Identity in Childhood and Adolescence
Tsing A L 1993 In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality
in an out-of-the-way Place. Princeton University Press, Prin-
ceton, NJ
T. M. Luhrmann
Identity in Childhood and Adolescence
Identity will be discussed as an individual psycho-
logical characteristic. In its broadest sense, identity
refers to a person’s sense of continuity with the past
that constitutes the foundation for a meaningful
personal and social present, which, in turn, suggests
directions for their future. The theorist in the latter
part of the twentieth century who is most closely
associated with the concept of identity is Erik Erikson
(1980). In fact, a recent biography of Erikson
(Friedman 1999) is entitled Identity’s Architect. The
most widely used research paradigm developed to
study Erikson ’s ideas empirically is the identity status
model developed by Marcia et al. (1993). Both
Erikson’s psychosocial developmental theory and
Marcia’s identity statuses are located within the
general context of psychodynamic (ego psycho-
analytic) theory. This contextual placement is es-
pecially useful because it establishes identity as a
developmental structural concept having implications
for later adult psychosocial development as well as
historical roots in earlier psychosocial periods. The
theorists, in addition to Erikson, who speak most
directly to the childhood conditions necessary to the
establishment of a sense of identity are John Bowlby,
Heinz Kohut, and Margaret Mahler. This discussion
of identity will be presented within the context of these
theories as well as the empirical work of Marcia and
colleagues.
1. Identity Described from an Eriksonian
Position
Erikson’s psychosocial developmental theory is based
upon the epigenetic principle that certain ego abilities
will develop in a predictable stage sequence given an
‘average expectable environment.’ He views identity as
the stage-specific task of adolescence. Although he has
offered different definitions of identity at different
times, a comprehensive one is:
The integration now taking place in the form of the ego
identity is more than the sum of the childhood identifications.
It is the inner capital accrued from all of those experiences of
each successive stage, when meaningful identification led to a
successful alignment of the individual’s basic dri!es with his
endowment and his opportunities. In psychoanalysis we ascribe
such successful alignments to ‘ego synthesis’ … (Erikson 1959,
p. 94, italics in original)
and identity refers to ‘a conscious sense of indi!idual
identity; … an unconscious striving for a continuity of
personal character; … as a criterion for the silent
doings of ego synthesis; and, finally, as a maintenance
of an inner solidarity with a group’s ideals and identity
(Erikson 1980, p. 109; italics in original).
The period following puberty and before young
adulthood is seen as a time when individual needs
(e.g., to be independent, to be sexually expressive) and
abilities (e.g., physiological maturity, cognitive soph-
istication) articulate with societal demands (e.g., to
begin to put away childhood, to prepare for an
occupation), and rewards (e.g., granting of increasing
autonomy, offering rewarding occupational niches
and relevant education!training). It is at this point in
the life cycle that the individual is expected to begin to
leave the childhood position of ‘one who is given to
and who takes’ to ‘one who is to give to, and be
responsible for, others.’ A crucial shift in ideological
perspective is required to navigate this transition. This
is one of the reasons that Erikson emphasized the
importance to identity of an ideology, a kind of theory
of oneself and one’s social outlook: a weltanschauung.
Childhood worldviews are not serviceable in adult life,
and adolescence constitutes the period of transition
between the two. Besides ideology, another area of
importance in identity formation in adolescence is
occupational choice. Making decisions about this area
involves adolescents’ inner self-examination of their
competencies, wishes, and goals and their outer
exploration of available rewarding social contexts.
Therefore, one might say that an adolescent is con-
structing an identity when he or she is exploring
alternatives and establishing commitments in the life
areas of ideology and occupation. Some of the
childhood constituents whose development is necess-
ary to identity formation are described next.
2. Childhood Antecedents to Identity
2.1 Eriksonian View
From an Eriksonian psychosocial developmental per-
spective (Erikson 1980), the childhood precursors to
the development of identity are the more or less
successful resolution of preceding psychosocial stages.
These involve the formation of predominant senses of
basic trust (from infancy), autonomy (from early
childhood), initiative (from play age), and industry
(from school age). Basic trust (vs. mistrust) refers to
the infant’s sense that the world (and, hence, oneself)
is trustworthy and largely benevolent and predictable.
