a needed step to preserve Christianity (and other religious minori-
ties) in the region.
Conclusions
Iraqi Christians have a right to return to their homes in the Nineveh Plains.
However, this right does not mean much without decisive steps translating this
right into reality, as discussed in this paper. The steps ranging from reconstruction
to security measures, from justice to improving protections to minority religious
groups are closely linked and interrelated. Failure to address any of the steps
may mean the collapse of the whole project. Unity of purpose and commitment
to comprehensive strategies are required to preserve the persecuted groups, like
Christians and other religious communities now standing on the verge of annihi-
lation after Daesh’s genocidal campaign.
The steps explored in this paper are the minimum that needs to happen to ensure
that religious minorities may return to the Nineveh Plains and be able to stay.
However, there are several other approaches that may need to be considered to
ensure a durable solution to the enforced displacement that they suffered.
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CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Rev. Bruno-Marie Duffe

Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development, Vatican City
To Receive the Other, to Receive God,

to Receive God in the Other.
A theological and ethical approach
to mutual hospitality
Abstract: The phenomenon of migration, becoming an increasingly frequent
experience of Europe and the world, is not only a purely political or social issue,
but for Christians it is also an important ethical and theological issue. The author
analyzes the ethical and theological aspects of migration, including the issue of
the right / duty of hospitality.
Keywords: Church, migration, integration
Abstrakt: Zjawisko migracji stając się coraz częstszym doświadczeniem Europy

i świata jest nie tylko kwestią czysto polityczną czy społeczną, ale dla chrześcijan
jest także istotnym zagadnieniem o charakterze etycznym i teologicznym. Autor
podejmuje analizę etycznych i teologicznych aspektów migracji, w tym także
kwestię prawa/obowiązku gościnności.
Słowa kluczowe: Kościół, migracja, integracja
Preliminary
If we consider the calls of the biblical Law, which is also the heart of the Gospel – to
offer a cult to God (first Commandment) and to respect the dignity of other men
(second Commandment) – this represents a great challenge for the Jews as well as
the Christian Community. Even if the common reference to Abraham, father of
the believers, who is a migrant, walking to the Promised Land, is central to our
memory… Even if the first human experience of Jesus, as a child, is as a migrant,
on the way from Egypt, in the first months of his human life… It is not sure that
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the spiritual and moral exercise to welcome the brother and the migrant is consid-
ered by all the Christian people as the acting expression of their faith. Hospitality
and love, offered to people in need, according to the principles of Mosaic Law,
the teaching of the prophets, the predication of Jesus-Christ, is today, as well as
in the past, a spiritual call for conversion. We can be touched by the Gospel and
meanwhile we can refuse another man who comes to us and disturbs our way of
life, like the friend we do not expect in the night [Luke 11, 5]… We can pray for
the protection of God our Father and keep closed our door to the migrants who
ask for protection. Now, in the first Letter of St John, we can read: He who pretends
to love God he does not see, and remains insensible to his brother in need, how can
Love could stay in him? [1 John, 3, 17].
The main theological assertion of this approach would be to say that we can assume
this appearing paradox between the love of God and the love of our brother, which
is never an antagonism between a spiritual and a human love, when we recognise
God in the other man, with his vulnerability. To receive is first to look at the other
man, woman, child or elder. It is a physical and spiritual experience in which one
concern engages another’s concern. Recognising God in the other, in the singular
experience of a mutual visitation and hospitality, opens the meaning of hospitality
itself. And we can remember the Gospel of St Matthew, chapter 25, in which we
find the three parables: the ten virgins, the talents and the last judgement. In this
“judgement”, the King identifies himself as the poor, the foreigner, the suffering
people and the prisoner: What you did for one of these brothers of mine, you did
it for me [Mat. 25, 40].
1. The Christian theological approach as a means for the social understanding

of hospitality and solidarity
How to think together, to receive and to believe, considering our common memory
and our contemporary social thinking and sensibilities?
If we start from our experience of meeting one another, we could propose that our
human experience of discovering cultural differences and our common humanity
opens us to understanding what we could call our co-humanity. This concept of
co-humanity suggests what Jesus himself experiments with, from his baptism –
this high symbolic act of his human solidarity and communion between divinity
and humanity. We could say that the experience of hospitality has its deep meaning
in our baptism: we are immersed together in the same water and we cross together
to the other side of the river, the side of justice and love where God is waiting for us.
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The first level of this invitation to theological research considers the various
concerns that constitute the experience of encounters with others and which make
a link between the reference of the alliance in Christ and the experience of mutual
consideration, in our context, today. The word “concern” is to be understood in
its physical and spiritual meaning. To offer our “concern” is really a fundamental
experience of alterity and co-presence. Actually we could propose that mutual
hospitality begins with the experience of looking at the other and offering each
other mutual concern.
In our Christian theology of creation, which is a memory and a celebration of

God’s concern for life and His creatures, we could say that the human being comes
to life with God’s concern. Concern and love which give reality to a human being
– man and woman – called everybody to reach God’s resemblance. We read, in
the patristic theology of the first centuries of Christianity, that God the Creator
looks, at the same time, at the man He calls to live and Jesus-Christ, his loved son,
who is the Saviour and the perfect man.
Our baptism in the human experience of concern, with the migrants and refugees,
leads us to solidarity and to sympathy, alliance and communion. This experience
is profound and sometimes difficult. And we can understand that some people
prefer to turn away their concern. For this experience of meeting and solidarity
everybody calls: “Do you believe?” and “If you believe, love and you will see…”
Of course we can say that we are often caught up in emergencies and this situation
pushes us to the front line of humanitarian action. We have so much to do. And
we realise that we have to learn all the jobs of human solidarity: to take care of the
bodies, to lead the children to school, to understand law, to offer accompaniment
in our administrations… All these actions concern charity and consideration of
the man who is in desolation. We are in this pass from de-solation (which means
“first out of the land”) to con-solation (“opens to mutual recognition”).
2. When Jesus approaches Bartimaeus

The experience of Jesus-Christ meeting suffering or excluded people is always
a dialogue. “What do you want? What can I do for you?” Jesus asks Bartimaeus
[Mark 10, 51]. This dialogue opens for everybody the possibility to try to express
his hope. But we can say that we have, with this dialogue, the theological paradigm
of alliance: the biblical and Christian alliance is a dialogue between God and
each person and this is the model of our social fraternity: to listen and to speak to
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the other – especially the man who is waiting for a message of consideration and
solidarity. Human solidarity – which is the consideration of the other as another
myself, equal and in need of help, as said Pope John-Paul II [John Paul II 1987:
39] – needs to be founded in shared concerns and words or promises. To receive
and to welcome is first to enter into a dialogue: to listen to a story of suffering and
death – war, night, trafficking, fear, running and looking for a new hope… To
listen to a broken story which is still a human one. To be listened to is already to be
recalled to life. Only concern and listening can insert the experience of welcome in
the double dimension of memory and hope and to prevent it from being reduced
to action and the organisation of action for the other. We know that humanitarian
action can exhaust all the actors of solidarity because such endeavour pushes the
whole person over their physical and psychological limits.
To listen and to consider makes a link between to receive and to gather, to discover
and to offer. The persons we receive and whose way we share are also in our mind
and in our prayers: we can call them by their names that we pronounce them in
front of God, our Father. To gather and to offer are the other side of to receive
and to welcome. We can say that this spiritual movement builds human memory.
3. Hospitality as a dialogue gives its complete signification to mutual hospitality.

When Abraham looks at the three men at the Oak of Mamre [Gen. 18], he experi-
ences meeting the unknown. He cannot give the name of these persons or this
person – for the text presents one or three persons: three men or my Lord.
When Abraham saw them, he run to meet them and he said: O Lord,
please, if I received your grace, do not go on your way without be received
by your servant. Let us bring water, you could wash your feet and have
a rest under the tree. I have going to take a piece of bread and you will
have strength to go on ; for it is the reason why you passed near you
servant… [Gen. 18, 3-5].
Abraham identifies these three unknown men as his Lord and takes care of them.
He does not know them as he cannot give a name to the country where his Lord
sends him to. But he goes there and without knowing the men, he receives them,
thinking that these men are God himself coming towards him. The hospitality
becomes a grace, given to him and he is honoured to have been chosen to receive
these visitors. To offer hospitality is an honour and he gives the best of his richness:
wheat flour and his youngest lamb. To receive appears as a call to give. And we
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could say that to offer means the joy to receive. So, hospitality is, for Abraham,
the experience of mutuality. At this point, we think of the golden rule which is
in the two testaments: Do to the others what you would have them do for you
[Matthew 7, 12].
The symbol of this mutual hospitality is to be seen in the promise of fertility in

the time coming: Next year, Sara, your wife, will have a son [Gen.18, 10]. In this
experience of mutual hospitality, the future is opened – once again – to the gift of
life. We think, at this point of our reflection, the great hope of the migrant people
to have a child and to invest in the future as a time of new possibilities.
We could say that we have the same perspective when we read about the visit of
the Prophet Elyah to the poor widow in Sarepta – in a time of drought and great
poverty. When the prophet asks the poor woman for a meal, he announces that
the flour and the oil never will run out until the day of grace that God promises
to the poor (anawim: those who have no wealth but only their faith and hope
in God).
4. Our God is never resigned and He calls us to use our reserves to care for life.
In the experience of exchange which is characteristic of mutual hospitality, we
can say that we are joined in God’s project to fulfil an alliance in, for and with
our humanity. And the call for hospitality shows our part of the responsibility in
this story/history of alliance, with God, with Jesus and between ourselves. The
challenge is not only to survive in crisis situations but to stay and to act in the
inspiration of the Beatitudes: You are happy, you, poor people… You are happy
when you fight for peace, justice and when you are persecuted for my Name… for
the kingdom is opened for you [Mat. 5, 1-11].
The two main references to reflect upon and connect the experience of welcome
and fraternal alliance – as a symbolic exchange – are the two moments of the
Passion of Jesus: when Jesus washes the feet of his disciples and when he breaks the
bread, offering it to his disciples: This is my body [John 13, 1 – 20; Mark 14, 22-25].
We remember a third text when Jesus calls his disciples to feed the hungry crowd:
Give them something to eat [Luke 9, 13]. After washing the feet of the disciples,
Jesus says: “Do you understand what I did: if I wash your feet, you have to wash
each other’s feet.” [John 13, 12-15]. This act is not only a purification or ritual but
a resurrectional experience: to take care of humanity and to open a new alliance
for the future, toward the coming time of God.
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“To receive and to give” is the memory of Christ, he who gave his life – his body
and his love – for the whole humanity and who calls his disciples to give their love
to whoever arrived last and whose feet are tied…
5. The experience of mutual hospitality founds and opens a community for

the future
The intuition of receiving the other, especially migrant people who must leave
land, family, brothers and friends, brings to mind the call to welcome the
Son of God in our human community. This experience founds and re-founds
the Church (as well as the social community) with these men and women,
children and elderly. Jesus Christ is in the experience of welcome, as a man who
needs to be recognised as the Son. The expression used by Jesus when he sent
his disciples: “He who welcomes you, welcomes me, and he who welcomes me
welcomes the one who sent me.” [Luke 9, 48], this expression can be understood
as a sense of mission but also as the meaning of the experience of migrant
people themselves. Something within meeting and mutual consideration
concerns the announcement and the Kingdom of God. We understand that the
problem of migration is not only a social and political question (organisation
or reorganisation of the social space) but a theological point: to offer dignity is
to announce communion in Christ: communion in which each human being
is a member of Christ.
We realise that we are called to link the three references: universal fraternity
in Christ, mission received from Christ and communion already realised by
Christ.
It becomes clear, when we share the way with migrant people that the “challenge”
is to believe with them and to believe in one another, as God believes in us and
in each person. And this mutual consideration, as members of a Body, leads us
to devote our life. “We would like to give you our own life, because you became so
dear to us” [1 Thess. 2, 8].
Il we found a pastoral theology on the principle of dignity, we keep memory of the

concern of God on all his creatures. Founding our moral and social theology on
dignity, we make a link between creation, salvation and love of our brother. And
we active the community life to the future. For it cannot exist a pastoral thinking
without hope and if we reduce social and pastoral thinking only in the action can
lead us to exhaustion – and perhaps to distrust.
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6. Human rights as common duties

In the Encyclical “Pacem in terris”, in 1963, John XXIII wrote than the respect of
human rights has an effect for the person who is respected; this respect creates
in the person an obligation to respect the rights of the other(s). And the text
continues, saying:
“When the rules of the collective life are expressed in rights and duties,
people open their heart to spiritual values; they understand what is truth,
justice, love and freedom; they realize that they belong to a community of
this order. More, they are called to know God, in His Truth, Transcendence
and Unicity. So, the relationship with God appears as the foundation of
their life, personal and common life with the others.” [John XXIII 1963:
44-45].
7. Hope offered to the hopeless

In the third part of his “theological trilogy”, the title of which is “the Church in
the breath of the Spirit”, contemporary theologian Jürgen Moltmann sheds light
on the capacity of anticipation and hope which is inherent in giving one’s own life
and which is involved in the messianic mediation.
“In the Christian conception of the messianic mediation about time

coming, anticipation and resistance are united in the representation of
time coming and self giving. In the places where freedom is anticipated
in particular liberations, these liberations cannot be only justified if
there are liberations for the others, not as fight for personal interests.
It results that the particular anticipations about future (engagements,
solidarities, sharing) cannot be showed but only as self giving for the
future of the others. The real hope is an experience of giving for the
future of the hopeless people. The anticipation of freedom is acted in
the liberation of the oppressed people. Faith is offered in the love of the
poor people…” [Moltmann 1980: ch. 4, n. 5].
Actualisation
The four verbs that Pope Francis uses in his message for Peace Day (1 January
2018), invite us to rise to the challenge of mutual hospitality in the context of
the current migrations. These four verbs: to receive, to protect, to promote, to
integrate paint an active picture of mutual responsibility and lead us to reflect
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upon the circumstances of a human community, in our modern (post-modern?)

world [Francis 2018].
To receive is to consider the existence of the other and his own particular story
and history. It consists, in the same time, in re-thinking the capacities of human
community, for the present and future. The question is to take care of life and
take care of “life-together”. Finally, to receive is to open new opportunities for
discovering and meeting. The condition of receiving is to overcome our fear in
face of whom we do not know. In our perspective of mutual hospitality, to receive
must be conjugated in the mode of reciprocity: we receive one another, with our
experience, culture, memory and faith.
To protect is to consider the other as a member of our family, as a member of

the same social and spiritual body. As a member of a dialogue group in Israël-
Palestine said: “When we shall understand that, protecting the other, we protect
ourselves, we shall be on the way of peace”. To protect is to make reference to
human rights which are – as we said – human duties between generations, today
and tomorrow. We know that we need the engagement of the others to be protected
ourselves.
To promote is to encourage, to open the possibilities and to trust the capacities of

everybody. We know that if we do not hope for and with the other and if we do not
expect much from this person, we remain in bad feeling and in bad consideration.
Mutual encouragement says that everybody has a message for the community; this
message is unique and it brings something that we have never heard.
To integrate is to recognise that the other who came and asked for hospitality is
a member of our human community, a member of Christ’s body. To integrate is
not to refuse or to deny cultural, religious or spiritual specificities. It is to offer one
another our talents and experiences. Reciprocity finds here its greatest meaning:
to integrate opens to liberation and reconciliation, in our particular community
and in the universal community.
Here is the challenge of the new Alliance in Jesus-Christ in our history: a mutual
hospitality which is the experience of receiving one another and becoming
a community in Christ.
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Bibliography
Francis (2018), Message for Peace Day 2018, http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco /
en/messages/peace/documents/papa-francesco_20171113_messaggio-51giornat
amondiale-pace2018.html 03.06.2020.
John XXIII (1963), Encyclical Pacem in terris, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/
en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html 02.06.2020.
John Paul II (1987), Encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis, http://www.vatican.va/content/
john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-
socialis.html 01.06.2020.
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Ecclesiology, SCM, London.
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CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Gérard-François Dumont
Sorbonne University, France
ORCID: 0000-0002-0256-2619
Germany. Geopolitics of Migration:

The Chancellor Merkel’s Tragedy in Five Acts
Abstract: This article describes the German approach to the migration crisis that
has been going on in Europe for several years in terms of the policy pursued by
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This policy has been described as a tragedy
consisting of five acts. The ineffectiveness of politics in relations with Turkey and
the failure of German society to adapt to the phenomenon of illegal immigra-
tion as a permanent state of violation of the applicable law to which Germany is
attached were presented in a particular way.
Keywords: Angela Merkel, Germany, migration, migration policy, Turkey
Abstrakt: Niniejszy artykuł opisuje niemieckie podejście do kryzysu migracyj-

nego, trwającego od kilku lat w Europie pod kątem polityki prowadzonej przez
niemiecką kanclerz Angelę Merkel. Niniejsza polityka została opisana jako
tragedia składająca się z pięciu aktów. W sposób szczególny została ukazana
nieudolność polityki w relacjach z Turcją oraz nieprzystosowanie się niemieckie-
go społeczeństwa do zjawiska nielegalnej imigracji jako pernamentnego stanu
łamiania obowiązującego prawa do którego Niemcy są przywiązani.
Słowa kluczowe: Angela Merkel, migracja, Niemcy, polityka migracyjna, Turcja
International migration occurs whenever people change their state of residence.

Their explanatory factors are of different nature: political, religious, economic or
demographic. In the context of the 21st century, complementary causal elements
are at work under the effects of internationalisation and globalisation1.
On the factors and concepts of international migration, cf. [Dumont 2018].

1
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Today, as in the past, international migration has multiple effects, including on the
internal geopolitics of the countries where immigrants arrive. Indeed, Germany’s2
migration policy has been affected by the migration flows of 2015. Previously,
Chancellor Angela Merkel, in office since 22 November 2005, seemed to be unsink-
able. Then her image among Germans collapsed, as proved her electoral failures
in 2017-2018 and then her decision on 29 October 2018 to resign as president of
her political party and the announcement that she would not stand in Germany’s
next elections nor seek to renew her mandate as chancellor in 2021. In order to
understand this turnaround, which was unforeseeable in 2015 according to the
media, it is necessary to describe the five acts of what we can call “the tragedy of
Chancellor Merkel”.
Act One: Weak signals

Any geopolitical analysis must consider what is known in future-oriented studies
as “weak signals”, i.e. minor events, perceived as petty or unimportant, and yet
likely to exert a significant influence in the long term. Germany has experienced
two weak signals, the first one due to the refusal to be seen, the second one due to
a poor geopolitical analysis of the Middle East.
The first weak signal, which certainly predates Chancellor Merkel, since her begin-
nings date back to the 1970s, is what I have called a “demographic winter”, i.e.
the total fertility rate in Germany has fallen significantly and lastingly below the
replacement level fertility3. As early as the 1980s, i.e. before German reunification,
it was foreseeable that Germany’s working population would decline because, even
if the employment rate were to improve, for example by raising the retirement age,
the birth deficit would be too great to halt this foreseeable decline.
The data of this weak signal is well documented. Indeed, Germany (FRG + GDR),
which had well over a million births in the 1960s, and even over 1.3 million in
some years, had fewer than 800,000 births in 1975 and 1976. Although the number
of births rose to 900,000 in 1990, it fell back to less than 700,000 in 2005, the year
in which Ms. Merkel became Chancellor, to less than 700,000 in 2013, i.e. at its
2
The author warmly thanks Mr Henri Reynaud, former French ambassador, for his precious
advice.
3
The fertility rate necessary for women in one generation to be replaced in the next genera-
tion, i.e. about 30 years later; as a result, a hundred women are replaced by a similar number
of a hundred women. The threshold for the replacement level fertility is 2.1 children per
woman in countries with high levels of health and hygiene.
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lowest level since the Second World War. The intensity of Germany’s demographic
winter is such that, every year since 1972, the country has recorded more deaths
than births, with, in most cases, large discrepancies of more than 100,000. In years
when the net migration is not high enough to compensate for the excess of deaths
over births, Germany’s population declines compared to the previous year. This
was the case before German reunification from 1975 to 1979, from 1983 to 1986,
and then from 2004 to 2011. Most German political leaders do not attach adequate
importance to this weak signal data. Although Chancellor Merkel supported the
efforts of Ursula von der Leyen, who served as Federal Minister for Family Affairs,
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth from November 2005 to November 2009, this
issue is not sufficiently high on the agenda.
It is true that, after the end of the Iron Curtain in 1989, Germany welcomed
hundreds of thousands of “late resettlers”4 (Spätaussiedler) into its workforce.
Then, from 2008 onwards, the crisis that hit Spain and Greece in particular saw
the arrival of replacement immigration from these countries, thus offsetting the
German sub-replacement fertility that had occurred in previous decades.
However, the sustained low birth rate is a weak signal because it heralds, ceteris
paribus, a considerable need for immigration in order to halt the decline in the
working population and thus to sustain the German economy; it is true that this
economy outsources certain tasks, particularly to the countries of Central Europe
or elsewhere, but this is only part of the solution.
In Germany, Alfred Sauvy’s thought that indifference to demographic issues is

particularly distressing among politicians, in view of the responsibilities they take
upon themselves; Alfred Sauvy’s thoughts in this matter are summarised thus by
his daughter: “Demography is a very simple science which consists in anticipating
that children aged twelve will be twenty, eight years later. But the obvious character
of this calculation rarely interests politicians, whose horizon is often limited to the
next Election Day, rather than the future, and to the popularity of their decisions
rather than their consequences” [Sauvy-Wilkinson 1999: 2].
Another weak signal will come in 2011, when Ms. Merkel already has six years of
experience as a chancellor. An armed geopolitical conflict begins in Syria, at the
4
I.e. persons considered to be of German descent under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany of 1949, but previously living in the USSR.
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time of what has been called the “Arab Spring”. Even if it has internal causes, it is
largely fuelled by external powers, something that European countries refuse to
admit, since they seem to see in Syria’s geopolitics merely the same factors5 that led
to the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia or Mubarak in Egypt. The German government,
like that of other European countries, is convinced that the regime of Bashar
el-Assad will be quickly overthrown. Therefore, to follow what it believes to be the
meaning of history, from 2011, the European Union will issue the first sanctions
against Syria, in the name of ideological principles6 that are far removed from
the realities on the ground and quite close, without admitting it, to the American
neo-conservative school that was blamed for the intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Chancellor Merkel is obviously not the only one responsible for the attitude of
the European Union. But she was involved in this insufficient recognition of
the importance of the rise of the “Islamic State”, which was neither rapid nor
unforeseen [Dumont 2015a], as well as in the Western incomprehension of the
geopolitical characteristics of Syria.
In February 2012, while the United States has already closed its embassy in
Syria, several European countries, namely Belgium and the United Kingdom,
followed by Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, recalled their ambassadors
to Damascus for “consultations” and prepared a new set of European sanctions
against this country governed by Bashar al-Assad. As for Germany, it announced
that it did not intend “for the moment” to fill its vacant post of ambassador to
Syria. A “moment” that has lasted ever since, as the website of the embassy, more
than six years later, still displays “Temporarily closed”7. It should be noted that no
similar measures have been decided in the many other countries whose political
regime is also authoritarian. In March 2012, France closes its embassy in the belief
that it will be able to return within a fortnight since it considers that the regime
of Bashar al-Assad should be quickly replaced [Dumont 2016a: 117-120]. And
Germany seems to remain inert vis-à-vis Turkey which contributes to the violence
in Syria by greatly facilitating the arrival of jihadists recruited from Europe and,
more generally, the jihadist activities on the financial and military level and as
regards the medical care for Islamist fighters.
5
This is by no means the case; cf. [Dumont 2012].
6
The same principles also explain the military intervention in Libya from March to October
2011.
7
Precisely Temporarily closed, cf. [https://www.embassypages.com/ambassade1156/
08.11.2018]. On the other hand, the Czech Republic and Romania have kept their embassies
in Damascus open.
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However, these different positions, far from facilitating peace, contribute to the
destabilisation of Syrian territories, which could only lead to a massive exodus of
its population. Thus the two weak signals that were not observed were the certainty
that Germany was going to experience labour shortage and that participating,
even indirectly, in stirring up violence in the Middle East could only lead to an
exodus from the territories concerned, and therefore to a forced emigration, not
a freely chosen one.
Act Two: Syrian despair and geopolitical exploitation by Turkey

Indeed, throughout the years 2011-2016, armed violence will be stirred up, at least
periodically, in Syria by many foreign players. Even if Germany is far from being
among the most intrusive countries involved in the conflict, it is contributing
to it by its own decisions, marked by a certain emulation of the French foreign
policy led by Laurent Fabius8, or by the decisions in which it participates within
the European Union. As a result, Syria is experiencing a migratory outflow which,
from 2011 to 2016, affected around a third of its population, not including a second
third of IDPs. Syrian civilians, in order to ensure their survival, flee the country
to the nearest territories where their safety can be guaranteed: Jordan, Lebanon
and Turkey. Most remain close to the Syrian border as they hope for a quick end
to the conflict that would allow them to return home. Others, or the same ones,
also remain in this geographical proximity so that they can periodically travel to
Syria to see their family or friends who have remained in the country or to check
on the state of their property or land in their country.
However, many of these exiles are driven to despair, to no longer believe in the
possibility of a peaceful life in the Middle East in a context where a multiplicity
[Dumont 2015b] of military actors are active, actors who do not seem very willing
to stop fighting, especially since they benefit from significant support, direct or
indirect, from foreign powers. In addition, there is an entity created in 2006 in
Iraq which slipped into Syria to spread its violent Islamist ideology, i.e. the “Islamic
State” [Dumont 2015a]. So there is a tangle of local violence, regional implications
and actors from beyond the Middle East who take part in all that. The conflict
also appears to be global because the “Islamic state” recruits, in the name of its
ideology, all over the world.
8
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic from
May 2012 to February 2016.
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In 2015, the despair of Syrians is exacerbated by the Palmyra affair. Certainly,

on 20 August 2014, US President Barack Obama made a speech calling for the
eradication of the “Islamic state”, which he likened to a “cancer”, and organised
the global coalition to defeat ISIS.
However, despite its failure in Kobané taken over by YPG (People’s Protection
Units composed essentially of Syrian Kurdish groups) at the end of January 2015,
the “Islamic State” continued to progress in Syria, managing to conquer Palmyra.
Some of its troops went even as far as the south of Damascus. Thus, in May 2015,
the Syrians can only conclude that no force within the coalition prevented the
“Islamic State” from directing its troops towards Palmyra, whereas it would have
been easy to bombard them during the hundreds of kilometres of desert they
crossed. Was it negligence or intentional wrongdoing? No one knows. But, for the
Syrians, the conclusion of this new drama is bitter: if the international community
has allowed the “Islamic State” to advance as far as Palmyra, the day when other
Syrian cities, even Damascus, will be under military pressure from the “Islamic
State” which, it should be remembered, resorts to suicide bombers, no one will
come to their rescue. The conquest of Palmyra therefore has a fundamental impact,
even if the media mainly focus on the cultural heritage of Palmyra. For there were
civilians in Palmyra. Some were murdered by the representatives of the “Islamic
State”, sometimes in abominable conditions, such as the beheading on 18 August
2015 of the former director of Palmyra’s Antiquities, Khaled al-Assad, a world-
renowned archaeologist and expert on the ancient world. Thus, in the 2014-2015
period, not only has the “Islamic State” not been fought in a “relentless” manner,
but it has not even been truly contained.
For Syrians who are in Syria (at home or internally displaced) or already in
a country of first refuge, Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey, the message is clear: the
hope of being able to return home in the short term is dwindling.
In this context, Turkey, despite receiving substantial subsidies from the European
Union as a country with official candidate status since 3 October 2005, wants the
EU countries to remain discreet about its support, at least indirect, for the “Islamic
State”, and for Islamists in general, or about the increasingly repressive nature of
its regime. Turkey therefore sees a way to put pressure on the EU by facilitating the
way for large numbers of migrants to Europe, which has been formulated several
times by the President of the Turkish Republic, in the context of the balance of
power between Turkey and the EU, a kind of threat that can be summarised as
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follows: “If the EU continues to be distrustful or even hostile towards Turkey, the
latter has a weapon at its disposal, the migratory tap” [Perouse 2018].. With this in
mind, the Turkish government lets smugglers with a turnover of billions of dollars
operate in broad daylight, for example in Izmir.
By using, especially in 2015, refugees as weapons [Dumont 2015b], i.e. as a means

of pressure on the European Union, Turkey becomes, according to the formulation
then used by the director of Frontex, a “motorway for migrants” [Le Monde 2016a].
Act Three; generosity or opportunity?

Over the years, in Germany, there have been regular requests in employers’ circles
for even more open doors for immigrants who can work. In 2015, Chancellor
Merkel is still very popular in Germany, but much less so in Europe. She there-
fore sees in the reception of migrants a double opportunity: to satisfy Germany’s
economic needs and to give herself an image of generosity contrary to the one left
after the euro crisis.
In the summer of 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel, invoking the humanitarian

emergency in Syria, announced that she would not close German borders to the
Syrian refugees, which will lead to a considerable increase in immigrants and
asylum seekers in particular. Precisely, on 29 August 2015, she asks the Germans
to trust her by declaring: “Wir schaffen das!” (We will succeed!) [in welcoming
hundreds of thousands of immigrants]. On 5 September 2015, a historic declaration
by the German government announces the opening of borders and the reception
of asylum seekers blocked in Hungary, which is equivalent to the suspension of the
Dublin regulation which assigns responsibility for processing asylum applications
to the first European country the asylum seeker has entered.
In particular, given the unilateral nature of this decision, taken without any
consultation or even without informing its European partners who participate in
two common organisations, the EU and Schengen [Dumont, Verluise 2016], no
other European country, not even France, is following suit. As the other European
countries are not following in Germany’s wake, Merkel’s open-border policy
brought pressure over Germany, and more particularly over the Länder closest to
Austria and therefore Hungary, i.e. the countries where the Balkan route9 leads.
9
The Balkan route actually covers several roads, for example from Istanbul to Sofia in
Bulgaria, or from Turkey to Greece to reach, via the Balkans, Belgrade, then Budapest or
Ljubljana and the other countries of the European Union.
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Following the decision of 5 September, the already significant number of daily

arrivals is increasing to several thousand per day. However, the Chancellor presents
the events as a temporary and exceptional phenomenon.
Underneath the generosity displayed and praised by the media, the motives are
more prosaic: finding labour force for the German economy as fewer genera-
tions reach working age due to the sub-replacement fertility resulting from the
“European demographic winter”; taking into account the fact that it was becoming
extremely difficult to apply the Dublin regulation, i.e. to implement the procedures
for sending immigrants back to their first country of entry, given the large number
of migrants. However, in September 2015, many pundits and politicians consider
that Germany “saved Europe’s honour” and is therefore Europe’s moral conscience.
But where are the morals when you have one part of the responsibility for the fact
that people are living in a situation of desperation which forces them to leave their
country, and another part of the responsibility for the fact that these same people
are exploited by smugglers10. For it is not a question of freely chosen emigration,
but of emigration that is essentially forced.
Chancellor Merkel’s call11 for open border migration policy is all the more striking
in that, as Germany no longer has diplomatic relations with Syria, it is impossible
for Germany to have the information that would enable it to easily detect the many
fake Syrian passports that can be bought and sold on the black market.
Between September 2015 and March 2016, the number of asylum applications in
Germany reached record levels. It had been particularly high (400,000) in 1992 as
a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and again reaching 150,000 in 1996;
10
Indeed, other solutions could have been implemented in the form of humanitarian visas
and/or temporary protection. In the words of the European Council Directive of 20 July
2001: temporary protection is “a procedure of an exceptional nature ensuring, in the event
of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who
are unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection for
such persons, in particular if the asylum system is also likely to be unable to cope with such
an influx without causing effects contrary to its proper functioning, in the interests of the
persons concerned and of other persons seeking protection”.
11
Admittedly, the opening of Germany’s borders is followed by a series of restrictions: on
13 September 2015, suspension of the Schengen agreements and reintroduction of controls
at the border with Austria; Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro are added to the list of “safe
countries of origin”; family reunification suspended for two years for holders of subsidiary
protection. But this does not cancel out the effects that have already been unleashed.
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then it reached a very low level in 2008 with 28,000 applications. The conflicts in
the Middle East, but also the difficulties in the Balkans, will see the number rise
to over 120,000 in 2013. Eurostat does not provide monthly figures, but the annual
figures speak for themselves: 476,510 asylum applications in 2015 and 745,155
in 2016, against 202,645 in 201412. Over the two years 2015-2016, the number of
first-time asylum seekers will therefore be well over one million, 1,221,665 to be
exact. Indeed, Syrians (or those presenting themselves as such) form the largest
flows of asylum seekers in Germany13, both in 2015 (36% according to Eurostat14
figures) and in 2016 (36% according to Eurostat15) and again in 2017 (25%16), i.e.
158,655 Syrian applicants in 2015; 266,250 in 2016 and 48,970 in 2017, respectively.
Act Four: an outflow but lasting impacts

Then, the massive influx of immigrants to Germany seems to be coming to an
end, as the number of asylum seekers will decrease sharply in 2017 (222,560)
and 2018.
This decrease in the number of asylum seekers is explained by three sets of

geopolitical developments that took place in 2016, only one of which is due to
Chancellor Merkel. The first one is the closure of the Balkan route. This decision,
taken on 24 February 2016 by interior ministers convened by Austria, was decided
outside EU bodies, independently of Germany, and contrary to statements
expressed by the European Commission. It will be applied as of March 2016 by
Austria, in consultation with the other countries brought together, i.e. Slovenia,
Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo.
This closure limits the entry of migrants into the European Union and makes
potential future migrants understand that they can no longer trust the smugglers
who were “selling” this Balkan route to them. Hungary, for its part, had decided
to apply the Schengen rules, which require all persons entering the European
Union to have identity documents allowing them to enter [Dumont 2016-2017].
In addition, Austria decided to restrict the entry of migrants to its territory to 80
asylum seekers per day and 3,200 people in transit. EU Member States Slovenia
and Croatia, as well as Serbia and Macedonia also announced quantitative limits
for migrants.
12
Figures from the Eurostat website [12.11.2018].
13
Compared to the population of the countries, Hungary and Sweden have a higher percentage.
14
Eurostat 44/2016 – 4 March 2016.
15
Eurostat 46/2017 – 16 March 2017.
16
Eurostat 47/2017 – 20 March 2018.
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The second reason for the drop in the number of asylum seekers is the agreement
negotiated by Chancellor Angela Merkel with Turkey and signed by the European
Union and Turkey on 18 March 2016. This agreement consists to pay the Turkish
government to abandon its geopolitical instrumentalisation of migrants, which it had
hitherto indulged in, in order to obtain advantages from the European Union. In this
balance of power, the European Union agreed to pay 6 billion euros to Turkey, grant-
ing the reopening of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union (which
means above all the maintenance of pre-accession funding which represents around
1 billion euros per year), promising to abolish visas for Turkish nationals wishing to
travel to Europe, and limiting the question of possible returns from Greece to Turkey
to a so-called “one for one” agreement limited to 72,000 people. This means that for
every Syrian sent back to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian would be
resettled from Turkey to the EU, up to a maximum of 72,000 people17.
From then on, the Turkish government changed its policy of turning its country
into a “motorway for migrants”; it decided to thwart the action of the smugglers
who systematically organised the sending of migrants to Europe. The very rapid
success of this operation confirms the extent to which this government was previ-
ously favourable to the actions of the smugglers.
The third major geopolitical event explaining this drop in the number of asylum
seekers in countries such as Germany or Sweden is the geopolitical evolution
within the Syrian conflict itself. The changes in the civil war situation in Syria
modify the Syrian refugee flows. Due to the regaining of control of various cities
by the government of Bashar al-Assad, the geographical perimeters of the Syrian
civil war shrank between the end of 2015 and 2016, as a result of the Russian
military intervention18, officially decided at the request of the Syrian government
from September 2015, and the acceleration of fighting led by the Syrian army, the
Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian troops. In the light of a good geopolitical analysis,
all this support – which greatly facilitated the task of territorial reconquest by the
army of Bashar el-Assad against various militarised groups supported by other
countries – was not unpredictable.
In 2016, the Syrian territories enjoying relative calm or even hope for a future calm
are more vast than in 2015. Syrian population can see that it is possible to stay in their
17
In practice, this part of the agreement has been very poorly implemented.
18
Without omitting the action of Russian diplomacy to limit or even to stop the sending of
arms and munitions by Turkey or Qatar to certain rebel groups.
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homes, with the decline in military violence and an ending civil war, and prefers
to stay in Syria rather than to flee abroad. Incentives to leave therefore diminished
between 2015 and 2016, and even more so in 2017 and 2018; some Syrian refugee
populations in Lebanon or Jordan are even considering returning to their country.
The case of Aleppo is, in this respect, revealing of this situation: the hope of stopping
rebel fire on Western Aleppo and the reconquest of Eastern Aleppo, then the concre-
tisation of this hope, with the end of the battle of Aleppo on 22 December 2016
signifying the end of clashes within the city, encouraged the populations first of all to
leave less, then others to return, despite the difficult living conditions within the city.
However, in Germany, the impact caused by the arrival, especially from September
2015 to March 2016, of such a large number of migrants in such a short period
of time is considerable. The problems that Germany is facing correspond to one
of the ten laws of population geopolitics that I have designated as the “law of
numbers” [Dumont 2007]: when the number of asylum seekers was not very differ-
ent from previous years, the planned procedures were implemented without major
difficulties. When the pressure of numbers becomes considerable, the nature of
the phenomenon changes and the situation becomes difficult to manage, even for
a country like Germany, which has accepted to receive many people presenting
themselves as asylum seekers and to finance the consequences.
Faced with the very high number of immigrant arrivals, some regions and munici-
palities are finding it difficult to organise the reception of newcomers. There are
long queues in front of first reception centres (Erstaufnahmezentren), temporary
camps and a lack of administrative services in several German localities. Germans
do organise themselves into reception committees, distribute food and clothing
and refer asylum seekers to the relevant administrations and language courses.
But the German authorities are apparently overwhelmed and have difficulty in
registering all asylum applications. And then the procedures lead to a backlog
of cases in the courts. Other observations include the difficulties of administra-
tions in simply registering and monitoring immigrants, the violence caused by
immigrants in Cologne on the night of 31 December 2015, the attacks19 in Berlin
19
According to a Hungarian intelligence note, “it has been established that more than ten
members of the terrorist cell responsible for the attacks committed in Paris on 13 November
2015 and in Brussels on 22 March 2016 stayed on or transited through the Hungary territory
between July and November 2015, taking advantage of the flow of migrants”; cf. « Comment
les terroristes se sont infiltrés en Europe » [How terrorists infiltrated Europe], [Le Monde
2016b].
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and elsewhere, not to mention the problems linked to integration of migrants

within the German society20.
At the end of 2015, former German President Gauck summed up the situation
as follows: “Many people are worried and wonder how Germany will be able to
remain open to refugees in the future, if thousands more people arrive on top of
those already here. Will we be overwhelmed one day? […] Will our prosperous and
stable country be pushed to a breaking point? […] Let me quote (a representative of
a municipality): “Professionals and volunteers have come to a standstill. Our backs
are against the wall. […] And remember that this is a statement from someone
who helps, who plays an active role, not from someone who looks passively and
complains. We want to help. We have big hearts. But our means are limited.”
Germany is a law-abiding society and is committed to respecting its legal system.

Some Germans find it difficult to accept that a significant proportion of the
620,000 asylum seekers whose applications were rejected in the period 2015-2017
have not all left Germany, and are therefore in an irregular situation and thus off
the administration’s radar. The departure of some of them, particularly Afghans,
to France, a country which grants asylum [Leschi 2018] more generously to these
nationals, does not, by any means, eliminate all situations of illegality.
Accordingly, the decline in asylum applications and immigration flows in

Germany in 2017 and 2018 compared to 2015 and 2016 does not mean the end of
questions in Germany about how migration flows have been managed, nor the
end of the consequences of these flows.
Act Five: the outcome: a dire atmosphere

The outcome is particularly clear when the German parliamentary elections of
September 2017 are approaching. According to a poll published in the daily Bild,
81% of Germans consider that Berlin, under the leadership of Chancellor Merkel,
has been too complacent with Turkey. It is true that, in addition to the asymmetri-
cal agreement of March 2016 mentioned above, Germany has silently accepted very
violent remarks from Erdogan or his ministers. Germany did not react to meetings
organised in Germany in favour of the AKP party, where Turkish officials made
20
Which can be objectively measured by the fact that Turks living in Germany (and in
Europe) – including a growing number of bi-nationals – vote much more frequently for
Erdogan’s AKP Islamic party than actually Turks living in Turkey.
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speeches that were very hostile to German values and very belligerent towards the
Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP).
As a result, the federal elections of September 2017 are marked by a sharp fall of
the Christian Democratic Party and the historic breakthrough of the AfD party
(Alternative für Deutschland), opposed to immigration with, according to the
results of the seats distributed proportionally in the Bundestag21, 12.64% of the
votes. As Heinrich August Winkler went on to write, “the entry of the AfD into the
Bundestag is a turning point in the history of Germany” [Winkler 2018]. 32.93%
of the votes go to the CDU/CSU compared to 41.54% in 2013. The centre-left
SPD, with 20.51% of the votes, is at its worst level since the Second World War,
compared to 25.73% in 2013. The FDP liberals return to the Bundestag and surpass
the 10.75% mark against 4.76% in 2013. The Greens increase their votes slightly,
with 8.94% against 8.45% in 2013. Finally, the radical left, Die Linke, is credited
with 9.24% against 8.59% in 2013. Angela Merkel, in order to remain chancellor,
obtained a majority in the Chamber of Deputies thanks to the formation, which
was very difficult to put in place, of a coalition with the SPD.
In the following months, the issue of immigration remained on the agenda. On

16 April 2018 an alleged anti-Semitic attack took place in Berlin. It was filmed by
a young non-Jewish Israeli Arab, wearing a yarmulke to gauge antisemitism in the
city. In the subjectively filmed footage, individuals attacked the young man with
a belt and shouted “Jew!”. The main alleged perpetrator, who turned himself in to
the police, is a young Syrian refugee who lived in a migrants’ centre near Berlin.
Chancellor Angela Merkel, interviewed on 22 April 2018 by the private Israeli

television channel Channel 10, is forced to reflect on the rise of antisemitism in
Germany and its causes: “We have a new phenomenon, as we have many refugees,
among whom there are, for example, people of Arab origin who bring another
form of antisemitism into the country”, she explained. “The fact that no crèche,
no school, no synagogue can be left without police protection appals us all”, the
German Chancellor added.
21
Who elects half of the 598 deputies. The other half of the deputies are elected according
to a majority vote in 299 constituencies. It should be noted that with a voting system for
legislative elections in line with that currently existing in France, the AfD would probably
not have any deputies. On the other hand, according to the German voting system, in
France, the Font national (Rassemblement national) would have won several dozen seats
in the French legislative elections of June 2017.
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In May 2018, a scandal broke out at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
(Bundesamt für migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF, the German equivalent of the
French OFPRA), whose Bremen branch is suspected of having improperly granted
asylum to some 1,200 foreigners between 2013 and 2016 without carrying out the
necessary checks and without due diligence. The director of the office as well as
other persons were suspended and indicted, but Germany is questioning the chain
of responsibility, which could go as far as the Chancellor Merkel.
On 26 August 2018 in Chemnitz (Saxony), a 35-year-old German of Afghan origin

was fatally stabbed five times, presumably by two young foreigners, one Syrian and
one Iraqi. The next day, thousands of demonstrators marched under the slogan
that the government should guarantee “the security of all citizens”. In September,
other demonstrations took place again in Chemnitz and Köthen (Anhalt). Some
of the demonstrators, carrying German and AfD party flags and placards such as
“Stop the flow of asylum seekers” or “Defend Europe!” [Le Monde 2018] chanted
also “Merkel must go”.
One month later, on 25 September 2018, it was the defeat of a man very close to the
chancellor, Volker Kauder, who was running for a new mandate at the head of the
CDU-CSU group in the Bundestag and who had held this position for thirteen years,
that is to say since Merkel’s debut in the chancellery. Even though in Germany the
majority deputies are relatively free in relation to the executive branch, this result
can be seen as a slap in the face to Chancellor Angela Merkel by her parliamentarians
and thus as a sign of the decline in her authority within her own camp.
On 29th September 2018, it is the inauguration of the Great Mosque of Cologne in

the city centre, built by the branch of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Ankara
Ditib (Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği) or Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious
Affairs. Thousands of Erdogan supporters waving the Turkish flags gather at
the new mosque, shouting “Who’s the biggest? Turkey!”. Germans – including
part of the Turkish diaspora – wonder what loyalty such Erdogan supporters
have for Germany since many of them seem to favour a foreign country rather
than their homeland of choice22.
Then Chancellor Merkel’s “disrepute” [Uterwerde 2018] among her voters is

indirectly confirmed. On 14 October 2018, in the Bavarian elections, the CSU loses
Such a discussion may concern other diasporas as well, in various countries [cf. Dumont 2007].
22
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10.5% and falls to 37.5%, while the other major traditional party, the SPD, falls
below the 10% (9.7%), and the AfD enters the Bavarian regional parliament with
10% of the votes. In this context, the election results have led German companies
to fear a kind of boomerang effect, i.e. that Germany’s migration boom in the years
2014-2016 will lead to a less attractive environment. Thus, some companies “fear
that internal immigration disputes could affect Germany’s image and discourage
skilled workers from coming to work here” [Boutelet 2018].
On 28th October 2018, the regional elections in the Land of Hesse will produce
results similar to those in Bavaria, with the CDU scoring around 10% lower.
Following this election, the AfD party is now represented in all the regional
parliaments of all the Länder. It can no longer be considered as a party of Eastern
Germany alone. The day after the CDU’s poor election result, Chancellor Merkel
announced that she would not be standing for re-election in December 2018 for the
presidency of her party and that she would not be seeking re-election as Chancellor
in the 2021 parliamentary elections.
Such an outcome is initially based on a refusal to see weak signals, thus on a politi-
cal approach that is essentially anchored in the short term. As one analyst puts
it: “The Chancellor has given up every attempt to put her policy in a long-term
perspective” [Winkler 2018]. The political skill shown by Angela Merkel in taking
power and staying in power, in managing certain issues and crises, cannot hide
her insufficient understanding of the fundamental realities of her country, the
geopolitical balance of power and the logic of migration. In particular, to think
about the freedom of movement is to think about the fact that emigration must be
free and unrestricted. This means, on the one hand, not committing acts likely to
contribute to forcing people to emigrate and, on the other hand, fighting smugglers
who exploit people’s poverty and their dire situation.
The tragedy of Chancellor Merkel is insufficient action on the most critical structural
problems of Germany, the difficulty of considering the future risks, the freedom
of peoples to be themselves and the geopolitical parameters of immigration. The
tragedy of Angela Merkel raises another question, because we must “discuss the
share of German responsibility in the very worrying state of today’s Europe” [ibid.]
and for example the restrictions placed on the free movement of Europeans because
of the “slow agony of the Schengen area” [Su, Romain 2018; cf. Dumont 2016b; La
Tribune de Genève 2016]. Is not Merkel’s tragedy also the tragedy of an EU that has
badly implemented the freedoms and values it claims to cherish and uphold?
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Bibliography
Boutelet C. (2018), En Allemagne, un modèle grippé, Le Monde, 16 October 2018.
Dumont G. F. (2007), Démographie politique. Les lois de la géopolitique des populations,
Elipses, Paryż.
Dumont G. F. (2012), Syrie : de la géopolitique des populations à des scénarios prospectifs,
[in:] „Géostratégiques”, nr 37, III quarter 2012 r.
Dumont G. F. (2015a), L’« État islamique », un « nouveau califat » pérenne? , [in:] Pautet,
Arnaud (koordynacja), „Moyen-Orient, Chaos et recompositions, Elipses”. Paris.
Dumont G. F. (2015b), Syrie et Irak: une migration sans précédent historique?, Diploweb.
com, „La revue géopolitique”, 12 December 2015.
Dumont G. F., Verluise P. (2016), Géopolitique de l’Europe : de l’Atlantique à l’Oural, PUF,
Paris.
Dumont G. F. (2016a), Les migrants , Hearing by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Armed Forces Committee on 11 May 2016, [in]: Legendre, Jacques, i Gorce, Gaëtan,
„Rapport d’information sur les migrants”, Senat, nr 795, 13 July 2016, Paris.
Dumont G. F. (2016b), Schengen est mort de ne pas avoir été appliqué, Liberté politique,
6 November 2015.
Dumont G. F. (2016-2017), L’Union européenne entre « hiver démographique » et crise des
migrants, „Diplomatie, Les grands dossiers”, nr 36, December 2016 – January 2017.
Dumont G. F. (2018), Géographie des populations. Concepts, dynamiques, prospectives,
Armand Colin, Paris.
Pérouse J-F. (2018), La Turquie et le « crise migratoire » de 2015, Anatoli, nr 9, autumn 2018.
Leschi D. (2018), Migrations : la France singulière, „Fondapol”, October 2018.
Le Monde (2016a), 11 March 2016.
Le Monde (2016b), 13 & 14 November 2016.
La Tribune de Genève (2016), 28 January 2016.
Su, Romain (2018), “Telos”, 6 November 2018.
Sauvy-Wilkinson A. (1999), Alfred Sauvy aurait cent ans, [in:] „Population&Avenir”, nr
642, March-April 1999.
Uterwedde H. (2018), Fin de partie pour Angela Merkel ?, „Telos”, 9 October 2018.
Winkler H. A. (2018), Le Monde, 7-8 October 2018.
https://www.ec.europa.eu, 08.11.2018.
https://www.embassypages.com/ambassade1156/, 08.11.2018.
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10 . 2 16 9 7/ C S P. 2 0 2 1. 2 5 .1. 0 4
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Łukasz Kaczmarczyk
University Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0003-0363-3009
The “free market” of migrant smuggling

and its implications for EU migration policy
Abstract: The aim of the article is an economically analysis of the motivations
and ways of operation of smugglers and migrants by verifying the hypothesis
that combating illegal smuggling of migrants is extremely difficult due to mutual
benefits obtained by participants of transactions concluded on the market of
services supporting migration. In addition, these benefits result from the system-
atic reduction of the risk of human rights abuse during migration under the influ-
ence of market and technological factors. Economic factors determine the high
level of adaptability of the migrant smuggling market to the used migration policy
instruments through flexible prices and shifting costs to migrants. As a result, the
European Union’s tougher migration policy may lead to a worsening of human
rights standards in the process of smuggling migrants.
Keywords: European Union, human rights, migration policy, migrant smuggling
Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest ekonomiczna analiza motywacji i sposobów działa-

nia przemytników oraz migrantów poprzez weryfikację hipotezy stanowiącej, że
zwalczanie nielegalnego przemytu migrantów jest niezwykle trudne ze względu
na wzajemne korzyści czerpane przez uczestników transakcji zawieranych na
rynku usług wspierających migracje. Dodatkowo korzyści te wynikają z syste-
matycznego ograniczania ryzyka nadużycia praw człowieka w trakcie migracji
pod wpływem czynników rynkowych i technologicznych. Czynniki ekonomicz-
ne decydują o wysokim poziomie zdolności dostosowawczych rynku przemytu
migrantów do stosowanych instrumentów polityki migracyjnej, nie tylko przez
elastyczne ceny, ale także przez przerzucanie kosztów na migrantów. W rezul-
tacie zaostrzona polityka migracyjna Unii Europejskiej może doprowadzić do
pogorszenia przestrzegania standardów praw człowieka w procesie przemytu
migrantów.
Słowa kluczowe: polityka migracyjna, prawa człowieka, przemyt migrantów, Unia
Europejska
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Global population movement on an unobserved scale since the end of World

War II and the well-developed migrant smuggling business, seeing new market
opportunities in these flows, can affect not only economies in countries of origin,
transit and destination, but also strategies to combat the criminal organizations.
Migrant smuggling is a very attractive and lucrative form of criminal activity, with
an extremely low detection risk, resulting in the third largest business of interna-
tional criminals groups [according to data from the International Organization
for Migrants, for: da Silva 2017], with estimated turnover in the European Union
(EU) of 3.0-6.0 billion EUR per year [Europol 2016: 13]. Moreover, according
to European Commission (EC) estimates, 80%-90% of immigrants came to the
Old Continent with the assistance of smuggling networks1. In addition to funds
derived from irregular support for migration flows and the provision of high-
quality fraudulent identity and travel documents (e.g. confirming low income
levels or indicating false reasons for migration), criminal networks will likely
profit from participating in money laundering and offenses against their own
clients who are exceptionally vulnerable to human rights contraventions (such as
trafficking or coercion). It should also be noted that in the Smuggling Protocol
[2000] annexed to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNTOC), migrant smuggling is defined in strictly economic terms as “the
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not
a national or a permanent resident” [UNODC 2018]. As a result, the implemen-
tation of research on migrants smuggling with negligence or underestimation
of the economic perspective limits the possibilities of analyzing a crucial factor
stimulating the development of the smuggling services market. The economic
approach makes it possible to interpret migrant smuggling as a business focused
primarily on profit maximization [Salt 2000: 35]2.
Referring to methodological issues, the market perspective conditions the analysis

of the activities of migrant smuggling organizations in terms of costs and benefits
that determine the size and basic features of demand for services of criminal
1
According to some sources, this applies not to most, but to all migrants [European
Commission 2015: 21]. As the Europol reported, most of those attempting to enter the EU
originate from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, Niger, Morocco, India,
Bangladesh, China and Vietnam [Europol 2016: 5].
2
There are also allegations, that some smuggling groups provide their assistance to migrants
upon humanitarian grounds, without financial benefits. Although this type of motive
cannot be excluded, it should be considered a marginal phenomenon, dominated by the
desire to maximize profit.
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groups on the part of migrants and supply of facilitation services offered by

smugglers [European Commission 2015: 130]. The volatility of market prices for
these services is conditioned by the interaction demand and supply. In addition,
taking into account the business dimension of smugglers’ activities provides
a conceptual framework for analyzing the supply of smuggling services, focusing
on intermediaries organizing smuggling operations to maximize profits from
the investment. Due to the fact that migrants’ journeys to Europe are most often
carried out by several transit countries, comprehensive migration support services
must include long-distance transport, accommodation and the provision of forged
documentation, which impels smugglers to demand exorbitant prices. As a result,
profit-seeking migrant smuggling networks offer assistance to those migrants who
are ready and likely to incur high travel costs [UNODC 2018].
The purpose of the article is to present the incentives and modus operandi of
smugglers and migrants in economic terms by verifying the hypothesis that
combating illegal smuggling of migrants is extremely difficult due to mutual
benefits obtained by participants of transactions on the market. In addition, these
benefits result from a systematic reduction of the risk of human rights abuse during
migration under the influence of market and technological factors. The following
specific questions were subordinated to the research problem formulated above:
• What incentives stimulate the demand for smuggling services for migrants?
• What kind of services are provided to migrants by criminal groups?
• How is the risk of human rights abuses reduced during migration?
• How can the specificity of the migrant smuggling industry affect the effective-
ness of EU migration policy?
The starting point of the analysis are issues related to the booming demand for
smuggling services, including the root causes of migration and the phenomenon of
“attracting” migrants by highly developed economies of EU countries. The issues
mooted in the first chapter include also various sources of financing for migration and
mechanisms of financial support for migrants based on ethnic and family relations.
The second chapter focuses on the development and specific features of rapidly
spreading migrant smuggling networks, supported by autonomous local structures,
to explain the reasons for the low detectability of criminal activities related to migrant
smuggling by law enforcement agencies. These problems arise from the fact, that the
crimes are committed through the provision of migration facilitating services, which
naturally includes charging fees to cover the costs of providing it. This is followed
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by issues concerning the “human costs” of migrant smuggling related to human

rights violations, which however disappear under the influence of fierce competi-
tion on the smuggling market, the development of alternative remittance systems,
and the exchange of information through social media. Analysis of the “free market”
of migrant smuggling through economic lenses allows a deeper understanding of
the foundations for effective tackling of migrant smuggling business, but also the
unintended side effects of combating illegal migration. The fight against smuggling
of migrants takes place in the conditions of benefits achieved by both parties to the
transaction and the need to respect the principles of political correctness.
1. Migrants as the steadily developing demand side of the smuggling market

The basic push factors, i.e. those that may lead to migration to the EU, include social,
economic, political and environmental conditions in less developed countries.
Poverty, limited opportunities for economic and social advancement, prolonged
political instability and disintegration, violence, armed conflicts, natural disasters
and persecution [ibid.] motivate migrants to leave their homelands, stimulating
the development of the smuggling industry, despite the necessity of exposing
themselves to the perilous travel often ending in tragedy. Although push factors
may seem dominant, many migrants are relatively well-off people who, despite
the high socioeconomic status in their home country, in response to pull factors,
decide to migrate, looking for much better living conditions for themselves or their
families in secure and prosperous European economies with a higher standard of
public services, greater employment opportunities, better education and health
care, as well as more generous social welfare systems [Salt 2000: 32]. Thanks to the
growing access to information, visions of abundance of consumer goods in Europe
are amplified by the possibility of exercising a wider range of fundamental rights
and freedoms [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 6]. Consequently, actions for the economic and
political stability of migrants’ countries of origin can only to some extent limit
their pursuit of a higher standard of living on the Old Continent.
Due to the decreasing possibilities of legal entry into European countries, migrants
decide to place themselves in the hands of organized crime, while contributing
to the flourishing market of smuggling networks to an unprecedented scale
[Gallagher, Carling 2017]. Migrants are assumed to use smuggling services only
when it seems impossible to move without their help, for example in the case of
difficult border crossings or the need to travel in harsh conditions [Reitano, Tinti
2015: 5, 8]. Contact with smuggling networks is initiated not only by migrants,
but also by smugglers who encourage migration. The process of seeking potential
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customers, including through social media (including Facebook3) and online

advertising, as well as establishing trust-based relationships between market
participants plays an increasingly important role in stimulating the demand for
smuggling services [Campana 2017]. Those who do not use social media have to
rely on recommendations and information provided orally. In addition, in order to
better adapt to the potential recipients’ preferences, recruitment to the smuggling
network is generally carried out among members of local or diaspora commu-
nities, with particular emphasis on those who have previously used smuggling
services and may become smugglers in destination or transit countries [Chongaile
2015]. As a result, criminal organizations develop mainly on the basis of ethnic
or linguistic criteria, while fulfilling a “bridging” function between different
communities and cultures [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 5].
The demand for migration support services is primarily a consequence of the

distorted picture of living conditions in Europe, reinforced by fears and delusions,
and even deliberate misleading [European Commission 2015: 28]. People in the
most difficult economic situation tend to recruit a smuggler regardless of the price
demanded due to the expected, attractive life prospects in destination countries
and naive visions of quick earnings abroad [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 5]. In this context,
employment opportunities in the informal economy, offering a huge number of
legal, semi-legal and illegal jobs, and possible inclusion in the social welfare system
are particularly tempting. In response to these phenomena, a number of European
countries (in cooperation with EU structures) have launched awareness campaigns
to discourage migrants from using smuggling services by presenting the real condi-
tions in which migrants are smuggled and the view of standard of living in the desti-
nation countries. However, due to the never-ceasing flow of information (especially
via the Internet), migrants can be presumed to be often aware of the risks associated
with travel, and the decision to migrate is the result of calculating the benefits and
losses arising from exposure to danger before reaching the destination. It cannot be
excluded that they also consider the possibility of losing their lives and consciously
agree to it. As a consequence, smugglers are classified by customers as good and bad
ones, depending on the level of risk associated with the use of their services, therefore
unilateral depiction of smuggling networks as groups that are intrinsically ruthless
or oriented solely on exploitation of migrants is not considered reliable or useful in
reducing the demand for these services [Gallagher, Carling 2017].
3
It takes only a few minutes to find smugglers on the website, but the Facebook representatives
convince, that they are cooperating with law enforcement agencies to shut down any pages
or posts promoting migrant smuggling services [da Silva 2017].
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At the heart of effective demand for smuggling services are financial resources,
i.e. the higher the level of disposable income or the greater the ability to raise cash,
the higher the quality of facilitating services offered. To raise the funds required to
cover the travel expenses, migrants draw on savings or sell real estate and jewel-
lery. They also take out loans, mainly from unscrupulous money lenders, which,
however, makes the whole undertaking much more risky for them. In addition,
the poorest make attempts or are forced to take illegal, low-paid work in urban or
suburban areas along the route, in order to pay off debts or accumulate savings
to cover further expenses [Europol 2016: 5]. Analysing the structure of payment
means used in smuggling operations (diagram 1), it is easy to notice that migrant
smuggling has close links with money laundering, as cash transactions dominate
here, and about 20% of transactions are concluded through alternative banking
systems that transfer funds outside of formal value circulation. Fees are often paid
in installments at subsequent stages of the customer’s journey4.
Diagram 1. Structure of sources of financing migration
Source: own study based on: [Europol 2016: 4].
In order to hide money laundering, smugglers generally carry out legal activities by carrying
4
out projects using cash or payment services (casinos, car dealership) as well as investment in
luxury goods (cars, real estates). Dirty money is also mixed with legal funds and transferred
via formal and informal banking systems [Chonghaile 2015].
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Migrants can also count on financial support from family and friends who treat
them as an investment to achieve a higher standard of living, even if the expected
return on it is not high or does not guarantee success [UNODC 2018]5. Those who
reach their preferred destination send money transfers to their families to repay
the loan or meet other family obligations6.
The presence of an ethnic diaspora in a country that migrant has chosen signifi-
cantly determines the preferences of migrants regarding routes and migration
countries [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 7]. This is due to the role that members of the
diaspora, with which migrants have national, linguistic or cultural ties, can play in
planning and organizing migration by providing assistance, often without direct
material benefits, in:
• travel preparation (including emotional support and accumulation of funds for

migrants planning to use migration facilitating services),
• providing information on the quality of smuggling services,
• accommodation, travel planning or employment on the black market by helping
to obtain (illegally) a work permit,
• arranging fictitious marriages or false adoptions,
• introducing and integrating the migrant with the local community in the desti-
nation country [European Commission 2015: 134].
2. Migrant smuggling networks as a flexible business model

Briskly thriving migration-supporting nets that use a variety of modi operandi
to maximize the benefits of high demand driven by the migration crisis consti-
tute the supply side of the smuggling market. The characteristics and tasks of
smugglers may vary depending on the region, route or profile of their activ-
ity: while some specialize in smuggling migrants as ‘full-time professional
criminals’, others regard migration as an opportunity for additional income
[Salt 2000: 36]. Although many smuggling groups have traditionally operated
only along migration routes, the current scale of migration provides them
with unprecedented profits that allow them to permanently transform from
5
Because of the fact that most minors reaching the EU are unaccompanied by adults, this
group is extremely vulnerable to harsh labour conditions or sexual exploitation. Nevertheless,
it is young people that are perceived by families as a highly profitable “investment” due to
the much lower probability of being sent back to their home country.
6
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, remittances from irregular migrants the income of households.
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loosely coordinated smuggling networks into professional criminal groups

that support the development of local economies by investing income [Reitano,
Tinti 2015: 4].
A typical smuggling migrant network is composed of actors with varying

degrees of involvement (diagram 2). The network leader (or organizer), respon-
sible for supervision and comprehensive coordination of organization’s activi-
ties, usually operates in one of the key migration hubs, where migrants try to
access smuggling services or transport infrastructure. Leaders maintain (usually
remote) contact only with selected core members of the organization. Prices of
smuggling services are set by local coordinators, who act as heads of regional
cells in areas where migration routes run. Their duties consists in coordinating
activities at the lower levels of the organization, which includes accepting orders
from clients, booking flights, buying or renting means of transport, or recruiting
truck drivers [Europol 2016: 9]. Although the possibilities of local coordinators’
influence on the functioning of the entire criminal network are limited, the
scope of their tasks depends primarily on the complexity of the network in
which they operate.
Diagram 2. The decentralized structure of migrant smuggling network
Source: own study based on: [Europol 2016: 9].
The supply side of the smuggling market has a complex and opaque structure.
The market, particularly at the lowest, local level, is very fragmented and deprived
of separate management, thanks to which it has become highly competitive [da
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Silva 2017]. As experts emphasize7, organized smuggling networks are supported

by a huge number of professional, local collaborators, dealing with corruption
and forgery of documents, and by ordinary citizens, such as carriers, hoteliers,
taxi drivers, truck drivers, travel agents and lenders [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 5]. The
‘subcontractors’, equipped with special knowledge and experience, are recruited
mainly through social media and operate outside the criminal organizations
on an ad-hoc basis. As a consequence, they form part of the criminal network
only occasionally, and sometimes render services for several smuggling groups
at the same time [Europol 2016: 10]. Professionals who are members of ancillary
networks often run legal businesses on a daily basis, only occasionally performing
tasks assigned by criminal networks and taking advantage of opportunities to
make some extra money offered by the illicit economy [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 5]. Due
to the very low requirements for participation in the migrant smuggling market
(low capital investment, not very advanced skills, low risk of being brought to
justice [UNODC 2018]8), agencies combating smuggling networks must take into
account the fact that when one member of the subsidiary grid is apprehended, the
vacuum emerged is immediately filled by others [da Silva 2017].
Even if the basic structure of the market is currently a loosely interconnected

network, it can be observed that these networks are becoming more and more
specialized, rationalizing operations through mergers and acquisitions, coopera-
tive relationships, the absorption of smaller organizations or open conflicts over
market share [Salt 2000: 42-43]. As a result of the monopolization market factors,
smuggling structures are becoming more and more transnational in nature,
going beyond national borders and undertaking other forms of criminal activity
[UNODC 2018].
The scope and structure of smuggling services offered is tailored to the payment
possibilities of the migrant, although prices may vary significantly depending
on the country of origin and preferred destination (prices shoot up when it is
necessary to cross many borders), type of transport and guaranteed safety of the
smuggling route. Closer contacts with smugglers or willingness to cooperate with
7
For instance, Paolo Campana [2017], a criminologist at the Cambridge Institute of
Technology, referring to the structure of the smuggling market, describes this industry as
a “quintessential free market” without monopolies, unlike other black markets controlled
by organized crime groups.
8
In consequence, almost anyone can become a smuggler or co-worker of the smuggling
network: from street vendors offering assistance in crossing the borders to tourist guides
and fishermen equipped with boats for sea expeditions [Campana 2017].
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them may also be relevant in price negotiations [Chongaile 2015]. In addition to

providing comprehensive services to accompany migrants throughout the entire
migration route, some offers provide support for migrants only in the area of
the local smuggling network on a point-to-point basis [European Commission
2015: 132]. In relatively cheaper pay-as-you-go packages fees are transferred to
unrelated smugglers bit by bit, after a specific part of the route has been travelled
by the migrant. However, this type of migration is recognized to be biased with
a particularly high risk of violating human rights. “Package” offers are more
expensive, but they are definitely a faster and safer way to reach the destination
[Reitano, Tinti 2015: 4-6].
The scope of additional smuggling services depends primarily on the funds avail-
able, which affects the modes of transport offered. However, using a combination
of these means is considered to make the journey longer and more dangerous.
Very low-income migrants can take advantage of land transportation (including
desert routes), facilitated by smuggling network only on sections with extremely
uncomfortable conditions (illegal crossing of borders by foot, in trucks, by rail
or through special tunnels) [UNODC 2018]. Regardless of the particularly high
risk, the poorest, most desperate migrants (or with no alternatives) make attempts
to cross the sea. Sea routes are usually crossed on boats often unseaworthy and
overcrowded. In this context, the significant number of sinking recorded when
attempting to get from North Africa to the EU through the Mediterranean should
not be surprising9. At the same time, the mass purchase of boats and a wide range
of life jackets from local producers and fishermen contributes to the skyrocketing
injection of financial resources to local economies, which positively influence
their development [European Commission 2015: 31]10. Additionally, due to the
rooting of criminal organizations in local economic structures, they are gaining
significant support from the community in smuggling migrants, which is a serious
challenge to the successful combating the smuggling industry.
Despite tight controls on land and sea routes in the EU in recent years, airways
are a relatively less frequently used channel for smuggling migrants. Although air
9
T he amount of the fee affects the privileges granted to migrants, also in terms of security
standards. For example, the more affluent Syrians traveled on the plane and received life
jackets, while Africans were locked in their luggage hatch and were not equipped with life
jackets [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 10].
10
Fees paid to fishermen for help in smuggling are so high that they can completely give up
fishing [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 15].
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transport is perceived as the most effective and safest way to travel, smuggling by
air is associated with high costs, with the need to involve professional counterfeit-
ers of documentation authorizing them to cross state borders [Reitano, Tinti 2015:
7]. However, there are many options available for obtaining this type of document:
a borrowed or stolen passport with a photo of a migrant-like person, a fake travel or
ID document, a legal passport or visa issued on the basis of false documents confirm-
ing personal data [UNODC 2018]. Fake documents are delivered to clients by the
facilitator at the beginning of the journey or systematically at subsequent stages of
the smuggling route, which allows migrants to travel between sections by themselves.
The costs incurred by smugglers are in some cases estimated to absorb almost
50% of the smuggling fees. Migrant payments must cover the expenses of network
members involved in smuggling activities, i.e. the rental of so-called “secure
homes”, where migrants are waiting for the departure, rental or purchase of a boat
or other means of transport, as well as special fees for local armed militias or
authorities for protection [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 13]. A large part of the expenditures
are bribes given at various stages of migration routes to make officers the part of
the enterprise. Immigration and customs officials as well as other law enforcement
officials receive money for passing unverified vehicles or ships through border-
crossing points, and corrupt consulates and embassies staff charge fees for visas
and passports or supporting the migration applications [Europol 2016: 12].
An analysis of the supply side of the smuggling market indicates that it is based on
profits not only from huge economies of scale, but also from operational practices
that violate basic human rights. Relatively fixed, i.e. independent of the number of
smuggled persons, costs of bribery encourage the mass movement of migrants. As
a result, criminal networks try to transport as many individuals as possible at a time,
which ensures lower average service costs. Unfortunately, these low-cost operating
methods most often consist in squeezing “human cargo” into extremely small spaces
in trucks, containers or crowded boats to make its value sufficiently high to mitigate
the risk of seizing by law enforcement agencies [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 10]. However,
these methods significantly violate human dignity, posing a greater risk to the life
and health of migrants and resulting in a sharp rise in the number of reported deaths
and serious injuries during smuggling operations [UNODC 2018].
3. Mitigation of risk of human rights violations in the migrant smuggling market

The development of organized crime involved in migrant smuggling is consid-
ered as a reaction to the growing restrictions on the influx of migrants from less
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developed countries into the Old Continent. As a dirty business, the smuggling
market gives tremendous power to the criminals, which significantly increases the
likelihood of serious breaching of human rights and the exploitation of migrants
[European Commission 2015: 130]. As a result, in the market of migration support
services legal and illegal operations easily blur into one another, and migrant
smuggling turns into human trafficking [Chongaile 2015].
As stated in the EC report from 2015, in addition to negative experiences related

to severe conditions of travel to the EU and staying detention facilities, customers
of smuggling networks are extremely vulnerable to mistreatment by smugglers,
in the form of human trafficking, hostage taking, extortions, rapes, robberies,
battering, tortures and blackmailing [European Commssion 2015: 20]. There are
frequent cases of kidnapping for ransoms from migrant families and the so-called
debt slavery, where the cost of smuggling is initially covered by the smuggler, and
migrants or their families are forced to repay the debt under the conditions set
by the criminal group, fearing of violence or deportation from the destination
country11. An additional threat to the safety and well-being of migrants are long
migration routes, with numerous detours or last-minute shifts, depending on the
weaknesses in border controls. In some cases, when migrants tried to turn back,
they were forced to continue their journey. The practices presented above clearly
show that not everyone who has decided to use illegal migration channels are
aware of the circumstances in which the journey will take place [Salt 2000: 34].
Particular attention should be paid to the methods used by criminal groups to

shield from the risk of detecting their activity and avoiding criminal liability. The
strategy of these groups is based on blurring the boundaries between smugglers
and customers, as a result of which migrants are forced, e.g. to navigate a boat or
drive a truck [Gallagher, Carling 2017]. Criminals were also reported to pretend to
be migrants so efficiently that they were not apprehended at borders, but repatri-
ated [UNODC 2018]. Moreover, smugglers stay up-to-date with developments
along the migration routes and measures taken to prevent illegal smuggling, such
as changes in law enforcement, asylum procedures or improved border controls,
using online platforms, which allow them to respond immediately to disadvan-
tageous conditions at borders or their closure. Changing smuggling routes or
looking for safer routes in regions where the law enforcement is weaker, however,
F
11
or example, Eritreans were transported free to the Libyan coast and then locked up and
tortured to obtain ransom from their families [Chonghaile 2015].
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causes automatic price surge, not only increasing the financial costs borne by
migrants, but also – paradoxically – the demand for services provided by migrant
smugglers [Europol 2016: 10].
There is some irony in the fact, that the search-and-rescue operations undertaken
by organizations seeking migrants in trouble have become a good illustration of the
creativity of criminal networks in reducing risk and operational costs [Gallagher,
Carling 2017]. In an attempt to mitigate harsh humanitarian consequences of the
smuggling business, these organizations help migrants who call for help by firing
torches or sending an SOS signal from “disposable” boats (like dinghies) drifting
in international waters12. Therefore, the main goal of smugglers was to transport
migrants to the border of international waters, where they might receive the aid.
A side effect of the aid action was the reduction of the logistic and operational costs
of smuggling, which is indicated by less fuel carried on migrant boats, and to lower
market entry barriers to the level at which smugglers can be anyone who is able to
manufacture or buy a boat and find people willing to take advantage of the services
offered13. Consequently, the possibility of being taken off the smugglers’ hands by
humanitarian organizations has made facilitation services much more attractive
to migrants, significantly increasing the illegal migration tide [Campana 2017].
Market and technological factors may have an impact on the gradual reduction of
human rights abuses in the smuggling market. Although the choice of a trusted
contractor in such a dangerous and unstable business is extremely hard, market
mechanisms lead to a natural selection of “bad” and “good” smugglers, while the
latter can be defined as persons or groups willing and able to transport migrants
to destination countries as safely as possible and at an acceptable price [Gallagher,
Carling 2017]. Zooming up competition in the smuggling market and numerous
customer complaints have forced a shift in risk sharing between seller and buyer.
On the one hand, money is less and less often paid to the smuggler in advance, and
on the other – the process of selecting service providers, according to their reputa-
tion, is carried out. The selection is conducted by word of mouth (family members
or friends who used the services of a given smuggler and successfully arrived to
12
In order to contact humanitarian organizations, smugglers often provided migrant groups
with a cell phone and telephone number to call for assistance from the state.
13
According to the chief prosecutor of Catania in Sicily, “Italian Operation Mare Nostrum
(…) had an unexpected effect. The criminal organizations handling the migrant trafficking
took advantage from the new opportunities and deliberately enhanced [the] danger of the
situation in order to force the Italian Navy to advance toward the African coast, so lowering
their costs and consequently prices required to the migrants” [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 12].
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destination) and recommendations on digital forums [European Commission

2015: 132]. Due to the dissemination of modern communication technologies
and constant access to information, migrants can efficiently inform each other
about the quality of services received and travel conditions offered by smugglers
[Reitano, Tinti 2015: 25]. Being aware that “accessing and evaluating informa-
tion could mean the difference between life and death” [Campana 2017], i.e. it is
conditio sine qua non to stay in the trade, smugglers are forced to take additional
risk associated with supporting migration and more reliably comply with the
provisions of contracts concluded with customers [da Silva 2017].
Migrants increasingly pay for smuggling services through insurance offices,

third party guarantors or escrow services, which guarantees payment of funds to
smuggler only when the customer is satisfied with the services delivered14. One
of the most prevalent forms of payment for smuggling is the use of an informal
remittance system called hawala. This illicit banking is primarily based on mutual
trust and respect, supported by text messaging and a well-developed network of
brokers. Funds deposited with an underground money handler (hawaladar) are
transferred to smugglers (as per the migrant’s order) after completing the next
stages of travel in transit or destination countries [Chongaile 2015]. In some cases,
the smuggler receives some of the money on the up-front basis, and the balance
is paid only after confirming that the migrant has safely reached the checkpoint
or his final destination.
In addition, a developing money-back guarantee scheme might make the

smuggling market more transparent and fair, because if the migrant does not
reach his destination, the money is sent back to the family and the whole deal is
called off. In more dramatic cases, compensation for fatalities is paid to families of
victims. Even if these indemnifications can be interpreted as the consequence of
remorse and a manifestation of the humanization of the smuggling market, they
are primarily aimed at maintaining the position on the market [da Silva 2017].
4. Implications for EU migration policy

An analysis of the migrant smuggling market from an economic perspec-
tive gives rise to reflections on the impact of the specificity of this market on
EU immigration policy, in particular in the context of the low effectiveness of
14
Funds are transferred to the smuggler after the broker deducts the agreed amount [Reitano,
Tinti 2015: 18].
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counter-smuggling operations. Given the characteristics of the migrant smuggling

industry, it appears that the implementation of a comprehensive response to the
illegal influx of migrants by systematically transforming the crime from “low risk,
high-reward” business to a “high risk, low-reward” one is unlikely [Chongaile
2015]. The deterring function of sanctions and a more stringent EU migration
policy (e.g. with no access for migrants to social welfare systems) are considered
ineffective or, more importantly, unacceptable from humanitarian perspective. As
for the efficacy of tightening migration regulations, such as forced deportation
of migrants or sending them back to their place of origin, they are considered to
have little impact on weakening migratory pressure, largely due to the persistent
disparities in socio-economic development between developed countries and
developing ones that ensure steady and unlimited demand for smuggling services
[Salt 2000: 41]. Additionally, it should be borne in mind, that capacity building of
law enforcement and the development of new methods of detecting crime, as well
as monitoring the evolution of forms of migration to the EU require vast invest-
ment as a prerequisite for increasing the degree of international coordination in
the field of preventing illegal migration. Catching up with the high dynamics of
the development of smuggling networks becomes practically unattainable with
limited financial resources of European countries, strained by huge public debts
as the legacy of the economic crisis in Europe.
Undoubtedly, more legal and communication barriers on migration routes result

in increased demand for smuggling services, which enables criminal organizations
to thrive. Highly responsive character of the market means that announcements
concerning new security measures, rising border controls or changes in resettle-
ment policy in European countries affect the immediate adjust of smuggling
routes or the increase in prices of smuggling support services due to the higher
costs of circumventing the barriers to migration [Gallagher, Carling 2017]. As
a result, smuggling becomes not only more expensive, but also more dangerous
for smuggling networks customers, as the need to use their services increases.
Therefore, the ability to react swiftly to changes in the business environment
determines the flexibility of the smuggling market15 and the rapid “internaliza-
tion” of all forms of combating organized crime, which results in a small deterrent
effect [Salt 2000: 43].
15
T. Reitano and P. Tinti confirmed, that criminal networks operating across the Horn of
Africa very quickly adapted the methods of operation to the growing number of migrants
from Syria heading to Europe [Reitano, Tinti 2015: 9].
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The costs of migrant support services might also increase in the case of stricter
combating of smuggling networks or toughening sanctions for illegal smuggling,
as a result of improving the quality of surveillance of migrant transport, increasing
detection of smuggling or conducting more effective evidence proceedings. Higher
risk translates into higher fees very quickly. Excessive concentration on maximiz-
ing and concealing profits means that smuggling proceeds are highly vulnerable
to freezing, seizure or confiscation, but the low effectiveness of traditional instru-
ments to fight organized crime will probably not be able to stem smuggling activity
and weaken the wave of illegal migration [Gallagher, Carling 2017].
In view of the above, one of the considered methods of limiting the role of organized
crime in migration flows is to introduce laxer control of entry into the EU, open state
borders or create additional legal migration channels. However, it is worth noting
that even if this could curtail the activity of smuggling networks, social debate on
the cultural and social implications of an increase in the migrant population in host
countries is needed, also when migrants are perceived as an illegal workforce, which
can play an active role in filling shortages on the labor market and counteracting
negative demographic trends in the economies of target countries. Bearing in mind
the fears of European societies, public authorities appear to be caught up in a specific
Gordian knot when we take into account the dilemma on the one hand between
maintaining cultural unity and promoting diversity, and on the other – between
budgetary constraints in public finance and diverse political interests. Consequently,
the EU’s efforts to develop a coherent solution to the problem of migrant smuggling
within (constituting European identity) liberal values and human rights basis may
limit the autonomy of Member States to conduct their own migration policy. This
is crucial in the light of the fact that liberal democracy is one of the most important
factors attracting migrants to the Old Continent, contributing to the increase in the
number of migrants arriving in the EU at an exponential rate [ibid.].
Conclusions
The analysis of the migrant smuggling market presented in the article indicates
that smuggling operations for commercial purposes are very difficult to detect
and rarely punished due to (typical of this market) the consensual structure of the
relationship between the migrant and the smuggler. Despite the temporary nature,
these relationships condition an almost ideal business model, in which each trans-
action party profits. Has the migrant reached its destination, the smuggled and
smugglers remain in a “win-win” situation, which bolsters the “symbiosis” between
market participants.
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Reciprocal benefits for market agents, however, do not exclude the asymmetry of
market power to the disadvantage of migrants, which sometimes results in a harsh
violation of human rights, although migrants are not dissuaded from relying on
smuggling networks by threats to life or difficult travel conditions. The economic
dimension of smuggling activity indicates a tendency to commodification of
masses facilitated by criminal organizations, for which migrants are only one of
the goods smuggled across national borders (tobacco, drugs, firearms) [UNODC
2018]. However, this phenomenon is systematically mitigated by a free market
mechanism that gradually eliminates dishonest contractors due to the free flow
of information between migrants. As a result, migrants may perceive smuggling
services as less coercive, which will stimulate their willingness to settle or work
in the EU.
The above-mentioned economic factors also determine the high level of adapt-
ability of the migrant smuggling market to the modifications of migration
policy, not only through flexible prices, but also by shifting costs to migrants.
As a result, a tightened migration policy may lead to the deterioration of human
rights standards in the process of smuggling migrants. The hopes of European
decision-makers that the migration crisis can easily be resolved while respecting
European values on the basis of close cooperation between public authorities in
the field of migration policy may therefore prove futile.
Bibliography
Campana P., (2017), Trading on human tides – the ‘ free market’ of people smuggling,
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Chongaile C.N. (2015), People smuggling: how it works, who benefits and how it can be
stopped, “The Guardian”, https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop ment/2015/
jul/31/people-smuggling-how-works-who-benefits-and-how-to-put-stop 03.06.2020.
da Silva Ch. (2017), Inside the ‘ free market’ of people smuggling, “The Independent”, http://
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and cooperation with third countries. Final Report, DG Migration & Home Affairs,
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Europol (2016), Migrant smuggling in the EU, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-
documents/migrant-smuggling-in-eu 03.06.2020.
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Gallagher A., Carling J. (2017), Migrant smugglers are winning. Here’s why, World
Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/migrant-sm ugglers-
are-winning-here-s-why/ 02.06.2020.
OUN (2000), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, https://
www.unodc.org/…/SoM_Protocol_English.pdf 04.06.2020.
Reitano T., Tinti P. (2015), Survive and advance. The economics of smuggling refugees and
migrants into Europe, Institute for Security Studies, Paper 289.
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Migration”, Special Issue 2000/1.
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10 . 2 16 9 7/ C S P. 2 0 2 1. 2 5 .1. 0 5
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Piotr Ślusarczyk
University Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in Warszaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0003-4648-2095
Language in the service of ideological

and political struggle.
Instrumentalization of the term Islamophobia
Abstract: The text analyses the term of Islamophobia in the political, social and
scientific discourse. It integrates contributions from the fields of political science
of religion, linguistic pragmatics and social communication to prove that in
various contexts the term “Islamophobia” is deprived of a cognitive value due to
its ambiguity, semantic imbalance and pejorative character. Author investigates
the problem of institutionalization of the term “Islamophobia”.
In the context of international practice, the Author indicates that the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation aims to strengthen the prohibition of “discrediting Islam”
in the United Nations and the European Union. He analyzes the use of the term
by the authoritarian regime of R. Erdogan. The background for the reflection is
the following axiological issues: freedom of speech, separation of religion and
state, the right to criticize social manifestations of religiosity and the Islamic
social doctrine.
Keywords: Islam, Islamophobia, linguistic manipulation, freedom of speech
Abstrakt: Artykuł analizuje pojęcie „islamofobii” w dyskursie politycznym,

społecznym i naukowym. Łączy w sobie wkład z dziedzin nauk politologii
religii, pragmatyki językowej i komunikacji społecznej, aby udowodnić, że
termin „islamofobia” używany w różnych kontekstach jest pozbawiony wartości
poznawczej ze względu na jego dwuznaczność, nierównowagę semantyczną
i charakter pejoratywny. Autor bada problem instytucjonalizacji terminu
„islamofobia”.
W aspekcie praktyki międzynarodowej Autor wskazuje, że Organizacja
Współpracy Islamskiej dąży do wzmocnienia egzekwowania zakazu „dyskre-
dytowania islamu” na forum ONZ i Unii Europejskiej. Analizuje także
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wykorzystanie tego terminu przez autorytarny reżim R. Erdogana. Tłem

refleksji są następujące kwestie aksjologiczne: wolność słowa, rozdział religii
od państwa, prawo do krytykowania społecznych przejawów religijności oraz
islamska doktryna społeczna.
Słowa kluczowe: islam, Islamofobia, manipulacja językowa, wolność słowa
1. Preliminary remarks
This work focuses primarily on an attempt to identify, describe and analyze the
instrumentalization of the term Islamophobia, i.e. on other than strictly refer-
ence or cognitive functions of the term. Due to limitations resulting from the
size of the text itself, the paper is not and cannot be an in-depth analysis of this
phenomenon, it is rather an attempt to outline its framework, or metaphorically
speaking, to create a kind of „map” on which key points are marked. I understand
instrumentalization here in a primary sense as making the concept of a tool for
achieving particular goals, in this case political and ideological.
Reflecting on this concept, remember that its use is entangled in a number of

theoretical problems. In addition to typical semantic considerations such as
content, scope of the concept, the possibility of its operationalization for the needs
of empirical research; there is also the question of politicizing this term. Erich
Bleich meta-analyzes the concept of Islamophobia1, at making it an analytical
tool, while enabling it to be used for empirical research. As a result, he proposed
that Islamophobia be understood as “ill-considered.”2 negative attitudes or
emotions directed against Islam or Muslims “ [Bleich 2011: 1593]. At the same
1
The scholar took into account the numerous definitions of this term appearing in politi-
cal and, above all, scientific discourse, used by: Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg,
Vincent Geisser, Pnina Werbner, Sherman A. Lee, Tahir Abbas, José Pedro Zúquete, Mehedi
Semati, Jocelyne Cesari and Jörg Stolz. A review of the scientific literature allowed to formu-
late the following conclusions: Islamophobia is treated as a manifestation of “social evil”
[Bleich 2011: 1538], manifesting itself as fear of Islam and Muslims, which translates into the
spread of a new form of “racism”. Islamophobia is also to be characterized by stereotyping
of Islam and Muslims and an essential approach that treats Islamic values as by definition
incompatible with Western axiology. There is a dispute among scholars who reach for this
concept whether mental processes are included in the concept, or only actions that are
exclusive and hostile to Muslims. Others, in turn, call for a distinction to be made between
what concerns Islam and what concerns Muslims; for the distance to the doctrine is different
and hatred for a particular religious group is different [ibid.: 1538-1585].
2
In the original this definition is: “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at
Islam or Muslims”. The English adjective indiscriminate can also be translated as thought-
less, uncritical, and unscrupulous.
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time, the scholar is aware of the threats arising from the abuse of this concept,
especially when it comes to justified criticism of negative phenomena occurring
in Islamic communities.
Bleich’s project, though dictated by concern for the precision of the scientific
language and methodological correctness of research, assumes that the evolution
that the term has undergone “from a political concept” to a tool “used for political
purposes” allows its ideologically burdened use. It is difficult to agree with this
assumption. First, the term Islamophobia was introduced to the public debate as
part of an ideological project, and secondly, the “scientific” meaning of nolens
volens still coexists with both ambiguous and purely rhetorical language imple-
mentations, which usually connects the genus iudiciale (accusatory tone) with the
genus demonstrativum (rebuke). From this point of view, there are convincing
objections raised by John Bowen, arguing that the use of Islamophobia as “an
analytical term is somewhat risky” because it is used “in a too broad sense and is
highly polemic” [Bowen 2005, quoted from: Bleich 2011: 1584].
Some researchers are willing to research prejudices and stereotypes without

referring to the term Islamophobia. José Pedro Zúquete proposes to use harsher
categories such as “anti-Islamist” [Zúquete 2008: 324], Fred Halliday prefers the
term “anti-Muslim”, while Kenan Malik is inclined to use the concept of “anti-
Muslim prejudice” [Bleich 2011: 1584]. These suggestions result from a concern to
preserve the conceptual nature of the dictionary of social sciences without giving
up research on socially harmful phenomena at the same time. In addition, they
impose on the researcher reaching for these concepts the need to demonstrate both
the irrationality of attitudes towards Islam or Muslims, and to reach for tools to
identify prejudices on the psychosocial level.
A separate issue is the awareness of the limitations of research autonomy; whether

we want it or not, the processes of society also affect the world of science. The
already mentioned José Pedro Zúquete sees in (over) the use of the concept of
Islamophobia a threat to an open, democratic and pluralistic scientific debate. In
his opinion, “unfettered use of terms such as” Islamophobia “, which are undoubt-
edly moralizing, can stigmatize and push the” Islamophobic “periphery of public
debate to those who criticize and even try to understand some aspects of Islam in
a manner inconsistent with current trends. The conflict (sometimes open, often
latent) of legitimate criticism or important points of view with demonization has
consequences in the form of ending any truly democratic and open debate on any
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topic, silencing voices, fearing stigmatization, in practice it facilitates the actions

of those who actually [the issue – PŚ] they demonize. (…) In recent decades there
has been a lack of public debate and interaction between rulers and rulers on key
issues (such as immigration), which in turn has increased the attractiveness of
parties that claim to represent the nation and call for the establishment of “real”
democracies. In this light, the term “anti-Islam” seems to be a more appropriate
analytical category to be used in some Islamic discourses, especially those on
the far right, because at least it begins the necessary (and long overdue) process
of distinguishing Islamic discourses: those who arouse irrational fears and treat
Islam as a monolithic block from those who may be critical of certain aspects,
but are not ipso facto “anti-Islamic” because of the criticism being carried out “
[Zúquete 2008: 324]. Too wide use of the term Islamophobia, therefore, blurs the
line between justified and avoided unauthorized generalization of explanations
and analyzes about Islam or the influence of Muslims on contemporary Western
societies, from extreme attitudes that operate on stereotypes. Traces of awareness
of these problems can also be found in Polish science.
Ryszard Michalak notes that the researcher describing the relationship between
religion and politics is under particular pressure, both from the inside of the
environment and from the outside [Michalak 2017a: 156-159]. To highlight this
problem, the scholar refers to the category of political correctness, which can
be understood both as an ideology serving to build a model of a multicultural
society [Scruton 2002: 287], as well as a social phenomenon manifested, among
others “Social ostracism and fierce ideological struggle” [Chechłowska-Lipińska
2003: 9] directed at those who do not share the belief in the possibility of creating
a coherent multicultural society, or who do not agree with far-reaching cultural
relativism, manifested in the prohibition of assessing individual cultures “accord-
ing to objective and comprehensive criteria, especially truth, good and beauty”
[Chechłowska-Lipińska 2003: 9]3. Researchers dealing with Islamic issues are
aware of the pressure of political correctness. Mirosław Sadowski notes that even
researchers writing about jihad “as an armed struggle with infidels to spread Islam
are accused of Islamophobia” [Sadowski 2017a: 136]. This example shows that in
scientific research, Islamophobia – on the one hand, is used to identify “hostility to
Islam, which is the basis for fear and aversion to all or most Muslims” [definition
Not only the term ‘Islamophobia’, but also concepts with an analogous word-formation
3
structure, researchers identify as a tool for specific political purposes, consisting in shaping
social processes and even the vision of man and humanity in the ongoing cultural dispute
[Gierycz 2017: 460-465].
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of Julian Jeleński, quoted from: Sadowski 2017a: 136] and to stigmatize statements
on Islam, including those scientifically entitled.
The discussion on the term Islamophobia is embroiled in the current dispute

regarding the condition of the multicultural society, the nature of Islam itself, as
well as phenomena related to Muslim immigration, integration of Muslims, or
reflection on the reasons for the development of extremist attitudes – those Islamic
and those far right. The controversy surrounding the relationship between the
Muslim world and the West is also important.
Two main positions can be distinguished in this dispute. One – recognizes

Islamophobia as an element of social reality, manifesting itself in unjustified
fears of Islam and Muslims, the other indicates that fears of the growing political
influence of Muslim organizations, as well as the actual failure of the model of
multicultural society, have their rational, not prejudicial, grounds.
On one side, therefore, we have Islamosceptic attitudes, usually selective4, resulting

from various ideological orientations: criticism of radical Islam Ayaan Hirsi Ali
[Ślusarczyk 2017: 122-139] is based on liberal ideas, even Christian Sookhdeo [2009]
emerges from Christian and anti-totalitarian positions. The recently deceased
Bernard Lewis occupies a unique place in this group. This precursor of political
Islam research [Lewis 1988], as one of the few orientalists, broke with the ideas
proclaimed by Edward Said, recognizing that the constant positioning of Muslims
as a victim of Western imperialism, US or Israeli policy «favors tyranny and at the
same time is ineffective governments of the Middle East, which in this way justify
a misery that they cannot overcome. And they want to direct the growing anger of
their subjects to other, external enemies « [Lewis 2016: 125-126]. Lewis was skepti-
cal about some of the Turkish diaspora›s use of the common sense of guilt over
the Rhine in Germany, resulting from the fascist past, to «prevent measures being
taken to protect the German identity, which, I would say, is endangered like other
4
I use this term in the sense proposed by Ryszard Michalak, who defines this attitude as
follows: Islamoscepticism is understood here as any – individual and collective – critical
attitude towards Islam (full Islamoscepticism) or any element characteristic of this religion
or the phenomenon it generates, e.g. ideology, social movement, political party (selective
Islamoscepticism). The assumption is that this attitude results from rational reflection and
skepticism / skeptics’ doubts about the possibility of achieving a state of permanent and
harmonious coexistence of Muslims with non-Muslims due to the axiological contradictions
that exist between them. In European conditions, this discrepancy is primarily based on the
incompatibility of democracy with Sharia [Michalak 2017b: 287].
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national identities in Europe» [Lewis 2007]. This Middle Eastern expert openly
stated the third wave of Islamization in the form of «terror and migration» [ibid.].
From completely different positions, there are researchers referring to the postco-
lonial category, who in Muslims, both those living in Europe and North America,
see the victims of prejudice and discrimination, while warning against the rise
of xenophobic and far-right moods. In addition, they are willing to parallel the
contemporary Muslims and Jews who are victims of Nazism. Due to the fact that
these scholars form a quite substantial and diverse collection both in terms of the
fields they represent and the languages in which they publish, in this paper I limit
myself to indicating those who are the most influential5. These scholars consider
the concept of Islamophobia as reference.
According to the French sociologist and political scientist Vincent Geisser6 in

Europe, we can observe a new form of Islamophobia, which, in addition to the “folk”
strata, includes “also the media and intellectual strata, and its media today become
media leaders and moral authorities (publishers, philosophers, writers, scientists)”
5
The dispute is also about Poland. In 2017, the thematic issue of the philosophical journal
Practice Theoretical was published, devoted to Islamophobia [Islamophobia. Contexts,
Practice Theoretical 2017, No. 4]. The inspiration for this publication was the reaction of
Polish society to the refugee crisis, which, as Monika Bobako wrote in the main text, became
an opportunity for “exposed elements of nationalist discourse” [Bobako, 2017: 9 Przemysław
Wielgosz analyzes the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the neomarkist spirit, claiming that
the fueled fear of Islam is “a tool of the neoliberal policy of” sharing and ruling “subordinate
classes in Europe and North America” [Wielgosz 2017: 38]. Interestingly, Wielgosz believes
that Gazeta Wyborcza lends its columns to spread Islamophobic content [ibid.: 39]. Jarosław
Gowin and Witold Waszczykowski, who “justifying the anti-refugee policy of the Polish
government in the media and on the international forum” [ibid.]. Marcin Starnawski treats
Islamophobia as a component of radical nationalist as well as racist and populist discourse
[Starnawski 2017: 62-84]. Ryszard Michalak discussed critically the Polish scientific narra-
tive operating on the problem of Islamophobia [Michalak 2019: 201-213; 2017a: 156-174].
There is also a broader bibliography on the subject.
6
As a side note, it is worth noting that the Polish edition of this book was published in
cooperation with the Muslim Association of Education and Culture, i.e. the community
associated with the Muslim League. This information may contribute to a deeper reflection
on the impact of stakeholders, in this case a Muslim religious organization, on scientific
discourse. Islamic communities represented by Saudi Arabia attempted to conclude an
agreement with the University of Warsaw regarding the construction of an Islamic study
center and mosque. This offer was ultimately rejected. As she admitted in an interview
with Rzeczpospolita, prof. Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo, then the dean of the Faculty of
Oriental Studies of the University of Warsaw “such proposals for financing the construction
of a center for Islamic or Arabic studies are submitted to many universities in Europe and
are often accepted” [Rybak, Czeladko 2010].
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[Geisser 2009: 128]. He accuses some academic critics of Islam of igniting fear, which
the scholar calls “alarmist tone”, as well as creating phantasms about the religion of
Muhammad and its followers. In his opinion, instead of focusing on “Islam experi-
enced and experienced by his followers,” some intellectuals are building his unreal
image, often doing so in the name of ideological struggle [ibid.: 129-130].
Some scholars go a step further, arguing that the modern West is flooded with
a wave of “post-fascism” (National Front in France, Northern League in Italy,
Pegida in Germany), which is a mutation of colonial and totalitarian ideology.
Under the influence of extreme-right moods, “Islamophobic laws were to be creat-
ed prohibiting wearing headscarves in public places.” According to Enzo Traverso,
an ally of Islamophobia as ‘new Western racism’ in today’s Europe remains the
‘neo-colonial and discriminatory concept of secularism’ [Traverso 2016: 19].
Similar voices coming from the world of science can also be heard in the United
States. One of the most important researchers using the concept of Islamophobia is
prof. John Esposito, who in view of the growing population of Muslims in Europe
and the US, sees the need for their integration [Esposito, 2002: 245-256], at the
same time recognizes as an obstacle in this process of prejudice against Muslims,
and also believes that it is Islamophobia, “ having long and deep roots “[Esposito
2019: 15], drives Islamic fundamentalism and translates into an increase in anti-
Western sentiment in Islamic diasporas [ibid.: 15-33]. Katarzyna Brataniec situates
the position of an American scholar in opposition to the concept of a clash of
Huntington’s civilization, reporting his position as follows:
According to John Esposito, the tendency to see the world in a convention of

simple opposites leads either to disregard and ignore different traditions and
cultures, or to treat them as strange, strange, mysterious, inferior to their own
culture. The world of civilization in conflict inevitably becomes a world of double
standards: one for countries from the same civilization circle and the other for
foreign countries [Brataniec 2009: 83].
A professor specializing in religious studies and international relations is also

considered one of the most influential Muslims in the world [Drembkowski 2012:
124], who popularizes his theses in the opinion-forming press.
In 2010, the Huffington Post published his article on Islamophobia. In the

text Islamophobia: A Threat to American Values?. He argued that “the legacy
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of terrorist attacks of September 11 and after September 11 was used by media

commentators, hardened Christian Zionists and politicians whose goal of incit-
ing fear is Islam and Muslims. Islamophobia is fast becoming for Muslims what
anti-Semitism is for Jews. Rooted in hostility and intolerance towards religious
and cultural beliefs and a religious or racial group, it threatens the democratic
structure of American and European societies” [Esposito 2010]. This voice was
criticized by a liberal Muslim living in Canada, Hasan Mahmud [2013], who
accused the scholar of “ignoring the fact that in our global village the West is
regularly flooded with reports of violence from Muslim communities; these acts
of violence are committed in the name of Islam, citing the Koran and citing the
Prophet, for example”. This discussion also reveals a broader interpretative aspect,
namely the role that Muslim texts legitimize or can legitimize violence, and what
role Western media and politicians have in driving anti-Muslim sentiment, and
which Muslim fundamentalists.
Despite many attempts to define this term, we do not have a clear and uncon-
troversial concept of “Islamophobia,” and we do not have criteria to separate
“Islamophobia” from rational and objective critique of Islamic doctrine (includ-
ing the impact of Islam’s political on global and local political reality, social and
cultural)7.
Being aware of the theoretical problems and controversies described above,

I propose a critical reflection on the functions of the concept of Islamophobia,
which it fulfills not only in scientific discourse, but also as a component of a specific
ideology or tool of political influence. In the dispute about the place of Islam and
Muslims in Europe and the world, the term is used by the identifying communities
with the left; they are also used by Muslim countries in international disputes.
I abstract here from the genre differences of the material being analyzed (scien-
tific statements, documents issued by non-governmental organizations, or media
statements). Behind this decision is the intention to show that, despite formal
During the sessions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, attempts
7
were made to adopt a clear and sharp definition of the concept of “Islamophobia”. Neither
the additional panel in 2013, nor the discussion that took place in 2016 in this respect were
fruitful. Stephan Cougulin drew conclusions from the discussion on this term during the
session, who generalized the current position as follows: “Asking for a clear definition of
Islamophobia, we received the following answers: 1) the concept of” Islamophobia “does
not apply to normal disputes; 2) manifestation of Islamophobia is the question about the
definition of “Islamophobia”; 3) no definition will be given because everyone knows what
it means; 4) Islamophobia should be criminalized” [Couglin 2016].
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differences, one can indicate a common space to use the term Islamophobia. Of
course, the “systemic” analysis of individual discourses requires separate research.
Currently, the most influential organization fighting Islamophobia is the

Organization for Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic
Conference), which, bringing together fifty-seven Muslim countries, undertakes
actions aimed at extending international prohibition on “discrimination” of
Islam, resulting in “penalisation of the crime of blasphemy manifested in disre-
spect for a given faith” [Gieryńska 2017: 126]. Turkish leader Recep Erdoğan and
NGOs such as Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA) are also
active in the field of “fighting Islamophobia”. At work, I critically analyze the
Islamophobia study – a challenge for everyone8 from 1997 constituting one of
the first documents on this subject, the “report” for 2016 created at the request of
the Turkish think-tank Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research,
representing the interests of the Turkish AKP [Bayrakli, Hafez 2017], as well as
the latest book publication by Monika Bobako, which partly based its argument
on the document of a Turkish organization [Bobako 2017: 359]. This material will
be used to develop a typology to use the instrumental of this concept.
2. The term “Islamophobia” in public discourse

The very sources of this term remain unclear. It seems reasonable to look at its
genesis in the literary and journalistic work of the French painter, Islamic neophyte
Étienne Dinet and writer Silman Ben Ibrahim, who jointly wrote the text The
life of Muhammad – the Prophet Allah. Islamophobia was intended to call the
intentional and misrepresentation of Islam in a bad light by journalists, oriental-
ists and politicians. The very concept was to fit into the semantic field of racism
[Piwko 2016: 161-165].
The analyzed term is referred to in various contexts and even loses its conceptual
focus. And so we come across him reading about the subject of literary work embed-
ded in a social context. The issue of Islamophobia is raised in relation to the work of
Oriana Fallaci or Michel Houellbecqu as the author of Submission [Modrzejewska
2017: 97-105]. However, with the difference that Fallaci is sometimes treated as the
founder of anti-Islamic discourse [Górzna 2015: 213-214], while Houellbecqua’s
writing is spoken of as being ‘able to capture social change’ [Modrzejewska 2017: 105].
8
This document was created as a result of an analysis – Islamophobia – its features and
threats. See Islamophobia a challenge for us all. Summary (https://www.runnymedetrust.
org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf)
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Perhaps one of the differences in the reception of the work of both writers is due
to the context in which they appeared in the circulation of their books. Critical of
Islamic publications of the Italian journalist were accompanied by protests from the
Muslim community. There were even attempts to bring the writer suffering from
cancer at the time to court. The premiere of the book by the French writer looked
completely different. At dawn on January 7, 2015, the cover of the “Charlie Hebdo”
magazine appeared as part of the promotion of the novel Submission, and at 11:30
Islamic terrorists killed satirists in the editorial office of the magazine.
Another context in which the concept of Islamophobia is used is Christian-Muslim

dialogue. Aldona Piwko drew attention to the problem of Islamophobia, on the one
hand noticing the problem of prejudice against Muslims, and on the other noticing
the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, which drives these attitudes partly [Piwko
2016: 161-182]. Michał Łyszczarz, a member of the Joint Council of Catholics and
Muslims, attributes the concept of Islamophobia to a broader phenomenon, i.e.
religious intolerance. At the same time, he indicates that this problem in Poland
concerns immigrants, not Polish Tatars, as they constitute a group well integrated
into society [Łyszczarz 2012: 80-82].
Islamophobia, according to some researchers and commentators, is to charac-

terize Polish society. Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska puts forward the thesis about
«platonic Islamophobia» [Górak-Sosnowska 2006, 2011], according to which Poles
should not be afraid of Islam, because Muslims are a very small minority on the
Vistula. At this point, the author overlaps two phenomena – criticism of Islamic
doctrine and dislike of Muslims [ibid.].
Adam Balcer speaks in a similar vein. In his opinion, the manifestation of

Islamophobia is the reluctance of Polish society to accept Muslim immigrants, as
well as the position on this issue expressed by the government of Beata Szydło or
the leader of Law and Justice. The presentation of Muslims «as the eternal persecu-
tors of innocent Christians» [Balcer 2016: 13-27] is to characterize the editorial
line of conservative magazines – the weekly «Do Rzeczy» and «wSieci». According
to the analyst, who made himself known to a wider audience as a supporter of
Turkey›s integration with the European Union, Polish anti-Islamism favors
Moscow›s interests.
The analysis of the examples cited shows that the use of the term Islamophobia
is to legitimize specific ideological attitudes or justify the theses, which are not
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so much a diagnosis of social reality, but a voice in current political disputes. For
proponents of the idea of ecumenism, expressed in the openness of some Catholic
communities to dialogue with Islam, the term Islamophobia will be used to mark
a distance to those who either do not believe in the value of Christian-Muslim
dialogue or are skeptical about it. In contrast, Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska›s
concept is used to express the belief that the Polish society is closed, which instead
of following the path marked by European elites, is subject to stereotypes and
unjustified fears. Adam Balcer, on the other hand, uses Islamophobia to mark his
dissatisfaction with the immigration policy of the Law and Justice government
and to define himself in opposition to conservative circles, understood both in
strictly political (ruling party) and journalistic (Do Rzeczy weekly categories)».
3. Distortion (disruptive) nature of the concept of “Islamophobia”

The notion of “Islamophobia” was introduced to the public discourse on a large
scale by the British NGO Runnymede Trust with the support of the Committee on
British Muslims and Islamophobia, publishing the report Islamophobia challenge
for all. According to its provisions, the media, scientists and politicians should
write about Islam in a predetermined manner, coordinated by the authorities,
which in 1997 implemented a project of social change in the spirit of multicultural
ideology. According to the provisions of this document, the “open” way of writing
about Islam has been contrasted with the “closed”. The vision of this concept in
Polish political science research was approved by, among others Sylwia Górzna
[2015: 203-224] and Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska [2010: 191-202]. This document
replaces the true – false opposition, with an open – closed dichotomy. For its
authors, not cognitive reliability was important, but “ideological correctness”.
And so Islam should be presented as:
1) „Diverse and constantly evolving, of which differences, debates and disputes

are an integral part”;
2) Influenced by other cultures and religions, as well as influencing other cultures
and religions – (Islam) a) has common values and aspirations (with the West);
b) willingly interacts with other cultures; c) enriches (Western culture);
3) «Different, but not defective, and deserving of respect»;
4) «Seen as a potential or actual partner in joint ventures»;
5) «True religious faith honestly practiced by his followers»9;
9
Islamophobia a challenge for us all. Summary, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/
publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf, access: 19.11.2017
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The proposed regulation also included a peculiar procedure for dealing with
criticism of Muslims made for Europe, Western society or the wider occidental
lifestyle, as well as reservations raised against Islam. According to the report,
disagreeing with Islam should go hand in hand with counteracting the exclusion
of Muslims and acts of hostility directed against them, while criticism of the West
formulated by Muslims should be carefully considered before anyone decides on
its legitimacy. The most controversial record from the point of view of Islamic
research was the order to treat Islam as a religion, while rejecting the definition
of Islam in ideological or political terms. The concept of “clash of civilizations”
as well as theses about the pursuit of political Islam to gain political advantage in
Europe should have been recognized as an expression of Islamophobia Of course,
this document did not have the power of a legal act, but it was an instruction for
entities operating in public space – both for NGOs and public institutions. These
recommendations are (also today) a point of reference for many NGOs, expert
groups and journalists. It is worth noting that the text was widely disseminated,
giving the “anti-Islamophobic” recommendations a leaflet. Undoubtedly, the image
of Islam contained in the document was clearly positive. To avoid being accused
of Islamophobia, Islam should be portrayed as diverse, compatible with Western
society, partner-like, honest and reasonably criticizing the West. According to this
political project of shaping social consciousness, Islam appears to be unequivocally
positive and its criticism is not only undesirable, but also unethical.
The Islamophobia documentary challenge should be treated as an attempt to

create a kind of taboo. In a free society, it is difficult to imagine formulating the
same recommendations for presenting any other religion or ideology. In a word,
the concept of „Islamophobia” has a distortion function, which manifests itself
in „providing arbitrarily controlled, transformed, fragmentary information”
[Markowski 2010: 1630] and disregarding postulates of semantics and language
logic [Jeziński 2009: 52-53]. This disregard is manifested in the rejection of postu-
lates fundamental for scientific methodology, such as the logical function of the
concept, the sharpness of the term, its predictive and objective nature [Frege 1977:
19-88]. In this case, it imposes a priori specific cognitive categories that de facto
make it impossible to formulate other conclusions about the studied reality, in
this case Islam, than those adopted in advance and recognized as binding, and
also forces positive evaluation of Islam. The image of the Muslim world created
on the basis of Islamophobia criteria, in principle, makes it impossible to take up
such problems as, for example, the authoritarian nature of Islamic legal doctrine
[Sadowski 2017a: 111-275; Sadowski 2017b: 105-115].
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4. Ideological and disparaging nature of the concept of “Islamophobia”

This concept is present not only in social discourse in the West, but also in
Poland. In 2012, the National Science Center decided to co-finance research on
the phenomenon of Islamophobia by awarding Dr. Monika Bobako a grant. In
2017, a publication entitled Islamophobia as a technology of power. This item
also does not solve the definition problems. So how is Islamophobia understood
in this publication?
Monika Bobako recognizes that „Islamophobia” is „a manifestation of fear, hostility,

contempt for Islam and Muslims” [Bobako 2017: 16]. This definition of the term
makes us decide on the motivation of individual entities, let’s add motivation, which
is not always given to us directly. By using this concept in this way, it is not possible
to distinguish legitimate criticism of Islam, e.g. as legal or political doctrine, from
hostility towards Muslims themselves. After all, there is a difference between writing
a critical review and showing contempt for the author, not to mention acts of violence
against him. This approach to the problem makes it impossible to separate the allega-
tions resulting from „fear, hostility and contempt” [ibid.], from those dictated by
concern for democracy or freedom guaranteed in the European and Polish legal
order. Interestingly, Monika Bobako considers Islamophobia as a belief in „signifi-
cant incompatibility of Islam with democracy” [ibid.: 119], as well as reservations
raised in relation to the status of women in Islam. In no way, however, the author
shows the compatibility of Islam and democracy, while ignoring the extensive bibli-
ography on the constitutional organization of Muslim societies and the social role of
women in Muslim communities [ibid.: 119-120]. The author claims that identifying
the contradictions between Islam and the values of Western societies is nothing but
a projection of fears. Let’s look at the quote:
Islamophobia can therefore be understood as a form that articulates the fears and
frustrations present in societies that have undergone neoliberal change, and thus
the mechanism that processes these fears and then redirects dissatisfaction and
anger to the scapegoat of Islam. According to this mechanism, Islam becomes
a screen on which Western societies project negative phenomena, i.e. political
objectification, degradation of women, irrationalism, and at the same time is
a contrast, a negative reference point, allowing these societies to maintain the
belief that in their essence they are free of these phenomena. [ibid.: 120].
Apart from the legitimacy of the parallel between the status of women in Islamic
communities and those in Europe, we can conclude that Monika Bobako is also
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subject to a kind of projection of fears of „continuation of the darkest threads

of European history” [ibid.: 378]. Let us add that in recent years Europe and
the United States are Muslims responsible for numerous acts of violence, and
these acts also fall under the „darkest” pages of Muslim history, about which
the author of Islamophobia… does not want to remember building her anti-
accidental narrative.
The term is a scholar entangled in a worldview dispute, seeing the sources of

Islamophobia in the belief that there is an „impassable alienation of (Muslim)
religion and culture, as well as a” substantial „incompatibility of Islamic values
with Western or (Judeo) Christian values” [ibid.: 17]. This assumption is in fact
a controversial thesis that can by no means become a cognitive axiom in social
sciences. First of all, this definition does not explain what values we are talking
about – axiological theory knows a number of different classifications; secondly,
can the statement that the concept of Quranic law is logically contrary to the
democratic order be considered a manifestation of hostility towards anyone? Using
this construction, one should indicate precisely what values and why should be
considered common to Islam and the West.
According to Monika Bobako, Islamophobia is a manifestation and discourse

about Islam that has little to do with reality. Rather, they are a projection of
fears and prejudices, and thus a self-assertive cognitive structure „ [ibid.: 17].
The question here is who and how decides which theses or concepts should be
considered as factual and which are „projections of fears and prejudices” [ibid.]?
Understanding the capacity and complexity of numerous problems associated
with the presence of Islam, this task, in fact, becomes difficult to do in one genera-
tion, even for a large group of researchers. This approach to the problem allows
usurping practices to decide which theses or concepts can be cognitively accepted
and which should be rejected. Each of them should be considered and rejected if
convincing counterarguments are found.
The author also states that the problem of Islamophobia „occurs in parallel with
other forms of xenophobia or racism” [ibid.: 18]. Here, there is no clear distinction
between ethically reprehensible acts of violence against anyone and critical of
Islamic doctrine. After all, it is impossible to recognize every dispute between
social groups as a potential incentive for violence. After all, the maximum limit
for any dispute is the health and life of the individual. Openly and unambigu-
ously condemn all acts of violence of which Muslims are the victims and whose
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perpetrators are Muslims, as well as those of which are the „indigenous” inhabit-
ants of Poland, Europe or any other country.
Meanwhile, analyzing terrorist attacks, violent or discriminatory practices

committed by followers of Allah, in connection with or against specific ideas
rooted in Islamic tradition, may be considered an unlawful generalization, ergo
manifestation of Islamophobia. In principle, this „peculiar sanction” leads to
the prohibition of contextual analysis of the activity of members of the Muslim
community, while accepting the analysis of individual actions of the inhabitants
of Europe in a very broad context – from colonial experiences, criticism of patri-
archy or capitalism, to broadly understood anthropological studies. In a word, the
actions, texts or ideas of a non-Muslim can be analyzed slowly through the prism
of maximum suspicion of racism, xenophobia or colonial impulses, but the use of
similar contextual tools to study supporters of jihad, sharia or broadly understood
political Islam – will be an example of hostile narrative for an activist fighting
Islamophobia and prejudice.
Undoubtedly, the concept of „Islamophobia” is a term – out of focus, abstract,

emotionally negative as well as ideologically burdened. Its use opens the door
to „psychologizing speculation,” allowing even arbitrary speech about explicit
motivations, and also puts the subject using this term in a „doubly” privileged
position – once – cognitively – so I decide who speaks according to facts and who
only expresses his prejudices – two – morally privileged – I decide about it, which
theses or concepts are ethically acceptable and which “create a climate of consent”
for racism and xenophobia. In a word, the concept of “Islamophobia” allows to
discredit in principle any critic of Islam who challenges or does not share the thesis
proposed in the Islamophobia report. This concept becomes a tool in the ideologi-
cal and political struggle that gives the possibility of a specific psychiatrization of
the opponent (phobia), compromising his thesis cognitively and morally himself.
The institutionalization of this concept by introducing it to scientific discourse
in Poland raises ethical doubts, as this concept can be used as a justification for
limiting the debate and freedom of scientific research. In addition, it destroys the
conceptual order characteristic of rational discourse, because it replaces the opposi-
tion ‘truth – false’, or more broadly ‘fortune – unfortunate’, an emotionally colored
and manipulative discussion of Islam in the false categories of ‘Islamophobia’
– ‘reliable knowledge of Islam, without prejudice’. Meanwhile, from a linguistic
point of view, the antonym of the concept of “Islamophobia” is “Islamophilia”,
which can be described as “a penchant for Islam”. So maybe it would be worth, next
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to Islamophobia, to examine the consequences of Islamophilic attitudes. Given the

primary and etymological meaning of the word phobia, it means “unreasonable
fear of something.” Well, to use this concept responsibly, it must be proved that
these fears, and neutrally speaking, fears are groundless.
The specific ‘career’ of the concept of ‘Islamophobia’, which includes circles of

journalists, journalists, NGOs, politicians, as well as analysts and scientists, creates
an intellectual climate that can be negative from the point of view of security
interests. Attempts to provide a reliable description of the ideological background
of Islamic terrorism, as well as activities for the social cohesion or integration
of Muslims in Europe, sometimes hinder the discourse in which the concept of
Islamophobia appears as a discrediting term – cognitively and morally [Adamska-
Rękawek 2016: 10-18].
5. Fighting Islamophobia as a tool of political influence of Muslim countries

The Islamic Cooperation Organization, which associates fifty-seven Muslim
countries, has been running the Islamophobia Observatory since 2008, which
regularly publishes “reports” on this issue. In addition to the chronicle of events
recognized as manifestations of Islamophobia, they also contain conclusions and
recommendations, and in the first document Islamophobia was associated with
“racial hatred, intolerance, prejudice, discrimination and building stereotypes
[2008: 8]. At the same time, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation adopted
the determinants of Islamophobia as the British proposal of 1997 discussed above,
and used the definition included in the report of the UN Human Rights Council
of August 21, 2007, according to which Islamophobia should be understood as
“unfounded hostility to and fear of Islam, and dislike of all Muslims or most of
them. “ OWI lists the following “root causes” of Islamophobia:
1) the belief that Islam spread with the sword (literally “lived the sword”), hates
and uses violence against unbelievers, and persisted to challenge the Western
way of life;
2) insufficient dissemination of information about Muslim victims of terror,
opposition of Muslim politicians and Islamic religious authorities to terror and
extremism;
3) abuse of freedom of speech by Western media, whose messages “hurt, insult
Muslims and carry prejudices and discrimination”.
4) no legal regulations to prevent the propagation of literature and statements
encouraging “religious and intercultural intolerance”.
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5) limiting the debate on intolerance and discrimination against Muslims to an

educated elite, which means that its content does not penetrate ordinary citizens.
6) the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes after the September 11 attacks by strengthen-
ing stereotypes, generalizations about Muslims, punishing all Muslims for the
marginal, unfortunate actions of some Muslims who unlawfully claim to act
in the name of Islam” [ibid.]. These theses become the basis for the postulates
submitted by the OWI, they include, above all, postulates to limit freedom of
speech, and especially criticism of Islam, hence the pressure on the international
community to introduce regulations in Europe and North America to combat
Islamophobia also understood as dissemination “ negative narratives “about
Islam. To this end, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, referring to the
provisions of the resolution signed A / HRC / RES / 16/18 of 24 March 201 [UN
Human Rights Council 2011], launched the so-called The Istanbul Process,
aimed at making the international community recognize Islamophobia as
a crime. Ultimately, these attempts, due to the indecisive attitude of President
Obama’s administration, were unsuccessful, although the Organization for
Islamic Cooperation is constantly postulating the creation of legal tools to
fight Islamophobia. In the July 2017 report, an example of an “Islamophobic
discourse” was the words of Francois Hollande, who said that “France has
a problem with Islam” or the sentence of Geert Wilders, saying that “Islam and
freedom do not interact with each other” [32]. It should be emphasized that OWI
rightly condemns acts of violence directed against Muslims or the aggressive
language of public debate, however, using the concept of “Islamophobia”, it
attempts to limit freedom of speech, equating Islam critics with those who are
ready to use direct violence, as well as stigmatizing politicians, who demand
a restriction on immigration from Muslim countries and those who recognize
the problems of the Muslim minority with integration.
OWI, using the term ‘Islamophobia’, among the victims of violence motivated
by religious hatred, in some sense distinguishes Muslims [Gieryńska 2017:
123-124]. Meanwhile, Muslims are both victims and perpetrators of violence.
It is impossible to stigmatize and combat manifestations of violence in public
space, of which Muslims are victims as Muslims, and at the same time support
the Muslim Brotherhood or other organizations seeking to introduce Sharia law in
Europe, and tolerate hatred preachers or the occurrence of Islamic radicals under
the sign of Yusuf Al- KaradawiegoIf the same amount of efforts as OWI puts in
the fight against Islamophobia would also put in the fight against anti-accidental
attitudes, then indeed the organization’s activity would serve to maintain global
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peace, and not strengthen Islam’s position as a political and legal doctrine in the
world. It should also be noted that if the members of the Organization for Islamic
Cooperation instead of using the concept of “Islamophobia” would adopt a more
general and non-differentiating religion, e.g. the concept of “religious discrimina-
tion”, then it would appear that many of these countries would have to undergo
very serious political changes, including on the rejection of Sharia law, which
by definition is based on three fundamental inequalities – a woman and a man,
a Muslim and an infidel as well as a free man and a slave [Sadowski 2013: 30].
6. “We understood too much, we questioned too little”