A sense of autonomy (vs. shame, doubt) is formed as
one modifies one’s will (in areas such as toilet-training
and locomotion) to coincide with the demands of
significant socializing figures in such a way that an
eventual feeling of justice is attained. During the
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Identity in Childhood and Adolescence
periods of trust and autonomy, a self-structure (de-
scribed in Sect. 2.2) is also being formed. Initiative
involves the harnessing of previously developed auton-
omy in early childhood to the planning and completion
of projects, both physical and interpersonal (viz.,
oedipal). Initiative is a crucial component in the ability
to ‘play,’ both by oneself and with others. The
immediate psychosocial precursor to identity is a sense
of industry which springs from the child’s experience
of self as a competent worker with peers and teachers
in school. As each psychosocial stage’s challenge is
met and resolved in an essentially positive manner,
these accrued ego strengths furnish the adolescent
with the psychological foundations to resolve suc-
cessfully the identity issue of adolescence. Failure to
optimally resolve earlier stages jeopardizes, but does
not obviate, identity development, because every stage
is assumed to occur in some form at every other stage.
A particular psychosocial stage is not just resolved or
unresolved once and for all time. Hence, all of the
stage issues preceding identity recur at adolescence
and there is an opportunity for their reresolution.
However, because the adolescent must now face not
only the present issue of identity but past ones as well,
it is necessary to provide the person with a better-than-
average expectable environment in the form of psycho-
therapy, counseling, or special programs aimed at
enhancing psychosocial development.
2.2 Object Relational Perspecti!e
Object relations theory is that branch of psycho-
dynamic thought that focuses on relationships being
more crucial to personality development than are
individual drives and abilities (see Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983). Here, the important identity-preceding
structure is the self, a personality structure formed out
of interpersonal interactions. The view of the de-
velopment of the self presented here combines the
thought of Bowlby (1982), Mahler et al. (1975), and
Kohut (1977). The self is formed in infancy and early
childhood (up to four years of age) out of the
internalized and ‘metabolized’ interactions between
the child and significant other persons (sometimes
called ‘self-objects’). Although the origins of the self lie
in self-other interchanges, the self is experienced as
one’s own, and one comes to sense one’s existence as
both a separate and interdependent being. The con-
ditions necessary for the establishment of a self include
an initial period of undifferentiated symbiosis
(Winnicott’s ‘dual unity’) with a mothering!caregiving
figure, differentiation from that figure, attachment to
the caregiver and other significant objects, exploratory
back and forth movements from the attachment figure,
and eventual individuation as the self–other inter-
actions become internalized and take the form of a
secure self. Concurrent with, and following, the
establishment of a self are conditions, described by
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Kohut (1977), that promote the maintenance and
enhancement of that self. These are the presence of
several kinds of ‘self-objects,’ namely ‘mirroring’ (an
object who reflects the infant’s ambitious grandiosity),
‘idealizing’ (an object who can be admired, identified
with, and whose strength can be shared), and twinship’
(a ‘best friend,’ a companion of one’s heart). These
self-objects continue to be important to self-main-
tenance and enhancement throughout the life cycle.
2.3 Classical Psychoanalytic Approach
The important identity-preceding structure described
by classical psychoanalytic theory is the superego
(Freud [1933] 1964). This personality structure is
assumed to be formed at about five to seven years of
age and is based upon internalizing the values of
parental figures in order to defend against experiencing
negative feelings occasioned by fear of punishment or
of loss of love. The conscience aspect of the superego
reflects parental prohibitions: what one ought not to
feel, be, or do. The ego ideal portion of the superego is
composed of parental aspirations: what one should
feel, be, or do. Hence, the superego provides an
internalized ‘parent,’ experienced as oneself, that is a
source of guilt and shame, as well as a source of self-
esteem. It is especially the ego ideal portion of the
superego that undergoes modification during the
identity formation process of adolescence. During this
period, which may be seen as a second differentiation
phase (Blos 1967), adolescents may substitute con-
temporary popular figures (e.g., sports or music stars)
or literary or scientific heroes for original ego ideal
parental introjects in efforts to become their own
persons, rather than, or in addition to, being only their
parents’ child.