Reflection on the practical use of the concept of “Islamophobia” returned to the
British press due to an opinion poll conducted on a group of Muslims between
April 25 and May 31, 2015 commissioned by public television Chanell 4. According
to the presented data, 34 percent of Allah’s British followers would inform the
security service a loved one in the jihadist movement, 23 percent believe that
British law should be replaced by sharia in places where the Muslim community
is the majority, more than a third of Muslims are of the opinion that polygamy
should be legal, in a group of Muslims between 18 and 24 life percentage of similar
opinions is 35 percent. 39 percent of Muslims believe that wives should always
obey their husbands, one-third rejects total condemnation of stoning for adultery,
and 35 percent say that Jews in Britain have too much influence. More than half
of Muslims believe that homosexuality should be outlawed10.
This data provoked Trevor Phillips, former chairman of the Equality and Human
Rights Commission and co-author of the document Islamophobia challenge every-
one to verify their position on Muslim intercourse in Great Britain. The activist
in the essay being a commentary on the research results wrote:
This is a really scary discovery. Muslims with separatist views on how they want
to live in the UK are far more prone to supporting terrorism than Muslims with
opposite views. And there are too many separatist views to believe that we will
be able to gradually overcome this threat. “Liberal Muslims have been saying for
some time that our” live and let live others “approach has led to the development of
a climate in which extremist ideas thrive in Muslim communities in Great Britain.
Our politicians have tried to assure us that only an insignificant minority holds
T
10
he research data is contained in the document: Juniper Survey of Muslims 2015, 25.04
– 31.05.2015, ICM, https://www.icmunlimited.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mulims-
full-suite-data-plus-topline.pdf.
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such dangerous views. “Meanwhile, girls are sent for cliteridectomy, young women
and men are forced to enter into unwanted marriages, and teenagers are seduced to
wear suicide vests or, in the case of girls, become jihadist brides.” We understood
too much and questioned too little. In doing so, we have found ourselves in danger
of sacrificing a generation of young British people to values that are contrary to
the beliefs of most of us, including those of many Muslims” [Phillips 2016].
After broadcasting a documentary What do British Muslims really think? over 200
complaints have been received by the UK telecommunications regulatory authority.
There were also allegations of Islamophobia against the authors of the documentary
film and the company that carried out the study, as well as attempts to discredit the
methodology used. Accusations of methodological deficiencies were rejected by
the Chairman of the British Public Opinion Research Council John Curtice, who
said in an interview with the BBC journalist that the research company used the
report to use standard methods used in research on minorities living in the UK
[Greene 2016]. Maha Akeel, acting as Information Director of the Organization
for Islamic Cooperation in an article that appeared in the Independent, found
that publishing such data contributes to the rise of Islamophobic sentiment. In
his opinion, the media should not disclose them, because, as he put it, “distrust
between religious communities should be avoided” and that the results of these
studies fall into the hands of those who “hate” [Akeel 2016]. In a word, method-
ologically correctly conducted research in his opinion should be hidden, because
they show Muslims in an unfavorable light. The categories of truth and scientific
reliability should give way to ideological orthodoxy.
Conclusions:
1. The concept of „Islamophobia” serves some supporters of various ideas (e.g.
multiculturalism, liberalism, cultural relativism) to discredit the moral of the
opponent;
2. The concept of «Islamophobia» often has a distortion function, a priori stigma-
tizing any voices critical of Islam as allegedly contradictory to the facts, thus
preventing reliable understanding of this complicated matter of Islam and the
influence of Muslim communities on Western countries. As Ryszard Michalak
rightly notes:
The term ‘Islamophobia’ used in the scientific narrative of sociologists, politi-
cal scientists, culture experts or philosophers must raise serious methodologi-
cal and competence doubts. All references to phobia, i.e. anxiety [neurotic]
disorder, are the exclusive diagnostic competence of practicing psychiatrists,
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neuropsychiatrists and clinical psychologists (designations F40-F48 International

classification of diseases and health problems ICD-10, developed by the World
Health Organization). Islamophobia diagnosed by any of these specialists will
then have the status of a specific disorder [or its stage], most often occurring
within ecclesiogenic or ecclesiomorphic neurosis. The term ‘Islamophobia’ (here
consciously written in quotation marks), used in the social sciences and humani-
ties, however, results either from the reflective and uncritical methodological
uncertainty of researchers, or serves to consciously express their ideological
orientation (eg. Islamophilic, anti-eventalist, adhering to multiculturalism) and
is then part of an attempt to discredit different positions. Another, non-medical
context of reaching for «Islamophobia» and other «phobias» is to designate such
concepts as a tool of political struggle [Michalak 2017b: 302].
It should be noted, therefore, that the term «Islamophobia» for the designation
of a clinical unit does not raise methodological doubts, while as a term being
a component of rational discourse on cognitive ambitions one should treat it
with far-reaching reserve.
3. The concept of «Islamophobia» is detrimental to rational public debate, because
instead of focusing on the relevance or reference of truth-false judgments about
Islam and the Muslim community, it is proposed to introduce a kind of taboo
ordering to present Islam and its followers in a predetermined way.
4. The institutionalization of the concept of «Islamophobia» especially in Europe
and the United States is part of a broader strategy of most Muslim countries,
which is to criminalize all positions critical of Islam and Muslim practices. It is
no accident that the reports issued by the Organization for Islamic Cooperation
[Gierczyńska 2017: 123-129] contain the names of conservative politicians whose
goals should be considered contrary to the aspirations of many Islamic countries.
5. The notion of «Islamophobia» serves the purposeless reflection of criticism from
European countries and governments against undemocratic actions by Muslim
countries. The President of Turkey, responding to allegations of introducing
authoritarian orders over the Bosphorus by European politicians, replied that
«the Community’s attitude towards Turkey is characterized by Islamophobia»
[Lowe 2017].
6. A broad understanding of the concept of “Islamophobia” makes it possible
to equate a researcher, politician or journalist whose attitude towards Islam
is more critical than the one recommended in the British document from
1997 with a killing jihadist in the name of Allah. As Nilüfer Göle does, he
writes: “Jihadists as well as people affected by Islamophobia fight cultural
mixing and defend impossible identity, religious or national purity. That is
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why they sabotage common life, preventing debate and destroying meeting
places – some with verbal violence, some with physical violence “[Göle 2016:
285]. Well, it must be made clear that being an “Islamophobe” and criticizing
even bluntly Islam or Muslims is not the same as killing random and innocent
people. There is a difference in both the moral and legal classification of the
act of verbal offending or even insulting anyone and killing another person. If
we thoroughly analyze the scholar’s words, it should be said that by using the
concept of “debate” he simultaneously excludes from it those who do not share
the author’s enthusiasm in building a multicultural society, nor the proposal to
build a “post-Western Europe” in which its basic values will be negotiated with
Muslims e.g. the issue of Sharia [ibid.]. At this point, the author manipulates the
concept of “Islamophobia,” which due to its indeterminacy and abstractness,
easily undergoes similar operations.
7. The notion of “Islamophobia” falls not only into public debate, but also into
legal acts. It serves politicians or pressure groups to restrict freedom of speech
and sometimes even political or ideological persecution. Well, in a free and
democratic Europe or North America, contrary to the demands of some
researchers and representatives of many Muslim countries, no one is put in
prison because he presents a “narrative hostile to Islam”.
8. It is absolutely necessary to apply the provision contained in the Polish Penal
Code, penalizing incitement to violence, as well as to combat cases of discrimi-
nation regardless of who causes them and for what reasons.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Mariusz Sulkowski
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland
Orcid: 0000-0002-2317-3671
Two Cities and Two Orders

– jāhiliyyah by Sayyid Qutb
in the context of Saint Augustine’s thought
Abstrakt: W niniejszym artykule zestawione zostały dwie koncepcje dotyczą-
ce ładu politycznego – na tle myśli św. Augustyna ukazana została koncepcja
jāhiliyyah Sajjida Qutby. Jak podkreśla Erik Peterson doktryna wypracowana
przez św. Augustyna ostatecznie przekreślała możliwość tworzenia w ramach
chrześcijaństwa teologii politycznej – to co boskie i to cesarskie zostało rozdzie-
lone, chociaż możliwość współpracy między tymi dwoma porządkami została
zachowana. Tym samym w aspekcie polityki pojawiła się sfera świeckości.
Koncepcja przedstawiona przez Qutbę także akcentuje istnienie dwóch porząd-
ków, jednak w odróżnieniu od św. Augustyna porządki te nie mają charakteru
duchowego, a ściśle empiryczny. Władza i prawo Allaha powinno rozciągać się
na całość życia społecznego, politycznego i gospodarczego. Wszystko co się tej
wizji przeciwstawia, ujęte jest w kategorii rebelii przeciw Allahowi. Stąd konflikt
między tymi porządkami jest nie tylko nieunikniony, ale ma także charakter
egzystencjalny.
Słowa kluczowe: Sajjid Qutb, islamizm, fundamentalizm, św. Augustyn,
jāhiliyyah, państwo Boże
Abstract: This paper presents a comparison of two concepts of political order –

Saint Augustine’s thought is a background for the presentation of the jāhiliyyah
concept developedby Sayyid Qutb. As Erik Peterson emphasizes, the doctrine
developed by Saint Augustine ultimately eliminated the option of building politi-
cal theology within the framework of Christianity – the divine was separated from
the imperial. However, the possibility of cooperation between these two orders
was maintained. In consequence, the sphere of secularism appears in the aspect
of politics. The concept presented by Qutb also emphasizes the existence of the
two orders. However, unlikely to the Saint Augustine conception,these orders are
not spiritual but purely empirical. Allah’s rule and the law should extend over
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the entirety of the social, political and economic life. Whatever stays is contrary
to this vision, is classified as a sort of rebellion against Allah. Therefore, the
conflict between the two orders is not only unavoidable but also have anexistential
character.
Keywords: Sayyid Qutb, Islamism, fundamentalism, Saint Augustine, jāhiliyyah,
city of God
Introduction
There can be no doubt as to the fact that Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is one of the
most prominent and at the same time most controversial 20th-century thinkers
associated with the Islamic renaissance period (as-Sahwah) [al-Mehri 2006: 7;
Black 2011: 309], whose range of influence has spread far beyond Egypt. When
Qutb started his public activity, he took nationalistic and anti-British position1,
yet he gradually moved towards a more Islamic stance. In 1948, as an employee of
the Ministry of Education, he was sent by his superiors to the United States, in the
hope that his anti-Western attitude could be somehow mitigated. Qutb returned
to Egypt on 20 August 1950 [Khatab 2006a: 2]. The consequences of his stay in the
United States were opposite to those intended by his superiors; Qutb became an
uncompromising antagonist of the Western civilization, which he identified with
materialism, racism, promiscuity, militarism and moral primitivism, Zionism
and bias against Islam2. Since then, he associated with the Muslim Brotherhood,
to become the natural successor for Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood’s founder
and leader, who was murdered in 1949. In 1953, Qutb became editor-in-chief
of the Society’s official gazette (‘al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). With his radicalized
views and calls for Islamization of the State, he was on a colliding course with the
Revolutionary Council, in power since 1952, which was taking a more secularist
path. In 1954, the government prohibited the functioning of the Brotherhood,
arresting about four thousand people, including Sayyid Qutb, who was sentenced
to 15 years in prison. He stayed there, except a short episode of several months3,
continuously until his death in 1966. The period of his imprisonment was charac-
terized by the further radicalization of Qutb’s views. At the same time, he wrote
whis two key works – namely the multiple-volume commentary on the Qur’an:
4
– In the Shade of the Qur’an and the Signposts on the Road, or Milestones (Ma’alim
1
He was a member of a nationalist party Wafd.
2
In Qutb’s memoirs [Qutb 1951], you can find out more about Qutb’s views about America.
3
Qutb was out of prison from December 1964 to August 1965.
4
Commentary to the Qu’ran.
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fi’l-tareeq). In the second book, which he wrote two years before he passed away,
Qutb clearly and unambiguously presented his viewpoint on the status and role
of Islam in the contemporary world, by referring to the concept of jāhiliyyah and
defined the primary goal to be pursued by Muslims as setting up an Islamic state
[Khatab 2006b: 7]. In this aspect, it would be valuable to confront Qutb’s thought
with that of Saint Augustine, presented in his monumental work The City of God.
The theological doctrine developed by Saint Augustine ultimately legitimized the
autonomy of the religious and the secular. Both Saint Augustine and Qutb assume
the existence of two orders – divine and earthly, yet their mutual relationship is
defined in a completely different way.
In this context, here is the fundamental research question: what is Islamic

fundamentalism? Which model of the relationship between the City (State) of
God and the earthly state is applied in Saint Augustine’s theology? What is the
meaning of jāhiliyyah in Qutb’s reasoning? What form of a relationship between
the Islamic state and the jāhiliyyah is assumed in Qutb’s model? If these models
differ, what might be their political consequences? It is claimed in this paper
that Sayyid Qutb’s concept defining the relations between the Islamic state and
the jāhiliyyah converges in some aspects with the concept of the two cities by
Saint Augustine5. However, this concept is entirely different in its fundamental
point, namely the relationship between the divine order and the worldly order.
Saint Augustine’s theology is not only based on the assumption of simultaneous
continuity of these two orders in time but also on their collaboration to maintain
peace on Earth. Qutb’s thoughts about this matter are uncompromising – the state
must be ultimately (and completely) founded on Islamic principles; otherwise, it
would become jāhiliyyah and hence remain under Satan’s rule. Consequently, any
collaboration between these two communities becomes impossible.
These fundamental theological assumptions bear significant consequences for

politics. Whereas Saint Augustine’s theology leads to a model in which religion not
only abstains from contesting but even supports politics and its secular character –
jāhiliyyah in Qutb’s model –must be eliminated and replaced by Allah’s Sharia law.
The fight, or jihad, thus becomes unavoidable until God’s order is implemented
completely and ultimately on Earth.
5
The similarities between the thought of Saint Augustine and Qutb were noted by A. Black,
see: [Black 2011: 310].
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Islamic fundamentalism
Islamic fundamentalism is among the most significant challenges faced by the
contemporary world. It is not only evidenced by the subsequent stages of the
struggle with Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, or the terrorist attacks by radical
Islamic fighters in Europe. Also, a highly fundamentalistic interpretation of the
Qu’ran exists among Muslims living in Europe [Koopmans 2015: 43] (together
with the fact that this community is growing continuously [PEW 2017]), which
should raise concerns about a deeper insight into that phenomenon. As J. Jansen
notes, we need a theologian’s outlook to understand what fundamentalism is about.
Fundamentalism is not a protest against being poor. To think so is simply unsophis-
ticated. [Jansen 2005: 23].
Only the theological perspective will reveal the intellectual background of the
concepts and, at least as importantly, the actions of Islamic fundamentalists.
Without this perspective, the insight will not only be reductionist but in fact,
it will fail altogether, while its explanatory value will become negligent: … it
transpires, in a completely obvious manner,… that fundamentalism, according
to all the applicable standards, is a religion and not a mere political ideol-
ogy. It is also at the same time a political movement and an ideology. Modern
political science categories do not fit and are irrelevant [Jansen 2005: 30]. The
dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism, which is both religious and political,
has some major consequences for religion itself as well as for politics. In this
article, we follow Jansen’s definition of fundamentalism as a set of beliefs that
draws modern political power into the realm of religion; it offers a religious
approach to political power. It wants power in order to coerce mankind into
obeying God’s commands; it even wants to enforce the advent of the Kingdom
of God itself. [Jansen 2005: 24]. Fundamentalists relentlessly strive for the
implementation of the divine order, and their actions are motivated by religion.
As Jansen bluntly notes, the desire to murder got its theological justification
from Sayyid Qutb [Jansen 2005: 216].
To be able to perceive the weight of the essential presumptions adopted

by Islamic fundamentalists, we must first refer to a point of reference and
comparison, i.e. the model which constituted the relationship between State
and religion in Europe, based on the evangelical distinction between the divine
and the imperial (Mt 22, 21), elaborated upon from the theological perspective
by Saint Augustine.
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As Voegelin emphasizes, the social order in the Middle Ages was constituted by
three sources of authority: the emperor, the philosophy, and the Revelation6. These
sources were intertwined and their relationships formed the rule of the Western
governance: when these three authorities retained their relative autonomy, holding
each other in check, without anyone overpowering the others, order prevailed. Yet
whenever one of them absorbed the others or take over all the three functions, disor-
der ensued. [Voegelin 2003: 337]. Voegelin points out that in a totalitarian state,
the ruler would also cover spiritual leadership with the ideological coat. Based
on the foundations of the rule of Western governance, a new space was formed in
Europe for civic liberties [Acton 2006: 33]. The presentation of Islam in Qutb’s
categories means an endeavour to combine all these three power functions within
a single hand, thus giving rise to a serious question about the totalitarian character
of the Islamic state.
Saint Augustine – the two cities

Saint Augustine (354-430) was the first theologian in the history of Christianity
who took up a systematic review and description of the Church and State relation-
ship. In response to the political status of the declining Roman Empire, he wrote
a monumental treaty entitled The City of God, where he analyzed the essence of
the relationship between the City (State) of God and the earthly state. It should
be emphasized at this early stage of analysis that neither the divine state nor the
earthly state can be identified in the categories of empirical institutions [Voegelin
1997: 214]. The City of God is a transcendent community, not identifiable with
any historical institution. As E. L. Fortini points out, these communities are called
‘cities’ by way of analogy only. The City of God is not a separate political community
that would exist along with others, based on God’s law. … Both the City of God
and the worldly city extends beyond the borders of individual political communi-
ties; neither can be identified with any specific city or kingdom [Fortin 2010: 201].
Although the City of God shows itself empirically on Earth, it is still a transcendent
category. This is understandable if we consider the fact that for Saint Augustine,
religion is mainly something that concerns the human soul and heart: ‘there’, in
its transcendent space, is where real cult happens and genuine respect is given to
God:… we honour Him with the sweetest incense when, in His sight, we burn with
6
In his commentary to the thought of Saint Augustine, E. L. Fortin notes that while philoso-
phy deals with the truths generally accessible to all human beings, forming a natural meeting
place for believers with nonbelievers. Only with philosophy can a Christian make their position
comprehensible for others and, if need be, oppose any claims that may be raised against them,
with their own weaponry [Fortin 2010: 183n].
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pious and holy love; to Him we devote and surrender his gifts in us and ourselves …
to Him we offer on the altar of our heart the sacrifice of humility and praise, kindled
by the fire of love [Augustine 1977, X.3; vol. I, p. 444n]. Also, Saint Augustine links
the etymology of the word religion with the word religerent – to choose (God);
hence, its meaning indicates an action of will and reason instead of something
external to the human being7.
As Saint Augustine says, the holy city is above among the holy angels, yet it bears
citizens here on Earth, too [Saint Augustine 1977: XV 1, p. 165]. So what is the
essence of citizenship in one or another city? Now citizens are begotten to the
earthly city by nature vitiated by sin, but to the heavenly city by grace freeing nature
from sin [Saint Augustine 1977: XV.2, p. 167]. Hence, the determining categories
are not any external, earthly acts of law, even Church law, but rather spiritual
categories, i.e. grace and sin. Mere formal membership of the Church does not
warrant being a citizen of the City of God. By remaining within the Church in its
“institutional” aspect only, sin can deprive a person of grace and such a person
will then cease to be a part of the City of God – these are people whose morals
are utterly corrupt but who think they are safe because they persevere, in a way, in
communion with the Catholic Church… Such people, by the wickedness of their lives,
abandon Christ [Saint Augustine 1977: XXI, 25.4, p. 542]. Therefore, paradoxically,
a person who is perceived as a Christian can internally belong to the earthly city
[Kornatowski 1965: 67]8. Grace builds the city of God, whereas sin constitutes
the earthly city. In this context, we can read the probably most famous thought
of the entire treaty by Saint Augustine: Two loves have built two cities: the love of
self, which reaches even to contempt for God, the earthly City; and the love of God,
which reaches even to contempt for self, the heavenly City [Saint Augustine 1977:
XIV.28, p. 162].
At the same time, Saint Augustine claims that the earthly city through its rulers
or the nations it conquered is controlled by a desire to rule [Ibid., p. 163]. Does this
presentation imply that the institution of a city (state) is inherently evil? Absolutely
7
Being attached to Him, or rather let me say, re-attached – for we had detached ourselves and
lost hold of Him, – being, I say, re-attached to Him, we tend towards Him by love, that we
may rest in Him, and find our blessedness by attaining that end … [Augustine 1977, X.3;
vol. I, p. 444n].
8
Saint Augustine emphasizes that it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible, for a person
to determine whether another person is honest or not, due to the fact that the state of the
soul is not perceivable by senses. In-depth cognition is reserved for God only [see Augustine
1953: 205].
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not; for the reason of the original sin, the city is a necessary institution. Moreover,
this situation is not limited to a Manicheic duality – the two cities are somehow
intertwined for the time being, or amalgamated in this world [Saint Augustine 1977:
XI.1, p. 6]. This amalgamation continues until they are separated through the Last
Judgment and each of them reaches its proper end, which will be without end [Saint
Augustine 1977: XVIII, 54, p. 388]. From the perspective of Christian theology,
the final separation of the two cities throughout history is neither possible nor
desirable. The weeds grow intermixed with the wheat up to the time of harvest
[Augustine 1977: XX,9, p. 457]. Only at the end of history, on the day of the Last
Judgment, will God Himself separate the two.
This intermixing is also demonstrated through the fact that a Christian is a double
citizen – of the City of God as well as an earthly city. The earthly city, i.e. the
empirical one, is a source of particular goods which help Christians throughout
their lives, while the designation of the City of God is not to replace that commu-
nity, but rather to strengthen it by supplying benefits carried by the City of God, or
resources appropriate for accomplishing a higher goal than any goal towards which
a civic community could lead by itself [Fortin 2010: 202]. On the one hand, Saint
Augustine’s theology uniquely revolutionizes the predominant social relations. On
the other hand, it preserves the incumbent political status:… as the heavenly City is
wayfaring on earth, she invites citizens from all nations and all tongues, and unites
them into a single pilgrim band. She takes no issue with that diversity of customs,
laws, and traditions whereby human peace is sought and maintained—[Augustine
1977: XIX, 17 (vol. II, p. 424)]. The heavenly City crosses all references to ethnicity,
nation, language or custom, and at the same time… Instead of nullifying or tearing
down, she preserves and appropriates whatever in the diversities of diverse races is
aimed at one and the same objective of human peace, provided only that they do not
stand in the way of the faith and worship of the one supreme and true God [Ibidem].
Hence, the understanding of Christianity or the very phenomenon of religion in

the West refers in its central point to faith, whereas it is not understood primarily
as the law revealed in a divine way, governing every action and opinion, dedicated
to replace the earthly laws people comply with. … The only practices it opposes are
those condemned by reason itself, as offensive or immoral [Fortin 2010: 206].
Consequently, Saint Augustine’s theology prevents and hinders the formation of

any orthodox political theology within the framework of Christianity. Any expec-
tation of God’s City to be realized on Earth has no theological basis whatsoever
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[Fortin 2010: 203] and is an inherently failed concept. E. Peterson emphasizes in

his polemic dispute with Carl Schmitt that through orthodox Christian theology,
this ‘political theology’ was abandoned, as it misused the word of Gospel to justify
the political situation. Something like ‘political theology’ can only exist against the
background of Judaism or paganism [Peterson 2012: 58]. Within the Christian
theological reflection, the political project of a God’s State on earth has been
considered heresy. It is only the Church and not the State to be perceived as
a rearing institution [Fortin 2010: 190]. Salvation is only possible in the Church
and not in a political community.
Yet even the existence of cooperation between the City of God and the earthly city
in respect of achieving peace on Earth has not prevented Augustine from doubting
whether the arrival of Christianity will not cause wars to disappear. The earthly
city will not be able to elude wars because earthly rulers have always been striving
and will continue to strive to take hold of continuously larger areas of land and
greater power [Augustine 1977: IV, 3 (vol. I, p. 221)]. Moreover, he opposed any
human guesswork announcing the arrival of an era of peace for the Church; on
the contrary, the Church will be persecuted until the end of time and the coming
of the Antichrist [Augustine 1977: XVIII, 52 (vol. II, p. 382)]. Augustine’s realistic
approach to this matter is evident9.
The theology taught by Saint Augustine, based on the evangelical separation of

the divine and the imperial (Mt 22,21), was implemented in practice at the point
in time when Christians began to hold significant political offices in the Empire10.
The situation became extremely burdensome when the Christian emperor
Anastasius I tried to influence the development of the Catholic doctrine. When the
emperor began to support the heresy of monophysitism, he was instructed by Pope
Gelasius I that… obviously, Emperor Augustus, there are two supreme authorities
that rule this world: the sanctified gravity of the bishops and the emperor’s superior-
ity [Gelasius 1986a: 167]. In this way, the Church reserved for itself a monopolistic
position on resolving matters of a theological nature. The Pope further emphasized
that this separation was transpiring from Christ’s will, as Christ – considering
the imperfection of human nature – thus distinguished between the offices of both
9
T he paradox of striving towards peace and at the same time the unavoidability of war in
the earthly world is also emphasized by E. Gilson, see: [Gilson 1953: 229].
10
Initially, they were emperor’s officers converted from pagan beliefs. The first accounts of
Christians holding important offices in the Empire date back to the second half of the 3rd
century, see: [Euzebius of Caesarea 2013: VIII,6 (p. 567); VIII 9 (p. 575)].
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powers according to their own proper activities and separate dignities, wanting His
people to be saved by healthful humility and not carried away again by human
pride, so that Christian emperors would need priests for attaining eternal life and
priests would avail themselves of imperial regulations in the conduct of temporal
affairs… Thus the humility of each order would be preserved, neither being exalted
by the subservience of the other, and each profession would be especially fitted for
its appropriate functions [Gelasius 1986b: 171]. In this way, the principle of the
Western governance, consisting of a distinction between the two orders and their
respective fields of activity, began to constitute Europe’s political and religious
order [Halecki 1950: 47].
Qutb – the two states

Sayyid Qutb’s thought, too, is based on a separation of reality into two communi-
ties, this time the Islamic one and the jāhiliyyah. According to its classic defini-
tion, jāhiliyyah means the age of ignorance and barbarity [Goldziher 1966: 202]11
and is generally used to negatively define the moral and religious state of the
society of Arabia during the pre-Islamic period [Encyclopedia of Islam 2004: 370;
Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān 2001: 37]. In this meaning, jāhiliyyah became a closed
chapter of history, with the victory of Islam. Yet Ibn Taymiyyah (deceased 1328)
linked this term to pre-Islamic customs maintained among the Muslims of his
time. For Ibn Taymiyyah, the reality of the jāhiliyyah was not a description of the
past, but of the present. The same path was taken by Muhammad Abd al-Wahhāb,
living in the 18th century (founder of Wahhabism) or, in the 20th century, by
such thinkers as Muhammad Rashīd Ridā (deceased 1935), Abū l-‘Alā’ Mawdūdī
(deceased 1979) and, finally, by Sayyid Qutb.
Qutb defines jāhiliyyah in the context of the Qu’ran sūrahs 41-50 V which, as he
points out, discuss the most important issue of the Islamic faith and its codes of
living and justice… of government, law and the administration of justice in matters
of dispute [Qutb 2009: 90]. Referring to the concept of jāhiliyyah as the term is used
in the Qur’an (pagan ignorance), Qutb explains that it … means that people are
ruled by people, because this signifies that they submit to one another. They refuse
to submit to God alone and reject His Godhead, acknowledging instead that some
human beings have qualities of Godhead and hence they submit to their (human
– M.S.) authority. As such, the term pagan ignorance, or jāhiliyyah, does not refer
I. Goldziher emphasizes that the word jāhiliyyah carries a strong pejorative axiological
11
burden, involving brutality, aggression, wildness and cruelty, generally opposed to the
gentleness of Islam. More about the origins of the concept, see: [Goldziher 1966: 201-208].
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to a particular period of time (i.e. to pre-Muslim Arabia – M.S.), but to a certain

situation which may come into existence at any time. Whenever it exists, it must
be described as jāhiliyyah, which is in contrast to Islam [Qutb 2009: 112; see also:
Qutb 2006: 160]. Hence, anything which is not Islam, which is not expressed in
the Islamic state and the Islamic culture, is jāhiliyyah [see: Qutb 2006: 106, 123].
Two societies do exist, but without Augustine’s intermixing; there is only the
uncompromising either-or. … Anyone who does not wish to be ruled by God’s law
actually desires to be ruled by the law of pagan ignorance. It is at this point that the
two ways part and people are left to their choices. … It is either Islam or jāhiliyyah,
faith or unfaith, the rule of God or the rule of pagan ignorance. Those who choose not
to judge in accordance with what God has revealed are unbelievers, wrongdoers and
transgressors. People who do not accept God’s law are not believers [Qutb 2009: 113].
Qutb’s vision does not encompass an “institution of double citizenship” – either

one is a member of a society ruled by Allah’s law or of a society ruled by jāhiliyyah
laws [Qutb 2006: 106]. Whereas for Saint Augustine, the categories of the City of
God and the earthly city were derived from the spiritual realm instead of being
empirical categories, Islam and jāhiliyyah for Qutb are concepts that describe
the reality we experience empirically. Among other reasons, this is because in
the Islamic order, the Church does not exist as a separate institution. B. Lewis
notes that the state was the church and the church was the state [Lewis 2003: 119].
The sacral and spiritual essence of the Church has been incorporated into the
framework of a political community.
Qutb’s uncompromising stance on this matter is very prominent when compared

to the position taken by Saint Augustine. As it has already been emphasized
before, according to the author of The City of God, Christians maintain a lot
of ‘earthly’ customs and laws, under one condition only: that these are not in
opposition towards honouring God and God only. However, when Qutb considers
the grandeur of the generation of the Companions of the Prophet, he postulates
a complete departure from anything which is not Islamic: purified from the influ-
ence of all other sources, free of the Greek philosophy and logic, ancient Persian
legends and their ideas, Jewish scriptures and traditions, Christian theology, and,
in addition to these, fragments of other religions and civilizations [Qutb 2006: 31].
Hence, all the problems faced by Muslims are due to non-Islamic influences, which
should always be perceived as negative by their very nature. If Islam is again to play
the role of the leader of mankind, then it is necessary that the Muslim community
be restored to its original form [Qutb 2006: 25]. The purity of the original form,
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expressing complete submission to Allah, is the only criterion by which Islam can
be differentiated from jāhiliyyah. Diversion from the original purity was caused by
the fall of Islam. Therefore Muslims today should remove [themselves] from all the
influences of the Jāhiliyyah… return to that pure source. Here, the Manicheic view
of reality is particularly prominent. All the relations with ignorance should be cut
off [Qutb 2006: 33]. This shift should be comprehensive, involving our concepts
of life, our principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of
life…. Jahili society… is not worthy to be compromised with [Qutb 2006: 34n]. Qutb
emphasizes that the chasm between Islam and Jāhiliyyah is great, and a bridge is
not to be built across it so that the people on the two sides may mix with each other
[Qutb 2006: 156], whereas any attempt at building a system that would encompass
these two components is doomed to fail [Qutb 2006: 149] because God does not
forgive any association with His person [Ibidem].
Whoever attempts at mixing these two orders is Shirk – a polytheist who usurps his
right to hold God’s power. The category of Shirk (polytheism) is not just a narrowly
defined theological category. Polytheism also occurs when a person attributes
God’s power to himself, for example, by creating the laws instead of abiding them.
By reference to the Qu’ran, Qutb claims that Allah is the only legitimate legislator
[Qutb 2006: 67]. It is a critical point in Qutb’s thought: whereas in the Western
culture, religion is mainly conceived as faith (even though the latter is dead without
deeds – Jacob 2,17) and a personal bond with God, Qutb would emphasize the
prevalence of the law. To become an Islamic society, it will not suffice for a group
of people to call themselves that, as Westernized Muslim scholars would also do
[Qutb 2006: 86]; it is not even sufficient to regularly perform one’s duties such
as prayer, fasting, or pilgrimage (al-Hajj). The decisive factor is the compulsory
status of Shari’ah, the Islamic law. The Islamic society is not one in which people
invent their own version of Islam, other than what God and His Messenger-peace be
on him-have prescribed and explained, and call it, for example, ‘progressive Islam’
[Qutb 2006: 106]. Speaking of the Islamic creed There is no deity except Allah, and
Muhammad is the Messenger of God cannot remain as a mere declaration in the
heart of an individual Muslim person. Faith should materialize as an active group
that will cut itself off from the jahili society and become independent. At the centre
of such a community, there should be a new leader, who would break the relation
of loyalty towards the old order and remain loyal to the new Muslim community
[Qutb 2006: 58]. This is the context in which Qutb’s memorable words about the
essence of Islam appear: The people ought to know that Islam means to accept
the creed “La ilaha illa Allah” in its deepest sense, which is this: that every aspect
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of life should be under the sovereignty of God, and those who rebel against God’s
sovereignty and usurp it for themselves should be opposed [Qutb 2006: 48]. Every
force perceived as one that refuses God’s order and power is treated as rebellion.
Religion in this version bears an obligation to carry certain external consequences,

i.e. to seize the political power and to implement the Shari’ah: wherever an Islamic
community exists… it has a God-given right to step forward and take control of the
political authority so that it may establish the Divine system on earth, while it leaves
the matter of belief (sic! – M.S.) to individual conscience [Qutb 2006: 86]. Hence, it
is mandatory to comply with Shari’ah, God’s law, which by its very nature, encom-
passes the public field, whereas personal beliefs one holds in their heart remain
private. Allah’s rule must be established on earth, not just as a spiritual reality but
as a very concrete one, empirical and practical: to establish God’s rule means that
His laws be enforced and that the final decision in all affairs be according to these
laws [Qutb 2006: 68]. Thus, the assessment of a deed, particularly a political one,
does not depend on its intentions but only on the consequences. This uniquely
“behavioristic” approach is completely inconsistent with Christian ethics.
In this concept, the separation of State from religion, the distinction of two powers
and their respective fields of competence not only becomes groundless, but as
a matter of fact, it becomes the worst of all sins: Shirk. Qutb does not leave any doubt
in this matter, claiming that Islam initiates the constitution of law and injunctions,
rules and regulations [Qutb 2006: 44]. Thus, Islam is a religion and a state at the
same time. Khatab emphasizes that for Qutb, State is not just some blurred concept,
but a community with one and only overlord – Allah, holding the complete power
hakimiyyah. He is also the only source of authority [Khatab 2006b: 8]. A true Muslim
lives according to the Shari’ah or strives to implement Shari’ah – one should accept
the Shari’ah without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. This
is Islam. There is no other meaning of Islam [Qutb 2006: 48]. Qutb’s radicalism rules
out any links to Saint Augustine’s understanding of religion.
Another crucial matter, which is reviewed by political scientists with increasing

frequency, concerns the completeness, or the totality of Islam, i.e. the extent of
Allah’s rule on earth and the human obligations arising from there. In Qutb’s
terms, Shari’ah covers not only purely legal matters but also attitudes, the way of
living, the values, criteria, habits and traditions, which are legislated and affect
people [Qutb 2006: 108]. There is a prominent link between the range of matters
covered by Islam and social/political activism. Islam should not focus on the theory
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of faith, but rather transform this faith into a living reality [Qutb 2006: 50], whereas
the object of this religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth
[Qutb 2006: 83]. Islam constructs its foundation of belief and action on the principle
of total submission to God alone [Qutb 2006: 99]. Hence, Islam comprises the
entirety and the totality of political and social life.
The above provides grounds for Qutb to conclude about the Jihaad obligations,
existing for the following reasons: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to
arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish
all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man
over others. … The Jihaad of Islam is to secure complete freedom for every man
[Qutb 2006: 81]. Promoting Islam is just the first step, which will be followed by
a confrontation of forces with non-Muslim society [Danecki 1991: 124].
In the context of the requirement to fully submit to Allah, we notice the Manicheic
tendency to present anything other than Islam (anything jahili) as an enemy of
Islam – In the world there is only one party of God; all others are parties of Satan and
rebellion [Qutb 2006: 130]12, For human life, there is only one true system, and that is
Islam; all other systems are Jahiliyyah [Qutb 2006: 131]. Whereas a certain duality can
be observed in Saint Augustine, this distinction still remains spiritual in nature. For
Qutb, on the other side – the non-Islam – is an empirical category, and the measures
undertaken towards it have a practical dimension, both political and military. There
is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), and
it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari’ah is the authority
and God’s limits [limits set by God – M.S.] are observed, and where all the Muslims
administer the affairs of the state with mutual consultation. The rest of the world is the
home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb) [Qutb 2006: 131]. As regards Dar-ul-Harb, a Muslim
can be in a state of war or a state of peace, based on an arrangement13.
Qutb emphasizes that even possible discontinuation of attacks on Islam will not
change Islam’s attitude towards the society of ignorance until they pay the Jizya
tax, which will imply surrender [Qutb 2006: 84]14. The effort (Jihaad) takes up
12
Here, Qutb references surah 4,76: Those who believe fight in the way of Allah, and those who
disbelieve fight in the way of the Shaitan. Fight therefore against the friends of the Shaitan!
13
For more insight into the practical aspect of the division into Dar-ul-Islam and Dar-ul-Harb
in the contemporary world, see [Bar 2003].
14
An interesting matter in this context is the status of Christians, who – along with Jews – are
called the People of the Book in the Qu’ran. Qutb emphasizes that until Christians submit to
Shari’ah and pay the jizya tax, they should be treated as Shirk – polytheists [Qutb 2006: 94].
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the form of direct confrontation, which broke into pieces all those walls which were
standing between man and the truth [Qutb 2006: 49]. After annihilating the tyran-
nical force, Islam establishes a new social, economic and political system, in which
the concept of the freedom of man is applied in practice [Qutb 2006: 70]. Qutb’s
radicalism is inherently linked to a Utopian belief not just in the necessity but in
the practical possibility of building a new world: Islam did not come to support
people’s desires, which are expressed in their concepts, institutions, modes of living,
and habits and traditions, whether they were prevalent at the advent of Islam or are
prevalent now, both in the East and in the West. … It has come to abolish all such
concepts, laws, customs and traditions, and to replace them with a new concept of
human life, to create a new world on the foundation of submission to the Creator
[Qutb 2006: 148]. The intention to create a new concept of human life and a new
world reveals both his deep aversion towards the old reality and the radicalism
of his choice of resources. Qutb emphasized that to leave the miserable state of
mankind, people cannot allow themselves the comfort of small changes, but the
actual transformation needs to be vast and far-reaching [Qutb 2006: 151, 153]15. If
anyone claims that it is possible to adapt Islam to Jahiliyyahh, he is not a Muslim
[Qutb 2006: 154]16.
Conclusions
The presentation of Islam in Qutb’s categories is an endeavour to combine all
these three power functions in a single hand, thus giving rise to a serious question
about the totalitarian character of the Islamic state.17. Concerning Voegelin’s
words, we should conclude that the political and religious order defined by Qutb
is strictly anti-Western and represents the maximum disorder. The two states not
only cannot be intertwined but even have any common points – where Islam is,
jāhiliyyah is not allowed Shari’ah, the law of Allah, becomes a tool for structuring
the political and social reality. According to that law, anything “outside” Islam
must be subordinated. Paradoxically, the vision of creating a new world reveals
certain gnostic aspects of Qutb’s political thinking; in this perspective, it places
Islam on equal terms with such ideologies as Communism, striving to set up
a kingdom of freedom on earth.
15
The truth is that Islam not only changes concepts and attitudes, but also the system and
modes, laws and customs, since this change is so fundamental that no relationship can remain
with the jahili way of life, the life which mankind is living [Qutb 2006: 153].
16
In this context, it would be reasonable to look at any attempts at building the so-called
Euroislam, a version of Islam which would be consistent with the European values.
17
More about the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and totalitarianism: see also
[Bäcker 2004: 83-98].
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Islam is presented, on the one hand, as a total principle, which structures every
aspect of human life, and on the other, as an annihilating force, destroying every
obstacle in its path. The world has to be liberated by force because it will not go under
the rule of Allah voluntarily. Rémi Brague notes that one particular attribute of Allah
is very strongly emphasized in Islam: His omnipotence Allah is not the Father in
Islam, what is left here is the omnipotence itself. The creation presents this almighty
force and not the beauty of the Creator. This force would more often materialize as
a destructive rather than a constructive capacity [Brague 2014: 158]. This comment
has a particularly strong effect when Qutb’s thinking is concerned. In terms of
Saint Augustine’s theology, the definition of Islam as presented by Qutb, in which
Allah demands absolute obedience and enviously guards His monopolistic power
[Danecki 1991: 124] would rather match order of a city of Satan than a city of God.
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Khatab Sayed (2006b), The Power of Sovereignty. The political and ideological philosophy
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Kornatowski Wiktor (1965), Społeczno-polityczna myśl św. Augustyna [The Social and
Political Thought of Saint Augustine], Instytut Wydawniczy PAX.
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41, No. 1.
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CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Peter Schallenberg
Theologische Fakultät Paderborn, Germany
ORCID: 0000-0003-2399-1065
The requirement of the state.

About the legacy
of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde
Abstract: In this text, the author shows how natural law thinking is derived from
fundamental Christian teachings about man and his relationship to God. In a first
detailed train of thought, he makes it clear, primarily with reference to the think-
ing of Augustine, that although human beings also have within themselves the
ability and longing for the good, they tend by their nature to choose not the good
but what is pleasant for them. Therefore, from a Christian point of view, the
state order is justified, on the one hand, to protect people from their destructive
potentials and, on the other hand, to force education towards the good, so that
people are enabled to use their freedom for the good and not for what is only
pleasant for them. In a second step, he relates this to the founding of the European
Union and its associated canon of values on the one hand and, in connection
with this, to Catholic social teaching and Christian humanism or personalism
on the other. He then concludes by focusing on the great German state theorist
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, who, influenced by Catholic social teaching and
Christian humanism, made the considerations developed in the text fruitful for
thinking about law and statehood in modern democracies.
Keywords: Natural law, Christian Humanism, Augustine, European Union,
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Ritter-School
Abstrakt: W tekście autor pokazuje, jak prawo naturalne wywodzi się z fundamen-
talnego nauczania chrześcijańskiego o człowieku i jego relacji z Bogiem. W pierw-
szym szczegółowym toku myślowym wyjaśnia, przede wszystkim w odniesieniu
do myśli Augustyna, że chociaż ludzie mają w sobie również zdolność i tęsknotę za
dobrem, to z natury skłaniają się do wybierania nie dobra, ale tego, co jest dla nich
przyjemne. Dlatego też z chrześcijańskiego punktu widzenia porządek państwowy
jest usprawiedliwiony z jednej strony po to, aby chronić ludzi przed ich destruk-
cyjnymi potencjałami, a z drugiej strony wzmacniać wychowanie ku dobru, aby
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ludzie mogli korzystać z ich wolności dla dobra, a nie dla tego, co jest dla nich
tylko przyjemne. W drugim kroku odnosi to z jednej strony do ustanowienia Unii
Europejskiej i związanego z nią kanonu wartości, a z drugiej – w związku z tym –
do katolickiej nauki społecznej i chrześcijańskiego humanizmu lub personalizmu.
Następnie podsumowuje, skupiając się na wielkim niemieckim teoretyku państwa
Ernst-Wolfgangu Böckenförde, który pod wpływem katolickiej nauki społecznej
i chrześcijańskiego humanizmu sprawił, że rozważania rozwinięte w tekście były
owocne dla myślenia o prawie i państwowości we współczesnych demokracjach.
Słowa kluczowe: prawo naturalne, humanizm chrześcijański, Augustyn, Unia
Europejska, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Ritter-School
Introduction
Celebrating in the community of Europe and in an obvious secular context
[Wouter 2017: 375-394] the 100th anniversary of the restoration of independence
and statehood to the Republic of Poland – “Polonia Restituta” – after more than
120 years of brutal subjugation of the Polish state to the three so-called “Polish
divisions”, put into place by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772, 1793 and 1795,
we can reflect on the legacy of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930-2019), the
famous catholic philosopher and lawyer, and his important writings concern-
ing constitutional and political theory [2017]. His work is concerned with the
link between religion and state, more specifically: the requirement for a good
state, or the connection of the image of a person (as a human being) and the
image of the state, or the connection of transcendent values and immanent
law [Stein 2007].
1. Image and Education

In the German language, since the great Dominican preacher Meister Eckhart
(1260-1328), influenced by St. Augustine (354-430), Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita
(early 6th century), and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), “Bildung”, the term used
for education and formation, stems from the root word “Bild“, which translates as
image or archetype. Education, therefore, comprises much more than schooling
or upbringing with an envisaged goal in mind. Education and training invariably
involve something derived, and secondarily, something we can avail ourselves of.
However, in order to be authentic, this derivation and availability must correspond
to the unavailable archetype, or the original idea, in short: the first requirement.
Such is an ideal that precedes reality. It is an ideal which only after being grasped
intellectually enables us to cope with and shape reality and adopt a moral way of
living. The idea of good(ness) precedes all forms of insight and action. When and
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insofar as God as Creator is first and foremost identified with being good per es,
the biblical transmission of the creation of the world and human beings can be
understood in a far more clear-cut and comprehensive manner. This is precisely
what is meant by the legendary Garden of Eden in the Old Testament and in the
old Israelite tradition: the lost requirement, the lost paradise of ideals, and the
Genesis creation narrative describing how humankind was created in the image
of God: The core of the first human beings, their primal nature, was intended
to be an ideal. Human nature is made good by participating in God’s perfect
goodness. This is what is meant by the Judeo-Christian terms “creation” and the
“creation of the world”. It is always oriented towards goodness and God. In other
words, good simply means being. Evil is thereby, in the scholastic language of St
Thomas Aquinas, privatio boni, “unreal”, or the absence of God – which does not
detract from the gruesomeness of evil, yet provides consolation by indicating that
evil is surmountable [Journet 1962]. According to theological thought since the
time of St. Thomas Aquinas and the medieval philosophy and theology after 1250
[Fontana 2018], human beings as individuals can model themselves on the image
of God through spiritual activities, or, from the perspective of Greek philoso-
phy, by differentiating between “action” (praxis, agere) and “making” (poiesis,
facere). In such terms, making would merely be “indirectly moral in character
because it derives value from an object that has been produced. Action, on the
other hand, is of moral relevance and is the reason why Aristotle also assumes
the existence of a hierarchical order in which praxis is ranked higher than poiesis.
The pre-eminence of praxis is made clear in Aristotle’s claims that life as whole
is a life of praxis since the purpose of life is to live a good life” [Becker 2006: 303].
In this context, the meaning of good is precisely what we in modern times refer
to as happiness, or, in other words, living a complete and abundant life together
with others. This is the essence of Aristotelian ethics, which was taken up by St.
Thomas Aquinas and the modern catholic anthropology and political theology, up
to the so called “Ritter-Schule” at the University at Münster (Germany) after the
Second World War: everyone aspires to happiness and this needs no justification.
It is evident to all that eudaimonia (happy life) is the ultimate goal. However,
reaching this goal is dependent on practicing virtues.
2. Happiness, God, and the evil

Rejoicing in others as we stand before the happiness of our own life: That is
precisely the meaning behind the terms “creation as a gift of God” and “the gift
of our own life”. Nature and its fortuitousness are interpreted as Creation and
divine necessity; this intellectual breakthrough is a highly impressive human
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achievement from a Christian perspective. This ethical surplus crystallizes in

the experience of dying and death and here touches upon the reality of faith:
“The consequence for how we deal with happiness and the quest for happiness
lies in the spiritualization stemming from the Easter dimension of Christian
life. Constant transformation springing from hope paves the way forward and
creates a biographical axis providing direction and support as we often make
risky individual decisions” [Demmer 2008: 11]. Death is the last, inner-worldly
insurmountable outer misfortune, or rather, evil, which invariably turns into inner
misfortune when it cannot once again be overcome from the outside, thereby
transcending the empirical sphere. In Christian theology, overcoming death in
this way is called salvation. It represents salvation from the pressures associated
with a happiness that is limited in time. This salvation is offered by God in the
revelation of human freedom. According to the Gospel of John, God is Spirit. The
Gospel of John also refers to the human spirit in its final and no longer unsurpass-
able potential. At the same time, however, human beings experience themselves as
imperfect creatures that, despite their freedom, are already limited with respect
to goodness and perfect happiness as a result of their flaws and “original sin”.
God’s creation as the innermost essence of what it means to be human is limited
by our innate ability to be led into temptation, toward evil and to sin, which is
likewise part of human nature. To sin is to live as though God never existed, to
remove all traces of God from our daily life, to doubt the necessity of our own life
as given by God and to consider ourselves and others to be nothing more than
dispensable particles of dust in the Universe. Therefore, more impetus needs to
be given to the essential but broken freedom to achieve good and to fulfill one’s
purpose. This would serve to counteract such deep-seated mental despair and the
growing barrenness of humanity. In other words, people must be incentivized
in good conscience to develop and reach out towards goodness. Doing so would
ensure such goodness takes a specific shape in their lives and and the resultant
gratification would motivate them to live out such goodness every day. However,
without weighing up the pros and cons before God, and the will to make sacrifices,
such endeavors to achieve goodness will prove unsuccessful. Humankind’s inner
urge to be good should be encouraged through incentives. Conversely, tempta-
tions to do evil should be parried by sanctions. The reason is that human beings
lack instinctive and infallible inclinations to achieve goodness and fulfill their
true purpose. In fact, human beings have a propensity to behave in a destructive
manner toward others and themselves. They chase after what seems to be good
but is not. Here we can see that humankind is ensnared in an obsessive quest good
in the penultimate, in sin, in evil. According to Christian faith, this is part of
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the human inheritance, even before any personal and individual guilt. Christian
faith refers to this as humankind’s original sin [Martelet 1986], a deeply rooted
lovelessness in all humans, far away from every gnostic and dualistic interpretation
[for instance Fromm 1980; Pagels 1991]. Indeed, it is this original sin that thwarts
all human striving for good with astounding success. “Impulses are becoming
narcissistic and egotistical. Such impulses tend to prevail in a violent manner”
[Görres 1991: 18].
3. Civil law and civil order

Human beings fulfill themselves within a civilization and the framework of
societal and public order. This framework lays the foundation for all ethical tradi-
tion which gives grounds for expecting to lead a successful and fulfilled life. In
this respect, culture is at the service of human nature’s quest for utter perfection,
which, in turn lacks in the instincts required to forge a clear path to this end.
Every form of higher culture springs from a law of reason, which can be viewed as
a critical from of the law of nature: What does every human being, inherently and
using their reason, regard as good and perfect? With an eye to ethical standards,
this is precisely where the term “human dignity” comes into play. This concept
guarantees, in unparalleled clarity, that all individuals are an end in themselves
and this applies universally. This is the starting point of a fulfilled existence for
every human being. The prime task of ethics, not least social ethics, is thus to
determine the interplay between nature and culture and examine the bound-
ary between educating and sanctioning our original nature on a constant basis.
Therefore, culture appears to be the necessary ground for a society worthy of
humanity. Moreover, culture complements and forms a model for our fractured
nature. Human nature still carries a vague memory of the best of this perfect love:
the original paradise of a fulfilled life. Yet, such fulfilling happiness cannot be
achieved through human nature alone. Fragments of this idea of paradise can be
recognized here on Earth, in the human mind and, foremost, in good thoughts. It
can only be created in outlines, at least sketchily, through the giving of incentives
for action to achieve goodness. According to Immanuael Kant, striving for happi-
ness leads to the Categorical Imperative according to which people have to do what
makes them worthy of happiness: living in harmony with themselves as moral
beings. Such dignified means of achieving happiness are ingrained in culture.
Here, the term that springs to mind is the alienable dignity of human beings
as persons, which is to be guaranteed by the state. The state does not originally
have its own right, but every person possesses this inalienable basic right. A state
(and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force) may only intervene when the
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people’s rights are under threat. In the interest of crating a successful image of
happiness, promoting human sanctification and perfection must be a matter for
both state and society. Both must strive to promote this image. Furthermore,
incentives are required for healing and promoting goodness through education
and by popularizing guiding principles. Unfortunately, indifference seems to be
infiltrating every aspect of our lives. We see this in how the affairs of a state are
conducted. It is made evident when a state displays indifference with respect to all
values or even goes as far as to absurdly declare itself neutral in this regard. It is
manifest when life choices and ways of life are considered equally valid before the
law or society. Ultimately, the state, and individuals, will be indifferent. Instead,
all that will matter will be the different options belonging to groups of people that
differ extremely from one another, or of people who no longer share anything more
than the resolute will to survive at all costs. However, qualifying values to such
an extent would mark the end of humanity and contradict the notions of human
beings as persons [Lewis 1943].
4. The state and evil

Let us recall the classic definition of the state given by St. Augustine in his great
book “De civitate Dei”. There, referring to the Genesis account of the murder of
Abel by Cain, St. Augustine underlines the necessity of a so called status iustitiae
after the assassination of Abel by Cain, because that episode unleashed complete
anarchy. According to this original insight of St. Augustine, a minimal guaran-
tee of a minimal state of minimal justice is the ultimate goal of every state. The
purpose and the goal of the state is nothing else than the welfare of its citizen, the
human persons, and, for sure, every person, because every human bering, called
metaphysically person, is created by God in his image and likeness. As such, every
person is gifted with an inalienable dignity and an inherent beauty of the soul, as
Plato also affirms in his famous “Myth of Gorgias”. In other words: the state has
no value without the human person, the bearer of dignity, but the existence of
a person is also inconceivable without community and without the state. Without
the state, as St Augustine argued, the person is nothing, because the person would
be living among an anarchic gang of robbers, as he underlines in the famous forth
book of “De civitate Dei”: “Remota iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?”
[IV 4]. On account of this unity of reciprocal relationship between the person and
the state, the extinction of state and nation is quickly followed by the extinction of
the human person. Accordingly, the security of every human being, especially the
weak, the unborn and newly born, the handicapped and the dying person, is the
sole purpose and “raison dètre” of a good state, which must be more than a good
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gang of robbers [Mathewes 2010]. These ideas converge obviously in thoughts on

personality. Much thinking in the field of personality-psychology is bolstered by
the powerful notion of a “human or personal self” which starts as a dim outline
and gradually takes shape. The Self is, on closer inspection, considered as a person.
As mentioned in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s famous dictum “The state is living
on preconditions which could not be guaranteed by it”, state and society are tacitly
based on the primary concept of a person who pushes forward towards developing
personality and successful self-fulfillment. That promotes an awareness of the
absolute singularity and irrevocability of one’s own life and of the vocation of every
human being to strive towards unmistakable happiness. This is precisely where
the notion of the eternal immortality of the human soul takes root, which was
formulated paradigmatically by Plato for Western thought and also connected up
with the Jewish idea of humankind being irrevocably made in the image of God.
The possibility of eternal happiness in God includes the option to turn away from
goodness and God for all eternity. In such a case, the true misfortune is no longer
one’s physical death but rather one’s spiritual death, understood as a permanent
state of obduracy and the fact of being encapsulated in wrong-doing. Looking
back on her reports on the Eichmann trials, Hannah Arendt describes the fatal
catastrophe of the normality of wrong-doing and evil: “Evil in the Third Reich
had lost the quality by which most people recognize it – the quality of temptation”
[Arendt 2006: 150]. Beyond Cain and Abel, as persons of Evil and Good in the Old
Testament and therefore inspiring St. Augustine to his differentiation between the
state of God (civitas Dei) and the state of the Earth (civitas terrena), a leveling of
the difference between good and evil is making ground. For humankind, however,
this results in a death more permanent than the physical death itself. Plato, too,
found succinct words for such a development: “For death itself no man fears,
unless he be an absolute fool or coward; it is doing wrong that a man fears: for to
arrive at the world below with the soul laden with many offences is the uttermost
of all evils” [Plato 1994: 78]. From that follows the classical principle of a fulfilled
existence applicable to all people. This principle is based on the notion “that to do
injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not
the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in
private life” [ibid.]. The entire human life is one continuous fool’s errand consisting
of choosing between God and transience, between happiness and satisfaction,
between truly self-giving love and illusory, consuming and abusive love [Lewis
2009]. Life choices are enabled firstly by demonstrating a willingness to make
sacrifices, which in itself can be deemed a success. This unmistakable calling of all
human to educate themselves and make life choices is also the core of all forms of
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solidarity between people within state and a society. Regardless of their achieve-
ments and abilities, the notion of humankind as having been created in the image
of God thus endowed with dignity is recognized and acknowledged and protected.
Christianity sees humankind’s endeavors to achieve all-encompassing happiness
in the context of suffering and fragmentation, with the talk of original sin recalls.
Perfect happiness is not of this world and exists only as an idea, in peoples’s mind.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of God and in the light of the resurrection of
Jesus Christ, every human life however fragmented can therefore in its core and
essence be interpreted as happy. This theological idea cannot be annulled by the
monstrous malevolence of real people; the state refraining from carrying out the
death penalty for instance is a faint echo of it. What needs to be resisted are the
insidious attempts to see humankind as nothing more than a consumerist rabbit
that responds efficiently to all forms of incentive, or a hard-working ant that can
be optimized via technology. This is the temptation to forgo the idea of that every
person is worthy of love. Such temptations are countered by the Christian view of
humankind and the notion of happiness as salvation from pressures to live a vain
life in both time and space.
5. Europe as a good state

Against this background, the restoration of Europe in particular as a community
of values and virtues is also seen as the creation of a good state. In 1919 Poland was
reborn, and in 1957 Europe was reborn, precisely on March 25, 1957 on Capitol
Hill in Rome. There six founding states signed a restored Europe into existence. It
was hoped that Europe reborn would be the restoration of the old Christian Europe
of Emperor Charles LeMagne, who was crowned and anointed on Christmas 800
AD in St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome by Pope Leo III, to inaugurate a holy Empire of
Christian humanism and of guaranteed dignity of the human person (as an image
of God). But this period ended on 6 august 1806 with the abdication of Emperor
Francis II in Vienna under napoleonic pressure. The founding fathers of the new
and restored Europe are well known: Alcide de Gasperi (1881-1954), born near
Trento, then part of Austria, and therefore sensible to the necessity of reconcili-
ation and peace among the different nations. He was educated at the university
of Vienna and was cofounder of the famous “Partito Popolare Italiano” after the
First World War in Italy; he was a friend of Don Luigi Sturzo, the founder and the
first general secretary of this Christian Democratic Party in Italy. Then Robert
Schuman (1886-1963), a French Catholic layman, born in Luxembourg, later,
after the Second World War, became the Prime Minister of France and was the
main author of the famous “Schuman-Plan” for organizing the so called “Montan
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Union”, as the precursor of the European Community. Last but not least we have
Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), the first Chancellor of the restored federal republic
of Germany after Nazism and the Second World War, also an active catholic and
cofounder of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) after the war. It was not by
chance that they were Christian and catholic laymen, and thinking in the famous
tradition of a holy empire in the Augustinian tradition of a balance between church
and state: the church is essentially the civitas Dei, ruled and sustained by the seven
sacraments, as the permanent presence of Christ in the human history, govern-
ing the forum internum, the internal market place of every human person with
motivation and intention and deliberation about good and evil. The state is the
civitas terrena, ruled by law and justice, the forum externum as the external market
place of public affairs and public discussions with public arguments, based on the
Natural Law, about right and wrong, understandable as the far echo of good and
evil, which is seamlessly realized only in the mind of God, in platonic words: in the
eternal ideas of God, who overlooks time and eternity. Nor was it by chance that
they realized the idea of a European Community on March, 25 1957 on the Capitol
Hill in Rome with a twelve-star flag. These were a triple symbolization of what the
European Community project aspired to be: March 25th is the catholic feast day
of the Annunciation of Mary’s conception and birth of Jesus by the angel Gabriel.
In the patristic tradition of the church, Mary’s assent to the angel’s message and
her agreement with God’s plan was seen as a sharp contrast to Eve’s assent to the
serpent’s message in the garden of Eden, in Paradise, and her disobedience to God.
Thus the feast of the Annunciation also celebrated Mary’s “yes” which overturned
Eve’s “no”, thereby inaugurating a new era of restored relationship with God and
a renewed and restored humanity. Founding the European Community on the
feast of the Annunciation was meant to signal in this community the restoration
of God’s original idea of a human community in Paradise. The twelve stars of the
European Community – when, in fact, there were only six states – refer to the
twelve stars in the crown of the “woman clothes with the sun, with the moon under
her feet” (Rev 12, 1); and they represent the complete restoration of God’s design at
the end of time, before the beginning of eternity: the restoration of the twelve Old
Testament prophets of Israel in the twelve apostles of the New Testament. Thus,
founding the European Community under these symbols meant that the project
was also seen as paving the human way in progress toward eternity and God.
Capitol Hill symbolized the typology of three hills (or mountains) in old, oriental,
and European tradition of human civilization, namely the hill of Golgotha as the
hill of God’s mercy through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the Areopagus as the
hill of greek philosophical insight and reflection about natural law and goodness,
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and the Capitol as the hill of Roman Law and the codification of justice against
the arbitrariness and against totalitarianism. These three hills were considered as
the indispensable and irreplaceable cornerstones, as the requirement for a restored
Europe and for the states in this European Community.
6. The values of Catholic Social Teaching

After the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989, Poland was restored to its status
as a middle European country, and as a country of European greek and Christian
tradition and civilization. Against this background of the collapse of communism in
Europe, Pope John Paul II wrote his famous Encyclical Letter “Centesimus annus”
in 1991, one hundred years after the first papal Encyclical Letter concerning social
ethics, “Rerum novarum” of Pope Leo XIII in 1891. In “Centesimus annus” Pope
John Paul II wonders whether, in the wake of the collapse of communism, capitalism
had now become the only option and, as it were, the sole winner in the battlefield
of divergent economic and political ideologies of the late 19th and 20th centuries.
He refused to believe in such a vision, especially in a capitalism unqualified by any
adjectives. An acceptable form of capitalism for the pontiff would be a “capitalism
that is human, integral and person-centred. It would be a capitalism with a human
face” [John Paul II 1991: 42], and for that one needs a strong state to steer the market
and to guide the economy. It is a social and cognitive capitalism [Rindermann 2019].
Pope Benedict XVI with his Encyclical Letters “Deus caritas est” (2006) and “Caritas
in veritate” (2009) and Pope Francis with “Laudato si`” (2015) underlines the same
perspective and continues the development of a catholic social thought that upholds
a real economy at the heart of which finance functions to promote the integral
growth and development of the person and a good state. In this sense, the famous
“invisible hand” of Adam Smith is not enough [Wight 2015]. One needs the visible
hand of the four principles of the catholic social teaching, as four requirements of
a good state and a good economy: Personality and Personhood as an expression of
every human person’s metaphysically added value, understood as a bearer and owner
of inalienable dignity; solidarity, not as an vague sense only of compassion, but as
a virtue, which encourages one to commit to the wellbeing of another; subsidiarity,
according to which “all societies of a superior order must adopt attitudes of help
(subsidium) – therefore of support, promotion, development – with respect lower
order of societies” [Ponfitical Council Iustitia et Pax 2004: 160]; common good,
understood not as a gross national product or gross domestic product, but as the
guarantee of personal and associative good, especially in families. The common
good of every person in a human community is thus the fundamental right to life
and to its full realization.
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7. Böckenförde and the legacy of Christian Ethics

These four basic values as basic requirements of the state are fruits of Christian
humanism that inspired Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde during his whole life and
in all his writings concerning political ethics [Pavelka 2015], especially embossed
by his studies in the so called “Collegium philosophicum” at the University of
Münster (Germany), founded by Joachim Ritter 1947 and developing the political
ideas of Aristotle and Hegel about state and politics in the tradition of a strong and
alive natural law. He studied there in this circle together with Hermann Lübbe,
Odo Marquard, Robert Spaemann and Ernst Tugendhat [Böckenförde, Ritter
1965]. One basic idea is always underlined: a human being does have priority over
the collective and over the state. But the fact, that the person is not self-sufficient
in his or her individuality and distinctiveness leads the person to find perfect
fulfillment only in a community with other humans, in friendship and love. This
is a crucial insight of European Christian humanism and it points to Christ, who,
as a person, reveals God as relational love and points the human being to a perfect
eternal love as his destiny. Hence, the human is not only an individual person,
although gifted by an individual immortal soul [Siedentop 2014], and the human
person is bound to requirements as guarantees of life and development, especially
the unconditioned right to life. The famous “Böckenförde-Dictum” about the
necessity of requirements of the state [Böckenförde 1991: 92-114; Forsthoff 1967:
75-94] underlines this requirement of a secular state: the necessity of a metaphysi-
cal natural law as guarantee of the untouchable dignity of every human person and
as a nucleus of civil rights [zu Löwenstein 2018]. This is and has to be the heritage
of a European Community [Dziedzic 2015: 307-321] and of every type of a state
that wishes to be more than, in augustinian words, a civilized gang of robbers.
And this is precisely one important legacy of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde [Dreier
2019: 189-214].
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Becker M. (2006), Praxis / Poiesis, in: Wils J-P., Hübenthal C. (ed.), Lexikon der Ethik,
Paderborn.
Böckenförde E-W. (1991), Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation,
in: Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und
Verfassungsgeschichte, Frankfurt/Main.
Böckenförde E-W. (2017), Constitutional and Political Theory. Selected Writings, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
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Böckenförde E-W., Ritter J., Collegium philosophicum, Basel.