2.4 Summary of Perspecti!es
In summary, there are three important personality
structures posited by different branches of psycho-
dynamic theory, each taking form at different points in
the individual life cycle. The self (an object relational
concept) is formed in infancy and early childhood out
of the internalized and transmuted interactions be-
tween the individual and important self-objects. The
superego (a classical psychoanalytic concept) is de-
veloped during play age and is based upon the
internalization of parental prohibitions and aspira-
tions. An identity (an ego psychoanalytic concept) is
formed during adolescence and is indicated by self-
and environmental exploration and eventual com-
mitment in significant life areas. A self establishes that
one is; a superego determines how one should be; an
identity is a statement of who one is. A self and a
superego are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions
for the formation of an identity.

3. Empirical Work: The Identity Statuses
The four identity statuses (Marcia et al. 1993) are ways
in which a late adolescent might be found to be dealing
with the identity issue. They are intended to reflect, on
a behavioral level, the nature of the identity structure
described by Erikson. Criteria for determining the
identity statuses are the presence or absence of
exploration and commitment in the areas of occu-
pation, ideology, and interpersonal values. Identity
status is typically assessed by means of a structured
interview scored with a standardized manual, although
sometimes a questionnaire is used. ‘Identity achieve-
ment’ persons have undergone a period of exploration
and have made ideological, occupational, and inter-
personal value commitments. ‘Moratorium’ individ-
uals are currently in the exploration period, actively
searching among alternatives. When this exploration
process becomes emotionally fraught, these kinds of
moratoriums are described as being in an ‘identity
crisis.’ ‘Foreclosure’ persons are those who are com-
mitted in the interview content areas, but who came to
those commitments with little or no exploration;
usually, they have adopted directions laid down for
them by parents or other early authority figures.
‘Identity diffusions’ persons are uncommitted in im-
portant life directions and are not currently engaged in
a process leading to commitment (as are the morator-
iums).
Over 35 years of research has established empirically
some of the following characteristics of the four
identity statuses. Identity achievement individuals
have been found to be resistant to experimental
attempts to raise or lower their self-esteem, to be
nonconforming to group pressure, to think effectively
under stressful conditions, to employ the higher levels
of moral reasoning, to be advanced in intimacy
development, to be complex in thought processes, and
to come from families where differences among mem-
bers are acknowledged and accepted. In addition, they
appear to have a strong and autonomous sense of self,
are capable of secure attachment relationships, and
are realistically high in self-esteem and relatively
unimpeded by rigid superego strictures.
Moratorium persons, like identity achievements,
are relatively stable in self-esteem and not easily moved
to conform. Sometimes their level of cognitive per-
formance exceeds that of achievements and they tend
to function at the highest levels of moral thought.
Occasionally, they vacillate between harsh self-judg-
ment and lax self-permission. They are the lowest
among the statuses in their endorsement of auth-
oritarian values, probably reflective of their attempts
to differentiate themselves from their parents. Their
relationships with their families are ambivalent, and
they tend to be somewhat insecure in their attachment,
at least for the duration of their moratorium period.
Foreclosure individuals are the least cognitively
flexible of the statuses and the most highly endorsing
Identity in Childhood and Adolescence
of authoritarian values, suggesting a relatively unmod-
ified ego ideal. They employ conventional reasoning
about moral issues and either acquiesce superficially
to, or stubbornly resist, positions discrepant from
their own. In relationships, they give the appearance,
but not the substance, of intimacy. They describe their
families in unrealistically ideal terms. In terms of
attachment, they are about evenly divided between
secure and insecure attachment patterns.
Identity diffusion persons are vulnerable to self-
esteem manipulation and become disorganized in their
thinking when under stress. They are at the lower
levels of both moral reasoning and capacity for
intimacy. Diffusions experience a marked distance
between themselves and their parents, especially the
parent of the same sex, whom they feel that they can
neither emulate nor please. It is not surprising, then,
that they are the most insecure in attachment among
the statuses.
It should be kept in mind that most of the studies
that have furnished the above findings have involved
the use of the identity status interview, have been done
in Western, technologically advanced countries, and
most of them have involved college students. However,
there have recently been a fairly large number of
studies being conducted in developing countries and
with other social classes and ethnic group, especially
by Jean Phinney and her colleagues (see Roberts et al.
1999). Whether or not the foregoing descriptions of
the identity statuses will obtain with these noncollege
groups remains to be seen. One might expect, for
example, a foreclosure individual to appear differently
in a culture that prizes foreclosure than in one valuing
exploration and change. In any case, the interview
method would provide more flexibility in such invest-
igations than the more static questionnaire measure.
4. Identity De!elopment in Adulthood
While identity is first consolidated at late adolescence,
this is only the initial identity. An identity can be
expected to undergo successive transformations at
least with each life cycle stage (see Kroger 2000).
Hence, the identity serviceable to the late adolescent
will probably be reformulated in early adulthood
when intimacy is the primary psychosocial concern.
Another change can be expected in middle adulthood
around issues of generativity. Finally, integrity at old
age poses perhaps the greatest challenge to the
reconstruction and maintenance of an identity in the
face of necessary physical, mental, and interpersonal
losses. The processes by which identity changes in
adulthood appear similar to those described by Piaget
(1972) to account for changes in cognitive structure:
assimilation, disequilibration, and accommodation
(Whitbourne and Connolly 1998). An identity assimi-
lates experiences so long as they are comprehensible
within the identity structure. When they can no longer
7161
Identity in Childhood and Adolescence
be sufficiently accounted for by the individual’s ident-
ity ‘theory,’ a state of disequilibration exists, and a
subsequent accommodation, or change, in identity
structure is called for in order to handle the new
experiences. In a sense, an achieved identity contains
the seeds of its own destruction. Because the identity
was formulated to deal with certain experiences, it
affords some efficiency in experiential processing and
permits one to be aware of new experiences previously
not within awareness. The growing awareness of
experiences not assimilable in the current identity
leads eventually to the disequilibration of that identity
(a moratorium period) and to the necessity of formu-
lating a new one (achievement). As life experiences
accumulate in adulthood, prior identities are modified
and made more serviceable. These achievement-
moratorium-achievement (MAMA) cycles (Stephen et
al. 1992) are not undertaken by all persons. There are
some who foreclose at adolescence and, by means of
employing defensive processes, or by remaining in
foreclosing settings, never experience disequilibration
and identity reformulation. Also, identity diffusions
may drift through life taking on, superficially, what-
ever identities are provided to them by their environ-
ments. The assumption in identity theory is that
MAMA cycles are probably the most developmentally
adaptive trajectories.
Research has shown some relationships between
identity development and the resolution of adult
psychosocial stages following adolescence. Achieve-
ments and moratoriums are more advanced in in-
timacy than are foreclosures and diffusions (Marcia et.
al. 1993). Persons who are resolving positively the
generativity issues of middle age look very much like
identity achievements; and those who are having
difficulty here appear much like foreclosures and
diffusions (Bradley and Marcia 1998). Persons charac-
terized as integrated at old age are more likely to be
identity achieved than those not so integrated. (Hearn
et al.) Thus far, however, all studies involving linkages
between identity and preceding or succeeding psycho-
social stages have employed simultaneous measure-
ment. Except for research within the identity
development period (approximately ages 13–23), there
is no longitudinal research linking earlier stages
with identity for the same individuals.
5. Criticism and Suggestions for Further
Research
Both the Eriksonian approach to identity, as an
individual personality variable, and the identity status
approach to the study of Eriksonian ego identity have
not been without their critics. Some theorists see
society constructing individuals’ identities, rather than
individuals’ constructing their own identities out of
social givens (e.g., Gergen and Gergen 1997). These
critics, though, have difficulty in explaining individual
7162
differences in identity content and process within the
same culture. Some writers have questioned the degree
to which the identity statuses fully represent Erikson’s
ideas (e.g., Cote and Levine 1988, but see also
Waterman 1988). However, these critics overlook the
substantial nomological network of studies that have
actually yielded accrued meaning to both the identity
statuses and to Erikson’s identity construct. Similar to
any scientific construct, the identity status paradigm is
a ‘work in progress.’ Yet, it remains the predominant
method for studying the development of ego identity
in adolescence.