Demmer K. (2008), Gott denken – sittlich handeln, Fribourg.
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nach der Wende, [in:] Van Reeth J. and others (ed.), Secularisation & Europe.
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und seiner Tradition, Hamburg.
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john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.
html, 03.06.2020.
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Lewis C. S. (2009), The Great Divorce, London.
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Berlin.
Martelet G. (1986), La Flaute originelle, la souffrance et la mort, Paris.
Mathewes C. (2010), The Republic of Grace. Augustinian Thoughts for Dark Times, Grand
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Pavelka J. (2015), Bürger und Christ. Politische Ethik und christliches Menschenbild bei
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Academic Press Fribourg, Fribourg.
Plato (1994), Gorgias, Oxford / New York.
Pontifical Council Iustitia et Pax (2004), Compendium of Social Teaching of the Church,
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Rindermann H. (2019), Cognitive Capitalism: Human Capital and Well-being of Nations,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Siedentop L. (2014), Inventing the Individual. The Origins of Western Liberalism, Harvard
University Press, Harvard.
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freiheitlichen Verfassungsstaates, Campus Verlag Frankfurt/Main.
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University Press, Stanford.
Wouters J. (2017), The Place of Religion and Churches in the European Union, [in:]
Van Reeth J., Pottier B., Slawinski H., De Rycke F. (ed.), Secularisation & Europe,
’s-Hertogenbosch, Kraków.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Sławomir Sowiński
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0003-1324-121X
Creative tension between religion

and politics, and espistemological
temptations to reduce it on the basis of
political science
In memory of Prof. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde
Abstract. The “Böckenförde paradox” may lead to the question: of modern politi-
cal science can capture the value of the structural tension between religion and
politics? In politics and the world of religion too, there is a tendency to reduce
this tension, either by trying to identify politics with religion, or by completely
separating them. In the epistemological dimension, the tendency to reduce this
tension can also be seen in the sciences of politics, although it occurs to a different
extent in functionalistic, institutional or historical approaches.
Keywords: Böckenförde, politics, political science of religion, religion
Abstrakt. Słynny „paradoks Böckenfördego” może prowadzić do pytania: czy

współczesne nauki o polityce potrafią uchwycić wartość strukturalnego napięcie
między religią a polityką? I w polityce, i w świecie religii dostrzec można tendencję
do redukcji tego napięcia, albo poprzez próbę utożsamiania polityki z religią, albo
poprzez ich całkowite separowanie. W wymiarze epistemologicznego tendencję do
redukcji tego napięcia dostrzec można także w naukach o polityce, choć w różnych
stopniu występuje ono w ujęciach: funkcjonalistycznym, instytucjonalnym, czy
historycznym.
Słowa kluczowe: Böckenförde, polityka, politologia religii, religia
The recently deceased prominent German lawyer and constitutionalist Professor

Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde reinforced our belief that the mutual relations
between religion and politics, despite their longevity and various experiences, also
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today in the post-secular era, are still alive, dynamic and open in nature, marked
by possibly unresolved dilemmas to the end. Such a statement can be made, for
example, on the basis of the famous “Böckenförde paradox”, according to which
a libertarian democratic state of law must use axiological sources, which it cannot
produce by itself1, or his other accurate remark that in a democratic system the
Churches can choose between a political and metapolitical mission, but cannot
reliably fulfil them simultaneously2.
However, it is worth considering whether contemporary social sciences, especially

political science, have long been expressing their ambitions to explain – at least
from a political point of view – the nature and significance of these relations, and if
they have the appropriate competences and methodological instruments for doing
so. In this context, the question of whether contemporary political science is able
to see and properly assess the particular tension that arises between religion and
politics seems interesting in this context. Or, for methodological or axiological
reasons, do they tend naturally toward an epistemological – so to speak – reduc-
tion of this tension?
We wish to devote our considerations to this issue.
1
Professor Böckenförde himself said of this paradox: “a liberal secularised state has
a basis in something that it cannot guarantee on its own. There is a great risk here,
which the state took on in wanting to take on and face the challenge of freedom. A state
can exist as a liberal state only because the freedom it provides to its citizens will
be regulated from within, because of the moral substance unit and unity of society.”
[Böckenförde 1994: 120].
2
As emphasised by Prof. Böckenförde, both roles (political or metapolitical) of the Church,
from the point of view of the rules of a democratic state, are possible. However, the Church
– without losing credibility – cannot combine both strategies and “use democracy until
it reaches the majority, and in case of failure, withdraw to the position of natural law and
point to its unique position” (Cf. the same, Ethos of modern democracy and the Church,
[ibid.:42]. Interestingly, this awareness also took root in the social teaching of the Catholic
Church in Poland. Chairman of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, Fr. Archbishop Stanisław
Gądecki, his solemn homily delivered during Holy Mass. on the 100th anniversary of
Poland regaining independence, he summarised, among others, with the following state-
ment: “The Church (…) has a duty to speak from metapolitical positions, reminding
about norms, principles and ethical values which should guide the government in making
decisions in this field. However, he cannot – if he does not want to lose his political
credibility – change his form of involvement from political to metapolitical and vice
versa, depending on what he considers at a given moment to be more favourable to him”
[BP KEP 2018].
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To make a meaningful approach, at the outset we outline the nature and political
value of this particular tension that arises between religion and politics (point 1), as
well as various tendencies or temptations to reduce it that arise in terms of political
practice (point 2). However, in the main part of our considerations we wish to
reflect on how much (point 3) and in what form (points 4 and 5) this reduction
can come to the fore not so much in the dimension of political practice as in the
espistemological area of analysis of the political process. We also want to consider
the extent to which the tendency of this epistemological reduction is carried by
some of the theoretical approaches present in political science, i.e. functionalism,
institutionalism or a historical approach (point 6).
1. The tension between religion and politics and its value

Of course, not only Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde pointed out that democratic
politics and religion (in any case, Christianity, which is our area of interest) remain
and should be in a state of mismatch, endless dialogue, which in some dimension
also remains a dispute.
This relation is also shaped by the formula of the “autonomy and coopera-
tion” of the Church and the state which is very clearly present in the social
teaching of the Catholic Church, at least since the Second Vatican Council.
In this approach, it is emphasised that the independent Church and state,
while maintaining their separateness and respecting the religious freedom of
believers and non-believers, should cooperate for the common good 3. Religion,
while distancing itself from the direct political process (but also defending
itself against attempts to privatise it) should protect its public and metapolitical
status, thanks to which it can also indirectly influence the quality of the politi-
cal process [Sowiński 2012]. Developing this perspective, Piotr Mazurkiewicz
3
Such a formula can be found, inter alia, in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, but
also – interestingly – in the Polish Constitution of 1997. “Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World” of the Second Vatican Council (Gaudium et Spes) states: “The Church
and the political community in their own fields are autonomous and independent from each
other. Yet both, under different titles, are devoted to the personal and social vocation of the
same men. The more that both foster sounder cooperation between themselves with due
consideration for the circumstances of time and place, the more effective will their service
be exercised for the good of all” [Pastoral Constitution]. In turn, in Article 25 point 3 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 states that “The relationship between
the State and churches and other religious organizations shall be based on the principle of
respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well
as on the principle of cooperation for the individual and the common good” [Constitution
of the Republic of Poland].
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speaks in this context about the “non-political politics of the Church”4, while
Aniela Dylus points to the unique, specific role of the Church in a democratic
society5. Father Maciej Zięba draws attention to the dangers of the ideologisa-
tion of religion and religious agnosticism [Zięba 1998: 94]. Piotr Burgoński
describes the model of the “presence and natural tension” of the Church in the
Polish public sphere [Burgoński 2013: 23], and author of these words analyses
the topic of “the presence, otherness, transcendence” of the Church in the
public sphere, which distances itself from both attempts at its politicisation
and privatization [Sowiński 2012: 333-345].
The intuition that religions in modern democracy should seek their public path
between their attempts to privatise them and the temptation of being dragged
into the political game is of course more universal than the social teaching of the
Catholic Church. In modern philosophical and social thought, it can be sought
at least since de Tocqueville [1996] or Lord Acton [1995] for the reflection of even
such contemporary outstanding thinkers as Jürgen Habermas [Teinert 2006], José
Casanova [2005] or Leszek Kołakowski [1990].
Still, however, without developing this thought, we can generally say that in
the belief here (and quite widely shared today), religion (and certainly modern
Christianity) as well as contemporary democratic politics – for the good of
both, accompanying each other – should also maintain their own diversity and
autonomy. To put it briefly, here we mean a kind of pattern of tension between
religion and politics, which – similarly to physical or biological systems – is born
as a result of regularly interacting diversity. Voltages, which, leading to inevitable
4
As emphasised by this experienced researcher of the relationship between religion and
politics, the Catholic Church, mobilising its faithful (and all people of good will) to public
commitment, solidarity and responsibility, at the same time emphasised its identity different
from the state. He writes, “Christianity, on the one hand, emphasizes the ethical dimension
of political commitment, mobilizing the faithful to take political responsibility; on the other
hand, it reminds of the inalienability in this world of the Church as an institution radically
different from the state [Mazurkiewicz 2017: 252-253].
5
Analysing various models of the Church-state relationship, the author distances herself from
the model of the “state” church, “blending in with politics”, “decreeing the truth”, “interest
group”, resembling the association of the “horizontal” church, “democratised” church or
“church” radically separated from the state.” Instead, he favours the model of a “free Church
in a free state”, “moderately separated from the state, a Church that does not avoid “social
involvement” or taking “substitute functions” in special situations, but in a democratic state,
wants to be a “salt of the earth “and” mystical church” (Quotation marks come from the
typology created by the author) [Dylus 2016: 415-434].
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collisions, frictions, pressures or stresses, at the same time generate energy that
can serve both phenomena within this special system.
Indeed it is this particular tension, its level, character (or lack thereof) that remains
the main object of substantive interest in political sciences trying (in terms of what
is politically) to explore and explain the specificity of the relationship between
religion and politics, especially the influence of religion on public life, and thus
indirectly, also on the political process.
Because it is thanks to this tension that, in a situation of natural democratic politi-

cal conflict, fulfilling the community-forming function, religion can build and
restore, as is politically necessary, the framework of a democratic community. It
is thanks to this tension that religion can also have a corrective function towards
the political process, by constantly invoking human dignity, freedom, solidarity
or long-term responsibility towards future generations. Finally, thanks to this
tension, also in the situation of a pluralistic society, publicly present (though politi-
cally autonomous) religion can convincingly perform a kind of critical function,
reminding reliably, with its own eschatological realism, of the natural limitations
and imperfections of any political action and the real danger of ideologising
politics [Sowiński 2012: 333-345].
The tension we are talking about here, and actually the way it is regulated, also
seems to be at the root of the diversity of political relations between Churches
and countries in the European Union, which is increasingly studied today by
political scientists. This can be seen in the perspective of the so-called “Church
clause” (Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty), which protects quite different forms of
such relations, consistent with the tradition and history of individual countries. In
practice, this means the simultaneous recognition and respect of: French solutions,
which since the time of the famous Act of 1905, in the spirit of laïcité treat religion
as a private individual matter, Danish or Greek models, where the largest churches
are de facto state-owned, or German, Italian, Spanish or Polish models, in which
the autonomy and cooperation of the state and Churches is associated with the
historical and cultural significance of religion, and these Churches perform
a number of important social functions6.
6
A good compendium discussing various models of the state of the Church in the European
Union is a collective work edited by Professor Gerhard Robbers, which in Polish appeared
under the title State and Church in the European Union [Robbers 2007].
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Last but not least, we finally notice that the lack of tension we refer to here
opens the way to challenges or dangers closely watched today, and not only
in political science, such as religious or secular fundamentalism, ideologisa-
tion or political instrumentalisation of religion [Grosfeld 2009; Gierycz 2009],
“ethnicization of religion” [Zenderowski 2011] or “sacralisation of ethnos”
[ibid.].
2. Tendencies to reduce tension between religion and politics.

Political dimension
Our last remark recalls an equally important question from the perspective of
political science regarding what is the natural (in some sense) political temptation
or tendency to reduce the tension we describe here.
When ascertaining and emphasizing the value of this structural tension

between religion and politics, it must be remembered that this tension, like
any influencing the elements or phenomena connected with it, exerts pressure
on their internal processes and structures. In a situation where this pressure
is particularly noticeable, the phenomenon of the political system may (react)
by striving for one or another form of discharge or reduction of this tension.
Translating this to the political dimension we are primarily interested in, we
can see that the structural tension between religion and politics may give rise
to political fear not only about the lasting conflict between the state and the
Churches (or religious associations), but also about the functionality of the
political system, and above all about the political sovereignty of his authority.
Hence, a common tendency of traditional and modern political systems (and
especially their power) is the desire to partially reduce or completely discharge
the tension we indicate.
Such political tendencies can have a different character and range. Referring
to the diversity of their character, we can generally say that the political
tensions we cite can be reduced either by trying to sharply separate religion
from politics towards the privatization of religion, or by identifying religion
with politics, i.e. striving to close them. One of the best-known examples
– a de facto-privatizing separation – seems to be the famous French Act of
December 1905, sharply separating the state from the church in the Third
Republic [Basdevant-Gaudemet 2007: 126-127]. In turn, numerous attempts
to identify or even conclude religion with politics can be sought in a variety
of circumstances and concepts such as ancient forms of the sacralization of
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power7 or theocracy 8, the Augsburg Peace of 1555 (with its guiding principle
“cuius regio eius religio”), or the various varieties of civil religions 9.
Although both of the political tendencies indicated here (separation and identifica-
tion) seem to be moving in completely opposite directions (radical secularism of
power or [quasi] theocratic rule], from the point of view we are interested in, their
effect is similar. And it is precisely the reduction of tension between religion and
politics that in consequence usually means dominating the specific mission of
religion through ambitions or political goals. In both cases, similar effects may
arise consisting in limiting or even levelling the above-mentioned metapolitical,
community-forming, critical and correcting contribution of religion to the politi-
cal process. In both cases, the risk of fundamentalism being born – in the former
secular and in the latter religious – may increase.
Referring to the question of the second, and thus possible range of such politi-
cal activities, raised above, we can equally generally note that both attempts
to separate and identify religion and politics may take on a more structural
dimension, involving appropriate institutional solutions10, inscribed in the very
7
An outstanding expert on Catholic social teaching, Cardinal Josef Höffner, as an example,
mentions in this context, among others, the cult of the Syrian king Antioch, manifestations
of the cult of some Roman emperors (Augustus, Domitian, Aurelian, Diocletian), and the
cult of the Inca emperor. [Höffner 1999: 240].
8
The manifestations of theocracy are noticed by Cardinal Höffner, for example, in the
thought of the political party of the Zealots active in Israel during the time of Christ or
concepts, some theologians of the Middle Ages. Thomas, or already in the 16th century at
Francisco de Vitoria [ibid.: 240-241].
9
It is worth recalling that intellectual and practical search for civil religion has been in
progress since at least the time of Jean Jacques Rousseau. And although both researchers
and followers of this concept have led to quite different (and distant from each other) conclu-
sions, the essence is probably the desire to reduce the tension between civic and religious
loyalty. For both the secular concept of civil religion, probably closer to the spirit of French
republicanism, as well as concepts referring to traditional eschatological religions, closer
to the republicanism of American founding fathers, in essence want to limit the tension to
which citizens living simultaneously in two different, unadapted worlds are exposed, and
loving at the same time two different homelands. Citizens loyal to both God’s and earthly
states at the same time [Węgrzecki 2016].
10
As some examples of such a feud of structural or systemic reduction of tension between
religion and politics, one can cite the model of French separation, on the one hand,
and the model of the state church on the other, in which – as, for example, in Greece
or Denmark – the constitution The church, especially supported by the state. With all
the doubts and discussions that these solutions may raise, both though, in completely
different ways, settle many practical questions and doubts about the relationship
between the state and the Church, thus reducing the tension indicated by us. However,
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foundations of the political system, or a more tactical dimension, consisting

in the current policy that this or that other authority may pursue towards this
or that other religious entity, that this entity is politically instrumentalizing
or disavowing11, independently, and sometimes against the rules of religious
freedom, which are inscribed in the operation of a democratic political
system.
3. Tendencies to reduce tension between religion and politics.

Epistemological (political) dimension.
The political tendencies we recall to reduce tension between religion and politics,
as well as their possible political consequences, are obviously nothing new in
contemporary politics and so, as we have pointed out above, have already met
with considerable, also critical, interest in the sciences of politics. Definitely less
present in scientific reflection seems to be the epistemological, and not purely
political, dimension of this issue. And this particular tension between religion
and politics can be a problem not only for politicians but also for contemporary
political scientists.
Basically, this problem lies in the fact that the political scientist, armed with his
theoretical tools, encountering the phenomenon of religion on his scientific path
(in the vicinity of politics), either may recognise that religion cannot be scien-
tifically interested in non-political fact, or for the purposes of his research he
may view religion as a phenomenon analogous to other political or even political
phenomena in some respects. In the first case, religion and its meaning disappear
from the research horizon altogether. In the second case, admittedly, religion
remains on this horizon, although not as a phenomenon of a special eschatologi-
cal genre, but as a social, public or political fact. In both cases, he may become
familiar with the special role of religion in public (and indirectly political) life, and,
as a consequence, ignore the tensions between religion and politics to which we
have referred here, and thus also ignore the problem of its reduction and political
consequences arising as a result. Therefore the issues – as we tried to show above
– are quite significant for politics.
in both these cases – as is worth emphasizing – the importance of religious freedom is

emphasized [Robbers 2007].
11
Very interestingly in relation to the situation of contemporary Poland, he writes about Prof.
Michał Gierycz [2009].
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In short, the methodological problem we indicate here is that even if the tension
between religion and politics actually occurs and affects the political process,
or its reduction happens (with all its consequences), then the scientist – while
guarding his political scientific skills – may sometimes underestimate it or even
fail to see it at all.
Therefore, while later focusing mainly on this important espistemological and

methodological issue, firstly we will try to take a closer look at it, tracking its
various possible variants. Secondly, we will consider the possibility of its occur-
rence on the basis of several different theoretical approaches dominating political
science. Thirdly, we will make a carefully attempt to outline a few recommenda-
tions that this epistemological problem in the field of political science helped to
limit.
4. Epistemological reduction – separation variant

Epistemological reduction, as in the case of political reduction, in the field of
political science can – as we have already noted above – take two main forms:
separation or substitution.
Reduction through separation means removing religion (and its impact on political
processes) outside the sphere of serious scientific reflection regarding the domain
of political matters. Some of its manifestations may arise even on the basis of the
high-profile – albeit more sociological than political – concepts of seculariza-
tion of Peter Ludwik Berger [Berger 1997; Borowik 1997], Thomasa Luckmanna
[2006], or Niklas Luhmann [2007]. Although in different respects they probably
differ from each other, emphasising either the “liberation” (in their opinion) of
the modernizing world from the influence of religion (Berger) or the “privatisa-
tion” of religion in the modern world (Luckmann and Luhmann), the common
research consequence resulting from them, it may be concluded that religion is not
an important and significant element in the public life of modern society today.
Another example of such a possible separating reduction may be the simplistic
and one-sided treatment of Popper’s popular concept of “open society” – especially
its reading, which removes all traditional axiology, including religious beliefs,
beyond the rational boundaries, and thus beyond parentheses, which modern
science can sensibly and critically examine. Leszek Kołakowski [1990: 150-177],
among others, wrote about dangerous illusions arising from this interpretation of
Popper’s thoughts or friar Maciej Zięba [2011].
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Relying on only two examples of such a possible reduction, however, we can

cautiously assume that in modern political sciences, and especially among
researchers of religion and politics, it is not very common. First of all, of
course, this is because researchers of religious relations with politics about
the presence of the former must be convinced by a definition. Secondly,
also because even a political scientist who does not deal with the relation-
ship between religion and politics on a daily basis, without taking into
account the presence and significance of the former, will have considerable
trouble with a meaningful explanation of many key contemporary political
processes, such as the “third wave of democratization”, peaceful revolutions
in Europe in 1989, or Poland’s accession to the European Union in the years
1997–2004.
An interesting issue and worth considering is the question about the possible
causes of the epistemological reduction mentioned here. Much indicates that, apart
from the aforementioned purely workshop-related political problem, which is to
examine the “non-political politics” of religion, wider considerations may also be
involved, as well as ideological (or ideological) matters. Without expanding on
this, let us just mention that it can be a general problem of modern social sciences
related to distrustful transcendence [Wysocki 2015], or even more broadly, the
special legacy of enlightenment, which is a redefinition, or reduction of the concept
of rationality, to the sole dimension of empirical knowledge, verified through
experiments [Ratzinger 2005].
5. Epistemological reduction – substitution variant. The church as an interest

group? civil society? Sector III? public sphere actor?
The problem of epistemological reduction that we are talking about here in
political science is also in the form of an analogy or a kind of theoretical substi-
tution. This substitution – as we have already mentioned above – means treating
religious entities in scientific research as another, perhaps special, variety of
a wider genre of political actors, which political science is used to dealing with
on a daily basis.
In the more radical but definitely rarer variant, this type of reduction occurs
there and when researchers or analysts of political life, for various reasons known
to them, treat Churches or religious associations as participating in the politi-
cal actors’ struggle for power, and even contrary to the self-declarations of the
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interested parties themselves12. Much more often the reduction here in politi-
cal science is more subtle when researchers of the political process, realising the
non-political nature of religious entities, situate them in a political area, treat-
ing them, for example, as a special kind of interest group, part of society civic,
non-governmental institutions operating in the third sector, or other actors in
the public sphere.
Each attempt at such epistemological analogies or substitutions has its substan-

tive reasons and generally testifies to good self-awareness and intellectual effort,
researchers who try to find a narrow theoretical path between respect for the
“non-politics” of religious actors, and loyalty to their political science, which
commands the use of proven theoretical approaches and research methods. Each
of these research choices is therefore justified somehow. Everyone, however, carries
the inevitable risk of epistemological reduction, i.e. not recognising or underesti-
mating the differences and tension between religion and politics.
As regards treating religious institutions as peculiar “interest groups” or

representatives of “civil society”, this problem is highlighted, among others, by
Aniela Dylus, stressing the need for “indeterministic” explanation of the public
status of religious actors and warning – in this context – against the temptation
to reduce “social complexity to interests” or create a “deterministic model of
society” [Dylus: 2005: 172; 2016: 415-434]. In the context of the epistemological
situation of religious institutions in the so-called Third sector and treating them
as social institutions, the theoretical problem indicated here is evoked, among
others, by Tadeusz Kamiński. And although in his very interesting studies on
this subject he presents a host of good reasons to accept such an epistemological
procedure, at the same time he raises questions and doubts related to the choice
of such [Kamiński 2012]. Finally, with regard to the epistemological qualification
of churches as public sphere actors, this problem was highlighted by those who
wrote these words [Sowiński 2018]. To further elaborate on this thread, let us not
only notice that this kind of epistemological substitution, with all its advantages,
carries the risk of reducing the theological teaching of the Church (concerning
sin, forgiveness and redemption, Christian mercy) to a mere moral dimension.
It tempts me to succumb to what Habermas calls “deliberative rationality” [ibid.:
12
Examples of this kind of substitution can be sought in analyses (in my opinion much more
journalistic than political science) of critics of the Catholic Church’s involvement in the
public sphere of free Poland after 1989, who see various manifestations of this involvement
in the struggle for power.
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47-53]. It also creates problems arising from the need to translate the religious
language into a secular language understood by all participants in the public
sphere [ibid.].
As a result, we can say that such – epistemological – situating the Church in the
public sphere, although revealing many, does not reveal all the religious reasons
of the Church in socially important matters such as the dispute about spiritual
vetting in Poland after 1989, a discussion about the legal protection of Sunday
or the debate about the possibilities of political reconciliation and forgiveness.
Therefore, in such a functionalist analytical approach, the question about the role
of the Church in the public sphere seems much more justified than treating it as
yet another typical actor [ibid.].
6. Functionalism, institutionalism and the historical approach (as well as their

limitations) in studies of religion and politics
The epistemological and theoretical problem we are talking about here has a fairly
universal dimension in political science, and every political scientist who tries to
follow this narrow path between respect for the religious identity of the churches
and loyalty to his scientific background must clash with it. Saying this, however,
it can be seen that this problem – with varying intensity, with different conse-
quences, and in any case in different ways – manifests itself on the basis of different
theoretical approaches that political scientists used to take while studying politics
and religion.
Furthermore, let us try to consider it on the basis of three selected and often
(though not exclusively) in the study of religion and politics of practiced approach-
es: functionalism, institutionalism and the historical approach.
A functionalist approach derived from sociology or ethnography [Beyme 2005:

108] in political science research on religion and politics is used relatively often,
for example among researchers of the Catholic Church’s contribution to the
processes of European integration, systemic transformations and democratization
of the modern world. At the center of his theoretical perspective lies the question
concerning the function of the examined element in the whole structure or system
under scrutiny. Although in the sciences of politics it is sometimes referred to in
a broader sense (largo), in the form of a metaphor for “political theatre” (politi-
cal stage, backstage, actors, audiences, etc.), it appears more often in a narrower
sense, questioning the functionality (or dysfunction) of individual elements in
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relation to the entire system or political process, and therefore whether individual
elements and their behavior are consistent with the objectives of the entire system
or political process [ibid.: 111].
However, in order to elicit the tension between religion and politics that is of
interest here, the functional perspective understood in this way should probably
be slightly opened up so much towards the narrowly understood political system,
but rather towards the broader political (or metapolitical) system, which in fact
describes parliamentary democracy in the categories of public sphere, civil society,
the third sector, or simply social life.
This approach or view (especially with the correction proposed here), from the
point of view of political science, has many advantages in the case that interests
us. It allows for a clear distinction between what is public and what is political,
and thus, to capture the important fact that the tension between religion and
politics often arises in the political public sphere, and often penetrates the political
system indirectly. Thus, this approach is well suited, for example, for studying the
relationship between religion and politics in the realities of modern democratic
systems, which particularly emphasizes the need to separate religion from a direct
political process.
However, this does not change the fact that it also carries the possibility, and even
the aforementioned form of temptation and epistemological reduction, primarily
in the substitution variant. Recalling the partial considerations already mentioned
above, we can briefly note that in this approach – somewhat inevitably – treating
religious entities in the same way as foundations, associations, educational or
charitable institutions can lead not only to the omission of the religious identity
of the former, but also, which is particularly important to us, to know their critical
or corrective role. In other words, a functional approach, in a way necessarily, as
a criterion for analysing the Church activities in the public sphere (and indirectly
its impact on the political process) prefers the logic and axiology of this sphere,
thus making it difficult to grasp the critical and corrective role of Churches
towards the public sphere itself.
To use an example, in the axiology of the democratic public sphere, which is to

control and correct the democratic political process, next to transparency, freedom
or justice, stand values that Charles Taylor defines as secularism, apolitically and
mathematically [Taylor 1996], or what Habermas recognizes as – mentioned above
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– “deliberative rationality“13. Each of these values has its own philosophical and
political justification, but each also raises questions and provokes debates, in which
Churches also participate.
The corrective and critical contribution of Churches to the public (and indirectly
political) sphere in such debates can remind us of the weakness but also human
dignity in the context of the debate on openness and transparency, about the need
for responsibility in the context of the discussion about freedom, about mercy in
the context of the dispute about justice, about the human hunger for transcendence
during debates about secularism, or about the value of objective truth when faced
with the pressure of “deliberative rationality”. The point is, however, that this criti-
cal and corrective contribution is easily neglected or omitted, assessing it – which
in this case seems to prefer a functional view – in the light of principles that are
to be critically assessed or corrected.
In this sense, we can also repeat that the functional perspective does not unequivo-
cally reveal – important for tension between religion and politics – the distinction
between the Church’s role in the democratic public sphere of certain roles and the
Church becoming her typical actor [Sowiński 2018: 47-53].
The institutional approach in the studies of religion and politics that interest us
here is also used quite often, especially by researchers who focus on the shape of
relations between the state and the Church (or Churches).
It can also be understood broadly or narrowly, depending on the definition – the

key here – of the concept of the institutionalization of political life. In a broad
sense, institutions can be understood in it “as temporal, factual and socially
generalized expectations of behavior” [Beyme 2005: 90]. In the narrower sense,
which is probably often used in the study of religion and politics, understanding
institutions generally boils down to politically key formal and legal institutions
13
According to the German philosopher, this form of rationality is networked and commu-
nicative, and its source is “interactions between lawfully institutionalized will formation
and culturally mobilized public spheres, which for their part are based on associations of
civil society, remaining equidistant from the state and the economy” [Habermas 2009:
243]. Important seems that although this form of rationality protects what Habermas calls
the “world of life” (public life), the forms of its communication “so regulate the course of
discursive shaping of opinion and the will that its fallible results have a presumption of
reason” [ibid.: 248]. In this sense, it is probably difficult for the Churches to accept this
form of rationality uncritically.
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(parliament, government, political parties, judicial institutions, media), or it

simply focuses on the institution of the state, because on this ground, the state
is treated – as Klaus von Beyme observes – “with special honor as an institution
over institutions” [ibid.].
This institutional view of the relationship between religion and politics, which
here most often takes on the nature of the relationship between the state and
the Church, in an epistemological sense seems to have a number of advantages.
Firstly, and probably most importantly for us, often focusing on the formal
relations of the two institutions, it reveals not only a certain limited convergence
of their goals (e.g. religious freedom), but also indelible differences between
them, i.e. the state that we have referred to as voltage. It seems, therefore, that
in this perspective one can clearly see the warning against the sacralization
of political institutions, which Fr Prof. Tischner formulated in his time. He
recalled: “The idea of God is the idea of the absolute. The state, government
and law are relative. When the idea of the absolute contains an error, the other
concepts also turn out to be wrong. Then the relative values are raised to the
order of absolute values, and the absolute values disappear. This is because there
is a mistake in thinking about the absolute that relative values are subject to
absolutization. God is becoming a god.” [qoute after: Makowski 2006]. Secondly,
this approach reveals how the idea of a modern state emerges from the history
of the intriguing process of cooperation (but also competition) of the institu-
tions of the state and the Church – from the dispute about investing in the 10th
century, through separating political thought from religious thought and the
principles of Augsburg peace in the 16th century, to the contemporary processes
of secularization of politics [Böeckenförde 1994: 120; Starck 1997: 79–80]14.
Thirdly, the advantage of this institutional approach also naturally seems to be
the inherent possibility and inclination to comparative studies, i.e. comparing
and topologizing various practiced models in relations between the Church and
the state. And this, in turn, creates the possibility of creating a specific scale to
It is also worth recalling the thought of C. Schmitt according to whom, the concept of
14
sovereignty, in a sense, can acquire a sense of sacred. Referring to “Leviathan” he wrote that
German philosopher “Gisbert Beyerhaus and Karl Theodor Budderberg have shown that in
the concept of sovereignty that is in force in the modern rule of law, the Calvinist concept
of God is included in the secularized form together with the characteristic legibus solutus
principle” [unbound by laws]. The most prominent English expert in this era of religious
wars and time to shape concepts, John Neville even claims that the God of Calvinism
is a Hobbesian Leviathan with omnipotence unlimited by law and conscience [Schmitt
2008:43].
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measure the intensity of the voltage that interests us here. Fourthly and finally,
in this approach, one can also examine relations with religion (or Churches) not
only of the state, but also of other political institutions, such as at least political
parties15 also creating comparisons and typologies here.
After all, however, this approach does not seem to be free from the temptation we
indicate, or the tendency to reduce or familiarize tensions between religion and
politics. In the variant that we have termed epistemological reduction by separa-
tion, this temptation may consist in acquainting oneself with the actual public (and
indirectly political) significance of religion in the study of all those cases in which,
for various reasons, the religious denominations actually affecting the social life
of, are not institutionalized enough, and the Churches or religious associations
that represent them are not formally institutional partners of the state without
any legal and public status. In this sense, from a purely institutional perspective,
it is difficult, for example, to fully show, the special tension between religion and
politics in the People’s Republic of Poland, which was of utmost importance both
for the state-church relationship and for the functioning of the authoritarian state
itself.
In the variant of epistemological reduction by substitution, the threat described

here may consist in reducing the entire relationship between religion and politics
(state and Churches) solely to the formal and legal dimension, with a key question
in this regard about the legality of these or other actions. Then, however, from
the research field of view one can very easily lose sight of a number of usually
dynamic, cultural, social or political processes that occur permanently in the area
between what is political and what is religious. Then, too, it is easy to overlook the
growing or weakening of tension. Finally, focusing on legal and formal legality, it
is much more difficult to grasp the key to political science’s legitimacy of religion
and politics in their mutual relations.
In other words, the institutional approach in researching the relationship between

religion and politics, focusing on the procedures that these relations are to order,
regulate or standardize in one way or another, may inevitably lose the perspective
of difference, dispute and conflict. This is a perspective, which is an immanent
part of the tension that interests us in this study.
15
A
n interesting example of such research in Polish literature is presented, among others
Prof. Krzysztof Kowalczyk [2012].
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Finally, let us briefly recall the historical approach used in political science, also
called the historical-genetic. Its essence is a focus on political temporality and
political change, which in consequence often leads to various periodization in
the description of the political process, reconstructing its individual sequences,
attempts to indicate breakthrough moments, or building cause-and-effect expla-
nations [Beyme 2005: 80nn].
Setting aside the problem of methodological relations of this political science

approach to historical sciences, we only notice that it is also used relatively often in
the area of research on religion and politics, especially in monographs attempting
to capture the dynamics of change within one country or political system [Deląg
2016]. And like in the case of functionalism or the institutional approach, it has
– in the context we are interested in – its own advantages as well as limitations.
Among the advantages, one can point above all to some kind of methodological
openness, which by focusing on the temporality of the studied process or political
state, leaves the researcher a free hand in choosing the aspect of the changing
reality to be studied. From this perspective, it is from the knowledge, experience
and methodological imagination of the researcher that the design of the research
and such a definition of its direct subject depends, as the tension between religion
and politics may fully reveal. Secondly, it is also worth noting that the historical
approach, like no other, allows us to grasp the fundamental question of politi-
cal permanence or political change in political science. Thanks to this approach,
we can make a non-trivial decision whether the tension between religion and
politics is a natural state to which each political system somehow tends with the
power of its own inertia, and which can only be mitigated or delayed. Or – as we
suggested above – is it quite the opposite, and is the natural state that can only be
corrected, mitigated or postponed (occurring on the side of religion, politics, or on
the side of both these phenomena) the desire to reduce this tension by separation
or identification?
Among the limitations and tendencies toward epistemological reduction, we can,

first of all, indicate the possibility of some kind of axiological reduction. In short,
the researchers of the history of a particular social or political being, consciously
or not, sometimes make a certain methodological choice, focusing either on the
dimension of durability and duration, or on trends to change. Sometimes, such
a methodological choice takes the shape of an axiological one, either in the form
of a traditional paradigm, where the value of the behavior or beliefs or institutions
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becomes the permanent or unspeakable value, or in the form of the modernist

paradigm, when the value itself becomes change itself, very often associated with
the Enlightenment idea of modernity and progress. Such a traditional or modern-
ist epistemological tendency, in the study of the relationship between religion and
politics, may obscure the picture of both phenomenon and the actual relationship
between them.
Secondly, in relation to religion and politics, it is also worth remembering that

in each of these two special areas time runs in a different rhythm and gener-
ally different turning points, and the perception of history itself, are different.
Hence, measuring religion and politics with one common historical measure and
showing one common change, or in other words, putting them together in one
time sequence presented in the research may slightly blur the picture of reality,
influencing the failure to notice differences or tensions between religion and
politics.
To use two examples only. In studies on the relationship of religion and politics in
contemporary Poland, it is sometimes believed that because after 1989 (or 2004)
the political system and social life underwent a profound transformation, Polish
Catholicism and the Church present in Polish society should have undergone
a similar transformation. The lack of such a transformation – in this approach –
would give rise to unnecessary, dysfunctional conflicts between modern society
and the “insufficiently modern Church”. It seems that this view, resulting precisely
from the expectation of the convergence of direction and pace of change in the
world of religion and politics, blurs the essence of the relationship between religion
and politics.
Example two. We note that the fundamental changes that have taken place fairly
extensively in the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican Council
(1962–1965), are recognized in democratic public opinion as a manifestation of some
modernization of the Church, or in any case its aggiornamento or opening to the
surrounding world. However, the point is that the theological logic of the Council
fathers says not so much (or not only) about the modernity of Christianity, but above
all about its return to the evangelical sources, and therefore something that in the
progressive and linear logic of contemporary politics is difficult to understand.
Finally, let us note that the historical approach we have cited here, in research-
ing the relationship between religions, focusing on the possible diversity of these
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relationships in time (changes or no changes) necessarily leaves less space to

capture internal differences in the world of religion and the world policies that
can significantly influence the tension we are interested in.
Conclusions. Towards a system of ideologically and methodologically open

sentences16
Searching for a way to summarise our considerations, it seems difficult to indicate
a simple solution of a kind of epistemological quadrature of the circle which is
the study of the relationship between politics and religion, on the theoretical basis
of political science. This does not mean, however, and our conclusions may lead
to the idea that this methodological problem cannot be slightly offset by making
politics a little more sensitive to the “non-political politics of religion”.
To put it briefly and generally, we can say that research on the relationship between
religion and politics, so as not to lose the unique tension signalled by us from
the cognitive horizon, should remain, above all, with all their scientific identity,
a system of ideological and methodologically open sentences.
Ideological openness here means avoiding all paradigms evaluating a priori

religious understanding of the world or rejecting the possibility of its rational
analysis due to current cognitive capabilities. In short, this is primarily about
avoiding the deterministic version of the secularization paradigm, in favor of
what Margaret Archer and her related researchers call “critical realism”. As
Artur Wysocki explains in an interesting study, it is a recommendation to adopt
“ontological realism” and “epistemological relativism” as research paradigms,
i.e. the initial assumption that being and its existence is something primary to
the possibility of knowing it [Wysocki 2015]. In a similar, though slightly more
philosophical vein, this postulate is also formulated by Cardinal Józef Ratzinger,
dedicating to contemporary “my friends who don’t believe” Pascal’s advice that
in a joint debate about the world around us, enlightenment, excluding religious
consciousness, the establishment of etsi Deus non daretur, be replaced by a positive
veluti si Deus daretur assumption open to the possibility of existence. Father Maciej
Zięba also looks for a similar recommendation for epistemological openness in
the philosophy of Karl Popper, citing at least the following words of the author
of the concept of “Open Society”: “one must take the effort and risk of traveling,
16
I n this context, the term “open sentence system” is used by the senior of the Warsaw school
of Catholic Social Teaching, Rev. Prof. Helmut Juros, who uses it precisely in relation to
the CST.
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being provided only with an anthropological compass (…). We must move forward
to what is unknown, uncertain and dangerous, using reason as a guide towards
both – towards security and freedom” [Zięba 2011: 145]. We can also indicate her
traces in the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas [Teinert 2006: 163-164].
In the case of religion and politics, this research attitude should mean accepting
the possibility of the existence of God or the truth of the religious image of the
world, regardless of whether we are able to verify it with the help of research tools
available today.
The methodological openness which we want to recommend with our consider-

ations means the theoretical effort in searching for a narrow and probably difficult
to discover and travel, epistemological path which, remaining on the basis of
political science, is to lead to the point of view from which – ultimately impossible
to learn with the use of political tools – religion and the tension between it and
politics can be seen best.
In an attempt to develop this general recommendation, we can firstly note that

although such paths – as we mentioned at the beginning – already exist, the effort
to discover enough of them still awaits political science. Especially since many of
them are original, unique and adequate choice mainly in the area and research
situation in which they arose.
Secondly, our cautious methodological statement appears to show that a conscious

choice of theoretical approach is important in designing religion and policy
research. From the three approaches we have cited as examples (functionalism,
institutionalism and historical approach) one can cautiously notice that the
historic approach seems to be the most epistemologically open within the aspect
of the tension between religion and politics that we indicate. Nevertheless, the
postulate of methodological diversification, i.e. a fully conscious and thoughtful
supplementation of the selected (leading) research horizon with other horizons,
seems to be a much more certain recommendation in this respect that results from
our considerations, thanks to which one can look at the examined aspect of the
relationship between religion and politics from different political perspectives,
verifying and supplementing each other’s perspectives.
Thirdly and finally, this results in a broader meta-theoretical recommendation,

according to which more intimately understood political science has much more to
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say about the intriguing relationship between religion and politics than narrowly
understood political science. Without developing this thread and leaving aside
a very interesting meta-theoretical dispute about the usefulness and weakness of
each of these concepts of policy research, here we only note that, other sciences,
such as history, sociology, psychology or theology can also help in perceiving the
impact of religion on the politics that narrowly understood as political science.
Therefore, similarly to Catholic social science, which bases its methodological
structure on several scientific disciplines, e.g. sociology, economics, ethics or
theology, also in political and religious studies, the metatheoretic formula of
political science seems to be much more effective, which opens up to ordered and
thoughtful use of various methods and points of view, from the political science
formula that narrows the research perspective.
We began our deliberations by recalling the thoughts of Prof. Ernst-Wolfgang

Böckenförde. Let us finish them with the following statement. The famous –
mentioned at the beginning – “Böckenförde paradigm” seems to concern not
only the subject of research which is religion and politics, but also carries with it
an important methodological premise. Paraphrasing the thought of an eminent
researcher, we can formulate it like this: political science, in research on religion
and politics can preserve its research potential on the condition of its ideologi-
cal and methodological openness to religious reality, which it cannot know and
explain in detail.
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CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Tamás Nyirkos
ORCID: 0000-0003-4330-0591
University of Public Service, Research Institute for Politics and Government, Budapest, Hungary
Secular religions
and the religious/secular divide
Abstract: Since Carl Schmitt first described some modern political ideologies
as the secular analogues of religious belief systems, it has become something of
a fashion to find further examples of such political theologies, or – in a broader
sense – political or secular religions. All these attempts simultaneously maintain
that political and secular theologies and religions are not “real” theologies and
religions, only “this-worldly”, “immanent”, “pseudo”, “quasi”, or “ersatz” versions
of the latter. However, a brief overview of the topic’s literature may nevertheless
raise doubts about the very possibility of making a clear distinction: the People
in democratic thought, the Proletariat in communism, the State in civil religion,
the Market or Money in certain schools of economics, or Mother Nature in deep
ecology (just to mention a few) seem no more empirical entities than the transcen-
dent Absolute of several “genuine” religions. Speaking of “secular” – at least in
these cases – therefore obscures more than it reveals – especially the fact that
such ideologies can be rivals to traditional religions precisely because they belong
to the same category. To call them secular will only help them to distinguish
themselves as more “objective”, “realistic”, or “scientific” than traditional belief
systems, which is most likely not the case.
Keywords: political religions, civil religions, secularization
Abstrakt: Od czasu kiedy Carl Schmitt po raz pierwszy opisał pewne współczesne
ideologie jako świeckie analogie systemów religijnych, dalsze poszukiwanie takich
teologii politycznych, lub – w szerszym sensie – politycznych lub świeckich religii,
stało się czymś w rodzaju mody. Wszystkie te podejścia równocześnie utrzymują, że
polityczne i świeckie teologie i religie nie są „prawdziwymi” teologiami i religiami,
a tylko „z tego świata”, „zapożyczonymi”, „pseudo”, „quasi” czy „ersatz” wersjami
oryginału. Niemniej jednak, szybki przegląd literatury przedmiotu może rodzić
pewne wątpliwości co do samej możliwości dokonania wyraźnego rozróżnie-
nia: ludzie/społeczeństwo w myśli demokratycznej, proletariat w komunizmie,
państwo w religii świeckiej, rynek albo pieniądze w poszczególnych szkołach
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ekonomicznych, czy Matka Natura w głębokiej ekologii (żeby tylko wymie-

nić kilka przykładów) wydają się nie bardziej empirycznymi jednostkami niż
transcendentny Absolut w kilku „prawdziwych” religiach. Dlatego też mówienie
o „świeckości” – przynajmniej w powyższych przypadkach – bardziej zaciemnia
niż rozjaśnia – szczególnie fakt, że te ideologie mogą rywalizować z tradycyjnymi
religiami właśnie dlatego, że należą one do tej samej kategorii. Nazywanie ich
świeckimi będzie tylko pomagało im aby odróżniać się jako bardziej „obiektyw-
ne”, „realistyczne” czy „naukowe” niż tradycyjne systemy religijne, co najpraw-
dopodobniej nie jest prawdą.
Słowa kluczowe: religie polityczne, religie świeckie, sekularyzm
Introduction
Treating certain – self-professedly secular – belief systems, political ideologies,
socio-economic theories, or phenomena as diverse as entertainment or science as
covertly or unconsciously religious has a long history. “Long” in this case means
starting with the first modern attempts to separate the secular from the religious,
and the most remarkable fact is that with such attempts, almost immediately
appeared the suspicion that this separation was, in most cases, more apparent
than real.
To find a sufficiently broad term that would cover all the phenomena involved
has always been notoriously difficult. “Secular religion” is just one option among
others; in a more specific context, “civil religion”, “political religion”, and “political
theology” have also been used; just as “pseudo”, “quasi”, or “ersatz” religion; or, to
cite more author-specific examples, “inner-worldly religion”, “immanent faith”,
“lay spirituality”, or “laicized mysticism;” not to mention those which simply spoke
of “new” religions without any further distinction.
All this already points to a profound uncertainty about the whole enterprise, but
before arriving at the roots of this uncertainty, let us first take a brief look at
the history of such comparisons. Afterwards we may turn to the terminologi-
cal problems of speaking about “secular”, “civil”, “political”, “pseudo”, “quasi”,
“ersatz”, etc. entities on the one hand, and maintaining that they remain a religion,
a faith, a spirituality, or a mysticism on the other. The fundamental problem is
obviously that of definitions, most importantly the definition of “religion”, which
the present paper will not solve, either. To the contrary, my purpose is to raise
further doubts of the very possibility of giving such a definition.
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A brief history
The term “civil religion” was coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du contrat social
in 1762, while “political religion” was arguably first used in its modern sense by
Condorcet’s Cinq mémoires sur l’instruction publique in 1791. For the present
discussion, Rousseau is of lesser importance, for his civil religion was in fact
a genuine – albeit very simple – religion with dogmas about God, the afterlife,
heavenly reward and punishment [Rousseau 2002: 253]. Even though its ultimate
task was to support social and political aims, its religious nature did not have to
be “uncovered” by anyone (and the same goes to later examples of civil religion,
most famously in Robert Bellah’s Civil Religion in America, which likewise noted
that the latter was a “genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious
reality,” even if “revealed through the experience of the American people”, see
Bellah 1991 [1967]: 179).
In Condorcet’s Mémoires, in contrast, the term “political religion” already had

the same negative meaning that would later most frequently be associated with it:
unconditional belief (in the new, revolutionary Constitution as something absolute,
a product of “universal reason”) indoctrinated by systematic propaganda to create
a “blind enthusiasm” among citizens (Condorcet 2005 [1791]: 42). Whether or not
Condorcet was right in suggesting that revolutionary ideas were covertly religious
is, of course, highly dubious. Already in 1791, the French Revolution promoted
many other, explicitly religious ideas and practices (the cult of Reason, the altars
of the Fatherland, religious feasts and oaths, see e.g. Ozouf 1976) that would soon
culminate in the worship of the Supreme Being, so Condorcet’s somewhat naïve
attempt to “unveil” one of those may have been mistaken at the very outset.
What did become a more adequate target of such unveilings during the nineteenth
century was the newly emerging ideology of democracy. The criticism of democratic
principles, the ideas of popular sovereignty and majority rule may not have used
the exact terms of “civil” or “political” religion, but other religious references were
more than sporadic. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America spoke
of the “dogma” of the sovereignty of the people, the people ruling the political world
as “God rules the universe”, or the “omnipotence” of the majority [Tocqueville 2010
(1835): 97, 108, and 411). In 1861, John Stuart Mill’s On Representative Government
mentioned the “false creed” of democratic egalitarianism [Mill 1977 (1861): 478].
In 1884, Herbert Spencer’s The Man versus the State called belief in representative
democracy (the “divine right of parliaments”) a modern “superstition” [Spencer
1960 (1884): 174]. In 1896, Gaetano Mosca’s Elementi di scienza politica (published
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in English as The Ruling Class) not only repeated Spencer’s verdict but compared
Rousseau and Marx to religious founders [Mosca 1939 (1896): 71 and 170]. Later
on, in the twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto’s 1916 Trattato di sociologia generale
(or Mind and Society in English) used even more religious analogies to describe
the modern belief in democracy and equality, stating that the rise of democratic
religion in the modern era was comparable to the rise of Christianity in the early
centuries [Pareto 1935 (1916): 1294].
In 1918, Luigi Sturzo may have been the first to use “secular religion” in connec-
tion with the worship of the absolute state [Gentile 2006: 93], while in 1922, Carl
Schmitt introduced his own interpretation of “political theology”, meaning that all
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state were “secularized theologi-
cal concepts” [Schmitt 1984 (1922): 36]. After Schmitt, such analogies became
even more widespread, with one remarkable difference: whereas in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries it was democracy which was most often suspected
of being covertly religious, from the 1920’s its place was taken by dictatorships in
the works of the Russian Nikolai Berdyaev or such authors as Guy Stanton Ford,
who first applied the analogy to contemporary dictatorships as having “a secular
religion of their own creation” [Ford 1935: 6]. In 1936, Adolf Keller called Leninism
a “camouflaged secular religion” [Keller 1936: 69], while in 1938, Frederick A.
Voigt discussed both Marxism and national socialism as “secular religions” [Voigt
1938: 3 and 57].
Eric Voegelin also wrote his own Die politischen Religionen in 1938, calling fascism
and national-socialism “inner-worldly” religions, and this line of anti-totalitarian
current culminated in Raymond Aron’s L’avenir des religions séculières in 1944.
The latter term in fact became so popular that in the 1950s, when Hans Kelsen
started to write a book-length refutation of all such comparisons, he named it
Secular Religion (or, as the subtitle goes, A Polemic against the Misinterpretation
of Modern Social Philosophy, Science, and Politics as “New Religions”, which once
again shows the ambiguity of terminology; it is also no accident that he found
all such concepts so problematic that he finally withdrew the manuscript, which
would only appear in print in 2012).
In addition to – or sometimes as part of – the ideologies of democracy and dicta-

torship, the cult of the state and the nation also came under suspicion. To give
a full list here would be utterly impossible, but it’s worth noting that Sturzo’s first
mention of “secular” religion already referred to the “absolute sovereign state”
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as an “irrepressible power and sole synthesis of the collective will”, and almost
all other Catholic authors writing on modern political regimes connected these
to the worship of the state, a so-called “statolatry” and the cult of the nation [see
Gentile 2006: 89-97]. The German legal scholar Hermann Heller, the Protestant
theologian Paul Tilllich, the anarcho-syndicalist writer Rudolf Rocker, and many
others made a similar connection between statism and nationalism in the 1930s,
until the seminal work of Carlton Hayes explicitly called nationalism “a religion”
[Hayes 1960].
Although such politico-religious comparisons have remained with us ever since

(on democratic religion see [Boia 2002], [Deneen 2005], [Wydra 2015]; on totali-
tarianism [Maier 2004-2007]; on the nation-states [Bossy 1987], [Cavanaugh 2011],
[Luoma-aho 2012], and many others), it has also become more frequent to describe
other, not strictly speaking political belief systems as secular religions. Paul Vitz
wrote of Psychology as Religion as early as 1977, Robert Nelson on Economics as
Religion in 2001, Philip Goodchild on the Theology of Money in 2009, Harvey Cox
on The Market as God in 2016, or John Rapley on Economic Religion in 2017. In
the meantime, Robert Nelson also opposed economic religion to “environmental
religion” in 2010, until in 2018, John Gray explicitly stated that some of the most
prevalent forms of atheism were in fact religious; and the list is still far for complete.
The meaning of it all

The abundance of examples, however, is more vexing than convincing, and raises
further questions. What is the exact meaning of a “secular”, “political”, “inner-
worldly” (and so on) religion, faith, or belief? Are all these (with their correspond-
ing practices, symbols, and institutions) in fact “religious”, or do we use such
terms only in the sense of “almost like” a religion? In either case, what are the
exact criteria that would define a religion? Have the authors writing on secular
religions ever provided such criteria with any degree of precision? If so, did they
coherently apply their own criteria to the phenomena investigated? If not, do we
still have any grounds to speak of “secular religions”, or – what is an even more
vexing issue – should we give up not only the term secular religion and its relatives,
but also the terms “secular” and “religious” altogether?
To give a definitive answer to any such question is extremely difficult. To return

to some of the examples cited before, Condorcet was rather vague on the subject:
speaking of “a kind” (une espèce) or “a sort” (une sorte) of political religion already
betrayed his reluctance to identify a “real” religion here, presumably because he
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found that political creeds were similar to religious ones only in the sense of
being dogmatic and intolerant, but this was hardly a full definition of religion [see
Condorcet 2005 (1791): 42 and 44].
Tocqueville, on the other hand, who detected many more analogies between
religious and political ideas, never explicitly called democracy a “religion.” Even
if the people ruled the American political world as God ruled the universe; even
if the idea of popular sovereignty was treated as a dogma; and even if the majority
was vested with such divine attributes as omnipotence, he carefully avoided any
identification between political creeds and genuinely religious ones (which, for
him, usually meant “Christian”, one might add).
In Mill’s account, “false creed” may indeed be nothing more than a metaphor, and
it also remains doubtful whether Spencer’s frequent references to “divine right”,
“oil of anointing”, “political superstitions”, or “political fetish” should be taken
at face value, or just as rhetorical tools. There are some passages, however, that
point to a more profound analogy: “It is curious” he says, “how commonly men
continue to hold in fact doctrines which they have rejected in name – retaining
the substance after they have abandoned the form” [Spencer 1960 (1884): 174-175).
This substance, at the same time, is not “religious” in general, but once again
something known from monotheistic traditions, mostly from Christianity (see his
references to “omnipotence”, or the scholastic concept of omnipotence “bounded
only by physical impossibilities”, 173 and 175).
Mosca’s remarks on the religious character of “politico-social schools” are no less

ambiguous: they are “in a sense” religious, but also “shorn of strictly theological
elements” [Mosca 1939 (1896): 166). In the same vein, Pareto’s “significant analo-
gy” between democratic religion and Christianity – so, once again, Christianity,
and not religion in general – leaves open the question whether they belong to
the same category, or are just compared for the purpose of explaining one from
the other.
Schmitt, who uses a similar analogical reasoning (a “systematic analogy”, [Schmitt

1984 (1922): 42]), nevertheless speaks of “secularized” theological concepts, and
although he never precisely explains how “secularized” should be understood, so
much seems clear that “secularized” is something different from “non-secular-
ized,” i.e. genuinely religious. In the case of socialism, however, the religious idea
(that of “atheism”) seems to be perfectly identical with the political; otherwise we
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should say that socialism is a “secularized atheism”, which would be – to say the
least – somewhat paradoxical [cf. Schmitt 1984 (1922): 51 and 59].
Berdyaev is just as ambiguous on the subject: at times he declares that “commu-

nism persecutes all religions because it is itself a religion,” but other times he
returns to the more traditional vocabulary of “secularized” and “pseudo” religions
[Berdyaev 1966 (1931): 70, 84 and 85). Eric Voegelin also carefully separates “trans-
worldly” or “spiritual” religions (überweltlich or geistlich) from “inner-worldly”
(innerweltlich) religions, thereby denying the full status of “religion” of the latter
[Voegelin 2000 (1938): 32-33); yet the whole distinction seems to evaporate when
the object of political worship proves to be the spirit of the people (Volksgeist),
which has no objective reality [Voegelin 2000 (1938): 66]. Raymond Aron shows
the same ambiguity when talking about “secular” religions and their “quasi-
sacred” objects in his The Future of Secular Religions [Aron 2002 (1944): 178],
while maintaining in his The Opium of the Intellectuals that communism is
based on “hyper-realities” totally resistant to empirical facts, and thereby barely
distinguishable from a “real” religion [Aron 1962 (1955): 122-123]. Authors like
Erik Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn also carefully separate substitutes for religion
(“Religionsersatz”) from real religions (again, mainly Christianity); even though
the analogies of Christian and secular religions are more numerous than their
differences [Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1974: 54].
“Ersatz,” “pseudo,” “quasi,” and other words are still part of the vocabulary of
secular religion literature today (see e.g. [Smith 1994] or [Cox 2016: 8]). Although
some authors do attempt to distinguish between “religionsersatz” and “ersatzreli-
gion” (a substitute for religion and an actual religion replacing others), or “pseudo”
and “quasi” religions (those which show an “intended but deceptive similarity” to
real religions, and those which have a “genuine”, albeit unintended similarity to
them, see [Tillich 1988 (1963): 293], it remains true that in most cases the terms
remain ambiguous. Even words like “secular” or “secularized” are difficult to
view as something “non-religious” in the proper sense. As William Cavanaugh
once ironically put it, “Carl Schmitt was right to say that all modern concepts of
the state are secularized theological concepts if by secularized one means covert”
[Cavanaugh 2011: 3].
The definition of “religion”

The reason why it seems almost impossible to say whether the adjective “secular”
denotes a real, albeit non-traditional religion or something fundamentally different
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from religion is that no author gives a precise definition of religion itself. Most texts
seem to imply that religion is such an obvious concept that it needs no further
explication, while the case is the exact opposite: it is notoriously difficult to give
an exact definition. Traditional definitions that rely on such formulas like “belief
in a god or several gods or other supernatural beings” are clearly insufficient, for
a number of so-called religions either have no gods (like Buddhism), or these gods
are not personal (like in pantheism), or even if they have entities that with some
laxity may be called gods, these gods are more natural than supernatural beings
(as in most non-monotheistic traditions). Words like “supernatural” or “transcen-
dent” are simply meaningless in such traditions, so all extensions which would like
to replace gods or spirits with other supernatural or transcendent “principles” or
“processes” will also fail to pass the test (cf. [Asad 1987], [Smith 1998], [Fitzgerald
2000], [Crane 2017]).
A brief answer to the question whether a reasonably clear definition of religion was
given by any of the authors writing on secular religions is also negative. It is only
from the randomly listed features of secular religions that we might infer what
a given author thinks to be the “essence” of religion. Dogmatism and indoctrina-
tion in Condorcet; dogmas about a non-empirical reality with God-like attributes
in Tocqueville; again a set of empirically non-testable claims in Mill and Spencer;
the former plus a church-like institution in Mosca and Pareto; concepts like
God, law, and exception in Schmitt; dogmas, catechisms, an overarching moral
teaching, a church-like institution, a professional priesthood, and a high level
of enthusiasm in Berdyaev; dogmas, rituals, and enthusiasm in Aron (later also
belief in a “hyper-reality”); dogmas and a church-like institution in Keuhnelt-
Leddihn; belief in an absolute idea and a corresponding moral teaching, symbols
and rituals in Hayes; belief in a non-empirical reality, symbols, and rituals in
Bossy, Cavanaugh, Luoma-aho, or Cox; and so on.
In some cases, as the above list shows, the criteria are too few to define religion,
while in others, so precise and numerous that of all traditional faiths only
Catholicism may count as a “real” religion. In both cases, however, we remain
confused about how to separate the secular from the religious.
If one or two features like dogmatism and reliance on some ultimate principles
are sufficient, then almost every overarching ideology or moral theory can be
called a “religion”; and saying that the these are not genuinely “supernatural” or
“transcendent” is also of little help. The Constitution, the People, the Proletariat,
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the State, the Nation, the idea of the human self, the Market, money, or Mother
Nature are just as non-empirical as anything that a so-called “real” religion and its
adherents believe in. Because of this, it has by now become surprisingly frequent
to define religion as nothing more than an attempt to “create meaning” (see e.g.
[Harari 2015] and [Gray 2018]) in an otherwise meaningless world; but this is
already a complete dissolution of the secular/religious divide. On the other hand,
if a well-defined set of dogmas, an infallible magisterium, an official liturgy, and
a fully-fledged symbolism is required, then only some forms of totalitarianism
and – once again – Catholicism will count as religions, while the majority of the
world’s so-called “religious” traditions will remain outside the category of religion.
Let us make it very clear that no author in the “secular religion” tradition had
a solution to the problems outlined so far, and maybe necessarily so. The very term
“secular religion” implies a contradiction, for the meaning of “secular” can hardly
be anything else than “non-religious.” As for dictionary entries: the Cambridge
English Dictionary defines “secular” as “not having any connection with religion.”
In the Oxford English Dictionary, it is “not connected with spiritual or religious
matters.” In Macmillan’s, it is “not religious or not connected with religion.” In
Collins, “things that have no connection with religion.” A “secular religion” would
therefore mean a “religion that has no connection with religion” or a “not religious
religion.” A curious exception is Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary in which “secular”
is “not overtly or specifically religious.” At first sight, this definition seems to
retain the possibility that “secular” is not necessarily non-religious, only covertly
or non-specifically religious. Yet the same dictionary also says that “secular” is “of
or relating to the worldly or temporal”, so the inconsistency surfaces once again,
for “worldly” is: “of, relating to, or devoted to this world and its pursuits rather
than to religion or spiritual affairs.” In other words: despite all attempts to invent
more and more complex definitions, secular religion theorists are still left with
the notion of a religion which is devoted to other things than religion.
Conclusion
The reason why so many great thinkers – some of the best in their own times –
failed to notice the contradiction in the very concept of “secular religion” would be
worthy of further investigation. The first and most obvious reason is that almost
all of them took Christianity as a starting point, a “model religion”, and from this
perspective it seemed natural that democratic and totalitarian ideologies, the cult
of the state or the nation (and many others) were not Christian but something
else; which may be true, but says nothing about their difference from “religion” in
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general. In other words, I would suggest that when they spoke – and some of them
still speak – of “secular” (political, inner-worldly, immanent, and so on) religions,
they actually mean “non-Christian”, which means, at the same time, a cultural
appropriation of Christian principles and values in different forms.
The significance of all this is not merely semantical or philosophical. In the field
of politics, it also means that the only difference that seems to remain between real
and secular religions is that the latter do not overtly accept the religious label. It
also means that the very idea of secularism may best be described not as an attempt
to break with the former, allegedly “religious” foundations of politics and society,
but as an attempt to obfuscate the real nature of modern ideologies, presenting
them as more rational or more scientific than the traditional ones they wish to
replace. The discourse of “secular religions” – regardless of its terminological
incoherence – therefore remains a useful way to “unveil” such attempts, and to
emphasize the continuity between our past and present belief systems, whether
we call them “religious” or not.
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Arthur Livingston, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York.
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Went Wrong, Simon & Schuster, London.
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Discourses, ed. Susan Dunn, Yale University Press, New Haven.
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Vitz, Paul C. (1995) [1977], Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self-Worship, Grand Rapids,
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Jarosław Macała
University of Zielona Góra, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-0788-0747
Religion
as an element of geopolitical research
Abstract: This article assumes that a growing group of researchers dealing with
geopolitics considers it relevant to analyse the role of religion in geopolitical
processes. However, research on the relationships of religion and geopolitics is
poorly advanced. Culture and religion have always been connected with areas
of human life, including geography. Thus, the most extensive contemporary
research is concerned with the influence of culture, including religion, on
geopolitics, within the geocivilisational framework, which states that the basic
contradictions of the world are cultural or civilisational, when civilisation
is treated as the broadest entity with which people identify. As a result, only
relatively few academic researchers write about the need for the creation of
geopolitics that is independent of religion, believing that the religious revival
in the modern world has varied and, above all, independent geopolitical conse-
quences. Considering studies on the influence of religion is a new and necessary
quality in geopolitical research.
Keywords: critical geopolitics, geopolitics, religion, religion and geopolitics,
religious geopolitics
Abstrakt: Ten artykuł wychodzi z założenia, że coraz większa grupa naukowców,

zajmujących się geopolityką, uznaje za istotną analizę roli religii w procesach
geopolitycznych. Jednak badania nad relacjami religii i geopolityki są słabo
zaawansowane. Kultura i religia wiążą się stale ze środowiskiem życia człowie-
ka, w tym również geograficznym. Stąd największa ilość współczesnych badań
dotyczy wpływu kultury, w tym religii, na geopolitykę, w ramach spojrzenia
geocywilizacyjnego, który głosi, iż podstawowe sprzeczności świata mają charak-
ter kulturowy, czyli cywilizacyjny, kiedy cywilizację traktujemy jako najszerszą
całość, z którą identyfikują się ludzie. W efekcie tylko stosunkowo nieliczni
badacze akademiccy piszą o potrzebie powstania samodzielnej geopolityki religii,
opierając się na przekonaniu, iż odrodzenie religijne we współczesnym świecie
posiada wielorakie, a przede wszystkim samodzielne konsekwencje geopolityczne.
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Tym samym uważając studia nad wpływem religii za nową i niezbędną jakość
w badaniach geopolitycznych.
Słowa kluczowe: geopolityka, geopolityka krytyczna, geopolityka religii, religia,
religia i geopolityka
Introduction
At the outset, it should be noted that the relationship between religion and geopoli-
tics is an issue that is complex and not easy to analyse, and one which has not
yet been thoroughly studied [Pickering 2017: 115]. There are many reasons for
this. Some of them are associated with an underestimation of the role of religion
in the modern world, assessed from the perspective of the secular West, or with
a unilateral display of its dysfunctional role in political processes. Others result
from the complexity and weakness of research instruments. A thorough analysis
of the coupling of religion and geopolitics discourage many scientists due to their
degree of complexity, because it requires interdisciplinary research, and since
religion is not usually an independent or sovereign factor. After all, it must be
considered in relation to its cultural, political, economic or geopolitical context
[Agnew 2003: 603-606; Ó Thuathail 2000: 187-188].
However, numerous assessments signal a clear increase in the importance of

culture and religion in research in the humanities and social sciences. That is
why today in Western civilisation it is recognised on the one hand that we live in
a post-secular world, and on the other that there are opinions that “God’s return”
to public life is taking place, and modernisation, technology and rationalism have
not led to the decline of religion [Ó Thuathail 2000: 207; Micklethwait, Wooldridge
2011: 22-25]. The growing role of religion was influenced by the process of mental
changes, in which, against the background of Western prosperity, disputes about
post-material values became more and more important: cultural and social
patterns, e.g. accenting one’s identity, freedom of choice of lifestyle, views, values,
etc. This is why in the lives of many people, it can be seen that the increasingly
globalised world, apart from the areas of certainty and security, exacerbated doubt
or anxiety, which in turn intensified the search for the moral sense of existence.
Religion gives a kind of stability when modernity mainly offers uncertainty. In
other words, religions still offer answers to fundamental questions about human
existence that arise regardless of changes in social, economic or political systems
[Anderson 1997: 23-24].
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It is also worth pointing out a wider phenomenon: seeking support in religions

is in many regions of the world and civilisations a response to the global crisis of
values, to the pressure of modernisation processes strengthened by globalisation.
Often identified with the cultural, economic and political westernisation and
homogenisation, often deviating from the existing codes and cultural symbols
of many societies.
This sketch attempts to address selected issues related to research on the inter-
action of religion and geopolitics, because their broad penetration exceeds the
capabilities of this article and individual author. First of all, my aim is to indicate
when and in which contexts religions can influence geopolitical analyses to open
new research perspectives in geopolitics which, in turn, will make it possible to
find regularities regarding the influence of religion on contemporary geopolitics
that is very difficult today.
1. Are religion and geopolitics connected by worldview?

In answer to the above question, two approaches to contemporary geopolitical
research can be simplified. The first influential position is grounded in the tradi-
tional view of geopolitics. Its basis is the assessment that religion is a secondary
phenomenon in geopolitics. Usually treated separately, because both spheres
(religion and geopolitics) belong to the other worlds of the sacred and the profane,
although the borders between them are dynamic and in practice only in the West
are they treated as separate spheres. In this understanding, geopolitics on the
basis of purely earthly, rational, as it was believed, scientific assessment, looked
for universal regularities, the process of creation, development and collapse of
centres of force, mainly countries, in defined and permanently and permanently
recognised geographical, even territorial, frameworks. The sphere of ideas, culture
or religion were at the same time insignificant, irrational phenomena that escaped
analysis, because the legitimacy of the state, its sovereignty, external and internal
policy lost their religious legitimacy in the West, because “the disenchantment of
the world” had taken place [Burgoński, Gierycz 2014: 19- 20]. This also resulted
from Western influential theories of secularisation and modernisation, created in
opposition to religion and its institutional forms and assuming their gradual incar-
ceration [Dawson 2015: 23-25; Luke 2006: 219-220]. To a large extent, a similar
position, minimising the influence of religion, was adopted by a realistic and
neorealistic school in international relations, most similar to the views of classical
geopolitics.
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This view has changed in recent decades and is associated with a wider so-called
cultural turn in social sciences, as well as in geography, focusing the attention
of researchers on how people imagine space and what conditions such a social
practice. On this basis, the second trend in geopolitical research, which treats
religions as a permanent geopolitical factor, is gaining strength. Firstly, spatial
thinking and religion belong to the permanent, basic and eternal components of
human thinking about the world, and therefore also about space, the state, the
nation, etc. Secondly, man is homo politicus and homo religiosus and the two
dimensions are integrally embedded in them and cannot be artificially separated,
although they may conflict with each other. Thirdly, religions generally have their
own territorial dimension, since their followers live in specific areas, functioning
within specific, territorial state structures. The two identities, religious as well as
state and national, remain in a constant relationship with each other. Fourthly, for
followers of a particular religion in a specific place, it is religion, along with other
factors, that valorises the significance of space, shaping the associated identity
and emotions, e.g. equipping people with a mythological or symbolic imagina-
rium. Thus, by influencing, for example, symbols that build community cohesion,
a vision of the world, creating the basis for collective and state identification.
Fifthly, religions also influence social behavioural patterns, and the motivation
to act in public and political space, even through their mission message [Danacica
2005].
2. To what extent did religion influence and affect the roots of geopolitics?
Studies on the relationship between religion and geopolitics are a relatively young
area in scientific research. In classical and neoclassical geopolitics, as mentioned
above, the role of religion was marginal since classical geopolitical thought was
steeped in positivism, eurocentrism, nationalism, imperialism and statism. The
search for normative relations between space and politics was dominated by the
analysis of classical, durable, measurable power factors, among which there was no
special place for changing cultural factors, including religion, as a justification for
political considerations and actions. All the more so because in Western countries
where it arose, the influence of religion on politics was already small at that time
[Heffernan 2000: 27-28, 47]. Paradoxically, on the other hand, its most prominent
representatives were usually connected by a conservative worldview, a dream of
a return to stability and harmony, based on traditional values, derived at least
indirectly from Christianity, opposed to turbulence, instability, and conflicts
resulting from modernisation [Ó Thuathail 2000: 192-193].
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Looking for an exemplification of the above assessment, it is worth noting that in

the case of the German Geopolitik, the most prominent representatives consid-
ered geographical factors more important than cultural ones. Moreover, they
emphasised the impact of the space occupied by the nation on the shaping of its
culture. For the creator of political geography Friedrich Ratzla, external, natural,
scientifically possible, and not internal, psychological and cultural factors were
much more important in human history. Hence the clearly anti-religious blade
of his thoughts: he opposed the religious teleology of history, because nature was
of decisive importance, while the positivistic development of science depreciated
the importance of religion in the lives of nations and states.
In turn, in the case of a Swedish political scientist and lawyer, the author of the
term “geopolitics” and the Germanophile, Rudolf Kjellén, his attitude towards
religion is poorly penetrated in research, but it is believed that geographical factors
also played a much greater role than cultural. The state considered a living organ-
ism that required adequate space for its development. Among the five analyti-
cal categories of the state, geopolitics was paramount, and religion was within
ethnopolitics. He noticed that the state had measurable features (e.g. the territory,
demographic potential or the number and equipment of the armed forces), as well
as ones less measurable, qualitative – for example, culture, language, religion,
tradition, the nation’s mentality. He definitely preferred the former.
The most prominent German geopolitician Karl Haushofer also considered the
influence of religion primarily from the perspective of geopolitical factors, i.e.
the strength of the state and the nation in a given territory. On the one hand, it
should be strong and rooted to preserve the identity of its followers, defend them
against hostile spiritual and ideological influences from outside and relying on
a foreign “genius loci”, which was one of the conditions for the successful defence
of its own territory and borders. On the other hand, they should form missionary
capabilities among the faithful, as an element of the ability to expand towards
other geopolitical entities. In other words, religion was instrumental in the service
of classical factors of power.
In the case of the Anglo-Saxon Classical Geopolitics School, its most famous
representative Halford Mackinder in many of his works focused far more on
the study of the relationship between the geographical environment and power
centres in a global perspective, as well as the concepts of peace and order after
both world wars. This does not mean, however, that he ignored the role of religion,
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but treated it as a secondary factor in human activities [Macała 2015: 9-11]. In

turn, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan was again more interested in power politics,
especially in the dimension of maritime competition. However, religion played
a certain, if negative, role in his thinking. First of all, he negatively assessed blind-
ness and religious fanaticism, which led to the pursuit of spreading one’s faith
and, as a result, led to conflicts and religious wars. It overshadowed the ability to
rationally analyse classical geopolitical factors in the name of raison d’etat and
implementation of political interests by European countries [Mahan 2013: 74]. This
only changed the findings of the Westphalian system, gradually freeing politics
from the dominant influence of religion. On the other hand, according to Tomasz
Klin, the American admiral “in some publications mentioned the divine will as
the transcendent driving force of American expansion – but he never developed
this argument in dozens of geopolitical publications.” [Klin 2014: 176].
During the Cold War, the conflict between the two superpowers and related
political and military blocs became most important for geopolitical research. For
some, it was conditioned by ideological factors: on the one hand, in simplification,
communism and totalitarianism, with liberalism and democracy on the other. In
the analysis of this opposition, for others (e.g. Zbigniew Brzezinski) geopolitical
factors – i.e. the strategic confrontation of the two powers of land and sea and two
imperial systems – were more important. No clear connections between religion
and power politics were noticed, because religions were treated from both sides
as a competing socially and politically declining factor. In the communist world,
religion was a false “opium for the masses”, and so should disappear from human
life and be replaced by Marxism-Leninism. In the capitalist world, however,
according to many researchers, the religious factor had not played a great role for
a long time, and the secularisation processes had pushed religion into the private
sphere [ibid: 178].
This state has been changing for several decades. In many geopolitical studies,
the dominant role of physical space and traditional power factors, which is also
associated with social and technological changes, is weakening what is typical
for classical and neoclassical geopolitics. It is worth noting the loud demand for
the extension of the geopolitics research field to include “Soft factors” – cultural,
religious, ethical etc. – best expressed in the term “soft power” coined by Joseph
Nye [see Nye 2007]. In the post-Cold War world, along with the weakening
role of “naked power” in international relations, Nye aptly noticed the growing
importance of the intangible factors of power, culture system, values, politics, and
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therefore also religion, that build the image of the attractiveness of individual
countries or alliances on the international arena, especially in the West, which
often have the ability to attract other states, persuade and influence their actions
without having to resort to “hard power” and thereby strengthening its position
in the world. This can be called a kind of ideological hegemony, referring to the
thoughts of Antonio Gramsci.
Hence, more and more geopolitical analyses appeared, in which the assumption
is that culture and religion are constantly associated with the environment of
human life, including the geographical one. However, the scale can be differ-
ent. In this, the largest amount of contemporary research concerns the impact of
culture, civilisation, including religion, on geopolitics and international relations,
as part of a geo-civilisation view, which states that the basic contradictions of the
world are of a cultural or civilisational nature, when we treat civilisation as the
broadest entity with which people identify. Paradoxically, however, this type of
approach is combined with classical and neoclassical geopolitics, because this
method of analysis does not attach special importance or independent signifi-
cance. The civilisation divisions or intertwining ethnic, national, religious and
material factors affecting the possibilities of using the geographical environment
are more important.
3. Is religion a part of geopolitical ideas and to what extent?

Undoubtedly, geographical and geopolitical images appeared in the perception
of space by people centuries earlier, before Rudolf Kjellen defined the concept of
“geopolitics” and before the end of the 20th century when the category of “imagi-
nations” began to be used for research in geography and geopolitics. Research on
them was based on the assumption that they are based on cultural background,
and not mainly on the physical shape of the space in which people lived. In this
way, every society creates its own space, defines it, tames it, adapts to it and adapts
the space for itself and its vision of the world, values and needs. In this sense,
geography is a form of power, not natural, objective, but produced, subjective
knowledge, providing one way of thinking and describing reality over others.
Nowadays, postmodern geopolitics, especially critical geopolitics, refers to

geographical and geopolitical imaginations, treating them as cultural construc-
tions of space and analysing them through discourse research, because they are
most fully realised in the language we use to describe the world. Critical geopolitics
creators themselves consider the concept of “imaginative geography” coined by the
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outstanding literary scholar Edward Said in the late 1970s to be the basis of their
view on geopolitics. He defined them as the common practice of designating in our
minds particular spaces that are “ours” and others that are “alien”, and one of the
basic divisions can be a value distinction, sometimes completely arbitrary, between
“our land” which is mentally, territorially and close to us and alien “barbarian
land”. This imagination is therefore not innocent or apolitical, but is a cognitive
construct, strongly associated with the phenomenon of power and identity. The
influence of religion seems obvious in terms of the creation of the spaces, because
one of the oldest and deepest divisions in this respect was the religious division
along the lines of the imagined Orient – for example, West and East, Christianity
and Islam [Said 2005: 96- 97, 102-107; Routledge 2006: 237].
In critical geopolitics, on the basis of the term coined by Said, the entire struc-
ture of geopolitical ideas with its various elements, such as geopolitical codes
or geopolitical visions, based on the understanding of geopolitics as a culture,
was created. Geopolitical images are becoming a system of visualising the world,
indispensable in foreign policy. However, their basis is self-identification, and
hence they are associated with the location of the national identity in a specific
place, in a given territory, divided into allies and enemies, and thus dichoto-
mously define “their own and strangers”, outline the mission of the nation,
the scope of its borders, etc. emotional attitude to their own territory. In this
division, cultural factors, including religious ones, determining individual and
collective identity, and therefore a look at one’s own and foreign space, play
a very important role [Ó Thuathail 2004: 83, 98; Sack 1983: 58-59]. It seems to be
an accurate assessment that geopolitics understood in this way is an ideological
way of seeing the world is a “geopolitical imagination” which can be affected by
religion [Potulski 2010: 260].
Through geopolitical imagery, researchers ask how geopolitics is produced: how

certain beliefs about the spatial organisation of the world arise and how they
become dominant, how they shape and justify the practice of political institu-
tions and other social actors, and how the actors reflect particular beliefs while
expounding justification for their own actions. Religion, as one of the most
lasting components of human thinking about the world, plays a large role in
creating images based on the division between our own and strangers. Therefore,
among academic researchers from the critical geopolitics circle there is a belief
that geopolitics is consistently connected with religion [Ó Thuathail, Agnew
1998: 79-80].
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In most studies, religion is an important, but not decisive, factor in the production
of geopolitical images. In one view, the common elements of the theoretical models
presented above is the connection between them and the nation and nationalism,
a relational and exclusionary phenomenon, considered in the dichotomous opposi-
tion enemy-friend. This has consequences also in the political sphere, because
cultural and ethnic differences, along with religious ones, are one of the most
common causes of conflict in the modern world. Hence, it is necessary to study
such categories as: shared historical territory, myths, identity, history, religion,
economy, etc., which affects relations with the outside world in which “strangers”
play a significant role [Zenderowski 2014: 305-315; Blacksell 2008: 80-86].
In the second trend, the susceptibility of geopolitical ideas to mythology, to the

symbols of thinking, emotions, formed, confirmed and modified by religions
and ideologies deeply anchored in the experiences of a given group or archetype
community, the school system, media and social elites seems to be particularly
important for these considerations that affect the image of the world. For centu-
ries, the creators of states and ethnic communities, and today many ideologists
of nationalism have tried to use religious relations in this aspect and capture
their essence to create and consolidate the identity and cohesion of the nation as
a community [Smith 2009: 91-96, 173-180].
In the third trend, which seems to overstate the importance of religion in

geopolitics, it is assumed that although religion and geopolitics belong to differ-
ent spheres, they share many analogies. First of all, this is because religion, in
my opinion exaggeratedly, is treated as geopolitics, because both are a way of
seeing the world, expressed in images and ideas. Religions strongly influence social
processes of cohesion and identification, mainly in terms of their own and strang-
ers, and shape an understanding of the world and its processes, expressed in the
geopolitical imagination. They are the canvas for great narratives and myths that
transcend the horizon of any individual’s life, generation or nation. Thus, they
become worldviews, ideologies that generally become politicised. In other words,
they show how to interpret the world that surrounds us and how to act within it.
They are certainly divided by the kind of faith they require for their visions of the
world [Sturm 2013: 139].
It is worth noting that it situates religions as an element immanently inherent in

geopolitics, as part of geopolitical thinking, externalised in discursive practices.
Religious language is an integral part of discourse, including secular. Religion
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influences the geopolitical discourse of the elite, for example by using religious and
theological vocabulary, myths, symbolism and purposes. What is characteristic
in this first instance is the adaptation of Carl Schmitt’s famous statement that
political concepts are secularised theological concepts [Schmitt 2000: 60-61; Sturm
2013: 137].
The above three highly schematic views on the relationship between geopolitics
and religion used in critical geopolitics offer some general conclusions:
a) geopolitics cannot be completely “secular” as it used to be in classical and

neoclassical geopolitics,
b) the above outlined understanding of the interaction between religion and
geopolitics paradoxically depreciates the role of religion, reducing it practically
to ideology, while valorising geopolitics,
c) it requires the analysis of certain geopolitical processes to take into account the
specificity of a given religion and its impact at a specific time and place, so you
cannot focus on merely analysing the text within the discourse, but also, and
to a large extent, the context,
d) hence the role of religion is different in the case of secularised Western societies,
where religions are often treated as part of the “tradition” to a small extent
affecting the ideas of secular elites, and others – e.g. among followers of Islam
or Hinduism, whose geopolitical ideas cannot be understood without a religious
context,
e) almost never is religion the only factor affecting ideas about space; it must be
considered in a complicated relationship, especially with intangible geopolitical
factors [Agnew 2014: 333-335],
f) that is why we can talk about geopolitics in various religious variants in this
current of research, e.g. “Christian”, “Catholic”, “Islamic” or even “‘Buddhist”
[Agnew 2010: 39-61; McConnell 2013: 162-169],
g) studies of geopolitical imaginations often focus unilaterally on the ideological
role of religion as a factor of violence and oppression, as a conflicting factor,
referring to dominion and hegemony, justifying aggression, imperialism and
war, often combined with fundamentalism or nationalism [Armstrong 2017:
9-10]
h) the positive, peaceful message of religion is disregarded, its teaching about love
and respect for each person, contribution to dispute resolution and conflicts;
the harmonious coexistence of followers of different religions in a certain area
or in one country are disregarded [Megoran 2004: 43-45; Kulska 2014: 576-577].
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4. How does religion affect geopolitical analysis?

The number of publications on the impact of religion on geopolitics is limited,
although it has been discernibly growing for several years. However, it is difficult
to find in them some established or most influential way to study the relationship
between geopolitics and religion, which also illustrates the scale of the difficulty.
At least several theoretical and methodological studies of academic geopolitics
have appeared, attempting to show the relationships on a complex interdisciplin-
ary basis. They assume that the study of the interactions of religion and geopolitics
should take into account the complexity of contemporary geopolitical processes
in which religion almost never appears as the only or most important factor.
Hence, the authors of methodological studies do not agree not only on plotting the
research field, but also on research methods or workshops as well as in assessing
the scale and structure of the interaction of geopolitical phenomena with religions
in the past and present, and in clearly showing the boundaries of how religion is
a phenomenon external to geopolitics, and how much it resides within it. Therefore
at least a few research directions are involved, which agree that religion is playing
an increasingly important role in contemporary politics and geopolitics. This
shows the scale of the difficulties facing religion’s geopolitics. Each of them tries
to develop their own research against this background, firstly dealing with the
complex methodological issues [see Sturm 2013; Agnew 2014; Dijkink 2006; Klin
2014; Macała 2015].
Many more publications can be described as case studies, and their thematic
and methodological palette is extensive yet not coherent. They also show a clear
dominance of empirical research over theoretical. They refer more or less to
practical geopolitics. They are characterised in the case of Western publishing
houses by the quite obvious dominance of some problems and limitation to
the analysis of some religions or regions of the world. Rarely is the influence
of Christianity on geopolitics of Western countries, e.g. the United States, the
subject of research, which results from a further well-established belief in the
effectiveness of secularisation processes [Pickering 2017: 121-133]. More often,
the subject of research concerns threats resulting from the conflict-generating
impact of religion on geopolitics. The consequence of Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the
USA from 11.09.2001 is that most of the studies on the discursive relationship
between religion and geopolitics understood in this way concern Islam, funda-
mentalism (mainly Islamic) and nationalism, not only examining the impact of
religion on their geopolitical imaginations, identity, but also on foreign policy.
The mechanism by which religion can be instrumented for geopolitics is often
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analysed in discursive practices. Hence, research often refers to the current exclu-
sion, oppression and violence against others, conflicts and wars conducted in the
name of ideologically understood religion [Sturm 2015: 819-840; Zenderowski
2014: 303-315].
However, it is worth paying special attention to publications which show the

significant role of religion in the various dimensions of geopolitical actors from
civilisations other than Western, probing deeper than the generally shallow analy-
ses focusing on the problems of fundamentalism or Islamic terrorism. One can
cite here, for example, a study by Sanjay Chaturverdi on postcolonial geopolitics of
India or David Newman on the most important threads of geopolitical discourse
in Israel [Chaturverdi 2000: 211-232; Newman 2000: 302-327].
In the case of publications from popular geopolitics, there is clearly a huge lack
of research that would analyse the relationship between religion, pop culture and
geopolitics. From the Western perspective, one can mention publications exposing
the conflict-generating role of religion, mainly Islam, as the basis for a threat to
Western civilisation. For example, one can recall here the great book by Marcin F.
Gawrycki, Entangled Images, in which many pages deal with the stereotypical and
negative perception of other civilisations and religions in American films, mainly
focusing on Islam and Arabs [see Gawrycki 2011]. At least in part, a similar grid of
problems operates the publication of one of the greatest representatives of Klaus
Dodds’ critical geopolitics about the role of Hollywood in the war on terror, in
which the film becomes a tool to support and legitimise the hegemonic narrative
of the US political elite [Dodds 2008: 1621-1637].
Conclusion
One of the reasons for the weakness of research on the interaction of religion
and geopolitics is the belief among many Western scientists that the influence
of religion on the international situation is low, which was confirmed by classi-
cal and neoclassical geopolitics in its studies. However, this view has changed in
recent decades, and religion is increasingly becoming one of the important factors
influencing contemporary geopolitics. However, a specific study of this impact
raises a number of doubts, fears and discussions. First of all, due to significant
methodological problems, starting with elementary issues with the definition of
basic concepts and their components. Then, religion almost never occurs to be
as the only or most important factor. Therefore, as a rule, it must be studied in
a specific combination of time, place and religion with geographical, economic,
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political and cultural factors. So, one can find numerous attempts to scale them
in the literature and determine the scope of mutual interactions.
Hence, perhaps, despite the fact one might try to use the so-called “Geopolitics
of religion” as a new trend of geopolitical research within critical geopolitics, it is
not particularly popular among researchers, and only to a limited extent among
critical geopolitics and the “Herodote” school. Even there, there are tendencies
to reduce the role of religion to one of the ideological factors influencing the
creation of the image of a given group or nation. So a lot of work still lies ahead of
researchers who recognise the important or key role of religion in some geopoliti-
cal analyses.
Many more publications involve a broader, cultural view of geopolitical processes.

Among them, there are works on the dynamics of civilisational divisions and their
role in international politics, in which religion is one of the criteria of diversity. It is
just that they often lead to blurring and a disregard for the importance of religion
in contemporary geopolitics. All the more so because for most researchers the
current geopolitical divisions of the world are very complex and dynamic, and to
a small extent reflect religious problems, while economic ones are definitely more
prominent, e.g. the rich North vs the poor South.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Jerzy Ciechański
Warsaw University, Poland
ORCID 0000-0002-2528-3903
“Progress” and the Church

in the Context of Human Rights:
A Council of Europe Experience
Abstract: Human rights have become an instrument of “Progress”, understood as

a license for satisfying every conceivable human desire, in the service of a “Utopia”
understood as a state of affairs in which all human rights are perfectly realized.
The Council of Europe and other similar international bodies have become
convenient venues of their instantiation. What results is endless proliferation of
human rights, insistence on their amalgamation so that any distinction from the
categorical civil and political rights be eliminated and, ultimately, trivialization of
human rights. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church has something important to say
on all the critical points of current public debate of the matter. Yet, its representa-
tives all too often take a passive stance in all those varied expert bodies in the
Council of Europe and elsewhere, where “Progress” so conceived is being forged.
The article pleads for a change.
Keywords: human rights, the Council of Europe, progress, the social doctrine
of the Church
Abstrakt: Prawa człowieka stały się instrumentem “Postępu”, rozumianego jako

licencja na zaspokojenie wszelkich ludzkich pragnień, w służbie “Utopii”, rozumia-
nej jako sytuacja, w której wszystkie prawa człowieka są w pełni zrealizowane. Rada
Europy i inne podobne organizacje stały się wygodnymi forami legitymizowania
i prawnego sankcjonowania tych aspiracji. Efektem jest niepowstrzymana prolife-
racja praw człowieka, żądanie ich amalgamacji poprzez uznanie wszystkich praw
za tak samo kategorycznie obowiązujące, jak prawa obywatelskie i polityczne, zaś
ostatecznie – trywializacja praw człowieka. Tymczasem Kościół Katolicki ma coś
ważnego do powiedzenia w odniesieniu do wszystkich najważniejszych punktów
debaty w tej kwestii. Lecz jego przedstawiciele często zachowują się pasywnie we
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wszystkich tych rozmaitych ciałach eksperckich Rady Europy i innych podobnych

organizacji, gdzie wykuwa się tak rozumiany „Postęp”. Artykuł postuluje zmianę
tego podejścia.
Słowa kluczowe: prawa człowieka, Rada Europy, postęp, nauka społeczna Kościoła
Introduction
After 20 years of experience working as an expert and negotiator at various
international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the ILO and the UN
in the area of human rights, particularly, social rights, I have come to a conclu-
sion that human rights have become a vehicle of a particular kind of “Progress”
which marches through the institutions to make the world over. From a barrier
guarding the individual from government oppression, human rights have evolved
into a license for satisfying individual appetites complete with the injunction for
societal affirmation. The Church, with its message of “thou shalt not” is a natural
enemy. “Progress” so conceived is not only anti-Christian. By turning human
rights into an expedient political tool, it trivializes them. In all those international
organizations the Holy See is present, but is not heard often enough. In the halls of
the Council of Europe the Catholic point of view or, under those circumstances,
Catholic heterodoxy on human rights is heard loud and clear mostly on those
solemn albeit rare occasions when popes appear to address it. But even then, the
clarity of their message is dispersed by the pomp and circumstance. Presentation
of the Catholic point of view is all the more needed at the level of numerous techni-
cal committees and expert groups where the mundane work on the programmatic
and legal human rights texts takes place.
Arguably, the Catholic Church seems to have an understanding of the ontology

and epistemology of human rights which is better than the prevailing “progres-
sive” orthodoxy. The Judeo-Christian ontology of human rights reveals their
proper foundation, scope and ways of protection. The Catholic social teaching
properly relates social human rights to civil and political rights and to social
policies. Finally, the Catholic moral teaching admonishes that “what is right
for me” is not necessarily “right”. Given those strengths, the Holy See should
unswervingly proffer, what is here called, the Church’s heterodoxy of human
rights and do it in a language which will resonate in the increasingly post-
Christian West.
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Human Rights as Vehicles of “Progress” and the Need to Prevent Their

Trivialization
The 18th century European Enlightenment ushered into national laws liberal
democratic constitutions with their bills of rights. After the atrocities of World
War II—most notably—the Holocaust, a general consensus has emerged that the
human individual must never again be left alone to face the formidable power of
the Leviathan. Governments must be bound by international guarantees of human
rights for the violation of which both states and their functionaries should be
brought to account under international law. Its milestone manifestation was the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948, followed by two fundamental, legally binding 1966 interna-
tional covenants: one—on civil and political, while the other—on economic,
social and cultural rights. As the Cold War-time negotiations on the texts of those
covenants dragged on, they could not come into force until 1976. In the meantime,
democratic states of Europe and the Americas adopted regional instruments,
similar in scope and design. Essentially, civil and political rights were declared
categorically binding upon states parties, while economic, social and cultural
rights were to be implemented gradually, to the maximum of resources available
to each state party from domestic and international sources.
Three important developments marked the evolution of national and international

human rights protections ever since: (1) “sacralization” of human rights leading
to their proliferation; (2) legislation by reinterpretation of the law by judges and
legal experts; and (3) rectification of human wants and satisfaction of appetites
by turning them into rights. An epistemic community of experts, advocates and
political activists has emerged to manage that process. The logic of collective action
has set in to give it dynamism and a particular political direction. Consequently,
human rights have become a vehicle of “Progress” [Kuźniar 2000: 34-47].
The post-Holocaust guilt in Germany, Austria and in other Western societies

tainted with various degrees of collaboration or connivance with the Nazi “Global
Solution” created a fertile ground for sacralization of human rights. Later, in the
1960s and 1970s, with the ideological collapse of the socialist project, as modern
capitalism and “welfare state” rendered the working class conservative, the
postmodern ideologues conceived new classes of the “oppressed” or “marginal-
ized”: women and the ever growing categories of “minorities” in need of protec-
tion against “structural oppression” by the “majority” [Hicks 2011]. The erstwhile
sacralized human rights have thus become a convenient vehicle of “Progress”.
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Activists and lawyers have become its ministers and courts of law as well as
multiple quasi-judicial bodies, domestic and international—its temples [Delsol
2008: 3-5, 76-79].
As Anthony Julius put it: “A human rights discourse now dominates politics; there
is a powerful human rights ‘movement’. It is new secular religion of our time.
Politics itself has been juridified. Liberalism provides the terms and defines the
tone in which both Europeans and Americans now address their political affairs.
The post-leftist appropriation of this discourse has been in the development of
a ‘transnational progressivism’ or antinational cosmopolitanism. It deprecates
unrestrained state sovereignty; it endorses international and transnational legal
institutions; it champions human rights against national security considerations;
it accepts the liberal critique of imperialism. (…) The new militant is not the party
sectarian but the NGO activist” [Julius 2010].
Sacralization of human rights led to their proliferation. In Western democratic

countries, opposition to human rights became politically impossible. At the time
of this writing, there were well over a hundred of human rights instruments at the
international level, i.e., covenants, conventions, protocols, charters, declarations,
codes, etc. regulating state behavior with varied legal rigor. They grant a litany
of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, rights to individuals in general, to
certain specifically protected categories of individuals, to groups of individu-
als, and so on, and so forth. Already in 1981, a US UN Ambassador, Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, observed before the UN General Assembly 3rd Committee that “…
an effort has been mounted to deprive the concept of human rights of specific
meaning by pretending that all objects of human desire are ‘rights’ which can be
had, if not for the asking, then at least for the demanding. The proliferation of
‘rights’—to a happy childhood, to self-fulfillment, to development—has proceeded
at the same time that the application of human rights standards has grown more
distorted and more cynical” [Kirkpatrick 1981/2: 198].
Still, human rights have been on the march. For the activists, human rights
embody their version of “Progress”. “Progress” must presuppose a Utopia. In this
case, Utopia is when all human rights are perfectly implemented. As that can
never happen in any country, no matter how liberal, democratic and economically
advanced, more rights will always be needed. Apart from the universal protec-
tions of the two UN human rights covenants and similar regional conventions,
already mentioned above, specific protections have been afforded to the racially
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discriminated, women, the tortured and/or cruelly, inhumanely or degradingly

treated or punished, children (i.e., persons up to 18 years of age), migrant workers
and their families, those in danger of forcible disappearance, and persons with
disabilities. Currently, in the pipeline are the rights of the elderly and, probably,
the rights of girls. Increasingly, demands are being raised to recognize the rights
of animals and the rights of plants. Theoretical foundation for those “rights” have
already been laid out [Smith 2008].
In its landmark 1978 judgment Tyrer v. UK the European Court of Human Rights
adopted into the international human rights law the “living Constitution” doctrine
invented by the US Supreme Court. The Human Rights Court held that the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms “is a living
instrument which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.
Consequently, the Court found that that same law of the British Isle of Man which,
until that judgment, had conformed with the Convention, suddenly—by fiat of
the Court illuminated by the judges’ understanding of “present-day conditions”—
began to violate it.
Under the static law doctrine, what the constitution or a human rights treaty
permitted at the time of its enactment is permitted forever. Only the sovereign
people could bring about change by amending the constitution or sovereign
governments by amending a treaty. However, under the living law doctrine, the
politically unaccountable judges might write into the law their own political
preferences. The limit is their imagination and the sense of propriety. In fact,
judges (and soon also other lawyers and activists) happily embraced the living
constitution and living treaty doctrine to pronounce themselves authoritatively
on controversial issues of social policy and social morals which in a democratic
society properly belong to the province of politics [Scalia 2009: 13-15]. Such legisla-
tion from the bench clearly violates the separation of powers [Delsol 2008: 44-45].
In the heydays of the post-Cold-War-end-of-history enthusiasm a World

Conference on Human Rights convened in 1993 in Vienna. It adopted a Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action containing a plank which, as the so-called
“agreed language”, has ever since been endlessly repeated in all possible interna-
tional documents, even remotely related to human rights. It reads: “All human
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The inter-
national community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis”. In the virtual reality of “living
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law” that internationally endorsed phrase is used to amalgamate the financially

expensive and therefore politically-laden and—to a considerable extent—aspira-
tional economic, social and cultural rights with the categorically enforceable civil
and political rights, without formally amending the relevant international treaties
which explicitly and appropriately differentiate between those two categories of
rights. It has been persistently claimed that, by virtue of that statement, the “inter-
national community” has once and for all resolved in principle that economic,
social and cultural rights are identical with civil and political rights and must,
therefore, be treated in the same way in all aspects of their application and imple-
mentation. All kinds of manipulations and reinterpretations of the treaties, which
obviously state otherwise, are therefore justified.
Apart from the naiveté of the belief that social problems and aspirations which
social rights denote could be resolved or satisfied by legal fiat, it is simply not
true that those two sentences of the Vienna declaration were ever intended to
mean what has ever since been claimed they do. Those sentences represent a hard-
fought compromise between the United States and other Western democratic
countries on the one hand, and Communist China, together with such other
“friends” of human rights as Syria, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Myanmar, the Sudan, Libya,
North Korea, Malaysia and Yemen on the other, which claimed the supremacy of
economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights as culturally
“Western”—a long-standing practice of oppressive regimes. The United States
threatened not to subscribe in Vienna to any document which would question the
universality of human rights by downplaying the civil and political rights without
which human rights are deprived of any content and meaning [Lewis 1993a 1993b;
Riding 1993; Sciolino 1993].
The activist judges, human rights lawyers and professional advocates have formed
an epistemic community which semi-autonomously sets the human rights agenda
and uses human rights and their implementation and verification procedures,
nationally and internationally, to override or circumvent the national democratic
process and national sovereignty [Haas 1992: 3; Lilla 2017: 113]. The experts
and activists enjoy political and oftentimes financial support from progressive
governments and private foundations who seek to export their moral and political
values to others by means of legal edict. International organizations, the Council
of Europe among them, are a natural venue where such efforts materialize into
countless resolutions, legal drafts and, finally, international treaties, thus receiving
international community’s official imprimatur. This is how, first sacralized, and
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then progressively multiplied and reinterpreted human rights have become instru-
ments of “Progress” itself. Of particular interest here are their activities in the areas
of social rights and policies and social engineering, which involves morality. They
are not only politically sensitive; they often constitute a fundamental challenge to
religion and religious beliefs [Marthoz & Saunders 2005: 8].
There is no conspiracy in what the epistemic community of human rights

represents and pursues. With over a hundred human rights instruments at the
international level, countless national regulations and a plethora of national and
international human rights enforcement and verification bodies and procedures,
arcane knowledge is indeed required to operate such a complex system of laws
and institutions. The emergence of a respective epistemic community is thus quite
natural. Similarly, natural is the dynamism of its activities. It is governed by the
logic of collective action whereby in a society special interests tend to trump major-
ity interests as individual gains for the members of the special interest group by
far exceed the individual costs to be borne by the members of the society at large.
While benefits are concentrated, costs are diffuse [Olson 1965]. Thus, the odds are
usually in favor of the activists. Their knowledge of the subject-matter will surely
be superior and their dedication to the cause stronger than those of the skeptics.
Finally, few will be prepared to bear the opprobrium of enemies of human rights.
Under the “living treaty” doctrine and with functional support of international
organizations, like UN and the Council of Europe, the “logic of collective action”
results in endless proliferation of human rights, ultimately leading to their inflation
and trivialization. To prevent that a new heterodoxy of human rights is needed.
It would seem that the Church does not only have a stake in reviving human
rights – that once great transformative idea of human civilization – but has also
something important to contribute to all the key points of current controversies
over the future of that idea. Where postmodern orthodoxy reigns supreme, perver-
sion of the law starts with the perversion of the language. A language which would
rectify that, while striking a chord with the post-Christian, is therefore a must.
What Is to be Done?
“People are inherently valuable” or “rights come from wrongs” (?)
Let us start with the very ontology of human rights. That unique achievement of
Western civilization was possible because of its Judeo-Christian roots. Hence, the
memorable phrase of the 1776 American Declaration of Independence: “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
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by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.” Hence, the most popular representation of the 1789
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen fashioned in the shape of the
Tablets of Moses in which God inscribed his Ten Commandments [Landauer 1995:
434-5]. Enlightenment, in fact, instantiated into positive law a great transform-
ing Judeo-Christian idea of man created in the image of God. That needs to be
constantly repeated and reminded, given the dominant postmodern “narrative”
presenting Western civilization as socially oppressive and politically imperialistic.
The narrative which plays into the hands of those actually oppressive regimes
which wish to present international guarantees of human rights as manifestations
of Western “cultural imperialism”.
The Judeo-Christian tradition arguably forms a better foundation of human rights

than the progressive orthodoxy essentially holding that people are inherently valuable
because they are people or, for that matter, the so-called “experiential” theory that
conceives rights as mirror images of ultimate wrongs [Dershowitz 2004]. Is that so?
The latter theory strikes by its obvious restriction to the most horrific “wrongs”
over which a general consensus could reasonably be expected and, consequently, to
a mere handful of rights which might eventually ensue. And even that could not be
assured, as evidenced by those multitudes and their political patrons who consider
Israel a “crusading state”. For them even the Holocaust does not meet the standard
of ultimate “wrong” from which rights would spring by “experiential” concord of
humanity. As for the former, there is a long-established view among radical ecolo-
gists who believe that the Earth is a single living organism and conclude: “The Earth
has cancer and the cancer is man” [Gregg 1955]. What about moral pessimists, like
Rousseau, who highlight the malevolence associated with human interaction? What
about people who are depressed, suicidal or self-mutilating? In view of all those quite
commonly-held beliefs and human practices, the words: “So God created man in
his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he
them.” [Gen. 1:27], which profess human exceptionality in nature, provide a firmer
foundation of human rights. Human as sovereign individual set apart from nature
and endowed with reason, free will, moral sense (with inability to command him/
herself out of moral laws) and the need for the transcendent. The Book of Genesis
offers perhaps the least obvious concept there is. But, if one organizes life on that
principle, i.e., that there is a divine spark in each human person, it not only gives
meaning to human life, but proclaims precedence of the rights of humans over state
laws and ultimately lays ground for the formation of a democratic political order
[Peterson 1999: 467-9].
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From such ontological perspective, human freedom and human rights assume
proper sense and direction. The God-ordained unalienable human right to the
“pursuit of happiness” is not about defying community and pursuing trivial
pleasures by yielding to instinct or satisfying whims. It is about making life
meaningful to oneself and making a positive mark on the life of the community.
In other words, human rights are there to actuate individual, not government’s,
responsibility for one’s happiness.
All the important building blocks of the Catholic heterodoxy of human rights are
to be found in papal addresses by John Paul II and Francis to the Council of Europe
and the European Parliament. That human rights as legal rights are hollow without
a community that believes in them. That community must share certain underly-
ing values. Those values are Judeo-Christian values; they derive from human
nature formed by God in his image. That human rights must not set the individual
in opposition to his or her community. Instead, they must link the individual to
the concept of common good or greater good. That rights cannot be separated from
duties, as my right is your responsibility. That “limitless” rights become a source
of conflict; a self-centered conception of rights leads to the disregard for and
instrumentalization of others. Finally, that human rights, which reflect human
transcendent dignity, protect the individual from government tyranny [John Paul
II 1988a 1988b; Francis 2014a 2014b].
All that represents an optimistic perspective of human rights as instruments

of genuine fulfilment of the self and harmony between the individual and the
community. It is strikingly different from the dominant post-modern orthodoxy
of human rights as “emancipators” from constraints of duty and responsibility,
especially, as “protectors” against societal “oppression”. The government is the
guardian of “freedom” so conceived and provider of “happiness” thus ordained. It
is a travesty especially in democracy of which its avid observer forewarned already
180 years ago when writing about an “immense and tutelary” government busy
securing the gratifications and facilitating pleasures of a “multitude of men all
equal and all alike” and worrying only that it might not “spare them all the care
of thinking and all the trouble of living” [Tocqueville 2000: 869-70].
“Social rights can be guaranteed by fiat” (?)

An area of human rights in which the progressive orthodoxy manifests itself quite
clearly are the social human rights persistently redefined as categorical claims on
the society to provide for everyone regardless of their particular circumstances
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and economic realities. In that regard, the Catholic social teaching offers not only
a more reasonable but also more practicable approach to those rights and a robust
platform for sensible social policies necessary to turn those aspirations into reality.
The social teaching of the Church conveys the message that material wellbeing
alone will not solve social problems; spiritual uplifting must come alongside,
if not precede material provision. Social rights are implemented in and by the
community. Therefore, they must not set the individual who is unconditionally
entitled against the community which is categorically obliged. Consequently, the
state has but a subsidiary role. Turning people into clients of the state is not the
right path to social progress.
The social teaching stresses the dignifying relationship between the worker and
work as well as the importance of private property without which one is a servant
of another or a client of the state, and the “‘natural human right’ to form private
associations” in defense of the interests of both workers and employers. It focuses
on the autonomy of the individual, the autonomy of the family and the communal
nature of social wellbeing, and it values social cohesion. Consequently, the social
teaching “insists on necessary limits to State’s intervention and on its instrumental
character, inasmuch as the individual, the family and society are prior to the State,
and inasmuch as the State exists in order to protect their rights…” [Centesimus
Annus 1991: §§6-11, quote: §11]. Within those limits, the state is bound to follow
in its policies the principle of subsidiarity in allowing human industriousness
and entrepreneurship to cement individual autonomy and produce wealth, and
the principle of solidarity in defending the weakest and providing the necessary
minimum support for the unemployed worker [Ibid.: §15]. Regard for the other,
respect for justice, balance of rights and duties, stewardship and prudence in the
use of resources and care for common good, provide a proper moral direction for
the provision and exercise of social protections. Respect for human life, dignity,
worship, association and ownership of things necessary for physical survival
and personal autonomy certainly precede the state, thus, they are categorically
binding. Social rights, however, may be ensured only within a society, in the
context of human solidarity. Primary responsibility for the exercise of economic
rights “belongs not the State but to individuals and to the various groups and
associations which make up society. The State could not directly ensure the right
to work for all its citizens unless it controlled every aspect of economic life and
restricted the free initiative of individuals” [Ibid.: §48]. When it comes to the area
of social rights, which address “forms of poverty and deprivation unworthy of the
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human person”, the social teaching does not put much trust in the Welfare State,
referred to as the “Social Assistance State”: “By intervening directly and depriving
society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human
energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies, which are dominated by
bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients, and which
are accompanied by an enormous increase in spending. In fact, it would appear
that needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and
who act as neighbours to those in need. …[C]ertain kinds of demands often call
for a response which is not simply material but which is capable of perceiving the
deeper human need”. Social policies should overcome the “individualistic mental-
ity” and focus on “the family as their principal object”, “by providing adequate
resources and efficient means of support, both for bringing up children and for
looking after the elderly, so as to avoid distancing the latter from the family unit
in order to strengthen relations between generations” [Ibid.: §39].
The social teaching of the Church has played a role in the understanding and
implementation of social rights, by practically addressing key social problems of
the day: breakup of families, demographic crisis, persistence of social problems,
and alienation. In many ways, it has also inspired the 1990s and early 2000s welfare
state reforms in the US and the EU. Yet, it has been practically unnoticed in the
Council of Europe which remained a bastion of the orthodoxy, focusing on the
proliferation of social rights and their amalgamation with civil and political rights,
a recent example of that being the so-called “Turin Process” initiated in 2014
with the objective of boosting ratifications of the revised European Social Charter
and a collective complaints protocol thereto. With the “Turin Process” failing,
a Drafting Group on Social Rights (CDDH-SOC) was set up under the authority of
the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Human Rights. The original idea of
the Secretariat was to produce a report which would again insist on the amalgama-
tion of social rights with the civil and political ones to eliminate the reportedly
existing “gap” in their protection. Over the four sessions of CDDH-SOC held in
2017-19 a representative of the Holy See was present in the room but restricted
himself to a single statement at the final session in which he extolled the UN
Sustainable Development Goals.
“The right to reproductive health” (?)

The “right to reproductive health” promoted through international organizations,
such as the Council of Europe, must be considered here. Even though the Church
believes that its rejection of abortion, as grounded in the Scripture, is not just right
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but also nonnegotiable, sadly enough abortion on demand is now widely regarded
in Europe as a human right. In view of that it is not helpful that the Church’s
moral doctrine lumps contraception together with abortion as manifestations of
the same “Civilization of Death” [Gratissimam Sane 1994: 41; Evangelium Vitæ
1995: 10-11]. Its moral rectitude notwithstanding, the political effectiveness of
the Catholic heterodoxy in post-Christian Europe is thereby grossly undercut.
Still, something can be done to at least contain what the papal teaching calls the
“barbarism” of the “right to abortion” [Evangelium Vitæ 1995: 11].
Not being able yet to formally inscribe into international human rights treaties
“the right to abortion”, the forces of “Progress” have been incessant in trying to
subsume that “right” into the right to the highest attainable standard of health,
which has been internationally recognized in such treaties. Whenever possible,
the phrase “right to reproductive health” has been injected into international legal
documents dealing with human rights and now enjoys the fateful status of “agreed
language”. For the proponents, the “right to reproductive health” includes abortion
and contraception. A prime recent example of legal sophistry in that regard can be
found in a 2018 UN Human Rights Committee (mis)interpretation of the right to
life [General comment No. 36: §8] guaranteed under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Admissible state regulation of abortion has been
restricted by the learned legal experts in so many ways that nothing short of grant-
ing abortion on demand would comply with those restrictions. In their general
comment the Committee did not concern itself in the least with the fetus’s right to
life. Another was the 2019 UN Nairobi Summit masquerading as an official review
of the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development; an
attempt was made to sneak into the final document new “agreed language” accept-
ing unfettered access to abortion as a “human right” [Joint Statement 2019].
In the Council of Europe and elsewhere government representatives may not

be instructed to openly confront such usurpations. But there is no reason why
the representatives of the Holy See should be passive. At literally every instance,
a reference to the “right to reproductive health” or “sexual and reproductive
health and rights” is proposed, they should be demanding an explicit annotation
that there is no internationally recognized right to abortion and contraception.
Consequently, some might be deterred from trying to inject such deceitful refer-
ences, while others—mobilized to object against perverting the law (regardless of
their particular stance on abortion]. Still others, might have a change of heart. After
all, supporters usually argue that abortion should be “safe, legal and rare”. Would
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they likewise qualify any other human right? For those who once succumbed to
the “freedom of choice” argument, the glaring arbitrariness of such “choice” might
become apparent. At times abortion advocates have been called out when trying
to hijack international organizations for their purposes [Holy See and Trump
administration 2019; Joint Statement 2019; Smith 2019]. Yet, it is critical that it be
done systematically and consistently, at their every attempt. Otherwise, qui tacet,
consentire videtur.
“Nondiscrimination on grounds of gender and gender identity” (?)