There is a clear need for longitudinal studies on a
developmental theory such as Erikson’s. This includes
tracing, empirically, the childhood antecedents of
adolescent identity as well as the transformations of
identity throughout the life cycle. What are the
necessary childhood conditions for identity formation
at adolescence? What does identity look like at
adulthood, at old age? In addition, now that we have
some validated measures of the adult psychosocial
stages we can be more specific about identity develop-
ment’s impact on their resolution. Is identity forma-
tion at adolescence a necessary condition for, say,
generativity at middle adulthood? Additional areas of
research concern include the impact of social con-
ditions on identity formation. What kinds of social
contexts foster or restrict identity development at
adolescence? How does identity differ cross-culturally?
Who one is, to oneself and to others, is a lifetime
project and a singularly cherished accomplishment
and possession. Human history is replete with stories
of persons and nations willing to go to any lengths to
preserve or establish their own identities. What is
significant about Erikson’s approach to identity, in
addition to the richness of his description, is that he
locates its initial formulation within the individual
lifecycle as the specific developmental task of ado-
lescence, to be continued by means of successive
reformulations throughout adulthood.
See also: Europe: Sociocultural Aspects; Everyday
Life, Anthropology of; Food in Anthropology; Gen-
ealogy in Anthropology; Identity and Identification:
Philosophical Aspects; Personal Identity: Philosophi-
cal Aspects; Self-development in Childhood; Self-
evaluative Process, Psychology of; Self-knowledge:
Philosophical Aspects; Self-monitoring, Psychology
of; Self-regulation in Childhood
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Copyright ! 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Identity Movements
The main objective of social movements is to trans-
form society so as to reflect the social actors’ interests
and view of the world. Such was the case with the labor
movement in the early twentieth century and the
decolonization movement in the 1960s (see Social
Mo!ements, History of: General and Social Mo!e-
ments: Resource Mobilization Theory; Chazel 1992,
Oberschall 1983). The identity movements that came
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
Identity Mo!ements
to the fore in the last third of the twentieth century are
of a different nature, because they express two comp-
lementary types of collective demands: (a) the defense
of interests and the promotion of rights of certain
groups of individuals who feel discriminated against,
and (b) the search for symbolic recognition by a
significant other.
Identity movements defend the interests, world
visions, and values of groups of individuals or com-
munities defined by such characteristics as phenotype
(or race) and ethnicity; sex; language; sexual orien-
tation; mythical origins and ancestral territory, in the
case of First Nations in the Americas and the South
Pacific; and religion, in the case of certain societies.
Melucci (1989) even posits that all social movements
have an identity dimension (on the link between social
movements and identity, see Jasper 1997, Larana et al.
1994).
Identity movements have three main and very
distinct objectives. First, they denounce injustice
toward minorities. Second, they convey the idea that
specific cultures must be taken into consideration
when public policies are elaborated so that they meet
the specific needs of minorities. Third, they demand
greater control of their institutions—a demand that
sometimes goes as far as self-government.
Individuals involved in identity movements pro-
mote their own interests (Olson 1965) based on their
way of seeing things and their personal knowledge and
values. Their action is therefore marked by instru-
mental, cognitive, and axiological rationales. Boudon
and Bourricaud (1982!2000) have shown that the two
dimensions of collective behavior described by Smelser
(1962), relation with norms and relation with values,
are so closely linked as to become interdependent. The
shared values of the members of a group or community
play a central role in emerging identity movements, at
least as important as the pursuit of individual interests.
This article will specify what should be understood
by identity, define the characteristics of different types
of identity movements, and discuss the relationship
between the universal and particularistic norms which
are specific to each movement.
1. Identity
In the early twentieth century, identity was often
defined according to ‘objective’ traits, such as English
tenacity, German discipline, and French ingenuity.
What we now call identity was then known as the ‘soul
of peoples’ (see Siegfried 1950). Today, the problem of
identity is no longer seen in this light (see Social
Identity, Psychology of ).
It is no longer possible to separate personal and
collective identities. Individuals now belong to several
social networks and groups, which, in turn, shape their
identity, and they draw from society the elements that
they need for self-definition. Today, they are faced
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