Gender, in the context of human rights, notably nondiscrimination, is another
important issue on which government representatives at the Council of Europe
keep silent but the representatives of the Church ought to be spreading their
heterodoxy. Gender theory and gender ideology set out a political agenda which
calls for ever more intrusive legal protections against alleged discrimination. The
2011 Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on combatting violence against
women and domestic violence mandates states parties to introduce all kinds of
sensible and needed protections against those evils, including criminalization of
forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and forced abortion.
Regrettably, the convention also turns gender theory and ideology into law by
using such concepts as “historically unequal power relations” between women
and men [Preamb. §9], “structural nature of violence against women” [Preamb.
§10], “substantive equality” [Art. 1(1)(b)], gender as “social construct” [Art. 3(c)],
“gender identity” [Art. 4(3)], and by stigmatizing “men and boys” who are singled
out as perpetrators [Art. 12(4)] or advocating gender theory/ideology-based educa-
tion [Art. 14(1)(2)]. Thus, it legally privileges gender theory as the explanation of
violence against women and in families and gender ideology as the directive for
government policies in regard to such violence. The convention legislates that the
“root cause” of violence against women and in the family is patriarchy. A cursory
consultation of evidence seems to offer alternative (if not, better) explanations.
The real root causes of violence against women and in the family are to be found
in such personal characteristics of spouses or partners as addictions, substance
abuse, psychological immaturity, family break-up, etc. And yet, the Istanbul
Convention mandates states parties to engage in extensive social engineering to
revise the “traditional” morals, beliefs and practices which it summarily considers
as “stereotypes”. In the national debate over its ratification a prominent Polish
sociologist opined that “the convention is a vehicle for dismantling the family”
used by “homosexual groups” in their attempt to subvert the deepest structures of
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society [Staniszkis 2014]. For a former president of the Polish Constitutional Court
and national Human Rights Ombudsman the convention might “rise a suspicion
to be an attack on our civilization” [Zoll 2014]1.
Even if they were allowed to in their instructions and wished so personally, govern-
ment representatives will find it very difficult to confront in the Council of Europe
or similar international fora such officially sanctioned assertions of gender theory
and ideology. Nobody in their right mind supports any kind of actual discrimination
against women let alone violence against women or in families. At the same time,
by questioning the tenets of gender theory and ideology, presented as “scientific”
and “research-based”, one would easily render oneself vulnerable to accusations of
bigotry. Last but not least, government officials hardly ever are competent enough
to challenge the ideologues of “Progress” on the merits of their “research”.
But the Church has a much higher stake in all that. After all, the matter is not
about playing with words and quibbling about their definitions. By first dimin-
ishing (“gender as social construct”) and then altogether negating the biological
and psychological distinctions between men and women (gender as “identity” or
“performativity”), gender theories underwrite policies which, under the guise of
“antidiscrimination”, ultimately target natural family as the source of oppression
of women and children and transmission of traditional, i.e., “oppressive”, values
and morals. The most vulnerable in the society are the first victims in that war on
culture. And, as a once progressive prominent writer discovered: “the destruction
of traditional family had at its real target the destruction of Biblical morality”
[Phillips 2018: 100].
In 2019 the Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education issued a document:

’Male and Female He Created Them’: Towards a Path of Dialogue on the Question
of Gender Theory In Education. Indeed, it does contain a Catholic heterodoxy;
a fundamentally positive vision of men and women as equal in dignity and
mutually reciprocal parts of humanity. It starts with the straightforward premise
that humans have a nature which they must respect and cannot manipulate at
will. That human nature forms the basis of the “life-giving relationship between
men and women”, which in turn founds the natural family [Male & Female 2019:
In 2014 professor Andrzej Zoll criticized the Istanbul Convention for “its very slack, impre-
1
cise language filled with internal contradictions” and singled out Art. 12 on the need to
uproot gender “stereotypes”, as especially dangerous. In 2020 professor Zoll recanted his
2014 opinion.
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§§30-51, quote: §31]. Human nature and natural family precede the sociopolitical
order of the state which must recognize them; human rights and family rights must
be respected by the state as they are anchored in human dignity. Hence, state’s
subsidiarity and primacy of the right of families to the education of their children
in accordance with their values.
As to the contents of education in regard to sex and gender, the document rightly
distinguishes between ideology of gender and gender research (which can surely
be a legitimate field of study). It further shows how over time gender theories
blended into a political ideology which allegedly conveys a neutral conception
of the person and of life, yet in fact reflects an anthropology opposed to faith
and to reason [Ibid.: §1]. “In all such theories … there is agreement that one’s
gender ends up being viewed as more important than being of male or female sex.
The effect of this move is chiefly to create a cultural and ideological revolution
driven by relativism, and secondarily a juridical revolution, since such beliefs
claim specific rights for the individual and across society” [Ibid.: §20]. “Freedom
is confused with the idea that everyone can act arbitrarily … and everything were
possible and permissible” [Ibid.: §22]. “This has led to calls for public recognition
of the right to choose one’s gender, and of a plurality of new types of unions, in
direct contradiction of the model of marriage as being between one man and one
woman, which is portrayed as a vestige of patriarchal societies” [Ibid.: §14]. The
concept of family devoid of the generation of new life “is thus emptied of meaning”
[Ibid.: §21]. Notably, the document rightly insists on the necessity to “combat all
expressions of unjust discrimination” and to educate “to respect every person in
their particularity and difference, so that no one should suffer bullying, violence,
insults or unjust discrimination….” [Ibid.: §§15, 16].
The Vatican document is, however, coached in a language so esoteric that its utility
in the context of expert discussions in the Council of Europe and similar bodies,
let alone for a pastor on the parish wishing to illuminate his flock, would surely be
problematic. Meanwhile, it would seem that a more direct confrontation with the
prevailing orthodoxy might be in order. Proliferation of social rights is contained
by finite resources available to the otherwise eager politicians. The tragic practice
of abortion is contained by its intrinsically horrific nature. However, when it comes
to the social and political implications of gender theories and ideologies, what is at
stake is the very fabric of society, i.e., its basic structures, institutions and beliefs
which make the society function. And the moral and cultural revolution, currently
on the march, insidiously appears emancipatory (liberation of women) in its general
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nature and irrelevant in its most bizarre (existence of over two dozen of “genders”,
gender “identities” and “expressions”) implications; thus, not objectionable.
In the present-day “culture” of international organizations, the people of the

Church are literally the last ditch of potential open resistance coming from repre-
sentatives of the Western group. Thus, whenever gender theory or ideology and
gender-based research is introduced as justification to claim rights or formulate
policies addressing alleged “discriminations”, they should be pointing out, first, to
the scientifically flimsy foundations of that theory and research alike and, second,
to broader social and political consequences of such policies.
Heavy ideologization of gender theory and gender-based research is already quite

well-documented. The discipline has been marred by “idea laundering”, i.e., produc-
tion of “scholarship” by cross-referencing to ideologically-laden articles of other
gender scholars. Facts are first victims of gender analysis, like persistent segrega-
tion by sex of professions in Nordic countries despite their level best efforts to
eliminate “gender differentiation”. No attempt has, so far. been made to revise the
basic premise of gander theory. The second victim is solid research methodology,
like persistent equating of outcome disparity with discrimination. Because of such
“research culture” Peter Boghossian, James Lindsay and Helen Pluckrose (scholars
who politically situate themselves on the left), were able to publish in 2017 and 2018
alone seven bogus articles in top-tier gender study journals which, when exposed,
those journals had to retract [Melchior 2018; Boghossian, Lindsay & Pluckrose 2019;
Pluckrose, Lindsay 2020]. A prominent liberal academic, Mark Lilla, opined sarcasti-
cally on the contents and validity of that scholarship: “More generally, they will be
taught that nothing about gender identity is fixed, that it is all infinitely malleable.
… A whole scholastic vocabulary has been developed to express those notions: fluid-
ity, hybridity, intersectionality, performativity, transgresivity, and more. Anyone
familiar with medieval scholastic disputes over the mystery of the Holy Trinity—the
original identity problem—will feel right at home” [Lilla 2017: 86-87].
The consequences of that ideologization for society and polity go, however, far
beyond scholastic disputes in the ivory towers of academia. The proliferation of
political grievances dressed in the costume of human rights professes a particular
“cult of the individual”—where subjective experience dominates over empirical
evidence, where normal is labeled “normative” and, as such, reprehensible because
“exclusionary”, while transgression is celebrated as liberating, and, as such,
demanded every protection of the law against “discrimination” and “intolerance”,
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where femininity and masculinity are under official assault as vestiges of “oppres-
sive patriarchy”, where family has been redefined into a temporary arrangement
of any configuration among consenting adults, and where the ominous “right to
choose” routinely privileges sexual impulse over responsible behavior. Speech is
compelled to conform to “tolerance”, now mandating unreserved affirmation
of every lifestyle choice not explicitly interdicted by criminal law. Research and
publications get castigated for asking the “wrong” questions or, even worse, reach-
ing the “wrong” conclusions [A Letter 2020].
But perhaps most importantly, the natural family as the most basic societal insti-
tution is further undermined with all its attendant social problems. That “cult
of the individual” for decades already inculcated as received truth at university
humanities departments and taught in schools contributes to the environment in
which children lack a consistent mother or father figure while the affirmation of
their own sexual identity with its concomitant social roles may be obstructed when
told that such identities are just a matter of individual choice which may well be
transient. As a former social policy expert of The Guardian, concluded: “family
disintegration and reformation did incalculable damage to children”, with the
lower classes being disproportionately affected [Phillips 2018: 97].
Conclusion
Human rights—one of the greatest achievements of Western civilization are
being trivialized through their proliferation, amalgamation and politicization.
By turning them into a secular religion, their ontic foundations have been under-
mined. If there is no divine spark in every human being, then human rights are
at the whim of the state. If social rights are identical with civil and political rights
then—as categorical—they do not limit government power but mandate govern-
ment’s omnipotence over the society and the economy. If unfettered abortion is
a “human right” then the right to life, i.e., the foundation of all other human rights,
is compromised. Under the guise of the “right to choose”, it becomes the right
to arbitrarily decide which life is worthy of living—an antithesis of unalienable
human rights. Radical renditions of gender theory and ideology as foundations of
human rights epitomize their politicization and trivialization. Not only do they
revolutionize the most basic social institutions and social mores, but also give rise
to violations of rights of other people and to social engineering on a massive scale.
When Jonathan Yaniv of British Columbia—a biological man who considers

himself a woman and legally uses a female name Jessica—takes selfies in women’s
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restrooms or visits female beauty parlors to get genital depilation, he does all that
claiming his right to nondiscrimination on grounds of his “gender identity and
expression” [Slatz 2019]. When denied the procedure, he sued 16 salons before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal charging transphobic discrimina-
tion. The Tribunal had enough sense do deny his claim. But, grotesquely enough,
it did it on what really is a technicality, namely that “scrotum waxing was not
a service customarily provided by the Respondents” [Yaniv v. Various Waxing
Salons 2019: 3]. The tribunal could not just reject Jonathan’s ridiculous claim
because the British Columbia Human Rights Code protects against discrimina-
tion on grounds of “gender identity”. So does the Istanbul Convention in its Art.
4(3), so far, only within its scope. European “Yanivs” will have to wait to try their
luck at courts until the EU Fundamental Rights Agency gets its way. And it has
already reproached: “The EU treaties do not explicitly provide protection from
discrimination based on gender identity, and only six EU Member States explicitly
protect trans people from such discrimination” [Protection 2015: 8].
In Warsaw, Poland, the 2019 Women’s Congress debated, inter alia, the need for
“trans-species sisterhood” in the fight against the “objectification of the human
and animal female”—a supposedly common feature of the patriarchal society,
where “violence has a gender” (which can only be male) [Tutak-Goll 2019]. Among
active panelists was Sylwia Spurek, a Polish MEP and formerly a deputy Poland’s
Human Rights Ombudsman. There obviously is a moral duty to treat animals
humanely. Yet to equate women with female animals at, for all places, a Women’s
Congress was a manifestation of a new strain of rights proliferation (this time:
animal rights) and ultimately trivialization of the rights of humans, as further
undermining their uniqueness among Creation.
The above are recent examples of excess and mockery that have afflicted the
most noble idea of human rights, seven decades since the Universal Declaration.
From God’s endowment to pursue meaningful life free of government oppression,
human rights have been largely reduced to a job program for ambitious lawyers
and ideological firebrands. In the Council of Europe and elsewhere there seems
to be a growing sense that the special interests have abused the “logic of collective
action”, but there is also fear of calling them out on that. After all, human rights
are the secular religion of our time a no one wishes to be labeled a heretic.
As an institution ministering to Christ set “for a sign which shall be spoken

against” (Luke 2: 34) and which “has something to say” about human rights and
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“human situations, both individual and communal, national and international”

[Centessimus Annus: §5], the Church, as a prime representative of the civilization
to which humanity owes human rights, should make its positions heard at every
level of the Council of Europe and any other international organization activity,
where human rights are being put at the service of the “Utopia”. And it ought to be
done in a language understandable to Western post-Christians. The truth needs
to be told and the meek need to be inspired so that the trivialization of human
rights may be arrested. Because the ambition for a world made perfect by human
rights might stray to a place opposite of any Utopia. To slightly paraphrase Grant
Gilmore’s famous dictum: “In hell there will be nothing but rights and due process
will be meticulously observed” [Gilmore 1979: 111].
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Rosita Garškaitė
Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, Lithuania
Catholicism and the Support

for European Integration: A Critique
of the Methodological Underpinnings
Abstract: It has long been argued that a special relationship between Catholicism
and European integration exists. Yet, the scholarly discussion of its meaning has
seldom gone beyond statistical analyses that show robust correlations, but cannot
provide an understanding of why and when Catholics tend to choose commit-
ment to European Union over skepticism or indifference to it. Three philosophi-
cal arguments are presented in the paper which indicate the flaws of positivist
research and show how an interpretivist approach could shed light on the topic
studied.
Keywords: Catholicism, European integration, European Union, Positivism,
Interpretivism
Abstrakt: Od dawna twierdzi się, że istnieje szczególny związek między katoli-

cyzmem a integracją europejską. Jednak naukowa dyskusja na temat jego znacze-
nia rzadko wykracza poza analizy statystyczne, które wykazują silne korelacje,
ale nie mogą dostarczyć zrozumienia, dlaczego i kiedy u katolików przeważa
przywiązanie do Unii Europejskiej nad sceptycyzmem czy obojętnością wobec
niej. W artykule przedstawiono trzy argumenty filozoficzne, które wskazują na
wady badań pozytywistycznych i pokazują, w jaki sposób podejście interpreta-
tywistyczne mogłoby rzucić światło na badany temat.
Słowa kluczowe: katolicyzm, integracja europejska, Unia Europejska, pozyty-
wizm, interpretatywizm
Introduction
The results of the 2016 EU referendum in the United Kingdom and the follow-
ing withdrawal of the country in 2020, also known as Brexit, made it clear that
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public support is indispensable for the existence of the European Union. Why do
some people favor integration and on what do they base positive evaluation of this
supranational political project? What could reinforce or undermine their support
in the future? These questions interest political elites as well as political scientists.
Four main theoretical explanations, namely utilitarian, reference, cue-taking and

identity, have long dominated the field [Hobolt and Vries 2016: 413-432; Ejrnæs and
Jensen 2019: 1390-1419). First, citizens from countries which most benefit from the
EU economically as well as people who personally benefit from the liberalization
of European trade are more supportive towards the EU. Second, individuals use
national proxies to evaluate the EU: citizens who trust national political institu-
tions are more supportive, as are citizens in more corrupt countries. Finally, if
citizens support a pro-EU national party or if national media coverage on the EU
is positive, they will sympathize with EU integration.
In addition to the three above-mentioned explanations, identity factors also

contribute to public attitudes towards the EU, i.e. people support the EU if it is
in line with their norms and values. To be more specific, particular attention has
been paid to religion and even more to Catholicism for two reasons.
Firstly, because of a close connection between Catholicism and the project of

European unification in historical terms. Most of the EU ‘founding fathers’ –
Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi – were practising or
even devout Catholics and their faith contributed to their determination to unify
Europe [Loughlin 2015: 43-56). Consequently, Catholic social teaching impacted
the main EU principles, particularly subsidiarity [Marquardt 1994: 616-640; Evans
2013: 44-60] and the Vatican has always supported European integration [Chelini-
Pont 2009: 131-146; Kratochvíl, Doležal 2015].
Secondly, contradictions between religious and liberal EU worldviews constantly

arise regarding the following issues: conflicts in life-and-death decisions, sexuality
and reproductive matters, regulations of religious affairs in the public sphere, insti-
tutional memory in terms of the “Christian roots” concept in the failed European
Constitution project and later in the Treaty of Lisbon [Foret, Schlesinger 2006:
59-81; Foret 2015; Mudrov 2015: 507-528; Mudrov 2016: 1-16). Moreover, the clergy
in some of the Central and Eastern European countries have spoken publicly
against the EU, identifying it as a threat to national identity and faith [Ramet 2006:
117-147; Szumigalska 2015: 342-356; Guerra 2016: 25-45].
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Literature review
Scholars have repeatedly shown that Catholics are more supportive of the EU
in comparison to believers affiliating with other Christian denominations and
non-believers, especially in countries where Catholicism is dominant [Nelsen,
Guth and Cleveland 2001: 191-217; Hagevi 2002: 759–769; Boomgaarden, Freire
2009: 1240-1265; Nelsen, Guth and Highsmith 2010: 1-26; Grötsch, Schnabel, 2012:
586-610; Hamerly 2012: 214-239; Lazić et al 2012: 167-191; Scherer 2015: 893-909;
Spohn, Koenig and Knöbl 2015; Nelsen and Guth 2015; 2016; Kolpinskaya, Fox
2019: 580-598; Scherer 2020: 119-149]. According to these authors, religion is
involved in questions regarding the ultimate scope and potential of the EU, what
ties Europe together, who counts as “European”, and how national borders and
identities matter.
Nelsen et al. [2001; 2010; 2015; 2016] conducted many studies repeatedly showing
that public opinions about integration in Europe are shaped by what they call
“confessional cultures,” meaning shared ideas, behaviors and particular institu-
tions produced by different religious traditions, namely by Catholic and Protestant
confessions. Catholics tend to support the EU more than Protestants, but the direc-
tion and strength of the influence is dependent on the national religious context
(e.g. Catholic minorities in Protestant countries tend to distrust the EU and
Protestants in Catholic countries tend to be warmer toward the EU). Boomgarden
and Freire [2009], Sherer [2015; 2020], Spohn, Koenig and Knöbl [2015], Lazić et
al [2012] also have revealed that the religious context of the country matters. As
Grötsch and Schnabel [2012] put it, a higher percentage of Catholics is related
to higher EU-confidence nationwide while a higher percentage of Protestants is
related to a lower level of confidence. Most studies indicate the difference between
observant Catholics and less committed ones, but the direction of the relationship
depends on a national context [Nelsen, 2010; 2016; Kolpinskaya, Fox 2019].
The above-mentioned scholars consider religion to be an independent variable

affecting support for the EU in their statistical analysis. They use various sets
of quantitative data from Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, European
Values Study, European Election Studies, International Social Survey Programme,
Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Election Studies of particular countries. They also
provide a broad overview of the developments since 1973. In addition, they observe
a regular relationship between Catholicism and EU support throughout the Union
as well as in separate member countries. Because of these three aspects (differ-
ent data, broad time and space framework) the correlation is well-established.
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Statistical methods such as multiple linear regression and factor analysis enable
scholars to distinguish between micro and macro variables, and to test whether
religiosity matters when other independent variables are controlled.
However, the scholarly discussion of the meaning of the relationship between

Catholicism and support for the EU has seldom gone beyond the statistical analy-
ses. The studies show robust correlations but do not provide an explanation as to
why and when Catholics tend to choose commitment to the EU over skepticism
or indifference to it. The most one can derive from above-mentioned research
as an explanation on this topic is that Catholics are open to supranationalism
because the Catholic Church historically was oriented towards internationalism
[Scherer 2020: 142] Although the quantitative analyses contribute significantly to
the knowledge, this paper argues that an interpretivist approach would shed more
light on the topic and indicate the flaws in positivist research.
Questioning Methodological Underpinnings

1. Causality
From a positivist point of view, religiosity is a causal factor, which is external
and contingent to support for the EU in the same vein as income, education,
age, partisanship etc. However, religion is a system of symbols which establishes
“powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods in men by formulating conceptions
of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such
an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”
[Geertz 1973: 90]. Therefore, it can shape the ideas that people have about social
reality, politics, and the EU. We should ask what the EU means to religious
individuals. Do the ideas originating from religion encourage their understanding
of EU in any way?
In contrast to sociologist Emile Durkheim who believed that social life should
be explained by profound causes unperceived by consciousness instead of the
notions that people have, philosopher Paul Winch argued that social life is an
expression of people’s ideas about reality. “It would be impossible,” he wrote
“to give more than a superficial account of those relations [with fellow monks
and people outside monastery] without taking into account the religious ideas
around which the monk‘s life revolves” [Winch 1958: 23]. In that case is it
possible to study Catholics’ support for the EU without considering religion as
a set of ideas about reality?
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Drawing on insights provided by MacIntyre [1962], Taylor [1971], McCann [1996]

about causality in social science, this paper suggests that a constitutive rather than
causal relationship between religion and support for the EU could be explored.
It is not external and contingent but internal, conceptual and constitutive, that
is to say that individuals conduct themselves in particular ways shaped by their
understandings – explicit or tacit – about their worlds. The term “constitutive”
expresses “a sensitivity to the ways that our actions are at once delimited and
enabled by a complex mix of partial, dialectically interactive knowledge-based
(or discursive) factors” [McCann 1996: 463].
In other words, being a member of a local Catholic community could render

sensible attitudes on the EU that would otherwise be too complex and detached
from the daily lives of most individuals. Most EU citizens do not have direct
personal experience, sufficient interest or emotional attachment to it. If we want to
be sure that religion shapes support for the EU, we should show that by choosing
between alternatives (to support or not), individuals are using criterion related to
Catholicism and “explain why the use of this criterion appears rational to those
who invoke it” [MacIntyre 1962: 61].
2. Context
Causal models abstract and isolate contextual factors as variables. By reducing
religion to a standard independent variable, the particularity of local religious
communities are lost. Despite the fact that Catholicism is as universal a religion
as one can get (Catholic doctrine and the authority of the pope apply to every
Catholic), differences between countries exist in terms of historical context (how
closely Catholicism intertwined with national identity), the political leanings of
the clergy and issues that are perceived as challenges to one’s religious and national
identity etc.
Through works of religious sociology we know at least two possible ways in which
religion can encourage certain political attitudes. On the one hand, religious
teachings stress the importance of some ideas and values and denigrate the
importance of others. On the other hand, religious communities provide cogni-
tive structures that help to simplify and understand social reality [Wuthnow
2007: 344-350]. Individuals do not adopt separate attitudes every time they face
a unique situation, but tend to rely on cultural schemas, metaphors, narratives
which allow them to organize the complex and ambiguous environment into
meaningful categories.
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“Saul may have become Paul in the aloneness of religious ecstasy, but he could
remain Paul only in the context of the Christian community” [Berger and
Luckmann 1966: 158]. The community is essential because it guarantees a conti-
nuity of a conversation with significant others. That is why to abstract from the
context of the communities in research means neglecting various conversations
“on which the subjective realities of the world hangs“ [Berger 1967: 17]. Catholics
in France can have very different interactions regarding EU questions compared
to what Pope Francis says or what Catholics in Poland take into account.
3. Language
Finally, the main positivist conundrum is how to operationalize and measure
public support for the EU. In the above-mentioned academic literature it is usually
operationalized as 1) an opinion as to whether EU membership is a good thing;
2) support for European integration; 3) consideration that the EU beneficial for
oneself or one’s country; 4) а positive impression of the EU; 5) trust in the EU; 6)
а positive assessment of EU institutions 7) а self-identification or sense of being
“European” etc.
Thus, support for the EU can be measured as evaluation, impression, trust or

identity. The question is whether these different aspects of the same phenomenon
are unrelated, interdependent or equivalent. Can one identify as European but
not trust EU institutions or think that one’s country benefited from the EU and
not have a positive impression of the EU in general? Moreover, should we assume
that citizens understand the concepts of “feeling European” or “being for further
European unification” in the same vein as scholars do? According to Winch,
concepts must be familiar to the individual, because if they are not, he or she
does not associate any subjective sense with it and consequently any explanation
based on such concepts is meaningless [1958: 15].
The interpretive approach could help to overcome this conundrum by studying

the concepts as they are used in ordinary language. This sort of enterprise requires
more open-ended attention to how people talk, use special terms, jargon, modes of
reasoning, metaphors etc. J. L. Austin noticed that scholars should not expect to
find simple labels for complicated cases [1970: 21]. We risk missing the connections
and distinctions that do not fit in our preconceived categories by ignoring nuances
involved in making ordinary claims. “[O]ur common stock of words embodies all
the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found
worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations,” also wrote Austin [1970: 8].
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This means that the study of ordinary language opens a window onto the
shared culture of a particular community. We can easily tell how the EU or
“Europeanness” are defined in the Lithuanian language, but a deep analysis of
how everyday language functions is required to enhance shared meanings which
may facilitate Lithuanian Catholics’ support for European integration. By paying
attention to the words that people actually use when thinking and speaking about
European integration, we can grasp how they regard this project in their own
terms. Subsequently we can analyze whether these shared meaning originate from
their Catholic context.
Conclusion
Why do people support the EU? It has been found that apart from dominant
economic and elite-centered explanations, religion also contributes to public
attitudes toward the EU. There is a strand of academic literature arguing that
Catholicism played a role in bolstering public support for the European project.
Without putting the Catholic community in the centre of the research, we cannot
understand whether this relationship is not merely contingent. As three arguments
concerning the methodologies of existing academic literature revealed, positivist
enterprise cannot explain the results of its own research.
The question remains as to what really shapes support for the EU – religious ideas,
particular local religious communities or neither? It is necessary to put the lived
experience of Catholics in the centre of the research if we want to get a sense of
what the established correlation means. As Taylor puts it, “a study of the science of
man is inseparable from an examination of the options between which men must
choose” [1971: 51]. This kind of analysis would contribute to the academic debate
on the role of religion in European integration and advance our understanding of
the nature of this relationship, which for now remains obscure.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Laura Chamberland and Hernan Tesler-Mabé

University of Ottawa, Canada
Horrific Pasts and Mundane Presents:

Living among the Jewish Ghosts
of Warsaw and Lublin
Abstract: This article represents a consideration of the way in which the Jewish
past in two key areas of Poland is obfuscated by the historical processes that led
to the creation and re-creation of the urban space. Focussing on the district of
Muranow in Warsaw and the Majdanek site in Lublin, the authors argue that the
juxtaposition of the horrific past and a more mundane present create a destabi-
lizing disjunction – what Suzanne Knittel calls the “historical uncanny” – that
unsettles and stands in the way of a Polish reconciliation with its Jewish past.
Keywords: Holocaust Memory; Jews; Poland; Warsaw; Lublin; Muranow;
Majdanek
Abstrakt: Artykuł jest rozważaniem nad sposobem w jaki przeszłość żydowska

dwóch obszarów Polski została zaciemniona przez procesy historyczne, które
doprowadziły do stworzenia lub odtworzenia tamtejszej przestrzeni miejskiej.
Posługując się przykładami warszawskiego Muranowa i lubelskiego Majdanku,
autorzy dowodzą, że zestawienie przerażającej przeszłości i bardziej prozaicznej
teraźniejszości daje destabilizujący rozdźwięk, który Suzanne Knittel nazywa
„historyczną niesamowitością” – niesamowitością, która niepokoi i stoi na drodze
pojednania się Polski z jej żydowską przeszłością.
Słowa kluczowe: pamięć o Holocauście, Żydzi, Polska, Warszawa, Muranów,
Majdanek
“There is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument.” – Robert Musil
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Robert Musil’s reflection on the invisibility of monuments presents a profound

critique of the morality of remembering. As James Young [1993: 5] remarked
in his book The Texture of Memory, we are “living in an age of mass memory
production and consumption.” In this age of modernity, remembering the past
is viewed as a fundamentally moral act, and forgetting is thereby viewed as a risk
that could lead society to repeat its past mistakes. One of the more popular ways
to preserve memory is through the construction of monuments and memorials
that commemorate specific historical events [Young 1993: 4]. On display for all to
see, these memorial sites become a particular container of memory and allegedly
demonstrate society’s commitment to preserving the past. Yet according to Musil,
although monuments are constructed to attract attention, they instead repel atten-
tion because their essential “stiffness” reflects a memory that remains static and
fixed in place [Young 2000: 176].
The proliferation of monuments and memorials can therefore have the

unintended consequence of sanitizing past events, not only because of their
inherent stiffness but due to an effort to appeal to mass consumption in a global-
ized era. Most notably with Holocaust commemoration, the bombardment of
a “never again” narrative that transcends time frequently reduces a complex and
multifaceted atrocity into a singular, repetitive, and consumable history bereft
of both nuance and essence. Such oversaturated representations of the Jewish
genocide render the Holocaust narrative as a “comfortable horrible memory”
[Knittel 2014: 10]. In this way, although traditional monuments and memori-
als are built in the name of remembering the Holocaust, they can actually
fail to meaningfully confront and engage with a deeper understanding of the
atrocity. Commemorative monuments to the Holocaust can thereby become
‘mundanized’ in their environment, and can therefore, in Musil’s words,
become “invisible.”
On these assumptions, we argue that while Holocaust monuments can be impor-

tant markers for remembering, they can also be inadequate for our understanding
of the multiplicity of ways that the Holocaust can be remembered, neglected, or
forgotten. Outside of the monumental Holocaust history, fragments of the Jewish
atrocity pervade the landscape of European cities. European citizens and its
visitors (whether consciously or not) thus perpetually interact with the ghosts of
the Holocaust. Unintentional encounters and engagements with these fragments
of shattered Jewish spaces can serve as an uncanny moment of interaction between
a horrific past and an ordinary mundane present.
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The authors therefore seek to broaden an analysis from the formalized monument
itself, to instead foreground the urban landscape surrounding it. In this paper,
the monument/memorial to the Holocaust thereby becomes the built environ-
ment of the cityscape that has witnessed Jewish atrocity. Poland here represents
a critical site of examination due to the central place that the Holocaust occupies
as well as how this history has shown itself in the country’s approach to post-war
reconstruction, particularly with Jewish spaces. Of course, Nazi occupation plays
an important part in this story, but even more so the collective memory of Polish
victimhood has had a significant impact on the ways in which the Polish people
perceived – and continue to perceive – the genocide against the Jews. As Katrin
Steffen points out, a “competition of victims (…) has dominated the dialogue
between Poles and Jews and contributed to the failure to remember Jewish life in
Poland” [2008: 209]. Deeply scarred by both war time and post-war experience,
therefore, Poles have navigated a constellation of tensions in their engagements (or
lack thereof) with the Holocaust, complicating the way in which the Jewish past
is manifest in major urban centres such as Warsaw and Lublin.
Post-war reconstruction in Warsaw sought to render a Jewish identity of the city

invisible. As Erica Lehrer writes: “On the Polish side, the priorities of the postwar
Communist state and the demands of Polish nationalism made the heritage of
Poland’s longstanding Jewish community invisible, unwanted, or irrelevant to what
had become a mono-ethnic (Catholic) Polish nation” [2015: 175]. It is hardly surprising
therefore that during its rebuilding, architects and urban planners erased any traces
of the atrocity from the Jewish district of Muranow by consciously not acknowl-
edging the district’s Jewish history in its reconstruction plans. Such an attempted
erasure however, has not been entirely realized, since Jewish culture has witnessed
a significant revival in the decades following the end of the Soviet Union. In Lublin,
the proximity of the city to the former death camp of Majdanek demonstrates an
uncanny overlap between the past Jewish atrocity and an ordinary present. Not only
has the Jewish element of the Holocaust been relegated as a footnote to the overarch-
ing Polish martyrdom in public descriptions of Majdanek itself, but its proximity to
the daily routine of Lublin’s inhabitants has made its place in the landscape uncanny.
The Polish cities of Warsaw and Lublin will be analyzed in a way that foregrounds
the fluidity of the (in)visible Jewish identity within these urban landscapes. We
therefore argue that these Holocaust memorial sites can be unsettling not only
because of the particular atrocity they attempt to commemorate, but also because
of their banal interactions between a horrific past and a mundane present.
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Such an analysis however, recognizes that these cases only represent a microcosm
of a broader context of engagement with the Holocaust, both within Poland and
across the globe. In the subsequent sections, we will outline how the theoretical
frameworks of curatorial urban landscapes and the historical uncanny, advanced
by Shelley Horenstein and Susanne Knittel respectively, can be applied to analyze
the fluid nature of a Jewish identity in the unique setting of post-war Poland. We
will then use the cases of Warsaw/Muranow and Lublin/Majdanek to demonstrate
how encounters with these fragments of Jewish spaces are uncanny before present-
ing a broader reflection on contemporary tensions over Holocaust memory.
Theoretical Development
In her book Losing Site: Architecture, Memory and Place, Shelley Horenstein
explores the relationship between memory and place, and the ways that built
architecture can capture and trigger memory. Architectural history, according
to Horenstein [2011: 4], is about more than merely an examination of monolithic
and static buildings. Such an approach to history analyzes how citizens actively
engage in their lived urban landscapes. Horenstein [2011: 4] views this process as
a fundamentally curatorial act, in which citizens interact with their built environ-
ment, and thereby generate symbolic means of remembrance and memory in
these places. In this way, traces of the past are inscribed into the present built
architecture of cityscapes. The past and present thus continually overlap and
intertwine with one another. We accordingly view the post-war urban landscape
of Warsaw and Lublin as inscribed with the memory of the Holocaust, which is
simultaneously erased and made visible in its present landscape.
The examination of these sites through a theoretical perspective of the “historical

uncanny” is also critical to understand how Holocaust memory is rendered (in)visible
in their Polish urban landscapes. In her book The Historical Uncanny, Susanne Knittel
defines this concept as “the inherent potential of sites of memory to trouble the self-
conception and identity of individuals, groups and nations” [2014: 8]. The ‘uncanny’
can therefore be explained by the uncomfortable sensation that one experiences when
unexpectedly encountering a traumatic historical site overlapping and intertwining
with an ordinary present. Importantly, these unexpected confrontations are generally
not intentional, but rather occur in a sudden moment when the visitor stumbles across
a fragment of a horrific past embedded into an ordinary landscape.
Knittel [2014: 9] uses Auschwitz as an example of a Holocaust site that is no longer

uncanny. She argues that the concentration camp “remains a monumental and
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disturbing symbol of inhumane suffering. But the shocking truth that it represents
is by now more readily assailable to an accepted historical past.” The seamless
assimilation of the Jewish genocide into a collective historical consciousness can
be viewed as a consequence of an oversaturation of its images in popular culture.
But encounters with the fragments of a traumatic Jewish past, foregrounded in

cities such as Warsaw and Lublin, are unsettling because of the sudden ways that
they become visible in their urban landscape. In turn, they become the “histori-
cal uncanny”: a suppressed yet ever-present reminder (whether consciously or
subconsciously evident) of the Jewish Poland now lost that constantly threatens
to destabilize Polish identity via its psychic exhumation.
Making the Invisible Visible: Warsaw and Muranow

Polish relations with post-war Jewish spaces have been largely subsumed into an
overarching narrative of a Polish national martyrdom. Indeed, as Michael Meng
[2011: 27] notes in his book Shattered Spaces, “victimization is at the very core of
what it means to be Polish.” The devastating impact of the Second World War on
Poland reinforced this collective consciousness but as a consequence obscured the
notion that segments of Polish society could have played a part in the Holocaust.
That a Pole could have played a role in the death of their Jewish neighbour went
against the dominant narrative of an overall Polish victimization at the hands of
the Nazis. Nevertheless, as Meng [2011: 23] critically points out:
Terms like “indifference” and “passive complicity” do not fully capture how
entangled Poles became in the Holocaust. In a country where Jews made up
10 percent of the overall population and where in many small villages Jews
constituted nearly half of the population, the persecution, ghettoization,
deportation, and mass murder of 3 million people over five years intersected
with the lives of numerous ordinary Poles in countless ways.
The complex and entangled relationship between Poles and Jews (both before and
during the war) significantly impacted the approach to post-war reconstruction
in Poland.
The post-war reconstruction of Warsaw, and its Jewish district of Muranow,

presents an important case study on the historical uncanny because of how the
Polish and Jewish (and socialist) relationship shaped the memory of the Holocaust
in the rebuilt cityscape. Warsaw’s near total destruction during the war had
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a profound impact on the ways that its residents and urban planners viewed their
approach to post-war redevelopment.1 Reconstruction designs of the city drew
heavily on the deep-rooted national narrative of an attempted annihilation of
the entire Polish nation by the Nazis. In both a real and imagined sense, the
rebuilding of Warsaw was envisioned as a symbol of redemption, and emblematic
of a destroyed, broken, and yet resilient nation [Meng 2011: 72].
Importantly however, this redemptive re-imagining of Warsaw subsumed its horrific

Jewish past into a broader Polish narrative of martyrdom. The reconstruction of the
historic Jewish district of Muranow was considered a “sensational project” in global
architectural development, since it is the only residential quarter in the post-war
era that was constructed from, and on, ruins [Uchowicz 2014: paragraph 2]. When
the Nazis invaded the city in 1939, they had used this pre-existing Jewish district
to create an enclosed ghetto, in which they forcibly confined all of Warsaw’s Jewish
population. By its official establishment in November 1940, Muranow, transformed
into the Warsaw Ghetto, became one of the largest ghettos in Nazi occupied Europe.
Surrounded by a ten-foot wall and covering an area of 1.3 square miles, at its height
the district housed 460,000 Jews. The population of the Warsaw Ghetto dramatically
reduced in July-August 1942 however, with the deportation of 280,000 Jews to the
death camp of Treblinka. The entirety of the Ghetto was subsequently annihilated
in April 1943, following the outbreak of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
Initial urban reconstruction plans for the destroyed Jewish district sought to erase
its traumatic Jewish past by building a new socialist future [Meng 2011: 77]. The
catastrophic state of the immediate post-war Muranow presented a difficult situa-
tion for redevelopment because the amount of rubble was so dense that much of
it could not be removed [Meng: 78]. As a result, urban designers, unable to clear
away the ruins of the past, were forced to incorporate the rubble in the rebuilding
of the district. Designs first published in 1946-1947 outlined technical details for
a spacious housing complex that was to be constructed on top of the destruction.
As one architect proclaimed [Meng: 78], “now, on the ruins and embers of Warsaw
will be built a new city, adjusted to new ways of life.” These initial plans to build
over the remnants of the Jewish space consequently ignored, and attempted to
erase, the traumatic symbolism of the district [Meng: 78].
Many studies cite that the Capital Reconstruction Office (Biuro Odbudowy Stolicy—BOS) had quanti-
1
fied Warsaw as 85% destroyed at the end of the war, and up to 60% of its population annihilated (a total
of around 685,000 people). Jerzy Elzanowski, “Ruins, Rubble and Human Remains: Negotiating
Culture and Violence in Post-Catastrophic Warsaw.” Public Art Dialogue, 2 no. 2 (2012): 114.
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In 1948 however, architect Bohdan Lachert2 took over reconstruction plans, and
envisioned Muranow’s post-war redevelopment as a space to memorialize the
Ghetto. As Lachert expressed [Meng: 78], “the history of the great victory of the
nation paid for through a sea of human blood, poured out for the sake of social
progress and national liberation, will be commemorated in the Muranow project.”
Lachert sought to infuse the design of the new housing complexes within an
overarching commemorative urban environment, and therefore curate a lived-in
memorial landscape. His project intended to infuse Muranow’s material ruins
– the dark red, rusty brick – with concrete to construct the buildings as a refer-
ence to the ashes of those who had perished. In this way, “every time a Muranow
tenant entered a building, she would have to climb a greened mound of rubble
to reach the front entrance. Each time she stored or retrieved preserves from the
common cellars, she would touch walls made of the same rubble that formed her
new ground plane-her new horizon” [Elzanowski 2012: 131]. Further, Lachert’s
architectural designs presented a visually somber, reflective atmosphere since the
outside walls would be left un-stuccoed and unadorned [Elzanowski 2012: 131].
Such an approach to Muranow’s post-war reconstruction by Lachert was therefore
deeply cognisant and embracing of the traumatic Jewish history of the space.
Significantly however, Lachert’s commemorative reconstruction project was

rejected by the Capital Reconstruction Office in 1950, and instead supplanted
with designs that favoured the style of socialist realism.3 This type of architectural
2
A brief and important bibliographic sketch of Bohdan Lachert: Lachert was part of
a growing architectural movement that advocated for a break with traditionalism. His wife,
Irena Lachert, was a social activist in prewar Poland and during the occupation became
an active member of Żegota (Council to Aid Jews) and the Union of Armed Struggle.
Their house in Warsaw’s Saska Kępa neighbourhood became an underground hub for
the Resistance movement. Moreover, the Lachert’s secretly rescued several Jews from the
Warsaw Ghetto, including Bohdan’s friend and close colleague Maksymilian Goldberg.
Despite Lachert’s attempts to convince him otherwise, Goldberg decided to remain in the
Warsaw Ghetto instead of escaping the city, and subsequently died in August 1942. In
a short commentary in one of his diaries, Lachert noted that Goldberg was “one of the
greatest architects. A phenomenal memory. A subtle and sharp intelligence. Great speaker
and great satirist. I agree with his wife’s biography that he died while still being alive and
that’s why he cut himself off from reality even though he still had a good sense of this
reality.” These personal experiences probably had a significant bearing on Lachert’s desire
to rebuild a future Muranow as a larger site of commemoration to its Jewish residents.
Uchowicz, “Reading Muranow,”; Olga Szymanska,“Lachert, The Law Court on Leszno
and Saska Kepa.” Jewish Historical Institute, January 13, 2016: http://www.jhi.pl/en/
blog/2016-01-13-lachert-the-law-courts-on-leszno-and-saska-kepa
3
Lachert ultimately resigned from the project in 1951, and handed his role over to Stepkowski.
It has been noted however, that while the wave of criticism for his approach to Muranow’s
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form, developed in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era, aimed to showcase
Soviet ideals through designs that emphasised a historic triumph of Communism
over capitalism in the built environment [Meng: 79]. Socialist realist architecture
conceived of the urban landscape as light, clean, spacious and orderly, in contrast
to the dark, dirty, disorderly, and cramped capitalist cities. Lachert’s project was
criticized by many socialist realist architects in this way, particularly by Polish
critic Jerzy Wierzbicki in the professional periodical Architektura. Wierzbicki
argued [Meng: 81] that Lachert’s designs were “monotonous, sad and grey,” with
the “rubble hallowed brick” creating a somber environment. This perspective,
which failed to acknowledge the Jewish atrocity of the space, was shared by the
Capital Reconstruction Office, and therefore, Lachert’s buildings – rusty and
unadorned in their symbolic space – were painted over in white and decorated
with small ornamental designs that were etched into the façade of the apartment
complexes. The new urban development created a “bright, cheerful and colour-
ful place” for the socialist working class [Meng: 81]. The decision to conceive
of Muranow’s destruction as rubble to be cleared away, rather than ruins to be
sanctified and acknowledged, therefore rendered the memory of the Jewish space
in Muranow invisible.
Katarzyna Uchowicz [2014: paragraph 4] points to Barbara Engelking and Jacek

Leociak’s 2001 Polish monographic study Przewodnik po nieistniejącym mieście (The
Warsaw Ghetto. A Guide to a Non-existent City), wherein they poignantly illustrate the
uncanny encounters with an erased Jewish memory in the post-war Muranow space:
The place-after-ghetto is empty (though it is covered with architecture),

it is emptied and dead (though filled with lively activity) (…) Walking
today in the area of the former ghetto, we experience a particular kind
of paradox of the presence of emptiness. This experience comes with
a kind of broadened vision, a doubling of perspective. Suddenly, we start
to see what we cannot see (an imagined reconstruction of the ghetto);
while in a sense we no longer see what we actually see (the reality of
here and now). The topography of contemporary Muranów becomes
in a sense a transparent curtain that covers what we really want to see.
Absence suddenly becomes present, the place-after-ghetto becomes real,
and the ghetto itself – this non-existent city – is recovered in memory.
redevelopment probably led to his resignation, the actual circumstances of his decision
remain unclear. This is primarily because Lachert is generally known to have accepted the
socialist realist doctrine. Uchowicz, “Reading Muranow,”: at para. 25.
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Such a visceral description fundamentally embodies a depiction of the histori-

cal uncanny, particularly in the landscape of post-war Muranow. Engelking and
Leociak identify the “place-after-ghetto” as a paradox, in which they are aware
of the juxtaposition between a space filled with architecture, but devoid of any
signs of the horrific Jewish atrocity. As they walk through the modern urban
landscape of Muranow, they express their “doubling of perspective,” of the
overlapping catastrophic past with the ordinary present. This engagement with
Muranow thereby foregrounds (and makes visible) the moments when a memory
of the past Jewish atrocity collides with its absence in the modern cityscape. As
a consequence, the sense of unease and displacement that one experiences in these
encounters can be described as uncanny.
However, the attempted erasure of the Jewish memory in Muranow has not
been entirely realized. There still are a few historical fragments that remain
in the city, which have been miraculously spared from socialist realist archi-
tectural development. At Złota Street #60 for instance, one of the last remain-
ing fragments of the Warsaw Ghetto wall stands uncannily juxtaposed with
modern apartment complexes; commemorated by a small plaque that indicates
its horrific past [Zaborowska 2004: 105]. Moreover, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union prompted a significant Jewish cultural revival in Warsaw. A restoration
project beginning in the late 1990s restored Jewish buildings along Próżna
Street, as an attempt to bring back, and rediscover, the historical Jewish roots
of the neighbourhood. Such redevelopment thereby seeks to make visible the
Jewish culture in the city.
Further, in July 2007, Bilewicz et al. conducted a study entitled, “Living on the
ashes: collective representation of Polish-Jewish history among people living in
the former Warsaw Ghetto area.” The authors’ research, “sought to analyze the
extent to which the Jewish history of the place was present in the shared collec-
tive memories and representations of the district among its present residents, vs.
whether it was replaced by Polish history and attached Polish meanings [Bilewicz
et al. 2010: 199]. Among the residents interviewed, results showed that those
“’living on the ashes’ perceived the Jewish history of their place of residence as
important and meaningful, even though almost no visible remnants of the Jewish
pre-war district have survived” [Bilewicz et al.: 195]. While such findings are
not necessarily representative of a wider recognition of Polish involvement in the
Jewish genocide, they nonetheless demonstrate an important engagement with
the revival of Jewish spaces in post-war Warsaw.
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Making the Visible Invisible: Lublin and Majdanek

An analysis of the Majdanek concentration camp, and its place in the wider city of
Lublin, can be viewed as a reversal of the invisible/visible framework of Muranow
in Warsaw. Here, the devastating site of the Holocaust is on display for all to
see. Majdanek was liberated by Soviet forces in July 1944 and was established as
a national memorial and museum by July 1947. As one of the first concentration
camps to be transformed into a commemorative site, Majdanek has been preserved
almost entirely as it was found. The memorials and historic sites at Majdanek are
devastating in their impact since they compel visitors to confront the unfathom-
able reality of the Holocaust. Arguably even more visceral in some cases than
Auschwitz, Majdanek presents physical reminders of an incomprehensible atrocity,
primarily by the exhibition of the Mausoleum, which holds representative ashes
of the victims murdered at the camp.4
Historic manifestations of cultural tensions however illustrate a complex entanglement

of Holocaust memory at Majdanek. When the camp was officially inaugurated in 1947,
the Polish parliament declared that, “the territory of the former Nazi concentration
camp Majdanek is to be forever preserved as a monument to the martyrdom of the
Polish nation and of other peoples” (emphasis added) [Steinlauf 1997: 69]. By proclaim-
ing the intention of preserving Majdanek for such a purpose, Poland’s parliament
obscured the Jewish element of the atrocity within a larger narrative of Polish national
martyrdom. In this way, Polish Jews were subsumed under the overarching category
of “Polish” and non-Polish Jews were subsequently relegated to the category of “other
peoples.” Although the Jews (Polish or otherwise) comprised a majority of the targeted
killings, the attempted genocide against them was relegated as a footnote to the more
significant martyrdom of the Polish nation. Moreover, these sentiments expressed in
Poland’s parliament neglected to recognize or acknowledge the notion that segments
of Polish society were also culpable in the attempted genocide against the Jews.
Beyond the grounds of the camp itself, Majdanek’s proximity to the city of Lublin
illustrates an uncanny integration of a catastrophic history with an ordinary
There are conflicting reports in the literature of exactly how many people were killed at
4
Majdanek. According to the official Majdanek Museum website, a total of 150,000 men,
women and children of various nationalities were imprisoned at the camp; and the direct
and indirect extermination resulted in the deaths of nearly 80,000 people; 60,000 of whom
were Jewish. Early scholarly literature however, has put this figure at 350,000 deaths, of
whom the Jews accounted for four-fifths of the murdered victims. Janet Jacobs, “From the
Profane to the Sacred: Ritual and Mourning at Sites of Terror and Violence.” Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 43 no. 3 (2004): 313.
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present. In the memoir A World Erased, Noah Lederman, the grandson of

Holocaust survivors, poignantly describes the uncanny place that Majdanek holds
in Lublin. Recounting his visit, Lederman notes:
From Lublin to concentration camp Majdanek was a fifteen-minute drive.

The guard towers and barracks were visible from the main road. Unlike other
camps, which were tucked away in forests, easier for those culpable to at least
deny, Majdanek sat in plain sight. An award on the shelf. It had been built to
be seen, to remind the Jews that no one cared. The gas chamber stood a few
hundred feet from rush hour traffic. (…) I watched as a mother pushed her
baby in a stroller along the perimeter of the camp. (…) Hundreds of apartment
buildings [in the near distance] were painted in colours that felt as bright as
Miami Beach pastels. Their terraces faced the black barracks, the gas chambers,
and the crematorium. Every morning was breakfast at Majdanek [Lederman
2017: 203].
Lederman’s account of Majdanek in Lublin demonstrates a complex intertwining

of the camp’s horrific past into the ordinary daily routine of the city’s inhabit-
ants. The camp is plainly visible for residents; on constant display for all to
see. Its permeable border between the camp and hundreds of apartment build-
ings that line its perimeter place Lublin’s residents in direct contact with the
Holocaust site on a daily basis. Nonetheless, such visibility can be obscured
through the normalcy of daily interactions with this site of atrocity. The seamless
blending of Majdanek’s tragic past with the mundane present can consequently
render this monumental history invisible. When the visitors’ gaze identifies this
juxtaposition however, the uncanny place of the shattered Jewish space in the
landscape becomes apparent.
Even further beyond the blurred boundary of Majdanek and the suburbs,
fragments of the Holocaust pervade the inner landscape of Lublin. At the intersec-
tion of Wieniawska Street and Krakowskie Przedmieście currently stands a small
orange-yellow building. The building, now the Faculty of Law department for John
Paul II University of Lublin, previously served as the headquarters for Operation
Reinhard, the euphemism for Hitler’s Final Solution to the Jewish Question.
Despite this monumental and horrifying history however, there are no plaques
or commemorative signs that indicate the building once served such a purpose.
As such, when its history is made apparent, the building’s seamless interaction
with a mundane present becomes uncanny.
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Over the last few years attempts have been made to remind Lublin’s residents of
the city’s past in the Holocaust atrocity.5 Visible from that Faculty of Law depart-
ment on Wieniawska Street and Krakowskie Przedmieście is a mural painted on
the façade of a nearby building. Written in solemn Yiddish verse are the words:
“Here there once lived a Jewish girl in a house that is no more, on streets that are
no more.” The art installation, by Mariusz Tarkawian, was created in 2011, as part
of Lublin’s Open City festival. Initiated in 2009, the contemporary art festival is
one of the largest of its kind and was created on the idea that “a city is a narra-
tion in itself as well as a meditation upon the narrative role played by the works
created by the participating artists” [Szabłowski 2016]. The mural, entitled “The
Street is Gone,” poignantly expresses the ambivalent nature of Jewish memory in
Polish communities. By drawing attention to the erased memory of the shattered
Jewish spaces in Lublin, Tarkawian effectively makes visible the ways in which
the lasting legacy of the Holocaust stretches into the present, and fundamentally
intertwines itself within the modern urban landscapes. These explicit reminders
of an overlapping past and present convey an uncanny remembrance on its gazers.
The last five years have seen a further effort to make explicit Lublin’s connections to
its Jewish past. With support from the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage,
the Grodzka Gate – NN Theatre – a local government cultural institution that
works “towards the preservation of cultural heritage and education” – established
an ambitious project seeking to make visible once again the Jewish presence in
Lublin.6 Focussing on the Holocaust experience, this project has since 2016 created
a series of commemorative sites and markers (e.g. murals at important communal
spots, flagstones outlining the boundaries of the Podzamcze Ghetto, concrete slabs
lining the route to Umschlagplatz, etc.) and engaged in educational programs
meant to teach about Lublin’s Jewish past. The question remains, however, whether
such reminders sufficiently intrude upon the present to allow for meaningful
5
As a critical demographic note – There were reportedly 45,000 Jews who lived in Lublin in
1939. Today, it is estimated that there are only about 20 individuals who identify themselves
as Jewish in the city. It is important to recognize however, that the devastating loss of Jewish
culture in Lublin was not entirely a direct result of the Holocaust itself but also due to the
pervasive anti-Semitic attitudes throughout Poland in the post-war era. For example, some
figures indicate that between 1944 and 1947, hundreds of Jews were murdered in Poland,
most of them specifically because they were Jewish. One of the more horrific violent attacks
against Jews occurred at a residence for Holocaust survivors in Kielce in July 1946, where
a mob killed 42 Jews and injured more than 100. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: 51-52.
6
History of the “Grodzka Gate – NN Theatre” Centre by Tomasz Pietrasiewicz https://
teatrnn.pl/kalendarium/wydarzenia/history-of-the-grodzka-gate-nn-theatre-centre/
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engagements that do more than soothe the souls of contemporary Lubliners in

a city left almost entirely bereft of living Jews.
Conclusions: Beyond the Polish Horizon

In this paper the authors have chosen to focus on the way in which the “historical
uncanny” – the moments of interaction between a horrific past and an ordinary
mundane present – appear and reappear in the Polish landscape whereupon the
Holocaust was in many ways centered. But discussions of Polish encounters (or
lack thereof) with the Holocaust in Warsaw and Lublin can present an impor-
tant reflection on wider engagements with memory of the Holocaust. The cases
examined in this paper represent a microcosm of the uncanny encounters with
fragments of Jewish spaces that render a traumatic Jewish past (in)visible. As
Knittel [2014: 292] notes, dwelling in the uncanny (and not seeking to eliminate
its ambiguity) is important because it allows for a critical awareness that things
have not “always been this way” and, therefore, they could be otherwise.
Pervasive and ever-present anti-Semitic sentiments tragically persist up to present

day – not only within Poland, but across the globe. These attacks are emblematic
of an overall failure to meaningfully engage with the horrific memory of the
attempted Jewish genocide. Moreover, the increasing frequency of such actions
(not only against Jews, but also toward other ethnic groups) is dangerously becom-
ing normalized in current society. An oversaturation and simplification of these
racist actions can have the unintended consequence of rendering the horrific
Holocaust atrocity as a “comfortable horrible memory.” Nevertheless, it would be
too easy to dismiss such prejudice and intolerance as an inevitably intensifying
process. Indeed, such an approach can actually serve to perpetuate anti-Semitic
and racist attitudes since it fails to critically engage in an active process that seeks
to render these moments as unsettling as they truly are. By making these intolerant
attitudes dwell in an uncanny and uncomfortable moment between a horrific
past and normalized present, society can thereby contribute to a more productive
engagement with a traumatic Holocaust memory.
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Writings on Art, Politics, Law, and Education, Edmonton, Alta: University of Alberta
Press, pp. 65-178.
Zaborowska, M. (2004) Reading Transparent “Constructions of History”; or, Three
Passages through (In)Visible Warsaw. In Forrester, S., Zaborowska, M., Gapova, E.
eds. Over the Wall/After the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures Through an East-West
Gaze. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 97-119.
213
10 . 2 16 9 7/ C S P. 2 0 2 1. 2 5 .1.14
CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Aniela Dylus
The Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Poland
Subsidiarity in the conceptual framework

of a social market economy
Abstract: The article comprehensively describes the principle of subsidiarity

and its role in the contemporary Social Market Economy (SOME) model of the
economy. The principle of subsidiarity first builds upon adopted ethical principles
such as freedom and justice. Only with such an assumption can its role be consid-
ered, including in the model of the Social Market Economy. The text deals with
the role of subsidiarity in the state and economic order as well as the relevance
and topicality of this concept.
Keywords: Catholic social teaching, social market economy, (principle of)
subsidiarity
Abstrakt: W artykule została opisana kompleksowo zasada pomocniczości

znana również pod nazwą: subsydiarność i jej roli we współczesnym modelu
gospodarki jakim jest Społeczna Gospodarka Rynkowa. Zasada pomocniczości
wpierw wypływa z przyjętych zasad etycznych takich jak wolność i sprawiedli-
wość. Dopiero przy takim założeniu można rozważać jej rolę, także w modelu
Społecznej Gospodarki Rynkowej. Tekst podejmuje zagadnienie roli pomocni-
czości w porządku państwowym i gospodarczym a także aktualność tej myśli.
Słowa kluczowe: katolicka nauka społeczna, społeczna gospodarka rynkowa,
subsydiarność, zasada pomocniczości
Introduction
Justifying the choice of the subject matter of this text as specified by its title,
I would like to recall that the social market economy (SOME) is a “contempo-
rary” concept. It was developed theoretically by ordoliberals from the Freiburg
School in the 1930s and implemented by Ludwig Erhard in post-war Germany
based on a program developed mainly by Alfred Müller-Armack. The currency
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reform introduced in Germany on 20 June 1948 is assumed to mark the begin-

ning of the social market economy. This Rhenish model of “socially tamed
capitalism” (J. Schumpeter) in various versions and shades was then adopted
by some European countries (e.g. Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, partially
– France) and by the European Union. The basis of the economic system of
Poland as well, pursuant to Article 20 of the 1997 Constitution, rests precisely
on the SOME.
I do not intend to discuss here the entire axiological foundation of the SOME
concept. I choose only one guiding idea – that of subsidiarity. From a meta-
theoretical perspective, subsidiarity is recognized as a norm, even a social principle,
and also as a certain value. After all, ethics assumes the equivalence of values and
norms, for values whose realization is demanded are guarded by certain norms.
I am also aware that the “social” component of the SOME concept is rather associ-
ated with solidarity, social equalization. However, I believe that subsidiarity is an
even more distinctive “trademark” of this model. Sometimes, the SOME is even
defined as “a market economy based on subsidiarity”.1 This deserves attention
also because it was the founders of the social market economy, the ordoliberals,
who gave “a modern expression to the idea of subsidiarity” [cf. Delsol 1996: 49].
Of course, subsidiarity cannot be isolated from other guiding ideas, which form
the foundation of the SOME.
Since the ordoliberals treated the principle of subsidiarity as closely related to

a specific image of a human being, a reconstruction of the ordoliberals’ anthro-
pological concept (1), as well as the place of subsidiarity among the guiding
ideas of the SOME (2) will precede further considerations. It turns out that the
category of order (ordo), which is of key importance for the SOME concept, was
developed precisely in reference to subsidiarity (3). We find similar references
both in the development of the economic “framework order”, which is the main
objective of economic policy (4), and in the course of the activity of the “social
state” in the course of its conduct of subsidiarity-rooted social policy (5). The
conclusion of this reflection will be providing the answer to the question regard-
ing the topicality of the concept of subsidiarity inscribed in the social market
economy (6).
See the title of the text by U. Nothelle-Wildfeuer: Soziale Marktwirtschaft als subsidiar-
1
itätsbasierte Marktwirtschaft.
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1. Anthropological foundation of the SOME

It is impossible to adequately learn and assess any economic concept and the
corresponding economic system without revealing their anthropological founda-
tions. Therefore, what image of man is assumed in the SOME system?
Even the name “ordoliberalism” to describe the Freiburg School that developed the
theoretical foundation of the SOME shows that its representatives generally admit-
ted to liberalism. They understood it, like Wilhelm Röpke, as a “legitimate child
of Christianity”, oriented towards traits such as humanistic, personalist, antiau-
thoritarian and universalistic [1950: 18 after Franco 2018: 268]. Such liberalism, of
course, was far from the laissez-faire approach of the so-called “paleo liberalism” of
the 19th century. It clearly distanced itself from a paleo liberal characteristic image
of a human being – homo oeconomicus, i.e. a fully free, rational egoist focused on
seeking the fulfillment of self-interest.2
Conversely, ordoliberalism, by recognizing the necessity to anchor the market in

a moral and institutional framework, placed at the centre the dignity and freedom
of a human being understood as a person. Wilhelm Röpke’s formula of “economy
in the service of man” [1937/1979: 332-334 after Franco 2018: 269] well reflects the
“economic humanism” of this specific liberalism, which does not isolate itself from
the socio-political context and tries to link human freedom with the social dimen-
sion – with reference to community [1957/1964 after Franco 2018: 269]. Here,
a human being was not treated in a one-dimensional manner. When identifying
human nature, both material and non-material needs were taken into account.
A human being is a whole that also includes the moral, spiritual and religious
dimensions, and is open to transcendence and religious questions.
For the founding fathers of the social market economy, human dignity was the
ultimate normative criterion. It was human dignity upon which economic laws
and mechanisms depended; the laws and economic mechanisms depended on it.
The existing economic, social and political order was assessed in the light of the
criterion of dignity. The shaping of the “dignity order” (Röpke, Eucken) or “the
economic order according to the measure of man”, in the words of Müller-Armack
[1981: 123-140 after Franco 2018: 270], was also declared.
2
This is how Andrea Hotze and Wolfgang Ockenfels reconstruct Wilhelm Röpke’s thought
[Hotze 2008: 115-190; Ockenfels 1999: 54].
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Wilhelm Röpke’s anthropological concept is enclosed in the image of homo libera-

lis. At the same time, he remembers about human fallibility, but also emphasizes
a human being’s social and solidarity dimensions and stands up for individual
responsibility. He defends small communities and intermediate groups against
the unauthorized interference of the state. The humanistic-liberal anthropologi-
cal core of Röpke’s thought [1964 after Franco 2018: 270] is well conveyed by the
sentence: “man is the measure of the economy; the measure of man is his relation-
ship to God”.3 In someone who was inspired by ancient philosophy, the Christian
image of man, liberal tradition and Christian social ethics, the seemingly shock-
ing identification of a Christian is not surprising. According to Wilhelm Röpke
“a Christian is a liberal, who does not know it” [1949: 18 after Franco 2018: 270].
This thinker is, quite rightly, placed in the current of economic personalism, and
even treated as a representative of Christian economic ethics.4 Chantal Millon-
Delsol is of a similar opinion. In her mind, Wilhelm Röpke undertook the task
of adapting the social teaching of the Church to modern society [1995: 33]. He
successfully sought points of convergence between the social market economy and
the principles of Christian social ethics. One of them is the principle of subsidiar-
ity, which, however, cannot be understood in isolation from other guiding ideas
of the SOME.
2. The place of subsidiarity among the guiding ideas of the SOME

As the name of the philosophical current within which the SOME was developed
indicates, its foundation is the idea of ordo, that is: order, of social order. This
order must be based on certain fundamental values, which are built into the
entire system, and whose universal acceptance is a prerequisite for the efficient
functioning of the economy. Namely, the SOME is a synthesis of freedom and
social justice. The obvious consequence of freedom is personal responsibility, and
of social justice – solidarity.5
Just as solidarity protects the social dimension of the person, defending it against
individualism, so subsidiarity defends personal freedom, participation and respon-
sibility against the claims of collectivism. In Catholic social teaching, which – as in
the case of Wilhelm Röpke – was close to the founders of the SOME, solidarity and
3
This is how Martin Hoch, in his 1962 laudation in honor of Wilhelm Röpke, summed up
his achievements.
4
This is the opinion of, among others, Wolfgang Ockenfels.
5
For more on this subject, see Dylus 1994: 11-19, especially: 14.
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subsidiarity are treated as mutually complementary basic social principles. The

reason they are inextricably linked is because “the former without the latter gives
way to social privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist
social assistance that is demeaning to those in need” – recalled Benedict XVI in
his 2009 Encyclical Letter Caritas in veritate (58).
Millon-Delsol provides yet another justification for the relationship of the principles
discussed herein. As is known, the negative sense of subsidiarity comes down to the
obligation of non-interference, while the positive involves the obligation to intervene
(“help”). The latter is based on the idea of solidarity. Being a social creature by nature,
a person cares about common, and not only individual, welfare [ibid: 34].
It is worth taking a closer look at the subsidiarity upon which the SOME is based.
3. The contribution of subsidiarity to order (ordo) in the state and society

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the subsidiarity guidance in shaping
the proper relationship between the market and the state. As in the case of the
image of man, the ordoliberals distanced themselves from two extreme approaches:
both from the classical liberal concept of the “night watchman state”, completely
uninterested in the market [cf. e.g. Eucken 1940/1989 after Franco 2018: 273], and
from various forms of collectivism, where the state aspires to be the only regulator of
market relations. As Wilhelm Röpke wryly noted, in collectivism the state becomes
a “crocodile” swallowing everything around [1923/1959: 42-46 after Franco 2018:
273]. In reflecting on the proper – from the perspective of the criterion of dignity of
the person and subsidiarity – place of the state in relation to the market and organized
society, it is certain that it is necessary to avoid both solutions in the style of a liberal
minimal state and the statist tendencies typical of various totalitarianisms.
In general, in the SOME the role of the state is assumed to be an active one. The
concept of the state that guards the common good is its constitutive element.
The state must have a comprehensive vision of the socio-economic order and
is to watch over its implementation. However, it is not about interventionism,
about single, direct interventions in the sensitive mechanism of the free market.
The tasks of the state vis-à-vis the economy come down primarily to shaping
the market order (ordo),6 to building a “framework order” that creates the right
6
A comprehensive description of the development and content of the idea of ordo from
the point of view of Walter Eucken, the founder of the Freiburg School, was presented by
Grzegorz Szulczewski [2012: 105-131] (especially sub-chapter 3.3).
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conditions for the effective functioning of economic life. The criterion of the
correctness of this order is providing inspiration for active participation in the
market – so that undertaking economic activity turns out to be more attractive
than soliciting resources from the redistribution of social income. The steering
of economic processes, usually forced by strong interest groups, is excluded. The
state is simply to constitute the forms of providing order in the economy; it is to
correctly shape the foreground of the market.7
The undertaking or not undertaking of specific tasks by state institutions, by

“a greater and higher association” towards “lesser and subordinate organizations”
(in the language of the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo anno) or by decision-making
levels “further” and “closer” to the citizen (in the language of the 1992 Treaty of
Maastricht) is determined by the competences of a lower-level person or institu-
tion. Therefore, a society with a complex structure has to continually resolve the
question of the division of competences. Here, subsidiarity proves to be an invalu-
able guidance – especially when there appears a conflict of competences. It is no
wonder that subsidiarity is sometimes referred to as the “principle of competence”.
This does not mean that it is a recipe for everything. As an example, for a long
time, the issue of “competence in the field of competence” has been the subject of
heated debates. By looking at the guidepost of subsidiarity, we will not determine
who is to identify the deficits in the competences of a lower instance and decide
on the delegation of tasks to a higher instance.8
As we know, the competences of individuals, communities or decision-makers

at various levels are not static, defined once and for all; they change depending
on the context. That is why the SOME, which refers to subsidiarity, is not a rigid,
established doctrine, but a system open to changes, corrections and reforms. After
the period of Nazi dictatorship in Germany, there was an urgent need to search
for an order that could counterweight the power of the state. For Wilhelm Röpke,
an important element of such order was the emerging social fabric developed
bottom-up. Röpke strongly emphasized the role of the market’s social background:
small communities, intermediate groups and various institutions. Supporting
them meant for him the affirmation of human dignity and remained in the spirit
of subsidiarity, for robust social ties are an antidote to the processes of massi-
fication and proletarianization [Kolev 2013: 119, 154-156, 160-169 after Franco
I have previously written about the ordering tasks of the social state [cf. Dylus 1994: 15].
7
This is pointed out by, among others, Chantal Millon-Delsol [1995: 33-35].
8
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2018: 273]. In accordance with subsidiarity, not only the state, but also individual
and social actors, a whole range of different institutions are eligible to contribute
to economic and social integration. It is therefore important to mobilize such
“ordering forces”, which form a counterweight to the state, that are capable of
inhibiting the concentration of power and the formation of monopolies. Among
such “counteracting forces” (Gegenkräfte) Röpke included, among others, religion,
press, science, family. They are to strive for a balance between an individual and
society and guarantee a proper relationship between the individual and the state.
They are to help citizens lead free and responsible lives. The same is achieved by
not only moral and intellectual “counteracting forces”, but also material ones –
enveloped by political and economic institutions. This concerns, for example,
the issue of private property or economic independence of individuals [Franco
2018: 275].
Moreover, being guided by subsidiarity in shaping the state order offers an oppor-
tunity to avoid bureaucratization, overgrowth of the welfare state and concentra-
tion of power [Röpke 1950/1964 after Franco 2018: 274]. Röpke further combined
subsidiarity with the philosophy of federalism and the program of decentralization
[ibid.]. On the issue of European integration, referring to this principle, he opposed
the creation of a European federal state. Europe as unity in diversity would tend
to be a decentralized union of states [Feld 2012: 1-31 after Franco 2018: 274].
4. Elements of subsidiarity in economic policy

Ordoliberals strove for a market economy that would be worthy of man. Such
a market economy is possible when the economic system is based on values such
as freedom, justice and rationality. The founders of the SOME, including Walter
Eucken [2005: 231 after Franco: 120], therefore argued for the creation of such an
economic environment based on the values of a smooth “undisturbed economic
system”. The state that carries out this task and its economic policy must be under-
stood in a dynamic way. It is supposed to be a “strong state”: non-partisan and
incorruptible. Only such a state will be able to guarantee the proper functioning of
the market “rules of the game” and fair competition, and to prevent monopolistic
tendencies and the concentration of economic power, which means the elimination
of small and medium-sized entities from the market. The creation of a “system
of competition” that would prevent the emergence of barriers limiting market
access for many dynamic economic actors was probably considered the most
important task of a subsidiarity-based economic policy. Monopolistic tendencies
are to be nipped in the bud, and various cartels and corporations should be subject
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to control by some central antimonopoly office in the interest of other market

participants.
Such a hierarchy of tasks within the framework of economic policy resulted from
the ordoliberals’ appreciation of the mechanism of competition as the funda-
mental and extremely sensitive market instrument. After all, it is competition,
as noted by Franz Böhm, which is the force that breaks down the power in the
economy. However, left to itself, according to Walter Eucken, it has a tendency
to self-destruct. To prevent this from happening and to prevent market seizure
by powerful economic entities capable of eliminating competitors and achieving
monopolistic and speculative profits, the state must protect competition.
However, individual representatives of the Freiburg School laid out the accents
slightly differently as regards the manner of achieving this goal. According to
Eucken and Böhm, the priority role for the state vis-à-vis the great cartels is the role
of a “disempowering referee” (entmachtender Schiedsrichter). As already indicated,
the state is to fulfill this role through the creation of an effective order or system
of competition. Admittedly, Röpke also stressed the importance of institutional
framework conditions for the regulation of the competition order. He even consid-
ered such an economic order as a “value frame” for market exchange. Nevertheless,
Röpke focused not so much on formulating the tasks of the state, like Eucken did,
but on developing a comprehensive political and social “framework order” for
market processes, as mentioned earlier.
The “framework order” of the economy, shaped by economic policy, is to guarantee

direct access to the market for all individual entities ready to undertake economic
activity. At the same time, it should be attractive enough to trigger their initiative and
creative capabilities. The more specific tasks of economic policy remain at the service
of this idea. Among them, employment to the fullest extent possible comes to the fore.
It gains a political and economic priority, as most members of society have a chance to
become active market participants merely by offering their work. And the category of
participation is essential for the understanding of subsidiarity. Various other economic
policy measures, such as loan preferences for young entrepreneurs – those who are
ready to engage in independent business, who are active and full of initiative, but who
do not have adequate capital – take this value into account.
This shows that one of the most important objectives of economic policy in the
SOME system is economic independence. The idea was – as Ludwig Erhard put
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it years ago – to move the maximum number of entities from the periphery of
the market to its centre. The rank of independence is at least equivalent to other
objectives usually associated with this system, such as welfare for all [Dylus 1994:
15-16].
The concept of the “social state” (Sozialstaat), characteristic of the SOME, is to

conduct an active social policy interdependent with the economic policy [Röpke
1952: 18-27 after Franco 2018: 275]. It is advisable at this point to try to determine
whether and how the outlines of the social order set out by ordoliberals were
consistent with the subsidiarity “direction indicator”.
5. Subsidiarity-based social policy

In the concept of the SOME, the economic and social spheres form an integral
whole. Therefore, ordoliberals, tirelessly and emphatically, stressed the interdepen-
dence of economic and social policy. An appropriate social policy is a prerequisite
for sound economic development. In turn, the premise of proper social policy is
free, efficient economy and the market order.
Müller-Armack clearly defined the objective of social policy, that is: the integration
of man with the free order of society. Formulated in a slightly different way, social
policy is primarily to find the right measure between economic growth, personal
initiative and freedom, and social balance. Help in creating conditions for a digni-
fied life and social safety is especially due to those individuals and groups who,
for various reasons, found themselves in a difficult situation. As such, in a way it
protects, complements and corrects the economy. However, it cannot cross certain
limits (it is precisely the principle of subsidiarity that helps to set them) so as not to
harm the market order [ibid.], and – ultimately – also the beneficiaries themselves.
Namely, criticism is due to the far-reaching interventions of the “social state”,
which destabilize the budget and cause such phenomena as chronic inflation or
“fiscal socialism” that violates the taxpayers’ freedom to dispose of income [Röpke
2009 after Franco 2018: 276].
Based on the foundation of an efficient economy and assuming the mutual

solidarity of citizens, a redistribution of social income is carried out within the
framework of social policy. The pillars of the “social state” consist of compulsory
social insurance for protection against the risks posed by old age, illness, accidents
or unemployment. The pension scheme, health, accidents and unemployment
insurance systems are supplemented by a system of social protection and various
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other forms of assistance. These systems deserve to be considered as supportive

and “subsidiarity-linked” when they not only fail to limit the independence,
responsibility and creative initiative of the beneficiaries, but also inspire and
stimulate the emergence of these traits. In other words, the assistance provided
in the framework of social policy is meant to be “help for self-help”. Wilhelm
Röpke and Alexander Rüstow further postulated that social policy should be an
“organic policy” (Vitalpolitik), taking into account the anthropological and social
framework. Namely, it is supposed to secure not only human material existence,
but also decent work, family life, proper relationship with the community and
nature [Röpke 1951: 48-53 after Franco 2018: 276].
At the same time, ordoliberals were aware of the effects of such social policy,
which would run against the grain of the principle of subsidiarity. They tirelessly
warned against exaggerated aid and overgrowth of the welfare state. Excessive
social interventionism of the state means a violation of the balance in relations
between an individual and society. It often demeans a person and turns him or
her into someone submissive to a state that takes on collectivist forms. It also
threatens the emergence of despotism, centralization, bureaucracy and corrup-
tion, as well as the growing exploitation of the state by interest groups. The state
gradually brings about a paradoxical situation: no one wants to bear burdens, but
everyone expects the state to fulfill any wishes and to satisfy any needs [Röpke
1949: 182-188 after Franco 2018: 276]. In such a situation, the duty of personal
responsibility, the ability to care for oneself and one’s relatives, as well as being
thrifty and able to save, may be violated. The founders of the SOME watched with
concern people’s uncritical entrusting of all their problems and worries to the state.
The most dangerous social effect of “anti-subsidiarity” social policy is the process
of accumulation of claims, the struggle between individuals and groups for the
maximum share in the distributed goods. Lack of political stability, instability
of the state, and succumbing to pressure from organized interest groups usually
trigger an avalanche of further demands that are impossible to meet.
Therefore, it is necessary to remove state monopoly on social policy. Subsidiary

state assistance is intended only to complement individual foresight. That is why
ordoliberals, for example Wilhelm Röpke [2009 after Franco 2018: 276], proposed
to restore some aid institutions known from the past: small self-help communi-
ties, mutual insurance groups, or savings and loan unions. Such concretization
of subsidiarity is consistent with the short description known in Catholic social
teaching: “as much society as possible, as much of the state as is necessary”. Apart
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from the government administration, the conduct of social aid should also be
allowed (or rather: should be invited) by non-state entities that make up broadly
understood civil society, as we would say today. In the worthy work of alleviat-
ing the social issues, there is room for charismatic charity activists as well as
for various social organizations, unions, associations, local, national and even
international foundations, including for the Church. In any case, the multiplicity
of actors is undoubtedly one of the signs of subsidiarity-rooted social policy.
Another sign is also the decentralization of this policy, for which Röpke strongly
advocated and linked this idea directly with the principle of subsidiarity. The
definition of this principle that he gave is noteworthy: subsidiarity means that on
the axis leading from an individual to the central state authorities, the primary
right belongs to the lower level, and the higher level enters the space directly
below it merely in an auxiliary manner, only when a task exceeds the capabilities
of the latter [ibid: 179 after Franco 2018: 277]. A contemporary application of
a subsidiary and decentralized social policy understood in this way is to leave the
widest possible scope of local affairs within the competence of local authorities
of various levels9 and to ensure stable sources of financing for the ensuing tasks.
A clear definition of the jurisdiction and responsibilities of central government
and local authorities’ actors responsible for social policy at various levels will help
avoid many misunderstandings and conflicts. The obvious authority of central
government is to control the legality of the actions of local authorities. In turn, the
right of citizens and their organizations is to participate in designing the directions
of social policy development. Thus understood, decentralization strengthens the
citizens’ ownership – it increases their participation in the exercising of power. It
constitutes a solid foundation for a strong and efficient state. On the other hand,
unjustified centralization of social policy contrary to subsidiarity, causing a loss of
human energy, triggering passivity and frustration of society, is usually addition-
ally associated, as John Paul II noted, with the domination of “bureaucratic ways
of thinking” (Centesimus Annus, 48), with excessive supervision and control.10
The synthetic description of the subsidiarity-rooted social policy presented here

within the framework of the SOME concept allows us to conclude that in the
literature on the subject this model of conducting social policy was rightly called
9
I n the field of social policy, the tasks of the local authorities include: health care, social
assistance, municipal housing, education, culture, and care for pregnant women [Auleytner
1997: 313].
10
For more on this subject, see Dylus, Mazur 2018: 546-549.
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the “motivational model”.11 The starting point for this model of social policy is
the assumption that the needs of citizens are met by citizens themselves thanks to
remuneration for their work. The assistance provided is not an objective in itself,
but a motivating means to overcome a difficult situation.
6. Topicality of subsidiarity as a guiding idea of the SOME

First it is worth recalling that in ordoliberal thought we find the seeds of the idea
of civil society. Undoubtedly, its renaissance came later, along with the discovery
of the importance of social capital. Several decades after the implementation of
the subsidiarity-rooted SOME system, we are all the more convinced that in order
to tackle the new social issues that arise today, the importance of the third sector
cannot be overestimated. Benedict XVI also recalled (cf. Caritas in Veritate, 37-39)
that civil society has great potential. It introduces an element to the public sphere
that is absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of both the economy and
politics. It is about gratuitousness and altruism, the “logic of the unconditional
gift” that goes beyond the “market logic” and “political logic”.
One of the many new social issues, especially pressing in the Western world, also
in the aging “grandmother Europe” (as Pope Francis described our continent) is,
for example, the proper way to organize care for bedridden patients.12 This issue
will not be addressed well without a subsidiarity-rooted social policy. In this case,
it requires the creation of a whole “scaffolding of the social fabric”. It requires
cooperation and division of tasks between public and non-state care actors: private
and non-governmental [cf. Welskop-Deffaa 2018: 15].
In Poland, the interest in the principle of subsidiarity as the guiding idea of the
organization of social life was clearly invigorated after 1989. During the transition
period, this “signpost”, reliably showing the directions of reforms, was rediscov-
ered. The fascination with concepts of subsidiarity, decentralization, “civic state”
while framing and implementing the local government reform is described directly
by the authors of this reform: Michał Kulesza [2018: 129-136] and Jerzy Rogulski
[2007: 32-35]. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted on 2 April 1997,
Synthetic description of this model (and others) – see Balicki 2004: 893-894.
11
One of the last issues of the series “Church and Society”, published by the Catholic Centre for
12
Social Science in Mönchengladbach, was dedicated to this topic. Each issue tries to articulate
a pressing subject matter. This time the issue’s title sounds alarmingly: End Exploitation in
the So-called 24-hour Care! Ethical Considerations on Labour Relations in German Home
Care [cf. Emunds 2018].
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states (in the Preamble) that fundamental rights are to be based on “the principle
of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities”.
The centralized system of state paternalism in the distribution of social benefits,
characteristic of the previous system, was no longer possible. On the other hand,
there remained the decentralization of social policy in the spirit of subsidiarity. It
was possible due to the creation of new democratic institutions to replace the state
at the local level, i.e. the local government. Moreover, after 1989, non-state entities
were allowed to implement social policy, that is: non-governmental organizations,
trade unions, foundations, or associations, including religious entities. We also
know that Article 20 of the Constitution provides that: “A social market economy
(…) shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland”. This
definitely helps to shift economic and social policy towards the path of subsidiar-
ity. Another issue that requires separate reflection is the actual implementation
of this constitutional norm.13
On the other hand, however, a thorough reflection on the topicality of subsidiar-

ity must not lose sight of some disturbing symptoms. Namely, there does not
seem to be a great need for subsidiarity in the second decade of the 21st century;
rather, an anti-subsidiary spirit of the times dominates. In view of the effects of
the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the following years, felt to this day,
the worrying consequences of globalization, the migration crisis and symptoms
of de-globalization – a feeling of growing chaos is spreading among citizens of
the Western world. As noted by Udo Di Fabio [2018], “There runs a new tear in
Western democracies, the gusty wind of populism is blowing; there is a rebellion
against the cold conditions of a globalized economy and against the hard logic
of supranational governance.” In this atmosphere, longings are born for a pater-
nalistic state with an authoritarian power that would “establish order”. Statist
tendencies are somewhat understandable under the conditions of multiple threats
and the associated anxiety, but such a spirit of the times is definitely not conducive
to subsidiarity. Nevertheless, it is in this context – as it seems – that the ordering
potential of the subsidiarity principle should be all the more recalled.
13
On this subject, see, for example, The Social Market Economy in Poland. Postulate or Reality?
(2015); Dylus 2016: 333-350, (especially sub-chapter V.3: “Social Market Economy as the
Basis of the Polish Economic System”). On subsidiary social policy in the Third Polish
Republic, see Dylus, Mazur 2018: 555-558.
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Auleytner J. (1997), Polityka społeczna. Teoria a praktyka, Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna
TWP, Warszawa.
Balicki J. (2004), Polityka społeczna, w: Szlachta B. (red.), Słownik społeczny, Wydawnictwo
WAM, Kraków.
Delsol C. (1995), Zasada pomocniczości, Wyd. Znak, Kraków.
Delsol C. (1996), Zasada subsydiarności – założenia, geneza oraz problemy współczesne,
w: Milczarek D., (red.), Subsydiarność, Dom Wydawniczy „Elipsa”, Warszawa.
Di Fabio U. (2018), Berlin ist nicht Weimar, „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ 27 September
2018 (No. 225).
Dylus A. (1994), Gospodarka, moralność, chrześcijaństwo, Wyd. Fundacji ATK Kontrast,
Warszawa.
Dylus A. (2016), Polityka w perspektywie etycznej i religijnej, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa.
Dylus A., Mazur J. (2018), Pomocniczość, dobro wspólne i solidaryzm jako aksjologiczne
determinanty polskiej polityki społecznej, w: Bojanowska E., Grewiński M., Rymsza M.,
Uścińska G. (red), Stulecie polskiej polityki społecznej 1918-2018, Wyd. Ministerstwo
Rodziny, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Narodowe Centrum Kultury, Warszawa.
Emunds B. (2018), Beendet die Ausbeutung in der sogenannten 24-Stunden-Pflege Ethische
Bemerkungen zu Arbeitsverhältnissen in deutschen Pflegehaushalten, J.P. Bachem
Medien, „Kirche und Gesellschaft“ Nr. 45, Köln.
Eucken W. (1940/1989), Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Berlin, w: Eucken W.
(1952/2004), Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Tübingen.
Eucken W. (2005), Podstawy polityki gospodarczej, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań.
Feld L. (2012), Europa in der Welt von heute: Wilhelm Röpke und die Zukunft der
Europäischen Währungsunion, „Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut” 2012 Bd. 70.
Fel S. (red.) (2015), Społeczna gospodarka rynkowa w Polsce. Postulat czy rzeczywistość?,
Wyd. KUL, Lublin.
Franco G. (2018), Wilhelm Röpkes Beitrag zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, „Die neue
Ordnung” 2018 Nr. 4.
Hotze A. (2008), Menschenbild und Ordnung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. A. Rüstow,
W. Röpke, A. Müller-Armack und ihre Konzeption einer Wirtschafts- und
Gesellschaftsordnung nach dem „Maße des Menschen“, Hamburg.
Kolev S. (2013), Neoliberale Staatsverständnisse im Vergleich, Stuttgart 2013.
Kulesza M. (2008), Budowanie samorządu, Wydawnictwo MUNICIPIUM S.A., Warszawa
2008.
Kulesza M. (2008), Zasada subsydiarności jako klucz do reform ustroju administracyjnego
państw Europy Centralnej i Wschodniej (na przykładzie Polski), w: Subsydiarność, Dom
Wydawniczy „Elipsa”, Warszawa.
Müller-Armack A. (1981), Der Moralist und der Ökonom. Zur Frage der Humanisierung
der Wirtschaft, w: tenże, Genealogie der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Frühschriften und
weiterführende Konzepte, Bern – Stuttgart.
Nothelle-Wildfeuer U. (2004), Soziale Marktwirtschaft als subsidiaritätsbasierte
Marktwirtschaft, w: Goldschmidt N., Wohlgemuth M. (red.), Die Zukunft der
Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik,
Tübingen.
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Ockenfels W. (1999), Wilhelm Röpke als christlicher Wirtschaftsethiker, „Ordo – Jahrbuch

für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft“, Bd. 50.
Regulski J. (2007), Reformowanie państwa. Moje doświadczenia, Wydawnictwo Wyższej
Szkoły Administracji Publicznej w Szczecinie, Szczecin.
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Erlenbach-Zürich.
Röpke W. (1950/1964), Die Enzyklika „Mater et Magistra“ in marktwirtschaftlicher Sicht,
w: Röpke W. (1950/1964), Wort und Wirkung, Ludwigsburg.
Röpke W. (1937/1979), Die Lehre der Wirtschaft, Bern – Stuttgart 1937/1979.
Röpke W. (2009), Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage, Düsseldorf.Röpke W. (1950), Maß
und Mitte, Erlenbach-Zürich.
Röpke W. (1957/1964), Marktwirtschaft ist nicht genug, w: Röpke W. (1957/1964), Wort
und Wirkung, Ludwigsburg.
Röpke W. (1952), Sozialpolitik einer freien Gesellschaft, w: Diskussion über eine bessere
Sozialpolitik, Hrsg. G. Duttweiler, St. Gallen.
Röpke W. (1951), Sozialpolitik einer freien Gesellschaft, w: Röpke W. (1951), Liberale
Sozialpolitik, „Der Volkswirt“ 1951 nr 51-52/5.
Röpke W. (1950/1964), Wesen und Wandel der Gesellschaft, w: Röpke W. (1950/1964), Wort
und Wirkung, Ludwigsburg.
Röpke W. (1923/1959), Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus und Staatsgedanke, w: Röpke W.
(1923/1959), Gegen die Brandung, Erlenbach-Zürich – Stuttgart.
Szulczewski G. (2012), Rozważania o miejscu etyki i moralności w teorii i praktyce
gospodarczej, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH w Warszawie, Warszawa.
Welskop-Deffaa E. M. (2018), Das Soziale in der digitalen Marktwirtschaft, J.P. Bachem
Medien, „Kirche und Gesellschaft“ Nr. 447, Köln.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Dominique Vermersch
Université Catholique de l’Ouest, France
ORCID: 0000-0001-5625-3638
The Catholic university faced

with the challenge of the waste of reason
Abstract: The article deals with the essence and mission of the Catholic University.
The author presents the common belief about the discrepancy between the orders
of faith and reason. He pays attention to the fact that in research human cogni-
tion has been reduced to its utilitarian and positivist approach. In consequence,
human cognition is detached from transcendence and science from the concept of
objective truth. Therefore, the mission of the university is to restore the original
unity of faith and reason.
Keywords: reason, rationality, faith, Catholic university, truth
Abstrakt: Artykuł dotyczy istoty i misji uniwersytetu katolickiego. Autor wskazu-

jąc na powszechne przeświadczenie dotyczące rozdźwięku porządków wiary
i rozumu zwraca uwagę na fakt, że w badaniach rozum ludzki został zredukowany
do rozumu utylitarnego i pozytywistycznego. W konsekwencji ludzkie poznanie
zostaje odcięte od transcendencji, a nauka od pojęcia prawdy obiektywnej. Misją
uniwersytetu jest zatem przywrócenie pierwotnej jedności wiary i rozumu.
Słowa kluczowe: rozum, racjonalność, wiara, uniwersytet katolicki, prawda
The contemporary mission of the Catholic university

We lack the historical distance to ascertain with what depth, and above all with
what courage, the authority of Pope Benedict XVI will contribute to the redefi-
nition and thus the revival of the Catholicity of the university. In the author’s
view, the method used is discreet, thanks to top-notch speeches given in various
university settings; cheerful and joyful, with this joy of seeking the truth and
serving it; framed by the Word of God, which is the first and ultimate source of
dialogue between Faith and Reason.
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What is the essence of a university if not an ever deeper understanding of the

vocation of the university? The mission of the university was defined in the very
first words of the Apostolic Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae [John Paul II 1990],
which is still considered the foundation of Catholic universities today: “The
particular task of the university is ‘the existential unification in intellectual work
of two orders of reality which are too often juxtaposed to each other, as if they
were mutually contradictory: these orders are, on the one hand, the search for
truth and, on the other, the certainty that one already knows the source of truth”.
This definition takes note of the dramatic rift between faith and reason. This
rift has a long history, but we have not yet finished measuring and experienc-
ing its repercussions in our own lives. By closing itself off to all transcendence,
reason has mutilated itself and is reduced to its positivist and utilitarian dimen-
sion: “As a result, the question that gave birth to the university – about the truth
and the good – disappears, in the end, to be replaced by the question of what is
feasible” [Benedykt XVI 2005]. Thus, the university – and not only the Catholic
university – is subjected to the dismantling of the organicity of knowledge, to
its segmentation and commercialisation, capturing young minds and sacrificing
them entirely to the feasible, the monetisable and the profitable. At the same time,
everyone is confusedly aware that a narrow rationality (be it technical, economic,
political, etc.) is unable to meet the challenges that beset our societies: economic
and financial crisis, climate change, intercultural tensions, and the search for
harmonious coexistence.
If such societal challenges are indeed embedded in a shallow and impoverished

conception of human reason, then it is not surprising that Benedict XVI encour-
ages us to redefine the University based on a broadened and therefore enriched
understanding; he invites us to “…have the courage to open ourselves to the depths
of reason and not to deny its greatness […] The great task of the University is to
find it again and again” [Benedict XVI 2006].
Rediscovering the depths of human reason: this is how Benedict XVI expresses
the contemporary task of the university. It is a theme that is very close to his heart,
as can be seen by the number of speeches in which he invokes this urgent need to
re-enlarge reason so that it does not close itself off from the transcendence. The
Catholic University is thus called to contribute to a new union of faith and reason,
which need each other desperately. This synergy constitutes the very genesis and
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development of the University1: when human reason starts to search for what
is essential, true, and “ultimate”, i.e. God, He Himself comes to meet us through
His Word revealed in Sacred Scripture. In what follows, we propose a Word which
meets today’s often anaemic modern reason and which outlines the contemporary
task of the Catholic university.
“A man had two sons…” (Luke 15:11-32)

Since the discussion about God is linked to the possibility of an analogous discus-
sion about man, the Christian educational activity became, very early on, part
of the process of initiation into faith: transmission and learning are two ways
of acquiring knowledge that complement each other, as faith and reason do. It
is the grammar of faith that teaches us to read and write; and this is what the
centuries-old Catholic educational tradition testifies to: the transmission of faith
is the prototype of all transmission that is inseparable from learning: “Go therefore
and make disciples of all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that
I have commanded you” (Matthieu 28:18-20). There is an organic link between
transmission and learning, which is illustrated by the adventure of the Prodigal
Son (Luke 15:11-32).
“Then Jesus said, “A man had two sons. The younger of them said to his father,
‘Father, give me the share of the estate that will belong to me.’ So he divided his
assets between them. After a few days, the younger son gathered together all he
had and left on a journey to a distant country, and there he squandered his wealth
with a wild lifestyle. Then after he had spent everything, a severe famine took place
in that country, and he began to be in need. So he went and worked for one of the
citizens of that country, who sent him to his fields to feed pigs. He was longing to
eat the carob pods the pigs were eating, but no one gave him anything. But when
he came to his senses he said, ‘How many of my father’s hired workers have food
enough to spare, but here I am dying from hunger! I will get up and go to my
father and say to him, “Father, I have sinned against heaven and against you. I am
no longer worthy to be called your son; treat me like one of your hired workers.”’
The search for God therefore requires from the outset a culture of the word, which has been
1
progressively built up through the emergence of various secular sciences. If seeking the truth
means seeking God, Edith Stein reminds us, then the search for God not only produces
a culture but also leads us to the truth about beings and things. In other words, the search
for God has produced and continues to produce academic science and knowledge which, in
turn, allow us to ‘perceive, in the midst of words, the Word of God’. To put it another way,
faith uses the fertility of reason so that it becomes, in turn, its servant.
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So he got up and went to his father. But while he was still a long way from home
his father saw him, and his heart went out to him; he ran and hugged his son and
kissed him. Then his son said to him, ‘Father, I have sinned against heaven and
against you; I am no longer worthy to be called your son.’ But the father said to
his slaves, ‘Hurry! Bring the best robe, and put it on him! Put a ring on his finger
and sandals on his feet! Bring the fattened calf and kill it! Let us eat and celebrate,
because this son of mine was dead, and is alive again – he was lost and is found!’
So they began to celebrate.
Now his older son was in the field. As he came and approached the house, he heard
music and dancing. So he called one of the slaves and asked what was happen-
ing. The slave replied, ‘Your brother has returned, and your father has killed the
fattened calf because he got his son back safe and sound.’ But the older son became
angry and refused to go in. His father came out and appealed to him, but he
answered his father, ‘Look! These many years I have worked like a slave for you,
and I never disobeyed your commands. Yet you never gave me even a goat so that
I could celebrate with my friends! But when this son of yours came back, who has
devoured your assets with prostitutes, you killed the fattened calf for him!’ Then
the father said to him, ‘Son, you are always with me, and everything that belongs
to me is yours. It was appropriate to celebrate and be glad, for your brother was
dead, and is alive; he was lost and is found.’”
Let’s examine in depth the interpretation of the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke
15:11-32), in which the Prodigal Son’s initial departure from his father’s house
symbolises the reason that has drifted away from faith. It is the youngest son, i.e.
reason which – during its young years – becomes carried away by an unreasonable
desire for autonomy, forgetting that it owed its first merits to the fatherhood of
faith.
“Father, give me the share of the estate that will belong to me”
Reason no longer grasps the legacy of faith as a gift but as a duty, as if faith
restrained it in its insatiable desire to know. This is still too often the unjust
reproach levelled at the Christian religion with regard to the progress of scientific
knowledge. Christianity has always regarded the questioning reason as part of
the very essence of the Christian religion2. The Christian faith is not conceived in
a positivist way, nor as a way out of unsatisfied desires, but as the dispelling of the
2
In the now famous speech he was to give at the Sapienza in Rome in January 2008.
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mythological fog of religion, which makes it possible to discover God who is the
Creative Reason and at the same time Reason-Love. The archetype of the principle
of secularism – consisting precisely in distinguishing the world from the One who
shaped it – is also rooted here. And it is precisely in this requirement and for this
purpose that the university was born in the Christian world.
“So Father divided his assets between them”

Just as faith is a free act of the will, God respects human freedom: He allows Himself
to be dispossessed, whereas He wanted to offer everything, to offer Himself. But
this takes time and mutual understanding. Reason, deliberately cut off from faith,
immediately loses the principle of unity: “the younger son gathered together all he
had and left on a journey to a distant country”. Reason immediately feels the need
to bring together what already seems to be dispersed and disorganised. The hyper-
specialisation of methodical knowledge makes one forget its organic nature, i.e.
its common source, evoked by faith and even by nature. But the split has already
taken place, so that it can be seen: reason, young and impulsive, has already left
on a journey “to a distant country”; the paternal and sapiential home has already
disappeared before his eyes.
“… and there he squandered his wealth with a wild lifestyle”

Having lost the principle of organic unity, everything happens as if reason saw its
knowledge disintegrate and dissipate against its will; and this in exact contrast
to the cumulative logic of transmission, which is often expressed through outlay
and accumulation. By leading “a wild lifestyle”, called rather to order and articu-
late what is true and good, reason – conversely – denies its identity and even its
raison d’être. The organic vision of knowledge that feeds the unitive end of human
action then gives way to the critical chains of events that affect reason itself. In
a noteworthy synthesis, P. Ide [2011] details how the conception of the University
elaborated by Benedict XVI takes note of this chain of events in four stages: (i) the
fragmentation and breakdown of knowledge feeds (ii) scepticism and relativism,
which lead to (iii) the positivist and utilitarian reduction of reason, ultimately
reducing it (iv) to mere immanence.
“Then after he had spent everything, a severe famine took place in that country”
The inexhaustible depth of the Word of God! What is the meaning of the reason
which has squandered everything? If not that it has come to question its very
foundations. And it is at the very moment when the very concept of nature is being
heavily abused – for example, through gender theory or the apparent omnipotence of
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technology – that the same nature suddenly, without warning, comes back to the fore.
Climate change, deadly earthquakes, tsunamis… Man experiences the often cruel
but perhaps salutary experience of an absolute lack of control. Nature, in its capacity
for analogy, refers man to a meaning, to a word, in short, to a logos situated beyond
the human control and the nature surrounding him. Nature, however badly it may
be treated today, retains this analogical dimension; it suggests directions towards the
good and, in a certain way, reminds man of his dignity and therefore of his duties.
Nature is a harsh mistress of life: for reason, which has squandered everything,
exploited and henceforth miserable, the descent into hell is not yet over. No longer
able to satisfy its own needs, the emaciated reason is reduced to employing itself under
such degrading conditions that it comes to envy the animal condition: He was longing
to eat the carob pods the pigs were eating. And indeed it is fashionable today to deny the
ontological difference between man and animal, to the extent that we see the animal
when we look at ourselves, and when we look at the animal we see the human in it.
“…he came to his senses”

Even in the depths of its misery, reason retains the capacity to come to its senses, to
acknowledge its errors; in short, to reason in a sound manner! It is this same look of
hope that we must spread over what is now called the new society of knowledge, despite
its errors. This recovery begins with material and even survival considerations: “here
I am dying from hunger!”. To restore its taste for life, to dispel the doubts that reason
has about itself: these are the first steps that the Church, the Christian educational
community and the university pastoral work can take to help reason. But this presup-
poses being vigilant, observing from afar the desire of our contemporaries to find the
path of faith, and then reaching out to them, like a father who, seeing his son from
afar, from very far away, is overwhelmed with pity and reaches out to restore his son’s
dignity. In short, the task of the university is to bear the mark of Divine Mercy.
Mercy reveals the very essence of the divine fatherhood, even its heart. It is what gives
form to the moral law given to man. In other words, it is precisely because “our lineage
comes from him” (Acts 17:28) that “your law is within my heart” (Psalm 40:9): this is
the very heart of the moral theology which we must tirelessly proclaim and promote.
Insofar as it is appropriate to continue and deepen this symbolic meditation3, it is

worth adding another word about the behaviour of the elder son, which perhaps
3
I propose a commentary developed by Vermersch (2018).
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symbolises another way of using reason. The parable does not tell us what happened
to the elder son, leaving open the possibility that he, too, may have drifted away from
his father. It is symptomatic in this context that he never utters the word ‘father’.
This father has only one desire for him: to pass on to him all his good, i.e. the
life of God. But what understanding of this good did the elder son have? “Look!
These many years I have worked like a slave for you, and I never disobeyed your
commands. Yet you never gave me even a goat so that I could celebrate with my
friends!” Ultimately, the elder son did not enjoy his freedom, in the sense that he
did not understand that his father had already given him all his good: “Son, you are
always with me, and everything that belongs to me is yours.” The path to the Good,
the path towards the Good, is also unfailingly the path of human freedom, the test
of human freedom; such is the common experience of the two sons: “Truth and
freedom either go together hand in hand or together they perish in misery” [John
Paul II 1998: 90]. There seems to be a taming relationship between freedom and
truth. For truth is revealed in space, in fidelity to the very Word of God (John 8:32),
which leads to true freedom, the freedom of the sons of God who have possessed
the true good. May that space be, more than ever, that of the Catholic university.
Mercy summarises the divine knowledge to be imprinted on the human heart and
reason. It is thus the first and ultimate medium of the transmission of knowledge,
gently suggesting its unity and organicity. The Parable of the Prodigal Son is thus
presented as a University parable: ex corde ecclesiae; the University has been born
and is continually reborn from the heart of the Church, which receives its life and
the gift of Mercy from the Pierced Heart of Jesus.
Bibliography
Benedict XVI (2005), Speech delivered at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart,
25.11.2005, Milan.
Benedict XVI (2006), Speech delivered at the University of Regensburg, 12.09.2006,
Regensburg.
Benedict XVI (2008), Speech delivered at the Collège des Bernardins, 12.09.2008, Paris.
Ide P. (2011), L’idée d’Université selon Benoit XVI [The idea of the University according
to Benedict XVI]; Seminar, 50 (2010), n°4.
John Paul II (1998), Encyclical Fides et ratio, Vatican City.
John Paul II (1990), Apostolic Constitution Ex corde, Vatican City.
Vermersch D. (2018), La raison prodigue, revisiter la mission éducative et universitaire
[The waste of reason: revisiting the educational and academic mission], Ed Emmanuel.
235
10 . 2 16 9 7/ C S P. 2 0 2 1. 2 5 .1.16
CHRISTIANITY
No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Wojciech Roszkowski
Polska Akademia Nauk, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-7736-2013
The beginnings of the Catholic Church

in the English colonies in North America
Abstract: The article presents the origins of the Catholic Church in the English
colonies of North America, with particular emphasis on Newfoundland,
Baltimore and the state of Maryland. The article presents the enormous influence
of Catholics on the formation of the American tradition of religious tolerance,
which was then somehow incorporated by the Founding Fathers of the United
States.
Keywords: Catholicism in the USA, the United States, religious tolerance, religious
freedom
Abstrakt: W artykule zostały przedstawione początki Kościoła katolickiego

w angielskich koloniach Ameryki Północnej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem
Nowej Funlandii, Baltimore oraz stanu Maryland. W artykule został przedstawi-
ony ogromny wpływ katolików na wykształcenie się amerykańskiej tradycji toler-
ancji religijnej, która następnie została niejako wcielona przez Ojców Założycieli
Stanów Zjednoczonych.
Słowa kluczowe: katolicyzm w USA, Stany Zjednoczone, tolerancja religijna,
wolność religijna
Today, Catholicism is one of the most numerous Christian denominations in the

United States, and its spread was determined by immigrants from Italy, Ireland,
Poland, Germany, and by the influx and growth of the Spanish-speaking popula-
tion from Mexico and other Latin American countries, mainly in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Although successive waves of Catholics coming to the US
brought their own spirituality and customs related to the profession of the Catholic
faith, these newcomers blended to a large extent into the Catholic community
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formed earlier, back in colonial times. This was mainly because the newcomers
joined the lower ranks of the social hierarchy of the emerging American society
linked by the common use of the English language and practical Anglo-Saxon
culture, in which Protestant customs dominated. It is no coincidence that, until
recently, the American social elite was referred to as “WASP”, meaning White,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant. It is also no coincidence that the first and – until the
2020 elections, the only – Catholic President of the United States was John F.
Kennedy. Contemporary American Catholic spirituality was shaped under the
strong influence of the Protestant environment and in juxtaposition with that
environment. What is important, and what differed from the European tradition,
where the Catholic Church often defended the social status quo against “libertar-
ian novelties”, in this confrontation the American Catholic Church during the
colonial times was on the side of the right to religious freedom because in the
Anglo-Saxon environment it was an oppressed minority.
The discovery of North America and its subsequent conquest by the Spanish had,
among others, a religious purpose. From the beginning, Columbus wondered
how to convert the Indians to Catholicism [Morison 1942: 204]. The violence and
abuse of the cross for political purposes that soon followed, as well as the speeches
of Spanish priests and friars, such as Father Antonio de Montesinos or Father
Bartolomeo de las Casas, who defended the rights of the Indians, prompted Pope
Paul III in 1537 to write the bull “Sublimus Deus”, in which he stated: “Indians
and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means
to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though
they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and
legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; (…) should
the contrary happen, it shall be null and have no effect” [Sublimus Deus].
From the very beginning as well, Catholic priests died at the hands of the
Indians. The first Christian martyr on today’s territory of the United States
was a Franciscan, Father Juan de Padilla, who died on the plains of Kansas in
1542 at the hands of the Wichita Indians [Ellis 1955: 5]. While Spanish Catholics
colonized the Gulf Coast, French Catholics began colonizing Canada and the
northern regions of the present-day United States. There, French missionaries,
mainly Jesuits, followed the fleet and the merchants. Father Jean de Brébeuf lived
with the Huron (Wyandot people) for almost three years to learn their language
and customs. He concluded that the prospects for the Christianization of this
tribe were slim. All the time he had an impression of “casting pearls before swine”
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[Ellis 1955: 11]. Nevertheless, he continued his mission for twelve years until he
fell into the hands of the Iroquois, who tortured him in a terrible way and killed
him at Georgian Bay in 1649 [Parkman 1910b: 213-214]. Father Brébeuf was no
exception. Three years earlier, the same Iroquois had tortured to death Father
Isaac Jogues near Auriesville, New York, and in March 1649, on Georgian Bay, the
Iroquois also killed Father Gabriel Lalemant. The cause of these massacres was
probably more the Iroquois’ hatred of the Huron and their friends than hatred
of Christianity [Ellis 1955: 12-13]. In 1675, Father Jacques Marquette was killed
on Lake Michigan, where the river now bearing his name flows into it [Parkman
1910a: 59 nn]. In territories explored by the Spaniards in the south and the French
in the north, Catholicism was the main Christian denomination.
This started to change when in 1607 the first English colony was established in
Jamestown, and then the English began to appear on the coast from Maine to
Georgia. The situation of Catholics in the New World was influenced from the
beginning by their situation in England. The first decades of the 17th century
were a period of growing internal problems in England. After the childless
death of Elizabeth I, who had held the country in an iron grip, cruelly perse-
cuting Catholics, James I, son of Mary Stuart and king of Scotland, ascended
the English throne in July 1603, which cemented England and Scotland
with a personal union. James Stuart was an Anglican, but a man lacking the
virtues of an effective ruler.1 Marking the new king’s nervous reaction to the
“Gunpowder Plot”, i.e. an attempt to blow up the parliament and the king by
Catholic conspirators, in November 1605 an extremely strict anti-Catholic law
(Popish Recusants Act) was passed in England, prohibiting “papist recusants”
(i.e. Catholics) from finding themselves closer than ten miles from London
and five miles from their place of residence [National Archives]. Therefore,
it is not surprising that, from the beginning, anti-Catholic bias prevailed in
the thirteen colonies that later became part of the United States. An example
1
From the time of his difficult childhood, James Stuart was fearful and emotionally unstable,
and he covered his uncertainty with verbosity, buffoonery, and sometimes cruelty. It was
said that in place of the masculine woman, the English had brought a feminine man to the
throne. The stability of his rule was not strengthened by the Catholic “Gunpowder Plot”
of 1605, nor by the pressure by Puritans or Presbyterians who wanted to impose more
discipline and harsh radicalism on the English Church. Meanwhile, James’s court was quite
a frivolous arena of intrigues and scandals. The king’s first moves, such as peace with Spain,
postponement of parliamentary meetings, or a rather special relationship with the favoured
George Villier, appointed Lord of Buckingham, aroused resistance among the aristocracy
[Maurois 1938: 323-337].
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of such prejudices can be the later anti-Catholic laws, passed during the
time of the English civil wars in Virginia (1642) or Massachusetts (1645)
[Ellis 1955: 19].
Thus, in the territory of the future United States, Catholics were the pioneers
of religious tolerance. Paradoxically, it was George Calvert (1580-1632), initially
a zealous Anglican, who contributed greatly to Catholics winning religious
freedom.2 In 1613, James I appointed him as one of royal commissioners to inves-
tigate the influence of Catholicism in Ireland. Calvert’s commission’s conclusions
were quite harsh: the report stated that pressure on the Catholic clergy should
be intensified and disobedient priests should be relegated. Calvert became an
important figure at court: he could afford to build the Kiplin Hall Palace in the
family estate. In 1617, he was awarded a knighthood, and two years later he was
also appointed as the king’s secretary of state. In 1623, James gifted Calvert a large
estate in Longford County, Leinster, Ireland. Probably at the end of 1624, Calvert
converted to Catholicism, which made his further political career in England
difficult. He then thought about greater involvement in the colonization of the
New World. As early as 1620, he acquired a property in Newfoundland, which
he named Avalon to commemorate the place where Christian missionaries first
appeared in Britain in the Middle Ages. The settlement, populated by a group of
Welsh, led by Captain Edward Wynne sent there by Calvert, initially prospered
quite well, so in 1623 Calvert obtained a concession from king James for the
whole of Newfoundland. Calvert now ran remotely the “Avalon Province” located
thousands of miles from the metropolis, as “Baron Baltimore”. His conversion to
Catholicism apparently did not bother James, who, moreover, fell into dementia
by the end of his reign.
After the death of King James in March 1625, his son Charles I Stuart could not
find a common language with the parliament, not least because shortly after his
George Calvert came from a modest family in Yorkshire, a county where Catholicism was
2
still fairly strong despite Elizabethan persecutions. Therefore, George’s father, Leonard, was
subjected to fierce pressure to raise his son in the spirit of Anglicanism and obedience to
the throne. George graduated from Trinity College at Oxford, which was associated with
paying tribute to Queen Elizabeth. After completion of his studies in municipal law at
London’s Lincoln Inn, in 1604 he married Anne Mayne in the Anglican rite. They named
their eldest son Cecilius after Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, who was the main defeater
of the “Gunpowder Plot”. Young Calvert’s close ties with Cecil, who at that time was the
secretary of state and Lord Treasurer of King James, resulted in George Calvert’s rapid career
[Browne 1890: 1-26; see NCoAB: 331].
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coronation, in June 1625 he married Henrietta Marie de Bourbon, daughter of

King Henry IV of France, a Catholic. While Charles declared that the Queen
would have freedom of confession only alone with her court, in a confidential
clause in the marriage contract, he committed to protect Catholics. In addition, he
continued the extravagant life of his father, plunging England into the enormous
costs of maintaining the court. All this made his religious policy inconsistent
[Maurois 1995: 170 nn.].
Meanwhile, in May 1625, Calvert set sail for America. His first visit to the Avalon
colony in Newfoundland did not make him too optimistic: apart from hunting
and fishing, the agricultural prospects there looked bleak due to the harsh
climate. Moreover, the Newfoundland colony was exposed to pressure from
French fishermen and colonizers. He returned to England, but the deteriorating
political climate there prompted him in 1628 to take his second wife and most
of the children, along with 40 new colonists to the New World. Meanwhile, one
of the Avalon colonists, a Puritan, reported to the king that Calvert favoured
Catholics. The harsh winter strained both the health and patience of Calvert
and his wife. He wrote to Charles about his difficult experiences, but the king’s
response reached Calvert only after he left for Virginia. In his letter, the king
urged him to return to England. It is not known how Calvert would react to
this call. He might have feared disfavour, but he made the decision to leave for
Virginia without knowing the king’s summons. Calvert arrived in Jamestown,
Virginia in October 1629 [Browne1890: 20-27].
The colony in Jamestown was established 22 years earlier. In May 1607, three
ships owned by the private Virginia Company from London – the Discover, the
Goodspeed, and the Sarah Constant – reached the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.
The commander of the 143-person expedition, Captain Christopher Newport,
led the flotilla 30 miles up the James River, named after the King of England,
and established a settlement there. The land was fertile, the vegetation was
abundant, the climate was friendly, and the natives did not cause difficulties
at first. Unfortunately, the colonists were not prepared for hard work and the
leaders undertook wrong decisions. The colony was built near salt marshes,
which almost led to disaster. In the winter of 1609/1610, many settlers died
of starvation, and one of them committed an act of cannibalism by killing
and eating his wife. In May 1610, the remaining 60 persons intended to return
to England, but the arrival of two more ships, including the colony governor
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Thomas Gates, dissuaded them from this intention. Despite the difficult condi-
tions, the colony survived.3
After arriving in Jamestown, Calvert was met with unfavourable reception by

the colonists, one of whom was even eager to beat Baron Baltimore. The colonists
quickly realized the religion he followed and demanded that he take the oath on
the Act of Supremacy, which he refused. In this situation, he had no choice but
to look for a new place to settle. Anyway, he had had such intention even earlier,
somewhat expecting that the Jamestown colonists would not be pleased with his
Catholicism. After a few weeks in Jamestown, Calvert returned to England to
attempt to obtain a royal charter for a new colony in the Chesapeake Bay area. On
the way back, his ship crashed off the coast of Ireland, his second wife drowned
in the crash, and he lost a large part of his property. Calvert’s attempts to obtain
the royal charter were hampered by Virginians from Jamestown and surrounding
areas, acting on behalf of the Virginia Company. One of their leaders, William
Clairborne, came to England with claims to exclusive colonization of the mouths
of the James, York, Rappahanock, and Potomac rivers and the Chesapeake Bay.
Eventually, King Charles granted Calvert a charter to colonize both sides of the
bay, but before the charter’s parliamentary approval, Calvert died on 15 April 1632
[Browne 1890: 28-31].
Tobacco cultivation began around Jamestown. Its precursor was one of the first settlers,
3
John Rolfe, who in 1614 married Pocahontas, the daughter of the Powhatan chief. Tobacco
became a regular and reliable source of income for Virginia, a colony named so after the
“virgin” Queen Elizabeth I. In 1619, the first legislative council of the colony was estab-
lished. However, the life of the colonists was still extremely hard. In the years 1622-1623, an
epidemic claimed about 500 victims. In 1624, about 1,200 colonists lived in Virginia, out
of around 4,000 who had come successively from across the ocean. Although the Indians
were initially friendly, aiding the colonists with food and advice, they gradually became
aware that the “whites” wanted to stay permanently and that their numbers were constantly
growing. More and more clashes occurred, in which the colonists’ weapons proved to be
more effective. Most of the Indian settlements lay in ruins, and the Powhatan chief led
increasingly hopeless raids, probably regretting the help initially provided to the settlers.
In March 1624, as a result of an unexpected attack by the Indians led by Opechancanough,
around 400 colonists were killed. In the same year, the statutes of the Virginia Company
were revoked and the colony came under the full jurisdiction of the King of England. Not
much is known about Catholics in Jamestown. It is true that on 1 October 1608, five Poles –
Michał Łowicki, Zbigniew Stefański, Jan Bogdan, Jan Mata and Stanisław Sadowski – arrived
in Jamestown on the ship “Mary and Margaret”, and launched glassworks, and tar and pitch
manufactures there, but we know nothing about their religious practices [HC 1845: 135-135;
Smith 1999: 1-12].
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Although George Calvert did not live to see the establishment of a colony in which
Catholics would enjoy tolerance, his son Cecilius Calvert (1605-1675) received
a royal charter dated 20 June 1632 as Second Baron Baltimore. The official name of
the new colony was Maryland (Terra Mariae) in honour of King Charles’s Catholic
wife, Henrietta Maria. The name was also symbolic for Catholics, as Mary, the
mother of Jesus Christ, was not particularly revered by Protestants. The seat of the
colony’s authorities was the settlement on the north shore of the Potomac River
named St. Mary’s City, and the area around that settlement was named Augusta
Carolina in honour of the king. The northern border of the colony was the 40th
parallel, and the southern one – mainly the Potomac River. Maryland was a kind
of a fief of the king, obligated to provide the crown with a fifth of the obtained
gold and silver, and two Indian arrows. However, the main source of income
for the colonists was not gold or silver, but the cultivation of tobacco. The royal
charter defined the status of the colony as the property of Cecilius Calvert, giving
him the power to appoint judges and other officials, as well as to grant land, and
to set duties and taxes. The only limitation to Calvert’s power was his pledge to
the establishment of an assembly of free citizens, which became the seed of anti-
Catholic opposition. The first settlers landed on 25 March 1634 on St. Clement
Island off the northern shore of the Potomac, led by Cecilius’s younger brother
Leonard Calvert (1606-1647) as the colony’s governor. Cecilius Calvert remained in
England. Two days after landing, the colonists settled just below the mouth of the
river to the sea, on the site of the village of the Yaocomico Indians of the Piskatawai
group, and began to build St. Mary’s City as the seat of the colony’s government
[NCoAB: 331-332; Browne 1890: 35-36; Rozbicki 1995: 66-68].
Among the first colonists in St. Mary’s City were two English Jesuits, Andrew
White (1579-1656) and John Altham (1589-1640). At the landing site, Father
White celebrated the first Catholic Mass in the English colonies. Over the follow-
ing ten years, Father White worked effectively to establish and maintain good
relations between the colonists and the indigenous Indians, and led the latter’s
intense evangelization. In 1640, he succeeded in converting a Piscatawai chief
named Chitomachon, and shortly thereafter – a Patuxent princess and most of
her people, hence earning himself the name of “Apostle of Maryland”. Father
White was assisted in the pastoral work by his confrere, Father John Altham of
Warwickshire (1589-1640), who fitted up an Indian hut for religious service, which
became known as “the first chapel in Maryland”. In 1637, two more Jesuits arrived:
Thomas Copley (1596-1652) and Ferdinand Poulton (1601-1641). Some Protestants
who, in search of religious freedom, fled to Maryland from harassment inflicted
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by competing Protestant denominations, also turned out to be allies in creating

tolerant foundations of the Maryland colony [Shea 1886: 40].
The first legal act to guarantee religious freedom in Maryland was the ordinance of
1639, which guaranteed religious rights without listing specific denominations. The
“Holy Church” mentioned in the ordinance meant the Catholic Church. Leonard
Calvert was able to push through this act thanks to the support of two influen-
tial settlers, Catholics Jerome Hawley and Thomas Cornwaleys. Although other
Catholic settlers also ardently supported the Jesuits’ evangelization campaign,
the status of land grants presented a problem, as there was a dispute over whether
governor Calvert had the right to grant land on his own terms, or under the terms
of the English law. As regards church property, the matter was even more difficult,
since Protestants prevailed in England. On both issues, Maryland’s Protestants
were not as obedient to Calvert as the Catholics were [Browne 1890: 101-116].
The Maryland experiment was born while the Thirty Years’ War was raging
in continental Europe and the revolution and civil war began in England. It is
difficult to say how Cecilius Calvert maintained the position of Baron Baltimore
during this turbulent period, especially since the family of his wife, Anne Arundel,
who died in 1639, sided with King Charles. In April 1643, Leonard Calvert arrived
in England, leaving his brother-in-law, Catholic Giles Brent, in Maryland as his
deputy. The Calvert brothers managed to maintain their position in England, but
at the cost of events in the colony. In 1644, a group of Virginia Protestants led by
Richard Ingle and William Claiborne took St. Mary’s City by force and burned
down the settlement, by then numbering several hundred inhabitants. Fathers
White and Copley were sent to England in chains. Since Father White argued that
he had broken the royal banishment, issued almost 40 years earlier, against his
will, he was spared. Father Copley even managed to return to Maryland in 1648,
but he died there shortly afterwards [Shea 1886: 42ff].
After returning from England, Maryland Governor Leonard Calvert was able
to restore his authority with the help of mercenaries from Virginia, but he died
on 9 June 1647. On his deathbed, he handed over his power to the Catholic and
royalist Thomas Greene, and he named as the executrix of his will his sister-in-law
Margaret Brent (1601-1671), a person of great merit in the history of the colony.4
Due to her role in the life of the colony, Margaret Brent is considered a leading figure in
4
Maryland history. She was a daughter of Richard Brent, Lord Admington and Lark Stoke,
one of his thirteen children. After one of her sisters converted to Catholicism, some siblings
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However, local Anglicans, supporting the English parliament in the struggle against
the king, took control of the Maryland colony. The Second Baron Baltimore, Cecilius
Calvert, residing in England, managed to maintain power over the colony thanks to the
support of a group of Puritans who were ill-disposed towards Anglicans, but only by
dint of the concession of agreeing to remove Greene and the appointment of William
Stone, close to parliament, as the new colony governor. As a result, on 21 April 1649, the
colony assembly passed the “Maryland Toleration Act”. This Act guaranteed freedom
of conscience and religion to all residents of the colony, on the condition that they
professed Trinitarian Christianity, and provided for severe penalties for discrimination
and mockery of religious beliefs [Browne 1890: 128nn; Maryland Toleration Act].
Meanwhile, King Charles was removed in England. He was sentenced to death

on 27 January 1649 and executed three days later opposite Whitehall in London.
Maryland’s first Protestant governor, Stone, complied with the 1649 Act, but in
his absence, his deputy Greene who held power temporarily, proclaimed the son
of the murdered king, Charles II Stuart, as king. Although Scotland stood behind
him, Greene’s move in the colony was sheer insanity, for it only reinforced the
arguments of Anglicans and Puritans that Maryland was a hotbed of “papists”.
When Stone returned, he immediately removed Greene from office. Since the
influx of Anglicans into the colony was faster than that of the Catholics, and
the revolution and persecution of Catholics by Oliver Cromwell was raging in
the homeland, the Calvert experiment collapsed in 1654 when, under pressure
from a group of Puritans, the Maryland colony assembly repealed the Toleration
Act. Cromwell’s two commissioners, William Clairborne and George Bennett,
removed Stone and forced upon the colony the power of Capt. William Fuller, who
called a new assembly, this time without any Catholics. However, because they
overstepped the mandate by Cromwell, whose intention was not to aggravate the
conflict, fights erupted between Stone’s supporters and Catholics on the one hand,
and Puritans on the other. Having come to power, Puritans led to the persecution
of Catholics. Ten persons were sentenced to death, and four were actually executed
followed in her footsteps and left for America. In November 1638, Margaret landed with
her sister Mary and brothers Giles and Fulke in St. Mary’s City. In October 1639, Margaret
received a land grant as the first female settler. Margaret and her sister henceforth managed
70 acres of land named “Sisters’ Freehold” and 50 adjacent acres named “St. Andrews”. Soon
thereafter, their estate expanded to 800 acres; Mary married Governor Leonard Calvert, her
brother Giles married Mary Kittamaquund, daughter of the late Piscataway chieftain, and
inherited the land rights of the tribe. On his death, Leonard Calvert entrusted her with the
execution of his will, saying: “Take all, spend all”. During the later struggles for power in
the colony, she withdrew from politics [Winifred 1977: 43-46].
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for religious reasons. Cromwell’s death in 1658 and the restoration of the Stuarts
two years later saved the status of the Maryland colony as a kind of Calvert fief,
but Protestants dominated the colony in numbers [Browne 1890: 137-165].
Religious freedom in the American colonies was introduced by King Charles II, who
in 1672 converted to Catholicism. However, Cecilius Calvert died in England on 30
November 1675. He was succeeded as the Third Baron Baltimore by his son Charles
(1637-1715), who arrived in the colony of Maryland in 1661. After the restoration
of the monarchy, Calvert was able to take the position of governor of the province
he officially owned, but the beginning of his reign brought, apart from a certain
stabilization of religious relations, also economic problems related to the decrease
of the prices of tobacco. Calvert managed to maintain the principles of religious
tolerance as he had a Catholic majority on his council. Some of the council members
were also related to the Calverts. The problems stemmed mainly from whether
the rules of English law were to be applied in the colony, or the rules followed by
the governor and, from 1675, the owner. Fearing a loss of control over the colony,
Calvert tried to restrict the right to vote to persons holding more than 50 acres of
land. There were also conflicts related to slavery. The first 13 slaves were brought
to Maryland in 1642. Initially, those who were baptized were given freedom, but
in 1663 the colony assembly passed the measure to introduce the lifetime status
of slaves, who, moreover, began to be brought to the colony on a larger scale in the
1790s, after Calvert had already lost control of the colony. In 1675, after the death of
his father, Charles Calvert came to London to take on the title of baron of Baltimore,
which he still managed to do despite the fact that his enemies, incited from overseas,
accused him of the lack of Anglican worship, and thus of the tragic moral condition
of the colonists. After his return to the colony, in 1681, Calvert had to crush another
Protestant conspiracy, led by former governor Josiah Fendall and John Coode, and
face the claims of the Quakers who, under William Penn, wanted to build their
capital south of the 40th parallel, in the territory of Maryland. In 1684, Calvert
travelled to England again in order to defend his interests against the Quakers and
against accusations that he favoured Catholics. He left his nephew George Talbot to
act as governor, who, however, soon gained notoriety for killing a customs officer on
an English ship. In his place, Calvert appointed another Catholic, William Joseph,
who aroused displeasure of Protestants with his statements about their poor moral
conduct [Brugger 1988: 22-36].
In 1688, the successor of Charles II, the Catholic King James II, was removed, and
Protestant William of Orange took the throne as a result of a coup led by parliament,
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called the “Glorious revolution”. Calvert hastened to acknowledge the new king,
but the messenger bearing this news died on his way to America. In this situation,
Anglicans in Maryland overthrew Governor Joseph from power. In the summer of
1689, the Puritan army of 700 soldiers under the command of John Coode defeated
the troops loyal to Baron Baltimore led by Catholic Colonel Henry Darnall. Darnall’s
surrender marked the end of religious freedom in Maryland. Coode established
a new colony government, which outlawed Catholicism. The faithful of the Roman
rite now had to confine themselves to worship at home. In 1704, a law was passed
that prohibited Catholics from holding office in the colony. Charles Calvert never
returned to his former estate, and in 1689 King William revoked the royal grant. In
1692, one year after Maryland became a fully royal colony, the Church of England
was recognized as the ruling church there. Catholics were henceforth forced to pay
taxes to the church that fought against them [Ellis 1955: 27; Brugger 1988: 37-40].
Catholics in Maryland found themselves in an unenviable situation. In 1765, there

were only 10,000 Catholics in Maryland, and a further 3,000 lived in Pennsylvania,
as some Maryland Catholics moved north, where Quaker leader William Penn
began another experiment with religious freedom in 1681. The tolerant Quakers
only temporarily, in 1705, bowed to the pressure from London, but throughout the
eighteenth century Catholics enjoyed the greatest freedom in Pennsylvania. English,
and especially German, Jesuits set up missions there, and the city Catholic parishes
around Goshenhoppen and Lancaster developed unhindered [Kashatus 2011].
Thanks to religious tolerance introduced by Charles II, Catholics gained more

freedom in other colonies as well. Charles allowed people of all faiths to settle
around New Amsterdam, which had been turned from a Dutch colony to an
English one. In 1682, the governorship of the New York colony was taken on by
a Catholic, Colonel Thomas Dongan, who brought three Jesuits to the colony.
Dongan took over the colony’s government that was in very poor condition, but
got the situation under control, and on 14 October 1683, he convened the first ever
assembly of colony’s representatives at Fort James, which passed guarantees of
religious freedom under the name of the “Charter of Liberties”.5 Again, however,
5
Thomas Dongan (1634-1715) was born in a Catholic family in Ireland’s Kildare county.
His family, supporter of the Stuarts in the civil war, fled to France after the overthrow of
Charles I, although it maintained the estate in Ireland. Thomas served in France in the Irish
regiment of the French army, rising to the rank of colonel. In 1678 he returned to England,
where in September 1682 he was appointed governor of New York by King Charles II and
granted the estate on Staten Island [New Advent].
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CHRISTIANITY
there was an anti-Catholic and anti-tolerance reaction: in 1689, German-born

Calvinist Jacob Leisler carried out a coup in New York and initiated the persecu-
tion of Catholics. Leisler’s rebellion was quelled by the English loyalists, and Leisler
himself was hanged. In 1693, however, an Act was passed in the New York colony
that the Church of England was the ruling established church [Ellis 1955: 29-30].
Due to England’s discriminatory policies and the status of a barely tolerated

and sometimes fought minority, Catholics in the American colonies did not
have their own hierarchy. After 1585, such a hierarchy did not exist in England,
so the American church was based on 186 Jesuits who carried out missionary
activities there in the years 1634-1773 under the general of the Order and the
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome, and from 1688 under the
missionary bishop with the title of Apostolic Vicar, who resided in London. When
the sovereign United States came into existence, the Catholic population did not
exceed 25,000. Massachusetts was dominated by the Puritans, Pennsylvania by
the Quakers, and the rest of the states by Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, and
other Protestant denominations. 156 years passed from the arrival of the first
Catholic missionaries until the appointment of the first American bishop in 1790.
This was already in the independent United States, and the function was assumed
by John Carroll (1735-1815).6 After joining the Jesuit Order in Europe, he returned
to America in June 1774. In the absence of a church organization in Maryland,
he worked there as a missionary. In 1774, he founded the parish of St. John the
Evangelist in Silver Spring. The conflict between England and the colonies drew
Carroll into the struggle for independence. He contributed to this cause by
writing letters to various personalities he had met in Europe. On 15 February
1776, Carroll was appointed by the Continental Congress as one of the envoys
sent to Canada to agree on cooperation with the local authorities, or at least on
their neutrality vis-à-vis the colonies’ war with England. Although the mission
His father, Daniel, originating from a respected Irish family persecuted by the English for
6
religious reasons, came to America as a young boy. John Carroll was born on a plantation
inherited by his mother Eleanor Darnall, granddaughter of the aforementioned Colonel
Henry Darnall, near Marlborough Town in the colony of Maryland. He was schooled at
home and then educated at a secret Jesuit school on the Bohemia farm under the supervision
of Father Thomas Poulton. At the age of 13, he was sent to the Jesuit College of St. Omer in
Flanders. At the age of 18, Carroll entered the Jesuit novitiate. He studied philosophy and
theology in Liège and was ordained as priest in 1761. Ten years later, he joined the Jesuit
Order. He was very critical of the dissolution of the order by Pope Clement XIV [NCoBA:
480-482].
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itself proved unsuccessful, Carroll met Benjamin Franklin during that travel.
This acquaintance later turned into a vibrant friendship. On 26 November 1784,
Carroll received Vatican documents appointing him head of the Catholic clergy
in the United States in the capacity of the apostolic prefect. In this role, he tried to
influence the Holy See for the Vatican to avoid creating the impression that church
appointments were an act of interference in the internal affairs of an independent
state. In April 1789, Carroll was elected bishop by the clergy of the new state – the
United States. After expression of approval of the decision by Pope Pius VI, Carroll
went to England, where on 15 August 1790 he received episcopal consecration as
the first American.
Discrimination against Catholics began to subside during the American War of

Independence. The slogans of the colony’s freedom from the metropolis were consis-
tent with the tolerance aspirations of the architects of the federation. In 1775, George
Washington denounced as nonsense the Anglican zeal in burning effigies of the
Pope and celebrating the Guy Fawkes Day in honour of the hero of the “Gunpowder
Plot” [The Writings of George Washington: 65]. The Founding Fathers of the United
States needed the favour of Catholic France against England. During the War of
Independence, Virginia, Pennsylvania and Maryland passed acts of religious toler-
ance. It was a necessity of the moment. Otherwise, the greatly diverse communities
of the colonies would have plummeted into internal conflicts instead of uniting
against the metropolis. Catholics entered the authorities of the new republic. The
bishop’s cousin, Charles Carroll, sat in the Senate as Maryland’s representative,
while another of his cousins, Daniel Carroll, along with Thomas Fitzsimmons of
Pennsylvania entered the House of Representatives. When in 1788 the United States
signed an alliance with France, freedom for Catholics became a matter of course.
The first ambassador of France to the United States, Conrad Alexandre Gérard de
Rayneval, celebrated the third anniversary of independence with a solemn Te Deum
ceremony at St. Mary’s church in Baltimore [Ellis 1955: 36-37].
At that time, the number of Catholics in the new state reached 16,000 in Maryland,
7,000 in Pennsylvania, and 2,000 in the states of New York and New Jersey. John
Carroll chose Baltimore as his seat, and the influx of priests from Europe soon
allowed him to send missions to Boston, New York, Charleston and the state of
Kentucky. As the bishop, in 1789 Carroll founded the first Catholic university in
the United States – the Georgetown College, which later adopted the present name
of Georgetown University. The statue of Bishop Carroll still stands in front of the
University’s main Healy Hall.
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Catholic leaders in the North American English colonies vigorously supported

religious freedom, being ahead of most of the Catholic clergy in Europe. In 1784,
while still a priest, John Carroll said: “(…) if we have the wisdom and temper to
preserve, America may come to exhibit a proof to the world, that general and
equal toleration, by giving a free circulation to fair argument, is the most effectual
method to bring all denominations of christians to an unity of faith” [An Address
to the Roman Catholics of the United States of America by a Catholic Clergyman
1784: 115].
Bibliography
An Address to the Roman Catholics of the United States of America by a Catholic Clergyman
(1784), John Carroll, Annapolis.
Browne W. H. (1890), George Calvert and Cecilius Calvert. Barons Baltimore of Baltimore,
Dodd, Mead and Company, New York.
Brugger R. J. (1988), Maryland: A Middle Temperament, 1634-1980, The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Ellis J. T. (1955), American Catholicism, The University of Chicago Press, 1955, Chicago.
HC (1845), Historical Collections of Virginia Containing a Collection of the Most Interesting
Facts, Traditions, Biographical Sketches, Anecdotes, &c. Relating to Its History and
Antiquities Together with Geographical and Statistical Descriptions by Henry Howe,
Babcock & Co., Charleston.
Helmes W. G. (1977), Notable Maryland Women, Tidewater Publishers, Cambridge, Ma.
Kashatus W. C. (2011), William Penn’s Legacy: Religious and Spiritual Diversity, http://
www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/pa-heritage/william-penn-legacy-
religious-spiritual-diversity.html 10.10.2020.
MacNutt F. A. (1909), Bartholomew de las Casas, The Arthur H. Clark Company,
Cleveland.
Maryland Toleration Act; September 21, 1649, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
maryland_toleration.asp, 10.10.2020.
Maurois A. (1938), Dzieje Anglii, Wydawnictwo J. Przeworskiego, Warszawa.
Morison S. E. (1942), Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus, Little,
Brown and Co, Boston.
National Archives, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/james-i/
law-for-recusants.
NCoBA, The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, vol. VII.
New Advent, https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05130a.htm, 10.10.2020.
Parkman F. (1910a), La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston.
Parkman F. (1910b), The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century, Little, Brown
and Company, Boston.
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Rozbicki M. (1995), Wirginia, Maryland i Karolina, [in:] Rozbicki M., Irmina Wawrzyczek
(ed.), „Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki”, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN,
Warszawa.
Shea J. G. (1886), A History of the Catholic Church within the Limits of the United States,
(University of Caifornia Press, California.
Smith J. (1999), Virginia Handbook, Moon Publications, Chico.
Sublimus Deus (1909), the text of the bull: Francis A. MacNutt, Bartholomew de las Casas,
The Arthur H. Clark Company, Cleveland, pp. 427-431.
The Writings of George Washington, vol. IV, Washington D.C.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Maria Szymborska
ORCID: 0000-0001-9054-9782
Sprawozdanie z seminarium naukowego
Jak uchwycić racjonalnie to, co nieracjonalne?

Poszukiwanie istoty totalitaryzmu i jego ewentualnego wpływu na dzisiejszą
młodzież – prezentacja badań zespołu politologów i socjologów z UKSW
w Instytucie Pileckiego 15 kwietnia 2020 r.
15 kwietnia 2020 r. w nietypowej jeszcze wówczas formule wideokonferencji

obyło się seminarium naukowe Instytutu Pileckiego poświęcone publikacji
Totalitaryzm w epoce postmodernizmu. Raport autorstwa Piotra Mazurkiewicza,
Michała Gierycza, Krzysztofa Wieleckiego, Mariusza Sulkowskiego i Marcina
Zarzeckiego jest podsumowaniem badań przeprowadzonych przez autorów na
zlecenie Instytutu Europejskiej Sieci Pamięć i Solidarność (ESPS). Zadaniem
Instytutu w ramach wspierania współpracujących państw Sieci jest m.in. badanie,
dokumentowanie i upowszechniania wiedzy o historii XX wieku, ze szczególnym
uwzględnieniem okresu wojen i totalitaryzmów w państwach Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej. Impulsem dla podjętych działań było pytanie, jak uodparniać
młodych ludzi na totalitarne ideologie, a wcześniej, jak diagnozować, czy na takie
pro-totalitarne fascynacje mogą być narażeni.
Praktyczny punkt wyjścia wymagał rzetelnego teoretycznego ujęcia badanego

zagadnienia. Od początku przyjęto, że same, dominujące wśród badań młodzieży
na ten temat, pytania o wiedzę faktograficzną nie wystarczą do dobrej diagnozy.
Znajomość historii, choć niezwykle istotna nie stanowi wystarczającej bariery dla
chęci poddania się nieuchronności dziejów. Dotychczasowe badania i definicje
totalitaryzmów z kolei koncentrowały się głównie na aspektach instytucjonalno-
-proceduralnych. Zespół z UKSW nie tylko zaproponował kompleksowe badanie
postaw wraz z ich komponentem poznawczym, emocjonalnym i behawioralnym,
ale przedstawił również nowatorską koncepcję rozumienia totalitaryzmu. Główne
założenia opracowanego modelu oraz wyniki badań zaprezentowali około 40
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uczestnikom opisywanego seminarium ks. prof. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, dr hab.

Michał Gierycz, prof. UKSW i dr hab. Krzysztof Wielecki, prof. UKSW. Spotkanie
ze strony gospodarza poprowadziła p. Aleksandra Kmak-Pamirska.
Do próby racjonalnego ujęcia tego, co nieracjonalne posłużył zespołowi znany

z badań nad demokracją podział na aspekt substancjalny i formalny systemu.
Takie ujęcie pozwala wyróżnić istotę politycznego zła, którego ewentualna forma
w dzisiejszych czasach byłaby przecież zupełnie inne niż ta, znana nam z historii.
I tak, w sercu totalitaryzmu zdaniem autorów leży pragnienie immanentyzacji
eschatonu. Choroba ducha, w której prawdę transcendentną zastępuje ideologia.
Bardziej lub mniej świadoma konstrukcja świeckiej religii rości sobie prawo do
zawładnięcia osobą ludzką niejako od środka i dąży do zrealizowania wizji dosko-
nałego świata w ramach konkretnego politycznego organizmu.
Drugim aspektem podkreślanym przez autorów jest przyjęta w danym społeczeń-

stwie antropologia. Wizja człowieka, może uznawać obiektywne ograniczenia
ludzkiej kondycji i postrzegać świat jako rzeczywistość wymagającą jego uwagi
i troski. Taką optykę nazywamy antropologią ograniczoną. Cywilizacja jest w tej
koncepcji tylko cienką warstwą na ludzkim barbarzyństwie, dlatego trzeba o nią
dbać i pamiętać, że nie jest dana raz na zawsze. Opresyjny charakter natury lub
kultury podkreśla z kolei antropologia nieograniczona. Tu celem jest emancy-
pacja człowieka, wyzwolenie nieskończonych możliwości rozwoju ludzkości.
Optymistyczna koncepcja nie dostrzegając znaczenia cnoty indywidulanej dla
życia wspólnotowego, zakłada, że każdy problem społeczny może zostać racjo-
nalnie rozwiązany. Skrajną jej postacią jest transhumanizm, określony w raporcie
jako antropologiczna paligeneza.
Totalitarna logika radykalnie zmienia sposób myślenia człowieka nie tylko o sobie
samym, ale także o stosunkach międzyludzkich. Dlatego za istotne z perspektywy
badania totalitarnej predylekcji, oprócz oceny wiedzy na temat istoty transformacji
ustrojowej i pro-totalitarnych przemian, uznano poznanie stosunku młodych do
wolności; zarówno rozumienia jej sensu, jak i znaczenia dla życia społecznego.
Badaniu poddano również przychylność młodych ludzi względem idei radykalne-
go postępu (emancypacji), który uzasadnia całkowicie swobodne przekształcanie
świata społecznego i eliminację z niego obiektywnego kryterium rozróżniania
dobra i zła. Stosunek do ograniczeń nakładanych na funkcjonowanie demokra-
tycznych instytucji, do kwestii istnienia oraz umiejscowienia nieprzekraczalnych
granic interwencji państwa w życie obywateli oraz możliwości stosowania przezeń
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różnych form przemocy. Istotne są również sympatie młodych dla radykalnych,

podważających demokratyczne standardy postulatów i ruchów społecznych.
Wreszcie gotowość podporządkowania się władzy społecznej awangardy – „elity”.
A także, na poziomie afektywnym, potencjalna niechęć do „innych” traktowa-
nych jako „obcych”, która może świadczyć o „wsobności” grupy, ewentualnie
nawet wrogości i zamknięciu się, w przeciwieństwie do otwartości i przyjaznych
odniesień do „swoich”.
Nie bez znaczenia dla narodzin pro-totalitarnych inklinacji jest również kontekst
społeczno-polityczny badanych – zakorzenienie młodych w sferze przedpoli-
tycznej (religii, rodzinie, harcerstwie, lokalnym środowisku). A także poziom
frustracji społecznej związany z ewentualnym kryzysem lub poczuciem istotnej
niesprawiedliwości.
Nakreślona koncepcja teoretyczna stanowiła punkt wyjścia do opracowania narzę-

dzi badawczych i zakrojonych na szeroką skalę badań empirycznych – jakościo-
wych i ilościowych. W ramach pierwszego etapu w 2016 roku przeprowadzono
dwadzieścia osiem wywiadów fokusowych z młodzieżą w wieku od 18 do 24
lat, po cztery w każdym z krajów objętych badaniem – w Polsce, Niemczech,
Austrii, Rumunii, Czechach oraz na Słowacji i na Węgrzech. W oparciu o wnioski
z badania jakościowego w 2017 roku w badanej grupie w ww. krajach przeprowa-
dzono obejmującą ponad 40 pytań reprezentatywną ankietę typu CAWI.
Przedstawione przez autorów wyniki badań wskazują na stosunkowo wysoki

poziom atomizacji i alienacji społecznej wśród młodzieży. Stabilnym elementem
zakorzenienia (niezależnie od narodowości i statusu materialnego responden-
tów) – pozostaje rodzina. Alarmujące 15% badanych zadeklarowało, że nie może
liczyć na wsparcie żadnej osoby czy instytucji. Podkreślić należy również ogólny
pesymizm respondentów dotyczący rozwoju sytuacji w ich krajach. Dwukrotnie
więcej respondentów wskazywało, że sytuacja zmienia się na gorsze (41%) niż na
lepsze (20%).
Jeśli chodzi o potencjalną akceptację dla praktyk palingenetycznych (odpowiedzi

„tak”, „raczej tak” i „trudno powiedzieć”) często sięgała nawet 80% (w zależności
od kraju i zadanego pytania) i (z wyjątkiem przypadku ludzko-zwierzęce hybry-
dy) nigdy nie spadła poniżej 50% badanych. Autorzy podkreślili przy tym, że
odpowiedzi „trudno powiedzieć” wobec tak istotnych kwestii nie powinno się
traktować jako „neutralnej”.
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Respondenci nie dostrzegają związku między kłamstwami i manipulacjami rządu

a własną wolnością osobistą. Nie łączą pojęcia demokracji z racjonalnością decyzji
podejmowanych przez dobrze poinformowanych obywateli; nie łączą szacunku
dla swojej godności i zdolności do podejmowania odpowiedzialnych decyzji
z prawem do życia w prawdzie.
W krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej spotykamy się z przekonaniem (sięga-

jącym 44% w Polsce i 45% w Czechach), że „rząd wybrany w demokratycznych
wyborach może być w istocie totalitarny”, podczas gdy w innych krajach (Niemcy
i Austria) takie podejście występuje u mniej niż jednej trzeciej respondentów.
Na koniec badacze zwrócili uwagę, że deklaracje opowiadające się za demokra-

cją i wolnością młodych ludzi – nigdy łącznie nie przekraczają 80% odpowie-
dzi. Z punktu widzenia rozkładu statystycznego jest to zrozumiałe. Wskazuje
jednak, że w odpowiedziach na prawie każde pytanie w tym obszarze można
zauważyć obecność około 10-20% (czasami zbliżających się do 50%) fawory-
zujących przeciwne opcje. Odpowiedzi na wiele pytań interpretowanych
jako jednoznacznie pro-wolnościowe nie przekraczają na ogół poziomu 50%.
Wskazuje to, że o przyszłości będą decydować ci, których wyróżniono jako
niezdecydowanych.
***
Implikacją opisanego seminarium było spotkanie dr hab. Michała Gierycza, prof.

UKSW z działem edukacji Instytutu Pileckiego. W wąskim gronie uczestnicy
zastanawiali się, jak przekuć koncepcje autorów raportu na konkretne działania
edukacyjno-formacyjne. Warsztatowe spotkanie nie miało na celu formułowania
daleko idących postulatów, ale można na jego podstawie zarysować kilka prostych
rekomendacji dla nauczycieli i wychowawców.
1. Sama wiedza nie wystarcza. Wielu intelektualistów zostało pociągniętych final-

nie zbrodniczymi ideami.
2. Społeczeństwo potrzebuje wartości, których samo z siebie nie może wyprodu-
kować – odcinając liberalne społeczeństwo od religii – odcinamy je od źródeł,
których samo nie może wyprodukować.
3. Istnieją granice dla ludzkiej wolności, a dobro, w tym bezpieczny ustrój
państwowy nie jest dany raz na zawsze.
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4. Konieczne jest pokazywanie istoty i mechanizmów przemian ustrojowych,

w jaki sposób może dochodzić do transformacji ustrojowej z demokracji liberal-
nej do totalitaryzmu.
5. W celu zapobiegania atomizacji konieczne jest wzmacnianie rodziny; obok
Kościoła stanowi ona jedyną „wyspę odrębności”.
6. Istotne jest zwracanie uwagi młodzieży na substytuty religii i pociągający urok
ideologii.
7. Warto ukazywać niebezpieczeństwa związane z poszukiwaniem nowego,
ulepszonego człowieka.
8. Zadaniem nauczycieli i edukatorów jest budowanie zdolności do krytycznego
myślenia i wolności myśli, czyli edukacja nie przedmiotu a podmiotu, który
prawdę odkrywa w sobie.
9. Finalnie niezwykle istotna jest kwestia równości w godności każdego człowieka
ukazywana w codziennym doświadczeniu.
Raport Totalitaryzm w epoce postmodernizmu można nabyć w wersji książkowej

w Wydawnictwie Naukowym UKSW lub pobrać pdf ze strony Wydawnictwa lub
portalu Europejskiej Sieci Pamięć i Solidarność.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Edward Balawajder
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Polska
ORCID: 0000-0001-9321-8882
Recenzja książki: Stefan Wyszyński,

Chrześcijańska doktryna społeczna.
Redakcja: Marek Wódka, Stanisław Fel, Wydawnictwo KUL,
Lublin 2020, ss. 201.
W 1981 roku Prymas Stefan Wyszyński pisał: „Opracowanie całokształtu dziejów

katolickiej myśli, nauki i pracy społecznej, jest potrzebą chwili i nakazem sprawie-
dliwości. Bez należytego przedstawienia tego zasobu energii społeczeństwa
polskiego nie zdołamy w pełni docenić jego możliwości”. Do wyrażenia takiej
opinii Prymas Stefan Wyszyński był szczególnie uprawniony, jako świadek
i promotor idei katolicko-społecznej w Polsce w XX stuleciu, znawca i historyk
złożonych jej dziejów, uważny obserwator i analityk zróżnicowanych tez, nurtów
i szkół. Przyjmując, że termin „katolicyzm społeczny” łączy w jedno myśl
i działanie, to bez zastrzeżeń należy uznać Prymasa Tysiąclecia, jego myśl i dzieło,
intelektualne i duszpasterskie, za postać absolutnie wyjątkową, wręcz prorocką.
Motyw Jego społecznego apostolatu wyrażał się, między innymi, retorycznym
pytaniem: „co stanowi istotę konieczności namysłu nad rzeczywistością społecz-
ną, jej opisywaniem, korygowaniem i jak ją widzieć, czy tak jak chciał K. Marks,
czy raczej należy sięgnąć dalej – do stale obecnych w życiu i współżyciu narodów
praw przyrodzonych rządzących tym życiem?”. Podejście to wyrastało z naucza-
nia i tradycji społecznej Kościoła głoszącego, że „rzeczą niemożliwą jest tworzyć
nowe społeczeństwo i nowe ustroje w przeciwieństwie do naturalnych warunków
ludzkich” (Pius IX).
Chrześcijańska doktryna społeczna to tytuł skryptu do wykładu dra Stefana

Wyszyńskiego, biskupa lubelskiego, przeprowadzonego w roku akademickim
1947/1948. Jego adresatami byli studenci ekonomii, którzy go spisali i wydali
w maszynopisie nakładem Koła Naukowego Ekonomistów Studentów KUL (95
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stron). Z opracowania tego korzystali również słuchacze Studium Zagadnień

Społecznych i Gospodarczych Wsi KUL, którego wykładowcą był też Wyszyński.
M. Wódka i S. Fel, redaktorzy książki, zasłużeni dla sprawy propagowania

myśli społecznej kardynała Wyszyńskiego, pracownicy naukowi Instytutu
Nauk Socjologicznych KUL, podjęli cenną inicjatywę wydawniczą krytycznego
opracowania skryptu. Wydobyli archiwalny egzemplarz z zasobów Biblioteki
Uniwersyteckiej lubelskiej uczelni, przedkładając go szerszej rzeszy czytelników.
Za sprawą ich naukowego trudu otrzymaliśmy możliwość poszerzonej i pogłę-
bionej analizy koncepcji katolickiej nauki społecznej Stefana Wyszyńskiego.
Rzeczą zastanawiającą jest, że uznani znawcy zagadnienia jak Cz. Strzeszewski,
J. Majka, P. Nitecki znali maszynopis tegoż skryptu, jednakże w ich tekstach nie
znajdziemy szczególnego nim zainteresowania. Być może stało się tak z powodu
dominującej w skrypcie perspektywy historycznej, którą uznali za nieprzydatną
dla systematycznego profilu ich analiz. Jednakże Cz. Strzeszewski podniósł, że
ks. Wyszyński do studium katolickiej nauki społecznej wprowadził nowość, to
jest orientację na jej historię. „Nowy wzorzec tej nauki” – w jego opinii – stano-
wił element różnicujący w odniesieniu do systematycznego profilu uprawiania
tej dyscypliny przez ks. A. Szymańskiego. Sądzę, że umiejętność Wyszyńskiego
w obszarze klarownego przedstawiania i uzasadniania tzw. zagadnień różnicu-
jących ułatwiała Mu definiowanie różnych szkół i stanowisk uczonych, co nota
bene uważał za konieczne, ponieważ „w miarę jak życie ludzkie będzie się różni-
cowało i specjalizowało, wypracowywać się będzie coraz pełniejszy obraz myśli
katolickiej, na tle której wyodrębniać się będzie swoimi zarysami katolicka nauka
społeczna. To jest praca wieków i pokoleń” (s. 68).
Chrześcijańska doktryna społeczna składa się z dwóch dopełniających się części:

zasadniczej, czyli skryptu z wykładów dra Wyszyńskiego sprzed 72 lat oraz 5
artykułów autorów, którzy jako specjaliści, podjęli się roli komentatorów. Całość
poprzedza Wstęp Redaktorów, w którym przedstawili przekonujące motywy podję-
tego przedsięwzięcia, przybliżyli osobę i miejsce Stefana Wyszyńskiego w ojczy-
stych dziejach, akcentując Jego związki z Katolickim Uniwersytetem Lubelskim,
którego był studentem, a z czasem także nauczycielem akademickim. Czytelnik
dowie się m.in. o początkowo nieskutecznych staraniach o zatrudnienie go na
uczelni, relacjach z kadrą naukowo-dydaktyczną i władzami – zwłaszcza rektorem
KUL ks. A. Szymańskim. Jest też próba odpowiedzi na pytanie: dlaczego swój
wykład z katolickiej nauki społecznej Wyszyński opatrzył określeniem „doktry-
na”. Autorzy wprowadzenia, zatrzymują się nad wyjaśnieniem P. Niteckiego,
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który wyeksponował „perspektywę duszpasterskiego posłannictwa Kościoła”

jako materię doktryny. To ujęcie, mimo wszystko jest niepełne, a takim może
pozostać jeśli pominiemy wpływy Kodeksu Społecznego oraz niemieckiej szkoły
historycznej (narodowej). Ks. Wyszyński przywołuje jej polskich reprezentantów
(S. Głąbińskiego i H. Radziszewskiego). „Doktryna” w ujęciu „starych” ruchów
społecznych i intelektualnych, a te Wyszyński doceniał, ma znacząco pogłębiony
charakter, nie wykluczający stanowiska P. Niteckiego. Skoro „Kościół nie tworzy
doktryn i systemów społeczno-gospodarczych” (s. 18), to inspiracja i trwanie przy
„doktrynie” być może wypływała z respektowania i szacunku dla przeszłości. Ks.
Wyszyński ten moment podnosił w wystąpieniach adresowanych do członków
SKMA „Odrodzenie” (Tygodnie Społeczne), publikowanych w prasie stowarzy-
szenia. Jak wyjaśnić genezę wielości sformułowań niemalże zamiennie stosowa-
nych przez Niego używanych w rodzaju: „katolicyzm doktrynalny”, „katolicka
doktryna społeczna”, „doktryna społeczna”, „ustrój chrześcijański”, czy tytułowa
„chrześcijańska doktryna społeczna”? Do istoty „doktryny” przynależy to, co
wynika z przeszłości i niepodważone zachowuje należną aktualność.
Skrypt dra S. Wyszyńskiego tworzą trzy rozdziały zatytułowane: Katolicka nauka

społeczna, Źródła norm katolickiej nauki społecznej i gospodarczej oraz Z dziejów
katolickiej myśli społecznej. Autor podejmuje w nich wątki szczegółowe, które
przybliżają poznawczą perspektywę, jego warsztat i terminologię. Czytelnik
może odnieść wrażenie nieładu, gdy dostrzeże, że tytułową kategorię rozdziału
pierwszego poprzedzają rozważania nt. katolickiej etyki gospodarczej. Całość
zamykają Wskazania bibliograficzne, w których przywołał tytuły publikacji
czołowych autorów polskich (A. Szymańskiego, J. Woronieckiego, L. Caro, K.
Lutosławskiego, J. Piwowarczyka) i zagranicznych (J. Messnera, G. Toniolo, H.
Pescha, L. Garrigueta), zebrane w tematyczne działy: katolicka literatura ekono-
miczna, ekonomia praktyczna i polityka społeczna.
Część drugą publikacji wypełniają artykuły wprost bądź pośrednio nawiązujące

do Chrześcijańskiej doktryny społecznej i miejsca jej autora w historii katolicyzmu
społecznego w Polsce. I tak Jan Żaryn (KUL a społeczna nuka Kościoła) przypomi-
na, wyrażone na początku lat 70. XX wieku, przekonanie byłego rektora lubelskiej
uczelni M.A. Krąpca, o istnieniu „utkanej z wielu nici i wątków” więzi między
uniwersytetem a osobą Prymasa Wyszyńskiego, tak, że „niepodobieństwem jest
ukazanie jej adekwatnego obrazu w krótkim artykule”. Wartością – co podkreślić
należy – tekstu historyka z UKSW i badacza dziejów Kościoła w Polsce jest ukazanie
perspektywy roku 1918. „Ta Uczelnia (KUL) nie przez przypadek powstała wtedy,
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gdy Polska odzyskała niepodległość. Dopiero wówczas staliśmy się, jako Polacy
i katolicy, w pełni zdolni do porządkowania przestrzeni społeczno-gospodarczej
narzędziami pozostającymi w dyspozycji suwerennego państwa”. Istotnie, KUL
zaistniał jako wsparcie dla suwerena, który – odzyskawszy państwo – miał prawo
oczekiwać propozycji w trudzie zagospodarowywania wolności w jej wielorakich
odniesieniach, w czym pomocny był Kościół i jego społeczne nauczanie. Było ono
„kompasem” dla przyszłej pracy studentów i absolwentów w życiu publicznym.
Ruch chrześcijańsko-demokratyczny, także narodowy, w okresie międzywojnia
zyskiwał włączając w swoje szeregi młodzież ideowo ukształtowaną w środowi-
sku SKMA „Odrodzenie. K. Turowski, historyk tego stowarzyszenia, pisał,,że
ks. Wyszyński był w nim, niekwestionowanym autorytetem, Nauczycielem
i Przewodnikiem, Ojcem.
KUL, a także późniejszy kardynał Prymas, działali w realiach PRL-u, w państwie

nowo kreowanym, które – jak zauważa w interesującym artykule M. Hułas (Pośród
szkół i tradycji. Źródła katolickiej nauki społecznej Stefana Wyszyńskiego) – „w swej
autorytarnej opresyjności nie tolerowało najmniejszych nawet poczynań mogących
osłabiać umacnianą ciągle jeszcze bazę monopolu na prawomocność i panowanie”
(s. 40). Autor identyfikuje źródła myśli społecznej, z których czerpał Wyszyński,
prowadzi czytelnika intelektualną ścieżką autora skryptu, identyfikuje tradycje
intelektualne, z których czerpał (s. 133). Gruntowna egzegeza dokonana przez
M. Hułasa uwzględnia kontekst powstania, układu i merytorycznej zawartości
skrypt, wskazując przy tym, że „ekonomia i system ekonomiczny jest jedyną insty-
tucją społeczną, na której koncentruje się jego wykład” (s. 138). Czytelnik spotka
w tekście tezy niejasne, problematyczne, gdy na przykład autor komentarza pisze:
„Autor skryptu traktuje katolicyzm jako uniwersalną miarę prawidłowości. Etykę
chrześcijańską jako drugą twarz etyki uniwersalistycznej”. W innym miejscu:
„Skrypt, jak każdy tekst naukowy, ma swą warstwę denotacyjną, jak każdy tekst
tego typu zawiera w sobie złożoną sieć konotacji, dających wgląd w motywy i cele
autora czy ogólnie w jego Sitz im Leben”.
Artykuł S. Fela, kierownika Katedry Katolickiej Nauki Społecznej i Socjologii

Moralności, dziekana Wydziału Nauk Społecznych KUL, zapewne inicjatora
przedsięwzięcia wydawniczego, (Stefan Wyszyński – prekursor lubelskiej szkoły
katolickiej nauki społecznej) traktuje o dwóch wybitnych postaciach w historii KNS
i stuletnich dziejów lubelskiej Alma Mater. Obok Prymasa to Czesław Strzeszewski,
dziekan Wydziału Prawa i Nauk Społeczno-Ekonomicznych zlikwidowanego przez
komunistyczne władze, historyk, ekonomista ze szkoły W. Grabskiego, szerzej
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znany jako założyciel lubelskiej szkoły KNS. On zaprosił doktora S. Wyszyńskiego,

aby podjął wykład, utrwalony w skrypcie opublikowanym w recenzowanej książ-
ce dla studentów ekonomii, a także słuchaczy Studium Zagadnień Społecznych
i Gospodarczych Wsi KUL. Po latach wyznał, że Wyszyńskiego rozumienie i ujęcie
dyscypliny było dla niego inspiracją, zaś „skrypt z Jego wykładów stał się wzorem
dla moich wykładów z katolickiej nauki społecznej”.
„Próba ustalenia, czy i na ile ujęcie KNS zawarte w skrypcie Wyszyńskiego

można uznać za pewien pierwowzór, który stanowił podwaliny i wyznaczył
ramy lubelskiej szkoły KNS” jest bez wątpienia aktem intelektualnej odwagi S.
Fela, wyrazem jego kompetencji i uznania dla obu mistrzów. Pytania S. Fela,
jak wiele podobnych, stoją w „drzwiach otwartych”. Czy dążenia ks. Antoniego
Szymańskiego do utworzenia szkoły KNS przed 1939 rokiem były rzeczywiste?
Dlaczego okazały się nieefektywne? Strzeszewski podejmując zajęcia w Lublinie
szedł drogą od Grabskiego w stronę Wyszyńskiego. Nie odrzucając formacji
pierwszego, promotora historycznej szkoły narodowej w ekonomii, zbliżał się
do Wyszyńskiego, w sensie dostrzegania ideowej bliskości – a z czasem – nawet
tożsamości, co powodowało, że mogli razem wkraczać na rozległe pola dyscy-
pliny ich łączącej. Teza, że ujęcie przedstawione w skrypcie znalazło rozwinięcie
i ugruntowanie w szkole Strzeszewskiego, została przez S. Fela uzasadniona
z wykorzystaniem ujęcia wypracowanego przez F. J. Mazurka. Wskazał on na
przymioty ujęcia Wyszyńskiego (interdyscyplinarność, biblicyzm, historyzm,
etycyzm, praktycyzm, dynamizm ujmowania prawa naturalnego), w perspekty-
wie którego Wyszyński rzeczywiście jawi się jako prekursor i ideowy założyciel
lubelskiej szkoły KNS. Strzeszewski dał jej „nowy początek” będąc dla niej nie tyle
„ojcem”, co twórczym kontynuatorem.
Artykuły B. Klimczak (Ekonomiczny przyczynek do chrześcijańskich źródeł insty-

tucji gospodarczych) oraz M. Zdun (Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego koncepcja
społeczeństwa a nurt „trzeciej socjologii”) dopełniają całości części komentator-
skiej publikacji. W pierwszym autorka, koncentruje się wokół terminu „instytu-
cje gospodarcze”, który pojawił się w skrypcie na oznaczenie związków z pracą
i własnością, a te pozostawały w kanonie i polu zainteresowania Wyszyńskiego.
Tekst wrocławskiej ekonomistki znacząco poszerza perspektywę poznawczą.
Istotnie – jak zauważa – rzeczywistość społeczna i gospodarcza w Polsce i na
świecie podlega radykalnej zmianie, dają o sobie znać nowe kwestie społeczne
i gospodarcze oczekujące trwałych rozwiązań. Perspektywa skryptu w obszarze
ekonomii nie traci na znaczeniu, także w wymiarze historycznym, przeciwnie
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– aktualizuje się na bieżąco w refleksji społecznej Kościoła. Tu – głosił Jan Paweł

II – trzeba przekroczyć siebie! „Pomimo wieloznaczności języka i różnych inter-
pretacji faktów instytucjonalnych” istnieje „obszar wspólny dla chrześcijańskiej
doktryny społecznej i ekonomii instytucji” (s.162).
Kardynał Wyszyński – uważa M. Zdun – przedstawia w Chrześcijańskiej doktrynie

społecznej, niewyrażoną expressis verbis, propozycję rozumienia społeczeństwa,
która „implikuje definicję jednostki i dookreśla jej pozycję w świecie”. Autorka
ma prawo do „wyczytywania myśli niejako między wierszami”, nawet uznania
jej identyfikacji za „szczególnie ważną”, bo dowodzi możliwości oddziaływania
Kościoła na społeczeństwo (165-166). W innym miejscu czytamy: „Jak Kościół
może na społeczeństwo oddziaływać, skoro za cel nie stawia sobie uformowania
konkretnego modelu? Odpowiedź jest w rzeczonym skrypcie i całokształcie poglą-
dów Prymasa, który odrzucał kolektywizm społeczny, jego antropologię”, wizję
wolności etc. Tak więc nie jednostka a osoba ludzka (lub osobowość), człowiek
a nie społeczeństwo, konstruują możliwą wizję (model) „uczestnictwa w świecie”.
Analizy, także empiryczne, zawsze muszą mieć teoretyczną podstawę, konceptu-
alne zakorzenienie. Z autorką wypada się zgodzić w kwestii zdecydowanej negacji
antropologicznego redukcjonizmu, ukrytego w zastosowanej aparaturze. Prymas,
jak rzadko kto inny, piętnował i odrzucał wszelkie formy redukcjonizmu. Czynił
to w imię racjonalności jako „prawa jednostki”. Za interesujące można uznać
rozważania M. Zdun ześrodkowane wokół nurtu „trzeciej socjologii”, odkrywa-
jącej „przestrzeń międzyludzką, zasypującą przepaść między redukcjonizmem
a realizmem” (s. 171), aczkolwiek niejednoznaczne, w odniesieniu do KNS i myśli
społecznej Stefana Wyszyńskiego.
Przedstawiony tytuł wydawniczy z przekonaniem polecam jako pożyteczną

lekturę szerszemu gronu osób żywo zainteresowanych dorobkiem intelektualnym
Księdza Prymasa. Zapewne wpisze się na stałe na listę opracowań oczekiwanych
i pożądanych wśród specjalistów, wykładowców i studentów, oraz duchowień-
stwa. Myśl Wyszyńskiego w żadnym razie nie należy do przeszłości, o czym warto
pamiętać w obliczu nadchodzącej uroczystości Jego beatyfikacji.
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No 25, 2021
WORLD • POLITICS
Mariusz Sulkowski
O islamie w perspektywie apologetycznej

Recenzja książki Abbé Guy Pagès
pt. Prawdziwe oblicze islamu, tł. P. Włodyga OSB
Wydawnictwo AA, Kraków 2020, ss. 528.
Książka księdza Guy Pagès’a jest wyjątkową publikacją w języku polskim. Jej Autor
(rocznik 1958) jest kapłanem posługującym we Francji (w paryskiej diecezji),
państwie o największej liczbie muzułmanów w Unii Europejskiej (ok. 6 mln osób).
Wcześniej jako duszpasterz pracował w muzułmańskiej Republice Dżibuti, a obecnie
popularyzuje wiedzę na temat islamu, jest m.in. redaktorem portalu poświęconego
islamowi (www.islam-et-verite.com). Chociaż na polskim rynku nie brakuje książek,
w których autorzy krytycznie, czy wprost polemicznie odnoszą się do islamu (np.
Oriana Fallaci, Bill Warner), to po raz pierwszy polski czytelnik otrzymuje publika-
cję, która jest apologią chrześcijańską. Ten gatunek literacki, rzadko już spotykany,
nastawiony jest na obronę chrześcijańskich prawd wiary, a w tym przypadku jest to
zdecydowana obrona przed teologicznymi „zarzutami” stawianymi chrześcijaństwu
przez islam. Autor systematycznie i metodycznie operując narzędziami teologii
chrześcijańskiej przepuszcza frontalny atak na doktrynalne podstawy islamu.
Publikacja ta daleka jest od półcieni i niejednoznaczności, a ks. Pagès nie próbuje
kryć się z tym, że dokonuje analizy islamu z perspektywy poznanej Prawdy, którą
jest Jezus Chrystus i Jego Objawienie [por. Ex Corde Ecclesiae 1990: 1]. Z tego też
względu Autor nie niuansuje, nie pozostawia niedomówień, ale stawia sprawę na
ostrzu (Hbr 4,12) stwierdzając, że w swej istocie islam „teologicznie można identy-
fikować tylko z anty-Chrystusem” (s. 26). Wydawać by się mogło, że teza ta daleka
jest od współczesnego „ducha dialogu” i braterstwa, jednak Autor wskazuje, że tak
nie jest – i to z kilku względów. Po pierwsze ks. Guy Pagès zastrzega, że jego kryty-
ka nie dotyczy muzułmanów, a islamu – określonej doktryny, systemu idei, a nie
poszczególnych osób. Takie rozróżnienie nie jest retorycznym zabiegiem mającym
uspokoić czytelnika, ale ważnym zastrzeżeniem metodologicznym – analiza ma
przede wszystkim charakter teoretyczny, a nie empiryczny, stąd bliżej jej do warszta-
tu teologii niż nauk społecznych takich jak socjologia czy politologia. Po drugie – być
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z kimś w dialogu, to szanować go jako człowieka i jego podmiotowość, dostrzegać

w nim osobę, której należy się prawda. Wszelkie półcienie, „uprzejme przemilczenia”
nie zbliżają nas do siebie jako ludzi, a wręcz przeciwnie – ujawniają nasze poczucie
wyższości, zakładają, że nasz rozmówca nie dorósł do „pełni prawdy”, którą my
co prawda znamy, ale On nie będzie w stanie jej przyjąć. Ks. Guy Pagès wychodzi
z założenia, że traktując muzułmanów poważnie i z szacunkiem – winniśmy im
prawdę, że miarą i kryterium dialogu jest Słowo, a nie słówka, choćby najmilsze
i pełne zapewnień o braterstwie. To zasadnicza różnica – dialog to zbyt poważna
sprawa, aby go banalizować. Można odrzucać islam, a muzułmanów kochać jak
siebie samego (s. 22).
Publikacja podzielona jest na trzy części: O Bogu, O Objawieniu oraz O Człowieku.

Już na początku pierwszej części Autor stawia zasadnicze pytanie – „czy chrze-
ścijanie i muzułmanie mają tego samego Boga?” Zazwyczaj w takich sytuacjach
pada prosta odpowiedź – tak, skoro jest jeden Bóg, to logicznym jest, że mamy tego
samego Boga. Zazwyczaj stwierdzenie takie zamyka dyskusję, jednak dla Autora
jest ona dopiero początkiem wywodu i dalszych badań. Otóż wiedzieć, że jest jeden
Bóg, to jedno (do tego wniosku prowadzi rozum naturalny), a wiedzieć Kim jest
Bóg – to drugie – do tego potrzeba Objawienia (s. 39). A to, co przedstawia Koran
jako objawienie Allaha, jak wskazuje ks. Pagès, jest zupełnie różne – i co ważniej-
sze – w swoich kluczowych momentach jest wprost sprzeczne z Objawieniem
chrześcijańskim. Nie zmienia tego faktu to, że islam uznaje Jezusa za proroka
– co więcej, te przekonanie wskazuje na zasadniczą różnicę między chrześcijań-
stwem a islamem – Jezus nie jest tylko prorokiem, jest Bogiem, co Koran z całą
mocą neguje i zwalcza (Koran 5,17). W tym właśnie wymiarze islam jest ściśle
antychrześcijański. Bóg islamu jest Bogiem absolutnie transcendentnym, a myśl
o tym, że mógłby się wcielić i przyjąć ludzką naturę, a następnie umrzeć na krzyżu,
po to, aby zbawić człowieka jest dla islamu bluźnierstwem. Allah nie jest kimś
z kim można wejść w komunię, jest kimś, komu należy się najwyższa cześć, jest
największym majestatem, mocą – ale nie Bogiem, który oddaje samego siebie dla
zbawienia człowieka. Dalej – Bóg chrześcijan jest Bogiem w Trójcy, co islam neguje
jako bałwochwalstwo i znamię politeizmu (Koran 9, 31). Dla chrześcijan Bóg jest
Logosem, Prawdą dającą się poznawać – i co więcej – pragnącą być poznawaną
przez człowieka – dla islamu Allah jest arbitralną wolą, której rozum ludzki nie
jest w stanie poznać, ale powinien się jej jedynie podporządkować.
W drugiej części publikacji ks. Pagès bada źródła obu religii i konfrontuje je ze
sobą wskazując na trudności z prowadzeniem dialogu z muzułmanami w sytuacji,
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w której uważają oni, że Pismo Święte zostało sfałszowane (s. 137). Z drugiej zaś
strony zdaniem Autora istnieje wiele dowodów wskazujących na to, że Koran
w znacznym stopniu wchłonął nieortodoksyjne, czy wprost heretyckie (s. 196)
poglądy sekt wczesnochrześcijańskich, judaizujących chrześcijan (sekta ebionitów)
oraz elementy nauczania Talmudu (teza ta jest zbieżna z badaniami m.in. Joachima
Gnilki czy Christopha Luxenberga dowodzącymi oparciu Koranu na lekcjonarzu
syro-aramejskim). Ks. Pagès powołuje się także na badania odnalezionego w 1972
r. rękopisu z Sany wskazując, że pierwotnie istniały różne wersje Koranu (s. 185).
Ten fragment książki wydaje się najtrudniejszy dla czytelnika nie tylko ze wzglę-
du na konieczność posiadania dosyć dużej wiedzy z zakresu krytyki tekstu, ale
także ze względu na prezentowanie szeregu naukowych hipotez i badań, które nie
zawsze są ze sobą spójne [por. Grodzki 2017]. W tej części Autor polemizuje także
z islamską teologią zakładającą, że Jezus zapowiadał przyjcie Mahometa (s. 115),
co jest jednym z kluczowych argumentów apologetów islamskich wskazujących
na ciągłość Objawienia chrześcijańsko-islamskiego. Autor odnosi się także do
sunny i hadisów jako z jednej strony źródła totalności islamu, w którym całe
życie i wszystkie jego płaszczyzny podporządkowane są wymogom i rytuałom
religijnym (s. 228), a z drugiej jako źródło nieetycznych zachowań muzułmanów (s.
275). Autor nie cofa się także przed stawieniem pytań o to, dlaczego muzułmanie,
tak zdecydowanie odcinający się od pogaństwa i akcentujących jedyność Boga,
oddają jednocześnie kult kamieniowi w świątyni Kaaba, który czczony był przez
Arabów w czasach pogańskich?
W ostatniej części „O człowieku” francuski badacz odnosi się do niezwykle aktual-

nych i ważnych kwestii dotyczących tego, na ile doktryna islamu jest źródłem
społecznej stygmatyzacji niewiernych, marginalizacji kobiet czy legitymizacji
przemocy w przestrzeni społeczno-politycznej. Autor wskazuje, że islam w znacz-
nym stopniu nie ma charakteru typowo duchowego, jak to jest w przypadku
chrześcijaństwa, w którym osoba wierząca dąży do duchowej komunii z Bogiem
we własnym sumieniu, ale jest przede wszystkim systemem prawnym, którego
zasadniczym celem jest zewnętrzne podporządkowanie zasadom ummy (wspól-
noty muzułmańskiej) (s. 382). Ks. Pagès wskazuje także, że islam ze swej natury
sprzeczny jest z postępem, ponieważ systemowo uczynił on „mityczne czasy
Mahometa” (s. 414) swoim zasadniczym punktem odniesienia. W konsekwencji
islam doktrynalnie zasklepił się nie tylko na wszelką religijną reformę, ale także
na wszelkie rzeczywiste zmiany dotyczące kluczowych relacji społecznych, w tym
m.in. na możliwość skutecznej integracji społecznej muzułmanów w Europie czy
zmiany sytuacji kobiet. Muzułmanin chcący być „dobrym Europejczykiem” musi
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ostatecznie przestać być „dobrym muzułmaninem” – i nie jest to zdanie dotyczą-

ce oceny samych muzułmanów, tylko konsekwentne wyciągnięcie wniosków
z doktryny islamu.
Myliłby się ten, kto widziałby w osobie ks. Pagès’a przedstawiciela nurtu katastro-
ficznego czy osobę obwiniającą islam za rosnące napięcia społeczne w dzisiejszej
Europie. Współczesnym wyzwaniem nie jest islam, ale stosunek Kościoła do
muzułmanów. Autor wskazuje, że Kościół w znacznym stopniu odszedł od swojej
misji, a przecież pierwszą powinnością Kościoła jest „wykorzystywać wszystkie
konieczne środki, by stworzyć formy ewangelizacji muzułmanów” (s. 33). Czy to
nie za mocne słowa, które przecież są poważnym zarzutem? Niech odpowiedzią
będzie refleksja na temat tego, kiedy ostatni raz w Kościele słyszeliśmy modlitwę
o nawrócenie muzułmanów. Czy Pan Jezus, Syn Boga Żywego jest już muzułma-
nom niepotrzebny [por. Dominus Iesus 2000: nr 22]?
Bibliografia
Dominus Iesus (2000), Jan Paweł II, Deklaracja o jedyności i powszechności zbawczej Jezusa
Chrystusa i Kościoła, Kongregacja Nauki Wiary, Watykan.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae (1990), Jan Pawł II, Konstytucja apostolska Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła
II o uniwersytetach katolickich, Watykan.
Gnilka J. (2010), Koran i chrześcijanie. Tajemnice początków, Wydawnictwo Jedność,
Kielce.
Grodzki Marcin (2017), Panteon sceptyków. Przegląd współczesnych teorii naukowych
poświęconych genezie islamu, Katedra Arabistyki i Islamistyki Uniwersytetu
Warszawskiego, Warszawa.
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Biographical note
Edward Balawajder – PhD in the humanities in the field of sociology, retired

researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of
the Catholic University of Lublin in Lublin, assistant professor initially at the
Department of Sociology of Morality, then at the Department of Sociology of
Knowledge and Education. Areas of scientific interest: social and economic
ethics, history of Catholic social science, social axiology, history of social thought,
history of Christian Democrats in Poland / mainly the views of its leader Wojciech
Korfanty /, issues of civil society and systemic transformation in Poland.
Chamberland Laura – a policy advisor for the Government of Canada. She

received her MA at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate Studies of Public and
International Affairs in 2020, and has a Bachelor of Social Science also at the
University of Ottawa in the Faculty of Political Science and History.
Jerzy Ciechański – PhD – Regional & Global Studies, Department of Political

Science & International Studies, Warsaw University. Graduate of the Warsaw
University Department of Law & Administration (LLM) and of Northern Illinois
University (PhD in political science). Academic teacher in Poland and the US.
Participated in Poland’s EU accession negotiations. Former chairman of the
Management Board of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
& Working Conditions and of the Council of Europe Social Cohesion Committee
and deputy chair of the EU Social Protection Committee. Publications on the UN
role in the maintenance of international peace and security, social human rights
and EU employment and social policy.
Bruno-Marie Duffe – French Catholic priest, doctor of philosophy, theology and

social ethics, since 2017 secretary of the Vatican Dicastery for Promoting Integral
Human Development.
Gérard-François Dumont – professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne.

Previously a Member Section of the Economic and Social Council, an expert with
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the European Economic and Social Committee and with Council of Europe, he
ran the journal Population & Avenir, is an administrator of the Paris Geographical
Society and member of Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.
Aniela Dylus – The Institute of Political Sciences at the Cardinal Stefan

Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Professor, Ph.D., humanities and social
sciences. The main research interests include: economic policy, globalization
processes, ethical thought in economy, Catholic social teaching, and Church–
state relations. Selected publications: The Problems of Ethics of Science in the
Lvov-Warsaw School (1987); The Extreme Morality as a Problem for Catholic
Social Teaching (1992); Economy-Morality-Christianity (1994); Changeability and
Continuity. Polish Political Transformation – Ethical View (1997); The Global
Market and its Limits (2001); Globalization. Ethical Reflections (2005); Politics
in Ethical and Religious Perspective (2016), Economy in Ethical and Religious
Perspective (2016).
Rosita Garškaitė – PhD candidate at the Institute of International Relations and

Political Science at Vilnius University, preparing a dissertation on the question of
how Catholics make sense of the European Union. Her research interests include
political sociology, sociology of religion, religion and politics, European identity,
philosophy of the social science, social teaching of the Catholic Church.
Łukasz Kaczmarczyk – holds PhDs in economics (international economics)

and theological sciences (theology of culture). From 2015, an assistant professor
at the Institute of Political Sciences and Administration at the Cardinal Stefan
Wyszyński University in Warsaw. Scientific interests: ethical and political aspects
of economics, economy-culture relations.
Jarosław Macała – PhD, a Polish historian and political scientist. Research

Interests: History of Political Thought, Geopolitics, Religion and Politics, Social
and Political Movements, Contemporary History. Associate Professor in Institute
of Political Science at the University of Zielona Góra.
Tamás Nyirkos – research fellow at the National University of Public Service

and associate professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary. He has
lectured on conservatism, political theology, and democratic theory at the Catholic
University of Portugal, the University of Lapland, and the Babes-Bolyai University
in Romania. He was also a visiting scholar at the University of Notre Dame.
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Ewelina U. Ochab – human rights advocate, author, and co-founder of the Coalition
for Genocide Response. Ochab works on the topic of persecution of minorities
around the world, with main projects including Daesh genocide in Syria and Iraq,
Boko Haram atrocities in West Africa, and the situation of religious minorities in
South Asia. Ochab has written over 30 UN reports (including Universal Periodic
Review reports) and has made oral and written submissions at the Human Rights
Council sessions and the UN Forum on Minority Issues. Ochab is currently
working on her PhD in international law, human rights and medical ethics.
Ochab authored the initiative and proposal to establish the UN International Day
Commemorating Victims and Survivors of Religious Persecution. The initiative
has led to the establishment of the UN International Day Commemorating the
Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief on August 22.
Wojciech Roszkowski – professor of history at the Institute of Political Studies

(ISP) of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Fellow at the International Wilson Center
for Scholars in Washington, D.C., visiting professor at the Univeristy of Maryland,
College Park (1988-1989), prorector of the Warsaw School of Economics (1990-
1993), ISP director (1994-2000), Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies, University of
Virginia in Charlottesville, Va (2000-02), Member of the European Parliament
(2004-2009). Author of e.g. “Najnowsza historia Polski” (under penname Andrzej
Albert), “Półwiecze. Historia polityczna świata po 1945 roku” (1997), „East Central
Europe. A Concise History” (2015)”, „Roztrzaskane lustro” (2019) and a history of
Christianity „Świętości, upadki, nawrócenia” (2021).
Peter Schallenberg – studies in philosophy and theology in Paderborn and Rome,

after graduation in Rome in 1991 pastoral activity, 1997 – 2005 director of the
Social Institute of the Archdiocese of Paderborn “Kommende” in Dortmund,
habilitation in 2003 in Münster, 2004 – 2009 professor of moral theology in Fulda,
since 2008 professor of moral theology and ethics at the Theological Faculty
of Paderborn and since 2010 also director of the “Catholic Social Institute” in
Mönchengladbach, since 2019 Consultor at the Dicastery for Promoting Integral
Human Development.
Sławomir Sowiński – Doctor of Science (dr hab.) in the field of political

science, teaching Professor at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw.
Publications: Dobra Nowina w czasach „dobrej zmiany”. Kościół katolicki w sferze
publicznej współczesnej Polski w latach 2015-2018, Warszawa 2021; Boskie, cesar-
skie, publiczne. Debata o legitymizacji Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce w sferze
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publicznej w latach 1989-2010, Warszawa 2012; Ile Kościoła w polityce, ile polityki
w Kościele (red. razem z P. Burgoński), Katowice 2009; Religia i konserwatyzm:
sprzymierzeńcy czy konkurenci? (red. razem z P. Mazurkiewicz), Wrocław 2004.
Publishing also in „Rzeczpospolita” and „Więź”.
Mariusz Sulkowski – Ph.D., associate professor at the Institute of Political Science

and Public Administration, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw. He
graduated from the faculties of Social Policy (2006) and European studies (2009)
at the Warsaw University. The author of various works such as Pół wieku diaspory
tureckiej w Niemczech [Half a Century of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany]
(Warszawa 2012), publications dedicated to the issues of multiculturalism in
Europe and the EU’s normative policies for Kosovo. Research interests: Islam in
Europe; European identity; multiculturalism; the relations between religion and
politics; Eric Voegelin’s thought; totalitarianism.
Maria Szymborska – PhD, sociologist, works in project management in

public administration, currently at the Center for Strategic Analyzes. For
almost 6 years, she co-created the team of the Social Challenges Unit of the
University of Warsaw, where she carried out numerous studies and projects for
non-governmental organizations and public administration. She used to work,
among others, with the Institute of the European Network Remembrance and
Solidarity, where she coordinated a research project on youth attitudes towards
totalitarianism.
Piotr Ślusarczyk – PhD – a graduate from Polish studies at Warsaw University,

doctor of humanities specializing in the history of Polish literature. Postgraduate
student at Historical Sciences Department at Kardynał Stefan Wyszyński
University. Author of publications on literature, culture studies and the politics
of religion. Chairman of the European Issues Institute. He specializes in cultural,
social and political impact of political Islam in Europe.
Hernan Tesler-Mabé – received his Ph.D. in History at the University of Ottawa

and teaches in the History, Modern Languages and Literature, and Religious
Studies departments at the University of Ottawa. His research centers on modern
Jewish culture across the Diaspora, with a focus on the intersection of art and
identity. His most recent publication – Mahler’s Forgotten Conductor: Heinz Unger
and his Search for Musical Meaning, 1895-1965 – was published by University of
Toronto Press and was awarded the 2020 Canadian Jewish Literary Award for Best
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Biography. Dr. Tesler-Mabé is President of the Association for Canadian Jewish

Studies and Coordinator of the Vered Jewish Canadian Studies Program at the
University of Ottawa.
Dominique Vermersch – professor of economics and ethics (Institut Agro,

France). He is the rector of the Catholic University of the West (France) since
2012 and Director of the Office of the Holy See for the recognition of academic
degrees. He was the Moderator of the Emmanuel Community between 2000 and
2009. Last published work: La Raison prodigue, revisiter la mission éducative et
universitaire. Editions de l’Emmanuel (2018), https://recherche.uco.fr/user/3012/
publications-chercheur-annee
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The Institute of Political Science and Public Administration

Scientific Advisory Board:

Subject editors: Mariusz Sulkowski, Ph.D., Michał Kmieć

Chair of the Political Theory and Political Thought

Graphics and cover designe:

The original version of the Journal is the English-language printed version.

Laura Chamberland and Hernan Tesler-Mabé reflect on the lack of significant

Wojciech Roszkowski presents the beginnings of the Catholic Church in the

Rev. Professor Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.

Migration policy and human rights

Rev. Bruno-Marie Duffe

Laura Chamberland and Hernan Tesler-Mabé

Reviews and discussions

Biographical note 266

Christian Minorities Returning

prawo i politykę dotyczącą możliwości powrotu, uwzględniając międzynarodowe

1. The Right to Return

embodied in Article 12 ICCPR, which, however, can be limited under

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

2. Addressing the Challenges Faced by Christian Minorities in Iraq

2.1. The Issue of Property Restitution and Reconstruction

Reconstruction Committee 2017]. The assessment made by Aid to the Church

2.2. Long Term Safety and Security

See: [Rasche 2017].

2.3. Access to Justice

2.4. Protecting the Rights of Minorities

Indeed, it is crucial to recognise that religious minorities have faced discrimina-

Bosnia Precedent?, Michigan Journal of International Law 1129.

Rev. Bruno-Marie Duffe

To Receive the Other, to Receive God,

Abstrakt: Zjawisko migracji stając się coraz częstszym doświadczeniem Europy

1. The Christian theological approach as a means for the social understanding

In our Christian theology of creation, which is a memory and a celebration of

2. When Jesus approaches Bartimaeus

3. Hospitality as a dialogue gives its complete signification to mutual hospitality.

The symbol of this mutual hospitality is to be seen in the promise of fertility in

5. The experience of mutual hospitality founds and opens a community for

Il we found a pastoral theology on the principle of dignity, we keep memory of the

6. Human rights as common duties

7. Hope offered to the hopeless

“In the Christian conception of the messianic mediation about time

upon the circumstances of a human community, in our modern (post-modern?)

To protect is to consider the other as a member of our family, as a member of

To promote is to encourage, to open the possibilities and to trust the capacities of

Germany. Geopolitics of Migration:

Abstrakt: Niniejszy artykuł opisuje niemieckie podejście do kryzysu migracyj-

International migration occurs whenever people change their state of residence.

On the factors and concepts of international migration, cf. [Dumont 2018].

Act One: Weak signals

In Germany, Alfred Sauvy’s thought that indifference to demographic issues is

Act Two: Syrian despair and geopolitical exploitation by Turkey

In 2015, the despair of Syrians is exacerbated by the Palmyra affair. Certainly,

By using, especially in 2015, refugees as weapons [Dumont 2015b], i.e. as a means

Act Three; generosity or opportunity?

In the summer of 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel, invoking the humanitarian

Following the decision of 5 September, the already significant number of daily

Act Four: an outflow but lasting impacts

This decrease in the number of asylum seekers is explained by three sets of

and elsewhere, not to mention the problems linked to integration of migrants

Germany is a law-abiding society and is committed to respecting its legal system.

Accordingly, the decline in asylum applications and immigration flows in

Act Five: the outcome: a dire atmosphere

Biographical note 266

1. The Christian theological approach as a means for the social understanding

5. The experience of mutual hospitality founds and opens a community for

3. Mitigation of risk of human rights violations in the migrant smuggling market

1) „Diverse and constantly evolving, of which differences, debates and disputes

5) limiting the debate on intolerance and discrimination against Muslims to an